On Sociocultural Discontinuity: Nationalism and Cultural Objectification in Quebec [and

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Author(s): Richard Handler, Bernard Arcand, Ronald Cohen, Bernard Delfendahl, Dean
MacCannell, Kent Maynard, Lise Pilon-Lê and M. Estellie Smith
Source: Current Anthropology, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Feb., 1984), pp. 55-71
Published by: University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for
Anthropological Research
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CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Vol. 25, No. 1, February 1984
(?) 1984 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, all rights reserved 001 1-3204/84/2501-0003$2 25
On Sociocultural Discontinuity:
Nationalism and Cultural Objectification
in Quebec'
byRichard Handler
BENJAMIN LEE WHORF ONCE OBSERVED that such words as
group, nation, society, and tribe mightjust as well be verbs as
nouns, for they refer to relationships rather than things
(1956:215). His remark followed fromhis analysis of how Indo-
European grammars,with theirfundamentaldivision into nouns
(referringto things) and verbs (referringto the action of things),
lead us to "objectify" reality (pp. 134-59). Whorf has not been
alone in exploring the epistemological consequences of objec-
tification,of what Whitehead (1925:75-85) called the fallacy
of misplaced concreteness. But though these problems of lan-
guage, thought, and reality have been revealed to us, we, the
users of these "object-positing" modes of thought, as Quine
(1959:155) calls them, continue to fall into the traps that they
set for us. Long ago Durkheim (1966:15) warned social sci-
entists that the use of common-sense "representations" would
obscure rather than illuminate the social realities that we wish
to apprehend. Yet in our quest for the real, we continue, as
Whorf suggested (1956:152, 238), to talk about talk-to take
our ways of thinking about the world "out there" for a neutral
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented in the Department
of Anthropology, University of California, San Diego, and at the 1983
annual meeting of the American Ethnological Society in Baton Rouge,
La. I thank the participants in those sessions for their stimulating
commentary. Franci Duitch, Jocelyn Linnekin, Daniel Segal, and M.
Estellie Smith read the paper as it progressed through various drafts
and helped me to clarify my analysis. The research reported in this
paper was funded in part by grants from the Danforth Foundation
and from Lake Forest College.
RICHARD HANDLER is Assistant Professor in the Department of
Sociology and Anthropology, Lake Forest College, and, on leave
from this position for 1983-84, Quebec Fellow at the Harvard
University Center for International Affairs (1737 Cambridge St.,
Cambridge, Mass. 02138, U.S.A.). Born in 1950, he was educated
at Columbia University (B.A., 1972) and at the University of Chi-
cago (M.A., 1976; Ph D., 1979). His research interests are nation-
alism and ethnicity,with special attention to nationalism in Quebec;
anthropology and literature, with special attention to the novels of
Jane Austen; and the historyof anthropology, with special attention
to the development of Boasian anthropology. His publications in-
clude "The Dainty and the Hungry Man: Literature and Anthro-
pology in Edward Sapir" (History of Anthropology 1, in press) and
"In Search of the Folk Society: Nationalism and Folklore Studies
in Quebec" (Culture 3[1]:103-14). The present paper was submitted
in final form 25 v 83.
Vol. 25 * No. 1 * February 1984
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labeling of natural things and hence to mistake concepts about
things for the things themselves.
A case in point is M. Estellie Smith's (CA 23:127-41) stim-
ulating article "The Process of Sociocultural Continuity."Smith
examines the epistemology of our concepts of "tradition" and
"change" and questions the extent to which theycan be usefully
applied to sociocultural phenomena. The heart of her critique
depends on an understanding of objectification, for she argues
that tradition and change are mistakenly assumed to be ab-
solute qualities of elements or aspects of social life that are
themselvesmistakenlyreifiedas "segregatedand pristine"things.
Yet, she contends, tradition and change are interpretivecon-
structs that depend upon the point of view of the observer,
rather than properties of "the phenomenon itself-"and this
phenomenon itself is not a thing (society or culture) made up
of things (institutions, traits), but a process that Smith calls
sociocultural continuity (pp. 127-28).
While I applaud Smith's discussion and agree with her anal-
ysis of tradition and change, it is my contention that she falls
into the very same trap from which her critique is meant to
free us. I will argue, first,that despite her intention to em-
phasize process, her notion of sociocultural continuity is un-
derpinned by a notion of the sociocultural system(as she prefers
to call it) which is itself an objectification; and, second, that
her claim that this sociocultural system is truly characterized
by "continuity" is equally the product of an objectifyinglogic.
Just as she has shown tradition and change to be interpretive
reifications rather than "the phenomenon itself," I will show
that we can equally well characterize Smith's socioculture by
the term discontinuity as by continuity. Such social-scientific
entities ("society," "culture," "sociocultural system") are objec-
tifications-the imaginative products of a world view in which,
as Whorf put it, "embodiment is necessary" (1956:241). As
such, they are not on-the-ground, natural, bounded, or abso-
lute ("the phenomenon itself"), but semiotic: symbolic objec-
tifications which are continually, and discontinuously, con-
structed in the present.
The concept of "objectification" will be explicated more fully
in what follows, but for initial clarity I shall specify several of
its implications. For Whorf, objectification refers to the ten-
dency of Western cultural logic to imagine nonmaterial phe-
nomena (such as time) as if they were embodied, or existent as
physical objects. Whorf implies-and I would explicitlynote-
that this logic privilegesobjects over events,since action is "CONTINUITY" AS A REIFYING CONCEPT
thoughtto be impossibleunlessembodiedin an agent.Objec-
tificationis particularlyevident in our thinkingabout such Smith begins by noting that "sociocultures persistthroughtime,
entitiesas nation,society,group,and culture,
social-scientific with constantly reaffirmedidentities, while also undergoing
whichwe approach as thingsin the naturalworld. I use the continuous change." This ever-changing persistence is what
term cultural objectification to refer to the imaginative em- Smith calls sociocultural continuity. Continuity is defined as
bodimentof humanrealitiesin termsofa theoretical discourse "the process whereby societies and individual members of those
based on the conceptof culture.As Wagner(1975:8) has put societies persist by deliberately or unwittingly altering and
it, "anthropology teachesus to objectifythe thingwe are ad- adapting." Alteration and adaptation-"continuous change,"
justing to [duringfieldwork]as 'culture,'much as the psy- "nonreplicability"-are "unavoidable" forseveral reasons: eco-
choanalystor shaman exorcises the patient's anxieties by logical pressure, the selectivity of human cognition (forgetful-
objectifying theirsource." ness, misunderstanding),and "the axiomatic uniqueness of each
My concernfortheproblemofobjectification stemsfroman context of each event." Continuity, Smith argues, is "the phe-
ongoingstudyofnationalistideologyin theCanadian province nomenon itself,"a phenomenon which "actually manifestsboth
of Quebec. Like Smith's,mymusingshave been promptedby tradition and change at all times." However, human beings-
a "native"discoursethat has led me to rethinkmy own, an- their"cognitiveorientation"skewed by the sociocultureto which
thropologicaldiscourse.Again like Smith's,the crucialexpe- they belong-may interpret continuity in terms of such mu-
riencesforme were those in which the people being studied tually exclusive concepts as "tradition" and "change." In other
engagedin a self-conscious examinationoftheirculturaliden- words, observers and actors in a particular socioculture can
tity.The situationsthatSmithdescribesfromherPueblo ma- interpretits various aspects and elements as either traditional
terialshave analoguesin myQuebec material,at leastin terms or new-though in actuality, because of nonreplicability,there
of the kindsof objectifiedculturalcreationsthatone findsin can only be what is new and, furthermore,what is new in this
connectionwith ethnicself-awareness.The main difference firstsense can take on sociocultural reality as tradition. By
betweenwhatSmithreportsand myexperienceis thepresence making such interpretations,people reifyone manifestation or
in Quebec of an explicitnationalistideology,in contrastto the propertyof "the phenomenon itself" and, taking the reification
more diffusenative commentary that Smithcites. But a na- forthe reality,misconstrue its actual nature. Smith argues that
tionalistideologyis a productof theWesterntradition,closely anthropologists should turn from the study of tradition and
allied to anotherproductofthattradition:social-scientific the- change-which, after all, are mere imaginative reifications-
ory.In studyingnationalistideologyI have been led inexorably to the study of "the conditions under which participants of a
to reconsideranthropologicaldiscourseitself,forthe two are given socioculture will identify'tradition' or 'innovation' " (pp.
equally groundedin such conceptsas "culture"and "group." 127-28).
In thepresentessayI am concernednotsolelywithinterpreting "Tradition" and "change," then, are constructs of the actor/
Quebecois nationalism,but with using the discourseof that observer:"events, cognitivelyreified,are capable of being tagged
social situationto examineanthropological theory-in partic- one or the other," but "in an acultural universe" they have no
ular, to pursue the issues raised by Smith, includingthose "such identity" (p. 140). But what might their identitybe in a
implicitin the verytermsof her argument. sociocultural universe? Through culture humans create fictions
Smithreportsa numberof incidentsfromPueblo lifethat of stability or of innovation which, as sociocultural facts, have
are becomingmore and moretypicalin the ethnographic lit- real consequences. "All individuals and events" are "genuinely
erature.All involvewhat she calls "thecreationofculture"(p. unique," but because "humans require . . . predictability,"they
134), with accompanyinginterpretations (by natives and/or stereotype those unique phenomena-as, for example, "tradi-
anthropologists) that see eithertraditionality or newness as tional" or "new"-and respond to them in terms of their ste-
intrinsic qualitiesofthosecreations.Forexample,shedescribes reotypes (pp. 134, 129). In other words, people create their
culturalrevivals-of an abandonedceremonialdanceand even, realityby the classificatorydevices of theirsociocultures: "real-
in the case of the San Tomasitocolony,of an entirecommu- ity is a necessarily relativistic creation" (p. 128). But that hu-
nity-and the discussionsthat theygenerateconcerningtra- manly created reality is "real" nonetheless, and it conditions
ditionand artificiality. She also tellsof innovationsstimulated human action. In sum, to stereotype phenomena as "tradi-
by outsideforces-the participationin leadershiprolesof per- tional" or "new" is to (mis)construe their actual nature, or,
sons qualifiedby nontraditional skills,as well as the creation better,to interpretthem in a necessarily fictionalmanner. But
of new leadershiproles in the formof tour guides-and the though fictional, these interpretations are nonetheless real-
inclinationofsomeTomasinosto interpret such innovationsas and here we are reminded of Geertz's (1973:15) caution that
traditional.Finally,she pointsout thatanthropologists them- "fictional" can mean "fashioned," "constructed," rather than
selves,in searchoftradition,have createdtradition-or,more "false" or "untrue." As Smith puts it, "rather than seeing 'con-
precisely, accountsoftradition-byeliminating fromtheirview tinuityas fiction'in opposition to 'continuityas reality,'we may
all phenomenathat did not accord with theirpreconceived accept that the phenomenon has sociocultural reality because
notionsof traditionalPueblo culture. the consequences of its perception are real" (p. 129).
Each of theseexamplesshows that Smithhas good reason Smith has now replaced "tradition" and "change" with "so-
to be.suspiciousof the epistemology of traditionand change. ciocultural continuity,"yet this new concept suffersfrom the
Her argument,brieflystated, is this: socioculturalsystems same flaws as those it replaces. Continuity, she argues, has
changecontinuously yetcontinuetopersist;anyevent,element, sociocultural reality. By this she means, first,that a humanly
or aspectof such systemshas unique (new) featuresyetrelates constructed reality is real and, second, that it has real conse-
to past events, elements,and aspects. Whetherwe (actors/ quences on/in human action. But her argument goes farther:
observers)label it "traditional"or "new" depends upon our her term "continuity" refersto a sociocultural system, bounded
conceptualframework,not on the phenomenonitself.What and unique in a world of many such systems. In other words,
anthropologists should study is socioculturalcontinuity, not Smith has embodied continuity by imagining a natural entity
traditionand change. to serve as agent for the process (continuity) that she seeks to
However,to take the continuity of socioculturalsystemsas analyze. Moreover, this embodiment leads her to look for con-
thephenomenonitselfleads to difficulties as greatas thosethat tinuity at the wrong level (to use a hopelessly reifyingmeta-
the rejectionof "tradition"and "change" allows us to avoid. phor), for,as I will argue with ethnography from Quebec, the
This will become apparent in a closer analysis of Smith's sociocultural system that Smith discusses is an objectification
argument. characterized as much by discontinuity as by continuity. In

56 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY

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other words, our predilection for embodiment continually per-
suades us to invent objects, which we take to be natural entities
in the real world; yet this continuous invention entails a kind
of discontinuitywith respect to the objects so created-which,
after all, are created and recreated in the symbolically con-
structed present.
In what ways does Smith's discussion of continuityentail an
objectified socioculture? First, we might note the implications
of various terms and phrases that she uses. Her base assump-
tion is that sociocultures persist, that is, theyexist continuously.
This continuous existence is also spoken of in terms of "sur-
vival," "adaptation," and "self-perpetuation" (pp. 129-31), all
of which imply the continuous change that Smith wishes to
stressbut also the continuous existenceof the thingthat changes.
Moreover, these biologic metaphors suggest that the sociocul-
tural entity is a natural entity, bounded in space and time.
Finally, Smith uses phrases which directlysuggest such bound-
edness, for example, when she speaks of "separate and dis-
tinctive sociocultural systems," "the entities we call societies,"
"a relatively bounded socioculture" (pp. 130, 131, 134), human
groups with a "transgenerational existence," and "the various
enclaves of this island population" (p. 140).
