Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Christopher Peterson
Death by Discourse
I took it that the addition of “Judy” was an effort to dislodge me from the
more formal “Judith” and to recall me to a bodily life that could not be
theorized away. . . . If I persisted in this notion that bodies were in some
way constructed, perhaps I really thought that words alone had the
power to craft bodies from their own linguistic substance? Couldn’t
someone simply take me aside? (x)
Although Butler goes to great lengths to show how the body always
“escape[s]” and “eludes its capture” by language, is not this threat
of the body’s dissolution, its full and final subsumption into lan-
guage, precisely the nihilistic possibility that this and other texts
rehearse over and over again, if only to win for the body a sense of
triumph over death? (HCD 4, 18). Responding in another context
to the paranoid conditionality of sentences that begin “‘If real bod-
ies do not exist . . .’” Butler writes: “The sentence begins as a warn-
ing against an impending nihilism, for if the conjured content of
these series of conditional clauses proves to be true, then, and
there is always a then, some set of dangerous consequences will
surely follow” (Benhabib 35). Writing in the wake of the de Man
scandal, the effort to counter this familiar caricature is under-
standable. But when does the effort to refute the caricature—post-
structuralism = nihilism—end up disavowing death, indeed, put-
ting in place the very metaphysics of presence that deconstruction,
in particular, has sought to displace? Does the charge of nihilism
always have to be answered by insisting on poststructuralism as “life
affirming”? According to the charge of nihilism, negativity leads to
consequences so dangerous that we cannot possibly look it in the
face. Or as the refrain often goes in contemporary identity politics:
the socially dead cannot afford, at this historical moment, when
they are just now emerging from the shadows of abjection, to dwell
with the negative, when as figures of death, that has been the only
space that they have been allowed to inhabit.
Given the polemic surrounding the question of nihilism, then,
how are we to understand the preoccupation with “discursive con-
struction” that haunts Butler’s work? Following from Foucault, her
use of the term “discourse” would appear to bear a set of meanings
that line up quite neatly with those of the French philosopher.
“Discourse” in Foucault is not only language, but carries the mul-
tiple valences of power, disciplinarity, institutionality, regulation,
and idealization. Although her texts clearly exploit these multiple
meanings, above all discourse comes to name something of a
threat to the body. Understanding discourse as anterior to the
Disc 28.2&3Type.qxd 8/7/08 12:27 PM Page 163
designed to allay ours fears that the body might dissolve into lan-
guage, what would happen, we might ask, if the reverse were to
happen? That is, what if language was absorbed into materiality
such that bodies became nothing but material stuff without ideal-
ity, indeed, without any discursive life? That such a question is not
even on the horizon confirms that this argument concerning dis-
cursive construction means to perform a certain risk to bodily life.
According to the tacit logic of this polemic, the possibility of every-
thing becoming nothing but material is so in line with conven-
tional thinking that it cannot even be considered a risk, despite the
possibility that a material world without ideality would be, as War-
ren Montag reminds us, a “material world without anything . . . a
body that has given up the ghost.”23 But if the possibility of a mate-
riality emptied of all idealizations is so remote that we need not
even entertain it as a possibility, the same might be said of its corol-
lary. Who actually thinks that the body is or might become nothing
but language? According to the preface of Bodies That Matter, there
would appear to be many people who fear this nihilistic conclu-
sion. And it is precisely the hysteria spawned by this terrifying
prospect that this argument seems compelled to assuage. The sub-
text of this argument appears to be the following: “Do not be
afraid (of poststructuralism)—the body still lives.”
We know, of course, that the body lives on beyond its
encounter with discourse-as-the-threat-of-death because it returns
four years after the publication of Bodies That Matter in the reading
of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic from The Psychic Life of Power that
I have already discussed, and in the essay, “How Can I Deny That
These Hands and This Body Are Mine?” In the latter, Butler anec-
dotally invokes the figure of her own sleep-deprived body, having
risen from a bad dream only to find herself as the tacit object of
criticism on television’s C-Span. As she relates the anecdote, femi-
nist historian Elizabeth Fox-Genovese commented to an inter-
viewer that she disliked the feminist view that “no stable distinction
between the sexes could be drawn or known, a view that suggests
that the difference between the sexes is itself culturally variable or,
worse, discursively fabricated, as if it is all a matter of language.”
