This research paper will trace the history, evolution and causes of the ongoing conflict between

two of the most important actors in the Middle East, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Taking 1929’s Saudi-

Iran Friendship Treaty as a starting point, the first part of the paper will document and analyze

the evolution of the relationship between the two countries till the 1981 Iran- Iraq War, commonly

seen as the start of this bitter conflict. The second part of the paper will discuss the effects of this

rivalry in shaping the major geo-political realities of the modern Middle East. Finally, the paper

will conclude with a discussion on the current status of this relationship, keeping in view the rise

of Saudi Prince Muhammad Bin Salman and Trump’s policy for the Middle East.

The strained relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia has given rise to a conflict that is often

dubbed by academics as the “Cold War of the Middle East” (F.Gregory 2014). In this so called

Middle Eastern “Cold War”, the two blocks contending for power in the region are Shia dominated

Iran and Sunni dominated Saudi Arabia. Given the bitterness of rhetoric from both sides today, it

might well seem that these countries have been at each other’s throat since the beginning of time

however, this is not entirely true. The bilateral relations between the two countries formally started

in 1929 when the cordial relationship between Iranian monarch, Muhammad Raza Shah Pehlawi

and Saudi King, Abdulaziz ibn Saud led to signing of the Saudia-Iran Friendship Treaty. The

decade following the treaty was marked by a state of relative calm however, the relationship was

not substantially strengthened due to inactivity on the diplomatic front. Saudi scholar, Saeed M

Badeed attributes this period of inactivity to Iran’s territorial ambitions in the region and the

difference in the religious practices of people in the two countries, especially during the Hajj

(Badeed 1993). The relations soured for the first time in 1943 when an Iranian citizen, Abu Taleb

Yazidi was executed in Saudi Arabia on charges of violating the sanctity of the Kaaba. The

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execution prompted a brash response from the Iranian government who broke off diplomatic ties

with Saudi Arabia. The tension however, did not last for very long and diplomatic relations were

resumed in 1946 due to strong personal ties of the two monarchs.

The decade and a half following this initial setback of 1943 proved to be very conducive as

relationship between the two countries thrived due to overlapping of interests. Both Iran and Saudi

Arabia sided with the US in the Cold War which increased their regional cooperation to guarantee

peace in the region. Moreover, they realized the potential of the abundant oil resources in their

respective countries and focused their attention to develop those industries. According to Princeton

trained scholar Banafsheh Keynoush, “The Saudi-Iranian political relations began to evolve

around three major issues: regional politics, oil, and international security.” (Keynoush 2007) The

fostering of favorable relations due to similar objectives arguably found its peak at the beginning

of the 1970s. Britain’s decision to withdraw its military presence in the Gulf in 1971 created a

power void in the region which the US aimed to fill. However, due to the horrible experience of

the Vietnam War there was exceeding pressure on the US government, from both home and

abroad, to stop military intervention in areas outside the United States. This prompted President

Nixon to make a huge change in US foreign policy, the culmination of which came to be known

as the “Nixon Doctrine”. The Nixon Doctrine argued for the pursuit of global peace through

partnership with its allies around the globe. In the Middle East, where the US was concerned about

the threat of Nasserism, Iran and Saudi Arabia were identified as allies who could play the role of

pro-western guarantors of peace in the Middle East. Known as the “twin pillars” (Pollack 2004) of

US policy Iran and Saudi Arabia benefitted from a large amount of American aid and continued

to work in tandem for securing peace in the region. Scholars argue that while the twin pillar policy

fostered momentary co-operation between the two countries, in hindsight it can also be highlighted

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as one of the significant triggers that have led to the present day conflict between the two countries.

In the 1970s, Iran was arguably the most powerful and developed country in the Middle East

whereas Saudi Arabia was comparatively economically weaker and had a far lesser population.

