Family Law Cases

1. Case no. 8: Mrs. Sujata Sharma v. Shri Manu Gupta(2016)

Issue: Following issues were framed in the case:
• Whether the plaintiff being the first born among the coparceners of the HUF property would by virtue of her
birth be entitled to be its Karta?
• Whether the interest of the plaintiff separated at demise of her father?
• What is the effect of amendment of 2005 and will it lead to any changes in the JFP in the law of coparcenary”

Facts:

• Her claim is opposed by some members of her family( defendants 1 to 4) while the others (5 to 9) have given
their NOC. Def. 10 and 11 state that their position is to be determined as per law.
• The suit property consists of residential property, some movable properties and various shares and deposits.
• The counsel for plaintiff contended that amendments to the Hindu Succession Act have made all rights
available to a hindu male also available to a hindu female. A daughter is now recognised as a coparcener. She
relies upon Sec 6 of the act.
• Also, that the most senior member in the HUF would become the karta.
• She further relies upon the 174th report of the Law Commission of India, wherein mentioned that there is no
reason why women should be deprived of the right and privilege of management of the HUF.
• However, the counsel for defendants 1 to 4 submits that section 4 has to be read in the context in which it
was enacted, i.e. only those customary rights have been overridden for which there is a specific provision
made in the act , sec 6 doesn’t specifically refer to the expression Karta of an HUF and that this right has to
be gleamed from the text in Hindu law.
• He claims that the right to become manager of the HUF still lies with the eldest male member according to
the ancient Hindu texts.

Decision:

• The suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff and she is declared the Karta of D.R. Gupta and Sons(HUF).

PARTITION CASES

2. A Raghavamma v. A Chenchamma( AIR 1964) COMMUNICATION OF INTENTION THROUGH WILL

Facts: look at diagram on page 138

• One X common male ancestor had two wives W1 and W2. S1 executed a will, whereby he gave his properties to
SS1, as SS1 died ,so S1’s properties devolved upon the minor son.
• There was no share for SS1’s widow in the will, but directed that until the minor son gains majority property
would be entrusted to Raghavmma. (his adoptive mother)
• She allowed prop to remain in hands of the widow, minor son died and Raghavmma filed suit for possession on
grounds of will.
• Widow contested on ground that SS1 wasn’t the adoptive son of plaintiff and she was denied right to partition.

Observations:

• Real ques is whether by making a will there is declaration of an intention to separate which would sever status?
• In the case, when the will became operative the declaration came to knowledge of the members. Ques before
court was whether member of JHF becomes separate by a mere declaration of his intention to divide from
family without bringing same to knowledge of other family members.
 • Court said that declaration cannot be made in a vacuum, it must be brought to notice of persons affected
thereby by words or conduct.(coparceners)
• An uncommunicated can amount to desire of partition but not severance.
• Doctrine of relating back: receipt of communication is according to date of notice
• If karta has alienated jfp in the meantime for legal necessity transaction will bind separating coparceners also.
• Will doesn’t communicate intention to separate. As person who made will dies right of survivorship applies and
not doctrine of relating back.
• Since contents were not made known to coparceners will would not be effective..

Held: plaintiff cant claim possession, property will devolve by survivorship upon minor son and after him upon his
guardian: Chenchamma(widow).

3. Puttrangamma v Ranganna(air 1968) REVOCATION OF PARTITION

Facts:

• Karta with 3 brothers and their descendants constituted a joint family.

• Karta became sick, while in hospital issued notice to separate from joint family.
• His younger brother’s son attempted to snatch notice and tear it but was prevented from doing so. After notice
was registered at, family members tried to bring about amicable settlement.
• At this Karta withdrew notice however no agreement was reached. He signed a vakalatnama and instructed
lawyer to institute suit for partition. On day when suit was instituted he died.

Observations:

• SC held it is not necessary that communication of intention must be sent through a notice or should be a formal
dispatch.
• When karta dictated and signed notice in hospital one of coparceners were present. Others also knew of it and
persuaded to withdraw it.
• Deceased further instructed his lawyer to file suit which was filed on day he died.

Held, the karta thus died as a separate family member. He became a divided member from date of notice.

