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G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the
testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and
from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings
rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or
to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the
doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to
which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material
facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27,"
Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased,
was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a
detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August,
19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house
except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of
the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height.
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure
means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but
one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door
and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had
received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the
door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard
no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed
open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy
growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and
called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just
above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In
the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted
by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar,
though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown
back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate,
Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately
wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in
the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who
slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to
bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the
incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant
was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on
friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that
when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his
companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and
gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants
employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at
their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after
the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon
returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the

stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs
and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but
said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he
forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals
suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on
his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the
room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong
believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the
military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty
by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty
prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate,
Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to
do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal
liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the
following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
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(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would
be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of
his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact
a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under
such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such
an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding
defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the
intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness
of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing
upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using
any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking
promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the
first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron."
That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his
charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was
no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant
believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for
the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his
charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be
held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act
for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we
hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always
that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact
is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary
ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder,
malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under
the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even
though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal
Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited;
Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596;
Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only
question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential
element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and
penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given
of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not
specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense
must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may
be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various
definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears
that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to
the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of
crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly
declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that
malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general
rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or
imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to
commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent
than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a
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wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is
criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent"
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference
between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of
them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore,
the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows
by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the
harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime
follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own
nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be
viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by
law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily
unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur
criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different
from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word
"voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent,
and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do
wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary"
implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the
definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of
1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant,
being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1,
p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be
said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually
intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or
imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions
of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime.
(Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that
where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without
fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no
act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral
injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for
example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following
language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the
malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to
cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that,
whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the
appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime
because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which
characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal
negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the
following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or
malice or their absence in the commission of an act defined and punished
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by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the
exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an
essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined
becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are
as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with
malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its
minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple
imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to
their discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty
prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first
paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one
thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words
"criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission
of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent),
negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute
to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful"
sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more
frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the
milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable

excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the
thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not
merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English
and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and
"malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than
"willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word
"malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a
particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification.
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the
definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously"
"with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to
imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will
always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute
a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position
with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in
the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo
animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always;
but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words,
punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be.
And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal
sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be
deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal
system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is
the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine
confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern,
is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims
as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man
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guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus
actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the
like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So
also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to
the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any
respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an
action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of
intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm
judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of
excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard
around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the
public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God
to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did
from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a
person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not
his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the
seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of
bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the
utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as
good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her
immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other
doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that
no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure
from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule
that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without
which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the
same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature
to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their

commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing
these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have
always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of
certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158,
notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been
said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime
exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to
break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact
forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity
therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord
with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia
facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed
offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil
in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always
there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The
guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
(Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54
Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen,
8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is
to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they
appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the
surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in
forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to
believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more
nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without
fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the
homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent
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person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference
to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is
the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear
to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to
be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he
was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of
this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and
on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol
demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief
that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that
his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one
will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be
innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he
would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such
circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the
presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or
assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1
of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person
slain had a felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed
him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it
will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable
homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable
grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart,
Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him,
with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent
menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough
in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head
before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It
turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design
of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more
criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol?
Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must,
before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded
— a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-
defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not
the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle.
(Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by
Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat
analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth,
at night, in company only of his wife, without other light than reflected
from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to
the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know,
who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder,
because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick
with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown
person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him
another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left
the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to
whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who
died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from
the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained
pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his
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sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be
considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-
defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that
he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there
did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and
in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him
to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs.
Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court,
under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the
sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from
behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child,
was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with
which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there
was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a
situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might
endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more
especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended
himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked,
he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which
were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with
which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was
capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the
consteration which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was
not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more
assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might
accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the
accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means
employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal
Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28,
1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was
situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there
was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces,
saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost
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at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at
immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting
different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May
assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been
the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that
was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm
toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief,
just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances,
find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as
day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability
appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence
justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in
calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he
remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p.
136.) The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
at night, by a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his
head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the
delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" —
because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four
individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol
at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same
spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as
having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The
criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a
majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but
not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned
the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide
committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned,

G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z.
Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the
Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the
lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to
an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two
months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this
judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary
Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a
telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo
Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain
Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four
men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio
Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the
Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram
and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to
arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the
telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was
likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked
whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose
morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of
police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in
9
ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he
volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into
two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the
route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When
this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was
then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida
indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with
her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was
very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta
then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32
and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour
already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the
defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned
out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo
Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's
paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene
and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and
to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the
provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot
wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body
which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence,
particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a
different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief
of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room
was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of
Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went
to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he
said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke
up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded,
Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is
Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.

On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering
the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired
at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and
continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that
he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then
apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly
incredible not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate
themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory. Oasis
averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody
in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta
testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed
immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis
assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is
apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to
exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their
mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the
testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea,
Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this,
to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual
recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in
bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that
when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and
considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on
the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her
testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants.
Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that her
version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In
her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were
unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence.
Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the
findings of fact made by the trial court.
10
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room
with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him
simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without
having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question
is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus
caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of
fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that
Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part,
the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the
circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through
specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact,
appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim
is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having
gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out
twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a
robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will
kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been
placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a
kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his
room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man
who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a
spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed
by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol
leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent
danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent
mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused,
having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by
circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they
then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case,
appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances
whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room
being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his

identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if
any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed,
according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for
appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed
not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is
reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily
harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary
force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine
is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force
shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to
any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2).
And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2
Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-
termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but
these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his
arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is
asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in
U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm"
without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited.
We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers
resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent
attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of
notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of
the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and
vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as
here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there
exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind
of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the
11
rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official
actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada,
"para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en
el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse
el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del
agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada
Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil.,
16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54
Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of
weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11,
No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs
no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be
taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise
of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present —
appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting
for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due
performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or
alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have
exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to
be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous
inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the
 12

penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case,
be imposed.

For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared
guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and
accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision
correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the
law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an
indemnity of P2,000, with costs.

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double
Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same
incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with
two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
13
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari
(S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005,
invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s
motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s
absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 4 Seven days later, the MeTC
issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration
but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC
the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit.
Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly
grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No.
2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at
the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of
S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803
constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning
dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC
was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a
judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A.
2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to
be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his
prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in
Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such
crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision
forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the
merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that
light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the
slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage
to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s
motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is
merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his
standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following
his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the
negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803;
and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from
prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
14
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation
of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of
the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency
of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to
review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-
arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its
ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There,
the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death
for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was
thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory
review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8
of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes
more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant
who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule
11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely
renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should
the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains
his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be
convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to
produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso
facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he
failed to attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records.
Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A.
No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which
was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought
reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense"13protects him from, among others, post-
conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that
petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question
whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise,
finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article
365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
15
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed;
if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor
in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging
from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if
done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the
court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should
be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the
defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do
an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in
which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such
help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating
to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and
"negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both
quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in
imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence"
and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize
"the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack
of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish
the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-
offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles
of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct
species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our
penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already
sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of
Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of
punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative
intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them
under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty
structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
16
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind
the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating
only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating
circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for
each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there
would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our
Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would
constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could
range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen
that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual
willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. 18 (Emphasis
supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that
their commission results in damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to
hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction
being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime
conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-
crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal
code) and since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The
contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22that "[r]eckless impudence is
not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been
abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two
decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s
conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are
distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller
found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal
confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article
365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-
crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related
branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses,
barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a
prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but
arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution
was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken
chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with
People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving,"
arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been
dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought
before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of
17
the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently
answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga 26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court
en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per
Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29(promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per
Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per
Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per
Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by
the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila 33 (promulgated
in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the
second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection
under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious
physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the
accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with
both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its
logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of
authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v.
Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the
subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from
the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution
was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence
suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to
rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an
accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior
conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,"
arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of
Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan: 38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the
pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in
the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking
thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now
Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical
18
injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province,
where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second
jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier
stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the
Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated
December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in
not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory
decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner
guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside,
without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act
resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must
perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not
death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a
vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a
motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in
refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s
case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also
involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with
"Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former,
the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we
quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People
v. Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and
dismissed the case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double
jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and
Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with
the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision
between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the
aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other
criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection
with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence
(Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the
collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence
(Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these
two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were
acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal,
Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that
the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he
had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga
was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In
the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed
by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to
the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of
the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the
Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion
of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On
appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case
filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for
multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
19
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the
accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving
under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in
a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had
pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the
Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with
damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was
alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on
appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there
said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation
of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the
offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court
of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second
offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is
whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say
whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to
support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of
the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the
prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions
of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s contention
might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the
accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant,
the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more

serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. 43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and
hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We
declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on
the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the
JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath
said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall
squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of
the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further
elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are
analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage
to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a
delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On
the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the
identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize
conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of
crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device
allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies 46); and (2) when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
20
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will
only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony
but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or
more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine
in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of
imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human
interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models –
that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to
persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or
grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a
quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the
single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the
consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the
scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which
involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one
quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a
light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand,
resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with
the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light
felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts. 49 Expectedly, this is the
approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even
though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original
jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision
correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing"
of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or
less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting
acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a
light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in
which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense
is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution
of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of
their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in
Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a
charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less
serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging
from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property
the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries
there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split
into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x
x.53(Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under
Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this
field demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the
"complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate
offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its
present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz
21
lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate
intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2)
we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-
crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their
number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus
maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365,
articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of
cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the
power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction
between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually
impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more
grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for
committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor
General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge
for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva]
x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution
obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
 22

physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the
inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of
the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are
derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because
the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of
this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157.
We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason
Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on
the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of SO ORDERED.

charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting
acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are
avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to
proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single
charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for
each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of
charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first
level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing
formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying
as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted
belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty
shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized
as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,

G.R. No. L-25366 March 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE BUAN, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Felipe C. Magat and Amado D. Dyoco for accused-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, in its Criminal Case No. 5243 (for serious physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence), overruling a motion to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy.
Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:
The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company on July
23, 1962, along the MacArthur Highway in the municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan.
Allegedly because of his negligence — and recklessness, the vehicle driven by him
struck and collided with the passenger jeep of Sergio Lumidao, damaging said jeep
and causing it to turn turtle, and injuring its passengers. Six of the latter suffered
slight physical injuries requiring medical attendance for 5 to 9 days: three other
riders came out with serious bodily injuries that needed medical attention for 30 to
45 days; while the jeep was damaged to the extent of P1,395.00.
A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto,
for which he was tried and acquitted on December 16, 1963. Prior to this acquittal,
however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of First Instance the
information in the case now before us, for serious physical injuries, and damage to
property through reckless imprudence. Admittedly, both charges referred to the
same highway collision.
23
When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his counsel
moved to quash the charges on the ground that he had already been acquitted of
the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court. The prosecution opposed the
motion and the Court denied the motion quash. Unable to secure reconsideration,
the accused appealed to this Court.
Sole issue before us, therefore, is whether the second case placed the
appellant twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and is barred by the previous
acquittal.
We agree with the appellant that the Court below erred in not dismissing the
information for "serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence," in view of the appellant's previous acquittal by the Justice of the
Peace Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, for the same imprudence.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions. This has been the constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court,
and is also that of this Court in its most recent decisions on the matter.
Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as the result of the
same vehicular accident one man died, two persons were seriously injured while
another three suffered only slight physical injuries, we ruled that the acquittal on a
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, was a bar to another
prosecution for homicide through reckless imprudence. In People vs. Diaz, L-6518,
March 30, 1954, the ruling was that the dismissal by the Municipal Court of a
charge of reckless driving barred a second information of damage to property
through reckless imprudence based on the same negligent act of the accused.

In People vs, Belga, 100 Phil. 996, dismissal of an information for physical injuries
through needless imprudence as a result of a collision between two automobiles
was declared, to block two other prosecutions, one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence and another for multiple physical injuries arising from the
same collision. The same doctrine was reasserted in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669,
April 30, 1959. In none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court regard as material
that the various offenses charged for the same occurrence were triable in Courts of
differing category, or that the complainants were not the individuals.
As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in his Derecho Penal (12th Ed.),
Vol. I, p. 439, has this to say:1äwphï1.ñët
Aun cuando de un solo hecho imprudente se originen males diversos,
como el hecho culposo es uno solo, existe un solo delito de imprudencia.
Esta es jurisprudencia constante del Tribunal Supremo. De acuerdo con
esta doctrinael automovilista imprudente que atropella y causa lesiones a
dos personas y ademas daños, no respondera de dos delitos de lesiones y
uno de daños por imprudencia, sino de un solo delito culposo.
The said author cites in support of the text the following decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain (footnotes 2 and 3).
8 octubre 1887, 18 octubre 1927.
Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte de una persona y
ademas se ocasionan daños, existe un solo hecho punible, pues uno solo
fue el acto, aun cuando deben apreciarse dos enorden a la responsabilidad
civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a consecuencia de un solo acto imprudente se
produjeron tres delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de daños, como todos son
consecuencia de un solo acto culposo, no cabe penarlos por separado, 2
abril 1932.
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This
24
same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs.
Diaz, supra:
... The prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted
the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in
this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the
inferior court.
In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the exoneration of this
appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of
Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the
same offense.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan is directed to quash and dismiss the charge in its Criminal Case
No. 5243. No costs. So ordered.
ALEXANDER PADILLA, Complainant, v. THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, Respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER COURTS AND COURT PERSONNEL;
COMPLAINT AGAINST A JUDGE; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND GROSS
INCOMPETENCE; MANIFEST IN CASE AT BAR. — The respondent judge has shown
gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the
accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must
establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law. The
respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is
not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In
requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the
accused to go scot free. The accused at the time of his apprehension at the Manila
International Airport had in his possession the amount of US$355,349.57 in
assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), without
any specific authority from the Central Bank as required by law.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BOLSTERED BY RELEASE OF US$3,000 TO ACCUSED DESPITE
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS. — He not only
acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his decision the release to the
accused of at least the amount of US$3,000.00, allowed, according to respondent,
under Central Bank Circular No. 960. This, in spite of the fact that forfeiture
proceedings had already been instituted by the Bureau of Customs over the
currency listed in the information, which according to the respondent should be
respected since the Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter
of seizure and forfeiture of the property involved in the alleged infringements of
the aforesaid Central Bank Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No.
960 to justify the release of US$3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge
again displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. There is
nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court
to release the said amount of U.S. Currency to the accused. According to the above-
cited CB Circular, tourists may take out or send out from the Philippines foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in
by them; for the purpose of establishing such amount, tourists or non-resident
25
temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in
other foreign currencies must declare their foreign exchange at points of entries
upon arrival in the Philippines.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — The Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court
Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law
and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and
consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the just and proper
administration of justice and for the attainment of the objective of maintaining the
people’s faith in the judiciary (People v. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it is hereby
ordered that the Respondent Judge be dismissed from the service. All leave and
retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited
with prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of government service,
including government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon,
RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision
due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in
Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Lo Chi Fai",
acquitting said accused of the offense charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency
out of the country.
Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge filed an
Answer, dated October 6, 1987, reciting his "commendable record as a fearless
prosecutor" since his appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila on December 4,
1962, until his appointment eventually as RTC Judge on February 18, 1983; that in
the reorganization of the judiciary after the February 26, 1986 revolution, he was
reappointed to his present position; that his length of service as prosecutor and
 26

judge is "tangible proof that would negate the allegations of the petitioner" (should
be complainant), whereas the latter did not last long in the service for reasons only
known to him; that the decision involved in the complaint was promulgated by
respondent on September 29, 1986, but the complaint against him was filed only on
August 6, 1987, a clear indication of malice and ill-will of the complainant to subject
respondent to harassment, humiliation and vindictiveness; that his decision, of
which he submits a copy (Annex A) as part of his Answer, is based on "fundamental
principles and the foundation of rights and justice" and that if there are mistakes or
errors in the questioned decision, they are committed in good faith. Accordingly,
respondent prays for the dismissal of the petition (should be complaint).
The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in rendering the decision in question. A
judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly or administratively,
for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.
"That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in the City of Pasay, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Mr. LO CHI FAI, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attempt to take out of the Philippines through the Manila International Airport the
following foreign currencies in cash and in checks:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Japanese Yen 32,800,000.00
Swiss Franc SW. FR 6,9000.00
Australian Dollar A$ 17,425.00
Singapore Dollar S$ 9,945.00
Deutsche Marck DM 18,595.00

The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a Canadian Dollar C$ 13,330.00
tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a Customs guard at the Manila International
Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange Hongkong Dollar HK$ 15,630.00
instruments out of the country. Lo Chi Fai was apprehended by a customs guard
and two PAFSECOM officers on July 9, 1986, while on board Flight PR 300 of the HFL Guilder HFL 430.00
Philippine Air Lines bound for Hongkong. At the time of his apprehension, he was
found carrying with him foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments (380 French Franc F/ 6,860.00
pieces) amounting to US$355,349.57, in various currency denominations, to wit:
Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder, French US Dollar US$ 73,950.00
Franc, U.S. Dollar, English Pound, Malaysian Dollar, Deutsche Mark, Canadian Dollar
and Hongkong Dollar, without any authority as provided by law. At the time the English Pound 5,318.00
accused was apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations which
he was supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival in Manila in previous trips, Malaysian Dollar M$ 14,760.00
namely, CB Currency Declaration No. 05048, dated May 4, 1986 for US$39,600.00
and Japanese Yen 4,000,000.00, and CB Currency Declaration No. 06346, dated June in checks)
29, 1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00.
Australian Dollar A$ 7,750.00
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC of Pasay City for violation
of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph British Pound 700.00