Hesitant to join the alliance in the first place for fear of being dominated, Saudi Arabia chose to

largely remain focused on developing its own country and “was neither willing nor able to act as

a 'pillar' of the U.S. regional security policy in the sense that Iran did” (Acharya 1989). The Shah

in Iran however, committed with the idea of being the sole guarantor of peace in the Middle East

and having territorial ambitions of its own spent billions of dollars to acquire arms from the United

States and considerably increased its military installations. Iran’s seizure of the islands of Greater

and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa in the aftermath of the British evacuation landed it in a territorial

dispute with newly independent, Sunni dominated UAE which intensified the Saudi skepticism

towards Iran.

As mentioned earlier, commentators on the Middle East have noticed that despite the fact that Iran

and Saudi Arabia conducted themselves as “partners” responsible for maintaining peace in the

region post 1971, a significant amount of competition and mistrust did manage to seep into the

relationship. While Iran dominated the regional countries owing to its superior military muscle,

Saudia in an effort to sustain their importance in the region supported smaller states who had

disputes with Iran in an effort to foster alliances centered in Riyadh. (Noyes 1994) However, it

must be noted that while this competition for control did strain the relationship between the two

states it does not explain the conflict’s present situation which has its roots in the historical event

that took place in Iran in 1979 – the Iranian Revolution.

On April 1st 1979, the Iranian population voted in a referendum that led to death of the 2500 year

old monarchy and transformed the country into an Islamic Republic. The chain of events known

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in history as the Iranian revolution transformed not only the country itself but also had (and

continues to have) a lasting impact on the entire Middle East. The effect of the revolution on the

Saudi-Iran ties was extremely prominent. The new government, led by Supreme leader Ayatollah

Roohullah Khomeini was anti-US, anti-monarchy and deeply conservative. Also, without the

formidable presence of the US or any other major power in the region, competition among

countries for regional control heightened. This competition for regional hegemony was the major

reason behind the Iran – Iraq war of 1980 in which Saddam Hussein, Sunni leader of the Shia

dominated country of Iraq invaded neighboring Iran. In the war that lasted 8 bloody years, Saudi

Arabia along with the US, Britain and other Middle Eastern countries supported Iraq. Saudi

support was particularly notable who according to respected statistics loaned approximately 9

Billion US dollars, interest free, to Iraq to support for the war effort that in addition to selling about

7 billion dollars’ worth of oil on Iraq’s behest. This support for what the Iranians’ regarded as an

unjust war of expansion further worsened the bilateral relations between the two countries. Iranian

hatred towards Saudi Arabia is best portrayed by the following statement given by Ayatollah

Khomeini at the end of the war: “Even if it were possible to forgive Saddam Hussein, it would

never be possible to forgive Saudi Arabia. These vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers

which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back. Mecca is in the hands of a

band of heretics.” (Gaub 2016)

Now that I have provided the necessary historical background of the events that led to the start of

the conflict, the next part of my essay will discuss the technical aspects of the rivalry and analyze

how this Cold War of sorts has played its part in shaping and influencing the current demographics

of the modern Middle East.

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The Iranian-Saudi rivalry has three main dimensions. The first one is that of a positional rivalry in

which both of the countries rival for political hegemony and influence in the area of the Persian

Gulf and the broader Middle East. Saudi Arabia, being a conservative monarchy wants the region

to remain favorable to monarchies in order to safe guard its own interests whereas post-

revolutionary Iran champions the idea of anti-status quo Islamic democracy and wants the Middle

East to take a similar direction. Secondly, the rivalry has an ideological element attached to it with

Saudi Arabia promoting a conservative “Wahhabi” ideology versus Iran promoting “Shia’ism”.