Looking beyond these terminological suggestions, we find a
fairlystandard discussion of the simultaneously objective and
subjective reality of the sociocultural entity or group. Smith
tells us that "successful" sociocultures "persist" and "survive"
when members "accept the overall validity of the . . . life-style"
and therefore"work to maintain continuity."I take this to mean
that people committed to a way of life may cling to its various
elements, or vary or abandon them, but in all cases they act
as they do in order to make good on their commitment. Fur-
thermore,it is they themselves who must evaluate the strength
of their commitment and decide whether or not continuityhas
been maintained: "A sociocultural system may be deemed suc-
cessful when, by evaluation of its members, there is a suffi-
cientlyviable population for the reproduction of new members
who mature committed to continuityof the socioculture's iden-
titywrit large (i.e., details may vary, but basic principles re-
main)" (p. 130). What is crucial here is sense of identity: the
sociocultural "content" of a continuously existing group varies
continually (hence the analytic inadequacy of "tradition" and
"change"), but as long as a sense of group identity exists to
orient future action continuity will be maintained.
Now, this sense of identityis a shared value, a shared belief,
and speaking more generally Smith says that it is these latter
that make "a" socioculture: "I have consistentlyspoken of so-
ciocultures, that is, human societies whose social relations are
bonded by shared beliefs, norms, and goals" (p. 131). The
shared belief in identity,in the existence of continuity,condi-
tions future action and thus turns fiction(an interpretationof
the phenomenon itself) into sociocultural reality. At this point
Smith's argument relies on a notion of the subjective bound-
edness of groups, one frequently invoked in the literature on
ethnicity,which allows both analysts and actors to isolate an
ethnic group on the basis of what Cohen (1978:381) has de-
scribed as the "loyalties and ascriptions made by a people about
themselves." As she puts it, "the culture carriers themselves
. .. are my main concern. I want to know how insiders-
'the natives'-view sociocultural elements" (p. 139). In partic-
ular, the insiders' shared belief in a continuous identity(based,
for example, on their interpretations of cultural content as
"traditional" or "new") maintains continuity-maintains, that
is, commitmentto "the sociocultural identitywrit large." Smith
gives China as the most dramatic example of this persistence
of a socioculture based on the persistence of an identity (p.
140):
China . ..is said to have persisted,despite...dramatic alterations
in boundaries,shiftsin the ethnicity
of rulingdynastieswheneverthe
entityresumedthe generalshape ofthe Chinesestate,thepresenceof
a multitudeof languagesand otherculturaldissimilaritieswithinthe
Vol. 25 *No. 1 *February 1984
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Handler: NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL OBJECTIFICATION
contextofa single"Chinesesocioculture,"
and, undoubtedly,
theviews
of certainsegmentswithinChina as to whethertheywere part of a
continuousentityor not.
Elsewhere, however, Smith's discussion implies what Cohen
(p. 381) calls "the objectivist emphasis" in ethnicity studies,
for she argues that the retention of pieces of a culture, in
however altered or idiosyncratic form, may be sufficientto
guarantee sociocultural continuity: "even if the society per se
vanishes . . . certain cultural patterns may persist because in-
dividual culture-carrierspersist. Despite being filteredthrough
various idiocultures in successive generations, transmitted
knowledge can sustain portions of the culture, some of which
may actually increase in symbolic significance" (p. 131).
Perhaps this passage implies both an objectivist and subjectiv-
ist basis for continuity: "cultural patterns" are said to persist,
just as, in a passage quoted above, we are told that "basic
principles remain" (objectivist emphasis); and, equally impor-
tant, those among whom they persist maintain them out of a
sense of loyalty or commitmentto an identity(subjectivist em-
phasis). This is why Smith tells us that such maintained frag-
ments "may actually increase in symbolic significance." Above
all, these cases of fragmentarypersistence keep open the pos-
sibility of revival and renaissance, not merely of the folkloric
fragments,but of the sociocultures fromwhich theycame. And,
Smith insists, such sociocultural renaissance (as, for example,
in the case of the rebirth of Israel) is not artificial, but the
phenomenon itself, continuity: "what actually occurs in such
cases is insufficientlyaddressed, possibly because we have tended
to study them as artificial results of a contrived nostalgia for
anachronistic traditions rather than as manifestations of con-
tinuity" (p. 132, emphasis added).
We come here to the crux of the matter. To oppose the actual
to the artificial,as Smith does, is to suggest knowledge of some
objectively given or natural reality. Both actual and artificial
are persuasive words in Western discourse. What is actual is
what is "real," and what is real exists independently of any
human perception or conception of it. What is real is what is
"out there" or what is "really there." The term nature is not
quite synonymous with reality, but the two cover much the
same ground: nature is a preeminent domain of reality, and
though the natural world is perhaps not all of reality it is a
significantpart of it (cf. Schneider 1968:107-17). By contrast,
what is artificialis the antithesis of what is natural. Artificial
refers to what is man-made, the product of artifice. What is
artificialis "false" and "unnatural." Logically, what is false and
unnatural can be quite real (false assumptions and unnatural
parents exist in a real world) but we nonetheless oppose, in
common sense, the partial synonyms "real," "true," and "nat-
ural" to "unreal," "false," and "artificial." Certainly Smith has
done this in insisting that cultural renaissance is a function of
continuityrather than artificiality-for continuityis "the phe-
nomenon itself."Apparently she believes that to see continuity
(in the form of a revival) as artificial would be to suggest that
it is inauthentic-that it is not the thing itselfbut, rather,some
other, spurious entity.
This is precisely the ambiguity and the problem. Societies
and cultures do not exist as entities in the world of nature,
though social science continually objectifies sociocultural pro-
cess by embodying it as the thingthat we call society or culture.
"Sociocultural systems" do not "persist,""survive," and "adapt"
as bounded natural things, and the renaissance of traditional
culture in the form of an objectified ceremonial, institution,or
sense of identityis not continuous with the past (as a material
thing can be said to have some sort of continuous physical
existence), but a new construction-referring to the past, to be
sure, but symbolically created in the present. Smith wavers
between an explicit insistence on the uniquely sociocultural, or
semiotic, reality of sociocultural phenomena (p. 128) and an
57
implicit but finallydecisive understanding of the sociocultural
system which persists as a natural object (pp. 130-34). Thus,
on the one hand, she insists on the relativity of all human
points of view and on the creative aspect of culture, understood
as a purely semiotic process. On the other hand, she speaks of
continuity as the phenomenon itself, one transcending artifi-
ciality. Furthermore, following her Pueblo respondents she
speaks of sociocultural continuity as a natural process: "[cul-
tural] novelty is the result of the demand of nature forrenewal,
an integral part of continuity" (p. 133). As we have seen, she
uses other expressions that imply a notion of socioculture as a
bounded natural entity.And, to complete the associational ma-
trix, we should remember that the real world, especially the
world of nature as conceived by Western science, is a world of
things. As Durkheim (1966:18) put it, "in nature there are only
things" (and it was Durkheim [p. 14] who commanded social
scientists to "consider social facts as things").
What is a thing? and why might it be misleading to construe
sociocultures as things? I can best answer such questions by
suggesting a rereading of Smith's argument in the light of a
ratherdifferentdiscourse, that of nationalist ideology as I stud-
ied it in Quebec. Quebecois nationalist ideology will present
us with a much fuller example of an objectifying logic that
continually invents cultural things, while simultaneously imag-
ining these provisional symbolic constructs to be naturally
bounded, continuous, and absolute.
THE QUEBEC CASE
STUDYING NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY
Trying to understand nationalism in a province of 6 million
people is an enterprise that an anthropologist, accustomed by
the traditions of the discipline to what Geertz (1968:xii) has
called "analysis practiced on the narrowed scene," might well
find disquieting. I carried on such an attempt through two
standard techniques, on the one hand eliciting and examining
statements (both officialand informal) about national identity,
on the other hand seeking out situations in which Quebecois
might act their identity(or, perhaps, act out their beliefs about
identity).2 Seeking statements,I interviewed informants,talked
with friends, and read literary, social-scientific, and propa-
gandist accounts of national identity.Seeking situations, I grad-
ually turned from political debates, rallies, and ceremonies to
events considered recreational or cultural (in the popular sense
of the word, implying "refined" pursuits unrelated to the more
practical facts of economics and politics; cf. Sapir 1924:403-
4). My understanding of events of this latter type has become
central to my analysis of Quebecois nationalism and what it
can tell us about social-scientific theory. These events are the
analogues, in my material, of Smith's Deer Dance revival and
her account of the rebirth of San Tomasito. For local color, I
offerthree vignettes taken from my field notes:
1. Some friends take me to a restaurant located in a rural
county near Quebec City. In the cityboth restaurantand county
have the reputation for being authentically traditional. It is
this quality that my Quebecois guides seek on this expedition,
and they aren't disappointed. Upon entering, one of our party
compliments the host on the tastefully rustic ambiance of his
restaurant."Another beautiful spot in Quebec," replies the host.
"Think of that at referendumtime. Every place like this helps
2 This ongoing study was begun in 1975; 16 months of field study
were divided among three visits, in 1976, 1977-78, and 1980. The
ethnographic present of the present paper is the period 1976-81, the
five years of the Parti Quebecois's firstterm in power. Major political
events of this period were the party's unexpected victoryin the elections
of 1976, when it took control of the provincial government; the 1980
referendumon independence, which independentistes lost by a margin
of 59 to 41% (with 84% of the electorate voting); and the party's
convincing reelection in 1981.
58
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in the creationof an independentcountry."The restaurantis
decoratedwith Quebecois handicrafts,some old and not for
sale, othersnew,but in theold style,and ticketedforsale. We
eat our traditionalfood-rabbit pie, amongotherthings-and
listento a youngfolksingerperformin the mannerof a tra-
ditionalballadeer. He has with him on stage a monograph,
Civilisation traditionelle des Lavalois, published by the Folk-
loreArchivesof Laval University.He consultsthisas he tells
tales,and whenI speak withhimlaterhe explainsthathe has
just discoveredthe book and is goingthroughit to learn the
thingsthathe mightwant to use.
2. Duringthe 1978WinterCarnivalin Quebec CityI attend
a folkdance spectacle,or show. The performance is held in a
hockeyarena seating11,000people; at one end of the playing
surfacea stage has been constructedto resemblea traditional
farmhouseinterior,dominatedby a paintedchimney,hearth,
and grandfather clock. Though theset dwarfstheperformers,
it createsan illusion,in thatvast arena, of familialintimacy.
We the audience are to be privyto an old-fashionedfamily
gathering.The beginningof the performanceis signalledby
the emergence,at the oppositeend of the rink,of a horse-
drawnsleighcarryingfur-bundled passengers.The sleighcir-
cles thefloor,to theimmensedelightoftheaudience,and stops
to let the passengersdisembark,wheretheyare welcomedby
thefamilyrevellersonstage.Numeroustouchesthroughout the
performancesustain this illusion of a familyparty-despite
hundredsof anonymousspectatorsand thousandsof empty
seats.
3. Travellingin ruralQuebec I stayseveraltimeswithfarm
familieswho mightconsiderthemselvesas performers forthe
touriststheyhost.One family'sChristmascelebration-square-
dancing, giguing,feasting-is interruptedwhen the hostess
gathersus roundthetelevisionforlate-night news. In a special
featureon Christmasin Canada, the familysees itselfper-
formingthe same dances we have been dancing.A filmcrew
had come fromthecitytwo weeksearlierto recordthisstaged
version.Anotherfamilytakes me to the village's Saturday-
nightdance, wherepeopledance "theold dances"accompanied
by accordionand electricguitar.My host explainsthat these
danceshad been all butforgotten untiltwoyearsbefore,when,
on theoccasionofthe300thanniversary ofthefoundingofthe
village,villagershad been invitedto performtheirindigenous
danceson television.The fewpeoplewho stillknewthedances
had taughtthosevolunteering to go, and thusthevillagershad
relearnedtheirdances. Since thattimethe regularSaturday-
nightdance has been revived,thoughnow, accordingto my
host,manydancersare touristsunknownto him.
Accountsof such events are by now commonplace,given
our growinginterestin culturalperformances.For our pur-
poses, theyneed to be studiedin lightof the ideologicalmes-
sages which, however tacitly,permeatethem. In Quebec,
nationalistideologyhas been promotedbywhatQuebecoiscall
nos elites-our elites.The institutional locus oftheseeliteshas
changedseveraltimessincetheriseof nationalismin theearly
19th century,and at different periods the propagationand
developmentof nationalistideologies have depended upon
varyingand changeablerelationshipsbetweenthemassesand
theelitesof different levels of French-Canadiansociety-pan-
Canadian, provincial,regional,local (Dion 1975, McRoberts
1975). To speak of elites and theirpromotionof nationalism
suggests that nationalistsentimentsare not spontaneously
emergentfromthesoul ofthemasses. Rather,nationalismhas
been the consistentresponseof some Quebecois to the play of
social forcesset in motionafterthe conquestof New France
by the Britishin 1760. Led by thosemostsensitiveor vulner-
able to the changingsociopoliticalsituation,Quebecois devel-
oped nationalistideologiesin orderto definetheiridentityand
interestsin a societysuddenlybecome plural at the center.
Those most persuadedby thisideologyhave succeeded,gen-
erationaftergeneration, in imparting ittothegeneralpopulace.
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
Consequently, nationalism seems to permeate all aspects of
public lifein Quebec. Thus, forexample, an interestin folklore,
ecology, and rural life-widespread in North America through-
out the 1960s and 1970s-becomes attached, in the discourse
of Quebecois, to specific issues of national identity and pro-
vincial politics. This is not to say that all Quebecois are na-
tionalists in the sense that, for example, members of the
independentiste Parti Quebecois are; even the Parti Quebecois
(hereafterPQ), in power since 1976 and the most successful by
far of all Quebecois nationalist political parties, was unable,
in 1980, to win a referendumconcerning the independence of
Quebec from Canada. In a less militant sense, however, most
French-speaking Quebecois-even those loyal to Canada-are
Quebecois nationalists, for most of them are at least nominally
committed to their identityas French-speaking Quebecois.