US Dollar US$ 17,630.00
Canadian Dollar C$ 990.00
without authority from the Central Bank.
Contrary to Law."cralaw virtua1aw library
The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, was subsequently
raffled to Branch 113, presided by herein respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.
Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions. — No person shall take out
or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of
the Philippines directly, through other persons, through the mails or through
international carriers except when specifically authorized by the Central Bank or
allowed under existing international agreements or Central Bank regulations.
Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine
foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange
brought in by them. For purposes of establishing the amount of foreign exchange
brought in or out of the Philippines, tourists and non-resident temporary visitors
bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central
Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library
The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883, which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange. — That any person who shall
engage in the trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of
existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime
of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal, (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of
27
no less than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos."cralaw virtua1aw library
At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman from Kowloon,
Hongkong, engaged in the garment business, in which he had invested 4 to 5 million
Hongkong Dollars; that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times, although the
only dates he could remember were April 2, 1986, May 4, 1986, June 28, 1986, and
July 8, 1986; that the reason for his coming to the Philippines was to invest in
business in the Philippines and also to play in the casino; that he had a group of
business associates who decided to invest in business with him, namely: Wakita
Noboyuki, Kobayashi Nabuo, Lee Shiang Pin, Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan, who had
their own businesses in Japan and Hongkong; that when he came to the Philippines
on April 2, 1986, he brought US$50,000.00 and 8,500,000.00 Japanese Yen which he
tried to declare but the Central Bank representative refused to accept his
declaration, until he could get a confirmation as to the source of the money, for
which reason he contacted his bank in Hongkong and a telex was sent to him on
April 3, 1986 (Exh. 4). He also brought in with him US$39,000.00 and 4,000,000.00
Japanese Yen when he arrived on May 4, 1986 which he declared (Exh. 1). Again, he
declared 8,600,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on June 28, 1986 (Exh. 2). He
also testified that his business associates, as per their agreement to invest in some
business with him in the Philippines, started putting their money for this purpose in
a common fund, hence, every time anyone of them came to the Philippines, they
would declare the money they were bringing in, and all declarations were handed
to and kept by him; these currency declarations were presented at the trial as
exhibits for the defense. When asked by the court why he did not present all of
these declarations when he was apprehended at the airport, his answer was that he
was not asked to present the declaration papers of his associates, and besides, he
does not understand English and he was not told to do so. He also testified on
cross-examination that the reason he was going back to Hongkong bringing with
him all the money intended to be invested in the Philippines was because of the
fear of his group that the "revolution" taking place in Manila might become
widespread. It was because of this fear that he was urged by his associates to come
to Manila on July 8, 1986 to bring the money out of the Philippines.
The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused,
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or not the accused wilfully
violated Section 6 of Circular No. 960. The fact that the accused had in his
possession the foreign currencies when he was about to depart from the Philippines
did not by that act alone make him liable for Violation of Section 6.
What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of bringing foreign currencies
out of the country was done — the very intention. It is that which qualifies the act
as criminal or not. There must be that clear intention to violate and benefit from
the act done. Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by overt acts
of a person."cralaw virtua1aw library
The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which, according to him, tended
to show that the accused had no wilfull intention to violate the law. According to
the respondent in his decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . this Court is persuaded to accept the explanation of the defense that the
currencies confiscated and/or seized from the accused belong to him and his
business associates abovenamed. And from the unwavering and unequivocal
testimonies of Mr. Templo and all of currencies in question came from abroad and
not from the local source which is what is being prohibited by the government. Yes,
simply reading the provisions of said circular will, readily show that the currency
declaration is required for the purpose of establishing the amount of currency being
brought by tourist or temporary non-resident visitors into the country. The currency
declarations, therefore, is already (sic) intended to serve as a guideline for the
Customs authorities to determine the amounts actually brought in by them to
correspond to the amounts that could be allowed to be taken out. Indeed, this
Court is amazed and really has its misgivings in the manner currency declarations
were made as testified to by the Central Bank employees. Why the Bureau of
Customs representative never took part in all these declarations testified to by no
less than five (5) Central Bank employees? Seemingly, these employees are the
favorites of these travellers. It is the hope of this Court that the authorities must do
something to remedy the evident flaw in the system for effective implementation
of the questioned Central Bank Circular No. 960.
But even with a doubtful mind this Court would not be able to pin criminal
responsibility on the accused. This is due to its steadfast adherence and devotion to
28
the rule of law — a factor in restoring the almost lost faith and erosion of
confidence of the people in the administration of justice. Courts of Justice are
guided only by the rule of evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library
The respondent judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law
in holding that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960,
the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate
the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent
(mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala
prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by his gross ignorance
allowed the accused to go scot free. The accused at the time of his apprehension at
the Manila International Airport had in his possession the amount of US$355,349.57
in assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces),
without any specific authority from the Central Bank as required by law. At the time
of his apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency declarations
in his possession. These were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his
previous trips to the Philippines.
Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for violation
of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the respondent nonetheless chose to exonerate
the accused based on his defense that the foreign currency he was bringing out of
the country at the time he was apprehended by the customs authorities were
brought into the Philippines by him and his alleged business associates on several
previous occasions when they came to the Philippines, supposedly to be used for
the purpose of investing in some unspecified or undetermined business ventures;
that this money was kept in the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines
to take the money out as he and his alleged business associates were afraid that the
"attempted revolution" which occurred on July 6, 1986 might spread. Such fantastic
tale, although totally irrelevant to the matter of the criminal liability of the accused
under the information, was swallowed by the respondent judge "hook, line and
sinker." It did not matter to the respondent that the foreign currency and foreign
currency instruments found in the possession of the accused when he was
apprehended at the airport — 380 pieces in all — and the amounts of such foreign
exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by the
accused at the trial. It did not matter to the respondent that the accused by his own
story admitted, in effect, that he was a "carrier" of foreign currency for other

people. The respondent closed his eyes to the fact that the very substantial
amounts of foreign exchange found in the possession of the accused at the time of
his apprehension consisted of personal checks of other people, as well as cash in
various currency denominations (12 kinds of currency in all), which clearly belied
the claim of the accused that they were part of the funds which he and his
supposed associates had brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of
investing in some business ventures. The respondent ignored the fact that most of
the CB Currency declarations presented by the defense at the trial were
declarations belonging to other people which could not be utilized by the accused
to justify his having the foreign exchange in his possession. Although contrary to
ordinary human experience and behavior, the respondent judge chose to give
credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that he and his alleged business
associates had brought in from time to time and accumulated and kept in the
Philippines foreign exchange (of very substantial amounts in cash and checks in
various foreign currency denominations) for the purpose of investing in business
even before they knew and had come to an agreement as to the specific business
venture in which they were going to invest. These and other circumstances which
make the story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to render the
findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the
accused, thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the decision "in good
faith." His actuations in this case amount to grave misconduct prejudicial to the
interest of sound and fair administration of justice.
He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his decision the release
to the accused of at least the amount of US$3,000.00, allowed, according to
respondent, under Central Bank Circular No. 960. This, in spite of the fact that
forfeiture proceedings had already been instituted by the Bureau of Customs over
the currency listed in the information, which according to the respondent should be
respected since the Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter
of seizure and forfeiture of the property involved in the alleged infringements of
the aforesaid Central Bank Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No.
960 to justify the release of US$3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge
again displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. There is
nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court
to release the said amount of U.S. Currency to the accused. According to the above-
cited CB Circular, tourists may take out or send out from the Philippines foreign
29
exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in
by them; for the purpose of establishing such amount, tourists or non-resident
temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in
other foreign currencies must declare their foreign exchange at points of entries
upon arrival in the Philippines. In other words, CB Circular No. 960 merely provides
that for the purpose of establishing the amount of foreign currency brought in or
out of the Philippines, a tourist upon arrival is required to declare any foreign
exchange he is bringing in at the time of his arrival, if the same exceeds the amount
of US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies. There is nothing in said
circular that would justify returning to him the amount of at least US$3,000.00, if he
is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in excess of said amount without
specific authority from the Central Bank.
Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge, Baltazar R.
Dizon, guilty of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave and
serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and consistent with the
responsibility of this Court for the just and proper administration of justice and for
the attainment of the objective of maintaining the people’s faith in the judiciary
(People v. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it is hereby ordered that the Respondent
Judge be DISMISSED from the service. All leave and retirement benefits and
privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his
being reinstated in any branch of government service, including government-owned
and/or controlled agencies or corporations.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 121917 July 31, 1996
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA, accused-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:p
On appellant Robin C. Padilla's application for bail.
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, appellant was
charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms punishable
by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua.1Pending trial, appellant was
released on bail. Thereafter, appellant was convicted as charged and meted an
indeterminate penalty of 17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 21
years of reclusion perpetua. He appealed to public respondent Court of Appeals, but
judgment was rendered affirming his conviction. Respondent court cancelled his
bailbond and ordered his arrest for confinement at the New Bilibid Prison.
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Dissatisfied, appellant
is now before us by way of a petition for review on certiorari with an application for
bail praying, among others, to be allowed to post bail for his temporary liberty. In
his subsequent pleading,1 appellant moved for the separate resolution of his bail
application.
The threshold issue is whether or not appellant is entitled to bail.
Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.2 On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.3Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years then bail
30
is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances4 under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. But when
the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt strong, bail shall be denied, 5 as
it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. If the evidence, however, is not
strong bail becomes a matter of
right.6
In People v. Nitcha7, the Court, reiterating established jurisprudence, there said:
. . . if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced
to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the
part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In
such a situation, the court would not have only determined that
the evidence of guilt is strong — which would have been sufficient
to deny bail even before conviction — it would have likewise
ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the
pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of
15 October 1991 in People v.Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused
who is charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall
no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right
even if he appeals the case to this Court since
his conviction clearly imports that the evidence
of his guilt of the offense charged is strong. 8
In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua. Applying the aforequoted rule, we find appellant not entitled to
bail as his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt is strong.
And contrary to appellant's asseveration, a summary hearing for his bail
 31

application for the sole purpose of determining whether or not evidence is
strong is unnecessary. Indeed, the extensive trial before the lower court
and the appeal before respondent court are more than sufficient in
accomplishing the purpose for which a summary hearing for bail
application is designed.
Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, moreover, is clear.
his health. This trend, however, has changed with the development of times.
Besides, appellant's situation is not akin to Dela Rama's factual milieu. While
appellant now shall be denied bail, nevertheless, we cannot be indifferent to his
medical needs. And by granting appellant's request, the Court is merely performing
its supervisory powers over detainees to safeguard, among others, their proper
accommodation and health pursuant to Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.

Thus: ACCORDINGLY, the cancellation of appellant's bailbond by public respondent court

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetuaor life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, in addition, applies in this case. The
circular unequivocably provides that when an accused is charged with a
capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the
trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the
accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.
Appellant's application must, perforce, fail as he is no longer entitled to
bail.
is AFFIRMED and the instant application for bail is DENIED for lack of merit.
Appellant's request for an X-ray and MRI examinations at St. Luke's Hospital is
GRANTED which should be conducted at the first opportune time to be arranged by
the Director of the New Bilibid Prison with the responsible officers of the hospital,
provided that appellant shall be at all times subject to the security conditions
imposed by the prison's director. The responsibility for the enforcement of the
subject request, as well as the security of the appellant, devolves upon the Director
of the New Bilibid Prison. Upon termination of the medical examinations, appellant
shall be recommitted to prison without delay. As much as possible, any unnecessary
publicity should be avoided.
SO ORDERED.

Be that as it may, we are not unwilling to accommodate his request for an X-ray and
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke's Hospital as follow-up examinations
for his 1994 slipped-disc operation. It has been said that while justice is the first
virtue of the court, yet admittedly, humanity is the second. Hence, petitioner's
request for the badly needed X-ray and MRI examinations for which the New Bilibid
Prison Hospital is inadequately equipped, as certified to by its Chief Officer,
deserves attention. We recall that way back in 1946, we allowed in Dela Rama
v.People's Court,9 a precedent on which appellant now anchors his application, a
prisoner to be released on bail when his continued detention would be injurious to

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WILBERT CABAREO, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Treachery is appreciated when it is shown that an assailant deliberately and
consciously adopted a means of attack without risk to himself. In the present case, it
was not shown that the attack had been deliberately adopted, or that it had entailed
no risk to appellant.
The Case
Wilbert Cabareo appeals the November 23, 1998 Judgment [1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Criminal Case No. 48852, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
In an Information dated January 20, 1998, Second Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Portia T. Cabalum charged appellant as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of December, 1997, in the Municipality of Lambunao,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm, with deliberate
intent and decided purpose to kill and by means of treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot Nerio Casaquite with the firearm which
the accused was then provided, hitting the victim on the back portion of his body
which caused his death.[2]
Upon his arraignment on February 27, 1998,[3] appellant, assisted by Atty.
Manuel Casumpang, pleaded not guilty. After trial in due course, the court a
quo rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being sufficient and satisfactory proof
shown to establish the guilt of the accused, Wilbert Cabareo alias Bebot, beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with which he stands charged, he is
therefore hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with such
32
accessory penalties as provided in Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code and,
moreover, to indemnify the family of the victim [in] the amount of P50,000.00 as
well as reimburse the family [in] the amount of P89,000.00 for the expenses [for]
the wake and burial of the victim, and [to] pay the cost.[4]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[5] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the following narration
of facts:
December 13, 1997, [was] the barangay fiesta of Jayobo, Lambunao, Iloilo (TSN,
April 24, 1998, p. 4). At around 9:00 [o]n the evening of the same day of festivities,
a disco was going on near the house of Barangay Chairman Aurelio Catedrilla (Ibid.,
pp. 5-6). Suddenly, there was a commotion near the store that was located a few
arms length away from the venue of the disco (Ibid., p. 7). It involved a certain
Pestilo and the younger brother of a certain Manolo (Ibid., pp. 8-9). The younger
brother of Manolo splashed beer on Pestilo (Ibid., p. 9). Then, Aurelio Catedrilla
went to the place where the trouble was to pacify them (Ibid., pp. 9-10). He was
followed by Nerio Casaquite (Ibid.). When Aurelio Catedrilla reached the place,
Wilbert Cabareo, alias Bebot, shot him at the back with a 10 inch long firearm (Ibid.,
pp. 10 and 12). However, instead of the bullet hitting Aurelio Catedrilla, it hit the
back of Nerio Casaquite (Ibid., p. 12). Wilbert Cabareo was about two arms length
away from them when he pulled the trigger (Ibid., p. 11).
Nerio Casaquite fell to the ground, while Wilbert Cabareo fled from the scene (Ibid.,
p. 13). The barangay tanod came to Nerio Casaquites aid and brought him to the
hospital (Ibid.).
However, Nerio Casaquite later succumbed to the gunshot wound he sustained
(Ibid., pp. 23-25).[6]
Version of the Defense

Denying the charge against him, appellant narrates the facts in the following
manner:[7]
On December 12 and 13, 1997, Barangay Jayobo, Lambunao, Iloilo, was celebrating
its Barangay Fiesta. As additional come ons to liven the celebration, a disco dance
was held every night from December 12 to 13, 1997 near the house of the
incumbent [b]arangay [c]aptain, Aurelio Catedrilla.
On December 13, 1997 at about 9:00 oclock in the evening, while the disco dance
was in progress, a certain Tayok Estiba and Pablo Sanchez were having a drinking
spree at the nearby store about two (2) armslength [sic] from the discohan,
probably as a sign of having reconciled after their quarrel the night before
December 12, 1997, which was successfully pacified by Nerio Casaquite and
Barangay Captain Aurelio Catedrilla. At that particular time, accused-appellant
while passing by the store towards the discohan was invited by Pablo Sanchez and
Tayok Estiva and [he] obliged himself to join in their drinking spree. Thereafter,
Pablo Sanchez and Tayok Estiva being drunk again quarreled with each other. As
before, Nerio Casaquite came to pacify them[;] however, this time, the protagonists
would not listen to him. Consequently, he requested the [b]arangay [t]anod present
to fetch the [b]arangay [c]aptain, Aurelio Catedrilla to help him in pacifying the
quarelling Pablo Sanchez and Tayok Estiva. A few minutes later, Barangay Captain
Aurelio Catedrilla arrived with his tanods and a military man. Immediately, the said
military man hit Tayok Estiva with the butt of his armalite rifle, forcing Barangay
Captain Aurelio Catedrilla to admonish him not to hurt Tayok Estiva being his grand
nephew. In obedience, the said military man now turned his ire against Pablo
Sanchez. To prevent the latter from being further hurt by the military man, Nerio
Casaquite now ushered Pablo Sanchez out of the store and persuaded him to go
home.
Meanwhile, Tayok Estiva, not yet fully assua[ged] of his anger against Pablo
Sanchez, was seen grappling with his uncle, Barangay Captain Aurelio Catedrilla, for
possession and control of a 12 gauge shot gun inside the store and in the presence
of accused-appellant. While thus in that situation, the gun accidentally fired[,]
hitting Nerio Casaquite at his back causing his death. Afterwards Barangay Captain
Aurelio Catedrilla told his grand nephew, Tayok Estiva, to leave the place. When he
33
finally left the scene of the accident, accused-appellant followed and also went
home.
The next morning, Barangay Captain Aurelio Catedrilla was arrested at his house as
the primary suspect in the shooting and killing of Nerio Casaquite on the night of
December 13, 1997. Despite the said arrest of Barangay Captain Aurelio Catedrilla
being duly witnessed by his cousin, guest Absalon Lego, however, the latter never
told the arresting police authorities that it was accused-appellant who actually shot
Nerio Casaquite. It was only 3 days later, and while Barangay Captain Aurelio was
already jailed, when Absalon Lego, who was fetched from his house by the younger
brother of the Barangay Captain, conveniently executed a sworn statement
inculpating accused-appellant as the one who really shot Nerio Casaquite on the
night of December 13, 1997. As a result, accused-appellant, Wilbert Cabareo was
arrested on December 19, 1997. Despite his protestation, however, the arresting
police dismissed his claim of innocence, without even giving him the benefit of the
doubt, in fairness and in the interest of law and justice [which] the police were
sworn to uphold and protect.
Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision, the trial court found the testimony of the prosecution witness,
Absalon Lego, to be positive and straightforward, hence persuasive and
credible.[8] Lego, who personally knew appellant, positively identified him as the
shooter. Moreover, the witness had a good view of the incident because he was only
a few meters away from the locus criminis, which was well-lighted at the time.
The trial court also rejected appellants claim that Tayok Estiva was the killer. It
held that this defense was improbable because the person in front of Estiva was
Aurelio Catedrilla, not the deceased. It also ruled that the killing was qualified by
treachery.
Hence, this appeal.[9]
Issues

In his Brief, appellant cites the following alleged errors:
I
The lower court erred in finding the defense of accused-appellant that it was Tayok
Estiva who fired the gun that hit Nerio Casaquite, highly improbable.
II
The lower court likewise erred in finding the uncorroborated testimony of
prosecution witness, Absalon Lego, sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused-
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.[10]
In the main, appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution
eyewitness. The Court, in addition, will also determine the character of the crime and
the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted of homicide, not
murder.
Main Issue:
Credibility of Lone Eyewitness
The defense assails the credibility of the lone prosecution witness, Absalom
Lego, claiming that he was outside the store where the incident occurred. Moreover,
his attention was focused on the nearby disco, not on the store, thus rendering his
account highly improbable. Moreover, when he saw the police arrest Catedrilla, the
former did not readily point to appellant as the malefactor. It was only three days
later that he came forward, stating that he had seen what happened and that
appellant had fired the fatal shot.
34
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses is a matter that particularly falls within the authority of the trial court, as
it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand. For
this reason, appellate courts accord its factual findings and assessments of witnesses
with great weight and even finality, barring arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance.[11]
In this case, the trial court, which had the opportunity to hear and examine the
testimony of the lone prosecution eyewitness, was convinced of his
credibility. Eyewitness Lego narrated that he was only a few meters away from the
incident and positively stated that it was appellant who had fired the shot that killed
the victim:
Q Where [was] this Aurelio going followed by Nerio Casaquite?
A He was intending to pacify the trouble.
Q Was he able to go where the trouble was?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when he reached the place what did Aurelio Catedrilla do?
A He was shot by Bebot.
Q When you said Bebot are you referring to the accused in this case Wilbert
Cabareo?
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q When Bebot shot Aurelio who was hit?
A Nong Nerio Casaquite was hit.
Q And what was Nerio Casaquite doing when he was hit?
A He had his back towards the accused also.
COURT:
Q How many times did the accused shoot Aurelio?
 35

A One time. Q How about you, what did you do?

