G.R. No. 110086. July 19, 1999. Paramount Insurance Corporation, Petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Dagupan Electric CORPORATION, Respondents

6/3/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 310
VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 377

Paramount Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 110086. July 19, 1999.
PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DAGUPAN ELECTRIC
CORPORATION, respondents.
Actions; Injunctions; Injunction is an extraordinary remedy

calculated to preserve the status quo of things and to prevent
actual or threatened acts violative of the rules of equity and good
conscience as would consequently afford an injured party a cause
of action resulting from the failure of the law to provide for an
adequate or complete relief.—Injunction is an extraordinary
remedy calculated to preserve the status quo of things and to
prevent actual or threatened acts violative of the rules of equity
and good conscience as would consequently afford an injured
party a cause of action resulting from the failure of the law to
provide for an adequate or complete relief. A preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party
or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or
acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or
acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory
injunction. Its sole purpose is not to correct a wrong of the past, in
the sense of redress for injury already sustained, but to prevent
further injury.
Same; Same; Injunction Bonds; Requisites Before Injunction
Bonds May Be Held Liable for Damages.—In order for the
injunction bond to become answerable for the abovedescribed
damages, the following requisites must concur: The application
for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was
issued; Such application for damages must be filed before the
entry of judgment; and After hearing with notice to the surety.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; What the law abhors is not
the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of
opportunity to ventilate a party’s side.—The records of this case
reveal that during its pendency in the trial court, DECORP filed
its Answer raising compulsory counterclaims for rescission of
contract, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016b1d7b968d7fa4d02d003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
litigation expenses. During the trial, Atty. Nonito Cordero

appeared as counsel
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
378
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

for petitioner. PARAMOUNT as well as the other sureties were

properly notified of the hearing and given their day in court.
Specifically, notice was sent to Atty. Cordero of the hearing on
April 27, 1985, which was set for the purpose of determining the
liability of the sureties. The counterclaims for damages of
DECORP were proven at the trial and yet PARAMOUNT did not
exert any effort to controvert the evidence presented by DECORP.
Given these circumstances, PARAMOUNT cannot hide under the
cloak of nonliability on its injunction bond on the mere
expediency that it was deprived of due process. It bears stressing
that what the law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but
rather the absolute lack of opportunity to ventilate a party’s side.
In other words, petitioner cannot successfully invoke denial of due
process where it was given the chance to be heard.
Same; Same; Same; It is neither mandatory nor fatal that
there should be a separate hearing in order that damages upon the
bond can be claimed, ascertained and awarded.—Contrary to
petitioner’s thesis, it is neither mandatory nor fatal that there
should be a separate hearing in order that damages upon the bond
can be claimed, ascertained and awarded, as can be gleaned from
a cursory reading of the provisions of Rule 57, Section 20. This
Court agrees with the appellate court’s ruling that:
“Jurisprudential findings laid down the doctrine that a final
adjudication that the applicant is not entitled to the injunction
does not suffice to make the surety liable. It is necessary, in
addition, that the surety be accorded due process, that is, that it
be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of its solidary
liability for damages arising from a wrongful injunction order.
Withal, the fact that the matter of damages was among the issues
tried during the hearings on the merits will not render
unnecessary or superfluous a summary hearing to determine the
extent of a surety’s liability unless of course, the surety had been
impleaded as a party, or otherwise earlier notified and given
opportunity to be present and ventilate its side on the matter
during the trial. Same; Same; Same; The injunction bond is
intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided that
the injunction ought not to have been granted.—PARAMOUNT
also argues that assuming it is liable on its injunction bond, its
liability should be limited only to the amount of damages accruing
from the time the injunction bond was issued until the
termination of the case, and not from the time the suit was
commenced. In short, it claims that the injunction
379
VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 379

bond is prospective and not retroactive in application. This Court

does not agree. Rule 58, Section 4(b), provides that a bond is
executed in favor of the party enjoined to answer for all damages
which he may sustain by reason of the injunction. This Court
already had occasion to rule on this matter in Mendoza v. Cruz,
where it held that “(t)he injunction bond is intended as a security
for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought
not to have been granted. It is designed to cover all damages
which the party enjoined can possibly suffer. Its principal purpose
is to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason
of an injunction.” No distinction was made as to when the
damages should have been incurred.
Same; Same; Same; Damages; The injunction bond answers
for any and all damages arising from the injunction, regardless of
whether it was sustained before or after the filing of the injunction
bond.—It bears stressing that McADORE was found liable to pay
actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and costs of the suit. To argue therefore that PARAMOUNT
is only liable on its injunction bond from the time of its issuance
and not from the time the suit was commenced is preposterous if
not absurd. Indeed, it would be impossible to determine the
reckoning point when moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and costs of the suit were supposed to have been
incurred. Consequently, it can be safely deduced that the bond
answers for any and all damages arising from the injunction,
regardless of whether it was sustained before or after the filing of
the injunction bond.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The company that issues the
injunction bond is liable, jointly and severally, for actual damages,
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
the suit, to the extent of the amount of the bond.—PARAMOUNT
further maintains that it is liable to pay actual damages only.
However, Rule 58, Section 4(b), clearly provides that the
injunction bond is answerable for all damages. “The bond insures
with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain no
ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be
dissolved. Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to
account to the defendant in the injunction suit for all: (1) such
damages; (2) costs and damages; (3) costs, damages and
reasonable attorney’s fees as shall be incurred or sustained by the
person enjoined in case it is determined that the injunction was
wrongfully issued.” Thus, PARAMOUNT is liable, jointly and

