EN BANC 5. ID.; RIGHT TO BENEFITS CANNOT BE WAIVED.
— The right to the benefits of amnesty, once
[G.R. No. L-1278. January 21, 1949.]
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ, Petitioners, v. ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ,
ANTONIO BELMONTE and FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Commissioners of the Fourteenth Guerrilla
Amnesty Commission, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. AMNESTY; PARDON AND AMNESTY DISTINGUISHED. — Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and
as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is
granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may
be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an
offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempt the culprit from
the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" (article 36, Revised Penal Code).
While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the
law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
2. ID.; REQUISITES TO ENTITLE ONE TO INVOKE BENEFITS OF AMNESTY; ADMISSION OF COMMISSION
OF OFFENSE NOT REQUIRED. — In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation
of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non,
admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as
a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainants, or the accused, shows that the
offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Although the accused does not
confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions
entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed
the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the
interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused,
on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of
amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,"
or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. — There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the commission of
a criminal act before a court or Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the
benefits of amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which
he is charged, does not necessarily prove that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his denial, the
evidence for the prosecution or complainant may show the contrary, as it is generally the case in
criminal proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is whether or not the offense
committed is of political character. The plea of not having committed the offense made by an accused
simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is not guilty thereof, and,
even if the evidence would show that he is, because he has committed it in furtherance of the resistance
to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political
motives.
4. ID.; WITHIN JUDICIAL NOTICE. — Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well
as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and
apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded
or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the
accused is entitled to said benefits.
established by the evidence presented, either by the complainant or prosecution, or by the defense, can
not be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty
Proclamation, which has the force of law, not only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if
he had never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can
not be punished as a criminal.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; MOTIVE FOR COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE, HOW ESTABLISHED. — Generally the
motive for the commission of an offense is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or
statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words
that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. The statement
or testimony of a defendant at the time of arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive, can
not generally be considered and relied on, specially if there is evidence to the contrary, as the true
expression of the reason or motive he had at the time of committing the offense. Because such
statement or testimony may be an afterthought or colored by the interest he may have to suit his
defense or the purpose for which he intends to achieve with such declaration.
7. MANDAMUS; AMNESTY COMMISSION TO ACT, DUTIES OF. — To hold that an Amnesty Commission
should not proceed to the investigation and act and decide whether the offense with which an accused
was charged comes within the Amnesty Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having committed
it, would be to defeat the purpose for which the Amnesty Proclamation was issued and the Amnesty
Commissions were established. If the courts have to proceed to the trial or hearing of a case and decide
whether the offense committed by the defendant comes within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation
although the defendant has pleaded not guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions can
not do so. Where a defendant to admit or confess having committed the offense or being responsible
therefor before he can invoke the benefit of amnesty, as there is no law which makes such admission or
confession not admissible as evidence against him in the courts of justice in case the Amnesty
Commission finds that the offense does not come within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation, nobody
or few would take the risk of submitting their case to said Commissions.
DECISION
FERIA, J.:
This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the petitioners against the respondents who
composed the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide whether or not
the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty.
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. As the
latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded against the former, and after trial the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an
appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8, dated September
7, 1946, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under
the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the
war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when
each particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from
enemy control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty
Commission presided by the respondents herein, and the other petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had
then been already apprehended, did the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission, presided by the respondents, issued
on January 9, 1947, an order returning the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the said Amnesty
Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having
committed the offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed
the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, issued by the President with the concurrence of
Congress of the Philippines, reads in part as follows:
"WHEREAS, since the inception of the war and until the liberation of the different areas comprising the
territory of the Philippines, volunteer armed forces of Filipinos and of other nationalities operated as
guerrillas and other patriotic individuals and groups pursued activities in opposition to the forces and
agents of the Japanese Empire in the invasion and occupation of the Philippines;
"WHEREAS, members of such forces, in their determined efforts to resist the enemy, and to bring about
his ultimate defeat, committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code;
"WHEREAS, charges have been presented in the courts against many members of these resistance
forces, for such acts;
"WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were committed in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy is not
a valid defense under the laws of the Philippines;
"WHEREAS, the persons so accused should not be regarded as criminals but rather as patriots and
heroes who have rendered invaluable services to the nation; and.
"WHEREAS, it is desirable that without the least possible delay, these persons be freed from the
indignity and the jeopardy to which they are now being subjected;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, in accordance with the provisions of
Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an amnesty in
favor of all persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and committed during
the period from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Philippines was actually
liberated from the enemy control and occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against chastity
or to acts committed from purely personal motives.
"It is further proclaimed and declared that in order to determine who among those against whom
charges have been filed before the courts of the Philippines or against whom charges may be filed in the
future, come within the terms of this amnesty, Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions, simultaneously to be
established, shall examine the facts and circumstances surrounding each case and, if necessary, conduct
summary hearings of witnesses both for the complainant and the accused. These Commissions shall
decide each case and, upon finding that it falls within the terms of this proclamation, the Commissions
shall so declare and this amnesty shall immediately be effective as to the accused, who shall forthwith
be released or discharged."
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong conception
of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to
classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the
institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves
the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or
forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and
it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence" (article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
(Section 10[6], Article VII, Philippine Constitution; State v. Blalock, 61 N. C., 242, 247; In re Briggs,
135 N. C., 118; 47 S. E., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 Ga., 285, 296; State ex rel Anheuser — Busch Brewing
Ass’n. v. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S. W., 52, 61; Burdick v. United States, N. Y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271; 236
U. S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.)
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order to entitle a person to the
benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a
condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is
charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the
complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature
of a plea of confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against
him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the
amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is
charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary
hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the
offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or
hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation," or not, in accordance with the terms of the
Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the
Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply
the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or
claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the
accused is entitled to said benefits.
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented, either by the
complainant or prosecution, or by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest that a
person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of a law, not only as innocent,
for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense because of the
amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punished as a criminal. Just as the courts of justice can not
convict a person who, according to the evidence, has committed an act not punishable by law, although
he confesses being guilty thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person considered by law
not a criminal, but a patriot and hero, for having rendered invaluable services to the nation in
committing such an act.
While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense charged was not against chastity and was
committed in furtherance of the resistance against the enemy, for otherwise, it is to be naturally
presumed that it has been committed for purely personal motive, it is nonetheless true that though the
motive as a mental impulse is a state of mind or subjective, it need not be testified to by the defendant
himself at his arraignment or hearing of the case. Generally the motive for the commission of an offense
is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or
immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his
motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. The statement or testimony of a defendant at the
time of arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive, can not generally be considered and
relied on, specially if there is evidence to the contrary, as the true expression of the reason or motive he
had at the time of committing the offense. Because such statement or testimony may be an afterthought
or colored by the interest he may have to suit his defense or the purpose for which he intends to achieve
with such declaration. Hence it does not stand to reason and logic to say, as the dissenting opinion
avers, that unless the defendant admits at the investigation or hearing having committed the offense
with which he is charged, and states that he did it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, and not
for purely personal motive, it is impossible for the court or Commission to verify the motive for the
commission of the offense, because only the accused could explain his belief and intention or the motive
of committing the offense.
There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the commission of a criminal act
before a court or Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the benefits of
amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which he is
charged, does not necessarily prove that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his denial, the
evidence for the prosecution or complainant may show the contrary, as it is generally the case in
criminal proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is whether or not the offense
committed is of political character. The plea of not having committed the offense made by an accused
simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is not guilty thereof, and,
even if the evidence would show that he is, because he has committed it in furtherance of the resistance
to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political
motives. According to Administrative Order No. 11 of October 2, 1946, creating the Amnesty
Commissions, issued by the President of the Philippines, cases pending in the Courts of First Instance of
the province in which the accused claims the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation, and cases already
decided by said courts but not yet elevated on appeal to the appellate courts, shall be passed upon and
decided by the respective Amnesty Commission, and cases pending appeal shall be passed upon by the
Seventh Amnesty Commission. Under the theory of the respondents and the writer of the dissenting
opinion, the Commissions should refuse to comply with the directive of said Administrative Order,
because in almost all cases pending in the Court of First Instance, and all those pending appeal from the
sentence of said courts, the defendants must not have pleaded guilty or admitted having committed the
offense charged, for, otherwise, they would not or could not have appealed from the judgment of the
Courts of First Instance. To hold that an Amnesty Commission should not proceed to the investigation
and act and decide whether the offense with which an accused was charged comes within the Amnesty
Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having committed it, would be to defeat the purpose for
which the Amnesty Proclamation was issued and the Amnesty Commissions were established. If the
courts have to proceed to the trial or hearing of a case and decide whether the offense committed by the
defendant comes within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has pleaded not
guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions can not do so. Where a defendant to admit or
confess having committed the offense or being responsible therefor before he can invoke the benefit of
amnesty, as there is no law which makes such admission or confession not admissible as evidence
against him in the courts of justice in case the Amnesty Commission finds that the offense does not
come within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation, nobody or few would take the risk of submitting
their case to said Commissions.

Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto Barrioquinto that the offended party or victim was
shot and killed by Agapito Hipolito, does not necessarily bar the respondents from finding, after the
summary hearing of the witnesses for the complainants and the accused, directed in the said Amnesty
Proclamation and Administrative Order No. 11, that the petitioners are responsible for the killing of the
victim, either as principals by coöperation, inducement or conspiration, or as accessories before as well
as after the fact, but that they are entitled to the benefits of amnesty, because they were members of
the same group of guerrilleros who killed the victim in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.

Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately proceed to hear and decide the
applications for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the courts have in the
meantime already decided, expressly and finally, the question whether or not they are entitled to the
benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So ordered.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-37420. July 31, 1984.]
MACARIA A. TORRES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO
NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO, AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO and
ADELINA NARCISO, Respondents.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a special civil action. 1 prays that the judgment
rendered by the then Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases, CA-G.R. No. 34998-R entitled "Macaria
A. Torres, plaintiff-appellee v. Vicente Santillan, Et Al., defendants-appellants", and CA-G.R. No. 34999-
R entitled "Vicente Santillan, Et Al., plaintiffs-appellants v. Macaria A. Bautista, Et Al., defendants-
appellees", and the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for New Trial, be set
aside; and that, instead, the Order of the Court of First Instance of August 7, 1963 be affirmed, or, in
the alternative, that the case be remanded to it for new trial.
Involved in this controversy are the respective claims of petitioner and private respondents over Lot No.
551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate (part of the friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an area of
approximately 1,622 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 issued in the
name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres.
The facts of the case cover three generations. The propositus, Margarita Torres, during the Spanish
regime, was married to Claro Santillan. Vicente and Antonina were begotten of this union. Claro died
leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina married and had six children, namely: Alfredo, Salud (married to
Baldomero Buenaventura), Demetria (married to Leonardo Quinto), Adelina (married to Cesario
Punzalan), Tomas and Amado all surnamed Narciso, who, together with Vicente Santillan, are the private
respondents. Antonina died before the institution of the cases, while Vicente died on June 4, 1957, 2
during the pendency of the cases in the Trial Courts, without progeny.
After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole, without benefit of
marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner Macaria Torres (later married to Francisco Bautista) was
born on June 20, 1898, and baptized on June 26, 1898. In a Certificate of Baptism issued by the Parish
Priest of Tanza, Cavite, Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres were named as father and mother of
petitioner, whose name was listed as "Macaria Arvisu." (Exhibit "C"). Another Baptismal Certificate,
however, listed her name as Macaria Torres, while her father’s name was left blank (Exhibit "4").
Subsequently, or on June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres were married (Exhibit "A").
Petitioner lived with and was reared by her parents. Margarita, the mother, died on December 20, 1931
(Exhibit "D"), while Leon, the father, passed away on September 14, 1933 (Exhibit "E").
Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms., more or less, had been leased temporarily by
the Government (Lease No. 17) to Margarita Torres who was the actual occupant of the lot. The date of
the lease cannot be determined with exactitude from the records. On December 13, 1910, the
Government, through the Director of Lands, issued to Margarita Torres, Sale Certificate No. 222 (Exhibit
"B") over the said lot at the price of P428.80, payable in 20 annual installments of P20.00 each. The
rental/s previously paid of P17.40 was credited to the purchase price. Testimonial evidence is to the
effect that Leon Arbole paid the installments out of his earnings as a water tender at the Bureau of
Lands, Tanza, Cavite. The last installment, however, was paid on December 17, 1936, or three (3) years
after his death.
On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon Arbole sold and transferred in a notarial
deed all his rights and interest to the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 551 in favor of petitioner, for the
sum of P300.00. 3
On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot No. 551 and asking
for the issuance of title in his name, which he filed with the Bureau of Lands. Based thereon, the Bureau
of Lands issued the corresponding patent in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 7,
1957, also in the name of said heirs.
On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Forcible Entry, with the
Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging that petitioner had entered a portion of Lot No. 551
without their consent, constructed a house, and refused to vacate upon demand. For her part, petitioner
claimed that she is a co-owner of the lot in question, being one of the daughters of Margarita Torres.
The ejectment case was decided against petitioner and the latter appealed to the then Court of First
Instance of Cavite, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 5547 (Ejectment Case).
On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot No. 551 before the then Court of First
Instance of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 5505 (Partition Case), alleging that said lot was conjugal
property of the spouses Margarita Torres and Leon Arbole, and that she is their legitimated child. Private
respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot belonged exclusively to Margarita Torres; that they are
her only heirs, and that the complaint for partition should be dismissed.
The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided on November 20, 1958 with a
finding that Lot No. 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita Torres, and adjudicating to private
respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the property in equal shares, and to petitioner a one-third (1/3) portion.
4 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which private respondents opposed. Pending its resolution, the
Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned, resulting in the complete destruction of the records of the two
cases, which, however, were later partially reconstituted.
On August 7, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, issued an Order granting
reconsideration and amending the Decision of November 20, 1958. The dispositive portion thereof reads
as follows:
"Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Declaring Macaria A. Torres as the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita
Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal partnership property of
the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(3) Adjudicating four-sixths (4/6th of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to Macaria Torres, and two-
sixths (2/6th) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, all surnamed
Narciso, legitimate children and heirs of the deceased Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is
already dead. The parties may make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to the parties, each party should
be alloted that portion of the lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far as this is possible.
In case the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three commissioners
to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases." 5
In concluding that petitioner is a legitimated child, the Trial Court opined:
"It is undisputed that when Macaria A. Torres was born on June 20, 1898, her parents, Leon Arbole and
Margarita Torres, had the capacity to marry each other. There was no legal impediment for them to
marry. It has also been established that Macaria A. Torres had been taken care of, brought up and
reared by her parents until they died. The certificate of baptism (Exh.’G’) also shows that Macaria Torres
was given the family name of Arvisu, which is also the family name of her father, Leon Arbole, and that
her father is Leon Arvisu and her mother is Margarita Torres. Such being the case, Macaria A. Torres
possessed the status of an acknowledged natural child. And when her parents were married on June 7, "That at the time of her birth or conception, we, her parents could have married without dispensation
1909, she became the legitimated daughter of Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres." 6 had we desired.

Private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the then Court of Appeals 7 rendered the judgment "That as natural child our aforesaid daughter was surnamed de Torres after that of her mother’s at the
sought to be set aside herein, the decretal part of which states: time she was baptized as per record on file in the Church.

"Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library "That as a legitimized daughter she should now be surnamed Arvisu after her father’s family name.

(1) Declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and "Wherefore, it is respectfully requested to anybody concerned that proper remedy be made for the
Margarita Torres; change of the surname of said Macaria de Torres as desired.

(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal partnership property of "In testimony hereof, we hereunto signed out names at Tanza, Cavite, this 5th day of March 1930.
the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres; and
(Thumbmarked) (Thumbmarked)
(3) Adjudicating one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to Macaria Torres, and the
other half (1/2) in equal shares to Alfredo. Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, all surnamed LEON ARVISU MARGARITA TORRES
Narciso, legitimate children and heirs of Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The
parties may make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to Signed in the presence of:
confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to the parties, each party should be alloted that portion
of the lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In case the parties are (Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Macaria de Bautista
unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three commissioners to make the partition. x x x

As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.

"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
Without costs in both cases." 8
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS)
The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:
MUNICIPALITY OF TANZA)ss
"Macaria A. Torres is not a legitimated daughter of Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres, the former
not having been legally acknowledged before or after the marriage of her parents. As correctly pointed PROVINCE OF CAVITE)
out by the appellants in their brief, the fact that she was taken cared of, brought up and reared by her
parents until they died, and that the certificate of baptism (Exhibit ‘C’) shows that she was given the "Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1930. The affiant Leon Arvisu exhibited to me
family name of Arvisu did not bestow upon her the status of an acknowledged natural child. no cedula certificate being exempt on account of going over 60 years of age and Margarita Torres having
exhibited no cedula certificate being exempt on account of her sex.
"Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, the governing law on the matter, children shall be considered
legitimated by subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or "Witness my hand and seal of office on the date and place aforesaid.
after the celebration thereof, and Article 131 of the same code provides that the acknowledgment of a
natural child must be in the record of birth, in a will or in some public document. Article 131 then CONSTANCIO T. VELASCO
prescribed the form in which the acknowledgment of a natural child should be made. The certificate of
baptism of Macaria A. Torres (Exhibit ‘C’) is not the record of birth referred to in Article 131. This article Notary Public, Cavite Province
of the old Civil Code ‘requires that unless the acknowledgment is made in a will or other public
document, it must be made in the record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register’ (Samson v. Until Dec. 31, 1930.
Corrales Tan, 48 Phil. 405)." 9
Not. Reg. No. 56
A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, dated April 16, 1973, was filed by petitioner. In support
thereof, petitioner submitted a typewritten Sworn Statement, dated March 5, 1930 of spouses Leon Page No. 2
Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres, 10 reading in full as follows:
Book No. III Series of 1930." 11
"SWORN STATEMENT
The reason given for the non-production of the notarial document during trial was that the same was
"We, Leon Arvisu and Margarita Torres husband and wife respectively, of majority age, and residents of only found by petitioner’s daughter, Nemensia A. Bautista, among the personal belongings of private
the Municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite, P.I., after being duly sworn to according to law depose and respondent, Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his death and who may have attempted to
say. suppress it. Private respondents, for their part, argued against new trial, and contended that it is not
newly discovered evidence which could not have been produced during the trial by the exercise of due
"That Macaria de Torres is our legitimized daughter she being born out of wedlock on the 26th of June diligence.
1898 at Tanza, Cavite, but as stated she was legitimized by our subsequent marriage.
The Decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by a Division of three, composed of Justices Jesus Y.
Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes, ponente. When the Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial
was considered, there was disagreement, possibly as to whether or not new trial should be granted in
respect of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930. A Special Division of five was then formed, composed
of Justices Antonio Lucero, Magno S. Gatmaitan, Lourdes P. San Diego, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B.
Reyes (Justice Perez having retired or having disqualified himself). In a minute resolution of August 24,
1973, the Division of five, by a vote of three or two, denied both reconsideration and new trial.
To warrant review, petitioner has summarized her submission based on two assignments of error. The
first was expressed as follows:
"Although the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child
of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, it has overlooked to include in its findings of facts the
admission made by Vicente Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein respondents) that
Macaria A. Torres and Vicente Santillan and Antonina Santillan are brother and sisters with a common
mother Margarita Torres and they are the legal heirs and nearest of relatives of Margarita Torres, and as
a consequence thereof, the Court of Appeals had drawn an incorrect conclusion in adjudicating the entire
share of Margarita Torres in the conjugal property solely to Vicente Santillan and the heirs of Antonina
Santillan." (Emphasis ours)
As we understand it, petitioner has conceded. with which we concur, that, without taking account of the
sworn statement of March 5, 1930, she cannot be considered a legitimated child of her parents.
Continuous possession of the status of a natural child, fact of delivery by the mother, etc. will not
amount to automatic recognition, but an action for compulsory recognition is still necessary, which
action may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents, subject to certain exceptions.
knowing as it does that the judgment is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence which is offered and no
amount of diligence on the part of the petitioner could it be produced in court at any time before it was
offered as it was found from the personal belongings of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his
death."
It is our considered opinion that new trial was warranted to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice.
Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of the Sworn Statement of March 5, 1930 is
established in accordance with procedural due process, a new trial would resolve such vital
considerations as (1) whether or not said Sworn Statement qualifies as the public document prescribed
in Article 131 of the old Civil Code; 15 (2) whether or not it conforms to an act of acknowledgment by
the parents after the celebration of their marriage as required by Article 121 of the same code; 16 and
(3) whether or not petitioner’s signature as a witness to said document was the equivalent of the
consent necessary for acknowledgment of an adult person under Article 133 of that Code. 17 Affirmative
answers would confer upon petitioner the status of a legitimated child of her parents, and would entitle
her to enjoy hereditary rights to her mother’s estate.
Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed as a witness to the document, she should be
chargeable with knowledge of its existence, and, therefore, the Sworn Statement was not newly
discovered evidence. In our view, the document can reasonably qualify as newly discovered evidence,
which could not have been produced during the trial even with the exercise of due diligence; specially if
it really had been in the possession of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party who, it was alleged,
suppressed the document.
In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be conducted by respondent Appellate Court, now
empowered to do so under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents’ original complaint in the
Ejectment Case reading:
"the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest of kins of Margarita
Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite on December 20, 1931." (Emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the now Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial, and
depending on its outcome, said Court shall also resolve the respective participation of the parties in the
disputed property, inclusive of the estate of the deceased Vicente Santillan. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in the
determination of her participation in the disputed property.

We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same Ejectment
Case, the underlined portion was deleted so that the statement simply read:

"That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza, Cavite,
on December 20, 1931."

In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as
abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer
forms part of the record. 13

If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence. Having
been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have
required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as
evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner’s submission, therefore, there can be no
estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence. 14

It should also be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents, in their Answer (parag. 4), denied
the legitimacy of petitioner.

The second error attributed to the Appellate Court has been pleaded as follows:

"Also, the Court of Appeals has gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition for new trial,
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 85423. May 6, 1991.]
JOSE TABUENA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA,
JR.,Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; EVIDENCE OUT FORMALLY OFFERED CANNOT BE CONSIDERED NOR GIVEN ANY
EVIDENTIARY VALUE. — The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not
mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. They were not by such
marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, "At the trial on the
merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and
then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents cannot be considered
evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."
2. ID; ID; RATIONALE OF THE RULE. — The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest
his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the
trial.
3. ID; ID; WHEN CONSIDERED ADMISSIBLE AGAINST THE ADVERSE PARTY. — We did say in People v.
Napat-a that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse
party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been
incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not fine that these requirements have been satisfied
in the case before us.
4. ID; ORIGINAL RECORD OF A CASE ARCHIVED; WHEN CONSIDERED READ INTO THE RECORD OF A
CASE PENDING BEFORE A COURT; FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS. — It is clear, though, that
this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the
opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or
"the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn form the archives" and "admitted
as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been established here. On the
contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being
considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was
never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to
counteract.
5. ID; TAX RECEIPTS AND DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP; ACCOMPANIED BY ACTUAL POSSESSION
SUPPORT CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. — While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong
evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land covered by
the tax declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership.
6. ID; ACTS ACCOMPANYING CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. — All the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose
Tabuena indicate that they were the owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her
forebears had been in possession thereof for more that fifty years and indeed, she herself stayed there
until she died. She paid the realty taxes thereon in her own name. Jose Tabuena built a house of strong
materials on the lot. He even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two
private persons who acknowledged him as the owner. These acts denote ownership and are not
consistent with the private respondent’s claim that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere
possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
7. ID; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE INFERIOR COURTS HELD NOT CONFORMABLE TO THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD. — It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts
below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is now showing that they have been reached
arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on record and appear
indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of basis.
It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into account evidence not submitted by the
private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square meters and
situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein
petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to
vacate the disputed lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla
while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa
Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan’s instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same
time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life.
Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did.
She remained on the said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of
Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof The complaint was filed when demand was made upon
Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited from
his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since then and until
they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla
was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the trial
court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff
but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the ownership of
the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different
parcel of land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October 4, 1921 addressed in
Makato, Capis, Philippines; Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount of P600.00
— the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest since October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is
paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa
Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4 of Exh. "C."
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the appellant,
the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of
stenographic notes, which it quoted at length. 2 The challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial
court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the above-described
documents but Exhibits "X" and "Y" and their sub-markings, which were the last will and testament of
Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C." In fact, the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits ‘A,’ ‘A-1,’ ‘A-2,’ ‘B,’
‘C,’ and ‘C-1,’ were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-
administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate court, which seems to have
confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the quoted
transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already
been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at
the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They
were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Inter pacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles,
3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will
advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents
cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. 4
We did say in People v. Napat-a 5 that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be
admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that these
requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the said exhibits could be
validly considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiff’s witnesses,
Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant’s
counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the documents. Nowhere in
her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:
ATTY. LEGASPI:
What is this Exh. "A" about?
A The translation of the letter.
Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla?
Court:
The best evidence is the document. Proceed. 6
She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial notice
of Tabuena’s testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with the case
before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." 7 Nevertheless, it applied
the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat
all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case
pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that
purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when
the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the
court’s direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record
of the case then pending. 8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the
knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is
clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the
archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been
established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil
Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the
petitioner puts t, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving
him no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of the
other case, striking off all reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiffs cause because "the said
testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What "other
evidences" ? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to corroborate, to wit,
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel that the complaint
should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. It
has failed to prove that the subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo
Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even assuming it was the same lot,
there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa
Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the land in question
belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly conveyed title to property that
did not belong to him unless he had appropriate authorization from the owner. No such authorization has
been presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have held in many cases.
However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known exception. In the case
at bar, it is not even disputed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have possessed the
disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact, the tax
declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence of the petitioner’s ownership. As
this Court has held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. 9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land covered by the tax
declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership. 10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject parcels of land by the
respondents and their parents before them for more than 30 years qualify them to register title to the
said subject parcels of land. 11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and magnanimously
allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not at least require her to pay the realty taxes in his
name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial court is that he was not much concerned with the
property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought from America. That is specious
reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really that unconcerned, it is curious that he should
have acquired the property in the first place, even as dacion en pago. He would have demanded another
form of payment if he did not have the intention at all of living on the land. On the other hand, if he
were really interested in the property, we do not see why he did not have it declared in his name when
the realty taxes thereon were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when the payments
were made in her own name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the owners of
the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession thereof for more
than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. 12 She paid the realty taxes
thereon in her own name. 13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot. 14 He even
mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private persons who
acknowledged him as the owner. 15 These acts denote ownership and are not consistent with the private
respondent’s claim that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by
Tabernilla.

It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts below and
even to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that they have been reached arbitrarily.
The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to
have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.

The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not been
formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably to the
Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327
and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of
existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting
sands and should not have been sustained by the respondent court.

Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim of
ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By
contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner’s contrary contentions that should have
persuaded the trial judge to rule in his favor and dismiss the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs
against the private Respondent. It is so ordered.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28100. November 29, 1971.]
GABRIEL BAGUIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in
representation of her minor children, DOMINADOR, LEA, and TEOFILA, all surnamed JALAGAT;
ANABELLA JALAGAT and EMMANUEL JALAGAT, Defendants-Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL NOTICE; COURT CAN TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A CASE PREVIOUSLY DECIDED
BY IT. — It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly
could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and
thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal.
Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice
Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether
or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under
consideration."
2. ID.; ACTIONS; PARTIES SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORSHIP AT THE ALTAR OF TECHNICALITY.
— There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy
which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice better,
not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to which appellees were
subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would not
have been frittered away on a useless and hopeless appeal. It has ever been the guiding principle from
Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the altar of
technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to law. Parties, and much more so their counsel,
should ever keep such an imperative of our legal system in mind.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL NOTICE; COURT PROPERLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A
PRIOR CASE RESOLVED BY IT. — The lower court properly took judicial notice of the prior case resolved
by it, wherein admittedly the same lower court dismissed an identical complaint filed over the same
property by the same plaintiff against the same defendants (who are the legal or forced heirs of the now
deceased Melecio Jalagat defendant in the prior case). Such judicial notice taken by the lower court is
sanctioned under Rule 129, Section 1. It in effect supplants the evidence on motion that Rule 133,
Section 7 authorizes a trial court to receive "when a motion is based on facts not appearing on
record."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ACTIONS; MOTION TO DISMISS; BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT; TAKING OF JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
SAID PRIOR JUDGMENT, EVIDENCE NEEDED TO DISPOSE OF MOTION. — The appeal’s sole assignment
of error, viz, that a bar by prior judgment cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss when such ground
does not appear on the face of the complaint, is clearly bereft of basis or merit. Such limitation of the
dismissal motion to that appears on the face of the complaint applies only when it is based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a valid cause of action. Rule 16, Section 3 precisely provides for
a hearing of the motion to dismiss, wherein its ground (other than lack of cause of action) may be
proved or disproved in accordance with rules of evidence and specifically Rule 133, Section 7, which
provides that" (W)hen a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter
on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter
be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions." When the ground of the dismissal motion is
a prior judgment rendered by the same court — a fact known to the court and to the parties as well, as
in the case at bar — the taking of judicial notice of said prior judgment by the same court constitutes the
very evidence needed to dispose of the dismissal motion.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by the Court of First Instance
of Misamis Oriental, presided by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which has not as yet been the
subject of a definitive ruling, is whether or not on a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata that
the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous
case decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied upon. Judge Gorospe answered in the
affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus called for.
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by plaintiff, now
appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to dismiss filed
by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. This
was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case, besides being clearly unfounded and
malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against
Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the
very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639. Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on
October 7, 1958 for ‘Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Estate and entitled Gabriel Baguio,
plaintiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, defendant, involving practically the same property and
practically the same parties as defendants are the widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or
forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the
same case as the instant one, has already been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from [an]
order of this Honorable Court [dated December 6, 1965]." 1 There was an opposition on the part of
plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a
basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there was
nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion may be inferred. Then, on September 26, 1966,
came the order complained of worded thus: "Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the
defendants under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground that plaintiff’s cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment, which this Court finds to be well-founded as it has already dismissed
plaintiffs complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat, defendants’
predecessor in interest from whom they have derived their rights, in an order dated December 6, 1965,
pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the new Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel of land
as the one in the instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby [dismissed].
The Court’s previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits
and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any subsequent action against the
same parties over the same issues and the same subject matter by the same plaintiff. [So ordered]." 2
Hence, this appeal.
The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be sustained. It is in accordance with law.
1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgment cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss when
such ground does not appear on the face of the complaint. What immediately calls attention in the
rather sketchy and inconclusive discussion in the six-page brief of appellant is that there was no denial
as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that there was a previous dismissal of the same
plaintiff’s complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of defendants, who as expressly admitted by
appellant was the deceased husband of one of them and father of the rest. There was no denial either of
the property involved being the same and of the finality of the decision in the previous case which would
show that appellant’s claim was devoid of any support in law. It would be therefore futile for the court to
continue with the case as there had been such a prior judgment certainly binding on appellant. What
then was there for the lower court to do? Was there any sense in its being engaged in what was
essentially a fruitless endeavor as the outcome was predictable?
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would sanction such
a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under
the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a
case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower
court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the
comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of
previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous
ruling is applicable in the case under consideration." 3

2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy
which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice better,
not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to which appellees were
subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would not
have been frittered away on a useless and hopeless appeal. It has ever been the guiding principle from
Alonso v. Villamor, 4 a 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the altar of
technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to law. Parties, and much more so their counsel,
should ever keep such an imperative of our legal system in mind. 5

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby affirmed. With costs against
plaintiff.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122480. April 12, 2000.] "On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112,491.00 with the
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount
BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due
and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents. to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply
the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments. When it is undisputed that a taxpayer is
entitled to a refund the State should not invoke technicalities to keep money not belonging to it. No one,
not even the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of another.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the March 31, 1995 Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) in
CA-GR SP No. 34240, which affirmed the December 24, 1993 Decision 2 of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA). The CA disposed as follows:
"Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the claim for refund,
petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of the
amount of P112.491.00.
"The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner’s petition on the ground that petitioner failed
to present as evidence its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that
petitioner had not yet credited the amount of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which
is the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability.
"Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied by respondent court in its
Resolution dated May 6,1994." 6
As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition. 7

"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit." 3
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision affirmed by the CA reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in [view of] all the foregoing, Petitioner’s claim for refund is hereby DENIED and this
Petition for Review is DISMISSED for lack of merit." 4
Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA Resolution 5 denying reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in this wise:
"This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00 representing petitioner’s tax
withheld for the year 1989.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
"It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not credited to its 1990 Annual income Tax
Return, the amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00), so as to refute its previous declaration in
the 1989 Income Tax Return that the said amount will be applied as a tax credit in the succeeding year
of 1990. Having failed to submit such requirement, there is no basis to grant the claim for refund. . . .
"Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they are regarded as in derogation of
sovereign authority and to be construed strictissimi juris against the person or entity claiming the
exemption. In other words, the burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to establish by sufficient and
competent evidence its entitlement to the claim for refund." 8
Issue

In its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1989, the following items are reflected: In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue in this wise:

Income P1,017,931,831.00 "The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the refund of P112,491.00,
Deductions P1,026,218,791.00 representing excess creditable withholding tax paid for the taxable year 1989." 9
Net Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)

Taxable Income (Loss) P8,286,960.00 The Court’s Ruling

Less:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1988 Tax Credit P185,001.00 The Petition is meritorious.
1989 Tax Credit P112,491.00
———————— Main Issue:
Petitioner Entitled to Refund
TOTAL AMOUNT P297,492.00
It is undisputed that petitioner had excess withholding taxes for the year 1989 and was thus entitled to
REFUNDABLE a refund amounting to P112,491. Pursuant to Section 69 10 of the 1986 Tax Code which states that a
corporation entitled to a refund may opt either (1) to obtain such refund or (2) to credit said amount for
"It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a total refundable amount of the succeeding taxable year, petitioner indicated in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the
P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in the present case. However, said amount as a tax credit for the succeeding taxable year, 1990. Subsequently, petitioner informed the
petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that it would claim the amount as a tax refund, instead of applying it
P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year. as a tax credit. When no action from the BIR was forthcoming, petitioner filed its claim with the Court of
Tax Appeals.
The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund. Since petitioner declared in its 1989
Income Tax Return that it would apply the excess withholding tax as a tax credit for the following year,
the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed to have done so. The CTA and the CA ruled that
petitioner failed to overcome this presumption because it did not present its 1990 Return, which would
have shown that the amount in dispute was not applied as a tax credit. Hence, the CA concluded that
petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the factual findings of the appellate court are binding
on this Court. This rule, however, does not apply where, inter alia, the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court failed to notice certain relevant facts which if
considered would justify a different conclusion. 11 This case is one such exception.
In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply the amount as a
tax credit. During the trial before the CTA, Ms. Yolanda Esmundo, the manager of petitioner’s accounting
department, testified to this fact. It likewise presented its claim for refund and a certification issued by
Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioner’s vice-president, stating that the amount of P112,491 "has not been and/or will
not be automatically credited/offset against any succeeding quarters’ income tax liabilities for the rest of
the calendar year ending December 31, 1990." Also presented were the quarterly returns for the first
two quarters of 1990.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert petitioner’s claim. In fact, it presented
no evidence at all. Because it ought to know the tax records of all taxpayers, the CIR could have easily
disproved petitioner’s claim. To repeat, it did not do so.
More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was attached to petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration filed before the CTA. 12 A final adjustment return shows whether a corporation incurred
a loss or gained a profit during the taxable year. In this case, that Return clearly showed that petitioner
incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it could not have applied the amount in dispute as a
tax credit.
Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It did not even file an opposition to
petitioner’s Motion and the 1990 Final Adjustment Return attached thereto. In denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said Return. In the same vein, the CA did not pass upon
that significant document.
True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the Return after the trial. The law
creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however, specifically provides that proceedings before it "shall not be
governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence." 13 The paramount consideration remains the
ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for orderly presentation of issues is not an absolute. It should
not bar courts from considering undisputed facts to arrive at a just determination of a controversy.
In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for Reconsideration clearly showed that petitioner
suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary to the holding of the CA and the CTA, petitioner could not have
applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to consider the said Return, as well as the other
documentary evidence presented during the trial, the appellate court committed a reversible error.
It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is to secure a just determination of
every action. They are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. 14 But there can be no just
determination of the present action if we ignore, on grounds of strict technicality, the Return submitted
before the CTA and even before this Court. 15 To repeat, the undisputed fact is that petitioner suffered a
net loss in 1990; accordingly, it incurred no tax liability to which the tax credit could be applied.
Consequently, there is no reason for the BIR and this Court to withhold the tax refund which rightfully
belongs to the petitioner.
Public respondents maintain that what was attached to petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was not
the final adjustment Return, but petitioner’s first two quarterly returns for 1990. 16 This allegation is
wrong. An examination of the records shows that the 1990 Final Adjustment Return was attached to the
Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand, the two quarterly returns for 1990 mentioned by
respondent were in fact attached to the Petition for Review filed before the CTA. Indeed, to rebut
respondents’ specific contention, petitioner submitted before us its Surrejoinder, to which was attached
the Motion for Reconsideration and Exhibit "A" thereof, the Final Adjustment Return for 1990. 17
CTA Case No. 4897
Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a Decision rendered by
the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In that case, the
Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990 . . .’’ 18 Respondent,
however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case. 19
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases,
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact
that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." 20
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the
Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court.
Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent.
Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court
cannot take judicial notice thereof.
To our mind, respondents’ reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if they had really
believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily proved that it did not suffer
any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that respondents opted not to assail the fact appearing therein
— that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 — in the same way that it refused to controvert the same
fact established by petitioner’s other documentary exhibits.
In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioner’s case. It is merely
one more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its
taxes for 1990.
Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and are to be construed
strictissimi juris against the claimant. Under the facts of this case, we hold that petitioner has
established its claim. Petitioner may have failed to strictly comply with the rules of procedure; it may
have even been negligent. These circumstances, however, should not compel the Court to disregard this
cold, undisputed fact: that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990, and that it could not have applied the
amount claimed as tax credits.
Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the side of petitioner. Technicalities and legalisms,
however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep money not belonging to it and
thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding citizens. If the State expects its taxpayers to
observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against itself in
refunding excess payments of such taxes. Indeed, the State must lead by its own example of honor,
dignity and uprightness.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered to refund to
petitioner the amount of P112,491 as excess creditable taxes paid in 1989. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 151857. April 28, 2005]
CALAMBA STEEL CENTER, INC. (formerly JS STEEL
CORPORATION), Petitioners, v.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A tax refund may be claimed even beyond the taxable year following that in which the tax credit arises.
Hence, excess income taxes paid in 1995 that have not been applied to or used in 1996 may still be the
subject of a tax refund in 1997, provided that the claim for such refund is filed with the internal revenue
commissioner within two years after payment of said taxes. As a caveat, the Court stresses that the
recognition of the entitlement to a tax refund does not necessarily mean the automatic payment of the
sum claimed in the final adjustment return of the taxpayer. The amount of the claim must still be proven
in the normal course.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the January 10, 2002
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 58838. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against Petitioner."3
The Facts
Quoting the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the CA narrated the antecedents as follows:
"Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel blanks for use by
manufacturers of automotive, electrical, electronics in industrial and household appliances.
"Petitioner filed an Amended Corporate Annual Income Tax Return on June 4, 1996 declaring a net
taxable income of P9,461,597.00, tax credits of P6,471,246.00 and tax due in the amount
ofP3,311,559.00.
"Petitioner also reported quarterly payments for the second and third quarters of 1995 in the amounts of
P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00, respectively.
"It is the proposition of the [p]etitioner that for the year 1995, several of its clients withheld taxes from
their income payments to [p]etitioner and remitted the same to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in
the sum of P3,159,687.00. Petitioner further alleged that due to its income/loss positions for the three
quarters of 1996, it was unable to use the excess tax paid for and in its behalf by the withholding
agents.
"Thus, an administrative claim was filed by the [p]etitioner on April 10, 1997 for the refund
ofP3,159,687.00 representing excess or unused creditable withholding taxes for the year 1995. The
instant petition was subsequently filed on April 18, 1997.
"Respondent, in his Answer, averred, among others, that:
'1) Petitioner has no cause of action;
'2) Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements set out in Section 5 of Revenue
Regulations No. [(RR)] 12-94;
'3) It is incumbent upon [p]etitioner to prove by competent and sufficient evidence that the tax refund
or tax credit being sought is allowed under the National Internal Revenue Code and its implementing
rules and regulations; andcralawlibrary
'4) Claims for tax refund or tax credit are construed strictly against the taxpayer as they partake the
nature of tax exemption.
"To buttress its claim, [p]etitioner presented documentary and testimonial evidence. Respondent, on the
other hand, presented the [r]evenue [o]fficer who conducted the examination of [p]etitioner's claim and
found petitioner liable for deficiency value added tax. Petitioner also presented rebuttal evidence.
"The sole issue submitted for [o]ur determination is whether or not [p]etitioner is entitled to the refund
of P3,159,687.00 representing excess or overpaid income tax for the taxable year 1995."4
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In denying petitioner's refund, the CA reasoned out that no evidence other than that presented before
the CTA was adduced to prove that excess tax payments had been made in 1995. From the inception of
the case to the formal offer of its evidence, petitioner did not present its 1996 income tax return to
disclose its total income tax liability, thus making it difficult to determine whether such excess tax
payments were utilized in 1996.
Hence, this Petition.5
The Issue
Petitioner raises this sole issue for our consideration:
"Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred when, while purportedly requiring petitioner to submit its
1996 annual income tax return to support its claim for refund, nonetheless ignored the existence of the
tax return extant on the record the authenticity of which has not been denied or its admissibility
opposed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue."6
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
Sole Issue:
Entitlement to Tax Refund
Section 69 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)7 provides:
"Sec. 69. Final adjustment return. - - Every corporation liable to tax under Section 24 shall file a final
adjustment return covering the total taxable income for the preceding calendar or fiscal year. If the sum
of the quarterly tax payments made during the said taxable year is not equal to the total tax due on the
entire taxable net income of that year the corporation shall either:
'(a) Pay the excess tax still due; or
'(b) Be refunded the excess amount paid, as the case may be.
"In case the corporation is entitled to a refund of the excess estimated quarterly income taxes paid, the
refundable amount shown on its final adjustment return may be credited against the estimated quarterly
income tax liabilities for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable year."
Tax Refund
Allowed by NIRC
A perusal of this provision shows that a taxable corporation is entitled to a tax refund when the sum of
the quarterly income taxes it paid during a taxable year exceeds its total income tax due also for that
year. Consequently, the refundable amount that is shown on its final adjustment return may be credited,
at its option, against its quarterly income tax liabilities for the next taxable year.
Petitioner is a corporation liable to pay income taxes under Section 24 of the NIRC. Hence, it is a taxable
corporation. In 1995, it reported that it had excess income taxes that had been paid for and on its behalf
by its withholding agents; and that, applying the above-quoted Section 69, this excess should be
credited against its income tax liabilities for 1996. However, it claimed in 1997 that it should get a
refund, because it was still unable to use the excess income taxes paid in 1995 against its tax
liabilities in 1996. Is this possible? Stating the argument otherwise, may excess income taxes paid in
1995 that could not be applied to taxes due in 1996 be refunded in 1997?
The answer is in the affirmative. Here are the reasons:
Claim of Tax Refund Beyond the
Succeeding Taxable Year
First, a tax refund may be claimed even beyond the taxable year following that in which the tax credit
arises.
No provision in our tax law limits the entitlement to such a refund, other than the requirement that the
filing of the administrative claim for it be made by the taxpayer within a two-year prescriptive period.
Section 204(3) of the NIRC states that no refund of taxes "shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in
writing with the Commissioner [the] claim for x x x refund within two years after the payment of the
tax."
Applying the aforequoted legal provisions, if the excess income taxes paid in a given taxable year have
not been entirely used by a taxable corporation against its quarterly income tax liabilities for the next
taxable year, the unused amount of the excess may still be refunded, provided that the claim for such a
refund is made within two years after payment of the tax. Petitioner filed its claim in 1997 - - well within
the two-year prescriptive period. Thus, its unused tax credits in 1995 may still be refunded.
Even the phrase "succeeding taxable year" in the second paragraph of the said Section 69 is a limitation
that applies only to a tax credit, not a tax refund. Petitioner herein does not claim a tax credit, but a tax
refund. Therefore, the statutory limitation does not apply.
Income Payments Merely
Declared Part of Gross Income
Second, to be able to claim a tax refund, a taxpayer only needs to declare the income payments it
received as part of its gross income and to establish the fact of withholding.
Section 5 of RR 12-948 states:
xxx
"(a) Claims for Tax Credit or Refund of income tax deducted and withheld on income payments shall be
given due course only when it is shown on the return that the income payment received has been
declared as part of the gross income and the fact of withholding is established by a copy of the
Withholding Tax Statement duly issued by the payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the
amount of tax withheld therefrom.
"(b) Excess Credits. - - A taxpayer's excess expanded withholding tax credits for the taxable
quarter/taxable year shall automatically be allowed as a credit for purposes of filing his income tax
return for the taxable quarter/taxable year immediately succeeding the taxable quarter/taxable year in
which the aforesaid excess credit arose, provided, however, he submits with his income tax return a
copy of his income tax return for the aforesaid previous taxable period showing the amount of his
aforementioned excess withholding tax credits.
"If the taxpayer, in lieu of the aforesaid automatic application of his excess credit, wants a cash refund
or a tax credit certificate for use in payment of his other national internal tax liabilities, he shall make a
written request therefor. Upon filing of his request, the taxpayer's income tax return showing the excess
expanded withholding tax credits shall be examined. The excess expanded withholding tax, if any, shall
be determined and refunded/credited to the taxpayer-applicant. The refund/credit shall be made within a
period of sixty (60) days from date of the taxpayer's request provided, however, that the taxpayer-
applicant submitted for audit all his pertinent accounting records and that the aforesaid records
established the veracity of his claim for a refund/credit of his excess expanded withholding tax credits."
That petitioner filed its amended 1995 income tax return in 1996 is uncontested. In addition, the
resulting investigation by the BIR on August 15, 1997, reveals that the income accounts were "correctly
declared based on the existing supporting documents."9 Therefore, there is no need for petitioner to
show again the income payments it received in 1995 as part of its gross income in 1996.
That petitioner filed its 1996 final adjustment return in 1997 is the crux of the controversy. However, as
will be demonstrated shortly, the lack of such a return will not defeat its entitlement to a refund.
Tax Refund Provisions:
Question of Law
Third, it is a cardinal rule that "only legal issues may be raised"10 in petitions for review under Rule 45.11
The proper interpretation of the provisions on tax refund is a question of law that "does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants."12 Having been
unable to use the excess income taxes paid in 1995 against its other tax liabilities in 1996, petitioner
clearly deserves a refund. It cannot by any sweeping denial be deprived of what rightfully belongs to it.
The truth or falsity of the contents of or entries in the 1996 final adjustment return, which has not been
formally offered in evidence and examined by respondent, involves, however, a question of fact. This
Court is not a trier of facts. Neither is it a collection agency for the government. Although we rule that
petitioner is entitled to a tax refund, the amount of that refund is a matter for the CTA to determine
judiciously based on the records that include its own copy of petitioner's 1996 final adjustment return.
Liberal Construction of Rules
Fourth, ordinary rules of procedure frown upon the submission of final adjustment returns after trial has
been conducted. However, both the CTA law and jurisprudence mandate that the proceedings before the
tax court "shall not be governed strictly by technical rules of evidence." 13 As a rule, its findings of
fact14(as well as that of the CA) are final, binding and conclusive15 on the parties and upon this Court;
however, as an exception, such findings may be reviewed or disturbed on appeal16 when they are not
supported by evidence.17
Our Rules of Court apply "by analogy or in a suppletory18 character and whenever practicable and
convenient"19 and "shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."20 After all, "[t]he paramount
consideration remains the ascertainment of truth."21
In the present case, the 1996 final adjustment return was attached as Annex A to the Reply to Comment
filed by petitioner with the CA.22 The return shows a negative amount for its taxable income that year.
Therefore, it could not have applied or used the excess tax credits of 1995 against its tax liabilities in
1996.
Judicial Notice of Attached Return
Fifth, the CA and CTA could have taken judicial notice of the 1996 final adjustment return which had
been attached in CTA Case No. 5799. "Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force."23
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records in other
cases tried or pending in the same court, even when those cases were heard or are actually pending
before the same judge. However, this rule admits of exceptions, as when reference to such records is
sufficiently made without objection from the opposing parties:
'". . . [I]n the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly
treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case
pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that
purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when
the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the
court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record
of the case then pending. '"24
Prior to rendering its Decision on January 12, 2000, the CTA was already well-aware of the existence of
another case pending before it, involving the same subject matter, parties and causes of
action.25Because of the close connection of that case with the matter in controversy, the CTA could have
easily taken judicial notice26 of the contested document attached in that other case.
Furthermore, there was no objection raised to the inclusion of the said 1996 final adjustment return in
petitioner's Reply to Comment before the CA. Despite clear reference to that return, a reference made
with the knowledge of respondent, the latter still failed to controvert petitioner's claim. The appellate
court should have cast aside strict technicalities27 and decided the case on the basis of such uncontested
return. Verily, it had the authority to "take judicial notice of its records and of the facts [that] the record
establishes."28
Section 2 of Rule 129 provides that courts "may take judicial notice of matters x x x ought to be known
to judges because of their judicial functions."29 If the lower courts really believed that petitioner was not
entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily required respondent to ascertain its veracity and
accuracy30 and to prove that petitioner did not suffer any net loss in 1996.
Contrary to the contention of petitioner, BPI-Family Savings Bank v. CA31 (on which it rests its entire
arguments) is not on all fours with the facts of this case.
While the petitioner in that case also filed a written claim for a tax refund, and likewise failed to present
its 1990 corporate annual income tax return, it nonetheless offered in evidence its top-ranking official's
testimony and certification pertaining to only two taxable years (1989 and 1990). The said return was
attached only to its Motion for Reconsideration before the CTA.
Petitioner in this case offered documentary and testimonial evidence that extended beyond two taxable
years, because the excess credits in the first (1995) taxable year had not been used up during the
second (1996) taxable year, and because the claim for the refund of those credits had been filed during
the third (1997) taxable year. Its final adjustment return was instead attached to its Reply to Comment
filed before the CA.
Moreover, in BPI-Family Savings Bank, petitioner was able to show "the undisputed fact: that petitioner
had suffered a net loss in 1990 x x x."32 In the instant case, there is no such "undisputed fact" as yet.
The mere admission into the records of petitioner's 1996 final adjustment return is not a sufficient proof
of the truth of the contents of or entries in that return.
In addition, the BIR in BPI-Family Savings Bank did not controvert the veracity of the return or file an
opposition to the Motion and the return. Despite the fact that the return was ignored by both the CA and
the CTA, the latter even declared in another case (CTA Case No. 4897) that petitioner had suffered a net
loss for taxable year 1990. When attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court, that Decision
was not at all claimed by the BIR to be fraudulent or nonexistent. The Bureau merely contended that
this Court should not take judicial notice of the said Decision.
In this case, however, the BIR has not been given the chance to challenge the veracity of
petitioner'sfinal adjustment return. Neither has the CTA decided any other case categorically declaring
a net loss for petitioner in taxable year 1996. After this return was attached to petitioner's Reply to
Comment before the CA, the appellate court should have required the filing of other responsive
pleadings from respondent, as was necessary and proper for it to rule upon the return.
Admissibility v. Weight
Indeed, "[a]dmissibility x x x is one thing, weight is another."33 "To admit evidence and not to believe it
are not incompatible with each other x x x."34 Mere allegations by petitioner of the figures in its
1996final adjustment return are not a sufficient proof of the amount of its refund entitlement. They do
not even constitute evidence35 adverse to respondent, against whom they are being presented.36
While it seems that the "[non-production] of a document which courts almost invariably expect will be
produced 'unavoidably throws a suspicion over the cause,' "37 this is not really the conclusion to be
arrived at here. When petitioner purportedly filed its administrative claim for a tax refund on April 10,
1997, the deadline for filing the 1996 final adjustment return was not yet over. Hence, it could not have
attached this return to its claim.
For reasons unknown even to this Court, petitioner failed to offer such return as evidence during the trial
phase of this case. For its negligence, petitioner "cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a liberal application
of the [r]ules"38 by giving it a blanket approval of the total refund it claims. "While in certain instances,
we allow a relaxation in the application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in
proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances."39
It would not be proper to allow petitioner to simply prevail and compel a refund in the amount it claims,
without affording the government a reasonable opportunity to contest the former's allegations.
Negligence consisting of the unexplained failure to offer the exhibit should not be rewarded with
undeserved leniency. Petitioner still bears the burden of proving the amount of its claim for tax refund.
After all, "[t]ax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions"41 and are to be construed strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer.
Finally, even in the absence of a final adjustment return or any claim for a tax refund, respondent is
authorized by law to examine any book, paper, record or other data that may be relevant or material to
such inquiry.42 Failure to make an assessment of petitioner's proper tax liability or to contest the return
could be errors or omissions of administrative officers that should never be allowed to jeopardize the
government's financial position.
Verily, "the officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue should receive the support of the courts when
these officers attempt to perform in a conscientious and lawful manner the duties imposed upon them by
law."43 Only after it is shown that "if something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it
was duly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises."44
In brief, we hold that petitioner is entitled to a refund; however, the amount must still be proved in
proper proceedings before the CTA.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals for the proper and immediate determination of the amount to
be refunded to petitioner on the basis of the latter's 1996 final adjustment return. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.