Q What kind of weapon did he use? A I also fled.[12]

A A 12 gauge gun. Moreover, Lego had a clear view of the incident, which happened in a
sufficiently illuminated area.
Q How long [was] that gun which he used in shooting Nerio?
Q So, the place where the trouble ensued was two (2) armslength [sic] away from
A Like this.
you?
xxxxxxxxx
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q Was that place near the store or near the dance hall?
Q So, there was no exchange of words between Nerio and the accused when the
A It was near the store and near the disco place.
gun was fired?
Q What about the place where the commotion took place, was that lighted?
A No, there was none.
A Lighted.
Q And what happened to Nerio when you said he was shot?
Q What kind of light?
A He fell to the ground.
A It was lighted by an electric bulb.
Q Right there at the place where he was shot?
Q Where was that bulb placed in relation to the store?
A He was about to walk back first before he fell to the ground.
A It was inside the store.
Q How far [was] that place where he fell [from] the place where he was shot?
Indeed, appellant has given us no sufficient reason to overturn the factual
A About one (1) arms length.
findings of the trial court. Futile is his claim that Lego, whose attention ought to have
xxxxxxxxx been focused on the disco instead, could not have witnessed the shooting
incident. First, Lego had a clear view of the store because it was only a few meters
PROS. GEDUSPAN:
away and was open on three sides, having only one wall at the back. Second, it was
Q How about Wilbert Cabareo alias Bebot, what did he do after he shot Aurelio? natural for him to look in that direction, because of the commotion that had occurred
prior to the actual shooting and the arrival of Catedrilla with three companions, one
A He fled.
of whom had a long firearm. In fact, Legos attention would have been focused on the
Q And what happened to Nerio Casaquite after he fell down? store, because Catedrilla even hit one Pablo Sanchez with the butt of a firearm.

A The Barangay Tanods came to Nerios aid. That Lego reported to the authorities what he had seen only after a delay of
three days is of no moment. In People v. Lapay,[13] this Court ruled that a witness non-
Q Where did they bring Nerio Casaquite?
disclosure to police authorities of appellants identity immediately after the
A To the hospital. occurrence of a crime is not entirely against human experience. Delay in revealing
the names of malefactors does not, by itself, impair the credibility of prosecution

witnesses and their testimonies.[14] In this case, Lego readily admitted that he was
afraid to report to the authorities. His failure to specify the object of his fear[15] did
not make his testimony less credible.
Estiva Not the Shooter
Appellant further claims that it was Estiva who shot the victim and that the RTC
erred in rejecting this claim. Allegedly, the trial court merely stated that said defense
was highly improbable because it was not the victim who should have been
hit. Rather, it should have been Catedrilla, being directly in front of Estiva who was
allegedly grappling for possession of the gun at the time.
It must be pointed out that the conviction of appellant was based primarily on
the testimony of Prosecution Witness Lego, who had positively identified the
former. The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the manner and
demeanor of all the witnesses, gave credence to Legos testimony and rejected
appellants claim. Its ruling on this point is clear and unassailable.
Crime and Punishment
Paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 4. Criminal Liability. --- Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
In the present case, appellant is responsible for the death of Nerio Casaquite,
even if the formers intended target when he fired the gun was supposedly
Catedrillo. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony, although
the actual victim be different from the one intended.[16] As held in US v.
Diana[17] decided by the Court as early as 1915, [t]he same crime would have been
committed if the injured man and the deceased had been Dionisio Legara, instead of
36
the defendants nephew, x x x; the crime of homicide would have been committed
just the same and one man would have been deprived of his life by the criminal act
of another.
Treachery
The trial court ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery. [18] It failed to
explain, however, the basis of said ruling. Indeed, the proven facts do not adequately
establish the presence of this qualifying circumstance.
Treachery is present when the means, method or form of execution gives the
person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation. It must be proven that
such means, method or form of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
without danger to the accused.[19]
In this case, the prosecution proved that appellant fired at the back of the
victim. It was not able to show, however, that appellant had deliberately adopted the
attack, considering that it was executed during a commotion and as a result of
it. Moreover, it could not be said that the attack was without risk to himself, because
the victim was then in the company of three other persons, all of whom were alert
and one was even armed.Indeed, the Court has held thus:[20]
x x x. The qualifying circumstance of treachery can not logically be appreciated
because the accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such a
manner as to insure the commission of the crime or to make it impossible or hard
for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. This circumstance can only
be applied, according to the tenor of Article 13, Sub-section 16 of the Revised Penal
Code, when the culprit employs means, methods or forms of execution which tend
directly and specially to insure the commission of the crime and at the same time to
eliminate or diminish the risk to his own person from a defense which the other
party might offer. In United States vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926, it was held that the
circumstance that an attack was sudden and unexpected to the person assaulted
did not constitute the element of alevosia necessary to raise a homicide to murder,
where it did not appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted a mode of
attack intended to facilitate the perpetration of the homicide without risk to
himself.
 37

Well-settled is the rule that a qualifying circumstance must be established as

clearly as the elements of a crime.[21] In this case, treachery was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Absent any other qualifying circumstance, appellant should
therefore be convicted only of homicide,[22] not murder.

Civil Liability

We affirm the award of P50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto, which is granted

without need of proof other than the commission of a crime. [23] Likewise, the trial
court correctly awarded the sum of P89,000 as actual damages, which we find to be
supported by evidence.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant

is CONVICTED of homicide and SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of eight
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months
and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The award of civil indemnities
is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-75390 March 25, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
DANILO VALDEZ and SINIPLICIO ORODIO alias "Kamlon", appellants.
FELICIANO, J.:
This case is before us on automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, convicting the
accused-appellants Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio of the crime of murder and
sentencing each of them to death.
The accused Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio were charged in an information
which read as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of June, 1977, in the Municipality of
Santol, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, armed
with a fire arm, with treachery and evident premeditation and
with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, shoot Eleno Maquiling inflicting upon
him a gunshot wound which caused the victim's instantaneous
death.
That the aggravating circumstance of nighttime was present in the
commission of the crime. Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
After arraignment and trial, the trial court rendered in due course, on 27 June 1986,
a decision finding both of the accused guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of
the decision states:
38
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the
accused Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio alias 'Kamlon' guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and judgment is
hereby rendered imposing upon each of them the Capital penalty
of death; to indemnify the heirs of Eleno Maquiling the sum of
P30,000.00; to reimburse the expenses in the sum of P3,000.00 to
said heirs, and to pay the costs.
The bail bonds posted by the accused for their provisional liberty
are hereby cancelled and their immediate arrest ordered.
The accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in the following respects:
1) That the evidence of the prosecution does not establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; and
2) That the evidence of the prosecution is based simply on
suspicion.
We will address these arguments together.
From the record, the facts of the case may be collated as follows:
The house of the Maquiling family stands on the slope of a mountain in Barangay
Ambagat, Santol, La Union. At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of 7 June 1977, the
victim Eleno Maquiling, his sisters Leticia and Thelma, his mother Esmenia, and his
father Juanito were an in the yard of their house. Esmenia and Juanito were under
the awning of their house facing north, engaged in stringing together tobacco
leaves. The victim's brother Dionisio was eating his dinner in the wall-less kitchen
located on the ground floor of the house. The victim Eleno was seated with his back
toward the north and plucking a guitar. The place and its surroundings were lighted
by a 300 candle power petromax lamp hanging under the northern end of the
awning of the house. 1
While the Maquilings were thus seated in their yard, a relative of the family, one
Carolina, arrived and asked Esmenia to accompany her to a prayer meeting.

Esmenia demurred and instead asked Eleno to accompany Carolina. The victim was
then just about two (2) meters away from his parents and about to stand up when
suddenly a very loud gun shot rang out from the northern side of the yard and
Eleno fell to the ground, crying out to his father for help. Juanita rushed to his fallen
son and carried him into their house; Eleno, however, died immediately thereafter.
The victim's mother Esmenia was about to succour Eleno when she instinctively
looked toward the direction from whence the gunshot came and saw the two (2)
accused, Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio, running down the hill away from the
bamboo groves on the northern side of the house. According to Esmenia, the
accused Danilo was wearing a blue shirt and dark pants and carrying a long firearm,
while the other accused Simplicio was running along side the former. Dionisio
Maquiling, brother of the victim, also testified that he too had seen Danilo with a
gun and Simplicio both running away in a westernly direction. Danilo stated that he
was then about seven (7) meters away from the accused-appellants. 2 Danilo Valdez
was a neighbor and a relative of the Maquilings, while Simplicio Orodio was their
old accquaintance residing in Sitio Village, Barangay Corooy of the same town; thus,
both were well-known to Esmenia and Dionisio Maquiling.
On 8 June 1977, the Municipal Health Officer of Balaoan, Dr. Monico O. Morales,
conducted an autopsy which showed that the victim Eleno had sustained eight (8)
gunshot (pellet) wounds on his back:
1. Wound, gunshot, ½; inch longest dia., 1 cm. below base of neck,
medial, pellet plowed slightly upward and found its exist at the
lower 3rd of neck, left, measuring 3/4 inch longest diameter.
(Thru and thru).
2. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia medial, 1 inch lateral to
vertebral column, right, pellet plowed upward and found its exit
at the base of neck, left, measuring ¾ longest diameter. (Thru and
thru).
3. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia level of 4th intercostal
space, back, right, penetrating the chest cavity, pellet was
recovered at the upper lobe of right lung.
39
4. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia 1 inch above armpit, back,
right, pellet plowed slightly upwards and to left. Pellet was not
recovered.
5. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia 8th intercostal space, back,
right, 1 inch lateral to the vertebral column, pellet penetrated
check cavity hitting lower lobe of lungs, right. Pellet was not
recovered.
6. Wound, gunshot ½ inch longest dia medial, back, left, level of
8th intercostal space, hitting the lower lobe, lung, left. Pellet was
not recovered.
7. Wound, gunshot. ½ inch longest dia chest, back medial, left,
(Level of 9th interspace), penetrating chest cavity hitting lower
lobe, lung, left. Pellet was not recovered.
8. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia postero-lateral, back, I inch
below lowest rib of chest, right. Pellet was recovered at the
abdominal wall, hypochondic region, front, right. Two (2) pellets
were given to Chief of Police, Segundo Tuvera. 3
The morning after the shooting, on 8 June 1977, Sgt. Segundo Tuvera of the
Integrated National Police, Santol, La Union, went to the house of the Maquilings to
investigate the death of Eleno. 4 He saw a petromax lamp hanging from the awning
of the northern end of the house, as well as footprints near the bamboo groves
near the northern side of the house. During his investigation, neither Esmenia nor
Dionisio informed Sgt. Tuvera of what they had seen.
On 10 June 1977, Juanito Maquiling, the victim's father, executed a sworn
statement before the police in the Santol Police Substation. Juanita admitted in his
statement that he had not seen the accused-appellants on the night of the
shooting. He did relate, however, that three (3) days prior to the shooting of Eleno,
Eleno had informed him that in case something untoward happened to him (Eleno),
the accused-appellants Danio Valdez and Simplicio Orodio should be held
responsible, since he (Eleno) had quarrelled with them concerning their stealing
 40

and robbing. 5 Juanita further, stated that the accused Danilo has had a personal Q. How far were they from you when you saw
grudge against Eleno; Danilo had mortgaged to Eleno's brother a stolen spading them?
fork, a circumstance that Eleno discovered when the real owner of the spading fork
came to talk to him. Esmenia, Eleno's mother, gave no sworn statement on that A. Witness indicating a distance of more or less
day. Ten (10) days later, on 20 June 1977, however, she made a sworn statement to five meters.
the Philippine Constabulary in San Fernando, La Union. Shortly thereafter, on 23
June 1977, Dionisio Maquiling, Eleno's brother, gave his own separate sworn Q. When you saw the two accused, did you see
statement also to the Philippine Constabulary. Both Esmenia and Dionisio Identified anything in their possession?
Danilo Orodio as Eleno's killers. 6
A. They have, sir, (Witness indicating a length of
At the trial, Esmenia Maquiling was firm and categorical in Identifying the about a foot), and it was Danilo Valdez who was
appellants as the men she saw running from the bamboo groves immediately after holding that object.
the shooting —
Q. Were you able to recognize that object which
Q. When you heard that gunshot, what did you Danilo Valdez was then holding?
do?
A. It was a gun, sir.
A. We immediately rushed to his side and we
found him on the ground, sir. Q. When you saw Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
Orodio north of your yard, what were they
Q. From what direction did you hear the doing?
gunshot?
A. I saw Danilo Valdez holding the gun while
A. North of our yard, sir. Simplicio Orodio ran downhill and then Danilo
Valdez followed, sir.
Q. When you went to the succour of your son,
what else did you do? Q. You Id that you saw Danilo Valdez and
Simplicio Orodio north of your yard. In relation
A. When I went, to give succour to my son, I to the place where you heard the gunshot,
turned and I saw these two, sir, where were they?

Q. Where did you see the two accused? A. Near the bamboo grove which is located
north of our house, sir?
A. North of our yard, sir.

Q. In relation to that bamboo grove where you
heard the gunshot, where were Danilo Valdez
and Simplicio Orodio at the time you saw them?
A. They were east of the bamboo grove, sir.
Q. How far were they from that bamboo grove?
A. Witness referring to a distance of about 6 to
6-½ meters away.
COURT:
Q. How far were you from the accused when
you recognized them?
A. Less than a meter away when I recognized
them, sir.
FISCAL:
Q. You Id that the distance between you and the
two accused at the time you saw them was five
meters more or less. Upon questioning of the
court, you Id that the distance is less than a
meter. Which is true?
A. Witness pointing to a distance of more or less
five meters.
Q. How were you able to recognize the two
accused at that distance of five meters from you
considering that it was nighttime?
41
A. There was a light from the petromax lamp
which was hanging [from] the awning of our
house, sir.
Q. That part of the house where this awning is
located, is there a wall surrounding the awning?
A. None, sir.
Q. That petromax lamp which you said was
hanging under the awning of your house, how
high is the petromax light from the ground
level?
A. The height is 12 feet, sir.
Q. How big was the petromax light?
A. About two feet, sir. 7
Esmenia's testimony was corroborated by the
equally definite testimony of Dionisio Maquiling,
who declared that:
Q. Where were you at the time your brother
was shot to death?
A. I was in our kitchen eating.
Q. Where was your brother then at the time he
was shot in relation to your house?
A. He was west of our kitchen.
Q. In what particular part of your house, inside
or outside?

A. Outside of our house.
Q. What time was your brother shot to death?
A. More or less 8 o'clock in the evening.
Q. You said you were in the kitchen of your
house eating and you Pointed to Danilo Valdez
and Simplicio Orodio alias "Kamlon" as the
persons who shot your brother. How were you
able to see Simplicio Orodio and Danilo Valdez
shoot your brother?
A. I saw them.
Q. Will you relate how were you able to see
Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio alias Kamlon
shoot your brother Eleno Maquiling?
A. When I was eating facing westward I heard a
gunshot and when I looked through the north I
saw Danilo Valdez running being followed by
Simplicio Orodio.
Q. When you looked northward and you saw
Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio running, did
you see anything in their possession?
A. A gun. (Witness showing a length of about
half a meter).
Q. Who of the two, Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
Orodio was hiding the gun?
8
A. Danilo Valdez.
42
The trial court found the testimony of witnesses Esmenia and Dionisio as positive,
credible and reliable. We find no reason to disagree with the finding of the trial
court. It is commonplace that "the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of
the witnesses are to be given great weight and a high degree of respect by the
appellate court". 9There is nothing in the record to show that the prosecution
witnesses were moved by any improper motive to accuse falsely the accused-
appellant — one a relative and the other an old acquaintance — of so grave a crime
as murder.
The circumstance that Esmenia waited for thirteen (13) days after her son's
assassination before reporting the Identities of the accused to the authorities, was
not unnatural in itself. She explained the delay by saying that she was afraid to talk
about the killing and that she had seen the accused loitering frequently around the
Maquilings' house, carrying a gun, after the burial of her son.10 The trial court
observed that Esmenia's fear —
was not imaginary because the night that she reported the
Identities of the accused their house was stoned by unidentified
persons. The delay was satisfactorily explained. In People vs.
Martinez, 127 SCRA 260, it was held that delay of witness for
several months, because of fear, in reporting the incident to the
police does not affect credibility. "Fear of likely retaliation by the
several accused who were still at large has been considered as a
justified reason for the witnesses' delay in coming forward with
their testimony' (People vs. Sampang, 16 SCRA 531; People vs.
Equal, 14 SCRA 89). 11
This explanation does not appear incredible in itself and certainly such a delay of
thirteen(13)days, under the circumstances of this case, does not warrant a
conclusion that her testimony as to the Identities of the killers of her son was false.
In People v. Martinez, 12 the Court held that the failure of a witness to reveal
immediately the Identities of the accused does not militate against his credibility.
Both Esmenia Maquiling and Dionisio Maquiling did not testify that they had
actually seen either Danilo Valdez or Simplicio Orodio shooting at the deceased
victim. The principal evidence against the accused is, therefore, circumstantial in

character. The trial court recognized this and was careful to analyze the chain of
circumstantial evidence on the basis of which the trial court concluded that the two
(2) accused had killed Eleno Maquiling:
While the prosecution failed to present an eye witness to the
actual shooting by the accused of deceased Eleno, the chain of
circumstances, prior and subsequent to the killing, leaves no room
for doubt that accused are the guilty persons. The rule is that
before conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused as the authors of the crime. (People vs. Pamintuan, 127
SCRA 820). In this case, this requisite has been fully met.
Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, WHEN
SUFFICIENT. — Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Tested by the rule stated above, and considering that Eleno was
killed by a shot in the back and suffered eight (8) pellet wounds
from one gunshot only; that the accused were immediately seen
running down-hill away from the scene after the gunshot report
with accused Danilo v. Valdez carrying a long firearm; that three
(3) days before the incident there was already bad blood between
the victim and accused Danilo Valdez as the victim confided to his
43
father Juanito Maquiling that if ever he would be shot accused
Danilo Valdez is the one to be blamed; 13 that when the place
where the clime was committed is an isolated place and it is
highly probable that some other malefactors could have been
present; and that footprints were seen by the police investigators
behind the bamboo grove where the accused were seen to come
from immediately after the shooting that Esmenia Maquiling even
described the clothing of accused Danilo Valdez; that the two
accused are well known to the victim's family thereby precluding
the possibility of mistaken Identity; all these proven facts afford
sufficient or a reasonable inference that the two accused were
indeed the killers of the victim. 14
In his brief, the Solicitor General took the position that accused-appellant Simplicio
Orodio should be acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain this conviction
either as a principal or an accomplice. The Solicitor General said:
In the case at bar, the information charged Orodio as having
allegedly conspired with Valdez in killing Eleno. The prosecution
did not however adduce any evidence establishing the aforesaid
alleged conspiracy between Valdez and Orodio to commit the
crime charged. The only fact that the prosecution was able to
successfully prove was the presence of Orodio at the crime scene
when he was seen running together with Valdez by Dionisio and
Esmenia after Eleno was gunned down and that he was
a barkada of Eleno. It is submitted that in the light of the
aforecited ruling in the Madera case, there exist no factual and
legal basis to sustain the conviction of Orodio either as a principal
or accomplice in this case. 15
We are unable to agree with the Solicitor General, whose view appears to be too
drastic a simplification of the evidence that was in fact before the trial court. Orodio
was present with Valdez at the time Eleno Maquiling was killed by a shotgun blast
at his back. He was in the company of a man running with a shotgun, at
approximately 8:00 o'clock in the evening, immediately after the fatal shooting, just
outside the Maquilings house where he had no business being if he were not acting
 44

in concert with Danilo Valdez, the accused-appellant who carried the shotgun. He
was a close friend (barkada) of the accused Danilo Valdez, both of whom the
deceased victim had Identified as probably responsible should any untoward event
befall the victim. Simplicio Orodio completely failed to explain what he was doing
with Danilo Valdez the night of the killing, on the one hand. Upon the other, both
Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio pleaded the same alibi. Valdez and Orodio both
testified that they were in Cervantes, Ilocos Sur, when Eleno was shot to death.
Their common alibi remained uncorroborated for both failed to present either the
mother of accused Danilo Valdez who was supposed to have come to Cervantes
Ilocos Sur, to inform them that Eleno Maquiling had been shot to death, or any
other witness for that matter. The trial court found the accused common defense of
alibi as non-credible "as it was not impossible for the accused to be present at the
scene of the crime. 16
premeditation may be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance. 19 The
circumstance of nighttime is, however, absorbed by treachery. 20 A second
aggravating circumstance — that the victim who had given no provocation was slain
in his dwelling — was also found by the trial court. 21
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial court finding Danilo
Valdez and Simplicio Orodio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
is hereby AFFIRMED. In view of the abolition of capital punishment under the 1987
Constitution, and in view of the presence of two (2) aggravating circumstances not
offset by any mitigating circumstance, the applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.