She continues: “Of course, this did not help my project of falling
asleep, and I became aware of being, as it were, a sleepless body in
the world accused, at least obliquely, with having made the body
less rather than more relevant” (1). Accused, once again, of having
negated the body as an object of intellectual inquiry, she nonethe-
less awakens to the experience of her own insomnolent body,
called back from the dead of sleep. She responds to this call to
return not only to “the body” in general, but indeed, to her own,
Disc 28.2&3Type.qxd 8/7/08 12:27 PM Page 165
sion, the Butlerian comedy of the Body, is thus none other than
negativity as resource, as that “magic power that converts the nega-
tive into being” (Écriture 381, Phenomenology 93). Speaking of
Hegel’s Spirit in a manner that in turn describes the travails of the
body in her own work, Butler writes:
What seems like tragic blindness turns out to be more like the comic
myopia of Mr. Magoo whose automobile careening through the neigh-
bor’s chicken coop always seems to land on all four wheels. Like such
miraculously resilient characters of the Saturday morning cartoon,
Hegel’s protagonists always reassemble themselves, prepare for a new
scene, enter the stage armed with a new set of ontological insights—and
fail again. As readers, we have no other narrative option but to join in
this bumpy ride, for we cannot anticipate this journey without embark-
ing on it ourselves.27
Precarious Bodies
On the one hand, the other may be another version of the same, in one
way assimilable, comprehensible, able to be appropriated and understood.
On the other hand, the other may be truly and radically other. In the lat-
ter case the other cannot be turned into some version of the same.30
Notes
1 Sharon Holland, Raising the Dead: Readings of Death and (Black) Subjectivity
ledge, 1991), 3.
3 Edgar Allan Poe, The Tell-Tale Heart and Other Writings by Edgar Allan Poe (New
France, 1967), 108, 60. While Derrida does not use the term “spectrality” in this
early text, his analysis of the absence that speech always implies anticipates the
vocabulary of his later work.
5 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State
Interview With Judith Butler,” in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 23.2
(1998): 281.
11 Martha Nussbaum, “The Professor of Parody: The Hip Defeatism of Judith
Butler,” in The New Republic, February 22, 1999; and Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject:
The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (New York: Verso, 2000). See also Jordana
Rosenberg, “Butler’s ‘Lesbian Phallus’; or What Can Deconstruction Feel?” GLQ 9:3
(2003): 393-414. For a particularly powerful reading of Butler’s adherence to a
metaphysics of presence, see Peggy Kamuf, “The Other Sexual Difference,” in Book
of Addresses. For an analysis of current scholarship’s amnesia of deconstruction, see
Herman Rapaport, The Theory Mess: Deconstruction in Eclipse (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2001).
12 Judith Butler, “How Can I Deny That These Hands and This Body Are
Identity and the Resurrection of the Body,” in Critical Inquiry 28 (Summer 2002):
930-974.
15 It is precisely her adherence to a dialectical mode that allows us to observe
a seemingly unlikely and unexpected rapprochement between Butler and those critics
who so strongly oppose poststructuralism. Terry Castle’s The Apparitional Lesbian
would seem to offer an appropriate example given that it takes up the problem of
the spectral only by first opposing itself to poststructuralist theory, and by citing
(but not naming) Butler no less as an example of the dangers of poststructuralism.
Castle elaborates her notion of the lesbian “ghost effect” primarily as it operates as
a trope of absence and invisibility. Understanding the lesbian as having been
“vaporized by metaphor” throughout the modern, Western literary tradition, Castle
insists that “it is time . . . to focus on presence instead of absence, plenitude instead
of scarcity” (19). Making the lesbian present involves looking at “the very image of
negativity” wherein “lies the possibility of recovery—a way of conjuring up, or bring-
ing back into view, that which has been denied. Take the metaphor far enough, and
the invisible will rematerialize, the spirit will become flesh” (7). We could perhaps
not ask for a more neatly transposed, albeit implicit, account of Hegelian negativity
in this claim that what is canceled—here the lesbian—is also conserved and so can
be recovered, made present again. But whereas Hegel would understand being as
that which emerges only via negativity, Castle imagines the ontology of the lesbian
as given prior to the social mechanisms of homophobia that would appear to jeop-
ardize it. There is no room in Castle for “looking the negative in the face, and tar-
rying with it,” to invoke Hegel’s well-known phrase from the preface to the Phe-
nomenology (19). Although she addresses the possibility that the spectral metaphor
can be used in the service of rematerialization, because she understands death in
terms that are both pre-dialectical and non-deconstructive, Castle, I would main-
tain, deprives the lesbian body of its spectrality. Such spectrality would name a
Disc 28.2&3Type.qxd 8/7/08 12:27 PM Page 175
ghostliness irreducible to the social and historical violence that erases the lesbian
from view. Although what we are calling Castle’s pre-dialectical understanding of
corporeality underscores the relation of non-identity that holds between Castle and
Butler, it is not clear that the latter’s dialectical corporealism gets us any farther
beyond the disavowal of the spectral. That is to say that, while she “dwells” with the
negativity of the body, it is only to re-present these bodies, and therefore to exorcise
the political of the spectral. See Terry Castle, The Apparitional Lesbian: Female Homo-
sexuality and Modern Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and G. W.
