The Latin American Studies Association

Subalterns, Signifiers, and Statistics: Perspectives on Mexican Historiography
Author(s): Alan Knight

Source: Latin American Research Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2002), pp. 136-158
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SUBALTERNS, SIGNIFIERS, AND STATISTICS:
Perspectiveson Mexican Historiography*
Alan Knight
OxfordUniversity
onthe"newcultural
Thisessaycomments
Abstract: ofMexicoandthe
history"
debaterecently
conducted
between
critics ofthegenrein the
andprotagonists
a scene-setting
HispanicAmericanHistoricalReview.After theessay
preamble,
consistsofthree substantive parts.First,in consideringwhatthenewcultural
historyisandwhatdegree ofnoveltyitmight claim,theessayidentifies
andcri-
tiquesseven featuresofthegenre: itsconcern forsubalterns,
agency, en-
political
gagement, thereinsertion ofpolitics,
mentalities, andinterdisciplinary
texts, in-
fluences.Second, theessayaddresses thestyleandsemantics ofthenewcultural
history,inparticular itspenchant forbuzzwords andjargon.Third,thearticle
turnstothemajorcritic ofthegenre, Stephen Haber,andconsidershispreferred
alternative scientific
(so-called TheessayarguesthatwhileHaber'scri-
history).
tiqueis oftenpersuasive,itis alsoinplacesmisconceived, perhapsexaggerated,
andtending toward a narrow positivism.Historiography,theessayunoriginally
concludes,neednotbefalsely polarized between narrow andfashion-
positivism
ablepostmodernism.
To presenta view ofLatinAmericanhistoriography-thehistorythat

has been and is beingwrittenaboutLatinAmerica,whetherby LatinAmeri-
cans or others-is a dauntingtask.The firstreason is thatthe continentis
largeand complex,and theoutputis huge and growing.Second,history, in
contrastto the othersocial sciences,tends to defineitselfin simple time-
and-place terms,hence logical subcategoriesofanalysistendto be elusive.
Whileeconomistscan be distinguishedbothbytheirtopicsofinterest(labor,
development,transport)and by theoreticalaffiliation(neoclassical,neo-
Keynesian,Marxist),historiansarenotso easilycategorized.Althoughtheo-
can be important(as with the EnglishMarxistsand the
reticalaffiliations
FrenchAnnales school), a greatmany historianswould defysuch classifi-
cations(Marxistsmightlump theiradversariestogetheras "bourgeoishis-
*Thisessay was writtenin response to a requestforreflectionson currentLatinAmerican

historiography, which formedpart of a cross-disciplinarypanel organized by Ruth Berins
Collier at the Latin AmericanStudies Association Congress in Miami, 16-18 March 2000. I
mentionthisoriginin partto "contextualize"theessay,in partto explainitsmotivation,which
has nothingto do withpersonal likes and dislikes.
136 LatinAmerican Reviewvolume37 number2 ? 2002

Research

PERSPECTIVES ON MEXICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY
torians,"but thisis too broad an insultto carrymuch specificity). And his-

torians'topicsofinterest, especiallywhen itcomes to job descriptions,tend
tobe spatio-temporal: earlymodernEurope (withspecialreference toSpain),
colonial LatinAmerica,Brazil in the nationalperiod. Useful and straight-
forwardthoughthese labels are, theyreveal nothingabout the approach
takenby thesehistorians.
Therefore, ifone seeks to generalizeabout LatinAmericanhistoriog-
raphy,one necessarilyconfronts a bewilderingrangeofapproaches,topics
ofinterest, and theoreticalaffiliations.It is possible to tease out some ofthe
main concernsand, perhaps,the principalaccomplishmentsof recenthis-
toriography: itsdiversification away from"top-down"nationalelitehistory;
itscritiqueofsome oftheold "metanarratives";itsrecoveryofregionaland
local history(perhaps thebiggestcontributionin sheer volume of knowl-
edge); and itsefforts,sometimessuccessful,sometimesnot,to "rescuefrom
theenormouscondescensionofposterity"thosegroupsthattraditionalhis-
torytendedto spurn-women, peasants,artisans,Indians.' These observa-
tions (uncontentious,I would think)could be anchoredin some massive
bibliographicalfootnotes,which,althoughtedious forauthorand reader
alike, could affordthe opportunity(in Samuel Gompers's phrase) to "re-
ward yourfriendsand punish yourenemies": "Prof.Y's deconstructionof
Bourbonfiscalreformsin the alcaldia of Nosedonde betraysa naive mis-
understandingof Bourbonaccounting .. , but we are greatlyindebtedto
Prof.X forhis insightfulanalysis of the neglectedrubberboot industryin
Pernambuco."Bibliographicalessays,althoughno doubtusefulforgraduate
studentsapproachingexam time,are a wearisome name-droppinggenre.
And because I have elsewhere attempteda succinct overview of Latin
Americanhistoriography, withnames dropped as rhythmically as riflefire
(Knight1997),I do not propose to repeatthatexercise.
It would be much more interestingto go beyond these time-and-
place categorizationsand tryto evaluate what Latin Americanhistorians
are doing in theoreticalor "paradigmatic"terms.By thatI mean evaluating
the paradigms,schools of thought,and theoreticalpremises thatinform
recenthistoriography. We may nothave our JohnMaynardKeynes,Eugen
Bohm-Bawerk,or MiltonFriedman,but we do have, or share,Karl Marx.
And otherlooselytheoretical approachescan be identifiedcoursingthrough
historiography, like DNA throughfamiliesand populations.Such a focus
will necessarilybe selectivebecause a good deal of historiographyis not
easily definedin termsoftheories,paradigms,or approaches.But because
thescope ofthisinquiryis excessiveanyway,a fewslices ofOccam's razor
(entianonsuntmultiplicanda) mightbe welcome.
Thereare two finalreasonsforpreferring thistack.First,while a con-
Class (Harmondsworth,EngI.:Penguin,
1. E. P. Thompson,TheMakingoftheEnglishWorking
1968),13.
137

LatinAmericanResearchReview
ventionaltime-and-placefocus is unlikelyto generatecomparisonswith

theothersocial sciencesunderreviewhere(how can we stackup "colonial
Brazil"against"neo-Keynesianeconomics"?),an analysisofrecenthistorio-
graphicaltheories,some ofwhich(such as cliometrics)enjoya close kinship
withthe social sciences,may fostercross-disciplinary interestand debate.
Second, the historiographicalpatch in which I forage-modern Mexico-
has recentlybeen thesiteofsome livelydebate concerningthenatureofhis-
toriography, specificallythe "new culturalhistory."While the debate con-
cernsrecentworksofhistory, itactuallyraisesold questions,some thesubject
of lengthydiscussion in the past. Thus just as the "new culturalhistory"
sometimesrepackages old and familiarformsof historiographyin new
neologisticwrapping,so thisdebate sometimesseems to rehearseold dis-
putes while claimingcutting-edgeintellectualnovelty.But then political
theoristshave been recyclingPlato and Aristotleforcenturies,so perhaps
thisis no cause forconcern.
WHAT IS THE NEW CULTURAL HISTORY?
The debate began in a stuffycrowded room at the AmericanHis-

toryAssociationconventionin New Yorkin January1997. StephenHaber
launched a critiqueofthenew culturalhistory, whichhe followedup with
furtherbroadsides in MexicanStudies/Estudios Mexicanos(a journal whose
contribution to scholarlydebate deservesrecognition)and in his introduc-
tion to How LatinAmericaFell Behind(Haber 1997a, 1997b). At the AHA
panel, threepractitioners of or sympathizerswiththenew culturalhistory
responded:EricVan Young,Mary Kay Vaughan,and WilliamFrench.The
fourcontributions have sincebeen published,prefacedby a kid-glovedin-
troductionby Susan Deans-Smithand GilbertJoseph.2Theyhave also been
supplementedby threeadditional commentsby FlorenciaMallon, Susan
Socolow, and Claudio Lomnitz: one pro-new culturalhistory,one anti-,
and one somewherein betweenbut morepro-thananti-(Van Young 1999;
Vaughan1999;French1999;Mallon 1999;Socolow 1999;Lomnitz1999).This
rosteradds up to a reasonablecorpus fordissection.It raises several of the
issues surroundingthe new culturalhistory;and although its time-and-
space focus is modern Mexico, the questions it provokes are relevantfor
broaderswathes ofhistory, notjust LatinAmerican.
An initialproblemthatlurksin all the thicketsof thisdebate is the
nature of the new culturalhistory.As Deans-Smithand Josephobserve,
"Perhaps the greatestdivergenceamong the contributors emergesin their
assessments of what the new culturalhistoryis, what it does, and how it
2. They admit to being "excessivelydiplomatic"and possibly "overstatingthe consensual

dimensionof the forum,"a mea culpa with the ringof truth(Deans-Smithand Joseph1999,
208).
138

does it" (Deans-Smithand Joseph1999,205; see also Van Young 1999,214).