severally, for actual damages, moral damages, exemplary
380

damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit, to the extent of the
amount of the bond.
Same; Same; Same; Suretyships; By the contract of
suretyship, it is not for the obligee to see to it that the principal
pays the debt or fulfills the contract, but for the surety to see to it
that the principal pay or perform.—It may not be amiss to point
out that by the contract of suretyship, it is not for the obligee to
see to it that the principal pays the debt or fulfills the contract,
but for the surety to see to it that the principal pay or perform.
The purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant
against loss or damage by reason of the injunction in case the
court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and
the bond is usually conditioned accordingly. Thus, the bondsmen
are obligated to account to the defendant in the injunction suit for
all damages, or costs and reasonable counsel’s fees, incurred or
sustained by the latter in case it is determined that the injunction
was wrongfully issued.
Same; Same; Same; The posting of a bond in connection with
a preliminary injunction (or attachment under Rule 57, or
receivership under Rule 59, or seizure or delivery of personal
property under Rule 60) does not operate to relieve the party
obtaining an injunction from any and all responsibility for the
damages that the writ may thereby cause.—The posting of a bond
in connection with a preliminary injunction (or attachment under
Rule 57, or receivership under Rule 59, or seizure or delivery of
personal property under Rule 60) does not operate to relieve the
party obtaining an injunction from any and all responsibility for
the damages that the writ may thereby cause. It merely gives
additional protection to the party against whom the injunction is
directed. It gives the latter a right of recourse against either the
applicant or his surety, or against both. In the same manner,
when petitioner PARAMOUNT issued the bond in favor of its
principal, it undertook to assume all the damages that may be
suffered after finding that the principal is not entitled to the relief
being sought.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Soo, Gutierrez, Leogardo & Lee for petitioner.
381
VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 381

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private

respondent.
YNARESSANTIAGO, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
30, 1993 in CAG.R. CV No. 11970 which dismissed
petitioner Paramount Insurance Corporation’s
(PARAMOUNT) appeal, thereby affirming the decision of
the court a quo finding petitioner liable on its injunction
bond.
McAdore Finance and Investment, Inc. (McADORE) was
the owner and operator of the McAdore International
Palace Hotel in Dagupan City. Private respondent
Dagupan Electric Corporation (DECORP), on the other
hand, was the grantee of a franchise to operate and
maintain electric services in the province of Pangasinan,
including Dagupan City.
On February 2, 1978, McADORE and DECORP entered
into a contract whereby DECORP shall provide electric
power to McADORE’s Hotel. During the term of their
contract for power service, DECORP noticed discrepancies
between the actual monthly billings and the estimated
monthly billings of McADORE. Upon inspection, it was
discovered that the terminal in the transformers connected
to the meter had been interchanged resulting in the slow
rotation of the meter. Consequently, DECORP issued a
corrected bill but McADORE refused to pay. As a result of
McADORE’s failure and continued refusal to pay the
corrected electric bills, DECORP disconnected power
supply to the hotel on November 27, 1978.
Aggrieved, McADORE commenced a suit against
DECORP for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. McADORE posted injunction bonds from
several sureties, one of which was herein petitioner
PARAMOUNT, which issued an injunction bond on July 7,
1980 with a face amount of P500,000.00. Accordingly, a
writ of preliminary injunction was issued wherein
DECORP was ordered to continue supplying electric power
to the hotel and restrained from further disconnecting it.
382


After due hearing, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 106, rendered judgment in favor of DECORP,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, there being preponderance of evidence, the

court hereby dismisses the amended complaint. Further, the court
rescinds the service contract between the parties, and orders
McAdore to pay Decorp the following:
1. Actual damages consisting of total arrearages for electric

services rendered from February 1978 to January 1983, in
the sum of P3,834,489.62, plus interest at the legal rate,
computed from the date of demand until full payment;
2. Moral damages in the sum of P600,000.00;
3. Exemplary damages in the sum of P400,000.00;
4. Attorney’s fees in the sum of P100,000.00; and
5. Costs of the suit.
“While this case was under litigation, the court issued a

number of restraining orders or injunctions. During these
incidents, McAdore filed the following bonds: Policy No. 8022709
by Paramount Insurance Corporation for P500,000.00; No. 00007
and No. 00008 by Sentinel Insurance Company, Inc. for
P100,000.00 and P50,000.00; and No. 1213 by the Travelers
MultiIndemnity Corporation for P225,000.00.
“Pursuant to the dispositive portion of this decision, the court
holds that these bonding companies are jointly and severally
liable with McAdore, to the extent of the value of their bonds, to
pay the damages adjudged to Decorp.
“Send this decision to: plaintiff’s counsel Atty. Pagapong;
defendant’s counsel Atty. Vera Cruz; and to each of the
1
bondsman. “It is so ordered.”