We hold that the prosecution's evidence was more than adequate to sustain the
finding of the trial court of a conspiracy between Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
Orodio. Conspiracy being present, it does not matter that the prosecution had
failed to show who as between the two actually pulled the trigger of the shotgun
that killed Eleno Maquiling. 17 Both Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio are liable as
co-conspirators since any act of a co- conspirator becomes the act of the other
regardless of the precise degree of participation in the act. 18

The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of treachery and evident
premeditation. The accused had purposely sought nocturnity and hid themselves
behind the bamboo groves located close by the victim's house and had fired at
Eleno Maquiling suddenly, without any warning, from behind obviously to ensure
the success of their deadly purpose without any risk to themselves and without any
possibility of retaliation. Three (3) days before his assassination, Eleno was already
apprehensive for his life when he disclosed to his father, Juanito Maquiling, his
quarrel with Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio over the latter's thievery and
robbery. Clearly, the accused had planned to kill Eleno some days before the fateful
night of 7 June 1977; the shotgun blast at the back of Eleno was not the result of a
spur of the moment decision.

Since both treachery and evident premeditation were present, and only one (1)
qualifying circumstance is necessary to constitute homicide into murder, evident

G.R. No. L-31657 January 31, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDGARDO VENGCO Y DAVID alias "Edwin", ROGELIO ENCARNACION Y DE LOS
SANTOS alias "Roger Pusa", ROMEO SOLIBA Y REDOBLA alias "Romy",
CONSTANTINO LENESES Y MARILLANO alias Alexander Remonte y Marillano alias
"Alex Remonte", and LEON DAVID alias "Junior", defendants, CONSTANTINO
LENESES Y MARILLANO alias "ALEXANDER REMONTE Y MARILLANO" alias ALEX
REMONTE, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-32264 January 31, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDGARDO VENGCO Y DAVID alias "Edwin", ROGELIO ENCARNACION Y DE LOS
SANTOS alias "Roger Pusa", ROMEO SOLIBA Y REDOBLA alias "Romy",
CONSTANTINO LENESES MARILLANO alias Alexander Remonte y Marillano alias
"Alex Remonte", and LEON DAVID alias "Junior", defendants, LEON DAVID alias
"Junior", defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Tagalo, Gozar & Associates and Ricafort, Laxamana & Nacpil Law Office for
defendants-appellants.
RELOVA, J.:
hese appeals are interposed by Constantino Leneses alias "Alex Remonte" and Leon
David alias "Junior" who, together with three others, were charged in Criminal Case
No. 87918, for the murder of Charlie Celadeña y Lim in the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XX. The lower court adjudged them guilty thereof, and
sentenced both of them to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
45
provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00,
and to pay the costs.
The information filed against said appellants recites:
That on or about the 24th day of August 1967, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, at night time, and with the
use of superior strength to insure and afford impunity, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon one, CHARLIE CELADEÑA Y
LIM, by then and there stabbing the latter with bladed and
pointed instruments which they were then armed, hitting him on
the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said
CHARLIE CELADEÑA Y LIM mortal and fatal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death moments thereafter.
(p. 2, Rollo of L-31657 & L-32264)
The version of the prosecution was unfolded by prosecution witnesses Go Hong,
Rolando Quiane, Purita Delgado, and Dr. Mariano de Lara, Chief of the Medico-
Legal Division, Manila Police Department.
Go Hong testified that in the evening of August 24, 1967 he was in his house at
2815-A Bagac Street, Tondo, Manila when he heard a commotion outside. Looking
out of the window he saw Charlie Celadeña being stabbed by Edwin Vengco while
three others, one of whom he recognized as appellant Constantino Leneses, were
moving away from the victim, all of them armed with a dagger, an ice pick and a
weapon with pointed blade. He went out of the house and lifted Celadeña from the
ground when he noticed that the latter was bloody in all parts of his body. The
victim was brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced
dead upon arrival.
Rolando Quiane testified that about midnight on August 24, 1967 he and his
brother were conversing on a sidewalk along Bagac Street, near the corner of
Corrigidor Street, Tondo, Manila, when a taxicab came and stopped at the place

where they were. Charlie Celadeña alighted from the taxicab. Thereafter, at about
30 meters away, a group of five persons, among whom were Edwin Vengco and
Leon David came towards them. As there was an incident between Charlie Celadeña
and Edwin Vengco three or four nights before, when the latter chased the former
and threw bottles at him, Quiane invited Charlie Celadeña to go with him inside the
apartment where he and his brother were living, to avoid the group. Celadeña
would not go with them and so Quiane and his brother went inside their apartment.
They then heard Charlie Celadeña knocking at the door of, and calling his sister at,
the latter's house across the street. After a while Quiane heard the voice of a girl
Calling for help. Quiane opened the door of the apartment and saw Charlie
Celadeña lying down on the ground bleeding.
The testimony of Rolando Quiane was corroborated by Go Hong and Purita Delgado
who declared that about midnight of August 24, 1967 while she was sleeping in the
house of "Ate During" the sister of Charlie Celadeña, along Bagac Street, Ate During
woke her up and she heard a commotion outside the house. When she peeped
through the opening of the window, she saw her "Kuya Charlie" leaning against the
wall of the house being held by two men, one of whom was appellant Leon David,
on his hands. Thereafter, another person approached the one being held by the two
and stabbed him, followed by two more men who also stabbed him. There were
several thrusts with pointed instruments hurled at Charlie until one of them ran
away, followed by three others, leaving the tall one who continued stabbing
Charlie, then already prostrate on the ground.
Dr. Mariano de Lara conducted the autopsy on the body of the deceased and his
post-mortem findings show that the deceased sustained eleven (11) stab wounds
mostly located in the chest and abdomen and one in the back. Five (5) of the stab
wounds were fatal.
The defense of Constantino Leneses alias "Alex Remonte", is denial and alibi. He
contends that earlier in the afternoon of August 24, 1967, he was at the tailor shop
near Jose Abad Santos Boulevard waiting for a pair of pants the tailor was making
for him. While waiting there, Edgardo Vengco, Rogelio Encarnacion, Romeo Soliba
and Leon David arrived and invited him to go with them. They went to the house of
Leon David where they had a drinking spree. He became dead drunk that he was
46
taken to his house in Balintawak where he stayed the whole evening unconscious
and regained consciousness only the following morning.
Appellant Leon David denied participation in the crime committed, contending that
only Edwin Vengco, Roger, Romeo and Alex attacked and killed Charlie Celadeña. He
testified that about 10:30 in the evening of August 24, 1967 he went home to turn
over the proceeds of the sale of cigarettes to his mother. He then proceeded to the
house of Edwin Vengco and joined the group, namely: Vengco, Romy, Roger and
Alex in a drinking spree. Vengco even asked money from him for the jeepney fares
of the three. Knowing Vengco to be a tough guy and a "siga-siga", he gave the latter
money. After about five minutes, he separated from them and proceeded to go
home. On the way, he saw at a distance of about eight meters a person being
ganged up by Edwin Vengco and his companions. Vengco and Alex were stabbing
the person with bladed weapons, while Roger and Romy were holding the hands of
the victim. He shouted at them not to do it and then left the place because he was
afraid that he might be implicated.
Further, Leon David denied the truth of the testimony of Purita Delgado who
Identified him as one of the persons who held the victim by his hands when the
latter was being stabbed by Edwin Vengco and his companions. However, on cross
examination, he could not say what reason or motive could have induced Purita
Delgado to testify falsely against him.
The defense also presented Melquiades Nuque, a taxi driver, who declared that he
was about 20 meters from the place of the incident which occurred in the evening
of August 24, 1967. He saw Vengco, Alex and the others assaulting the victim, but
appellant Leon David was not one of them,
Appellants put squarely in issue the credibility of Go Hong, Rolando Quiane and
Purita Delgado averring that the lower court erred (1) in relying purely on the
testimony of these three witnesses; (2) in not considering the individual
participation of each of the accused there being no proof of conspiracy; and (3) in
not holding that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is insufficient to convict
him.

The trial court committed no error in finding appellants Constantino Leneses and
Leon David guilty of the crime charged.
1. WE have consistently held that when there is no showing of improper motive on
the part of witnesses for testifying against an accused, the fact that they are
neighbors, friends or relatives of the victim does not render their clear and positive
testimony less worthy of full faith and credit. Purita Delgado saw her "Kuya Charlie"
leaning on the wall by the window of the house of her Ate During about a meter
away, being ganged up by appellants and their companions, when she peeped
through the window. The place was bright because of the two mercury lamps in
front of the house. Go Hong, husband of Ate During, immediately went to the
assistance of the victim after the assailants had ran away.
2. As found by the lower court, a circumstance highly indicative of the guilt is the
fact that soon after the commission of the crime, Leon David left Manila for
Cavitewhere he hid himself until he was arrested on February 2, 1970. His
explanation for hiding that he was afraid of Edwin Vengco does not impress Us
because if he was really innocent, as he claimed to be, he would not have gone into
hiding and would even tell the authorities what transpired that evening. The truth
is, he would have no reason to be afraid of anyone, including Edwin Vengco who
has no reason to go after him, he having done nothing wrong against him. On the
contrary, he was not afraid to shout at Vengco and his companions not to assault
the victim and later to testify in court with respect to their participation in the
incident.
3. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses have not been shown to suffer from
any inconsistency and/or contradiction. In fact, the testimony of only one witness, if
credible and positive and if it satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is
sufficient to convict. (People vs. Argana, 10 SCRA 311). Alibi, which is the defense of
Constantino Leneses, is weak since it is easy to concoct. Courts view it with caution
and accept it only when proved by positive, clear and convincing evidence. The
positive Identification of appellant Leneses as one of the perpetrators of the crime
dwindles the defense of alibi.
The crime committed is murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength. The
People's evidence relative to the commission of the crime, the manner of its
47
perpetration and the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is not disputed.
Appellant Leon David and his witness, the taxi driver, confirmed these facts. The
conspiracy among therein appellants and their companions is easily discernible
from their conduct. The way in which they assaulted Charlie Celadeña and their
conduct sometime before and immediately after the stabbing, clearly show that
they had agreed to kill him. The rule is that "if it is proven that two or more persons
aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their acts, although apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting
among them is proven (Underhill, Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed. by Niblack, pp. 1402-3;
People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868, 875). (Cited in People vs. Velez, 58 SCRA 21, 31).
WE agree with the trial court that "no generic aggravating circumstance was
sufficiently proved by the prosecution, the elements of nighttime, evident
premeditation and treachery, not having been established by its evidence. On the
other hand, no mitigating circumstance was shown by the evidence of the defense.
The medium of the penalty prescribed for the offense should be imposed on the
accused. The penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua, it being the medium of
the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death for murder."
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the modification that
appellants pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P30,000.00. (People vs. de la Fuente, G.R. Nos. L-63251-52, Dec. 29, 1983)
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-69564 January 29, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, RICHARD
DOE, PETER DOE AND JUAN DOE, accused. JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE and
MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-69658 January 29, 1988
JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XCVII,
QUEZON CITY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
These consolidated cases originated from the decision rendered by Judge Oscar
Leviste in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch XCVII, finding the accused-appellants Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario
Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide, sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of the victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00
for each of the victims and moral damages of P200,000.00 G.R. No. 69564 is the
automatic review of the death sentence while G.R. No. 69658 is a petition for
review on certiorari of said decision, the recourse taken by accused-appellant Juan
Escober 'to cut short that long period of wait for a final resolution of his fate." 1
Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons designated as John Doe,
Peter Doe, Richard Doe and Juan Doe, were charged with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in an Information dated
December 9, 1982. He entered a plea of "Not Guilty" with the assistance of counsel
Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon arraignment on March 2, 1983.
48
On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-appellant
Macario Punzalan, Jr. as one of the accused therein. He, too, pleaded "Not Guilty"
during the arraignment on April 22, 1983, assisted by court-appointed counsel, Atty.
Benigno Mariano, who at that time had replaced Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as
counsel de parte for Juan Escober.
A joint trial of the accused ensued. The prosecution presented its evidence,
summarized by the Solicitor General in his Consolidated Brief, as follows:
One of the alleged co-conspirator (sic), Amadeo Abuyen alias
Roberto Alorte, * was formerly a co-security guard of appellant
Juan Escober at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, Inc., a family
corporation owned by the couple Vicente Chua and Lina Chua. It is
located inside a walled compound about 50 meters away from the
residence of its owner, at 24 Joy Street, Grace Village, Balintawak,
Quezon City. About 4 months prior to the incident, Abuyen was
relieved by Domingo Rocero for being always absent and found
sleeping while on duty. [pp. 5-8, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 2-10, tsn,
Sept. 14, 1983; pp. 6-8, tsn, April 22, 1983).
At the time of the incident on December 3, 1982, Rocero's tour of
duty was from 7:00 in the morning to 7:00 in the evening. He left
his post at about 7:30 P.M. that evening after he was relieved by
appellant Juan Escober. On his way home, he passed by Barangay
Balingasa in Balintawak, where he saw Amadeo Abuyen in the
store of Colonel Samson drinking beer with three companions,
one of whom he later Identified as the appellant Macario
Punzalan, Jr. [pp. 4-11, tsn, April 22, 19831.
After Rocero had left his point, (sic) Vicente Chua went to his
office at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply as he usually does after
office hours, accompanied by his 13-year old son Irvin and 6-year
old daughter Tiffany On their way, he saw appellant Escober at his
post. At the office, the two children watched a television program,
as their father proceeded to the bathroom to take a bath [pp. 10-
17, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a tricycle and
proceeded to the Bee Seng Electrical Supply. Upon alighting
thereat, Abuyen knocked at the little door of the gate. Appellant
Escober, peeped thru the hole and opened the door. Then after
Abuyen had talked with Escober, the former asked Punzalan to
wait outside, while he (Abuyen) and his two other companions
went inside [pp. 4-5, tsn, Nov. 9, 1983].
At this juncture, the victims' mother, Mrs. Lina B. Chua, left their
residence to join her husband and two children. On her way, she
noticed that the pedestrian gate was wide open with the
appellant Punzalan standing there. She shouted why the gate was
opened, but nobody answered. Suddenly, she heard of shot
coming from the direction of the garage; and when she looked
thereat, she saw Abuyen and the appellant Escober walking
towards the gate. So, she rushed back inside the house to contact
her husband through the intercom. But since the intercom was
out of order, she hurriedly went outside and met appellant
Escober who volunteered the information "that he was not hit."
[pp. 9-20, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983].
Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was inside the bathroom,
when he heard the gunshot. He hurriedly went out and saw her
(sic) son Irvin lying on the sofa while her (sic) daughter Tiffany was
lying on the floor, both mortally wounded. Beside her (sic)
daughter, he saw a scissor blade [Exhibit 'E' fun of blood. He also
observed that everything was scattered in his office, with all Ms
drawers opened. Later, he found out that the P5,000.00 cash he
kept in one of the drawers was lost [pp. 1314, 31-36, tsn, Sept. 14,
1983].
Immediately, he went out and shouted for help from his wife to
bring out the car as their children was (sic) stabbed and bleeding.
Forthwith, she got one car, while her eldest son drove a second
one. After Vicente Chua had brought the two wounded children
inside the two cars, they were brought to the Chinese General
49
Hospital where they were pronounced dead upon arrival. [pp. 22-
26, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 13-14, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].
It was about 8:45 in the evening of December 3, 1982 when Police
Investigator Oscar Francisco was dispatched to investigate the
incident. And, since the victims were already brought to the
Chinese General Hospital, he was instructed to proceed thereto.
When he arrived at the hospital at past 9.00 o'clock P.M., he
found the victims already dead. Whereupon, he conducted a
cursory examination of the victim and indicated on two separate
sketches (Exhibits "C" and "D"), the 12 and 11 stab wounds
sustained by Irvin Chua and Tiffany Chua, respectively. From
there, he proceeded to the scene of the crime, where he met
Corporal Ibuan Pat. Robanera and a police photographer, who
arrived to assist him in the investigation [pp. 3-9, tsn, July 5,
1983].
Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a blood-stained blade of a
scissor (Exhibit "E") which the former said was found beside the
pool of blood inside the room where the incident happened. In
the course of his investigation, Francisco noticed that the drawers
inside the office of Vicente Chua were forcibly opened with its
(sic) contents scattered. Upon subsequent interview with Vicente,
he likewise learned that cash amounting to P5,000.00 was taken
by the culprits in one of said drawers [pp. 9-13, Ibid].
Thereafter, Francisco invited for questioning at the Police
Headquarters appellant Escober, the security guard on duty then
at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, who voluntarily gave his version
of the incident (Exhibit "F"). Aside from that of Escober, the
written statements of the victims' parents, Vicente Chua and Lina
B. Chua, were also taken (Exhibits "G" & "H", respectively).
Thereafter, Francisco referred on December 8, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit
"I") the result of his investigation to the City Fiscal who wrote at
the left hand margin thereon the following notations: "Detained