Thislack ofagreementmakesdebatingitsutilitysomewhatdifficult: we are
tryingto homein on a movingtarget.We can probablyagreeas to what his-
tory(historiography)is and can shelve for the moment the question of
"new" (whichdoes notaffectthecontentofthework,ratheritsrelationship
to earlierwork).Butwe are stillleftwiththevexatiousqualifier"cultural."
Several of the (pro-) contributorsmake littleattemptto define the term
(semanticprecisionis not theirstrongsuit). But Van Young, in a spiritof
"salutary... promiscuity," offersa definition(actually,he calls it,correctly,
"an imperialistassumption"):"All historyis culturalhistory"because "all
human actionsand expressionshave culturalvalences or meanings,"and
"culture"denotes "the process of meaningformation,the codes by which
meaningsare stabilizedand transmitted, and theideas in people's minds"
(Van Young 1999,213-14,216).
This definitionseems to me triviallywrong,substantiallyright,but
ultimatelyself-defeating. Itis triviallywrongbecause notall humanactions
have culturalmeaning:considerinvoluntarymusclereflexesand rapid eye
movements,and recallGeertz's discussion of winking,derived fromRyle
(Geertz1973,6-7). It is substantiallyrightbecause ifwe approachtheques-
tion of culturefroma broad scientificangle, the most encompassingand
unequivocal definitionwould be somethinglike Daniel Dennett's:"People
ache to believe thatwe humans are vastlydifferent fromall otherspecies-
and theyare right!We are different. We are theonlyspecies thathas an extra
mediumofdesign preservationand design communication:culture"(Den-
nett1995,338, his emphasis). Once thisdefinitionis accepted,virtuallyall
human activities(barringinvoluntaryphysical activitiessuch as reflexes
and twitches)fallintotheculturaldomain.Money (VanYoung's illustrative
example)certainlydoes (1999,213).Butso does everything else. Thucydides
and Herodotustherefore wroteculturalhistory. LyttonStrachey'selitebiogra-
phies are "culturalhistory."Stephen Haber writesvery good (somewhat
quantitative)culturalhistory.It happens to be classifiedas economic his-
tory,but theneconomicsare as much a partof culture(the "extramedium
of design preservationand design communication")as anythingelse. Van
Young rebutsthe notion (which may be nagging at the back of his head)
thatthisbroad definitionis a "flaccidformulationthatdilutesthe concep-
tual precisionofculture"(VanYoung 1999,214).In fact,thedefinition is pre-
cise enough (more so than any otherdefinitionin the debate thatI have
found).But itleads to theinescapable conclusionthatall historyis cultural
history,hence culturalhistory (old or new) cannotdenote a particularsub-
category.Consequently,Van Young's imperialistrallyingcry-"cultural
historyshould activelycolonize economicrelationsas it has done political
systems"-becomes redundantbecause theculturalhistoryempirealready
spans theentireglobe (Van Young 1999,214).
Van Young and othersmightreasonablyrespond thatI am logic-
139

chopping.Theyshould concede,however,thatI am using a hatchetoftheir

own making,namelythedefinitionofculturalhistoryas the"historyofthe
productionand reproductionofsociallyconstitutedmeanings"(Van Young
1999,214).In reality, thenew culturalhistoryis morespecific,and although
modesty may not be its prime virtue,its aims are indeed more modest
(which is why Van Young would like it to become more ambitiouslyim-
perialist).To definethenew culturalhistory"in reality,"we have to aban-
don thebroad,semanticallypreciseapproach I adopted just now and pro-
ceed in a morepiecemeal empiricalway: thatis, we have to examinewhat
practitionersof the new culturalhistorydo and what it entails.Here we
encounteranotherproblem:our definitionwill reflectthegroup we exam-
ine. Nor is it clear what criteriashould be used to selectthe group-if we
tryto selectthe group by notingwho conformsto a checklistof new cul-
tural historypractices,we have created our definitionalready! This is a
genuineproblem,evidentin thedebate:severalhistorians(myselfincluded)
are, ifnot pulled limb fromlimb,at least gentlytugged to and fro,while
theirnew culturalhistorycredentialsarejudiciouslyinspected.Severalfoot-
notes citesupposed practitioners ofthenew culturalhistorywho, it seems
to me, do notqualifyforthataccolade, JohnSchwallerand ElinorMelville,
to take two randomexamples (Van Young 1999,219,n. 16; 243 n. 71). Even
Deans-Smith'swork is hardlyan example of quintessentialnew cultural
historybecause itstandsin a distinguishedline oflate-colonialinstitutional
and economichistoriography (Van Young 1999,239 n. 61).
While themembersof theteam may be hard to pin down, thereis a
veryrough consensus on the playbook.Pros and antis alike discernsome
commonfeaturesofthenew culturalhistory.I have picked out seven thatI
list,along withsome briefinterrogatory comments.
Subalterns
The firstcommonfeatureis a concernfor"subalternhistory," thatis,
thestudyoflosdeabajo(theunderdogs),thepoor,oppressed,disempowered,
deviant,inarticulate, and marginal(Deans-Smithand Joseph1999,205;Van
Young 1999,219; Haber 1999,323). Four relevantobservationsoccurto me.
First,is subalterna useful termor merelygratuitousjargon?I shall
returnto thatlater.But two particularaspects of this question should be
flagged.
Second, ifthe termis to be useful,how should itbe defined?Haber
rightlypointsto thevaguenessoftheconcept(1999,323-24).ButHaber goes
too farin dismissingit on the groundsthatifeveryoneis in some respect
In fact,thereare plentyofcol-
subaltern,thenthetermloses all specificity.3
3. "The kingbeing subalternto God ... and so forth,"as Van Young puts it(1999,219,n. 17).
140