In analyzing the situationin Quebec I follow Geertz (1973:201-
7), who has suggested that we look at ideology as a cultural
system. Geertz's critique of "interest theory" and "strain the-
ory" is particularly apt here, for most scientific analyses of
Quebecois nationalist ideology have been grounded in one of
these approaches. The formerattempts to explain ideology as
"a mask and a weapon" utilized in class struggle,the latter as a
mechanism to deal with "the chronic malintegrationof society."
But, as Geertz argues, to explain an ideology by matching it
either with sociopolitical interests or with sociopsychological
strains is to educe a causal connection while ignoring the ide-
ology as a meaningful system (p. 207):
Both interesttheoryand straintheorygo directlyfromsourceanalysis
to consequenceanalysiswithouteverseriouslyexaminingideologiesas
systemsofinteracting symbols,as patternsofinterworking meanings.
Themes are outlined,of course;amongthe contentanalysts,theyare
evencounted.But theyare referred forelucidation,notto otherthemes
nor to any sortof semantictheory,but eitherbackwardto the effect
theypresumably mirrororforwardtothesocialrealitytheypresumably
distort.
In what follows I construct a reading of certain aspects of
Quebecois nationalist ideology. Yet I do not view such a reading
as secondary to a consideration of the supposedly more concrete
social realities in which ideology is said to be grounded. Rather,
it is my contentionthat a "cultural account"-to use Schneider's
phrase (1968)-encompasses the typical class analysis of Que-
becois nationalistideology,preciselybecause this analysis makes
use of the same objectifyingnotions of "nation" and "culture"
that are central to that ideology. A cultural account encom-
passes a class account because the former can examine-as
symbolic constructs-what the latter unquestioningly assumes
to be objective, nonsymbolic realities: "nation," "culture," and
"class." If one looks at the elaborate social-scientificdiscussion
of nationalism in Quebec, one finds attention directed above
all to the relationships between social class, political and eco-
nomic power, and national identityand culture. Whatever the
merits of these analyses, they suffer from unexamined as-
sumptions concerning the objective reality of nation, culture,
and class-the social entities and forces which are presumed
to explain nationalist ideology.3 At its worst this type of dis-
cussion leads to endless arguments about which class or elite,
or segment of a class or elite, has produced which version of
nationalist ideology, with no attention to the ideologies as sys-
tems of symbols and meanings.
In the study of nationalist ideology, then, I am interestedin
explicitly formulated beliefs propagated among the general
populace by a variety of individuals and organizations (cf. Shils
1968). When I say that situations and events, such as those
3Recent analyses of nation and class in Quebec which give extensive
referencesto previous work are those of Moniere (1977), Bourque and
Legar6 (1979), and Fenwick (1981). For a general discussion of class and
ethnicity in which both class and ethnic group are treated as social
groupings that are constituted both objectively and subjectively-as
groups with symbolically negotiable boundaries-see the work of
Schatzberg (1980) and Young (1982).
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Handler: NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL OBJECTIFICATION
depicted above, are permeated by nationalist ideology, I do not
mean that the action of all involved is theatrically contrived
for the sake of it. Interest in authentic Quebecois culture is
widespread in Quebec and need have no narrow ideological
significance. On the other hand, popular concern for national
culture depends ultimately on the incessant communication of
nationalist messages by a wide range of individuals, elites, and
organizations. In what follows I examine the content of the
ideological message, with particular concern for the symbolic
construction of "nation" and "culture."
IDEOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS OF "NATION" AND "CULTURE"
Dumont (1970:33) has remarked that the modern nation, as
defined in Western discourse, "is in principle two things at
once: a collection of individuals and a collective individual."
Applying this to the Quebec case, we can formulate the fol-
lowing interpretation.First, nationalists imagine the nation as
a collective individual, as a superorganism; in nationalist rhet-
oric the nation is personified, treated as a living creature with
soul, history,and destiny and, above all, attributes that make
it uniquely itself. Second, it is thought that human individuals
belong to the nation preciselybecause theytoo are characterized
by these attributes-in other words, because the attributesthat
distinguish the collective individual are embodied in each of
the human beings that make up the collectivity. Third, the
totalityof these attributesturns out to be what anthropologists
have traditionally called culture-or what the nationalists call
tradition, heritage, personality, and, also, culture. Fourth, in
nationalist ideology culture comes to be seen as natural. This
is because the collective individual has, like a living creature,
a natural history that has made it what it is; in the course of
this historyits personality has become "fixed,"as they say. The
notion here is one of evolutionary adaptation. Fifth, and in
sum, in nationalist ideology the nation is seen as an entitywith
clearly distinguishable boundaries. Like a living creature the
nation is bounded and self-contained and is characterized by
a distinctset of attributesthat can be identified.In other words,
the nation is a natural object in an objectively real world.
These five interpretiveremarks are illustrated by a text by
Rene Levesque, currenthead of both the PQ and the provincial
government. The text is taken from Option Quebec, a book
that Levesque published in 1968 and that served as a manifesto
for the nascent PQ. This text is an epitomizing example of
nationalist rhetoric in Quebec during the last two decades. It
brings together,in one coherent and explicit statement, most
of the ideas about national identity that I learned of in many
months of interviews and conversations. I let it stand here in
place of a more extensive analysis of the materials of my field
notes, which space does not permit. Though there is disagree-
ment, even factionalism, among nationalists, particularly with
respect to political strategiesand sociopolitical goals, most Que-
becois would accept the Levesque textas an accurate statement
of group identity. (This has surely been one reason for L&
vesque's tremendous popularity, and even forthe success of the
PQ.) In sum, despite various ideological disputes, the existence
and general characteristics of a Quebecois nation and culture,
as set forth in the following text (Levesque 1968:14-15), are
rarely questioned.4
4 I cannot here differentiatemy account of nationalist ideology by
reference to discrete trends or schools of thought. With respect to the
issue examined below-belief in the existence of a distinctive and
bounded nation and culture-there is remarkable agreement among
all historic and contemporary varieties of nationalist ideology in Que-
bec. For detailed accounts of the development and differentiationof
Quebecois nationalist ideologies, see the work of Belanger (1974, 1980)
and Moniere (1977).
59
We are Quebecois.
What thatmeans firstand foremost. . . is thatwe are attachedto
thisone corneroftheearthwherewe can be completely ourselves:this
Quebec.
Being ourselvesis essentiallya matterof keepingand developinga
personality thathas survivedforthreeand a halfcenturies.
At the core of this personalityis the fact that we speak French.
Everythingelse dependson thisone essentialelement....
We are childrenof thatsociety,in whichthehabitant,our fatheror
grandfather, was stillthekeycitizen.We also are heirsto thatfantastic
adventure-that earlyAmericathat was almostentirelyFrench. We
are, even moreintimately, heirsto thegroupobstinacywhichhas kept
alive thatportionof FrenchAmericawe call Quebec.
All these thingslie at the core of this personalityof ours. Anyone
who does not feel it . . . is not-is no longer-one of us.
But we know and feelthattheseare the thingsthatmake us what
we are. They enable us to recognizeeach otherwhereverwe may be.
This is our own specialwave-length on which,despiteall interference, hereunderstoodas personality
we can tuneeach otherin loud and clear,withno one else listening.
This is how we differfromothermen and especiallyfromother
NorthAmericans,withwhom in all otherareas we have so much in
common.This basic "difference" we cannotsurrender.That became
impossiblea long timeago.
More is involvedhere than simpleintellectualcertainty.This is a
physicalfact. To be unable to live as ourselves,as we shouldlive, in
ourown languageand accordingto our own would be likeliving
ways,
withoutan arm or a leg-or perhapsa heart.
Unless . . . we agreedto give in littleby little,in a declinewhich,
as in cases of perniciousanaemia, would cause lifeto slip slowlyaway
fromthe patient.
Levesque tells us that to be Quebecois, to be "ourselves,"
depends upon "keeping and developing a personality." This
personality is firstof all the personality of the nation. To speak
of national personality personifies the nation, makes of it a
collective individual. This personification becomes more con-
crete toward the end of the text, where body parts are men-
tioned and where, finally,the nation becomes a dying person.
The idea of national personality also suggests that the collective
entityis bounded by, or definable in terms of, a set of attributes
or characteristics; hence the insistence on "the thingsthat make
us what we are" and that make Quebecois "differfrom other
men." In sum, to personify the nation makes of it an entity
imaginarily bounded by the outlines of a living creature, and,
in another sense, by the attributesthat characterize it and only
it-that make it what it is and not some other thing.
This boundedness-the definitivenessof an identity-applies
to individual Quebecois as well as to the collectivity.Through-
out Levesque's text there is an easy transition from "a Que-
becois" to "we the Quebecois" to "the Quebecois nation." This
suggests that the human individuals who constitute the collec-
tive individual are considered to be replicas of it. In particular,
human individuals are Quebecois-are what theyare-because
they share the personality attributes that characterize the col-
lective individual, the nation. In other words, each human
individual shares in the collective personalitythat distinguishes
the Quebecois nation from all other nations and, hence, Que-
becois individuals from all other human beings.
What is the substance of this national personality? Levesque
mentions language, history,and shared values-elements that
nationalists usually refer to as heritage or culture. All these
things, as Levesque says, lie at the core of national personality.
As we shall see, the furtherspecification of what these cultural
elements are-which language is the national language, which
historyis national history?-becomes problematic and leads to
cultural objectification. For now it is enough to point to these
general elements of national personality and to note that dis-
cussion of national identityusually proceeds in general terms:
"we are Quebecois because we have a language, a culture, a
history."Only one specification attaches consistently to these
elements of national personality: theyare authentic, theyinhere
in the nation naturally. As Levesque says, this set of cultural
attributes is "a physical fact" that individuals and the nation
60
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itselfcannotrenouncewithoutinvitingdisaster-whichis here
envisionedas organicdissolution.At thelevel ofthecollective
individual,this naturalpersonalityis envisionedas resulting
froma historicalprocess of developmentand adaptation: a
small numberof Frenchcolonists,isolatedin a virginnatural
milieu,evolve and adapt to that milieuuntila collectivena-
tionalpersonalitybecomes"fixed"in them.At thelevel of the
individual,nationalpersonalityis oftendiscussedin termsof
temperamentand blood: people say that what distinguishes
Quebecois fromotherCanadians is 'joie de vivre"and "Latin
blood."
In sum, the nationis a collectiveindividualthatexistsas a
naturalobject in the real world. Like a livingcreatureit is
bounded,self-contained, and alive. Like a species-or like any
"thing"-it is distinguishablein termsof a set of attributes,
or culture.It is nationalculture
thatdistinguishes the nationand its individualmembersfrom
all othernations and human beings. "We differfromother
men,"saysLevesque; we are on "ourown specialwave-length."
Now, thisquestionof difference bringsus to an interesting
featureof the nationalistworld view. During politicalcam-
paignsI noticeda curiouscontradiction in the rhetoricof na-
tionalists.Politiciansspoke on the one hand of the riseof the
Quebecois nation-its arrivalat the brink ofmaturity, ofadult-
hood, a processabout to be fulfilled by thedeclarationofQue-
bec independence. On theotherhand,theyspokeequallyreadily
of an imminentdisasterthat faced the nation-of the nation
on thevergeof death. Thus Levesque can speak in one breath
of an indeliblenationalpersonality, one that"make[s]us what
we are" and that"we cannotsurrender," and ofthosederacines
who are no longer"one of us." This second,negativevisionis
discussedmainlyin termsof pollutionor, as Levesque does,
in termsof disease. Pollutionis above all culturalpollution-
"Anglo-Saxon"materialgoods, language, and values which
floodQuebec fromsurroundingterritories and which, if in-
gestedinto the national body, will lead to the death of the
nation.In sum, thereare juxtaposed, in nationalistideology,
a positiveand a negativevision:thenationis at oncecelebrated
as an emergententityand mournedas a dyingbreed. In both
visions, the nation is representedas an entitywith sharply
markedboundaries.Indeed, the fearof the violationof those
boundariesis directlyrelated to the conceptionof them as
naturaland proper.As Douglas (1966:113)has arguedin more
generalterms,"pollutionis a typeofdangerwhichis notlikely
to occurexceptwherethe lines of structure,cosmicor social,
are clearlydefined."
The culturalconceptsunderpinningthe nationalistworld
view,then,are these:The nationis a naturalentityin thereal
world. It differsfromall othersuch entitiesin termsof its
personalityor culture,the attributesof which clearlydistin-
guishit fromothernations,just as theydistinguish individual
Quebecois fromall otherhuman beings. But the integrity of
thisentityis threatened:culturalpollutionmayannihilate,one
byone, theattributes ofthenationalcultureand therebyoblit-
erate thosefeaturesthat mark offthe nationas a distinctive
entity.The problemforthe nationaliststhusbecomeshow to
preventnationaldisintegration.
THE OBJECTIFICATION OF CULTURE
A crucialproblemforthoseswayedby theassumptionsofthis
nationalistworldview is the maintenanceof nationalbound-
aries. The attemptto maintainboundaries,to stemthetideof
pollution,takes manyforms.The PQ, forexample,sees the
politicalarena as crucial.If Quebecoiscan controlthepolitical
machinery thatrepresents thenation,theycan implementpol-
icies and legislationthat will protectnationalboundarieson
all fronts-economic,linguistic,social, cultural.On each of
thesefrontsthe PQ now wages campaigns,and in thisthey
merelyaugmentand in some cases institutionalize the efforts
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
of a variety of private organizations and special-interestgroups
that have been fightingthese fightsfor years.
