C.

Citizenship

Valles v. Commissioner

FACTS:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian
mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she
later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as
a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her
disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time,
what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United
States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy
Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899
and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By
virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter,
herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as
basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to
her possession of dual citizenship.
In re: Vicente Ching

FACTS: Vicente D. Ching, legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay,
a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided
in the Philippines.

After having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, Ching filed
an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, he was allowed to take
the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine
citizenship. On November 1998, he submitted the important documents in compliance with the said
resolution.

During the 1998 Bar Examinations, Ching was one of the successful examinees but he was not allowed to
take the oath because of his questionable citizenship status. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, he
was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

In their comment, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.

Ching then filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship
and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999.

ISSUE: Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time."

RULING: The Court holds that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen
(14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his
intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of
electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly
not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of
election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate
right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result this
golden privilege slipped away from his grasp. Therefore, the Court Resolves to DENYVicente D. Ching's
application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

Go, Sr. v. Ramos

Facts:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit[9] for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go
alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents
himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not
so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese.” Luis argued that although
it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the
document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten
while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout,
Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with
the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport
from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,verring that the complaint for deportation initiated
by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business
dealings.

Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a
natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and
Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.

In resolution dated Feb. 14 2001, Associate Comm. Linda L. Malinab Hornilla dismissed the complaint for
deportation against Jimmy.

On March 8 2001, The Board of Commissioner reversed the decision. Their contention is that Carlos
election of citizenship was made out of time.

The board issued a decision dated April 17 2002 for apprehension and deportation of Jimmy Go to
China.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC but was denied by the said court.

They questioned the said decision and filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of appeals. The petition
was granted.

Their motion for reconsideration was denied at Bureu of immigration.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.

RULING:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention
is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a
person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for
even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4[98] of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application.[99]

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a
petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or
the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party
sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term “court” in this context includes
quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[100] Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be
assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for
deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts
have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law
authorizing it.[101]

Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his
deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to
continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and
academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other arguments advanced by
respondents regarding the same subject.

Tecson v. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

FPJ was a candidate for presidential election. However his qualification was questioned, specifically he
being a natural born Filipino Citizen. Petitioner herein contended that FPJ, being an illegitimate son of an
alleged Filipino Citizen and an America Citizen could have not acquired that Citizenship og his father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not FPJ is a natural born citizenship.

HELD:

In arriving at the answer whether or not FPJ is a natural born citizen, the Supreme Court reviewed the
following instances:

The citizenship of the father and the grand father of FPJ.

The constitutional provision existing at the time the father of FPJ acquired his citizenship from the
former's father, the grand father of FPJ.

The Supreme court held that,t he the constitutional provision applicable in finding out the answer is the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902.

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects
on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."

Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines,
and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a
native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who
obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.

Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.

"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

"The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Bengzon III v. HRET

FACTS:

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On
November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country."

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, Bengzon filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article
VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

The HRET dismissed and declared Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the decision.

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision. Petitioner asserts
that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by
repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he
was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and
inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
ISSUE:

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

RULING:

Yes, Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

(1) by naturalization,

(2) by repatriation, and

(3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed
by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire
Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to:

(1) desertion of the armed forces;

(2) services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;

(3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,

(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and

(5) political economic necessity.

Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces
of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
which provides in Section 1 that any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same
with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz
is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover,
or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado
on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of
their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies
within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some
act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Limkaichong v. Commission on Elections

Facts: Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first district of Negros Oriental. Her rival Olivia Paras,
and some other concerned citizens filed a disqualification case against Limkaichong. The latter allegedly
not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born, her father was still
a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichong’s dad. During the pendency of the case, election day came, and votes were cast. Results
came in and Limkaichong won over Paras. Comelec after due hearing, declared Limkaichong as
disqualified. Notwithstanding their proclamation of disqualification, Comelec issued a proclamation
declaring Limkaichong as the winner. This is in compliance with Resolution no. 8062 adopting the
disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution
of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation, filed a petition before the Comelec.

Issue: WON the proclamation done by the Comelec is valid, and WON Comelec should still exercise
jurisdiction over the matter.

Held: The proclamation of Limkaichong is valid. the HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s
proclamation. The SC has invariably held once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath
and assumed office as a member of the House of Rep., the Comelec’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and disqualification ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It
follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the Comelec of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it at the time of proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should
now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET. The use of the word “sole” in Sec.17 Art.
VI of the Constitution and in Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the
electoral tribunal’s jurisdiction over election contest relating to its members.

Maquiling v. Commission on Elections

Republic v. Kamran Karbasi

D. Suffrage

Gallego v. Verra
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte,
which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the
election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification.

Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a school teacher in Catarman,
Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte.In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost.
In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for
the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in
September 1940.

Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in
December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated
that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years.

Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was
elected mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by
choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to
remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that
Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a
teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2)
His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the
election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land
in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He
visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.

The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a
stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."

Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected
with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.
Faypon v. Quirino

FACTS:
Respondent was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur; came to Manila to pursue his studies; went to United
States for the same purpose; returned to the Philippines; and engaged in the newspaper work in Manila,
and Iloilo. When he ran for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, he was proclaimed by the
provincial board of canvassers as the governor. A petition for quo warranto was filed by the petitioner
on the ground of respondent's ineligibility for the said office because of alleged lack of residence. The
petitioner relies on the fact that the respondent registered as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and utterances constitute abandonment or loss of his
residence of origin.

RULING:
NO. The Court ruled out that mere absence from one's residence or origin - domicile - to pursue studies,
engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence.

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures" to improve his lot. When
election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his
native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reason, he may not be absent himself from
the place of his activities; so there he registers as voter. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi
to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus, registration of a voter
in another place has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.

Romualdez v. Regional Trial Court

Facts:

Petitioner Romualdez is a antural-born citizen; the son of Kokoy Romualdez and a niece of Imelda
Marcos. In 1980, he established his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. However, in 1986, during the
days of People Power, relatives of the deposed President (Marcos), fearing for their personal safety, fled
the country. One of them are the Romuladezes – they left the country and sought asylum in the United
States.

However, in 1991, the U.S. Immigration informed them to depart from the U.S. or else they’ll be
deported. Upon receipt of the information, Romuladez went back to the Philippines and did not delay
his return to his residence in Leyte and immediately registered himself as a voter.

In 1992, herein private respondent Advincula filed a petition to exclude petitioner from the list of the
voters alleging that the latter is a U.S. resident, and residency is a qualification for a registered voter.
However, the MTC denied the petition but when the respondent elevated the petition to the RTC, the
appellate court reversed MTC’s ruling and disqualified Romuldez as a registered voter. Hence, this case.
Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to be a registered voter in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte despite his
sudden departure to the U.S?

Ruling:

The Court held that YES, Petitioner is qualified as a registered voter because he is still considered a
resident of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

Stating that, the political situation brought about by people’s Power Revolution must have caused great
fear to the Romualdezes, and as having concern over the safety of their families, their self-exile is
understandable. Moreover, their sudden departure cannot be described as ‘voluntary’ or ‘abandonment
of residence’.

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right; a bounden duty of every
citizen enabling them to participate in the government process to ensure the will of the people.

Nicolas Lewis v. Comelec

Facts:

Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage
under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow
petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the requirement
of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1 year residency.

Ruling:

The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225 may exercise their
right to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189.

Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency requirement in
Section 1 of the same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth to provide a
system wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines are
empowered to vote.

The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189

Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections

FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11
months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in
1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition,
who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her
grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From
then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING
and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she
committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as
candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional
reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features
which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing
99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are
admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born
citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country
where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May
24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual
stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application
to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the
SC.

Social Justice and Human Rights

Calalang v. Williams

Facts: The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30
pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date
of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by
Manila Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer
challenges its constitutionality.

Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringes upon
the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice

Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any
given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither communism, despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces
by the state so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated.

Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights

FACTS:

In July 1990, a “Demolition Notice” was signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners), in his capacity
as an Executive Officer of the QC Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City
Mayor and was sent and received by the private respondents (being the officers and members of the
North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated).
In said Notice, the respondents were given a grace period of 3 days within which to vacate the premises
of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the PRs were informed by petitioner
Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the “People’s Park.”

On July 12 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Ferno, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR
against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter addressed
to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of QC to stop the demolition.

On July 23 1990, the CHR issued an order, directing the petitioners “to desist from demolishing the stalls
and shanties at North Edsa pending resolution of the vendors/squatters’ complaint before the
Commission” and ordered said petitioners to appear before the CHR.

On Aug. 1, 1990, the CHR, in its resolution, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more
than P200k in favor of PRs to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission’s
supervision and again directed the petitioners to “desist from further demolition, with the warning that
violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.”

On Sept. 10, 1990, a motion to dismiss (MD) filed by the petitioners before the CHR questioned CHR’s
jurisdiction. It was stated that the CHR’s authority should be understood as being confined only to the
investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that “the rights allegedly violated not such
rights but privilege to engage in business.”

On Sept. 25 1990, in an order, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition
of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the “order to desist.” Also, petitioners’ MD was
denied. It opined “it was not the intention of the Constitutional Commission to create only a paper tiger
limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it should be considered a quasi-judicial body
with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the PH.”

Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: WON the CHR’s jurisdiction is confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political
rights.

HELD: Yes! The CHR is prohibited from further proceeding with the case filed before it and from
implementing the penalty for contempt.

The CHR was created by the 1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted by then Pres. C. Aquino via
EO 163, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded and superseded the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase “human rights” is so generic a term that any attempt to define
it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate
to an individual’s social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify
the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally
considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

The term “civil rights,” has been defined as referring:

“to those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They include
the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise
defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. It may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a
civil action.”

Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the
right of petition and, in general, the right appurtenant to citizenship.

In the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it apparent that the delegates envisioned a CHR
that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. One of the delegates,
for instance, mentioned such areas as the “(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of
prisoner and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvaging and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious.” In any event, the
delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR’s
scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that “Congress may
provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its recommendation.”