the accused all prima facie case exist(s) and that accused is
probably guilty thereof. No bail recommended. [pp. 13-23, Ibid].
Subsequently, on the morning of December 10, 1982, the police
apprehended the appellant Punzalan, who in a police line-up was
readily Identified by the victims' mother, Una Chua, as one of
those she saw standing at the open gate of their compound
during the night of the incident on December 2 (sic), 1982.
Another statement (Exhibit "F") was, therefore, taken on
December 10, 1982 from the victims' mother to supplement the
previous statement she gave on December 8, 1982. Also taken on
even date were the statements of Security Guard Jesus Zaragosa
(Exhibit "K") and that of Virginia Alorte Abuyen, the mother of one
of the suspects who claimed that her son, Amadeo Abuyen,
mentioned to her his four [4] companions, including the herein
two appellants, in the commission of the crime. Even appellant
Punzalan waived his constitutional rights under custodial
investigation and voluntarily and willingly gave his statement
(Exhibit "M") wherein he did not only admit his participation in
the commission of the crime, but also implicated appellant Juan
Escober [pp. 25-26, Ibid; pp. 2-12, tsn, July 6, 1983].
Thus, in his second referral dated December 13, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit
"J") to the Fiscal, Police Investigator Francisco named the five [5]
accused as: Juan Escober y Geralde, Macario Punzalan, Jr. y
Guevarra, Amadeo Abuyen y Alorte, alias Florante Bato, alias
Dodong and a certain Peter Doe, albeit, only the herein two
appellants were apprehended. [pp. 7-8, tsn, July 6, 1983]. 2
Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to testify in his
defense. His testimony is deed in his Brief, thus:
Escober was then a Security guard and belonged to the Western
Private Detective Security since January 1, 1982 and was assigned
at Vising Electrical Supply at Joyce St. Grace Village, Balintawak,
Quezon City,owned by Vicente Chua and Lina Saw Chua. On
50
December 3, 1982, at 7 p.m. he reported for work. When his
companion left and he arrived (to take over) he cleaned the
guardhouse, a routinary work because Mr. and Mrs. Chua did not
like to see the guardhouse dirty and also because after the
security guard leaves, the security guard on duty must clean it.
There was a janitor but the security guards used to clean the
guardhouse. As security guard, he had a gun but on this occasion
he left it in the locker because he was cleaning the guardhouse.
Then when he was to throw the garbage, Alorte arrived and
talked to him because he, Alorte alias Abuyen, wanted to, and
two men [also accused named Does as they are also still at large]
entered and one man [co-accused Punzalan] was left at the gate.
Escober was not able to talk to Alorte alias Abuyen because when
Alorte came, one of his companions aimed a gun at Escober and
also a knife and they said they would kill him. He does not know
the man who aimed a gun at him. He only knows Alorte because
he Alorte used to be his co-guard at Vising Electrical Supply. They
then asked Escober to get into (climbed) the pick- up car inside
the garage and the other man was pointing a gun at Escober.
Alorte and his companion went up the Vising Electrical Supply.
Escober does not know the real name of Alorte; all the (sic) knows
is Roberto Alorte. Escober does not know the man who was left
near the gate but he knows him by face and he was then in the
courtroom and he pointed to the person who answered by the
name of Macario Punzalan, Jr., his co- accused. Escober did not
see what Punzalan was doing because he, Escober, was made to
climb the vehicle (pick-up). At this point, his gun was in the locker.
He was not able to get that gun when these four men entered
because a gun was already pointed at him. Alorte took Escober's
gun from the locker because he was formerly a security guard at
Vising Electrical Supply for 3 or 4 months. He does not know why
Alorte did not continue his work there. After 5 minutes, after the
two men went up the office, they came down and talked to the
man guarding Escober and Alorte fired at him. He was not hit for
he was able to avoid it and after that, the four men suddenly left.
Escober went down from the pickup and he heard Vicente Chua

calling him and he responded. Chua asked him to call Mrs. Chua at
the house because, according to Chua, their children were
stabbed. So Escober went to the house and called Mrs. Chua.
When Mr. Chua called him, Alorte and his companions were no
longer at the place for, after firing, they hurriedly left. Escober
was able to call Mrs. Chua and she and he, together, returned to
Vising Electrical Supply and upon reaching the place, Mr. Chua
was shouting and he could not understand him because he was
speaking in Chinese. Mrs. Chua went back and got the car, parked
it and returned to the office. When Mr. Chua went out of the
office, he was bringing his son and placed him at the parked car of
the office. When Chua returned to the office (after he called
Escober) and came back out, Escober saw him with his son and
placed him at the balcony. The two children who were stabbed
were carried in two cars because there were only two cars at the
driveway. Escober opened the gate. He does not know to what
hospital they went. After that, he called Jeffrey one of the sons of
the Chuas, so he could help him (Escober) call the police. Jeffrey
was not able to call the police because when Jeffrey gave him a
directory and asked him (Escober) to look for the telephone
number of the police but he told Jeffrey to look it up himself
because his eyes were blurred. After 15 minutes, the police came
and after that, the owner of the security agency arrived. Other
policemen not in uniform also arrived. They interviewed Escober
and forced him to go with them to the police precinct. He refused
because the owner of the agency had not then arrived. When
owner arrived, he called another security guard to guard the
Vising Electrical Supply. The police and the owner of the security
brought Escober to the precinct to get his statement and there
the police was forcing him to adroit he was the one who robbed
and killed the children of the Chuas and he told them do not know
everything. The testimony of Mrs. Chua that she saw him together
with Abuyen Alorte inside the garage is not true because he was
the one who told Mrs. Chua that their children were being
stabbed. When Alorte and his companions left, Mrs. Chua was
finding (sic) to call him (Escober). When he was brought to the
51
precinct, the investigator was typing something. Escober could
recall/remember only his signature. He Identified his statement,
Exhibit I for the defense, Exh. F for the prosecution. He narrated it
there exactly. The signature there are his. He knows the police
who investigated him but he does not know the person. Escober
was at the precinct when he signed his statement. He was there
up (sic) October 3, 1983, the date he testified in court (tsn, 2-13). 3
Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise testified in his defense. The gist of
his testimony is found in his Brief as follows:
PUNZALAN testified on his own behalf (his direct testimony is
found in TSN, pp. 2-35, Nov. 9, 1983). PUNZALAN is a fruit vendor
at "the market of Monumento." In the afternoon of 3 December
1982, according to PUNZALAN, he accepted the invitation of
fugitive ABUYEN/ALORTE for a drink, in a place near Abonce Beer
House; ABUYEN/ALORTE was with two companions whom he
introduced all his relatives; after several drinks, he was requested
to join the group to proceed to another place for which reason
they boarded a tricycle; and the group stopped 'at a place with a
high gate' because ABUYEN/ ALORTE wanted 'to drop by
someone' (TSN, pp. 2-11, November 9, 1983). ABUYEN/ALORTE
knocked at the little door and the security guard (PUNZALAN
Identified accused Escober as the security guard) opened the door
and they greeted each other; ABUYEN/ALORTE then instructed
PUNZALAN "to wait for him outside;" and thereafter
ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions entered the compound
(TSN, pp. 11-14, Nov. 9, 1983).
PUNZALAN further testified that he waited for half an hour for the
group; that while waiting he heard the mourn (sic) of a child that
he was then about to enter the premises but he met
ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions and saw them with
blood stains in their arms;' that ABUYEN/ALORTE and his
companions started running and he followed them; that in
response to his query AB ABUYEN/ALORTE stated that he stabbed

the two [2] children'; and that they boarded a taxi and he was
brought back to our place where we are selling apples' (TSN pp.
14- 18, Nov. 9, 1983)
PUNZALAN was apprehended early dawn of 10 December 1982 at
the Monuments market. No lawyer assisted him during his
custodial investigation despite the fact that he informed the
police officers that he has a lawyer by the name of Atty. Valdez
nor was he informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel. Nevertheless, the police investigator proceeded to
interrogate him. He disclosed that he was invited by Amadeo
Abuyen for a drink; and that they drank beer 'in a place near
Abonce Beer House. "PUNZALAN asserted that, when Exh. M was
presented for his signature he refused to sign (Exh. "M") because
'many statements thereon are not correct that he nevertheless
signed Exh. "M" because he was already tired and was forced to
sign it after they hurt me by boxing me, subjected me to water
therapy and he could not endure the pain, when they gave (him)
the electric shock treatment;" and that the portions of Exh. "M"
which are incorrect are those Identified as Exhs.'11-A and 11-B
(TSN, pp. 19-32, Nov. 9, 1983 ). 4
On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On February 8,
1984, despite his manifestation in open court immediately after the promulgation
of the decision that he was appealing the same to this Court, Atty. Mariano filed a
motion for reconsideration. This was opposed by the prosecution.
Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his appearance on
August 7, 1984 as counsel for accused Escober, and on August 20, 1984, he filed
another motion for reconsideration for the said accused, which was likewise
opposed by the prosecution. After an exchange of pleadings between Atty. Dacanay
and the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order dated November 21, 1984
denying the motions. Hence. the petition in G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic
review.
In G.R. No. 69658, accused-appellant Juan Escober contends that:
52
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING HIS TWO-
PAGE DECISION IMPOSING DEATH SENTENCE IN CULPABLE
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND CONSEQUENTLY IT MUST
BE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, ACQUITTING PETITIONER ...;
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT
PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED PUNZALAN AND
THREE OTHERS ACTED "AS PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION" CONSIDERING THESE CIRCUMSTANCES: FIRST:
(THE) UNLIKELY GARBAGE THROWING REASON OF ACCUSED
ESCOBER (PETITIONER) IN OPENING THE GATE OF THE
COMPOUND IN QUESTION, AGAINST THE TESTIMONY OF HIS CO-
ACCUSED MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR. OF KNOCKING ON THEIR
PART; SECOND THE RITUAL IN AVOIDANCE OF SUSPICION OF
FIRING A GUN JUST BEFORE THE EXIT OF THE CONSPIRATORS AND
VOLUNTEERING THAT HE WAS NOT HIT': AND THIRD: '(T)HE
VERSION OF JUAN ESCOBER 'PETITIONER) REGARDING HIS
ACTUATION DURING THE HALF-HOUR ROBBERY-HOMICIDE WAS
REPLETE WITH CONTRADICTIONS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED FURTHERMORE IN CONVICTING
PETITIONER TO DEATH AS SUCH PRINCIPAL UNDER THE
DECISIONAL LAW ON CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION ... OF SAID DECISION OF JANUARY 10,
1984. 5
These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for Accused-Appellant Juan
Escober filed in G.R. No. 69564.
On his part, Macario Punzalan, Jr. seeks reversal of his conviction on the following
grounds:
PUNZALAN SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; OR AT THE VERY LEAST, HIS
CONVICTION SHOULD BE NULLIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT

PUNZALAN WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO RE MAIN SILENT AND TO
COUNSEL IN ALL OF THE THREE OF THIS CASE: CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION PRELIMINARY IN- INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL ON
THE MERITS;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A MAT TER OF
LAW, PUNZALAN IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBERY;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRINCI PAL
MOTIVE FOR THE CRIME WAS ROBBERY;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ROBBERY WAS IN
FACT COMMITTED;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PUNZALAN ON
THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT;
THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW THE CRIME
WAS COMMITTED, THE LOWER COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, IN RULING THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS
ATTENDED WITH THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
CRUELTY, NIGHTTIME, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH, TREACHERY AND IN BAND. 6
We shall deal first with Escober's assigned errors, particularly the objection
interposed to the form and substance of the decision under review. Accused-
appellant Escober asserts that said decision is null and void for it does not conform
with the requirement of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution and that it was
rendered even before all the stenographic notes of the proceedings had been
transcribed.
We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984 consists of 1-1/2
pages, typed single-space, with a number of handwritten notations and insertions.
It reads:
53
The AMENDED INFORMATION charged the above-named accused
of Robbery with Homicide defined in Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code. It alleged, among others, that on or about December
3, 1982, in Quezon City, said accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by
means of violence and intimidation again persons robbed Vicente
Chua y Ching by entering the premises of No. 24 Joy St. Grace
Village, Quezon City and taking therein P5,000.00 and (sic) by
reason or on the occasion of said robbery employed personal
violence upon minors Irvin Chua y Saw and Tiffany Chua y Saw,
stabbing them and inflicting thereby multiple serious mortal
wounds directly causing their immediate deaths, to the damage of
their heirs.
Prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Vicente
Chua, Mrs. Lina Chua, Domingo Rocero, Oscar Francisco, Amado
V. Ramos, Teodoro Ibuan Abelardo V. Lucero and Dr. Josefina
Qua, and Exhibits "A" to "Z" with sub-exhibits; while Defense
evidence consisted of the testimonies of the two named accused
above and some exhibits, contained in Pages 1 to 454 of the
Records, Volume 2, Vol. 1 and 3.
In view of the foregoing evidence, and considering the
memoranda of both parties, the arguments and authorities cited
therein, this Court finds that the material allegations of the above
information are facts, and that accused Juan Escober y Geralde
and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra are guilty of the charges of
Robbery with Double Homicide, as principals by indispensable
cooperation as defined in article 17, par. 3, with no mitigating
circumstances, and attended by aggravating circumstances of
cruelty, nighttime to insure the commission of the crime, taking
advantage of number and superior strength, treachery, in band,
among others, and that the defenses and excuses of the accused
are unnatural, incredible, contradictory and uncorroborated. The
circumstances pointing to the (sic) this fact, among others, are the
following: The unlikely garbage throwing reason of accused Juan

Escober in opening the gate of the compound in question, against
the testimony of his co-accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. of knocking
on their part; the ritual in avoidance of suspicion of firing a gun
just before the exit of the co-conspirators of Juan Escober, and
volunteering the information that he was not hit. The version of
Juan Escober regarding his actuation during the half-hour robbery
homicide was replete with contradictions. Macario Punzalan
admitted being fetched by, going with and talking to, immediately
prior to taking a tricycle to the said compound, and later acting as
lookout for, his co-conspirators. The Court finds further that the
group took some drinks, not to get drunk admittedly, and
therefore to strengthen their resolve better to commit the crime
planned.
WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan Escober y Geralde and
Macario Punzalan, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged in the amended information, this Court holding
firmly that when a hired security guard opens the compound
under his protection to four men who turn out to be robbers and
murderers or when a former security guard accompanies and
meets with said malefactors immediately before the commission
of the offense and stands guard at the gate and flees with said
malefactors then the burden of proof is shifted to him to
exculpate and excuse himself by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence, which the named accused failed to do, but succeeded
only in insulting this Forum of Truth with their rediculous (sic)
justifications for the brutal and merciless killing of innocent and
helpless children on the occasion of that robbery in question, of
being held-up at gunpoint, of coincidentally being in the act of
throwing garbage and being fired at but not getting hit but not
knowing so many vital details a truthful witness would certainly
not forget, among others, thus that this court after a total
appreciation of all the evidence on record is convinced that there
being apple (sic) circumstances present that could only possibly
point to the guilt of said accused for the most heinous (sic) crime
that deserves the highest penalty, Hereby sentences the said
54
accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. to the
legal punishment provided by Article 294, Paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, which is DEATH and orders
the said accused further to pay the heirs of their victims
compensatory damages of P12,000.00 each, jointly and severally,
and moral damages of P200,000.00 to the said heirs, jointly and
severally.
SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10, 1984. 7
Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which it is based ...
The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems
primarily from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form
conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced.
Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the Amended Information were
the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits supported this
conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-appellant Escober because it was
allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing out what these
contradictions consist of or what "vital details" Escober should have recalled as a
credible witness. He also found the crime to have been attended by the aggravating
circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among
others," but did not particularly state the factual bases for such findings.
As enunciated by this Court in the case of Hernandez v. Colayco, 64 SCRA 480,
reiterating Montelibano v. Director of Lands, 21 Phil. 449; Alindogan v. Insular
Government 15 Phil. 168; City of Manila v. Insular Government, 9 Phil. 71; Enriquez
v. Enriquez, 3 Phil. 746; Braga v. Millora, 3 Phil. 458:
Without the concrete relation or statement in the judgment of
the facts alleged and proved at the trial, it is not possible to pass
upon and determine the issue raised in litigation, inasmuch as
when the facts held to be proved are not set forth in a judicial
controversy, it is impossible to administer justice, to apply the law

to the points argued, or to uphold the rights of the litigant who
has the law on his side.
It is not sufficient that the court or trial judge take into account
the facts brought out in an action suit, the circumstances of each
question raised, and the nature and condition of the proofs
furnished by the parties. He must also set out in his decision the
facts alleged by the contending parties which he finds to have
been proven. The conclusions deduced therefrom and the opinion
he has formed on the issues raised; then only can be intelligently
set forth the legal grounds and considerations proper in his
opinion for the due determination of the case.
As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof extremely difficult. Without a
particularization of the evidence, testimonial or documentary, upon which the
findings of facts are based, it is practically impossible for the appellate court to
determine whether or not such findings were sufficiently and logically supported by
the evidence relied upon by the trial court.
Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have appreciated the efforts shown
by respondent-judge to administer justice in this case in the most speedy and
expeditious manner. He obviously took to heart our admonition that judges do not
have to wait for the transcription of stenographic notes before rendering judgments
but can rely on the notes of the proceedings personally taken by them. For this is
what respondent judge did. The records show that he took copious notes of the
testimonies of the witnesses on which he apparently based this decision, as the
transcript of the stenographic notes were not yet complete at the time of the
rendition of the judgment. In fact, the review of the case suffered some delay due
to the failure of stenographer Eduardo Bober to submit to this Court the transcript
of stenographic notes of some hearings.
Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern of courts
and judges. More than this is the essentiality of justice and fairness which is the
primordial objective of the courts. Respondent judge lamentably disregarded the
latter for the former.
55
The decision of January 10, 1987 calls to mind the decision rendered by another
trial court in the case of People v. Banayo, 129 SCRA 725, regarding which We said:
At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim view of the apparently
indifferent attitude displayed by the trial court towards a murder
case it has tried as shown by the rendition of a decision, the body
of which contains only 63 lines spread out over less than three
typewritten pages, double-spaced and wide-margined. While
brevity should characterize a court's decision and length is not
necessarily determinative of its quality, the lower court in
deciding this murder case nonetheless should have outlined in
greater and more satisfactory detail the evidence presented by
both prosecution and the defense, the facts as found by the trial
judge based on the evidence on record and the jurisprudence and
the authorities supporting the court's decision.
This trial judge failed to do. There is not one single citation of
authority in the decision. The issues raised by the appellant
include allegations of concocted testimony, the nature of a dying
declaration, premeditation, conspiracy, treachery and superior
strength. The issues raised are quite serious and they deserved
better treatment. [Emphasis supplied].
With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to the
requirements of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the case should have
been remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new judgment. However,
since the records of the case, including all evidence necessary for a determination
of the innocence or guilt of the accused- appellants are now before Us, We deem it
wise to render judgment in this case in order to accord the accused-appellants their
right to a speedy disposition of their cases. 8
The prosecution's theory is that Juan Escober is a principal by indispensable
cooperation in the crime of robbery with homicide. In support thereof, it tried to
prove that Escober's actuations during the incident in question were done with the
knowledge of and pursuant to said nefahous plan. These acts consist of- [1] his
alleged act of opening the gate of the compound to his co-conspirators; [2] his