lectivenouns thatare fuzzy at the edges and have to be definedin "rela-

tional"termsbutarenotnecessarilyuseless:considerlandlords, peasants,
work-
ers,and capitalists.
Third,is the notionof "subalternity"new or merelya repackaging
ofolderconcepts?IfE. P.Thompsonhad entitledhis masterpiece"The Mak-
ing of theEnglishSubalternClass," would it have made much difference?
(Itwould have misledsome prospectivereaders,who mighthave expected
some kind of compositeregimentalhistory.)
Fourth,is thenew culturalhistoryat all interestedin non-subalterns
(be they"elites,""superordinates,"or "rulingclasses")? Several ofthesup-
posed featuresof thenew culturalhistorythatI will list(such as theinter-
est in mentalitiesand representations)would seem to be entirelysuitable
forelitestudies.One book cited,MauricioTenorio-Trillo'sMexicoat theWorld
Fairs,focuses on a projectthatFrenchcorrectlycalls "a matterforelites"
(Tenorio-Trillo1996; French1999,153). Fernando Cervantes's TheDevil in
theNew Worldaddresses religiousbeliefs(which equal cultureor cultural
history?),butbecause itsfocusis "hightheologyand itscomplexities,rather
thanthecarneyhuesoofpopular indigenousbeliefsystems,"itis said to dis-
play a "'top-down' approach to culturalhistory, at odds withthe new cul-
turalhistoryagenda" (Cervantes1994; Van Young 1999,235-36).4 Is elite
("high") culturalhistorynotreallyculturalhistory?Or should we conclude
that100 percentnew culturalhistoryinvolvescultureplus subalterns,while
cultureplus elitesis a kind ofwatered-downversion,like the "small beer"
givento callow novices in medieval monasteries?
Agency
The concernforsubalternssits and (as several commentatorspoint
out) sitsa littleuneasilyalongside a concernforagency.Subalternsmaybe
at thebottomoftheheap, but theyare notinert,passive, or ineffectual.Van
Young's endorsementof thisemphasis is well taken:"We would probably
all agree thata good dollop of agencywas a salutaryingredientin taming
thejuggernautofstructuralism" (VanYoung 1999,243).We would probably
all agree thatwe would all agree.But threepointsmightbe made.
First,stressingsubaltern(orlower-classor popular) agencyis noten-
tirelynew. Even stressingsubaltern(or lower-classor popular) agencythat
is associatedwithideas, projects,and programsratherthansimplematerial
stimuliis not entirelynew. We can go back to Thompson and the English
Marxisthistoriansof both the medieval period and the civil war; and we
can citetheample literature on theFrenchRevolutionharkingback toAlbert
4. It is not clear to me why the qualifierindigenousappears because it seems to implythat

thenew culturalhistoryis concernednot just with subalternbut with subalternIndianreli-
giosity,anotherarbitraryassumption.
141

Soboul, Georges Lefebvre,and even JulesMichelet.Perhaps the point is

thatthisemphasis is new forMexico or LatinAmerica.Such an argument
could be made, but it should be made specifically,not couched in spuri-
ously global terms,as it oftenis. Here, as elsewhere,theMexican new cul-
turalhistoryexudes a slightlyparochialair.
But a second problem arises with agency.From the possibilityof
agency,practitionersof the new culturalhistoryleap to the ubiquityand
efficacyof agency,or what Van Young,withhis aptitudeforapposite allit-
eration,calls "theapotheosisofagency" (Van Young 1999,243-44;compare
Wolf2001,410-11). We arriveat the paradox thatsubalterns,who are de-
finedpreciselyby theirsubordinateand disempoweredstatus,are seen to
be callingtheshots.The inmateshave takenovertheasylum:literallyin the
case of CristinaRivera-Garza'sthesison public healthin PorfirianMexico
(citedby French)in whichtheauthorshows how prostitutesand theinsane
"fullyparticipatednotsimplyin therejectionor therefashioning, but in the
verycreationofmedicalized discourseswithinthehospitaland insane asy-
lum" (French1999,264). To put it simply,ifwe overemphasizeagency,we
no longerhave subalterns.We have shiftingcollectivitiesengaged in bar-
gaining,"negotiating,""appropriating," and thuscodetermining outcomes.
This seems to get us uncomfortably close to classic NorthAmericanfunc-
tionalistpoliticalscience.
Nor is thiskinshipentirely spurious.Considerthethirdproblemwith
agency,theway thatin much of the new culturalhistory,agency involves
processesofconscious,instrumental, Zweckrationalitat activity(Weber1964,
14, 115).What is more,thisactivityrelatesnot to discrete"tradableitems,"
likevotes or money,buttobroad culturalattributesand identities.Apropos
of FlorenciaMallon, Frenchrefersto "local interpretations of history"as
"arenas in which the officialtenetsof nationalismcan be inspected,ac-
cepted,refashioned,or rejected"(French1999,255).5Van Young noteshow
in some new culturalhistory,groups are found "'using culture'as though
it were a discretesubstance,separable and residual" (1999,236-37). He is
referring to "dominantgroups,"but I do not thinkthisinstrumentality in
thenew culturalhistoryis confinedto elites.We findsubalternsexercising
theiragencyin similarlyinstrumentalfashion.Thus as Van Young rightly
observes,we reachtheparadox thatnew culturalhistorians-by definition
proponentsofa "culturalistperspective"on theworld-start to sound like
rational-choicepoliticalscientists,the sworn enemies of culturalism(Van
Young 1999,244;Chong 1996).The paradox arisesbecause agencyhas been
inflatedand "culture"has been turnedintoa tradablecommodity.
5. Perhaps marketratherthan arenawould be the appropriatespatial metaphor?Markets

typicallyinvolve inspection,acceptance,and rejection;arenas are places where quarterbacks
get sacked and Christiansare thrownto thelions.
142

PoliticalEngagement
The concernforsubalternsalso seems to imply a measure of con-
temporarypoliticalengagement.Accordingto French,Mallon's "historical
researchformspartofherown concernwithsimultaneouslyremakingthe
present"(French1999,235).Mallon,I think,agrees.She notonlyaffirms her
radical commitmentto the presentbut admits her emotionalengagement
withthepast (Mallon 1994). She favorsa tellingofhistorythatis "respect-
fuland empathetic"(withregardto certaingroupsand individuals,at any
rate),and she confidesthat"sometimesthatmeans stayinginside,maybe
even allowingthetearstainsto remainon thepage" (Mallon 1999,349). By
"stayinginside,"I assume she means thatas a historian,she does notmake
an effortto detach herselffromthe narrativeor contextbut accepts and
even welcomes empatheticengagement.This approach and thecriticismit
elicitsseem to me to be largelyirrelevantto thereal debate (see Haber 1999,
316-17,328). It is a commonplacethathistorians,like everyoneelse, have
politicalattitudesthatcannotbe ruthlesslyseparated fromthe work they
do (Collingwood 1999,210-11). Such attitudesmay influencethe choice of
topic (revolutionsand peasant movementsas against banks and business
cycles).They may also influencethe way these topics are addressed. The
same is true,mutatismutandis,ofthenaturalsciences:some greenactivists
are biologistsand vice versa. But we should notjudge thevalue of a piece
or a school ofhistoryin termsofitspoliticalprovenance(Nagel 1974,486).
We should judge it in termsof the strengthof its argumentsand theirem-
piricalfoundation.Thereis, I think,good and bad radicalhistory, good and
bad conservativehistory.If we have no timefor,say,"revisioniststudies"
thatdeny the Holocaust, it is because we know theyare historiographical
trash.If,as Haber claims,exponentsofthenew culturalhistorysee truthas
"contingenton theideological prejudicesof the reader" (Haber 1999,317),
hence see themselvesas engaged in polemical preachingratherthansober
empiricalinquiry,thenindeed theydeserve criticism.But I am sure they
would disputethepoint;and I am notsurewhetherHaber could prove his
assertionin thefaceof such a denial.
I would add a minorthought:while parading one's politicsin his-
toriographydoes notinvalidatetheresearch,itcan turnpeople off.Preach-
ersoftheLeftor theRightcan getprettytedious.And ifthegoal ofhistorians
is to convince-and thus to use the rightrhetoricto achieve conviction-
theparading ofpoliticscan be counterproductive. It may appeal to readers
who probablyalready agree with writer;it may put offthose haveringin
uncertainty;it will almost certainlyalienate those whose politicsdiffer.It
seems to me thatthesmartthingis to achieve discreteconversions,by force
offactand argument,ratherthanby historiographical hectoring.
1,4q