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by PRson a land which is planned
to be developed into a “People’s Park.” More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of QC which,
this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb
can not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have
been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that as
it may, looking at the standards discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are
not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of
the PRs can fall within the compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and political rights”
intended by the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its operational guidelines and
rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court.”
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power “to cite or hold
any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with
the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for contempt,
however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for
contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work.

Carino v. Commission on Human Rights

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure of
public authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their
classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of
Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to
heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were
administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and
temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a
walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed
dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In
the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking
teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the
respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that
while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as
teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier,
upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing
its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have
been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of
their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant
by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

Vinuya v. Executive Secretary

FACTS:

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with
the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in
the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ,
DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers
who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the
Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims
of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims
for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the
respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt
with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five
years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.

Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that
“the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative–‘the political’–departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate,
complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess
the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question
whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government
is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not
to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided
that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against
Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in
foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our
country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which
authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the
Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a
claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the
Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate
or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within
the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a
claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to
diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by
whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting.
Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not
adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national
law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions
remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of
international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term
describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction
should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole,
and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the
former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be
held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense
that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international
norms of equivalent authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SND v. Manalo

FACTS:

Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the
suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and
torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.

Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24,
2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing
petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA
ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and
the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the
present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports
and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision
promulgated by the CA.

HELD:

In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the
Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx
Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by
private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of
respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an
apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These
constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,”
the Court explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008

Razon v. Tagitis

FACTS:

Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor
for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin Kunnong
(Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a
seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong
to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned
from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message
to the latter’s Manila-based secretary, who advised Kunnong to simply wait for Tagitis’ return.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies
and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police
Station. More than a month later, or on December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through
her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander
Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police
(PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional
Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet (collectively referred
to as “petitioners”), with the Court of Appeals (CA). On the same day, the CA immediately issued the
Writ of Amparo and set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008.
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
“enforced disappearance” under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative
arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced
disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed
the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of
Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the
CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and
Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.

On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion
in its Resolution dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.

PERTINENT ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts, i.e. complete in every
detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights, is indispensable in an amparo
petition.

2. Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the petitioner to prove her allegations is
sufficient for the court to grant the privilege of the writ.

3. Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the alleged
enforced disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ.

ANSWERS:

1. No. However, it must contain details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while
presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through
State or private party action.

2. Yes.

3. No.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

1. REQUIREMENTS IN AN AMPARO PETITION

The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts must be read in light of the nature and
purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty – The framers of the Amparo Rule
never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of
a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts
constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this
requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a
situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is
detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the
petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial
concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court
requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition
should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty
and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality,
rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of
the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to
life, liberty or security – are present.

2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AN AMPARO PETITION

Burden of proof of Amparo petitioner – [T]he Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the
substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the
allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then
respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of
course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation
of the victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the
investigating authorities to appropriately respond.

Substantial evidence required in amparo proceedings – The [characteristics of amparo proceedings] –

namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast
to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) –
reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative
proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence
required – the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence – point, too, to
the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent
handling and investigation of extra- judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these
proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form
requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial
evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their
defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an
enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities
to appropriately respond. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations provided the
Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in
administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall
not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards
from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of
a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force.

Minor inconsistencies in the testimony should not affect the credibility of the witness – As a rule, minor
inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to strengthen
their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the
latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts
of a well thought of and prefabricated story.

Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the
evidence we shall take into account. The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of
evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual
rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we
reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at
hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be
admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.

3. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES in relation to THE WRIT OF AMPARO

The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance,
rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability , for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance – [The writ of amparo is] a
protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security.
It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of
action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not
determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have
been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed
to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed
to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.

The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to
evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate
– [T]he unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and
measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures
and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
(Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in
progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through
the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.

The concept of “enforced disappearances” is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction – The
Amparo Rule expressly provides that the “writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.” We note that although the writ specifically covers “enforced
disappearances,” this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the
Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo
Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: x x
x In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives and in
the Senate on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear
textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of
the concerns within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an
elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts. As the law now stands, extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from
the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are
now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature
has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding
penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the
power to enact under the country’s constitutional scheme and power structure. Source of the power of
the Supreme Court to act on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances – Even without the
benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances,
however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to
promulgate “rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts,” since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their
nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals
to life, liberty and security. Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be
very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby
directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights.
To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference – even if only procedurally – in a
situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or
actual violations of constitutional rights.

DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008
under the following terms:

1. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance

covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

2. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the
government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for
the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;

3. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;

4. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible for
the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using
extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court;

5. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the
obligation to disclose information known to him and to his “assets” in relation with the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
6. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further investigation,
periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action;

7. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations,
copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the
first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;

8. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court of
Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter
counted from the finality of this Decision;

The abovementioned directives and those of the Court of Appeals’ made pursuant to this Decision were
given to, and were directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine
National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from the
Supreme Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the
extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand.

Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, the
aforementioned directives – particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA – are specific to
this case and are not standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.

The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General
Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-
Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City.