having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind Alorte/Abuyen, the alleged
mastermined, after the gunshot; and [3] his having volunteered the information to
Mrs. Chua that he was not hit. The prosecution further attempted to show that the
gun-firing was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion and that Escober's version of
the incident is too replete with contradictions to merit belief.
After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that the guilt of Juan Escober has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an innocent gesture. One
who imputes an evil motive or purpose thereto must prove his allegations
convincingly. In the case at bar, even if the version of Macario Punzalan, Jr. that
Escober opened the gate at the knock of the alleged mastermind Amadeo
Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were to be believed, the same would not constitute
sufficient and convincing proof that Escober had knowledge of the nefarious plan.
The worse that could be attributed to him is lack of better judgment or laxity in the
performance of his duties as a security guard in having failed to exercise the
minimum precaution dictated by his occupation to exclude from the premises being
guarded persons who have not demonstrated any legitimate reason for getting in.
For it must be remembered that having been co-employees, Escober knew
Abuyen/Alorte. It was therefore not surprising that he should open the gate for
him. In fact, even Domingo Rocero, the security guard who replaced Abuyen/Alorte
and who was not as familiar with Abuyen/Alorte admitted on his Sworn Statement
having allowed Abuyen/Alorte into the compound thus:
20.T Mula ng manungkulan ka sa Bee Seng
Electrical Supply, ilang beses mo ng nakita si
Roberto Alorte sa malapit sa iyong
pinagguaguardiayahan?
S Dalawang beses ko na po siyang nakita sa
lugar na iyon, una noong buwan ng Septyembre
at pangalawa noong buwan November 1982.
21.T Ano ang dahilan at nakikita mo siya sa lugar
na iyan?
56
S Una binisita niya ako at pangalawa mayroon
siyang kasamang babae at hindi ko na siya
pinapasok sa loob ng Bee Seng Electrical
Supply. 9
The facts of the case likewise do not support the prosecution's theory that the gun-
firing incident was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion. We share the keen
observation of counsel for Escober that "... it is not a common experience that a
person allows himself to be shot by a gun. He would be the stupidest person on
earth if he allows that ... to avoid suspicion that he was in cahoots [sic] with
malefactors The least or perhaps the safest way for that evil purpose is to allow
himself to be rendered ineffective, i.e., by tieing [sic] him up, mauling him or
wounding him so he would live if he were a conspirator. To allow him to be shot by
a gun is too risky a ritual for he might get killed. 10
Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated within a span of 5-10 minutes,
not half an hour as found by the trial court, a time too short to enable
Abuyen/Alorte and Escober to contrive such a ritual or scenario, or if it were a pre-
conceived plan, for Abuyen/Aorte to have remembered it considering the
unexpected apprearance of Lina Chua at the scene and the need for immediate
escape.
Even assuming arguendo that the gun was fired in the air and not at Escober, the
same could have been done to scare Lina Chua away from the scene of the crime
rather than to divert suspicion from Escober.
That the gun-firing was not a ritual and that Escober was not a part of the criminal
plan are further bolstered by the statement made by Macario Punzalan during the
preliminary investigation, and extra-judicial statement of the alleged mastermind
Abuyen /Alorte dated April 16, 1986, submitted by the prosecution as Exhibit B
during the separate trial of said Abuyen/Alorte. The pertinent portion of Macario
Punzalan's statement reads:
FISCAL: Ito ba si Abuyen at saka si Juan Escober
at Abuyen ay matagal ng magkakilala?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko po alam sir, dahil po sa
guardiya po dati yung Alorte.
FISCAL: Ito ba ang kasalukuyang guardia
[referring to Escober]
PUNZALAN: Oho, siya po ang naka guardia noon.
[duty]
FISCAL: Noong pagkatapos ng pag-uusap nila
ano pa ang ginawa? Kung mayroon pa?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ko na po nakikita sir.
FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay
sumama ba?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.
FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober nakita mong
umakyat?
PUNZALAN: Hind ho, kung baga sa ano ay
pinapapatay ho sa akin ni Abuyen ni Alorte.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang
dahilan.
FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.
PUNZALAN: Hindi po.
FISCAL: Bakit?
57
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam
nga ang dahilan, sir, kasi po ay gusto kong
mahuli yung Abuyen, sapagkat iyon pong talaga
ang utak eh. 11
On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial statement reads in part:
... Pagkatapos ay sumakay kami sa tricycle at nakarating kami sa
bahay ni Mr. Chua ng bandana alas 8:00 ng gabi ng petsa 3 ng
Desiyembre. Pagdating namin doon ay kumatok ako at binuksan
naman ako ng guwardia dahil kakilala ko. Kinumusta ko muna siya
kong paano ang buhay-buhay niya. Habang nagkakamustahan
kami ay bigla ko siyang tinutukan ng aking baril sinabi ko sa kanya
na pasensiya na siya. Pinakuha ko ngayon kay DON-DON iyong
baril na .22 kalibre sa lalagyan nito. Pagkatapos ay sabay pumasok
si DON-DON at si REY sa opisina ni Mr. Chua. Ako naman ay
pumuesto sa labas ng opisina at sa gate ay si KUMANG. Nang
nakapuesto na ako sa pintuan ay pumalag itong guwardiya na si
Escober na hindi an pala ginapos nitong si KUMANG. Nang makita
ko ay binaril ko siya pero hindi siya tinamaan. Noong matapos
kong barilin si ESCOBER ay niyaya ko na sila at tumakbo na kami
... 12
These exculpatory statements, although emanating from alleged co- conspirators
and therefore may ordinarily be considered "polluted," deserve credence.
Punzalan's statement, it must be observed, is not even responsive to the question
being asked. The spontaneous and candid manner by which it was given lends
credence to his statement, that Abuyen/Alorte wanted Escober killed. This
statement, together with the statement of Abuyen/ Alorte that he himself fired at E
scober although the latter was not hit, unwittingly corroborates Escober's version
that the gun was aimed at him. That Escober was not thereby hit should not be
taken as conclusive proof that the gun-firing was a mere ritual because the same
could be easily occasioned by a poor aim and/ or the hurried manner of its
execution.

On the other hand, We see no reason why Abuyen/Alorte should absolve Escober of
any complicity in the crime if this were not the truth. The usual practice is for a
conspirator to exculpate himself and pass on the blame to a co-conspirator,
particularly in a case such as this where the crime charged is indeed very grave and
serious. However undesirable a person may seem, there may be left in him a sense
of justice and fairness. Without passing judgment on Abuyen/Alorte, We believe
that it was this sense of justice and fairness that moved him to disclose the truth in
his extrajudicial confession.
Escober's unilateral offer of the information that he was not hit does not prove
either that he was a co-conspirator. It was but natural that he would want to inform
and assure his superior who is presumed to be concerned with his safety and well-
being. The motivation attached to said act by the prosecution is therefore too
conjectural and far-fetched to pass the test of logic and reason.
The only evidence of the prosecution which may lead to a conclusion of Escober's
complicity is the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua that upon hearing a shot, she looked
at the garage where the shot sounded to have come from and saw Abuyen/Alorte
walking towards the gate with Escober about a meter behind.
We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy of this statement. We
observe that Mrs. Lina Chua was the last among the prosecution witnesses to give
her statement to the police. She gave her statement on December 8, 1983 when
none of the accused had been apprehended. So, soon after the violent incident her
appreciation of what she saw may have been faulty when she attributed the blame
on Escober whose lack of better judgment and laxity in the performance of his job
resulted in the tragic event.
Taken in conjunction with the extra-judicial confession of Abuyen/Alorte quoted
above, Mrs. Chua's narration of the situation would suffer from inaccuracy, aside
from being susceptible to other interpretations. Abuyen/Alorte declared that
immediately after the shooting, he called his companions and ran away from the
scene of the crime. Punzalan's testimony was of the same tenor, i.e., that
Abuyen/Alorte and his companions started running and he [Punzalan] followed
them. This was precisely the moment when the malefactors were fleeing from the
scene of the crime, and at which point Escober could have felt safe enough to
58
emerge from the pick-up where he was held captive. Thus, Mrs. Chua claims to
have seen Escober about a meter behind Abuyen/ Alorte, who was not walking, but
running away from the scene of the crime.
Indeed, it was not unlikely for Mrs. Chua to misinterpret the situation she described
having seen. She was then in an agitated condition on seeing the pedestrian gate of
the compound open, which was Escober's duty to keep closed. Moreover, from the
relative positions of Mrs. Chua, Abuyen/Alorte and Escober, the line of vision of
Mrs. Chua was such that it would be difficult for her to determine for certain the
distance between Abuyen/Alorte and Escober and whether the latter was merely
walking behind the former or in fact chasing him.
Additionally, in her testimony on August 1, 1986 in the separate trial of
Abuyen/Alorte, she declared that 'they [referring to Abuyen/Alorte and Escober]
were walking towards the gate; they were nagmamadali [in a hurry]." 13This
description given by Lina Chua does not jibe with the impression gathered from her
previous statement of seeing Escober walking behind Abuyen/Alorte. The element
of speed injected into the 'walking" by the descriptive term 'nagmamadali"
corroborates Abuyen/ Alorte's declaration that after firing the gun, he ran away
from the scene of the crime, and tills can be interpreted to mean that Escober was
indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte.
The fact that the accused was at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish his
criminal liability. To hold the accused guilty as co-principal in the
crime charged, the existence of conspiracy between the accused
and the actual killers, must be shown, and the same degree of
proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a
finding of the presence of the conspiracy, i.e., it must be shown to
exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime
itself. 14
The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that [1] Escober had knowledge of the criminal design
and [2] that his acts during the commission of the crime, such as the opening of the
gate and having been behind Abuyen after the gunshot, were performed pursuant
 59

to said nefarious plot. This being the case, the prosecution's reliance on the alleged
inconsistencies in Escober's testimony regarding his actuations during the incident
at bar can not improve its case. To convict on this basis is repugnant to the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved 15 and its corollary rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 16
Indeed, the accidents of Escober being on duty during the commission of the crime
and his having opened the gate to persons who turned out to be robbers and killers
make him an easy suspect. A less discerning mind could have been blinded by these
suspicions and compassion for the two hapless victims. But convictions can never
rest on mere suspicions, however, grave and serious.
We now turn to Macario Punzalan's case. He contends having been denied his
rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation, the
preliminary investigation and the trial on the merits.
ng isa para sa iyo ang hukuman na hindi mo na kailangang
bayaran ang paglilingkod nito.
3. Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng anomang
pahayag na maaaring gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo.
4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin,o gamitan ng anomang uring
karahasan o pamilit para ikaw ay magbigay ng salaysay.
Tanong — Pagkatapos na malaman mo,
maipaunawa sa iyo at mapagpaalalahanan ka ng
iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas
ng Pilipinas, nahahanda ka bang magbigay ng
isang malaya at kusang loob ng salaysay?
Sagot — Opo.

Punzalan's extra-judicial statement 17 is prefaced by the for lowing: Tanong — Nahahanda kang magbigay ng
salaysay kahit na walang abogado na
PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATAN SA ILALIM NG SALIGANG sumusubaybay sa iyo habang ikaw ay
BATAS NG PILIPINAS. sinisiyasat?

Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong sa himpilang ito ng Sagot— Opo.

pulisya hinggil sa isang usaping kinasasangkutan mo sa salang
PAGNANAKAW NA MAY KASAMANG PAGPATAY. Bago ka tanungin Tanog— Lubos mo bang naunawaan na ikaw ay
ng anoman, ipinauunawa ko muna sa iyo at pinagpapaalalahanan hindi maaaring pilitin or gamitan ng anomang
ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, uri ng karahasan upang maging saksi laban sa
tulad ng mga sumusunod: iyong sarili?

1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik at huwag magsalita Sagot— Opo.

o magbigay ng salaysay kung hindi mo nais.
Tanong— Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang
2. Ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng paglilingkod ng isang ipinaunawa sa iyo magbibigay ka pa rin ba ng
abogado na iyong mapipili. Kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng salaysay?
abogado, at nais mong magkaroon ng paglilingkod nito maglalaan
Sagot— Opo.
 60

called "informing" done by the Spolice in the case at bar was nothing more than a
superficial and mechanical act, gperformed not so much to attain the objectives of
the fundamental law as to give da semblance of compliance thereto. Besides, the
phraseology used by the police .respecting the appointment of counsel de oficio for
Punzalan was misleading. It gives M the impression that the services of a counsel de
oficio can be availed of by Punzalan
a only during the court proceedings, not during
the custodial investigation. c
a
Not having been fully and truly rinformed of his right to counsel, the waiver
appearing in Punzalan's extrajudicial
i statement cannot be considered intelligently
made. For this reason, aside from o the fact that it was done without the assistance
G 19 Needless to say, the extrajudicial confession is
of counsel, said waiver is not valid.
inadmissible in evidence. 20 .
P
With respect to Punzalan not having
u been represented by counsel during the
preliminary investigation, sufficen it to say that such irregularity which amounts to an
absence of preliminary investigation,
z should have been raised before the trial court,
Philippine jurisprudence is uniform
a and consistent in ruling that:
l
The question aof absence of a proper preliminary investigation is
also better inquired
n into by the Court below. When so raised, this
Court, speaking, through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held
that the trial Court
J is called upon 'not to dismiss the information
but hold the case
r in abeyance and conduct its own investigation
or require the. fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. As stressed in
People vs. Casiano, I SCRA 478 (1 961), this is the proper
Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional question in Escober's extra- procedure since the 'absence of such investigation did not impair
judicial statement, 18 the latter carried the same quoted prefatory statement. This, the validity of the Information or otherwise render it defective.
to our mind, indicates the lack of zeal and initiative on the part of the investigating Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First
officers to fully and truly inform Punzalan of his rights to remain silent and to Instance. The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable
counsel during the custodial investigation. The Identical manner by which the police does not argue against the validity of the proceedings, the most
sought to inform Escober and Punzalan of their constitutional rights shows a blatant that could have been done being to remand the case in order that
disregard for individual comprehensive ability arising from differences in such investigation could be conducted.
intelligence level, educational background and personal experiences. No effort was
exerted to see to it that Punzalan really understood what was being told, ... the proper forum before which absence of preliminary
considering his low educational attainment of Grade 2 Elementary level. The so- investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance,
 61

not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide
preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 24
court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could
even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1984 in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of
to be inquired into by the trial courts, not an appellate court. 21 the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Juan
Escober y Geralde is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
While it may be conceded that it would have been more judicious for the trial court his immediate release from confinement is ordered, unless detained for some other
to appoint a counsel de oficio for Punzalan other than the counsel de parte of his crimes. Accused- appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra is hereby found guilty
co-accused Escober, such failure did not constitute prejudicial error to warrant beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the complex crime of Robbery with
nullification of the proceedings taken against Punzalan. There is no evidence that Homicide and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
Atty. Mariano was biased in favor of Escober to the prejudice of Punzalan. The perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000,00,
records show that Atty. Mariano defended both accused with equal zeal and vigor
and that Punzalan was able to present his defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's SO ORDERED.
version of having knocked that the trial court believed. In the final analysis, the only
prejudice Punzalan might have suffered was the failure of Atty. Mariano to cross-
examine Escober on the latter's testimony regarding Punzalan's presence at the
scene of the crime. 22 Escober's testimony, however, was merely corroborative of
the testimonies of Lina Chua and Domingo Rocero, witnesses for the prosecution
who were cross-examined by Atty. Mariano. 23

Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had established the fact of
robbery and we are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Punzalan knew of
such plan. It is incredible that his three companions would fetch him on the pretext
of drinking beer and just bring him along to the scene of crime, thereby risking
another eyewitness to the perpetration thereof. Punzalan's flight from the scene of
the crime with his companions and his failure, if he were truly innocent, to report to
the police what he knew about the crime after reading it in the newspapers further
demonstrate his knowledge of the plan.

While it has been established that Punzalan's participation in the crime was to act
as a look-out, and as such, he did not participate in the killing of the two helpless
victims, he cannot evade responsibility therefor. Well-established is the rule in this
jurisdiction that whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence of or
on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
commission of the robbery are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GILBERT ELIJORDE y DE LA CRUZ
and REYNALDO PUNZALAN y ZACARIAS alias KIRAT, accused-appellants.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
GILBERT ELIJORDE Y DE LA CRUZ and REYNALDO PUNZALAN Y ZACARIAS
alias Kirat were convicted of murder by the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the
killing of Eric Hierro. Both accused were sentenced to death and ordered jointly and
severally to indemnify the heirs of Eric Hierro P50,000.00 plus P35,000.00 for actual
damages, P100,000.00 for moral damages and P25,000.00 for exemplary
damages. The case is now with us on automatic review.
The records show that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 21 May 1995 Eric
Hierro, Benjamin Visbal and Rodel Contemplado were drinking in the house of the
latter. Sometime later, Hierro and Visbal went out to buy mango at a nearby sari-sari
store. Accused Gilbert Elijorde, Reynaldo Punzalan and a certain Edwin Menes were
at the time in front of the store. As Menes approached Hierro the latter warned
Menes, Dont touch me, my clothes will get dirty. Suddenly Menes punched Hierro on
the face, followed by Elijorde who also boxed Hierro on the face, and Punzalan who
kicked Hierro at the back. Hierro and Visbal ran for their lives. They sought shelter at
Contemplados house. After some three (3) minutes, Hierro went out of the house to
go home together with Visbal and the latters wife.
As they walked home, Visbal noticed the accused Elijorde, Punzalan and Menes
waiting for them. As Hierro and company drew near, Punzalan kicked Hierro at the
back for the second time.Visbal tried to retaliate by punching Punzalan on the
face but was held back by his wife. Hierro ran away pursued by Elijorde. They were
followed by Visbal. Elijorde stabbed Hierro at the back.When Hierro fell down,
Elijorde placed himself on top of Hierro who was now raising his arms defensively
and pleading, Maawa na kayo, huwag ninyo akong patayin, wala akong kasalanan
sa inyo. Despite the pleas of Hierro for mercy, Elijorde stabbed him with a knife on
the chest and then fled. Visbal and his wife brought Hierro to the hospital where he
died soon after.
Dr. Benito Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer of Bocaue, Bulacan, conducted a
post-mortem examination of Eric Hierro, and reported that the cause of his death
62
was shock resulting from multiple stab wounds in the thorax penetrating the aorta
and vena cava.[1]
Gilbert Elijorde, Reynaldo Punzalan and Edwin Menes alias Nonong[2] were
accordingly charged in an Information for murder of Eric Hierro qualified by
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. But only Elijorde
and Punzalan were arrested and tried. Menes has since remained at large.
Both accused contend that the court a quo erred in finding that treachery
qualified the killing of Hierro to murder, and in finding Punzalan guilty of murder by
reason of conspiracy with Elijorde.The defense argues that Punzalan did not conspire
with Elijorde because the only participation of Punzalan in the commission of the
offense was his kicking of Hierro twice: first, after Hierro was boxed by Elijorde and
Menes in front of the nearby sari sari store, and the second time, when Hierro was
on his way home; that Punzalan remained in the place where he kicked Hierro and
did nothing more; that he did not join or cooperate with Elijorde in pursuing and
stabbing the deceased; and, that the acts of kicking Hierro were neither in pursuance
of the same criminal design of Elijorde nor done in concert aimed at the attainment
of the same objective of killing Hierro.
Indeed, with respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot assert
with moral certainty that he is guilty of murder. To convict him as a principal by direct
participation in the instant case, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and his
co-accused Elijorde be proved. That, precisely, is wanting in the present
case. Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and
convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture.[3] To hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act
in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[4] Hence, conspiracy exists in a
situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions
impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about
the death of the victim.[5] In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by
proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yield the reasonable inference that the
doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in
every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite
quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference.[6]
Clearly, the testimony of eyewitness Benjamin Visbal narrated the
circumstances surrounding the killing of Hierro, to wit:
 63

Q: Now, you said that Eric Hierro went to the store to buy mango, do you know A: Yes, Your Honor.
the reason why there was a boxing incident?
Q: When the three of you went out what happened?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: While we were walking home this Kirat (Reynaldo Punzalan) suddenly kicked
Q: What was the reason? Eric Hierro at the back.