4. Pedasubhayya v Akkamma(air 1958) SEVERANCE OF STATUS OF MINOR)

FACTS:

• Maternal grandfather of minor coparcener filed suit for partition on behalf of him as his next friend.
• Defendants(father, 1st wife and his sons) were dissipating ancestral estate by selling lands and incurring large
scale debts without any necessity.
• Petition was admitted but during pendency the minor died.

Issue:

Regarding the status of minor on his death and whether suit abated on his death.

OBSERVATIONS AND DECISION:

• Court observed that real point for decision is whether defendants were acting adversely to minor and
whether they used innoicent documents for purpose of defeating his right to the properties comprised
therein
• Defendants contended that in case of a minor when he expresses right to partition, it will not amount to
effect of division in status like in the case of an adult coparcener as minor is incapable of volition on his
own.
• Such volition can only be exercised by the court, and it will take effect from date when court gives decision.
If minor dies during pendency he dies as an undivided partner.
 • But court observed that as acting the as parens patriae it will protect interests of the minor. Therefore
effective date of severance will be same like in case of adult coparecener, i.e. when suit was instituted.
• Regarding question of whether suit is abated(ended) on minor’s death, till court examines the issue status
of minor will remain uncertain. Court will decide the case on merits.
• In present case partition was desirable. Therefore, his properties would go to his mother by inheritance.
• Case will be continued by legal representatives of minor.

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT

5. Vellikannu v. R.Singaperumal(2005)

Issue: when sole male survivor had incurred disqualification under the Act by murdering his own father, can he claim
property under the Mitakshara School? And if he cant, can his wife succeed to the property?

Observations:

• Learned counsel for appellant contended that she being the sole female survivor of the jfp as her husband
stands disqualified, under proviso to sec 6 is entitled to whole of the estate under sec 8 as class 1 heir.
• The respondent-defendant(husband) ha submitted that this disqualification which was attached to the son
equally applied in the case of wife as she is claiming the estate because of there marriage and she is also
disqualified to claim any property from estate of deceased father in law.
• If defendant was not disqualified under section 25 and 27, HSA, they would have inherited property under
mitakshara school. But murderer of his own father was disqualified on principle of equity, justice, good
conscience and as measure of public policy.
• Further, it shall be deemed as if such person died before the intestate, he will be deemed to have
predeceased the person he murdered.

Decision: Held, once the son is totally disinherited, his whole stock also stands disinherited, i.e. wife or son. Wife cant
lay claim to property of father in law.

6. Revanasiddappa and another v. Mallikarjun

Facts:

• D1 has two wives- P3 (1st wife) and D4 (2nd wife). He has 2 children with 1st wife, P1 and P2, and 2 from 2nd
wife, D2 and D3.
• Plaintiffs had filed suit for partition and separare possession of 1/4th share each of ancestral property. They
contended that he married 2nd wife while his first marriage subsisting and therefore children born in second
marriage would not be entitled to any share as they aren’t coparceners.
• The defendants contended that properties weren’t ancestral except for 1 of them. D1 also contended that
2nd wife was legally wedded wife and plaintiffs had no right to claim partition. He alleged further that oral
partition had already taken place earlier.
• Trial court gave decision in favour of plaintiffs.
• Appellate court decided that 1st wife was legal wife but illegitimate children were entitled to share.
Plaintiffs, D1, D2 and D3 are entitled to 1/6th share each.
• HC decided that illegitimate children weren’t entitled to claim partition but only a share in the jfp under
Section 16(3) of the Hindu marriage act. Allowed appeal by plaintiffs, p1, p2 and d1 entitled to 1/3rd share
each. Other claims rejected.
 Observations:

• D2 and D3 filed appeal in apex court.(current appellants) Question which crops up is whether illegitimate
children are entitled to share in the coparcenary property or whether their share is limited only to the self
acquired property of their parents under sec 16(3) of the Hindu marriage act?
• The section just uses the word property but has not qualified it with either self acquired or ancestral
property. It has been kept broad and general.
• According to the amendment to the Act, clauses expressly declared that such children shall be legitimate.
They cannot be discriminated against and will be at par with other legitimate children and be entitled to
property of parents, both self acquired and ancestral.
• In a changing society law cant afford to remain static. It has to meet the challenges of changing social
pattern in different times.
• Such legitimacy will however be conferred to children born out of only marriages which are void or
voidable.
• They are entitled to a share but cant claim it on their own right. During lifetime of parents such children
cant ask for partition but they can exercise this right only after the death of their parents.