HistorywiththePoliticsPut BackIn
Ifsocial historywas, accordingto an old formulation, "historywith
the politicsleftout," the new culturalhistoryis clearlyhistorywith the
politicsput back in. As Vaughan's intelligentresumeof twentieth-century
Mexican ruralhistorymakes clear,grapplingwiththestateand state-"civil
society"relationshas been a major and productivefieldof recentinquiry
(Vaughan 1999). It has reshaped our understanding,probablyforthe bet-
ter.Ifthisoutcomeis due to thenew culturalhistory, good luck to it.But as
Van Young suggests,thisreshapingis not exactlyevidence of a paradigm
shift.In Vaughan's account,"theNCH appears littlemorethana refigura-
tion of politicalhistory"(Van Young 1999,245). Now, it all depends what
you mean by "a refiguration." We cannotprovide hard quantitativemea-
surementofhistoriographical shifts,and thisinabilityprejudicestheentire
debate and ensuresthatitwill runand rununtilboredom,ratherthanreso-
lution,ensues. I would qualifythe reshapingor rethinkingof twentieth-
centurypoliticalhistoryas rathermore than a refiguration (which carries
theconnotationof merelyrearrangingthedeck chairs),althoughcertainly
farless thana paradigm shift.It has come about partlybecause historians
interestedin politicshave adopted "cultural"and "bottom-up"approaches.
Butthatdoes not,I think,make thosehistoriansconsumersor producersof
thenew culturalhistory,certainlynot in its hundred-proof form(Lomnitz
1999,371).
Two relatedobservations.Recenthistorians'attemptsto blend "cul-
ture" and politics have theircounterpartsin political science. Since the
1980s,politicalscientistscriticaloftheold pluralistand Marxistparadigms
have made efforts to "bringthe stateback in," thatis, to stressthe stateas
an independentvariable (Evans, Rueschmeyer,and Skocpol 1985). And a
fewhave done so witha distinctlyculturalthrust(such as Rubin 1997). So
thesetrendsare notconfinedto historiography. Nor again are theyentirely
new,at least in thegreaterschemeofthings.Mexican politicalstudiesmay
lack a culturaldimension,but thefusionofpoliticsand culturein otherhis-
toriographicaltraditions(as in Europe) is hardlynew.
Mentalities
The new culturalhistoryis concernedwith mentalities,signifiers,
representations,imaginings,discourses,and mannersand morality(Van
Young 1999,216,218,239; French1999,257). Again,one could respondthat
this concern is not so new. Mentalities provided the leitmotiv of the
Annales school decades ago, while thestudyofmoralsgoes back to theEn-
lightenment.Two otherqueries arise.First,to theextentthatthementalities
or imaginingsare those of subalterns(which seems likely),the practition-
ers ofthenew culturalhistoryset themselvesformidableproblems,as Van
144

Youngis ruefullyaware (1999,216). However much we may want to pene-

tratepeasant skullsin orderto findout what theywere thinkingwhen they
rebelled,thetaskmay prove "insuperablydifficult" (Van Young 1999,216).
The resultis a standingtemptationto resortto guesswork,empathy,"ethno-
graphicupstreaming"(retroactively applyingrecentethnographicfindings
to thedistantpast),and "imaginingtheimaginings"ofremote,inarticulate,
people (VanYoung 1999,226).A safercoursemightbe to complywithLud-
wig Wittgenstein's pithyinjunction:"Whereofthou cannot speak, do not
speak." Or,at least,relyon "behavioral"or "phenomenological"evidence-
these peasants rebelledhere,those did not rebel there-and presentsuit-
ably cautiousinferencesthatdo notpresume(in thewords ofQueen Eliza-
bethI) to "open windows intomen's souls."
Second and ratheroddly,theveryuncertainty oftheevidenceseems
to encourage a kind of bullish hermeneuticalconfidence.Haber suggests
thatthisis preciselybecause thestatementsbeingmade arevague and "non-
falsifiable,"hence theyplace a premiumon "ambiguityand the virtuosity
of theinterpretive ofthe new cultural
act" (Haber 1999,320). Practitioners
historyseem keen to assertthe primacyof mentalstatesand motivations.
This approach can lead to a fairlyextremeformofidealism (reminiscentof
Collingwood) wherebythe elusive activityof cogitationbecomes the ex-
planatorykey.At least,thatseems to be thecase: the exacthierarchyor re-
lationshipof causes (or variables)is oftena bit murky.To Van Young,who
combinesintelligenceand integrity, "it seemed thatthe internalimages in
people's heads . .. formedthebasis of thesemotives"forjoiningcollective
politicalviolence and "rarelyhad anythingexplicitlyto do witheconomic
grievances or with larger,more abstractlystructuralrepresentationsof
'interest"'(Van Young 1999, 116). Again, "social conflictthat at firstap-
peared exclusivelyor primarilyeconomic in originmightwell have had
deeper rootsof a more symbolicand ideational nature"(Van Young 1999,
141). Where the new culturalhistorytries"to arriveat a historyof mean-
ings forthe partiallyinscribed,"(the old?) social history,in contrast,tries
"to situatepeople socially,primarilywithregardto considerationsofsocial
class" (Van Young 1999,219). Van Young seems to be sayingthatwherethe
old social historywas concernedwithclass,whichhas itsrootsin economic
production,the new culturalhistoryis preoccupied with culture,thatis,
"internalimages" thatin facthave "deeper roots."6
The relativebalance of these factors-class, ideas, and interest(if
6. The passing referenceto "interest"is significantbecause it suggests an explanatory

approach, one familiarto generationsof historiansand perhaps best exemplifiedby Lewis
Namier.This approach stressednotsocioeconomicclass but politicalinterest,advantage,and
clientele.I am not sure what function"abstractlystructuralrepresentations"serve,but I am
sure thatinterestofferssome real mileage in dealing with popular, as well as elite,political
cultureand behavior.And it is not reducibleeitherto class or to "internalimages." In other
words,theseeconomisticand idealistalternativesdo not exhaustthe explanatoryrepertoire.
145

one wishes to include it)-is essentiallyan empiricalquestion thatrelates

to particularcircumstancesand problems.Only the most hidebound eco-
nomicreductionist(ofwhom thereare nowadays few) would insiston the
"exclusivityof class." But the "primacyof class" or economic causalityis
anothermatterand may well offera perfectly sound basis ofexplanation-
ofZapatismo,forexample.Thatdoes notmean thatZapatismowas a simple,
Pavlovian, materialistmovementor thatthe Zapatistas marched around
withouta singleidea in theirheads. Few or no historianswould acceptthat
travesty.But the propositionthatZapatismo was a movementof dispos-
sessed peasants directedagainstdispossessinglandlordsand thestatethat
representedthemseems entirelyplausible to me. In contrast,an idealistor
ideationalthesisthatstressesthe primacyor exclusivityof ideas as causal
factorsseems to me useless as an explanationofZapatismo. Otherpopular
movements-the Cristeros,forexample-may be a different matter,given
thattheirrebellionwas, primafacie,a religiousratherthanagrarianinsur-
rection.It is pointlessto propose an interpretivetemplate,be it materialist
or idealist,thatfitsall cases. The whole pointofhistoryis to investigatethe
cases and to frameappropriate(lower-to middle-range)hypothesesthat
explainthem.
TextualCriticism
The penultimatefeatureof the new culturalhistoryis textualcriti-
cism.Perhapsbecause oftheinfluenceofpostmodernism,thenew cultural
historyis givento theponderingoftexts.Afterall,as Van Young pointsout,
"cultureis to textas textis to culture"(Van Young 1999,224). I am unsure
what thatmeans,but Van Young also notes,I thinkcorrectly, thatthiscon-
cernfortextualprovenancecan lead to quite contrastingresponses:a fero-
ciouslycriticaldeconstruction on theone hand or a "regressionto credulity"
on the other(1999,218). The influenceof postmodernismcan be debated;
certainly,the influenceis not uniformand pervasive. Nor can we say
whetherthis slightlyschizoid approach to texts-part Oedipal rage, part
Confuciandeference-derives frompostmodernismor not. It may matter
to intellectualhistoriansor philosophers,but it is of less consequence for
workadayhistoriansofMexico or LatinAmerica.Perhaps,once again, the
ofthetopic-submergedpopularcultures-encouragesa some-
intractability
what cavalier "source-mining"approach.Ifdata are scarce,make themost
of what you have, embellishas best you can, discountwhat does not fit.
Perhapswe all do this,to a degree.Certainly, we have all been taught,long
beforegraduateschool,thattextsshould be viewed critically, interrogated,
and forcedto answer questionsthatwere neverput at thetime.7Therefore
7. Consider Michel Vovelle's use of wills to chartthe rise of secularism in eighteenth-