A: When Nongnong approached Eric, Eric stated, "Dont touch me, my clothes will Q: Do you mean to say aside from the first incident Kirat kicked Eric Hierro,
become dirty." (during) the second incident Kirat kicked Eric Hierro?

Q: Who is this Nongnong? A: Yes, Your Honor.

A: Edwin Meneses,[7] Your Honor. Q: When you were approaching, how many of them were there waiting for Eric
Hierro?
Q: When Eric Hierro said that what did Edwin Menes(es ) do?
A: The three of them were waiting for Eric Hierro but during the chasing it was
A: He suddenly punched Eric Hierro.
only Gilbert Elijorde who chased us.
Q: When Eric Hierro (was) punched what did this Gilbert Elijorde do?
Q; What did Edwin do during the second incident?
A: Gilbert Elijorde also punched Eric Hierro.
A: He did nothing.
Q: How about Reynaldo Punzalan?
Q: How about Kirat?
A: Reynaldo Punzalan kicked Hierro at the back, Your Honor.
A: He kicked Eric Hierro at the back.
Q: That was during the first incident?
Q: After that what did you do?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: I cant (sic) do anything, Your Honor, because I was being held by my wife.
Q: You mean to say they were three at that time?
Q: How about Eric Hierro what did he do?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: He ran away x x x x
Q: Now, after that Eric Hierro went home?
Q: While Eric Hierro was running did you see that Gilbert stab Eric at the back?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How long did Eric Hierro stayed (sic) at that place?
Q: That was the first stab that was made by Gilbert is that correct?
A: For about three (3) minutes, Your Honor.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: When Eric Hierro went out you went with him together with Eric Hierro?
Q: What happened to Eric when he was stabbed at the back?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: He continued running, Your Honor.
Q: Together with your wife?

Q: And how about Gilbert what did Gilbert do?
A: He continued chasing, Your Honor.
Q: How about your wife where was your wife?
A: At my back, Your Honor.
Q: When you met Eric Hierro at a certain point what did you actually see?
A: That was when I saw Gilbert stab Eric Hierro right on the chest.
Q: And when Eric Hierro was already lying (facing?) up?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And Gilbert was on top of Eric Hierro?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And you saw Gilbert stab Eric Hierro?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How many times?
A: Only once, Your Honor.
Q: During those incidents where was Kirat?
A: He did not run after Eric Hierro. He remained in front of the house of my cousin
Rodel.
On the basis of the above testimony, the only involvement of Punzalan
was kicking Hierro at the back before the latter was pursued and stabbed by accused
Elijorde. After kicking the victim, Punzalan remained where he was and did not
cooperate with Elijorde in pursuing Hierro to ensure that the latter would be
killed. There is no other evidence to show unity of purpose and design between
Punzalan and Elijorde in the execution of the killing, which is essential to establish
conspiracy. His act of kicking Hierro prior to the actual stabbing by Elijorde does not
of itself demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of purpose and action. For it is
possible that the accused Punzalan had no knowledge of the common design, if there
was any, nor of the intended assault which was committed in a place far from where
he was. The mere kicking does not necessarily prove intention to kill. The evidence
64
does not show that Punzalan knew that Elijorde had a knife and that he intended to
use it to stab the victim.[8] Neither can Punzalan be considered an accomplice in the
crime of murder. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice in the
commission of the offense, the following requisites must concur: (a) community of
design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between
the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or
intentionally rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the
criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable
either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the
accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation. There is nothing on record to show that accused Punzalan knew that
Elijorde was going to stab Hierro, thus creating serious doubt on Punzalans criminal
intent.[9]
In the absence of a previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal
responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is
individual and not collective, and that each of the participants is liable only for his
own acts.[10] Consequently, accused Punzalan must be absolved from all responsibility
for the killing of Hierro. It may be emphasized that at the time accused Elijorde
intervened in the assault, Punzalan had already desisted from his own acts of
aggression. He did nothing in fact to assist Elijorde in the immediate commission of
the murder. Moreover, the act of kicking by Punzalan prior to the actual stabbing by
Elijorde was evidently done without knowledge of the criminal design on the part of
the latter as that design had not yet been revealed prior to the killing of Hierro.
As regards the kicking of the victim by Punzalan, which the latter admits, there
is nothing on record to show that the kicking resulted in any injury on any part of the
body of Hierro. Neither is there any evidence that the victim was hit at all when
Punzalan kicked him. Of what then can Punzalan be held liable?
With regard to the principal accused Gilbert Elijorde, the trial court correctly
ruled that treachery attended the killing of Hierro thus qualifying the crime to
murder. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any

defense which the offended party might make. The fact that a verbal confrontation
accompanied by physical assault by the group of Elijorde preceded the actual killing
did not negate the treacherous character of the stabbing which resulted in the death
of Hierro. After the first physical assault which sent Hierro retreating and seeking
shelter in the house of a friend, the victim did not expect that the accused would
persist in inflicting harm upon him who, unaware of the impending danger,
proceeded home with his friends. Unfortunately, however, Elijorde was waiting for
the deceased and pursued him to his end. After stabbing Hierro at the back, and if
only to ensure the success of his criminal design, accused Elijorde persistently chased
his unarmed quarry until he finally overpowered his victim and delivered the fatal
stab on his chest. In one case, treachery was present where the accused stabbed the
victim with a bladed weapon even as his hands were raised and he was pleading for
mercy.[11] In another case where the accused who was armed with a revolver had an
altercation with the victim, fired at him, pursued him, and when cornered he
(victim) threw himself on the floor, raised his hands and begged the defendant not
to shoot him as he was already wounded, but the malefactor just the same shot him
thrice, we held that there was treachery in the killing.[12]
We likewise agree with the trial court when it disregarded the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength alleged in the
Information. No sufficient evidence exists to show that the requisites of evident
premeditation were present, to wit: (a) the time when the offender decided to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his
determination to commit it; and, (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act and for his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to
hearken to its warnings.[13] Where there is no showing that the accused Elijorde prior
to the night of the commission of the crime resolved to kill the victim nor proof that
such killing was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part, evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated against him.[14] Moreover, the time interval of
three (3) minutes between the first and the second assault on Hierro is too brief to
have enabled Elijorde to ponder over what he intended to do with
Hierro. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery;
hence, it cannot be appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance when
treachery is already present.[15]
65
The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by RA 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. As regards the accused Gilbert Elijorde,
the killing although qualified by treachery was not attended by any generic modifying
circumstance; consequently, the penalty to be imposed upon him must be the
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.[16] With respect to the accused Reynaldo
Punzalan, he should be acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.
Although not objected to by the accused, we modify the award of damages
adjudged by the court a quo in favor of the heirs of the victim, particularly with
regard to the moral and exemplary damages. The award of P100,000.00 for moral
damages may seem excessive considering the purpose of the award which is not to
enrich the heirs but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings. [17] For this
reason, an award of P50,000.00 may be adequate and reasonable.[18] The exemplary
damages awarded by the trial court may be deleted since they are granted only when
the crime is committed with one (1) or more aggravating circumstances. In the
instant case, treachery may no longer be considered as an aggravating circumstance
since it was already taken as a qualifying circumstance in the murder, and abuse of
superior strength which would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary damages
was already absorbed in the treachery.[19] But the indemnity for death fixed
at P50,000.00 and the actual damages representing uncontested funeral expenses
of P35,000.00 should be affirmed.
On the part of accused Reynaldo Punzalan as there is no finding of criminal
responsibility against him, only accused Gilbert Elijorde should bear the liability for
such civil indemnity as well as the actual and moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. Accused GILBERT
ELIJORDE y DE LA CRUZ is found GUILTY of MURDER and is accordingly sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. Accused REYNALDO PUNZALAN y ZACARIAS is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged and is ordered RELEASED FROM CUSTODY IMMEDIATELY unless
legally held for another cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to
report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt
hereof. Accused ELIJORDE is solely held responsible for the payment to the heirs of
the victim Eric Hierro the amounts of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, P35,000.00 for
actual damages and P50,000.00 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

KINGSTON(E) LI Y NUNEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On 19 April 1993, the relative early morning calm in General Luna Street,
Barangay Bangkal, Makati, was shattered when a petty argument evolved into a
street brawl. After the dust had settled, eighteen (18) -year old Christopher Arugay
(Arugay) lay dying from multiple stab wounds, while his neighbor, twenty-four (24)-
year old Kingstone[1] Li (Li), staggered injured, with hack wounds on his head.
Li was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch
148, with the crime of Homicide.[3] On 5 January 1994, after trial, he was found
[2]
guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals Fifteenth Division in
a Decision[4] dated 6 September 1996.
The version presented by the prosecution as to the antecedent facts leading to
Arugays death differs sharply from the version offered by Li. The accused claims that
the dispute stemmed from a spurned offer to drink, while the prosecution traces the
root of the fight to an indecorous bath in public.
The story of the prosecution was told by the witnesses Aubrey dela Camara
(dela Camara) and Ronaldo Tan (Tan).[5]
Shortly before his death, Arugay was watching television at home with his
sisters Cristy and Baby Jane, his girlfriend dela Camara and Baby Janes boyfriend,
Tan. At around 1:15 in the early morning, dela Camara and Tan suddenly heard a
noise outside. Peering through the window, they saw Li and a certain Eduardo Eddie
66
Boy Sangalang taking a bath completely naked. The two were facing the house of the
Arugays.[6]
Enraged, Arugay yelled, Pare bastos kayo, bat kayo nakahubad?[7]
Li shouted back, Putang Ina! and threw something at the Arugays
house. Sangalang also yelled, Putang Ina mo, lumabas ka, papatayin kita![8]
An incensed Arugay went out the house where he was met by Li, now wearing
briefs and carrying a baseball bat. Li struck Arugay on the head with the bat, causing
Arugay to fall. Li ran back to his house. Tan and dela Camara assisted Arugay and were
trying to drag him back to his house when Li re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li
then stabbed Arugay once.[9]
Immediately thereafter, dela Camara was confronted by Lis sister, Kristine, who
proceeded to pull her hair and slap her around. Kristine also wielded a bolo, with
which she hacked dela Camara in the arm. Although preoccupied under the
circumstances, dela Camara was able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at least once, so
she claimed.[10]
Tan saw Arugay run towards the street after he was stabbed, with Li and
Sangalang chasing him. He saw nothing further of the incident, according to him. [11]
In their respective testimonies, dela Camara and Tan are unable to account for
the fact that before the fight ended, Li also lay wounded with multiple hack wounds
on his head and body. This fact lies at the crux of the petitioners defense.
On the other hand, Li presents a different version.
Li encountered Arugay out on the street on the night of 18 April 1993, a few
hours before the brawl. Arugay was carrying a bayong containing various liquors. He
invited Li to a drinking session which the latter refused as he had work the following
day.[12]
Early the next morning, around one oclock a.m., Li was watching television at
his home with his friend Ricky Amerol when they heard objects being thrown at the
house. Peeping through the window, they saw Arugay and dela Camara in front of
the gate throwing stones and bottles at the direction of Lis house. The stones broke
window jalousies and also struck Amerol. At the same time, Arugay was also hurling
invectives at Li.[13]
 67

Annoyed, Li opened the door asking, Pare, ano ba problema mo? Wala naman Wounds stab:
kaming kasalanan sa yo. Arugay and his girlfriend just kept on stoning the house and
hurling invectives at petitioner. Arugay kicked the gate but Li prevented him from 1. 3.0 cm., long, spindle[-]shaped edges, irregular, oriented, horizontally,
opening it. Arugay then ran towards his house across the street.[14] with a sharp, medial and a blunt lateral extremeties, located at the
anterior chest wall, left side, 15.0 cm. from the anterior median line,
Li tried to fix the gate, which had become misaligned and its lock destroyed as
directed upwards, backwards and medially, involving the skin and
a result of the kicking. Reacting, he saw Arugay coming out of the house armed with
soft tissues only with an approximate depth of 4.0 cm.
two kitchen knives. In response, Li went inside his house and got a baseball
bat. When he returned to the street, Arugay attacked him with a knife. Li managed
2. 4.0 cm., long, spindle shaped edges irregular, with a sharp inferolateral
to avoid Arugays thrusts and hit Arugay with the baseball bat on the right
and blunt supero-medial extremeties, located at the anterior
shoulder. Arugay ran back to his house shouting, The long one! The long one! Li also
abdominal wall, right side, 0.5 cm. from the anterior median line,
dashed back to his house but before he was able to enter the door, he saw Arugay
directed upwards , backwards and medially involving the skin and
carrying a two-foot long bolo, running towards him. On Arugays heels were Ronaldo
soft tissues, laceration of the diaphragm and the right lobe of the
Tan and Aubrey dela Camara.[15]
liver, with an approximate depth of 10.0 cm.
Arugay tried to hit Li with the bolo. Li raised his right hand to protect himself
but Arugay was able to hit him on his right temple and right wrist. Not content, 3. 1.5 cm. long, spindle shape[d] edges irregular oriented almost
Arugay hit Li on the right shoulder. Li passed out.[16] horizontally with a sharp lateral and blunt medial extremeties,
located at the anterior abdominal wall, left side, 9.0 cm. from the
Upon regaining consciousness, Li tried to crawl back to his house but Ronald
anterior median line, directed backwards, upwards and medially
Tan hit him at the back of his left ear with a baseball bat. Eventually, Li managed to
involving the skin and soft tissues, penetrating the transverse colon
get back to the house and was brought to the Makati Medical Center by Amerol
with an approximate depth of 12.0 cm.
and Barangay Tanod Eduardo Reyes.[17]

On cross-examination, Li admitted that Eduardo Sangalang was also in his house
at the time the incident started. Sangalang was the boyfriend of Lis half-sister,
Cristy.[18]
Dr. Alberto Reyes of the Medico Legal Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of Arugay. He
noted the following injuries:
4. 1.5 cm. long, spindle, edges irregular oriented almost horizontally with
a sharp poster-lateral a blunt antero medial extremities located at
the anterior chest wall right side, 21.0 cm. from the anterior median
line, directed backward, upwards and medially involving the skin
and soft tissues penetrating the 8th intercostals space, into the
diaphragm and right lobe of the liver, with an approximate depth of
12.0 cm.

Pallor, lips and nailbeds.

Hemoperitoneum 1,500 c.c.

Contusion, arm, right, poster-lateral, 5.0 x 3.0 cm.

Brain and other visceral organs, pale.

Wounds, incised, scalp, parieto-occipital, right, 6.0 cm.; anterior sheet,

Stomach, half-full with rice and brownish fluid.
left side, suprammary 6.0 cm., inframmary 4.0 cm.

Cause of death stab wounds of the chest and abdomen.[19]
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Li guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding accused KINGSTONE LI guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to FOURTEEN (14) years, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal
as maximum with all the accessories of the law.
The accused is further ordered to pay to the heirs of the late Christopher Arugay
the sum of P50,000.00 for and as indemnity for causing the death of said victim.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Li appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed with modification the
RTC Decision. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals
denied.[21]
Li filed the present Petition for Review, seeking the reversal of his conviction for
the crime of homicide.
Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that the RTC erred in holding that he was
the instigator of the events leading to Arugays death; in not basing its Decision on the
evidence on record; in holding that he was guilty of homicide by reason of conspiracy;
and in not ruling that the evidence of the prosecution does not prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[22]
There is a difference in the factual findings of the RTC and those of the Court of
Appeals. The variance warrants the close review of the findings of the two
courts. While both courts argue that Li was guilty of homicide, their respective
rationales are different.
68
Neither court disputes that the proximate cause of the death of Arugay was the
stab wounds he received. The RTC concluded though that it was Sangalang, and not
Li, who stabbed Arugay:
From all these conflicting versions, this court after piecing out the evidence
presented and from what can be deduced in the circumstances obtaining finds that
because of the altercation between Christopher Arugay and Kingstone Li,
Christopher Arugay armed himself with a bolo and Kingstone Li armed himself with
a baseball bat.
From the evidence presented, it became clear to the court that it was Kingstone Li
who hit first with a baseball bat Christopher Arugay hitting the latter not on the
head but at the right arm which is near the shoulder. [23]
xxx
Now, after Kingstone Li has hit the deceased with a baseball bat, the deceased who
is armed with a bolo, retaliated by hacking Kingstone Li on the head and indeed he
was hit on the head and right wrist causing Kingstone Li to lose his hold on the
baseball bat and fell (sic) semi-unconscious or unconscious.
At this point in time, Eduardo Sangalang, who was then also present stabbed the
deceased several times at least six times.
This is explained by the findings of Dr. Alberto Reyes that Christopher Arugay
sustained an incise[d] wound on scalp, on the left chest, and four stab wounds that
are fatal.
When Christopher Arugay sustained the fatal wounds, two (2) of them piercing his
liver xxx[24]
While the RTC concluded that Li had not stabbed Arugay, it nevertheless held him
guilty, predicated on a finding of conspiracy with Sangalang. This issue shall be
explored in greater detail later.