Decision:

• Section 16(3) as amended does nit impose any restriction on the property right of such children except
limiting it to the property of their parents. Matter should be reconsidered by a larger bench and for that
purpose the records of the case be placed before the Hon’ble CJI for constitution of a larger bench.

7. Ganduri Koteshwaramma and anr. Vs Chakiri Yanandi and anr.

Facts:

• Appellants and respondents are siblings being daughters and sons of Chakiri venkata swamy. Respondent
1(plaintiff) filed suit for partition impleading father(d1) ,brother(d2), and 2 sisters(present appellants).
• Respondent claimed that he, d1 and d2 have 1/3rd share each(for property a, c and d). For property a which
belonged to his mother he claimed that all parties have 1/5th share each.
• Father died during pendency of suit. Trial court gave preliminary judgement that respondent was entitled
to 1/3rd share and 1/4th share of 1/3rd share left by 1st defendant. (in 1999). In 2003, court amended decree
declared plaintiff was entitled to 1/5th share along with defendant 2,3 and 4.
• Controversy is related to property a, c and d. 2005 amendment came into force in the course. Appelants
made application for passing decree in favour of partition into 4 equal shares. Contested by plaintiff.

Issue: whether benefits of 2005 Amendments are available to appellants?

Observations:

• Trial court allowed application of appellants.(2009) Challenged by respondent in Andhra Pradesh high court.
• HC allowed appeal and set aside order of trial court. Matter came before SC.
• The new section 6 to HSA provides for parity of rights in the coparcenary property among male and femae
members. The right accrued to a daughter in the property of a joint hindu family governed by mitakshara law is
absolute. Except when the partition had taken place before dec.20,2004.
• Question to be answered is whether prelim. decree of trial court deprives appellants of benefits of 2005
amendment although final decree hasn’t been passed yet.
• A prelim. decree determines rights of parties but it is by the final decree that immovable property is partitioned
by metes and bounds.
• If there is any change of events in between court can amend the prelim decree or pass another redetermining
the the rights and interests of parties having regard to changed situation.
 Decision: appeal allowed by court, order of trial court in favour of appellants restored(2009 order). Final decree to be
prepared in the same terms.

8. PRAKASH V. PHULVATI

FACTS:

• Respondent filed suit for partition and separate possession to extent of 1/7th share in properties and 1/28th
share in another mentioned.
• Her grievance in front of HC was that after 2005 amendment she was entitled to inherit coparcenary property
equal to her brothers.
• The stand of the brothers was that she couldn’t claim any share and it should be dealt under the Act as it stood
prior to the amendment. They relied upon a case wherein decision was that if father of a plaintiff had died
before 2005 amended provision could not apply

Issue : Whether she is entitled to a share? Whether the amendment will have a retrospective effect.

Observations:

• The appellant have questioned the judgement and order of HC with contention that amendment to section 6
has no application here. Father of plaintiff died on 18th feb 1988 and was not a coparcener on date of
amendment act.
• Respondent couldn’t claim to be daughter of coparcener as on death of his father notional partition took place
and shares of the heirs crystallized which created vested right in parties. These rights ant be taken away by a
subsequent amendment.
• Contention on behalf of respondent was that amendment being a social legislation should be read as being
retrospective. Daughter acquires right by birth and when her coparcener father died prior to amendment the
shares should be redefined.
• This contention cannot be accepted. Even a social legislation cant have retrospective effect unless so provided
for or so intended by legislature.

Decision: Held, rights under amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners irrespective of when
they are born. Appeal by brothers allowed. Order of HC set aside.