The political struggle itself takes two forms. First, the PQ's
ultimate goal, the firstplank of its platform, is to realize the
independence of Quebec. It has vowed to do this democratically
and only when it has become clear that to do so will realize
the will of the people-hence the strategyof referendatempered
by business as usual for a provincial government within the
Canadian Confederation (a strategy which some have inter-
preted as a dilution of principles in the pursuit of power). At
any rate, during its firstterm in power a great deal of the PQ's
energywas focused on the realization of national independence
by way of a referendum.
The second form of political action involves the normal ac-
tivities of government in regulating the economic, social, and
cultural spheres of Quebec life. Here the PQ, like all parties
that have controlled the provincial governmentsince the 1930s,
believes that even without independence much can be done to
protect national integrity-if only in a temporary and incom-
plete fashion. There are endless disputes with the federal gov-
ernmentin which the provincial governmentattemptsto protect
and enlarge its control of policy with respect to economic de-
velopment, immigration,education, and social welfare. In every
case the Quebec argument is that only Quebecois are in a
position to know what is good for them and, therefore,that
only Quebecois should formulate the policies that will shape
the future of the province. An adult, they say, must be free to
choose, and so must a country on the brink of adulthood.
Federal money is welcome-until such time as an independent
Quebec will have "repatriated" its full powers of taxation-
but federal interference is not to be tolerated. Many of the
policies that the Quebecois government seeks to implement
involve the protection of boundaries, of the autonomy and
integrityof the nation. For example, economic policy should
lead, it is argued, to the development of a self-sufficientecon-
omy that will allow Quebecois to produce what they need for
themselves, on their own terms. The rhetoric of pollution fig-
ures here-how can we stem the tide of imported consumer
goods? This echoes the rhetoric of earlier "Buy-Quebec" cam-
paigns sponsored by a variety of special-interest groups and
patriotic associations.
In the sphere of cultural life the government can act through
its Ministries of Education, Tourism, and Cultural Affairs.
Particularlynoteworthyhere are legislation designed to protect
the Quebecois language from the influence of English, official
encouragement for an annual round of patriotic holidays and
celebrations, and measures to protect what Quebecois call le
patrimoine, the cultural heritage. All of these activities involve
cultural objectification, and, in this, the PQ governmentmerely
takes its place among an array of actors, institutional and
individual, who work, and have worked forwell over a century,
to protect the culture of the Quebecois nation.
I have borrowed the idea of cultural objectification from
Cohn (n.d.:5), who uses it in a discussion of the colonial era
in India:
The Indian intellectualsof Bengal in the 19thcenturyand thenthe
whole Westerneducated class of Indians in the 20th centuryhave
objectifiedtheirculture.Theyin somesensehavemadeitintoa "thing":
theycan standback and look at themselves,theirideas, theirsymbols
and cultureand see itas an entity.Whathad previouslybeenembedded
in a wholematrixofcustom,ritual,religioussymbol,a textuallytrans-
mittedtradition,has now becomesomething Whathad been
different.
unconsciousnow to some extentbecomes conscious. Aspects of the
forconsciousends.
tradition can be selected,polishedand reformulated
Objectification is an apt term for the Quebec case because, as
we have seen, in nationalist ideology the nation is envisioned
as a natural entity characterized by its culture. Culture itself
is understood in a somewhat atomistic fashion as a collection
of traits integrated to form a unique object in the real world.
Furthermore,Cohn's discussion of objectificationlinks up with
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Handler: NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL OBJECTIFICATION
Whorf'sanalysisofthepredilection forembodiment in Western
thought.In theirsearchforan authenticcultureand identity,
nationalistsunconsciouslyfollowthe promptingsof Western
culturallogic when theylocate theirspecificity at the level of
naturalobjects.Paradoxically,such activityinexorablynegates
the culturalboundariesit is meant to preserve.In the first
place, itis typicalnotonlyoftheQuebecois,butofmostethnic
groupsin Westernsocieties.Thus Parsons(1975:63-67), fol-
lowingSchneider,has suggestedthatethnicgroupsall tendto
expresstheirpresumeddistinctiveness throughsimilarsymbols
and ideologies.Secondly,theobjectification ofcultureinvents,
over and over again, objects which are takento be naturally
boundedand continuous;yet,as we shall see, because theyare
continuallyreinterpreted and reconstructed (throughthe se-
mioticprocess of objectification) such objectified"pieces" of
culturecan have no continuousbounded existenceanalogous
to thatof a physicalthing.
The businessof protecting nationalidentityby maintaining
nationalboundariesinvolvestheprotection ofnationalculture.
To protectnationalculture,however,people mustfirstof all
know what it is, that is, they must be able to identifyits
distinguishing traits.It has alwaysbeen intellectualswho have
takenon the task of determining what nationalcultureis. In
thepast theseintellectualswerelay scholars,lawyers,writers,
politicians,and clergy.Since the 1960s the scene has been
dominatedby professionalacademics, especiallysocial scien-
tistsemployedby universitiesand the government.These in-
tellectualsfollowan objectifying logicin assumingthatculture
is a thingmade up of things(traits)and thattheirbusinessis
to identify,describe,collect,and preservetheseculturalthings.
An excellentexample of this process can be foundin the
recent Report Concerning the Disappearance of Certain Cul-
turalGoods (Ministeredes AffairesCulturelles1980). This re-
port begins with two case historieswhich trace the dis-
appearance,piece by piece, of the insidesof an ancienthouse
and a privatecollectionofethnographic objects.(For example,
photographswith superimposednumbersdissect the doors,
wall paneling,and fireplacesof the house and show how they
were disfiguredby additional objects such as radiatorsand
lightbulbs. Anotherphotographshows a stack of lumberin
an attic-the antique paneling,disassembledand rottingin
storage.)The reportconcludeswitha discussionof the prob-
lemsfacedby citizensand government in attempting to "reap-
propriate" thenationalpatrimony.Heretheaim ofthedocument
seems to be objectifying the whole province:"all objects of
daily life have become reflectionsof the culture."Given the
impossibility of"miniaturizing
Quebecoisculturein itstotality
and portraying it . . . inside a museum," how can it best be
utilized?Whatevertheultimatesolutions,thevitalfirststepis
to "inventory"the culture:"the Ministryof Cultural Affairs
cannotawaken Quebecois to the diverseaspects of theircol-
lectiveheritageunless theyhave protectedthe culturalmes-
sages afterhavingcorrectly identified
them"(pp. 384-85, 517).
In thisexamplewe see culturalobjectification carriedto its
logicalconclusion everyisolable"piece" of cultureanalyzed,
identified,and preserved.But theseobjectified piecesofculture
are neitherauthentic-thephenomenonitself-normerelypre-
served; theyare not continuouslyexistentnaturalobjects or
bounded traits,but newlyinventedsemioticobjectifications.
They are createdwhenone set ofculturalrepresentations (and
materialcultureis as representational as any otheraspect of
culture)is reinterpreted or reformulated, therebybecominga
new set of representations which,nonetheless,can referto the
priorset. We can speak of continuity in connectionwiththis
reformulation, but it is a twofoldsemiotic(not natural)con-
tinuity:on the one hand, the new representations referto the
old, and, on theotherhand,theprocessofobjectification recurs
continuously.Continuity,however,is not to be foundat the
61
level ofthethingitself,wherebothSmithand nationalistideo- County,ca. 1890." Surelythe object in the hand of a child
loguesseekit,fortheycontinually reinventtheobjectifiediden- would nothave been so identified, noteven by theadultswho
tityand culturethat theyclaim merelyto discover.In other gave it to him.
words, the culturesand culturetraitsthat are imaginedas Finally,the newly constructedand contextualizedobjects
continuouslyexisting(in the same way thatthingsexistcon- will hold new meaningsfor those who considerthem. Eth-
tinuouslyin nature)are notnatural,but semiotic,and as such nographicspecimensin a museumcase mean somethingdif-
are continuouslyrecreatedin the present.If we concernour- ferentto the nationalistpolitician,to the curator,and to the
selves solely with objectifiedculture,we mightjust as well public than theymeantto the peasants who fashionedthem.
speak of discontinuity as of continuity:
thoughsymbolicrefor- To the formergroup of actors theymean culture,national
mulationconstructsa kind of link-since presentrepresenta- culture;to thelattertheymeantsomethingelse. For example,
tions referto, or take account of, prior ones-the act of when people todaylearn and dance folkdances theydo so to
reformulation is also, necessarily,
apartfrom,distancedfrom affirm a local or nationalidentity;thisis themeaningthatthe
hencediscontinuous with-the objectofrepresentation. Cohn's dance has forthem. Those who danced those dances in the
formulation-"whathad been unconsciousnow. . . becomes past may not have done so as a self-conscious affirmationof
conscious"-covers onlya special case. The crucialelementin national identity;theydanced for amusement,forlove, for
objectification is not self-consciousness, for the objectifierisotherreasons that escape,us. The same dance, then, bears
unawareofthehiddenlogic-"embodimentis necessary"-that entirelydifferent meaningsforthe two sets of actors.Again,
guides his inventionof culture.What is centralto objectifi- thestatues,paintings,and ritualimplementswhichonce were
cationis thatitis semiotic-whichmeansthat,as in all cultural partof a livingfaithare todayboughtand sold, protectedand
action,thereis self-consciousness alongsideunawarenessand displayedas art. Duringmystayin Quebec therewas a much
continuity as well as discontinuity. The paradox ofnationalist publicizedtrialin whicha parishtriedto recoversomechurch
objectification-takingitself(and not the objectifiedculture treasuresthat had been sold to antique dealers. They did so
that it invents)as a culturalprocess-lies not in its self-con- notout of outrageover sacrilege,but out of a desireto restore
scious quality but in its unself-consciousness: people believe the artisticheritageleftthemby theirforebears.
thattheyare discoveringwhat theirculturehas been and is. If, now, we returnto the ethnographicincidentsportrayed
They assume that cultureis a real-worldentityand that by at theoutset,we shall findall threeof theseaspectsofdiscon-
analyzingits objectivepropertiestheycan preserveit. But, as tinuity. First,thetraditionalcharacteroftherestaurant, ofthe
I see it, theyare neitherdocumenting norpreserving a culture stage-setting--even of the host families-depended upon a
whichexistsindependently ofthem.Rather,theyare inventing carefulselectionof handicraftobjects, antiques,cuisine,and
an objectifiedcultureas, followingthepromptings ofa hidden entertainment. In the restaurant,by the way, one partof the
logicand an explicitideology,theyperpetually reinterprettheirselectionwas based upon the work of a folklorescholarwho
milieu. herselfhad selectively constructedan accountofQuebecoisfolk
What kinds of discontinuity-ofcreation-are entailed in life. Second, itemsthus selectedwere presentedin a context
theconstruction ofan objectifiedculture?First,objectification different fromcontextsin which theywould previouslyhave
is selective:to constructan accountor imageof a culturenec- beenfound.Forexample,traditionalhomecookingwas offered
essarilyinvolvestheselectionof some elementsat theexpense forsale by the restaurantand host families,and the perfor-
of others(cf. Smith,pp. 128-29). For example,currentcon- manceoffolktalesand songs-those relicsofa precommercial,
ceptionsof Quebecois cultureare permeatedby a romantic familialart-in the restaurantand, again, even by the rural
yearningforthe folksociety(Handler 1983). Accordingly, the families,became ambiance,anothercommercialproduct.Fi-
lifewaysof ruralQuebecois in past centuriesare takenas the nally,at least some of the actorsin these scenes understood
essenceofQuebecoisculture(cf.Bourque and Legar6 1979:26- theirparticipationas a statementof national identity.They
27). Such thingsas folkdancing,handicrafts, and agricultural believed that theywere gettingback to theirauthentic,tra-
practicesare researched,recreated,and held up as examples. ditionalculture.Frommypointofview thattraditionalculture
But muchis omitted:littleattentionis devotedto Roman Ca- was an objectification, a constructiongroundedin theideology
tholicism(or, when it is attendedto, it is treatedas folkart, ofthepresent.For me, it is theprocessofobjectification which
notas religion),to thecontactof ruralQuebecoiswithScotch, (as muchas anythingelse) is Quebecois culture-and muchof
Irish,and Americans,or to the culturalborrowingassociated anthropological cultureas well.
withthesecontacts.Yet thesemusthave been at least as sig-
nificantin thelives of Quebecois as thoseothertraitsthatare
now so eagerlysought. CULTURE, NATURAL OR SEMIOTIC
Second, theconstruction of an objectifiedcultureinvolvesa
new contextualizationof the elementsselected-which, be- By examiningQuebecois nationalistideologyI hope to have
cause theyare selectedoutofan arrayofelementsinone context thrownlighton the issue of reification in social theory.I have
and placed in oppositionto a different set of elementsin a asked whetherit is appropriateto considerculturesas things
different context,becomesomething otherthanwhattheywere. and, more particularly, whetherSmith'sconceptof sociocul-
In otherwords, the objects of a new interpretation-viewed tural continuity-directedas it is to objectifiedculture-can
in a new light,transposedto new contexts-becomesomething misleadus in our attemptto get at the socioculturalphenom-
new, though,once again, theymay be representedas contig- enon "itself."I have shownthat,despiteherinsistenceon cul-
uous with an authenticculturalpast. For example,a tool or turalcreativity, Smithspeaks as if sociocultureswere natural
toyin a museumcollectionofethnographic specimensthought entitiesexistentin the real world. RememberingDurkheim's
to embodythenationalheritageis notthesame thingas a tool dictum-"innaturethereareonlythings"-I haveaskedwhether
or toyin thehands of a peasant-and thisis trueeven though it is appropriateto speak of"a" sociocultureas ifit were,first,
we can speak of some sortof continuousphysicalidentityof a thingand, second (followingfromthe first),natural. This
the object. In the museumcase the object mustbe read and questionraisestheold debateaboutwhethersocialsciencemust
used differently thanit would have been read and used in the be naturalisticor phenomenological, to use Natanson's(1958)
field.It is juxtaposedto differentobjects.At theveryleast, its terms.This debateshouldnot,however,be crudelydefinedas
placementin a glass box createsa kind of sacred aura sum- one between"idealists"and "realists,"for,on the one hand,
marizedin theplacardthatsays"please do nottouch."Usually thosewho seek a semioticor interpretive theoryof culturedo
thereare otherinterpretive cuesas well:"Child'sRattle,Beauce not fora momentdeny the realityof culturalphenomena-I

62 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY

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for one would deny only that their reality is a natural reality
of things. As Cohn (1980:217) has put it, "cultures and societies
are not natural objects. It is only through culture that we
construct nature, not the other way around." On the other
hand, those who seek a naturalistic science of culture do not
deny the importance of subjectivity and ideas in cultural phe-
nomena, but they insist that such aspects be treated according
to a naturalistic methodology. Thus a theoretician as interpre-
tive in his orientation as Kroeber can nonetheless proclaim that
if anthropology is to follow the "way of science" it must "treat
all culture, including our own civilization, as parts of nature"
(1952:139).5
Having posed the issue in terms of "nature"-does culture
create nature or is it part of nature?-we ought equally to pose
it in termsof "things." But what, afterall, is a thing?According
to Heidegger (1967:53), in the Western philosophical tradition
a thing has been taken to be, first,framed by time and space
and, second, "the bearer of properties." The anthropological
construction of societies as things depends upon a similar set
of presuppositions. First, a thing is real; it exists in nature
independently of any human cognizance of it. Second, the es-
sence of the thing-what the thing "really is"-is similarly
independent of human knowledge. Each thing, as a bearer of
properties, is truly characterized by those properties. These
propertiesare taken as necessary and sufficientcriteriato define
and delimit the identity of things-that is, to separate each
thing from all others. Finally, a thing is bounded in space and
time. Temporal boundedness is equivalent to Smith's "conti-
nuity."For as long as it exists, a thing exists continuously,just
as in some sports a player cannot step out of bounds and then
return,during the same play, to the field of play-the journey
out of bounds having disrupted the continuityof his existence
during that particular play, hence annihilated him.
Any social-scientific discourse which speaks of societies as
thingsmust be underpinned by assumptions such as these. But
in the light of Smith's critique and my own, we can ask whether
theyought to be reformulatedor abandoned entirely.We must,
of course, agree that sociocultural processes are real, but not
that they exist in nature independently of any human cogni-
zance of them. As most social scientists would insist, such
phenomena are inextricably connected to the understandings
that cultural actors have of them; in some ways the actors'
understandings are the cultural phenomena. Even such ap-
parently "concrete" phenomena as functionally integrated in-
stitutions have typically been defined in terms of values and
norms, so that routinized behavior, while it is real enough, is
not independent of human thought. Here I agree with part of
Smith's argument-sociocultural phenomena have a peculiarly
sociocultural reality-but disagree when she contradicts herself
by equating that reality with a natural reality of things.
I also reject the notion that cultures are things characterized
by propertieswhich constitutetheiressence-that is, theiriden-
tityas things independent of other things. Nationalist ideology
insists that a nation is a bounded natural entitydistinguished
from all other national entities by its culture. As one of the
discussants of Smith's paper puts it, "states have political
boundaries and peoples have marks of distinction" (Jafari, p.
138). Here again I agree with Smith, and both of us have
insisted on the ongoing construction of cultural "content," on
the fact that cultural objects take on reality for those who
interpretthem-and in terms of their interpretations(for ex-
ample, "traditional" and "new")-but are not imbued with any
unchanging, constant, acultural essence. Thus thereis no "true"
answer to a question such as "What is Quebecois culture?" for
culturedoes not exist as a collection of thingsthat can be defined
I For an elegant discussion of the epistemology of natural and social
things, see Robert Murphy's The Dialectics of Social Life (1971: esp.
37-45), a work to which I am greatly indebted.
Vol. 25 * No. 1 * February 1984
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Handler: NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL OBJECTIFICATION
once and for all in terms of essential properties. What a culture
or a culture trait is can only be specified in terms of the par-
ticular points of view of those who create and act culture, and
those points of view are various and constantly shifting.
We run into similar difficultiesif we consider another, related
assumption-that the individuals who constitute a nation or
culture share in the essence of its collective character and,
sharing it, are themselves identifiable as being of that nation-
ality or culture. Actors do not so much share essence as they
communicate with one another. Communication between any
two individuals is always possible (to a degree), and commu-
nication across ethnic boundaries is as possible as communi-
cation withinthem. Communication across boundaries (forthat
matter,within them as well) may be belligerent or incomplete,
but it is communication nonetheless. Furthermore, boundaries
themselves are always contextual, constructed in and through
specific acts of communication as actors proclaim solidarity
with some and distance from others. Boundaries are not tan-
gible barriers that separate differentkinds of people, nor are
they fixed conceptual distinctions with fixed empirical refer-
ents. As we all know, people manipulate "interlocking, over-
lapping, multiple and alternative collective identities" (Southall
1970:44). Each time that they do so they make a statement
about who they are, and, though they may believe themselves
to be referringto an unalterable ethnic essence, our analysis
stressesthe provisionalityof theirdiscourse: the message changes
with each context,and its effectslie in its communicative power,
not solely in its referentialaccuracy.
Finally, I reject the notion, central to Smith's argument, that
sociocultural systemsare definitivelycharacterized by temporal
continuityanalogous to the continuityof existence that we posit
of natural objects. Cultural action is semiotic: it is perpetually
reinvented in the present. We can discuss this perpetual in-
vention of culture in terms of semiotic continuity,if we wish
to stress that a present-momentunderstanding takes account
of or refers to prior understandings. With equal justification,
however, we can point to the discontinuity inherent in these
semiotic acts, forin each case there is a taking-account-ofsome
thing (as we are forced to say) which is distanced from the
ongoing, present-tenseaction of taking account. Thus, for ex-
ample, historians (themselves cultural actors) may well point
to a continuous sense of identity within some analytically
bounded group of individuals and show that earlier generations
replace themselves with later ones who intentionally identify
themselves by the same ethnic label that their predecessors
used. But the acts of remembering and self-identificationnec-
essarily involve discontinuity as well as continuity,for even
self-identificationrequires a point of view that cannot be iden-
tical with the self so identified.As Sapir (1922:619) once wrote,
"introspection may be a dangerously elusive method, for the
moment of consciousness that we set out to describe can not
be strictlysynchronous with the moment of observation." To
speak of continuity,then, as the thing itselfis to privilege one
aspect of semiotic action at the expense of another. To claim
that aspect as the essence of the phenomenon is to reify the
knowledge generated by a point of view which, like all points
of view (with the nonhuman exception of an omniscient God),
cannot be definitive.
Western common sense, with its insistence on a truthwhich
is in conformityto things (Heidegger 1967:35-54), goes hand
in hand with an anthropological science that has consistently
privileged analytic distinctions (presumably based on an ac-
curate appraisal of the distinctiveness of things themselves) at
the expense of relational processes. As Whorf has shown, our
symbolic patterns consistentlyobjectify reality,creating things
fromthe most unlikely experiences. And we privilege this real-
ity of things to such a degree that, for example, it is difficult
63
to teach students in an introductoryanthropology course what
a symbol is because in our common sense symbols are trans-
parent, while their referents take on ultimate reality. Even
when symbolism becomes an object of study-when, using
other symbols, we look at symbols instead of through them-
we continue to privilege the thing referredto precisely because
we ask how symbols refer to "it." Thus Durkheim (1966:15)
warned social scientists against the use of commonsense rep-
resentationsbecause he thoughtthat such representationswould
act "like a veil drawn between the thing and ourselves." Like
most scientists, Durkheim envisioned progressively more re-
fined concepts that would bring us ever closer to the things
themselves. Yet such a vision overlooks the unclosable breach,
between ourselves and the reality "out there," that our depen-
dence on symbols entails. Moreover, it overlooks the possibility
that human creativity arises in this breach: the world that we
know-"nature," for example-is a world that we construct,
an ever changing production of cultural imagination. It is im-
possible to seize that imagined world as a thing,forthe attempt
to seize it is an act of imagination which necessarily constitutes
its object anew. Thus neither nationalists nor anthropologists
can document authentic culture, culture understood as the thing
itself,for the thing itselfis the attempt to capture it. Each new
attempt creates an object which is inherentlyinauthentic. And
this is not only because of the "axiomatic uniqueness of each
context of each event," as Smith has suggested, but, more
fundamentally,because these events-these attemptsto grasp-
are semiotic, hence creative.
Comments
by BERNARD ARCAND
Departement d'Anthropologie, Universite Laval, Quebec,
P.Q., Canada GlK 7P4. 1 Ix 83
As a Qu6b6cois, I should perhaps focus my comment on the
ethnographic material discussed here, but I cannot forgetthe
debate which is to be enlightened by this material. I cannot
resistsuggestingthat had the author been more careful in read-
ing Murphy's Dialectics of Social Life (a work to which in a
footnote he claims to be greatly endebted), the general for-
mulation of the theoretical argument would have moved be-
yond this rather simplistic and artificialdialogue between pure
types of materialistic empiricism and semiotics, both presented
here as extremeenough to be imaginary. To say that the process
of objectification is in itselfpart of culture and of anthropology
merelyrepeats, withoutdiscerniblereason, what has been clearly
established and known for decades.
On Handler's ethnography, three brief comments come to
mind. First, intellectuals do not have "the task of determining
what national culture is." Their task is to write profuselyabout
culture and be read by other intellectuals and ethnographers.
Second, Handler's choice of informantsdetermines the success
of his demonstration. His interestin the discourse of politicians,
mass media, and people in the tourist trade seems oblivious of
the fact that these are all true professionals in the creation of
rarefied, stereotyped, and artificialvisions of reality. The real
questions are whether Qu6becois believe any of this and why
such rhetoricappears at this particularplace and time in history.
Third, whatever informantsmay be saying remains only one
side of the story. The positive, kind, and often wishy-washy
declarations of our collective goodness offerthe polite expres-
sion of a definitionwhich also and always includes our relations
to others. To discuss Qu6bec nationalism without any mention
of colonialism is much like tryingto define Irishness without
the English, Algerian nationalism without the French, or even
New Zealand nationalism without Australia. Most of Handler's
references come from civil pronouncements which in them-
selves are often quite empty and artificialbut which cannot be
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understood without grasping the fear of encroachment from
outside; for example, the interestin old furniturefollowed the
massive purchase of all kinds of Qu6bec junk by American
collectors in the late '50s, and the praise of French would
certainly be less relevant if the language were not threatened
in the labour market. Looking at only one side offersa story
that makes little sense, turns signs into pure signs, and gives
semiotics a bad name.
Finally, whenever I read sentences such as "nationalists un-
consciously follow the promptings of Western cultural logic"
or "typical not only of the Quebecois, but of most ethnic groups
in Western societies," I wonder whether I should not be proud
to have been so excluded from the "West."
by RONALD COHEN
Department of Anthropology,University of Florida, Gaines-
ville, Fla. 32611, U.S.A. 23 VIII 83
The main point of this article is well-taken and clearly dem-
onstrated. Cultural nationalism and possibly all ethnic loyal-
ties, as well as-in my view-ethnic phobias, are selective and
meaningful. The most interestingfeature is the way Handler
shows how the entitivity of ethnicity shifts and changes its
constituents along with their meanings over time. These exe-
getical points are important, and we are in the author's debt
for developing and applying Smith's ideas in this useful way.
For those of us concerned with political phenomena, how-
ever, hermeneutical insight, although important, is only one of
a larger set of considerations necessary to the understanding
of a vexing problem. Cultural nationalism, whether it be that
of pre-World War II Germany or Japan, Zionist, Arabist, Ti-
betanTamil, Afrikaans, or Quebecois (to name only a few well-
known examples), is an especially potent and explosive force
hindering the pursuit of peace or at least less costly conflicts
among subgroups of our species. The reader searches in vain
for threads to tie this quite convincing exegesis of PQ ideology
into its context, into some relation to events as they have un-
folded or may yet come to pass.
Handler assumes that there is widespread support for PQ
ideology because "most French-speaking Quebecois-even those
loyal to Canada" are Quebecois nationalists in that they "are
at least nominally committed to theiridentityas French-speak-
ing Quebecois." The implication here is that the ideology re-
flects sociocultural reality and that we can, as Dumont (cited
by Handler) says, treat the collectivity as an individual and
the ideology as that "person" 's expressions of belief, meanings,
and aims. But Dumont is wrong-no collectivity is ever an
individual, and an ideology does not reflectthe meanings and
goals and cultural objectification of the collectivity.Some Que-
becois are said to be "deracines" (i.e., they do not accept the
ideology), and in dubbing them so L6vesque feels he can place
them outside the fold. Are they? Given the chance, the majority
of the collectivityvoted against a political step toward the PQ
goal of independence. Nowhere in the article are we given any
means to understand why the ideology as expressed in PQ
literaturefailed so clearly when put to the test. If independence
is the cornerstone of the ideology, then why did a majority
choose to remain as a province within the federation of Can-
ada? Indeed, everything adumbrated in the article points to
exactly the opposite outcome. The author describes a widely
accepted cultural nationalism expressed in Ren6 L6vesque's
writings and corroborated by the anthropologist's fieldwork
observations. Actually, the contemporary economic situation
in Quebec and the inability of the PQ to improve it mean that
the party is in deep trouble politically and may very well be
replaced by a more federalist-orientedregime. Even more co-
gent in the context of Handler's argument are recent assertions
by Quebecois that cultural nationalism may have gone too far
in denying language rights to Anglophone citizens of Quebec.
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
The social and cultural setting of any cultural nationalist ide-
ology is of necessity many times more complex than a her-
meneutical adumbration of one particular viewpoint within it.