The role that these ideologies play will become apparent when I will discuss the different countries

and groups that these two countries align with in various conflicts around the Middle East. Thirdly,

the conflict has an economic dimension to it with both of the countries being exporters of oil and

members of OPEC, and having most of their oil resources present near or around the Persian Gulf,

it is imperative that they maintain a strong position in the region. Apart from these three main

dimensions, another important aspect is the struggle between these two countries to act as leaders

of the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia aside from having a population that belongs to largest sect in

Islam “Sunnism” houses two of the holiest places in Islam; Mecca and Medina and hence regards

itself as the leader of the Muslim world whereas Iran, despite being Shia dominated considers itself

the leader due its popular Islamic revolution and rejection of idea of Kingship, predominantly

considered un-Islamic.

As argued throughout the paper, the rivalry between these two countries has significantly affected

the political realities of the Middle East. Each of the three dimensions discussed above have

directly and indirectly led to many political developments and unfortunately, insurgencies in the

region. The positional dimension of the rivalry becomes increasingly apparent when one analyzes

the strategic regional alliances of both the countries throughout the Middle East. Saudia’s

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unbridled support to Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980’s is a perfect example of a Saudi alliance

formed to neutralize the threat of Tehran. Throughout the 60’s and mid 70’s the relations between

Ba’athist Iraq and Saudi Arabia were considerably strained due to Saudi suspicion of Iraqi support

to regimes unfavorable to Riyadh. However, the spectacular Iranian revolution of 1979 and the

valid threat of Tehran’s plan to export the revolution to the broader Middle East prompted Saudi

Arabia to disregard its mistrust of Baghdad. The alliance formed between the two countries is

regarded by academics as one of the major reasons that prolonged the War which otherwise would

have ended after the apparent defeat of Iraqi forces in 1982. According to Cleveland and Bunton,

Saudi Arabia alongside with Kuwait supplied Baghdad with around 50-60 Billion US Dollars in

aid (William Cleveland 2012); a substantial amount which not only prolonged the bloodiest war

the Middle East has ever seen but also decimated the warring countries. Even though Iran has been

able to make some kind of comeback, Iraq still remains ravaged and continues to be the playground

of proxy wars between Riyadh and Tehran. Another important strategic development cited by

commentators as part of the Saudi ploy to reduce Iran’s influence in the region is the formation of

the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. An alliance of six Middle Eastern countries

including Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, all of whom

happen to be monarchies, the objective behind this alliance is to minimize the rise of militant

movements in the region and to keep the area conducive to sustaining monarchies. As one would

expect of a Saudi centered alliance in the Middle East, relations of Iran with each of the members

of the GCC can be regarded as cold, at the very least.

Akin to Saudi Arabia, Iran also has continued to look for alternatives that would minimize its

isolation and neutralize the balance of power in the region. Iran’s relationship with Syria is a

perfect example a strategic alliance formed between two countries to further their own interests

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and counter Saudi Arabian influence in the region. Dubbed as the “Odd couple” by scholars on

account of the strength of their partnership albeit substantial differences in demographics, Syria

has turned out to be an important ally for Iran as it provides it with a reliable friend in the Middle

East and also acts as a buffer through which Iran exerts its authority on Lebanon, a key player in

Middle Eastern politics due to its proximity with Israel. Hezbollah, an Iranian funded and managed

political party cum militant group in Lebanon, is a key asset for Iran with regards to its policy in

Palestine. Moreover, Hezbollah has also been employed by Iran to train militants in the different

parts of the Middle East where proxy warfare between Iran and Saudia has become particularly

intense. Very recently, Hezbollah has been suspected to provide training and arms to the Houthi

rebels in Yemen; a cold war theatre that is getting uglier day by day.