centuryFrance.
146

thenew culturalhistoryis merelyupdatingold bestpractice.Whethersuch

historyis doing it well again depends on the question at hand and the
qualityofitstreatment.
Influences
Interdisciplinary
My last diagnosticaspect ofthenew culturalhistoryis somethingof
a ragbag.We can defineschoolsofthoughtby theirinterestsand approaches
butalso by theirmentors,ancestors,and consorts.In disciplinaryterms,the
new culturalhistoryacknowledges a debt to anthropology,ethnography,
and literarycriticism(itsodd relationshipto rational-choicetheoryis rarely
acknowledged and may be unwitting).Given the new culturalhistory's
interestin culture,thesubaltern,and perhaps theexotic,thesedisciplinary
ties are unsurprising.It should be noted,however,thattheserelationships
are quite variable.Plentyof ethnographicstudies (of colonial Mexico, for
example) falloutside the new culturalhistorycategory,includingwhat is
probablythemostprolificand productiveschool,thatassociatedwithJames
Lockhart(Van Young 1999,234).
When it comes to individualmentorsand influences,thelistis long,
and any canon willbe open to question.Obvious contenderswould include
AntonioGramsci,E. P. Thompson,Michel Foucault,Roger Chartier,Ray-
mond Williams,StuartHall, JacquesDerrida,CliffordGeertz,PierreBour-
dieu, Ranajit Guha, Mikhail Bakhtin,JurgenHabermas, and JamesScott
(Lomnitz1999,368).The factthattheyare a ratherdisparatelot,who by no
means agreed witheach other,is notnecessarilya problem.Afterall, Marx
cobbled togethera prettyimpressiveand internallyconsistentsystemby
blendingGermanHegelianism,Frenchradicalpolitics,and Britishpolitical
economyand adding some extracondiments.The problemof eclecticism
arises,however,when thediversityand incompatibility ofthesesourcesgo
unrecognized:when sourcesare mined or plunderedfortheirobiterdicta,
withscantregardforconsistencyor logic.8Gramsciand Scott,forexample,
do notsitcomfortably together.Foucaulthimselfwentthroughseveralstages
and made rathera virtueofinconsistency(Megill 1985,187,191).Guha and
his subalternsschool have, I believe, fissuredinto disparate subgroups.
Geertz's reflectionson cultureseem to serve as a point of departurefora
good deal of the new culturalhistory("webs of significance"is a favorite
citation,"inscribe"a favoriteverb). Yet his thoughtson the matterbear
quotation.Geertzexplicitlyrejectedthenotionthat"cultureis composed of
psychologicalstructuresby means ofwhich individuals or groups ofindi-
8. Some of the new culturalhistoryfollows a kind of scholasticmethodology,which in-

volves recurrentquotations, long and short, germane and tangential, drawn fromthe
approved canon. Rhetoricalforcederivesas much fromcanonical citationas fromempirical
evidence.
147

viduals guide theirbehavior."He criticizedthenotionthat"cultureis ... a

symbolicsystem[embodying]the core symbolsaround which it is orga-
nized, the underlyingstructuresof which it is a surfaceexpression,or the
ideological principlesupon which it is based." And he has argued foran-
thropologybeing a science and objectivitya worthyand practical goal
(Geertz1973,11,17,24,30).
STYLE AND SEMANTICS
Having sketchedsome ofthesupposed attributes ofthenew cultural

history,I want to address a couple ofcriticisms. The firstis familiar,
thesec-
ond less obvious. The firstcenterson rhetoricor style.Rhetoricis important
forhistoriography in threerespects.First,a good stylecan seduce thereader,
while a bad styleoffendsand wearies. Edward Gibbon is stillread long
afterhis substantiveargumentsabout theRoman Empirehave been super-
seded. E. P. Thompson's diatribeagainstMethodismconvinces,in part,be-
cause of theforceof the invective.Because historianspresumablywant to
convincetheirreaders,a good stylehelps.Second,as a featureofstyle,meta-
phorsand other"tropes"can help conveythesense oftheargumentor nar-
rative.This practiceinvolves no literarysleight-of-hand: naturalscientists
sometimesuse metaphorstoo. But metaphorshave to be carefullychosen
and controlled.Oddly,practitioners ofthenew culturalhistoryoftenseem
to be the least able to controltheirtropesand the most likelyto mix their
metaphors.It would be easy but invidious to citeexamples. Certainly,the
literaryturndoes not seem to have conferredliteraryskills.
The thirdfailingis themostserious:thestyleofsome ofthenew cul-
turalhistoryis so bad as to be obscure.As Haber rightlyargues,clarityof
expositionis thefirstrequisiteofgood history, withoutwhichthereaderis
unsureofthesense and thecriticis unable to testthepropositions.Thereis
no obvious reason why the new culturalhistoryshould prove deficientin
thisfashion,but I can thinkof some possible reasons.First(in a bid forin-
stantpopularity),I would suggestthatthebulk ofthenew culturalhistory
is writtenin the United States (an interestingfactthatI will not pursue),
and in theUnitedStates,academic commandofgood, clear,elegantEnglish
is notall itmightbe.9 Second,theveryquest forliteraryflourishesand em-
bellishmentscan prove counterproductive. It is a case of "vaultingambi-
tiono'erleapingitself,"of prosaic muttondressed up as literarylamb. But
thethirdand mostimportantcontributor to stylisticopacityis thetastefor
jargon(Socolow 1999).
Now thereis nothingwrongwithjargonin some contexts.Academic
disciplines,professions,enthusiastsof thissportor thathobbyall resortto
9. Whetherthe United States is any worse than other English-speakingcommunitiesI

would not presumeto judge.
148

jargon,and forverygood reason. Jargonoffersa means to communicate

fairlydetailedinformation rapidlyand preciselyto an informedaudience.
It helps to maximize "consensibility"(Ziman 1991, 6). Americanfootball
would be impossiblewithoutthedense jargonoftheplaybook;economet-
rics,thelaw, and nuclearphysicsare all similarly"encoded." But thepur-
pose of thesejargonsis to facilitateswiftand precise communication.The
jargon of the new culturalhistoryis sometimessimilarlyjustifiable.Even
historians, whose disciplineis less technicaland whose terminologyis (gen-
erally)less arcane,use theirown argot,and withjustification: cliometrics,
prosopography, the"longue duree,"the"gentrycontroversy," the"Brenner
thesis,"and so on. Some of the staple termsand conceptsof the new cul-
turalhistoryare inoffensive, useful,and perhapsessential:hegemony, gender,
ethnicity, even subaltern(Lomnitz1999,375, n. 16). But practitionersof the
new culturalhistorysometimesseem to muddy the watersunnecessarily.
For example,defininghegemonyas both "process" and "end point" seems
to me gratuitousmuddying(Mallon 1999,339-40). Practitionersalso pro-
createnew tropesand neologismswithscantsense ofparentalresponsibil-
ity.I collecteda seriesofbuzzwords thatpopulate thenew culturalhistory
nested,
likedronesina hive:10 negotiated, decentered,
deconstructed,
embedded,
nuanced,
inscribed, codified,
decoded, space,trope,
Plus modernity,
transcoded.
archaeology, and thebody.A new one in the literature, both pro- and anti-,
whose sense I cannotfathom,is inductivism, which seems to mean some-
thingquite different fromthepracticeofdrawingconclusionsfromempiri-
cal data (Socolow 1999,357). And structuralism is deemed "fundamentally
materialist,"even in its anthropologicalform,which would seem to make
Claude Levi-Straussa Marxist(Vaughan 1999,287).
It would be tedious to reviewall thesesemanticdrones.Some seem
to me to derivefroma kind of conceptualhypertrophy: an idea or concept
possessed of a certainlimitedutility(even one thatis known and familiar)
rapidlyacquires a kindofspurious superutility. It (supposedly) opens new
vistasand reconfigures old problems.Like thelatestdot.comstock,itsrep-
utationsoars,and buyersqueue to buy withbullishenthusiasm.The recent
attentiongiven to "space" (and "sites") is a case in point.Again, thisfocus
is notwhollynew. The intellectualkinshipofhistoryand geographyis an-
cientand was anotherkeyitemin theAnnales project.Architectural history
is also an establisheddiscipline(recallthepioneeringworkofGeorgeKubler).
Mexican historiography is familiarwiththenotionofspace (Vaughan 1999,
276,n. 18),and thereis everyreasonto continuethisfruitful association.Yet
theword spacein thelexiconofthenew culturalhistory, sometimessuffers
a kind of runaway inflation:it is churnedout promiscuously,like Weimar
Reichsmarks,to thepointwhereitloses specificity and hence value. Some-
10. I chose that"trope"because thebuzzwords in questionseem to me to be largelyredun-