F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1977). The spectralization of bodies would find leverage in Hegel if it were not for
his positing of being as the emergent possibility of the “work of the negative,” that
is, of being as full presence mediated through a “fight to the death” with the other.
In Kojève’s widely influential reading of Hegel, it is precisely this confrontation with
negativity that characterizes Hegel’s philosophy as a “philosophy of death.” See
Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (Paris: Gallimard, 1947). Accord-
ing to Kojève, Hegel understood that man’s spiritual being could only be attained
by severing spirit from Judeo-Christian theology that posits spirit in a “beyond,” and
not in “man-in-the-world.” Despite his recognition that man, in Kojève’s words, is
“death living a human life,” Hegel nonetheless posits being as ultimately possible
on this earth, an ontological claim anathema to Derrida’s notion of spectrality. Yet
Specters of Marx begins by addressing an “off-screen” voice who says: “I would like to
learn to live finally” (13). Echoing Hegel’s assertion that one must dwell with the
negative, Derrida maintains that this sentence “has no sense and cannot be just
unless it comes to terms with death” (14). Both dialectics and deconstruction, then,
involve a recognition of finitude. But whereas Hegel asserts that Spirit “endures
[death] and maintains itself in it,” which implies the persistence of Spirit as pres-
ence, deconstruction announces the death of being as presence (19).
16 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (New York:
Vintage, 1978).
17 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1976).
18 See Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Rout-
ledge, 1990), 8.
19 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York:
Bohr’s quantum mechanics, which, contrary to classical physics, holds that materi-
ality is “unknowable” in itself, that “no elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon
until it is a registered (observed) phenomenon.” See Arkady Plotnitsky, Complemen-
tarity: Anti-Epistemology After Bohr and Derrida (Durham: Duke University Press,
1994), 101.
21 Jacques Derrida, L’oreille de l’autre: otobiographies, transferts, traductions (Mon-
tréal: VLB Éditeur, 1982), 85.
22 Seyla Benhabib et al, Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange (New York:
25 See Georges Bataille, La part maudite (Paris: Les Éditions de minuit, 1967).
Bataille argues that “The living organism . . . receives in principle more energy than
is necessary for the maintenance of life: the excess energy (the abundance) can be
used in the development of a system (for example, of an organism); if the system
can no longer grow or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed by the growth
of the system, it must lose it without profit, expend it, voluntarily or not” (70). See
also Georges Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice,” trans., Jonathan Strauss, Yale
French Studies 78 (1990): 9-28.
26Jacques Derrida, Écriture et la Différence (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967), 377.
Cited in the text as “Écriture.”
27 Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France
Unconscious (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1993), xiii. See also Reconfigu-
rations: Critical Theory and General Economy (Gainsville: University of Florida Press,
1993).
29 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York:
Verso, 2004).
30 J. Hillis Miller, Others (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 2.
31 Jacques Derrida, Donner la mort (Paris: Galilée, 1999).
32As Philippe Ariès has argued, death is treated almost as an aberration of life
in the U.S. Observing the American practice of embalming, he writes: “To sell
death, one must make it pleasant,” that is, something that is not death (69). Echo-
ing Ariès, Jessica Mitford asserts in her well-known exposé of the American funeral
industry, The American Way of Death, that the undertaker “put[s] on a well-oiled per-
formance in which the concept of death . . . play[s] no part whatsoever. . . . He and
his team . . . score an upset victory over death” (77, her italics). See Phillipe Ariès,
Essais sur l’histoire de la mort en Occident du Moyen Age à nos jours (Paris: Éditions du
Seuil, 1975); and Jessica Mitford, The American Way of Death (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1963).
33 Donald Pease, “The Global Homeland State: Bush’s Biopolitical Settle-
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 14, ed. and trans. James Strachey
(London: Hogarth Press, 1957), 289.
36See Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 1992).
Disc 28.2&3Type.qxd 8/7/08 12:27 PM Page 177
37 See Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination
(New York: Vintage, 1992); Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1982); Harry Levin, The Power of Blackness: Hawthorne,
Melville, and Poe (New York: Alfred Knoff, 1958); and Leslie Fiedler, Love and Death
in the American Novel (New York: Scarborough Books, 1960).
38 Karla Holloway, Passed On: African-American Mourning Stories (Durham: Duke