SUCCESSION TO PROPERTY OF MALE INTESTATE

9. Gurupad v. Hirabai (notional partition)

Facts:

• Khandappa died in 1960 leaving behind his widow(hirabai) 2 sons and 3 daughters. Hirabai filed suit for
partition and separate possession of share 7/24.
• Suit challenged by Gurupad, son of a deceased coparcener.
• In notional partition, Khandappa would have obtained 1/4th share (3 other of 2 sons and wife). Widow will get
1/6th share in 1/4th share of her husband as a heir thus she will get 1/24th share(other 5 sharers being children
of Khandappa.

Issue: whether widow would get 1/4th share also along with her 1/24 share i.e. 7/24 share in all. If partition occurs
during lifetime of coparcener, wife is entitled to share. Can she claim such share after her husband’s death when
notional partition occurs?
 Observations:

• The fact that the notional partition is fictitious should not be confusing because it is infact a legal fiction and
should be given its due effect.
• Heir’s share must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated and receive a share in partition which
had taken place in the life of the deceased. It has to be treated as concrete reality.
• The heirs therefore should get share in interest which deceased had in the coparcenary property in addition to
the share which he or she received on notional partition.
• An interpretation which will further the intention of the legislature and remedy the injustice from which hindu
women have suffered over the years should be preferred.

Held: Widow is entitled to 1/4th plus 1/24th share, i.e. 7/24th share.

10. UTTAM V. SAUBHAG SINGH(2016)

FACTS:

• Present appeal by plaintiff who filed suit for partition in which his father is defendant no. 3 and others his
father’s 3 brothers, defendant no. 1,2 and 4
• Plaintiff claimed 1/8th share in the suit property on footing that it was ancestral property and being coparcener
he had birth right in it.
• Defendants wrote a joint statement claiming that suit property isn’t ancestral and in an earlier partition
plaintiff’s father had become separate.
• Trial court decreed that property was infact ancestral and there wasn’t any evidence to show previous
partition.
• Appellate court upheld 2nd descision however held that plaintiff had no right to sue for partition while his father
is alive as he is second class heir as jfp is to be divided with rules of intestacy and not survivorship.(according to
provision under section 8)
• HC similarly dismissed the appeal since property belonged to the plaintiff’s grandfather and he has no birthright
in them.

Observations:

• In the apex court, counsel for appellant argued that only the interest of deceased grandfather would devolve
by intestate succession, leaving the jfp otherwise intact. Therefore plaintiff has right to sue father.
• Counsel for respondent contended that once section 8 gets applied, the jfp ceases to be jfp and can only be
succeeded to by application of either sec 30 or sec 8.
• Court observed, on a conjoined reading of section 4,8 and 19 of the act after jfp has been distributed in
accordance with section 8 on principles of intestacy it ceases to be jfp in the hands of various persons who
have succeeded to it and they hold it as tenants in common.
• This being the case, on birth of the appellant in 1977 property had already been devolved in 1973 on death of
grandfather. The said property is no longer ancestral property suit for such wont be maintanable.

Decision: Held, the appeal is consequently dismissed.

SUCCESSION TO PROPERTY OF FEMALE INTESTATE

11. BHAGAT RAM V. TEJA SINGH(2002) (property of female hindu originally inherited from her mother)

FACTS:
• Female hindu along with sister inherited property from mother on her death. Afterwards, one sister died
issueless. Other entered into agreement to sell the same to a person A.
• Deceased sister’s husband’s brother challenged the validity and claimed property as heir under section 15(1)(b)
 • Issue: whether property would devolve upon the legal heirs of the father(her sister) or on heirs of predeceased
husband(husband’s brother)

Observation:

• Court held that if female hindu dies intestate and issueless devolution of property has to be on the basis of
source from which property was inherited by the female.
• In absence of any children it would devolve upon heirs of father and in this case the sister, who was legal heir
of their father. Thus sale of property is valid.
• Counsel for respondent contended that deceased female acquired property from her mother and on her death
it would be inherited by her legal heirs .
• Court however observed that it if property originally belonged to parents of deceased female it should go back
to that family, otherwise persons who are not even remotely related to the person who originally held prop
would acquire rights to inherit it.