dant:theytakeup space and claimattentionout ofall proportionto theirsemanticcontribution.
149

timestheword denotesmerelythefactthatbecause eventshappen in four-

dimensionaltimeand space, everyeventhas a spatiallocation.Sometimes,
spaceis used in ways thatare partliteral(physicalspaces), partmetaphori-
cal (politicalopenings,culturalopportunities): hencethesecular,civilspaces
openedup byliberalanticlerical reforms, suchas the1856LeyLerdo(Vaughan
1999,251). This usage seems reasonable,even thoughthemixtureofliteral
and metaphoricalmay be potentiallyconfusing.In othercontexts,how-
ever,spacebecomes (literally)a blank,an emptypigeonholein whichto slot
anyoneand anything(Haber 1999,325).
So too with"thebody,"thevogue forwhichno doubtderivesin large
measure fromFoucault."1Renewed interestin thebody as both a physical
itemofresearch(medical history)and as a social or politicalmetaphor(a la
ErnstKantorowicz)is perfectlyacceptable,even welcome. But again infla-
tiontakesoff.Justas thingshappen in space, so people arebodies. Bya kind
of reductioad absurdum,any numberof processes can be relatedback to
thebody,simplybecause processesinvolve corporealpersons.When Ana
Maria Alonso concludes that "power insertsitselfinto bodies and selves
and findsits alibi in the very'natures'it configures,"she is (I think)mak-
ing thereasonableand unoriginalpointthatpower is "notjustexternal,but
internal,notjust repressivebut also productive,"which could be takenas
a gloss on theGramsciannotionofhegemony(Alonso 1995,237). But why
thisCartesiansplitbetweenbodies and selves? I takeselvesto mean minds
or identitiesor psyches,what in the old days were called "souls." Hege-
monicpower "insertsitself"intominds by creatingor fosteringa beliefin
its legitimacy,justice,or (in Scott's "thinsense") inevitability(Scott 1990,
72). How does power "insertitselfintobodies," unless we mean by direct
physicalpunishmentof the kind thatFoucault delightedto writeabout?
Directphysical punishment,however,is not hegemonicpower but brute
coercion,in thestyleoftheancienregime.Did theArgentineDirtyWar in-
dicate the hegemonyof the militaryregime?French,in glossingFoucault
and Alonso,refersto sundry"dispersedsites"ofpower,including"thehos-
pital,the universityand the school." "No overarchinggeneraltheory,"he
states (followingDavid Harvey), "explains what happens at each site."
"The one thingtheyall have in common... is thehumanbody-the siteat
whichall formsofrepressionare ultimatelyregistered"(French1999,262).
Most readersofthisjournalworkor studyin universities.Universitiescer-
tainlyhave power structures.They even have power-hungrywould-be
despots. But when did anyone last experiencea deploymentof university
power-a resortto repression-thatwas "registered"on the body,thatis,
which involved physicalcoercion?As a Mexicanist,I am well aware that
universitiesand repressionareno strangersto each other.ButU.S. and Euro-
11. This is true even though earlier studies (perhaps fuddy-duddyin comparison) pio-
neered thisapproach,such as Kantorowicz(1957).
150

pean universitiesare a different matter,and I have yetto see tenurecom-

mitteesresortingto thehot tongs.
"Space" and "thebody" are big organizingconcepts-or as I would
suggest,disorganizingconcepts.The restofthenew culturalhistoryvocab-
ulary,theverbsin particular,carryless conceptualclout.But theycan cer-
tainlybore and confuse.Examples are the varietiesof code:decode,encode,
transcode. Codeis a particularlyslipperytermbecause itcan mean two things
thatare almost diametricallyopposed. A cryptographiccode, a cypher,is
meantto disguise information; a legal or criminalcode is meantto publi-
cize and clarifyit (whethereitherdoes thejob is a different matter).Hence,
talk of "coded" and "encoded" informationbegs an elementaryquestion
thatno one seems ready to answer: is the informationdiscreet,disguised,
and arcane; or open, public,and accessible?Contextwill oftenanswer the
question,but it arises only because historianspersistin using a termthey
have notthoughtthrough.Likewise,decenter has become a genericlabel for
revise,rethink,subvert, and reconceptualize (usually by means of questioning
old "metanarratives").Inscribe(owed to Geertz?)is a fancyway of saying
write;and negotiate, as in collectivegroups "negotiating"withthestate,has
spread beyond its initialand perfectlyacceptable meaningto embraceall
mannerof contestationand conflictthatgo farbeyond negotiationin the
conventionalsense.Archaeology (fromFoucault)refersto researchintosome-
thingthat the author wishes to suggest is unusually intractableand for
whichtheresearcherperhapsclaims special credit.Finally,complexis used
to describeanythingthattheauthorhas difficulty grasping;itis oftena way
ofseemingto say somethingmeasured,judicious,and even flattering to the
referent ("thepeasantspossessed a complex,dynamic,and creativeculture")
when the author cannot thinkof anythingelse to say. It is safe, and it
sounds, well, sound. Again, no attemptis ever made to assess complexity
in quantitativeor otherterms.It is a throwawayline. Yetwhen used spar-
ingly,complexity can be a useful and meaningfulconcept.Mexico is more
complex than Michoacan. I would urge a moratoriumon complexsave in
thoseprovencases whereit means somethingand can be substantiated.
These semanticpointsare notnew-I am in partrepeatingSocolow
(1999). I suspect,furthermore, thattheyare pointsto whichsome will read-
ily assent and thatotherswill peremptorilyreject,resultingin no conver-
sion,no meetingofminds.But I would finallyask thequestion,why have
semanticsbecome so important?Historianshave oftenargued over mean-
ings: some of themajorhistoricalcontroversies(over the rise of the gentry
or the originsof the Second WorldWar) have hinged on the meaningsof
particularwords(gentry, Buttheparticipants
plans,blueprints).
origins, inthose
debates,forexample,A. J.P. Taylorand Hugh Trevor-Roper, wrotethesame
kind of English and in the case of Taylorand Trevor-Roper, wroteit very
well. The debate concerned specificwords, not a recurringvocabulary.
Maybe the combinedliteraryand linguisticturnshave broughtthisupon
151