This is, in my view, the major theoretical issue raised by the
article. If anthropological analysis is by choice limited to the
expressions and meanings attached to cultural things, then the
human condition is reduced to a set of interpretationsof mental
entities and their expression in language, metaphor, and art.
But people not only culturize-they act. And human action is
the result of multiple social and material, as well as mental,
factors. The excision of these fromsocial analysis may produce
a seemingly refinedtool of interpretation,but in my view the
cost of these benefitsis an inevitable and unnecessary distortion
in our understanding of real-world problems and events.
by BERNARD DELFENDAHL
"Galeye," 84210 La Roque sur Pernes, France. 3 VIII 83
Handler's handling of "objectification" seems an attempt to
establish yet another tautological academic rut. Is he saying
anything more than that insofar as a thing is constituted in
minds as an object of discourse it is constituted in minds as an
object of discourse? Such redundancy may serve to underline
the mental process, but nothing is thus said for or against
continuity.
Even the most dull-witted of Handler's Quebecois-for he
seems to credit them with little understanding of what they're
about-surely recognizes that a toy or a tool in a child's or a
peasant's hand is not treated in the same way as in a museum.
But to say it "is not the same thing" (emphasis mine) is like
taking a hoe and saying, "This is a hoe. Now I put it in a glass
case and look! it is no longer a hoe!" The reaction of the Que-
becois may well be "What kind of hocus-pocus is this?" unless,
of course, they also suffer from academic deformation or a
priori respect for academics. An old or resurrected Quebecois
may recognize that the Quebec nation is not the same today as
yesterday even though it is the same nation. The analysis of
these differentmeanings of "sameness" requires no appeal to
rupturing"objectification" or to the compulsive "embodying"
of abstractions. As to "selectivity,"I would opine that it is not
a matter of constituting the object or thing, but one of en-
hancing it-propaganda is not necessarily naive.
Handler seems, indeed, in favour of "trivial exercise in
circular affirmation"(Smith, CA 23: 140). In rejecting such
gymnastics,Smith invites us to do more "soft"thinking,whereas
Handler would identifyall thought with "hard" thought. And
is he not taking "thought" as a thing, objectifying a notion of
his as being "out there," in others' heads, as in his own? He
analyzes a quotation from Levesque as verifying Dumont's
view on the double nature of the modern nation, whereas I
can find no reference, explicit or implicit, anywhere in the
passage to a "collective individual," but only a description of
a "collection of individuals" having common traits. Here again
is the "trivial exercise in circular affirmation"of "understanding
a model we have constructed." Or is it a case of Handler's
anthropology's being "a misinterpretationof a parent" anthro-
pology? ("Every parent is a misinterpretationof a poem parent"
may be a more fecund saying.)
Thinking about abstract notions such as objectification may
help to open up the commonsense knowledge of man to subtler
insights, but if such notions are taken as making common
knowledge obsolete they become empty shells, mere badges
intellectuals display formutual recognition. Maybe the trouble
with most anthropologists is that they want to "do anthropol-
ogy" as M. Jourdain wanted to do prose: to establish or keep
their distinction as academics they must show-to themselves
and others-that they are doing something that the common
man is not doing and, preferably, that is beyond his doing.
Bertrand Russell advised that one firstestablish one's name
Vol. 25 No. 1 February 1984
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Handler: NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL OBJECTIFICATION
(and income?) by publishing more or less esoteric academic
stuff,the fartherfrom common parlance the better, and then,
having done this, start saying in plain language what one really
wants to say. Unfortunately,many seem to lose touch on the
way or never become self-assured enough to let pedantry drop.
A Montaigne, having a private income, could write freelyand
simply. A thing is a thing and takes on many meanings. One
wields an embodiment but talks about a meaning. Talk (or
writing)is the prerogative of academics-might not this be the
root of Handler's allergy to embodiment? A "structural" uni-
verse is only for the "intelligent" to understand, whereas any-
body can get in touch with substance. This implies not a refusal
to think, but a refusal to disembody thought, to empty it of
its substance. We may not be able to "know" the "thing itself,"
but we can keep it company and chat about it and so "get to
know it better."
by DEAN MACCANNELL
Department of Applied Behavioral Sciences, University of
California, Davis, Calif. 95616, U.S.A. 3 VIII 83
Modernity is the main obstacle in the path of the continued
development of anthropology. When cultural practices and ar-
tifacts are put on display for tourists and ethnicityis made a
basis for political action, everyone, including anthropologists,
begins to question the authenticity of culture and ethnicity.
Elsewhere I have argued (D. MacCannell 1973, 1976, 1977a,
b, 1982, n.d.) that tourism, ethnic politics, and the dialectics
of authenticityare generic characteristics of the groups we now
study, not a series of aberrations, and that we need to develop
new analytical frameworks for understanding these forms (see
especially D. MacCannell 1979 and MacCannell and Mac-
Cannell 1983). There are already quite a few studies that are
fully informed by this double critique of anthropology and
modernity (for example, Cohen 1977; Graburn 1976, 1977;
Ichaporia 1983). Even though much of this work has been done
by scholars with superb anthropological credentials, it retains
an aura of marginality. Therefore I am pleased to see these
issues appear in CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY and honored to be
asked for a comment.
Handler's article is valuable because it approaches the prob-
lem of the origin and aim of modern culture in a way that is
bound to make sense to students who wish to limit their re-
search to core concerns of the discipline, i.e., within the frame-
work of the older debate about cultural continuity vs.
discontinuity.Handler argues persuasively that, in its own wav,
anthropology is as complicitous as tourism and nationalism in
the artificial objectification of culture. In order to escape the
restrictionsthat anthropology has put on our understanding of
culture, Handler invokes semiotics. He suggests that we ap-
proach culture as a semiotic process and attend to the collective
creation of values as a way of gettingbeyond the reificationof
cultural formsthat results fromthe application of existingtech-
nical perspectives. My only complaint here is that he does not
go far enough in this direction.
I agree with Handler in his suggestion that the creation of
culture is a semiotic process, but so is the reificationof cultural
forms. All cultures, if they survive, must seem to be stable,
and this achievement of the appearance of stability is no less
a semiotic process than is the potential for absolute disconti-
nuity. Both tendencies are made possible by the principle of
the arbitrariness of the relationship between the signifierand
the signified. Any system of signs, such as Quebecois ideology,
contains two opposing potentials forthe futureof cultural inter-
pretation: (1) the model of culture that is proposed can fully
exploit the ultimate arbitrariness of the sign and conceive itself
in a radically relative way as but one interpretation in an
65
 endless series, opening the entire system to fragmentationand
expansion, or (2) the interpretationcan assert that its way of
connectingsignifyingmaterials to signifiedmeanings is the only
correct way, denving the authority of other signs. This latter
strategyis employed in touristic, nationalistic, and anthropo-
logical accounts of "authentic" ethnic identity. (For excellent
analytical statements on the capacity of cultural semiosis to
support both continuity and change, see Lotman and Uspen-
skiy 1978 and J. MacCannell 1979.) In sum, I am suggesting
that both cultural continuity and discontinuity are semiotic
productions, not just discontinuity,and only semiotics has the
analytical power to bridge the gap between them.
In a semiotic of culture, it is necessary to approach specific
morals and values as signs. Semiotic researchers firstdescribe
the imagery surrounding cultural expressions and the ways
meanings attach to particular images, i.e., they describe the
living relationship between the signifierand signified. Differ-
ences in the structureof the relationship of the signifierto the
signifiedpermit classification of the cultural materials as icons,
indices, and symbols, each with differentcommunicative ca-
pacities and functions. The final step in semiotic analysis of
culture is the building of a predictive, dialogic model: Who is
speaking to whom about what? And what are the limits and
probable outcomes of such a dialogue?
Handler makes some very suggestive statements,but he does
not really pursue them within a semiotic framework. For ex-
ample, he writes that within Quebecois ideology, individuals
"are considered to be replicas" of the nationalistic conscious-
ness. A replica is an instance of an iconic sign which has specific
features and limits in its expressive capacities. It would be
interestingto learn about transformationsof the status of in-
dividuals when they are thought to be icons-as opposed to
indices, which is their status in conventional social science
frameworks. Such a treatment might have permitted us to
identifywith the Quebecois by allowing us some access to their
particular existential problems. I should also have liked to learn
more about the context of expressions of "authentic" Quebecois
ethnicity. Is their political posture mainly for the English-
speaking Canadians, i.e., a means of correcting earlier neg-
ative stereotypes? Or is it an expression of solidarity across
class and subregional lines within French Canada? How do
expressions of ethnicitydifferdepending on the parties to the
dialogue? These are among the questions that would be
prompted by a rigorous application of a semiotic mode of anal-
ysis such as one finds in the works of Bouissac (e.g., 1978),
Drummond (e.g., 1977a, b), and Dumont (e.g., 1977, 1979).
I admit that I was somewhat perplexed by an article sched-
uled to be published in a journal named "Current Anthropol-
ogy" which makes claims in the name of "semiotics" while
invoking as authorityto do so the writingsof Whorf and Sapir.
With all due respect, something has happened since.
by KENT MAYNARD
Department of Sociology and Anthropology,Denison Uni-
versity,Granville, Ohio 43023, U.S.A. 11 VIII 83
Handler suggests persuasively that we should view sociocul-
tural phenomena not as natural systems, but as semiotic pro-
cesses, and that in conceptualizing about these processes we
should avoid taking our concepts for the reality to which they
refer. When considering this argument, however, we might
distinguishthe two issues of objectification and reification.The
firstrefersto the ontological nature of reality;e. g., is it a natural
system or a semiotic process? The latter refers to the meth-
odological issue of endowing what should be a sensitizing con-
cept with ontological status. It would be helpful to clarifythis
distinction, particularly in light of Handler's concern with the
nature of our data and of theory construction. Handler, for
example, argues that "such social-scientificentities ("society,"
"culture," "sociocultural system") are objectifications-the
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imaginative products of a world view in which, as Whorf put
it, "embodiment is necessary" (1956:241). As such, they are not
on-the-ground, natural, bounded, or absolute ("the phenom-
enon itself"), but semiotic: symbolic objectifications which are
continually, and discontinuously, constructed in the present."
It is unclear whether Handler is referringhere to "culture," for
example, as a concept or as those semiotic processes which
constitute its referent.By the logic of his argument, he would
seem to be referringto both.
The central focus of his article is an objectification. He
illustrates nicely the way in which Quebecois tradition is a
construction. Though he considers all cultural processes se-
miotic, he appears to narrow his claim by saying that objec-
tification is a by-product of a distinctly Western logic found
among "most ethnic groups in Western societies." Yet he seems
to accept its legitimacy in both Cohn's (n.d.) discussion of India
and Smith's article. In keeping with the tenor of Handler's
central point, however, one can argue that objectification is
inherent in the human construction of social identities. In
Schutz's (1962) terms, it involves the creation of a second order
of meaning, a sign of signs. Cultural phenomena refernot solely
to their everyday referents,but to the culture itself.
If objectification refersto only signs of signs, then it cannot
be synonymouswith culture. That Handler appears to conflate
the two at points may be due to his retentionof language and
conceptual views which are naturalistic and objectivistic. To
referto ideologies as "systems of symbols and meanings" runs
counter to his emphasis on the continual creativityof semiotic
processes. The use of ideology as a noun with a systemic ref-
erent is taken from Geertz. Geertz's account of culture, how-
ever, posits the public extrasomatic nature of symbol systems,
a view quite differentfrom Handler's semiotic position.
This raises the issue of the semiotic nature of sociocultural
phenomena. Handler emphasizes that, as semiotic phenomena,
nationalist ideologies entail the constant creativity of human
beings. He suggests, though, that we follow Schneider in pro-
ducing a "cultural account," a position which again leads to
an objectivist, if not naturalistic, view of symbols. He adopts
this position apparently because he rejects class analyses that
portray ideology as an epiphenomenon of "supposedly more
concrete social realities." I agree that such mechanistic inter-
pretations are too facile to encompass the subtle construction
of meaning. Yet one can recognize that symbols are grounded
in social practice without considering them epiphenomenal. To
conduct only a cultural analysis of symbols would divorce sym-
bols from the very human creativity which produces them.
Handler appears to deemphasize the relation between sym-
bols and practice because of his Geertzian conception of ide-
ology and his critique of interest theories which may leave
ideology as an unexamined system. Geertz's position, however,
presupposes intereststo be related to symbols primarilyin the
pragmatic manipulation of the latter forulteriorends, whereas
belief suggests commitment to symbols for their own sake.
Given the purposeful nature of human action, such a dichotomy
cannot be sustained. We create and socially reproduce meaning
because of its relevance to our projects at hand; meaning is
inextricably linked with interest. Interests and the ideological
constructions they presuppose and reproduce do not simply
distort sociocultural reality; they are the very media by which
we understand our surroundings and act successfully (cf. Gid-
dens 1981).
Understanding the relationship between symbols and inter-
ests is also necessary for clarifyingthe constant creativity of
the semiotic process. The creation of symbols is neither out of
whole cloth nor completely free. It is a social process which
produces and reproduces symbols. We must take account not
only of past ideas but of the routinized collective actions of
others. To focus only on systemsof meaning or on theircreation
apart fromsocial practice deemphasizes an important issue for
cultural "continuity,"the reality of structures of power which
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
are emergent yet contingent in human action. Consideration
of the "varying and changeable relationships between masses
and elites" in French-Canadian society, as Handler suggests,
is essential for examining the meaning of both Quebecois cul-
tural ideas and nationalist ideology.
by LiSE PILON-LE
Departement d'Anthropologie, Universite Laval, Quebec,
P.Q., Canada GiW 7P4. 4 viii 83
Handler's paper raises important questions about culture and
ideology. My comment will focus on three points: the semiotic
conception of culture, relativism as an epistemological position,
and the treatment of the Quebec case.
Is culture natural (a thing) or semiotic (a symbolic process)?
The concept of cultural objectification validates the choice of
the second term of the alternative. Resting upon Whorf's as-
sertion on the propensity of Indo-European grammars to refer
to things ratherthan to relationships, this concept is developed
via the critique of the essentialist conception of culture of M.
Estellie Smith and then applied to a concrete case. A new
concept of culture emerges. Culture is "a purely semiotic pro-
cess," "symbolically created in the present," with neither em-
pirical referentsnor temporal continuity.To avoid the essentialist
or ontological trap, Handler falls into the idealist trap: his
concept becomes a pure form without any content.
Despite the fact that Whorf's assumptions on the correlation
between language, thought, and culture have never been sup-
ported by scientificdemonstration, they appear here as an un-
questioned point of departure.
The limits of the concept of cultural objectification are not
clear, and this generates confusion. Is objectification an attri-
bute of Western languages or thinking (Handler easily slips
fromone to the other) in general? Then it means all and nothing
and has no heuristic value. Is objectification an attributeof all
Western ideologies? Then, is culture identical with ideology?
What about the anthropologist's point of view and its rela-
tionship to objectification? The author's answer is an episte-
mological relativism that stems from his idealist conception of
culture. Differentin nature fromthe philosophical and political
position of the American culturalists of the '30s, which was
critical in intention and in fact of the colonialism of European
nations, Handler's relativism is the result of an attempt to
empty the concept of culture of any content. If culture has no
fixed content, any discourse is as valid as any other. Then,
why bother doing anthropology? The acknowledgment of the
equality of the anthropologist's and the informants' discourse
is a positive step, but Handler has another ambition: to reveal
the nature of cultural objectification through his analysis of a
particular ideology. His relativism appears, then, as the result
of the ambiguity and ambivalence of his own position.
With the concept of culture reduced to a pure form, it be-
comes easy to analyse the content of an ideology as a "cultural
account" and to discard the class analysis of Quebecois na-
tionalist ideology as ideology itself. The result is a confusion
generated by an identity of notions and concepts. Culture be-
comes identical with ideology. The content of the ideology be-
comes the ideology itself. National identity is confused with
nationalist ideology.
What kind of knowledge about the Quebecois nationalist
ideology is provided by Handler's analysis? We learn that cul-
tural objectification is the main feature of that ideology, that
national identitydoes not exist because when nationalists assert
such a thing they "unconsciously follow the promptings of
Western cultural logic when they locate their specificityat the
level of natural objects." In sum, this means that nationalists
are victims of cultural objectification and that only the an-
thropologist can identify it as such. Equality now becomes
inequality.
The presence to some degree of that featurein the Quebecois
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Handler: NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL OBJECTIFICATION
nationalist ideology is not questioned here. What is important
is that an analysis that excludes class analysis leads to no further
knowledge of the nature of that ideology because its specificity
is reduced to the exemplification of the author's thesis. That
this kind of ideology has features of "Western cultural logic"
is obvious, and no new knowledge of its nature is derived from
this. On the contrary,the author's insistence on analysing this
ideology without any historic referenceconceals what is really
at stake in Quebec society, how this ideology came to be dom-
inant, and by what kinds of mechanisms it maintains its dom-
ination. The culturalistpoint of view is comfortingin permitting
one to stay on the abstract level ratherthan undertake the more
challengingtask of explaining ideology in termsof class analysis.
by M. ESTELLIE SMITH
Department of AnthropologylSociology,State University of
New York, Oswego, N.Y. 13126, U.S.A. 3 VIII 83
Given that a publication of mine serves as a critical focus for
Handler's presentation, and given that I am forced to take
issue with him on a number of points, I want to begin by saying
I applaud his effortsto grapple with both the epistemological
and the ethnological concerns that are of such consequence for
so many of us in anthropology. The ethnographic emphasis he
has selected as the nucleus for his theoretical discussion is, I
think, more apt than mine. The problems raised by the for-
mation of nationalist ideology speak to a wider audience and,
at least on the surface, address issues of more general concern
than tourism (though not more general, of course, than the
implicit questions of development and cultural "change").
I am, however, disappointed that Handler has chosen not
to pursue at greater length the major goal of my paper. Ter-
minological and philosophical issues aside, I urged that sci-
entists, especially those involved with programs of "directed
change," note what elements insiders and outsiders choose,
under what conditions, to identifythis or that as "traditional"
or "innovative," "new" or "old." Since nothing is either one or
the otherbut as we choose to identifyit, and since that cognitive
process is embedded in a complex matrix of sociocultural fac-
tors, which identity is assigned is some indication of people's
idea of the consequences of an "innovation" or "preservation
attempt." Handler does not, for example, address the question
of what has led the Quebecois only recently and after some
300 years to formulate explicitly "a nationalist ideology" upon
which a growing number of governmental, legal, economic,
and associational links are said to rest. Given the long-smould-
ering discomfort,even anger, among Francophones about their
position in a hithertoAnglo-dominated Canadian polity, why
now and not sooner or later? More to the point, why around
the agrarian, 18th-centuryhabitant when Quebecois have long
prided themselves on a certain "innate cosmopolitanism" con-
sidered lacking in the "stodgy, old-fashioned" Anglo elite? Fur-
ther, why should the impetus for this have come from the
educated, urban elite rather than from the "folk" from whom
the "tradition" is said to be derived? Why do the Francophones
of other provinces tend to disdain such effortseither as un-
realistic and romantic or as window-dressing forthe pragmatic
schemes of a minority of the Quebecois elite? Why, indeed,
have the Quebecois tended to alienate, say, the Acadians of
the Maritimes with what the latter see as an unduly exclusive
emphasis on Quebec per se? Why, given the dynamism of the
intellectual and entrepreneurial elite of Quebec, did not the
framers of the ideology choose to emphasize their cosmopoli-
tanism and sophistication? Many Quebecois (and other non-
Anglo Canadians as well) delight in pointing to what they say
are examples of the provincial, conservative, outmoded be-
havior and thinking of English Canadians and labeling such
activities with catch phrases such as "personified by Empire
67
Loyalists," "vested in the eastern-based financial interests,"and
"manifested in an anachronistic political and economic per-
spective derived from colonial capitalism." Why, in the face of
this and the growing internationalism of a world system, and
in full awareness of the "high technology revolution," do PQ
leaders choose to organize their effortsaround their own an-
achronistic symbols-an agrarian, rural past and another vari-
ant of the provincialism (in more senses than one) fromwhich
many Canadians are now tryingto escape?
Surely, for example, the bilingual facility of most educated
Francophones could have been emphasized as an indication of
theirgreater "fitness"to deal autonomously with a world dom-
inated by multinational business and political issues-partic-
ularly when Anglo-Canadians have have been ridiculed forthe
extentto which theylack such multilingual skills. In attempting
to expand the Quebec economy, Levesque and officialspokes-
men for the province visit abroad and stress these points when
dealing with representatives of foreignbusiness concerns. Yet,
in keeping with the ideology that Handler describes, Bill 101
encourages French monolingualism in Quebec, not only for
French-Canadians but for the majority of immigrants to the
province. The rationales forsuch a move are not the issue here;
what I am drawing attention to is the selection, though other
equally valid strategies are available (and employed in other,
external contexts), of these particular foci for the Quebecois
nationalist ideology. I repeat the central question of my paper:
Given that no event, trait, actor, or what have you is ever
"traditional" or "innovative" save as the label of this ideal
condition is attached, given the genuinely syntheticcharacter
of all "things," why choose one set of symbols over another,
create this identityrather than that? For that matter,why does
Handler (despite repetitionof the point that nothing is ever the
same or unique) choose to stress only the uniqueness, the crea-
tivity,the discontinuityinvolved in Quebec nationalistideology?
"Continuity" is simply a word that I have chosen to discuss
the process whereby members of human groups identify the
boundaries and contents of such groups, i.e., define the socio-
culture with which they identify and from which they draw
certain cognitive tools. Scholars have long recognized the need
to differentiatebetween short-term congeries of people and
those who perceive themselves as durative members of a society
with certain standardized ways of behaving and viewing the
world around them. We do this not only because it seems
analytically useful but because we recognize that the people
we study themselves have always made such a differentiation-
between "us," "our group," "our people," and foreigners,out-
siders, or newly incorporated aliens. Social scientists have ar-
gued that, for one thing, such societies are identified by
transgenerational continuity and, for another, the members
must possess a historical sense of their beginnings and persis-
tence in time. But if we know, empirically, that nothing can
stay the same and nothing is totally new and unique, how/why
do people minimize or ignore change, and when/whydo they
choose (consciously or unconsciously) to focus on uniqueness
and creativity?
Perhaps an example from language will illustrate my point.
Each utterance of sound in a language consists of a bundle of
distinctive features-voicing, aspiration, etc. Speakers of
American English distinguish between Id! and It! because,
though the two phonemes possess a number of features in
common, they focus on one, voicing or the lack of it, to dis-
tinguish the d of din fromthe t of tin-different words because
of differentinitial consonants. This distinctionis so fixed, cog-
nitively,that many naive speakers, when told that the bundle
that forms the medial consonant is the same in bitter and
bidder, will reject the idea and maintain that they pronounce
them differently-as, indeed, they will "prove" by inserting a
plus juncture (bit + ter) to restore the voicelessness of what is
graphemically indicated as t. Why should an articulatory fea-
ture be cognitively critical at one time and ignored at another?
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Why should we insist that we perceive a distinction between
two "sames" when, empirically, no such differenceexists? An-
other example can be found in the question of when a dialect
becomes a language. When did Latin become French, Italian,
etc.? Why is Latin labeled a dialect of Italian while Romansh
is accorded the status of a national language? When is auton-
omy and uniqueness perceived and when is it claimed that
"even though differentit is really the same"? What are the
consequences of such labeling? I wish Handler had directed
attention to such questions.
I turn now to the second aspect of Handler's paper, the
epistemological issues to which he devotes (to my mind,
unfortunately)a large portionof his commentary.While I would
like to respond in detail to the numerous misreadings of my
text-as well as the legitimate points of divergence-con-
straints of space make this impossible. Further, extensive de-
bates of this kind often bring (legitimate) charges of, at best,
scholasticism and, at worst, nit-picking.Additionally, Handler
and I have already engaged in extensive discussion on some of
these points, and this might lead us to employ, unwittingly,
"coded commentary" that would only serve to mystifyrather
than enlighten the reader, as well as detractingeven more from
the important issues in both our papers. I would rather en-
courage the reader to refer to my paper and, by comparison
of what I say with what Handler interpretsme as saying, make
an independent determination as to the points of divergence
and agreement between us.
I must, however, comment brieflyon several matters of pri-
mary concern. First, I believe that sociocultural behavior has
its genesis in the symboling capacity of humans. This is a two-
edged sword, and, on the negative side, it has been a constant
struggle for humans to "make allowances" for the extent to
which socioculturally derived cognitive factors bias what we
try to learn about things and processes, independent of those
factors. Thus, in a sense, all human behavior, events, and
processes (as well as natural "things/processes")are sociocul-
tural because they must be perceived, understood, and acted
upon by human agents in terms of idiosyncratic cognition de-
rived from and embedded in the sociocultural context.The at-
tempt to control for such cognitive skewing and escape its
constraintsis what the historyof science is all about; while we
will perhaps never completely free ourselves, it remains the
ideal of scholars. This culture-as-symbolingperspective causes
me, at times, however, to be baffled by the discourse of those
who utilize a "semiotic" frame of reference.Scholars employing
this tool appear, not infrequently,to blur critical distinctions
between signal, sign, and symbol. Further,some also variously
appear to wish to substitute "semiotic" for "culture" or, con-
trariwise, deal with what is too trivial forthe analytical weight
they would have it carry. Handler obviously grounds much of
his discourse in the semiotic perspective-though he does not
give explicit indication of how he employs the approach. This
is perhaps somethinghe would like to expand on in his response.
Secondly, he argues that (a) "sociocultural phenomena have
a peculiarly sociocultural reality" and (b) in the constant re-
newal of a sociocultural system, "the objects of a new inter-
pretation-viewed in a new light, transposed to new contexts-
become something new, though, once again, they may be rep-
resented as contiguous with an authentic [sic] cultural past."
Despite Handler's claims, I see no basic disagreement between
us. While I maintain that one can never avoid placing socio-
cultural phenomena in a new light and context-since that is
what the whole business of daily living by individuals entails-
and while I would argue that such behavior must (rather than
"may"), in some way, be perceived as contiguous with the past,
I cannot see how he and I differessentially on this point.
Thirdly, Handler persists in misunderstanding my construct
"continuity."Thus, he claims that I imagine "cultures and cul-
ture traits . . .as continuously existing"; that "[I] and nation-
alist ideologues" (though why not every human and human
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
group?) "claim merely to discover" such cultures and culture
traits; and, worst of all, that I consider these cultures and
culture traits somehow "natural." Nothing that is perceived by
human agents can be "natural"-not even nature. This is not
to say, of course, that natural things and processes do not exist.
Nor does it imply that knowledge of ourselves and the world
must foreverbe a game of blindman's buff.If cultural evolution
is anything, it is the increasing capacity to formulate ways of
knowing that take into account and minimize human distor-
tion. It does suggest that, once filteredthrough the cognition
of humans, all becomes transformed-to a greater or lesser
extent-into that which is "unnatural," i.e., sociocultural.
However, nowhere in my paper do I argue for the naturalness
of either the sociocultural systems or the process of identifying
sociocultural continuity; this would violate the most funda-
mental axiom of my anthropological perspective. Indeed, I
stress fromthe outset that "we study what we perceive is there
to be studied in the way we perceive it best to study it. Even
the most objective scientificinstrumentis designed by humans
who define what shall be targeted for observation and how it
is to be observed and/ormeasured" (p. 127). I do say that social
systems can be natural-i.e., that the structure and organi-
zation of nonhuman "entities" (living things, colonial because
of biological prerequisites) can be natural-again, insofar as
anythingobserved and analyzed by humans is ever capable of
being "natural." Further, I do argue that sociocultural systems
can have unintended consequences, and this would seem to
suggest that, as we identifyand artificiallydelineate the bound-
aries, contents, and field of such "systems," they have both a
functioningand a function that appears capable of eluding the
managerial skills of humans. Similarly, the process of creating
sociocultural continuity,when not truncated (cf. my discussion
on discontinuity,pp. 131-32), may, because of the aggregate of
individual human intentionality and cognition, generate un-
foreseen(even unacknowledged) consequences. I even suggest,
followingthe work of Richard Gregoryand others on the nature
of illusion, that humans may have a neurologically derived
need to find analogs for the new and unique, creating pattern
where only randomness exists, seeking order in chaos. This
may be a physiological necessity performed so as to accom-
modate to built-in upper limits for stress beyond which there
is an "overload" on the neurological circuitryinvolved in de-
cision making. (I would also suggest that, similarly,deprivation
studies appear to indicate that humans may have built-inlower
limits of tolerance for stasis. Lacking a certain minimal degree
of stimulation-of "newness"-humans begin to fantasize, be-
come inert and dehumanized, or die.) But, once more, to con-
clude fromthis that I would maintain the "naturalness" or self-
sustaining capacity of either the systems or the process of con-
tinuityis a gross misreading of my argument.
Next, I would note that, given the problems of language,
we can never communicate without some degree of misunder-
standing; all human symboling systemsare so meaning-fullthat
they contain a great potential for being meaningless (i.e., any
message is more or less altered in "meaning" by the receiver).
An example of this difficultymay be in the employment of the
term"discontinuity."Handler belatedly and sketchilyidentifies
what he means by this term when he asks "What kinds of
discontinuity-of creation-are entailed in the construction of
an objectified culture?" Now, clearly, this is not how I use the
term: I use it to referto the explicit labeling of a sociocultural
system as ended, as in the case of Byzantium or the world of
the aboriginal Tasmanians. I doubt, for example, if any pres-
ent-day Nahuatl-speakers identifyAztec socioculture as "hav-
ing continuity" in the modern world. They may consciously
claim to be maintaining discrete features identified as "traits
fromthe past," but theydo not see the socioculture as persisting
today. If, however, Nahuatl-speakers were to make a popular
and conscious attempt to differentiatetheir life-style,goals,
etc., fromthose of other Mexicans (and not necessarily in order
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Handler: NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL OBJECTIFICATION
to validate national autonomy for themselves), and if that at-
tempt were identifiedas the modern expression of a historically
continuous persistence/uniqueness, no matter how "mythic"
others might consider that recreated identity and the process
that brought it about, their behavior would be the process of
a cognitively defined sociocultural continuity"working to pro-
duce" a sociocultural system and identity. Clearly, this usage
of "discontinuity" (like that of continuity,perhaps) is not con-
sonant with Handler's. Nor, for that matter, do either of us
use the term as does, say, Foucault, though, like Handler,
Foucault attacks the logic of what he labels "continuity."Claim-
ing that the construct of continuity falsely argues for the per-
sistence of what comes from the past, Foucault seeks to
emphasize ruptures-significant, even revolutionary moments
of discontinuity.Of course, nothingcan trulypersist"as it was,"
and the belief that one can preserve the past is arrant nonsense.
Whether it is an antique coin, a shrine, the home of a long-
dead hero, a legend or even a fossil, the very act of "preserving"
tears it from one context and places it in another, thereby
substitutingone "reality" for another. Thus, the anthropolog-
ical truism that the only socioculture that is not subject to
change is that which has ceased to exist is patently false. We
change our perception of the "dead past" with the same facility
that we alter the "living present" and attempt to manage the
future. But-and here I think I differsharply with Handler
and Foucault-humans continually seek the genesis of the pres-
ent in the past, whether this be done, say, with the logical,
causal models of the natural sciences or with biologically based
genealogical models.
Discontinuity may be cognitively identifiedas creating that
which is new and/orterminatingthat which is old. Continuity,
on the other hand, permits no such disjuncture between "was"
and "is"; it requires that the past be present in what is and the
present have its originin what was. It recognizes that the human
cognitive faculty necessitates a continual reinterpretationor
(re)creation resultingfrom the specificitiesof time, place, per-
son(s), and sociocultural axiomatics while also leading to con-
tinual novelty.Unless we are willing to accept some theologically
derived explanation for the origin and nature of "things," it
would appear that the concept of continuityas I have presented
it brings us closer to understanding sociocultural dynamics than
does a reliance on the concept of discontinuity.The latter can-
not help but require us to reject all science to date, to assume
that we will never have even an approximation of nature-as-
natural, and to concentrate on searching forexamples of spon-
taneous generation. This prospect does not engage me, nor, I
think, will it engage others.
Reply
by RICHARD HANDLER
Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A. 20 Ix 83
Anthropologists who place primary emphasis on the interpre-
tation of symbols often find themselves attacked with the ar-
gument that symbolic studies-or semiotic analyses, or cultural
accounts-are too narrow to deal satisfactorilywith the prob-
lems theytackle. Thus Cohen and Maynard accept my analysis
as far as it goes but argue that it has to be completed by some
account of "social and material" factors and of the "'reality of
structures of power." Arcand and Pilon-Le ask for a similar
reorientation. A differentthough related critique comes from
Smith and Pilon-Le, who are disturbed by what they see as
extreme epistemological relativism. Pilon-Le abandons me to
"the idealist trap," while Smith states her preference for an
asymptotic conception of science-we will never fully under-
69
stand nature, but as science evolves we approach such absolute
knowledge.
By contrast, MacCannell, though not without criticisms of
his own, accepts the aims of my paper within the limits that
I set myself. I make no claim to have said all that there is to
say about Quebecois nationalism; my purpose was to examine
one aspect of nationalist ideology-objectification-in order to
learn something about objectification within anthropological
theory.The paper has to be read as a comparison of nationalist
and anthropological discourses: it was not meant to provide a
definitive account of the Quebec case, which we should ex-
amine from as many points of view as we can bring to bear
on it. Smith, for example, pursuing the issue she felt to be
central to her paper-why a given situation is categorized as
traditional or new-is able in her comment to generate a series
of intriguingquestions concerning the choices that Quebecois
have made in the constructionof theircollective identity.These
deserve to be pursued, though, once again, my focus in the
present paper was elsewhere.
In focusing the analysis on the epistemological issue of ob-
jectification, I begin with the assumption that human knowl-
edge and experience depend upon symbolically constructed
points of view. This does not mean, as Pilon-Le seems to think,
that I see culture and human knowledge as having no "em-
pirical referents." Nor does it mean that the world and our
experience of it are illusory or nonexistent. Instead, it means
that knowledge and experience emerge from an interaction
between mind and the world, and that the contribution of
mind-the symbolic ordering of realities-can never be elim-
inated or even diminished. In its historical movement science
does not asymptoticallyapproach "nature-as-natural," as Smith
terms it, for scientificrepresentations must always reflectthe
interaction (itself unquantifiable) between external reality and
historically specific value systems. We may wish to speak of
the development of science (as of art, religion, or any domain
of symbolic representation), but our notion of development
needn't imply progress toward an absolute understanding of
truth. Smith and I agree that to imagine some element of ex-
perience as continuous or discontinuous is to interpretit, not
to describe it objectively. However, I objected to Smith's equa-
tion of "the process of continuity"with "the thing itself."I tried
to show discontinuitywhere she had seen continuity,but I also
argued that neither term could be taken as a sufficientor ex-
clusive characterization. I tried to relativize her claim for con-
tinuity; as MacCannell puts it, "both cultural continuity and
discontinuity are semiotic productions."
To insist on the ineluctability of point of view and the sym-
bolic construction of reality suggests answers to the objections
of Cohen and Maynard. I agree that there are many aspects
of the Quebec situation that I did not treat, but not that those
aspects are somehow "concrete" (as opposed to symbolic) and
hence require a differentanthropological approach. Social ac-
tion is symbolic action, and the material world comes to our
attention only as we construe it symbolically: as Maynard sug-
gests, interests cannot be separated from the meanings they
presuppose. Why argue, then, that the realities of power, of
politics, of colonial domination require a differentanthropo-
logical epistemology than the analysis of art, religion, and ide-
ology? (They may well require of us, as citizens, a different
politics than that required by exclusive concern for,let us say,,
art; but even here, an effectivepolitics depends on an under-
standing that hegemony is always symbolic.)
Arcand objects that my contrast between the naturalistic and
semiotic positions is "simplistic and artificial,"and Smith con-
tends that I misread her when I claim that she sees sociocultural
systems as natural. However, I made it clear that what I saw
as naturalistic bias was implicit in Smith's approach, and my
purpose was to show how such naturalistic assumptions per-
meate anthropological discourse even when we are not aware
of them. For example, in her comment Smith states that "noth-
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ing . . . perceived by human agents can be 'natural'-not even
nature. This is not to say . . . that natural things . . . do not
exist." By contrast, I contend that natural things do not exist,
in and of themselves, as natural things: it is we who categorize
some aspects of experience as "natural" and others as "unnat-
ural." Both "nature" and "the unnatural" are cultural con-
structs. Once again, this is not to say that experience is unreal,
but only that its naturalness depends on our interpretation.
Maynard rightlypoints out that a cultural account can be-
come "objectivist, if not naturalistic," when it treats culture
and ideologies as bounded, seamless "systems" of meaning. I
agree, and in other research I have argued forthe necessity for
cultural accounts, for an anthropology that brings together
rather than isolates varying points of view (Handler and Segal
1983). Moreover, I would not claim that my interpretationof
nationalist ideology is privileged or definitive,though the pious
outrage of Delfendahl, and to a lesser extentArcand and Pilon-
Le, seems to stem from their belief that I have set myself up
as an oracle to the Quebecois.
Arcand and Cohen accuse me of oversimplificationin sug-
gesting that most Quebecois accept the PQ version of national
identity.In the light of their remarks I would emend the sum-
mary account of the relationship between nationalist ideology
and mass belief. What particularly impressed me during both
the 1976 elections and the 1980 referendumwas that federalists
as well as independentistes objectified culture and argued that
cultures(of whichever national minoritygroups concerned them)
ought to be preserved. There is no widely acknowledged al-
ternative to this view, and discussion of national identity,cul-
ture, and survival-Canadian as well as Quebecois-inevitably
evokes the objectifying logic that I discuss. To say this, how-
ever, is not to say that all Quebecois accept every implication
of these ideologies of identity. Certainly many do not concern
themselves, in their daily lives, with the boundaries of their
culture: iftheydid, nationalists would have less reason to worry
about cultural "pollution." Moreover, even those who are con-
sciously concerned about the protectionof culture needn't agree
with the PQ's political solution: federalists and independen-
tistes might share a similar sense of cultural identity while
disagreeing about which political arrangements best suit that
identity.These issues all point to the relevance of MacCannell's
concern "to learn more about the context of expressions of
'authentic' Quebecois ethnicity."
Looking at the same problem-the degree of acceptance of
certain modes of thought-as it appears in anthropology, I
disagree with Arcand, who says that anthropologistshave known
"for decades" about the anthropological objectification of cul-
ture and that thereforemy paper is superfluous. An objectifying
logic remains central to anthropological praxis, which contin-
ues to organize itselfaround "among-the" studies and to invent
culture as the property of distinctive groups. Of course some
anthropologistshave fordecades stressed the fuzziness of group
boundaries, but this tactic merely perpetuates what I see as
the problem. One of the keenest, and longest-standing,analyses
of anthropological objectification, that of Sapir, has always
been taken as heretical by most anthropologists. Sapir wrote
that "every individual is . . . a representative of at least one
sub-culture" (1949: 515). According to Mead (1959: 201), Ben-
edict interpreted this to mean that "culture doesn't matter."
However, Sapir's true objection was to "the metaphysical locus
to which culture is generally assigned" (p. 516).
I must devote special attention to Delfendahl, who accuses
me of tautology, hocus-pocus, pedantry, and intellectual pros-
titution. While I have often shared this irritation at the ob-
scurities of academic jargon, it seems gratuitous to condemn
my use of a specialized discourse (rather than the language of
"common knowledge") in what is, after all, a specialized jour-
nal. He grants that "the analysis of . . . differentmeanings of
'sameness' " may be a worthwhile project but merely ridicules
my particular analysis without offeringmuch in the way of an
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
alternative. He is content merely to observe that "a thing is a
thing and takes on many meanings." By contrast, I tried to
discuss the implications of a discourse that interpretsexperience
in terms of the cultural construct "thing"-that is, I argued
that "the thing itself" and the notions of boundedness it entails
are meaningful constructs, not irreducible elements of
experience.
Finally, MacCannell and Pilon-Le object to Whorf and Sapir
as outmoded sources. Silverstein (1979) has recently argued
that Whorf has been consistently misread, and dismissed on
the basis of those misreadings. In his judgment, Whorf "de-
veloped the sharpest tools for describing the grammatical cat-
egories of propositional language we have yet seen" (p. 197).
Whatever our estimationof the broadest implicationsof Whorf's
work, I find his particular interpretationsof Western thought
to be extremelyhelpful in the analysis of anthropological dis-
course. The work of Sapir, too, remains central for the study
of social-scientificepistemology as well as forsymbolic analysis.
I findit ironicthat MacCannell criticizesmy use of these sources,
taking theirage, apparently, as proofof theirinadequacy, while
invoking the terminologies of Peirce and Saussure.
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