12. OMPRAKASH V. RADHACHARAN(2009)

Facts:

• A hindu girl aged 15 years became a widow within 3 months of her marriage. She was driven out of her
matrimonial house immediately.
• She came to her parents home and was educated by them. She died intestate 42 years later leaving behind
huge sums in various bank accounts besides provident fund and substantial property. Her properties were all
self acquired and not inherited from her parents.
• Appellants are her mother and brothers. Respondents are the heirs of the husband of deceased.
• The contention of the appellants was that in case of this nature where the husband of deceased or her in laws
had not supported her during her lifetime, section 15(2)(a) shouldn’t be applicable.

Observations:

• It was negative by the SC in favour of husband’s heir on grounds of provision of the act. It is the heirs of
husband who have legal right to inherit property of an issueless married hindu woman and her parents or their
heirs cant inherit in their presence.
• Section 15(1) doesn’t make any distinction b/w self acquired and inherited property. It only refers to property
which has vested in deceased absolutely or which is her own.
• In case of self acquired property section 15(2) will apply. Court further observed “sentiments and sympathy
alone would not be a guiding factor in determining the rigths of parties which are otherwise clear and
unambiguous under the HSA.

Decision: only because a case appears to be difficult would not lead court to invoke different interpretation of a
statutory provision. Appeal will be dismissed accordingly.

HINDU WOMAN’S ESTATE

13. V. TULASAMMA vs. V. SESHA REDDI [sec 14(1) and (2)]

Facts:

• Properties in suit filed by widow Tulasamma were allotted to her under a compromise(as maintenance) in
1945. She had only life interest in them and there was restriction on alienation.
• Despite that, she made alienations on plea that she had acquired absolute interest.
 Issue: what happens when female hindu is given some properties as settlement, which prescribes that it would revert
back to the reversioners.

Observations:

• The right of widow to be maintained is not a jus in rem, it doesn’t give her any interest in jfp but it’s a jus ad
rem i.e. a right against jfp. It would not be grant for 1st time without any pre existing right in the widow. It is
merely a document effectuating a pre-existing right.
• Properties were acquired by her in lieu of satisfaction of her pre existing claim for maintenance. She is the
absolute owner and restrictions mentioned in decree are to be ignored.

Held, whatever limited interest in property she had, any restriction on her right being a “disability imposed by law”
would be wiped out and her limited interest would be enlarged under section 14(1).

14. JAGANNATH PILLAI V. KUNJITHAPADAM PILLAI

FACTS:

• Widow was not in possession of property on date of commencement of act, but the possession was restored to
her later.
• In a situation where she regains after the act upon retransfer of same property by transferee in whose favor
she transferred prior to act:
According to A.P. and Orissa HC she would be a limited owner
According to Madras and Bombay view she would be full owner.

Observations:

• The HS act applies even to property possessed by hindu female acquired by her after act commenced.
• Intention of legislature was to do away with concept of limited ownership of hindu female.
• When she bought prop from alienee to whom she had sold prior to act, she acquired prop within meaning of of
explanation to sec 14(1).
• When transaction was reversed and what belonged to her was retransmitted to her, what she acquired was
right which she once possessed which immediately matures into a full ownership.
• Contended that done or transferee who retransfers property to widow cant transfer title higher than what thay
had themselves in it.

Held, if reconveyance takes place before or after 1956, female would certainly be deemed to be in possession of prop.

15. JUPUDY PARDHA SARTHY V. PENTAPATY RAMA KRISHNA

FACTS:

• Said property belonged to P. Venkata subba rao who had 3 wives. 2nd wife had 2 sons and one daughter,
including defendant- Narsimha rao.
• 3rd wife did not have any issues. Venkata executed will in favour of 3rd wife who in turn executed will in favour
of defendant Pentapati subba rao and died in 1976.
• Defendant’s case is that Narsimha rao has no right to transfer property to plaintiff. Plaintiff’s case is that he
purchased prop from him as he was having vested remainder on expiry of 3rd wife.
• HC allowed appeal of Subba rao and held that 3rd wife was absolute owner under sec 14(1) and she had right to
bequeath property to him.
• Plaintiff appealed in SC
 • During pendency Subba rao died and his representatives were brought on record.

Observations: