MARGARITA AFIALDA vs.

BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE

This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. The complaint alleges that the now
deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed
compensation; that while tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later
died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force
majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support.

Before filing their answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of a cause of
action, and the motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiff has taken this appeal.

Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads:

The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if
such animal should escape from him or stray away.

This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who may have suffered it.

The question presented is whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its
caretaker.

The lower court took the view that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code, the owner of an
animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker
of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the
same code. Claiming that the lower court was in error, counsel for plaintiff contends that the article 1905
does not distinguish between damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not
he has been negligent or at fault. For authority counsel cites the following opinion which Manresa quotes
from a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court:

El articulo 1905 del codigo Civil no consienta otra interpretacion que la que, clara y evidentemente, se
deriva de sus terminos literales, bastando, segun el mismo, que un animal cause perjuicio para que nasca
la responsibilidad del dueno, aun no imputandose a este ninguna clase de culpa o negligencia, habida,sin
duda, cuenta por el lgislador de que tal concepto de dueno es suficiente para que arrastre las
consecuencias favorables o adversas de esta clase de propiedad, salvo la exception en el mismo contenida.
(12 Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish CivilCode, 573.)

This opinion, however, appears to have been rendered in a case where an animal caused injury to a
stranger or third person. It is therefore no authority for a case like the present where the person injured
was the caretaker of the animal. The distinction is important. For the statute names
the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the
obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the
one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.

In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his
work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury
or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was
one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.

In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 12, p. 578), the
death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his
establishment was by said tribunal declared to be "a veritable accident of labor" which should come under
the labor laws rather than under article 1905 of the Civil Code. The present action, however, is not
brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there being no allegation that, among other things,
defendant's business, whatever that might be, had a gross income of P20,000. As already stated,
defendant's liability is made to rest on article 1905 of the Civil Code. but action under that article is not
tenable for the reasons already stated. On the other hand, if action is to be based on article 1902 of the
Civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the
animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on those points.

There being no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, but without costs
in view of the financial situation of the appellant.
J.H. CHAPMAN vs. JAMES M. UNDERWOOD, defendant-appellee.

At the time the accident occurred, which is the basis of this action, there was a single-track street-car line
running along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other. One of
these switches was located at the scene of the accident.

The plaintiff had been visiting his friend, a man by the name of Creveling, in front of whose house the
accident happened. He desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Santa Ana and bound
for Manila. Being told by Creveling that the car was approaching, he immediately, and somewhat
hurriedly, passed from the gate into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car
was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the rear flatform. Plaintiff attempted to board the
front platform but, seeing that he could not reached it without extra exertion, stopped beside the car,
facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board. While in this
position he was struck from behind and run over by the defendant's automobile.

The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur, a
competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to Santa Ana being immediately in front of him, he
followed along behind it. Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was following
took the switch — that is, went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main
track. Thereupon the defendant no longer followed that the street car nor went to the left, but either kept
straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the plaintiff intended to
board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going.
When the front of the "San Marcelino" car, the one the plaintiff attempted to board, was almost in front of
the defendant's automobile, defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the
plaintiff, as above described.

The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.

A careful examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's driver was guilty of
negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side.
The plaintiff, in common out to board the car, was not obliged, for his own protection, to observe whether
a car was coming upon him from his left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right.
He knew that, according to the law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left
should pass upon his side of the car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were
the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car.

The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the facts and
circumstances of this case. As we have said in the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the
driver does not fall within the list of persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the
defendant would be responsible.

Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts
were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent act
of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other
vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts,
after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom,
becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to
drive up to Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although
he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly,
for the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of
negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance,
injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the
time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained
of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.

In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the automobile took the wrong
side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an
opportunity to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the interval between
the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be
sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.

Whether or not the owner of an automobile driven by a competent driver, would be responsible, whether
present or not, for the negligent acts of his driver when the automobile was a part of a business enterprise,
and was being driven at the time of the accident in furtherance of the owner's business, we do not now
decide.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
CAEDO v. YU KHE THAI

As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members of his family
were injured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from the defendants. The judgment, rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Rizal on February 26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following disposition:

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay to
plaintiffs Marcial Caedo et al., the sum of P1, 929. 70 for actual damages; P48, 000.00 for moral
damages; P10, 000.00 for exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with costs against the
defendants. The counterclaim of the defendants against the plaintiffs is hereby ordered dismissed, for
lack of merits."

On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an additional award of P3, 705.11 in
favor of the plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us in view of the total amount
of the plaintiffs' claim.

There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was responsible for the accident? and (2)
if it was defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily liable with
him? On the first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo negligent; and on the second, held his
employer solidarily liable with him.

The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E.
de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his
way from his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane
for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite
direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner
from his Parañaque home to Wack Wackfor his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at
fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic - the Mercury at
40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56
kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in
the same direction, was a carretela owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another
horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other
end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.

Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight
meters away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided with two
lights, one on each side, and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary
precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial,
the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must have
been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while.

In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead
of slowing dawn or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in
order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the
rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where
it collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he
slackened his speed, judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac
would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble - beat the Mercury to the point where it
would be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky maneuver
either way, and the risk should have been quite obvious. Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to 35
miles per hour (or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the brakes when
Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of
the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo gave for his
car's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and
wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last
moment by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene show that
the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.

There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that
he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether or not
Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver. The applicable law is Article
2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:

"ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he has been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months."

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle
who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due
diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It was
expressed in Chapman vs. Underwood (1914) 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:

"x x x The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are
continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits
his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself
responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta,
for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a
reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results
produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and
without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person
or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be
continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence,
makes his driver's act his own."
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondeat superior but rather the relationship
of pater familias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
prevent injury or damage.

In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since
1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten
years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for
having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any,
must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain
the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient
time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was
not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early
morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely
on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car
was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he
was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated
his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was
approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no reasonable
opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought
that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man
nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due
diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily
subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional
drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars andinstead hire other persons to drive for
them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of
traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually
encountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission under the aforesaid Article on the part of
a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on
the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of
his negligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of
his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is
concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to
one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a
uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very
inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.

We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarity with Rafael Bernardo, is an error. The
next question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages. The award of P48, 000 by way of
moral damages is itemized as follows:
1. Marcial Caedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
P20,000.00
2. Juana S. Caedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15,000.00
.
3,000.00
3. Ephraim Caedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4,000.00
4. Eileen Caedo . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3,000.00
5. Rose Elaine Caedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 3,000.00
6. Merilyn Caedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .

Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have granted them also actual or
compensatory damages, aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they sustained. Defendants, on the other
hand, maintain that the amounts awarded as moral damages are excessive and should be reduced. We
find no justification for either side. The amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by
reason of their injuries, other than expenses for medical treatment, has not been shown by the
evidence. Actual damages, too be compensable, must be proven. Pain and suffering are not capable of
pecuniary estimation, and constitute a proper ground for granting moral, not actual, damages, as provided
in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.

The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:

"MARCIAL T. CAEDO:

A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions, chest wall, anterior;

B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, 1st to 5th inclusive. Third rib has a double fracture; Subparieto-
pleural hematoma; Basal discatelectasis, lung, right lower lobe, secondary;

C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture, skull.

JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:

(1) frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) knees.

B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal;

C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior, left with displacement.

D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx, right big toe.

E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals, III and V right.

F. Concussion, cerebral.
EPHRAIM CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:

(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital

EILEEN CAEDO:

A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral aspect.

B. Abrasions, multiple:

(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx, middle finger; (2) Knee, anterior, bilateral; (3) shin, lower 1/3.

ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:

(1) upper and lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3) nasobial region; (4) leg, lower third, anterior.

MARILYN CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:

(1) shin, lower 1/3 right;

(2) arm, lower third

B. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right. (See Exhibits D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4
and D-5)"

It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-mentioned injuries, the amounts of
moral damages granted by the trial court are not excessive.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant
Yu Khe Thai free from liability,and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with
costs against the latter.
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS, FILCAR
TRANSPORT, INC., and FORTUNE INSURANCECORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car
company and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented
vehicle?

This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3 o'clock of 21 April 1987, two (2) vehicles, both
Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising northward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City,
figured in a traffic accident. The car bearing Plate No. PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being
driven at the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other
car, with Plate No. PCT 792, owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by
Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other vehicle. Upon approaching the corner
of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of
Soriano.At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver's license.[1]

As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with Soriano,
paid the latter P25,382.20. By way of subrogation,[2] it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well
as respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at his given
address; in fact, upon motion of petitioner, he was dropped from the complaint.

On 30 July 1991 the trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of
subrogation.[3]

On 31 January 1995 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court although based on
another ground, i.e., only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of
respondent FILCAR. [4] In other words, petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for sum of
money based on quasi-delict.

In this appeal, petitioner insists that respondents are liable on the strength of the ruling in MYC-Agro-
Industrial Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo[5] that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages
suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another.

We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding the dismissal of petitioner's
complaint. The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict x x x x"
To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. [6]

We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e.,
fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was
sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of
Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle
that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-
Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR
did not have any participation therein.

Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasi-delict provides:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of
their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains,in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the
part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from theirfailure to exercise due care and
vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. [7] Yet, as correctly observed
by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the
circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR being
engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was
no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be
responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter.
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: "In motor vehicle
mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by
the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune x x x x If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable
because of the absence of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-
Jensen.Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-
delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.

Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a misapprehension of our ruling

therein. In that case, the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by petitioner corporation
caused injuries to several persons and damage to property. Intending to exculpate itself from liability, the
corporation raised the defensethat at the time of the collision it had no more control over the vehicle as it
was leased to another; and, that the driver was not its employee but of the lessee. The trial court was not
persuaded as it found that the true nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing more than a disguise
effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the burdens and responsibilities of an employer. We upheld
this finding and affirmed the declaration of joint and several liability of the corporation with its driver.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 31 January
1995 sustaining the dismissal of petitioner's complaint by the trial court is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.