Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement

I. Previous Attempts

A. The Geneva Conference (December 1973)

● US and USSR proposed following Res. 338
● Met with reps. from Israel, Egypt, and Jordan Syria refused because of the
exclusion of the PLO
● Brief and achieved nothing

B. Kissinger’s “Shuttle-Diplomacy”
● Wanted to keep control of the peace negotiations and individual discussions
● Visited Israeli and Egyptian leaderships, relaying offers and counter-proposals
● November 1973: I-E agreement to exchange POW’s and enabled E. Third
Army to be supplied

C. Sinai 1 (January 1974)

● I. withdraw from the east bank of the Suez Canal and limited E. deployments
east of the Canal

D. Sinai (September 1975)

● Further Israeli withdrawal to beyond the Mitla and Geddi passes with US
manning electronic surveillance stations in the Sinai
● Accomplished by delaying an arms deal on F-16 jet planes and approved $2.5
billion aid
● E. reopened the Canal (June 1975) rebuilt its towns and retrieve the Sinai
oilfields

E. Syrian-Israeli Agreement (May 1974)

● Kissinger brokered agreement between S. and I.
○ I. pulled back from part of the Golan, in and around Quneitra, and a
demilitarized zone was established

II. Conditions

1. E.-S. relations deteriorated sharply S. suspicious that E. wanted a separate

peace with I. rather than an A-I peace settlement.
○ Accused E. of selling out Arabs for E.’s security and increased US ties

2. PLO achieved greater international recognition in 1974-75 declared the sole

legitimate representative of the Pal. people at the Rabat summit

3. Arafat condemns Zionism at the UNGA and talked about a state for both Jews
and Arabs passed Resolution 3236: declared the Pal.’s right to national
independence and sovereignty and the right of return for refugees along with their
property
 4. Resolution 3237: gave PLO observer’s status in the UN

5. Resolution 3379: following year; declared that Zionism is a form of racism and
radical discrimination improved the UN’s stance, but these resolutions did not
improve the positions of the Pal. Arabs

6. 1974: PLO offer to moderate its stance on the future Pal. state Pal. national
authority in any area liberated from I. control commitment

○ 1988: adopted a two state solution

7. The PLO and Lebanese Civil War (1975-1979)

○ Mid-1970s growing presence and involvement in Lebanon
■ 1975: Pal. comprised 20% of the pop.
○ Launched attacks on I. from L. I. reprisals
○ Embroiled in the faction fighting in L. civil war
○ Supported the Muslims against the I. supported Christians
○ S. helped enforce a ceasefire in Oct. 1976 S.’s presence alarmed I.

8. Israel Invades Southern Lebanon (March 1978)

○ PLO continued attacks derail peace talks between I. and E.
○ I. invasion of southern L. in March 1978 (Fatah’s hijacking a bus
where 34 I. were killed)
○ 25,000 I. troops remained in southern L. for three months until the UN
Interim Force in Lebanon) was deployed to buffer

9. Israeli Invasion of 1982

○ Another I. invasion in 1982 notorious massacres of Pal.s in the
refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila by Christian militias
○ Drove PLO out of L. Tunisia
○ Tarnished reputation

III. World’s Positions

A. President Carter’s Middle Eastern Policy

● Committed to peace settlement evangelical and to reestablish US’s
reputation internationally after Vietnam War
● Different approach general M.E settlement with a resolution for the Pal.
problem rather than Kissinger’s approach
● Restart the Geneva Conference with the USSR as a vehicle for settlement
● Adamantly rejected by I., so no headway

B. Sadat’s Foreign Policy After the October War of 1973

 ● Desperate to achieve a peace treaty with I., preferably addressing the
Pal. issue required direct negotiations with I. rather than the Geneva
Conference
● Wanted the Sinai back and to cut defense costs and focus on the large
economic problems E. faced
● 1975: 53% of the budget covered by borrowing
● January 1977: Bread prices rise violent demonstrations and rioting

C. Israel’s Foreign Policy After the 1973 War

● 1967-1977: foreign debt increased from $1.4 billion to $8.1 billion
● New leader, Begin (led Irgun), reduced further prospects for a peace
settlement
● Sephardic Jews now a majority poor and resented the Ashkenazim
● Begin declared the comprising of all of the held British mandate of Pal.
biblical lands of Judaea and Samaria

D. Begin Becomes Prime Minister (1977)

● More flexible in his approach
● Only contemplate negotiations that left the West Bank and Gaza with Israel
eventually considered a deal that withdrew I. from the Sinai in return for E.’s
recognition of I.
● E. initiated peace rather than I. (more cautious)
● Increasing I. settlements in Gaza, West Bank, and Sinai threatened prospects
with E.

E. Sadat Addresses the Knesset (November 1977)

● Sadat announced that the was determined to have peace, even if it meant
confronting the Knesset (Israeli parliament)
● I. invited Sadat to directly address the Knesset to facilitate the peace
negotiations tried to separate further the divide between moderate Arab
states and the more radical ones

IV. The Camp David Accords (September 1978)

● Sadat’s trip failed to broker a treaty Carter intervention required to bring
about the signing
● 1978: Carter abandoned the idea of a general Middle Eastern peace settlement
and takes up a more limited approach (akin to Kissinger’s)
● Deteriorating situation in the M.E, growing unrest in Iran, and I. invasion of
Lebanon Carter’s decision that peace was vital, even if it was not full peace
● September 1978: Carter invited Sadat and Begin to Camp David (Maryland)
for direct negotiations
● Lasted for 12 days a lot of pressure from Carter

A. Two Frameworks for Peace

 1. Full I-E peace treaty E. recognizes I. with full diplomatic relations
I. withdrawal from the Sinai
2. Vaguely addressing the refugee problem moving towards autonomy
in the next five years for the West Bank with status determined later
■ Caused other Arab states and the PLO to denounce the Accords
■ Condemn Sadat for signing a separate peace treaty with I.

V. The Washington Treaty (March 1979)

● Arab states universally hostile towards the Camp David Accords left Sadat
isolated
● Begin believed that the second framework would not essentially alter the
status of the West Bank and Gaza
● Announced that he would suspend rule for only 3 months while the US and E.
understood 5 years
● Personal visit from Carter to convince Begin to come to Washington in March
1979 to sign a treaty

A. Main Provisions
1. Ended the state of war between I. and E. since 1948
2. I. agreed to withdraw from Sinai (completed in 1948)
3. E. promised to allow I. freedom of navigation on the Suez Canal and
the Gulf of Aqaba

B. Limitations
1. E. the only Arab state to establish peace isolated from the other
Arab states not likely to permeate in the M.E
2. I. still occupied the Golan Heights continue to poison relations
with S.
3. No progression to the establishment of a Pal. autonomy in the West
Bank and Gaza I. actually increased construction of settlements
4. PLO attacks continued due to the failure of satisfaction
5. Late 1980’s: The Intifada (Uprising) of the Pal. Arabs in the West
Bank and Gaza began

VI. Gush Emunim

● 1974: Gush Emunim (bloc of the Faithful) started a campaign to establish
Jewish settlements in highly populated Arab areas of the West Bank
● Contrary to the Camp David Accords