In contrast, the Court of Appeals did not rule out the possibility that Li had
stabbed Arugay, and rendered unnecessary a finding of conspiracy to attach guilt to
the accused. It held:
The deceased suffered four fatal wounds, then (sic) the accused might have
inflicted at least one fatal stab wound and so with his friend Eddie Boy, who
remains at large. Since it has not been established which wound was inflicted by
either one of them, they should both be held liable and each one is guilty of
homicide, whether or not a conspiracy exists.[25] (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate courts formulation is wrong as the converse is the correct rule:
with the existence of conspiracy, it is no longer necessary to determine who among
the malefactors rendered the fatal blow;[26] whereas in the absence of conspiracy,
each of the accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts.[27] Thus,
it is necessary to determine whether a conspiracy existed between Li and Sangalang,
and if there was none, to ascertain the particular acts performed by Li.
The Court of Appeals also cited the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
Tan and dela Camara, to the effect that they saw Li stab Arugay at the left portion of
the body.[28] These testimonies are vital as they constitute the only evidence that Li
actually stabbed Arugay. A careful examination of the case however cautions us from
giving full faith and credence to the supposed eyewitnesses for the prosecution. The
RTC itself cast doubt on the veracity of all the eyewitness testimony, whether for the
prosecution or for the accused. The RTC noted, thus:
At the outset, the court has to state that it has noted that the witnesses for the
prosecution and that of the defense either held back on material facts or have
deliberately withheld some facts or added some matters to the real facts for these
are not only gaps but holes in the versions of the witnesses for the prosecution and
the defense. What this court can do is to cull from the evidence presented what
could be the approximate or near the truth. The prosecution did not help this court
any to have a good view of the facts and neither the defense. [29]
The relationships of the witnesses dela Camara and Tan to Arugay or the latters
family cannot be easily discounted. Dela Camara was the boyfriend of Arugay, while
Tan was the boyfriend of Arugays sister, Baby Jane. As such, they are not wholly
neutral or disinterested witnesses. Both of them actually asserted in open court that
69
they were not willing to say anything derogatory against Arugay. Tan testified as
follows:
Q: Since Jane Arugay is your girlfriend, and Christopher Arugay was your
friend, you did not like to say anything derogatory against
Christopher Arugay, did you?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Neither did you want to say anything also derogatory against the family
of Christopher Arugay, did you?
A: Yes, maam.[30]
Similarly, dela Camara testified as follows:
Q: As the girlfriend of Christopher Arugay, you did not say anything
derogatory [about] the said Christopher Arugay, am I correct?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: You do not like to besmirch his memory, am I correct?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: So that if Christopher Arugay assaulted Kingstone Li on April 19, 1993,
you did not like this, do you know that, did you Ms. Dela Camara.
A: Yes, maam.[31]
The revelations serve caution against accepting the testimonies of Tan and dela
Camara as gospel truth. They cast doubt as to whether these witnesses would be
capable to attest to an unbiased narration of facts, especially if by doing so, they
would be forced to impute culpability on Arugay, thereby staining the sainted
memory of their deceased friend.
Moreover, the respective testimonies of dela Camara and Tan are inconsistent
with each other with respect to material points. Dela Camara claimed that she and
Tan together assisted Arugay after the latter had been struck down with the baseball
bat.[32] Yet while Tan admitted that he had pulled Arugay away from the scene of the
melee, he made no mention of the assistance of dela Camara. [33] In fact, Tan stated
that dela Camara remained inside the house.[34] This assertion contradicts dela
Camaras claim that she was outside the house during the whole time the incident

transpired.[35] Nor did Tan advert to the scene painted by dela Camara of Kristine Li
wielding a bolo while pulling on the hair of Arugays girlfriend. That is an unusual
enough occurrence that would stick to the mind of anybody who would witness such.
Indeed, the tale weaved by Tan arouses more curiousity upon examination of
his sworn statement, executed the night after the incident. Therein, Tan referred to
some existing bad blood between Arugay and Li over a borrowed tape, a fact which
subsequently none of the parties would call attention to. [36] Curioser, Tan never
mentioned any baseball bat having been used by Li during the incident. Nor did he
mention any participation of Sangalang in the actual brawl. On the other hand, dela
Camara in her own sworn statement, asserted that both Li and Sangalang had
stabbed Arugay and that she herself was hacked on the arm by Kristine Li.[37]
Both Tan and dela Camara testified that Li stabbed Arugay on the left side of
the body as the latter was being pulled towards his house after having been struck
with the baseball bat.[38]However, Tan testified that Li came from behind Arugay to
inflict the stab wound,[39] while dela Camara stated that Arugay was facing Li when
he was stabbed.[40]
Most importantly, the testimonies of dela Camara and Tan both contradict the
physical evidence. As consistently held:
Time and again, we have upheld the primacy of physical evidence over biased and
uncorroborated testimony of witnesses. We have held:
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in
our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or rape
where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many
occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the
truth[W]here the physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence should
prevail.[41]
It is undisputed that Li had armed himself with a baseball bat as he prepared to
face Arugay. It also appears that the baseball bat remained at the scene of the fight,
as the same weapon was used to strike Li on the head after he lay injured.[42] In order
to sustain the claim of Tan and dela Camara that Li had stabbed Arugay, we would
70
have to postulate that Li was armed with both a knife and a baseball bat. This
scenario is severely flawed.
First. Tan and dela Camara would have us believe that Li faced off Arugay with
a baseball bat, then after having struck Arugay, he ran off to his home to get a knife,
returned to the melee, then stabbed Arugay.[43] This projected sequence is simply
incredulous. Li was already armed with a weapon that could incapacitate or kill. He
had already struck a blow that apparently forced the victim down. There is no logical
reason for Li to suddenly run off to get a knife, considering he already had a weapon
capable of inflicting damage and was at an advantageous position vis--vis the
prostrate Arugay.
There is of course the possibility that Li was already carrying the knife when he
emerged with the baseball bat, but that was not established by the
prosecution. Moreover, the scenario of Li brandishing a knife with one hand and
wielding a bat with the other is highly improbable. It would require unusual physical
dexterity for a person to wield both weapons simultaneously and still utilize them
with adequate proficiency. Nor is it likely that Li concealed the knife in his clothing.
According to Tan, Li was only wearing briefs when he attacked Arugay with the
baseball bat.[44]
Second. The pathological findings likewise cast severe doubt on the possibility
that Li had stabbed Arugay. The trial court concluded that only one knife was used in
killing Arugay, and probably only one wielder thereof. The RTC decision said:
The court noted also with particular interest the description of the four wounds as
found by Dr. Reyes. The first wound has been described by Dr. Reyes as 3.0 cm.
long, spindle[-]shaped edges, irregular, etc; the No. 2 wound has also been
described as 4.0 cm. long, spindle[-] shaped, edges irregular, etc.; No. 3 wound is
1.5 cm. long, spindle-shaped, edges, irregular, etc.; and the fourth wound is 1.5 cm.
long, spindle shaped edges irregular;
Thus there are two (2) outstanding characteristics of the four (4) stab wounds
sustained by Christopher Arugay. All of them are spindle[-]shaped and irregular in
their edges. This is significant because it would appear to the court that only one
weapon was used because all the characteristics of the four wounds were the
same. Thus, to the mind of the court there is only one person who inflicted these
wounds, not two (2) or three (3). It could be possible that there were two who

inflicted the stab wound[s] if the weapon used was given to another after using the
same and the other one to whom it was transferred used it also. But in this case
there is no showing that such incident did happen.[45]
It must be qualified that Dr. Reyes, the NBI Medico-Legal, refused to definitively
conclude that only one knife was used in stabbing Arugay though he conceded that
such was possible.[46]Nevertheless, the fact that Arugay sustained the same kind of
stab wounds tends to support the conclusion that only one knife was used on him.
Third. Dela Camara testified that she saw both Li and Sangalang stab
Arugay. Considering that there was only one knife used, her version would hold water
only if we were to assume that the same knife passed from the hands of Li to
Sangalang or that they held identical or similar knives. As the RTC ruled, nothing of
the sort was established. The more logical assumption would be that there was only
one stabber using one knife. The question now arises, was it Li or Sangalang who
stabbed Arugay?
There is the dubious claim of Tan and dela Camara that they did see Li stab
Arugay once. Assuming this were true, this blow would not have been the fatal stab
wound, as it did not prevent Arugay from further participating in the rumble and, as
subsequently established, inflicting damaging blows on Li. However, the physical
evidence belies any conclusion that Li inflicted any of the several fatal wounds on
Arugay.
Dr. Pedro P. Solis, the medico-legal consultant of Makati Medical Center who
also happens to be one of the countrys leading experts in Legal Medicine [47],
examined Lis injuries on the same day of the incident, and subsequently testified on
his findings. He concluded that Li suffered three types of wounds on his body. The
first type consisted of abrasions, consistent with forcible contact accompanied by a
hard object. The two other types of injuries were considerably more serious: incised
wounds and a contusion. As found by the RTC:
According to (sic) Dr. Pedro Solis, who examined the accused at
the Makati Medical Center on the very night after the incident and (sic) found the
following injuries on Kingstone Li, to wit:
1. xxx
71
2. Wound, incised, 12 cm., scalp, fronto-parietal area, right, 9 cm., right;
9 cm. posterior aspect, shoulder, right; 1.5 cm., postero-medial
aspect, distal third, forearm, right.
3. Contusion, 4 x 5 cm., scalp, parieto-occipital area (post suricular) left.
From the expert testimony and opinion of Dr. Pedro Solis, the injuries suffered by
Kingstone Li were defense wounds, and that there were two (2) weapons used in
inflicting injuries on Kingstone Li. One is a sharp edge[d] instrument such as a bolo
and the other one is [a] blunt instrument.[48]
The physical evidence of Lis injuries are consistent with his version that Arugay
had hacked him, and as he struggled to recover from the blow, he was struck with his
own baseball bat by Tan, thus explaining the contusion on his head. More
importantly though, the injuries were serious enough to incapacitate Li at the scene,
calling into question his ability to inflict the fatal blows on Arugay. As Dr. Solis
testified:
A: [I] noticed in this particular case that there are incise[d] wound[s] on
the right hand and right shoulder. These are injuries brought about,
as I said, brought about by [a] sharp edged instrument. This I
presumed to have been brought about by the inherent self defensive
(sic) mechanism of the victim. In so far as the injury on the head is
concerned, it must be a hit, now, I am referring to the incise wound
on the head, incise[d] wound on the head will also cause pressure on
the skull thereby producing some effect on the brain, this has been
aggravated by a blunt instrument applied on the left side of his neck
and joining as together the two injuries the incise[d] wounds and that
of contusion which is brought about by blunt instrument it might
have cause[d] him some degree of loss of consciousness.
Q: Would that person have been able to stab somebody one time, two
times, three times or four times after sustaining those injuries?
A: In that condition he has no complete power to perform volitional acts
because he must have lost partially or totally his consciousness
primarily the hit on the left side of the head because the brain is a
vital organ and slight jarring will cause los[s] of consciousness and

what we call in ordinary parlance, you saw shooting stars as a
consequence.
Q: Aside from los[s] of consciousness, would that person who sustained
that injury have been able to walk without the assistance of
anybody?
A: In all [likelihood], he might have lost I said of his volitional movement,
he [may be] able to walk but as I have observe[d] it must be with
assistance more particularly in this case whereby the incise wound
on the head is measured 12 cm., the head is a bloody organ in a way
that if a person is erect, blood will flow on that area and it might
cause even modification of his visual perception.[49]
Li was slashed on the head with a bolo, causing a twelve centimeter (12
cm.) wound, among other wounds. In such a condition, it is highly improbable that
he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on Arugay. Moreover, it could not
be established that Li was ever armed with a knife. Difficult as it is already to believe
that the wounded Li could have stabbed Arugay several times, the incredulity is
compounded by imagining that Li would have also groped around for a knife, dazed
and severely wounded as he was. Simply put, Li could not have stabbed Arugay. The
assertions to the contrary of Tan and dela Camara are inherently flawed.
Fourth. In all, the factual determination made by the RTC is wholly believable
up to a point. There were four participants in the brawl, namely Li, Sangalang, Arugay
and Tan. The first blow was struck by Li, who had armed himself with a baseball bat
and used the same to hit Arugay on the left upper arm. This unprovoked assault by Li
establishes at least some degree of criminal culpability on his part. Arugay then
armed himself with a bolo which he used to inflict an incised wound on the head of
Li. After Li had fallen, Sangalang, himself armed with a knife, fatally stabbed Arugay
at least four times. Tan had picked up the baseball bat dropped by the wounded Li
and struck Li on the head with the bat. These findings are consistent with the physical
evidence, reliance on which should be given greater primacy over the unreliable
eyewitness testimony of Tan and dela Camara.
Thus, Sangalang alone had stabbed Christopher Arugay. Yet the RTC still found
Li guilty on the tenuous determination that a conspiracy between Li and Sangalang
existed. The RTC held:
72
From the evidence presented, the court believes and it so holds that there was
conspiracy.
It must be pointed out that Kingstone Li and Eduardo Sangalang were then in the
same house at the same time. Eduardo Sangalang is the boyfriend of the half-sister
of Kingtone Li.
The act of Kingstone Li [in] getting a baseball bat and using it as a weapon and the
act of Eduardo Sangalang alias Eddie Boy in arming himself with a sharp pointed
weapon and both going out to meet Christopher Arugay whose only sin is to point
to the accused his scandalous and indecent act in bathing nude not in the
bathroom but in a place which is crowded by people who can see him especially
the ladies and is provocative to others are patent and conclusive presumption of
conspiracy for their acts were concerted and so close to each other that there is
no way but to conclude a conspiracy.[50](Emphasis not ours)
Proving conspiracy is a dicey matter, especially difficult in cases such as the
present wherein the criminal acts arose spontaneously, as opposed to instances
wherein the participants would have the opportunity to orchestrate a more
deliberate plan. Spontaneity alone does not preclude the establishment of
conspiracy, which after all, can be consummated in a moments notice through a
single word of assent to a proposal or an unambiguous handshake. Yet it is more
difficult to presume conspiracy in extemporaneous outbursts of violence; hence, the
demand that it be established by positive evidence. A conviction premised on a
finding of conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and
presumption.[51]
It is worth noting that while conspiracy was alleged in the Information against
Li, the prosecution devoted its efforts to prove that Li had actually inflicted the stab
wounds on Sangalang, tagging him as a direct participant in the crime. Thus, there
seems to be no evidence that would directly establish the fact that Li and Sangalang
had come into an agreement to commit a common felony. Any conclusion that there
was a conspiracy will have to be drawn inferentially, as the RTC did.
It is not necessary to prove a previous agreement to commit a crime if there is
proof that the malefactors have acted in concert and in pursuance of the common
objectives. Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy since it is by its nature

often planned in utmost secrecy and it can seldom be proved by direct
evidence.[52] Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves
when such point to a joint purpose and design.[53] Complicity may be determined by
concert of action at the moment of consummating the crime and the form and
manner in which assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal wound. [54]
However, caution dictates a careful examination of the established facts before
concluding, as the RTC did, that an implied conspiracy had been established. An
implied conspiracy must still be based on facts established by positive and conclusive
evidence.[55] Even if conspiracy per se is not criminal, as it rarely is in this
jurisdiction,[56] the weight of factual evidence necessary to prove conspiracy is the
same as required to establish criminal liability proof beyond reasonable
doubt.[57] Suppositions based on mere presumptions and not on solid facts do not
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.[58]
The RTCs conclusion that there was a conspiracy was drawn from these
circumstances, namely: that Li and Sangalang were in the same house at the same
time; and that they both armed themselves before going out to meet Arugay. The
fact that they were in the same house at the same time is not in itself sufficient to
establish conspiracy. Conspiracy transcends companionship,[59]and mere presence at
the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. [60]
The other circumstance that Li and Sangalang had emerged from Lis house, both
armed, to face Arugay has to be weighed against other facts also relied upon by the
RTC. As the RTC held, Sangalang stabbed Arugay only after petitioner had become
unconscious. Before that point, even as Li struck Arugay with a baseball bat, it was
not proven that Li had asked for, or received, any assistance from Sangalang. Based
on these circumstances, the Court is hard put to conclude that Sangalang and Li had
acted in concert to commit the offense. In fact, the stabbing of Arugay could very
well be construed as a spur-of-the-moment reaction by Sangalang upon seeing that
his friend Li was struck on the head by Arugay. From such a spontaneous reaction, a
finding of conspiracy cannot arise.[61]
Moreover, it appears that the fight involved two distinct phases. The first phase
commenced when Li, without sufficient provocation, assaulted Arugay with the
baseball bat. Lis participation in this phase, albeit as a solitary actor, was indubitably
established. Sangalangs participation, much less his physical presence during this
phase, was not established at all. In the second phase, Sangalang was the main
73
actor. Li was incapacitated by then. Clearly, the existence of conspiracy should be
ruled out.
After Arugay had been struck down, it appears that there would have been a
lapse of at least a few minutes, affording him time to procure the bolo. The second
phase in the brawl then commenced. No further blows appear to have been inflicted
by Li. On the other hand, Li himself became the victim of the hack wounds on the
head inflicted by Arugay. As Li lay incapacitated, possibly unconscious, it remained
highly doubtful whether he had any further participation in the brawl. At that point,
Sangalang, whose previous participation was not conclusively established, emerged
into the fray. Sangalang stabbed Arugay to death. Verily, it cannot be assumed that
Sangalang did what he did with the knowledge or assent of Li, much more in
coordination with each other.
The scenario as established by the RTC still leaves many open-ended questions
and admits to a myriad of possibilities. This very uncertainty indicates that Lis liability
as a conspirator was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The general principle
in criminal law is that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused. Consequently, when confronted with variant though equally plausible
versions of events, the version that is in accord with the acquittal or the least liability
of the accused should be favored.
The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm that
resulted from Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening
death from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the
effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm
of speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party
for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries, penalized as follows:
Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
.
2. By aresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from
engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance;[62]
 74

The duration of the penalty of arresto menor is from one day to thirty
days.[63] The felony of slight physical injuries is necessarily included in the homicide
charge. Since the Information against Li states that among the means employed to
commit the felonious act was the use of the baseball bat, conviction on the lesser
offense of slight physical injuries is proper. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances established, the imposition of the penalty in its medium period is
warranted.[64] Li was convicted by the RTC on January 5, 1994. Having long served
more than the imposable penalty, Li is entitled to immediate release unless, of
course, he is being lawfully detained for another cause.

What transpired during the dawn hours of 19 April 1993 was an artless,
spontaneous street fight devoid of any methodical plan for consummation. It arose
not because of any long-standing grudge or an appreciable vindication of honor, but
because the actors were too quick to offense and impervious to reason. Yet, however
senseless this lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of the circumstances must
be made to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of the evidence reveals that
the criminal culpability of Kingstone Li in the death of Christopher Arugay was not
established beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is responsible
for the death apparently remains at large. Yet absent any clear showing of conspiracy,
as in this case, Kingstone Li cannot answer for the crime of Eduardo Sangalang.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. Petitioner

Kingstone Li is ACQUITTED of the charge of Homicide for lack of evidence beyond
reasonable doubt.However, he is found GUILTY of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and
accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto menor in the medium period
of ten (10) to twenty (20) days. Considering that petitioner has been incarcerated
well-beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons is ordered to cause petitioners IMMEDIATE RELEASE, unless petitioner is
being lawfully held for another cause, and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days
from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance with such order.

SO ORDERED.