Yemen is a perfect example of the violent insurgencies that the Middle East has seen due to the

constant tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. A poor and rather mismanaged country sharing a

700 mile long northern border with Saudi Arabia that is highly penetrable and often used by

criminals, smugglers, terrorists and insurgents (Terril 2011), it has been the scene of arguably the

bitterest war the Middle East has seen since the Iran-Iraq War of the 80’s. Saudi Arabia, in order

to ensure loyalty and authority has contributed numerous funds to boost the Yemeni economy and

has provided a multitude of financial resources during times of political upheaval, however the

rise of Shia Houthi rebels post 2003 invasion of Iraq provided Iran with an opportunity to exert its

influence in a region so close to the Saudi heartland. Although Iranian officials deny of any official

involvement, reputed sources have reported Iranian influenced Hezbollah to be involved in training

and arming the Houthi resistance. Recently, the crisis in Yemen has exploded beyond control with

both the incumbent Yemeni government led by Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and the Houthi rebel

forces allied with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh pressing claim of the central government.

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Following the successful capture of the Yemen’s capital Sana’a by the Houthi rebels in 2015, the

Saudi’s grew increasingly worried about the threat so close to home and on April 21, 2015, a

consortium of 8 Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia launched an offensive to rid Sana’a of the

rebels. It has now been 3 years since the campaign began and the situation in Yemen looks

increasingly worse. A humanitarian crisis of epic proportion looms large with international

organizations like the World Food Program reporting that 60% of Yemeni’s, which is about 17

million people, are living on subsistence level food (Sharp 2017). Conflicts of the sort like

happening in Yemen and also in Syria are solid examples of how this never ending rivalry is

continuously harming peace in the Middle East. The two countries need to sort out their differences

quickly because without that long term peace in the Middle East will remain elusive.

What does the future hold for the Middle East? Well, the future, altogether, does not show many

indications that the relations between these two countries will get any better. While the re-election

of President Rouhani is a hopeful sign given his readiness to engage with Saudi Arabia and the

World in the hope for a more collaborative future, one has to acknowledge that his power is limited.

He cannot completely change Iran’s policy in Yemen and Syria but is always a willing negotiator.

However, back in Saudi Arabia the changing leadership position does not inspire the same hope.

In January 2015, Salman bin Abdul aziz Al Saud replaced Abdullah as Saudi Arabia’s king and

has quickly gained a reputation for breaking with established practice. He has named his son,

Mohammed bin Salman, Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense and under the new prince,

Saudia has apparently been changing its policy of farming out its external security to the United

States. It has become much more assertive and active. The new prince has also been in the news

for voicing out anti-Iranian sentiments. Moreover, the election of Donald Trump in the United

States also does not bode well for the relationship between the two countries. A vocal critic of the

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Iran Nuclear deal, one of the first things he’s done as President has been to trash the nuclear deal

and re impose sanctions on Iran. Whereas his predecessor, Obama attempted to moderate the

Saudi–Iranian rivalry, Trump has thrown all his support behind Saudi Arabia. In his 2017 visit to

Riyadh he praised Saudi Arabia of being a “magnificent kingdom” while at the same time

condemned Iran as being the “spearhead of terrorism” (AFP 2017). During the same trip the US

concluded a $110 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia, with the deal being explicitly linked to “Iranian

threats” (david 2017). It does not appear that accommodation is Donald Trump’s play-book and

this does not bode well for peace between the two countries and as an extension peace in the

Middle East.

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 Bibliography

Acharya, Amitav. 1989. U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf: Origins and Evolution under the Carter and

Reagan Administration. .

AFP. 2017. News Republic. May 13.

Badeed, Saeed M. 1993. Saudi-Iranian Relations 1932-1982.

david, Javier A. 2017. CNBC. May 20.

F.Gregory. 2014. "Beyond Sectariansim: The New Middle East Cold War." Brookings Doha Center

Analysis Paper.

Gaub, Florence. 2016. "War of words: Saudi Arabia v Iran."

Keynoush, Banafesh. 2007. Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes?

Noyes, Mohammad E. Ahrari and James H. 1994. The Persian Gulf After the Cold War.

Pollack, Kenneth. 2004. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America.

Sharp, Jeremy M. 2017. "Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention ."

Terril, Andrew. 2011. "The Saudi Iran Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security."

William Cleveland, Martin Bunton. 2012. A History of The Modern Middle East.

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