us. But ifso, it is ironicthat"turns"thatpromisedgreaterappreciationof

language seem to have produced debasement.Mallon, recognizinga prob-
lem,justifiestheuse of"prohibitive language,abstractcategories,and broad-
rangingclaims ... as batteringrams againstthefortressof perceivedposi-
tivism"(Mallon 1999,337).12Yet I am not sure thatthe dull and repetitive
thudofnew culturalhistoryis likelyto batterdown any walls, althoughit
may help put thedefendersto sleep.
I am moreinclinedto thinkthatthejargonin questionservesless to
clarifyand inform-as "good jargon" should-and more to flag and de-
marcate.The recurrent use ofcertainbuzzwords marksa kindofterritorial
"space" (metaphor).13Buzzwords functionlike FredrikBarth's"symbolic
'borderguards' and 'boundarymechanisms'thatseparateand differentiate
social groups in theirattitudesand perceptions"(Smith1986,10). Deploy-
ing the jargon is like beatingthe bounds of the village at Rogationtide:it
resemblesa Masonic handshakeor recallsa dog pissingon theperimeterof
itsterritory.14
Such semanticsignalingis not,of course,confinedto new cultural
historians.Stephen Haber, seeking to rub his opponents' noses in their
methodologicalignorance,remindsthemthattheyhave overlookedavail-
able "testsfornormalityand heteroskedasticity.. . , collinearity.. . , and
autocorrelation"(Haber 1999,314). He is, I think,makinga valid point,but
I suspecthe is also flauntinghis methodologicalexpertisewith a view not
only to confoundinghis opponents but also to impressinghis economist
colleagues.15But ifsemanticsignallingis common,it seems to be a partic-
ularlysalientfeatureofthenew culturalhistory.This associationmay have
somethingto do withthelinguistic-literary turn,and it may also represent
thefunctionalresponseofa new,or self-styled new,school thatis tryingto
define,demarcate,and defenditself.However explicable,thetrendunfor-
tunatelyencourageswaffle, and confusion.Metaphorsgethope-
imprecision,
lessly mixed, and prose becomes a collage of recycleddross. As George
Orwell wrote in 1946, "As soon as certaintopics are raised, the concrete
meltsinto the abstractand no one seems able to thinkof turnsof speech
thatare not hackneyed:prose consistsless and less ofwordschosen forthe
12.Does theword perceived implythatthefortress maybe a myth,likeQuixote's windmills?

13.1 am not sure I would wish to followSocolow and call it "pomo-speak" (Socolow 1999,
359).
14. The debate in question has elicitedsome red-bloodedmetaphors,and thisone is by no
means the mostoffensive.
15. Economic historiansof cliometricpersuasion have a deep need to be valued by their
economistcolleagues and a correspondingfearofbeing bracketedwith "soft,""impression-
istic,"and "anecdotal" historians,new culturalhistoriansworstof all. It would be tempting
to explorethecausalityofthisentiredebate in theseterms.But as withpeasants,I am notsure
we can "open windows intomen's souls," especiallythose of economists.
152

sake of theirmeaningand more and more of phrases tacked togetherlike

henhouse" (Orwell 1962,145,his emphasis).
thesectionsofa prefabricated
THE PERILS OF POSITIVISM
Finally,letme turnto theotherside. It may seem thatI have aligned

myselfunequivocallywiththeHaber critique,but thatwould notbe quite
true.Some ofthenew culturalhistoryis good, innovativestuff(oftenin spite
ofitsterminology). And theinfluenceofthenew culturalhistory-defined
inpolemicalHaberiantermsas lax,politicallymotivated,postmodernrant-
is probablyless thanhe supposes.16The supposed kinshipbetweenthenew
culturalhistoryand dependencytheory, whichHaber raisesin his book in-
troduction butnothisHAHR article,is doublymistaken:first, because many
ofhis supposed dependista historiansare nothingof the sort(Haber 1997b,
24,n. 30); and second,because thenew culturalhistory, to theextentthatit
conforms to thelooselypostmodemnorm,has littletimeforanygrandtheory
or "metanarrative"like dependency(whetherthatis a good or bad thingis
anothermatter).The problemofpoliticalpartisanshipis somethingofa red
herring:itmay raise a stink,but it does notpreventus fromreading,evalu-
ating,and even benefitingfromsupposedly politicallypartisanhistoriog-
raphy.And it is hard to establishwhetherproponentsof the new cultural
historyreallyare "ambivalentaboutthenotionthatthereareobjectivefacts,"
such that"anythinggoes" (Haber 1999,310). Most of them,to my knowl-
edge,have notpenned a forthright methodologicalmissionstatement.Mal-
lon declaresin her riposteto Haber that"the debate is not about the exis-
tenceofobjectivefacts"butratherwhetherwe can "determine[facts]regardless
ofthesubjectivities" ofauthorsand sources(Mallon 1999,333,heremphasis).
Would Haber assertthatfactscan be determinedregardlessof subjectivi-
ties?His advice thatwe should "systematically constrainsubjectivebeliefs
frominfluencingsubstantiveconclusions" seems to imply thathe would
not (1999,330). On the otherhand, Mallon denies that"themuch-vaunted
scientificmethodis the best way to assess most interpretations," and she
writesoftheneed to distinguishfactfromfiction,"even as we abandon the
claimto scienceand accepttheinevitablyblurrylinebetweenobjectiveand
subjective"(Mallon 1999,350,345).In theabsence ofclearerstatements, we
would have to inferthe corrosivesubjectivismof the new culturalhistory
fromtheworkitself.In manycases,itwould be difficult to tellwhethersup-
posed deficiencies(of the kind thatHaber criticizes)are the productof a
consciouslysubjectivistphilosophy, oftheauthors'sheerwoolly-mindedness,
or ofHaber's own suspicious mind.
While Haber is, I think,rightto criticizethe conceptualimprecision
and laxityof language evidentin a good deal of the new culturalhistory,
16. Here I agree withVan Young (1999,217-18).
153

his call fora morescientificapproach raises the question ofwhat a "scien-

tificapproach" would be. In his HAHR piece, Haber stressesthe need for
"logic,reason,and clearspecification"(Haber 1999,330). This broad recom-
mendation,consonantwith the classic statementsof Max Weber (1964,9)
and Geertz(1973),seems entirelyappropriate.Any historianwho roundly
rejectedit (and presumablyargued forillogicality, unreason,and vague or
nonexistentspecification)should indeed be consignedto themythicalasy-
lumofloonypostmodernists. Butdoes a "scientific
approach"demandmore?
In his prefaceto his economichistoryHow LatinAmericaFell Behind,Haber
makes a pitch for "the dispassionate analysis of systematicallygathered
quantitativedata" as one ofhis keydesiderata(Haber 1997b,7). Thatis fine
so long as thereis no presumptionthatquantitativedata are superiorto
qualitative,or thattopicsthatlend themselvesto quantitativedata should
be preferred.Thus, scientific cannot be equated with quantitative (Ziman
1991,14). Numbersare all verynicebecause theyaffordprecisionand facili-
tatecomparison.Butthereis a vast universeofhistorythatcannotbe quan-
tified,eitherbecause the data do not existor because theconcepts(includ-
ing many in the new culturalhistory)are inherentlynonquantifiable.Can
hegemonybe measured?How do we calibrateidentity?The precisionde-
manded by termssuch as theseis conceptualand semantic,notnumerical.
Economists and economic historiansoftendisplay ingenuityin seeking
numericalproxiesforelusive categories.Sometimestheywork and some-
timestheydo not.In thisrespect,quantitativehistoryis no different from
qualitative:thereis good and bad, successfuland unsuccessful.The proof
ofthepudding is in theeating.
Should historygenerate"testablehypotheses"?At theriskofseem-
ing to caricatureOxfordphilosophy,I would say thatdepends on what we
mean by testand by hypotheses. On thefirstcount,historiography is clearly
not experimental,so historianscannottesta hypothesisabout theMexican
Revolutionby rerunningit.That has no bearingon the scientific or nonsci-
entificstatusof historybecause thereare social sciences thatcan usefully
experiment(such as psychology),and thereare naturalsciencesthatcannot
(such as geology and cosmology).We can, however,testa hypothesisby
collectingdata, framinga clear argument,and submittingit forconsidera-
tionto expertsin thefield,whichis roughlytheway naturalscientistspro-
ceed. It maybe harderto achieve consensusin thehistoricalfield,although
we can all agree on some objectivefacts:thatDiaz fellin 1911,thatZapata
came fromMorelos,thatthe Constitutionof 1917 included a provisionfor
land reform.But theprocedureforpromptingdebate and seekingconsen-
sus does not differradically.17Last, as regardsthe testingof hypotheses,
Haber's invocationof the "Popperian falsificationist epistemology"seems
17. This pointapplies to both ofHaber's supposed "dominantparadigms in thewritingof

