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PROPERTY

5. DIONISIA P. BAGAIPO vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEONOR LOZANO
G.R. No. 116290. December 8, 2000

FACTS
Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot No. 415, a 146,900 square meter agricultural land
situated in Ma-a, Davao City while Respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel of land located
across and opposite the southeast portion of petitioner’s lot facing the Davao River.
On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Mandatory Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against Lozano for:
(1) the surrender of possession by Lozano of a certain portion of land measuring 29,162 square meters which is
supposedly included in the area belonging to Bagaipo under TCT No. T-15757; and
(2) the recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters which Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao
River traversed her property.
Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change in course of the said river, her property became divided into
three lots, namely: Lots 415-A, the area presently occupied by Bagaipo, 415-B, which cut across Bagaipo’s land
was taken up by the new course of the Davao River and 415-C, the land presently located across the river and
parallel to Bagaipo’s property.
For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion to their titled
property. He asserted that the Davao River did not change its course and that the reduction in Bagaipo’s domain
was caused by gradual erosion due to the current of the Davao River. Lozano added that it is also because of the
river’s natural action that silt slowly deposited and added to his land over a long period of time.
The trial court concluded that the applicable law is Article 457 of the New Civil Code and not Art. 461and
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence the present
case.
ISSUE
Whether the land is owned by Bagaipo due to the changing of the river’s course or by Lozano by the principle
of accretion.
HELD
The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in land area was brought about by erosion
and not a change in the river’s course. The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the corresponding expansion of
respondent’s property were the combined effect of erosion and accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is
inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim ownership over the old abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent.
The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: 1)
That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and 3)
That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. [13] These requisites were sufficiently
proven in favor of respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was sudden or
that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and was caused by alluvium and
erosion.

Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire
the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
PROPERTY
36. PACITA DAVID-CHAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.
G.R. No. 105294. February 26, 1997

FACTS

Petitioner alleged that her property, consisting of around 635 square meters, situated in Del Pilar, San
Fernando, Pampanga and covered by TCT No. 57596-R, located around the property are the following:
Northern and western sides: various business establishments.
Southern boundary: land of the Pineda family
East-northeastern boundary: a lot with an area of approximately 161 square meters owned by private Philippine
Rabbit Lines, which lied between her property and the MacArthur Highway.
On September 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition with prayer for preliminary
prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop private respondent from fencing its property and depriving her of access to
the highway. In short, petitioner’s lot was almost completely surrounded by other immovables and cut off from the
highway. Her only access to the highway was a very small opening measuring two feet four inches wide through the
aforementioned property of private respondent, which was now being obstructed by the bus lines’ construction of a
concrete fence. Petitioner believed she was entitled to a wider compulsory easement of right of way through the
said property of private respondent.

ISSUE

WON petitioner is legally entitled to a right of way through private respondent’s property?

HELD
Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, petitioner submits that “the owner of an estate may claim a
compulsory right of way only after he (or she) has established the existence of four requisites, namely: (1) the estate
is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid;
(3) the isolation is not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial
to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.”
While petitioner may be correct in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650, she nevertheless failed to
show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy their requirements.
Evaluating her evidence, respondent Court ruled that petitioner is not “without adequate outlet to a public
highway” since she built a concrete fence on the southern boundary of her property to separate it from the property
of the Pineda family. Worse, during the pendency of the case, she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use
as a means to reach the National Highway without passing through the property of defendant. If plaintiff wants a
bigger opening, then she can always destroy a portion of the concrete fence which she erected and pass through the
property of the Pineda family which, as shown on the attached sketch on the Commissioner’s Report, has an open
space on the southern boundary of plaintiff’s land.
The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement because she caused her
own isolation by closing her access through the Pineda property,
The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she made a valid tender of the proper indemnity,
since her complaint contained no averment that demand for the easement of right of way had been made after
payment of the proper indemnity.

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