history":the "social scientific"and the "traditional"(Haber 1999,310-11).
154

to me to be mistaken.I do notthinkitworksin practiceeven in thenatural

sciences (Ziman 1991, 35). It certainlydoes not work in historiography.
Neithernaturalnor social scientistsspend a greatdeal oftheirtimetrying
to falsifyhypotheses.Some "hypotheses"are takenforgranted,thatis,they
are close to axioms(such as Newtonianand Einsteinianmechanics,formost
purposes). Some are exposed to bothfalsificationist tests.
and verificationist
In history, we do not go around lookingforevidence thatDiaz fellin 1910,
or thatZapata came fromYucatan,or thatthe Constitutionof 1917 said
nothingabout land reform.Even when we tryto framebroaderor higher-
levelhypotheses(forexample,theMexicanRevolutionwas a "peasantwar"),
thereis no way a singleevidentialbolt fromtheblue is going to falsify(or
prove) such a contention.We should weigh the evidence forand against,
but thereis nothingPopperian about thatfamiliarforensicprinciple.In-
deed, it is hard to see why Haber, hardheaded cliometricianthat he is,
should be so enamoredof Karl Popper,who believed that"history... has
no unifyingtheories,"thatthe "laws"-or generalizations-of history"are
practicallywithoutinterestand totallyunable to bringorderinto the sub-
jectmatter,"and that"intheabsenceofspecifically universalhistoricallaws,
most historicalexplanationsare merelyinterpretations which cannot be
tested"(Leff1969,81-82).
Finally,whatof"hypotheses"?I do notthinkHaber's two paradigms
help much.18Narrativeor "traditionalhistory"containshypotheses,both
explicitand implicit,like discussions of individual motives,usually those
ofGreatMen,orimpliedcausal relationships, oftenburiedin narrative. Econ-
omists,as Donald McCloskey has emphasized, spend a lot of timetelling
stories(McCloskey 1990). What is different, apart fromthe greatertrans-
parencyof social-scientific hypothesizing,is that"traditional"hypotheses
areusuallyofa lowerlevelthansocial-scientific ones.ExplainingwhyCaesar
crossedthe Rubiconis ratherdifferent fromexplainingthedecline of slav-
eryin theLate RomanEmpire.Likewise,explainingwhyPorfirioDiaz gave
"the Creelmaninterview"in 1908 differsfromexplainingthe rationaleof
Mexican debtpeonage. Buttheseare differences ofdegree;theydo notpre-
suppose some radicallydifferent methodology.
While questioningthisschizoid approachto history, I would also re-
ject Haber's contentionthat "the goal of social scientifichistoryis to test
theoriesthatmake generalstatementsabout humanbehavior"(Haber 1999,
311). I have two reasonsforthisrejection,one solid and "objective"and the
otherrathermore loosely subjective.First,I am verydoubtfulas to what
those "general statementsabout human behavior" mightbe. We may be
able to generalizeabout Romanbehavior,or Roman slave owners'behavior,
or Roman slave owners' behaviorin theLate Empire-or about theirPor-
18. Judgingby the source,RobertFogel and GeoffreyElton,it looks like a schizoid theory,
produced by a veryodd couple.
155

firiancounterparts. But "human behavior"?Whateverconstantsmightap-

pear under thatheading are a matterforbiologistsand anthropologists(or
biologicalanthropologists), not historians(or culturalanthropologists).To
posit "generalstatementsabout human behavior" seems to go the way of
Collingwood's"crypto-history," whichis notaltogether surprising inHaber's
case, given thatCollingwood's primeexample of crypto-history was "so-
called classical economics"that"describesa certainset oftransienthistori-
cal conditionsunder thebeliefthatit was statingeternaltruths"(Colling-
wood 1999,244).
Second, I do not considerit the chieftask of historyto testgeneral
statementsor theories(thatis, high-levelhypothesessuch as inflationfol-
lows themoneysupply or revolutionspass throughdiscreteand patterned
stages). Testingsuch hypothesesfallsto othersocial scientists,economists
or sociologistsin thesecases. They profitfromour historicalfindings,and
we as historiansmay pickup on theirconclusionsand see iftheyhelp us in
our historicalinquiries.Roughly,therefore, some social scientistsproduce
higher-levelhypotheses(including"grand theory")thathistorianscan, if
theywish,consume,whilehistoriansproducelower-levelhypotheses(some-
timescalled "empiricalfindings"or "myopicnit-picking") thatsocial scien-
tistscan,iftheywish,consume.The activitiesare different in scale and, one
hopes, occasionallymutuallysupportive.Certainlyahistoricalsocial scien-
tistsare a liability,as are historiansirrationallyhostileto social science.But
themethodology-framingclear statementsand hypotheseswhile adduc-
ing clear evidence-is essentiallythe same. It is against these criteriathat
thenew culturalhistory, should be judged. I am inclinedto
likeany history,
agree with Haber thatthe new culturalhistory,when put to the test,fails
moreoftenthanitshould. Thatdoes notmean thattheenterpriseshould be
abandoned or thattheonlyalternativeis a narrow,number-crunching, pos-
itivistichistoriographical equivalentofThomas Carlyle's"dismal science."
Fortunately, we do not have to choose between the pomo funnyfarmand
thepositivisticprison.Thereare plentyof greenfieldsin between.
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158


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Subalterns, Signifiers, and Statistics: Perspectives on Mexican Historiography

Author(s): Alan Knight

This content downloaded from 134.193.117.53 on Mon, 1 Dec 2014 11:15:16 AM

To presenta view ofLatinAmericanhistoriography-thehistorythat

*Thisessay was writtenin response to a requestforreflectionson currentLatinAmerican

136 LatinAmerican Reviewvolume37 number2 ? 2002

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torians,"but thisis too broad an insultto carrymuch specificity). And his-

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ventionaltime-and-placefocus is unlikelyto generatecomparisonswith

WHAT IS THE NEW CULTURAL HISTORY?

The debate began in a stuffycrowded room at the AmericanHis-

2. They admit to being "excessivelydiplomatic"and possibly "overstatingthe consensual

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does it" (Deans-Smithand Joseph1999,205; see also Van Young 1999,214).

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chopping.Theyshould concede,however,thatI am using a hatchetoftheir

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lectivenouns thatare fuzzy at the edges and have to be definedin "rela-

4. It is not clear to me why the qualifierindigenousappears because it seems to implythat

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Soboul, Georges Lefebvre,and even JulesMichelet.Perhaps the point is

5. Perhaps marketratherthan arenawould be the appropriatespatial metaphor?Markets

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Youngis ruefullyaware (1999,216). However much we may want to pene-

6. The passing referenceto "interest"is significantbecause it suggests an explanatory

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one wishes to include it)-is essentiallyan empiricalquestion thatrelates

7. Consider Michel Vovelle's use of wills to chartthe rise of secularism in eighteenth-

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thenew culturalhistoryis merelyupdatingold bestpractice.Whethersuch

8. Some of the new culturalhistoryfollows a kind of scholasticmethodology,which in-

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viduals guide theirbehavior."He criticizedthenotionthat"cultureis ... a

STYLE AND SEMANTICS

Having sketchedsome ofthesupposed attributes ofthenew cultural

9. Whetherthe United States is any worse than other English-speakingcommunitiesI

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jargon,and forverygood reason. Jargonoffersa means to communicate

10. I chose that"trope"because thebuzzwords in questionseem to me to be largelyredun-

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timestheword denotesmerelythefactthatbecause eventshappen in four-

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pean universitiesare a different matter,and I have yetto see tenurecom-

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us. But ifso, it is ironicthat"turns"thatpromisedgreaterappreciationof

12.Does theword perceived implythatthefortress maybe a myth,likeQuixote's windmills?

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sake of theirmeaningand more and more of phrases tacked togetherlike

THE PERILS OF POSITIVISM

Finally,letme turnto theotherside. It may seem thatI have aligned

16. Here I agree withVan Young (1999,217-18).

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his call fora morescientificapproach raises the question ofwhat a "scien-

17. This pointapplies to both ofHaber's supposed "dominantparadigms in thewritingof

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to me to be mistaken.I do notthinkitworksin practiceeven in thenatural

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firiancounterparts. But "human behavior"?Whateverconstantsmightap-

ALONSO, ANA MARIA

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