McADORE did not appeal the above decision.
PARAMOUNT, however, appealed to the Court of Appeals
assigning the following errors, to wit:
_______________
1 Decision, Rollo, p. 48.
383
VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 383

I. APPELLANT SURETY WAS NOT GRANTED DUE

PROCESS NOR GIVEN ITS DAY IN COURT.
II. APPELLANT’S SURETY BOND, BEING AN

INJUNCTION OR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER BOND, THE MANDATORY PROCEDURE
IN SEC. 20, RULE 57, IN RELATION TO SEC. 9,
RULE 58, RULES OF COURT WAS NOT
OBSERVED IN THIS CASE.
III. NO EVIDENCE NOR PROOF HAD BEEN
PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT HEREIN
APPELLANT SURETY BOND SHOULD BE HELD
LIABLE FOR TOTAL DAMAGES AS2 ADJUDGED
IN THE CHALLENGED DECISION.”

In essence, PARAMOUNT contended that it was not
given its day in court because it was not notified by
DECORP of its intention to present evidence of damages
against its injunction bond, as mandated by Sec. 9 of Rule
58, in relation to Sec. 20 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
The Court of Appeals was not convinced with
petitioner’s contentions. On April 30, 1993, it affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
In the instant petition, PARAMOUNT seeks to reverse
and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals on the
following assignment of errors:
“FIRSTLY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

IN RULING THAT NOTICE TO PETITIONER AND ITS
PRESENCE THROUGH COUNSEL IN ONE HEARING WHERE
NO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DAMAGES
GUARANTEED BY PETITIONER’S BOND RENDERS THE
NEED FOR ANOTHER HEARING ON THAT MATTER A
SUPERFLUITY.
“SECONDLY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A
QUO THAT PETITIONER IS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE WITH McADORE TO THE EXTENT OF ITS BOND,
WHICH DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
3
EVIDENCE.”
_______________
2 CA Rollo, p. 75.
3 Petition, Rollo, p. 14.
384

PARAMOUNT asserts that “(t)he bone of contention in

the instant case is the matter of evidence (or lack thereof)
presented by private respondent during the hearing of the
case a quo, notice (or lack thereof) to the surety relative to
the proceedings before the court a quo during which said
evidence was4 presented, as well as the actual proceedings
themselves.” PARAMOUNT further asseverates that “no
evidence relative to damages suffered by private
respondent as a result of the injunction was ever presented,
or that if any such evidence was presented, the same was
done without notice 5to petitioner and in violation of its
right to due process.” Moreover, petitioner maintains that
the injunction bond was issued and approved sometime in
April 1980 to guarantee “actual and material damages as
may be sustained and duly proved by private respondent.”
Thus, it can only cover the period prospectively from the
date of its issuance and does not retroact to the date of the
initial controversy.
In its Comment, DECORP claims that PARAMOUNT
participated in the proceedings and was given its day in
court. This is evidenced by the “Notice of Hearing” dated
February 26, 1985 addressed to the three sureties. In fact,
at the hearing on March 22, 1985, PARAMOUNT was in
attendance represented by Atty. Nonito Q. Cordero.
Likewise, PARAMOUNT was notified of the next hearing
scheduled for April 26, 1985. DECORP further stressed
that the hearing on April 26, 1985 proceeded as scheduled
without any comment, objection, opposition or reservation
from PARAMOUNT.
The core issue to be resolved here is whether or not
petitioner Paramount Insurance Corporation was denied
due process when the trial court found the injunction bond
it issued in favor of McADORE liable to DECORP. Stated
otherwise, was there sufficient evidence to establish the
liability of the petitioner on its injunction bond?
The petition is devoid of merit.
_______________
4 Id., p. 11.
5 Id., p. 12.
385
VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 385


Petitioner’s submissions necessitates going into the
nature of an injunction as well as over the procedure in
claiming, ascertaining and awarding damages upon the

injunction bond.
Injunction is an extraordinary remedy calculated to
preserve the status quo of things and to prevent actual or
threatened acts violative of the rules of equity and good
conscience as would consequently afford an injured party a
cause of action resulting from the failure6 of the law to
provide for an adequate or complete relief. A preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a
party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It may also require the performance
of a particular act or acts, in which case7
it shall be known
as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Its sole purpose is
not to correct a wrong of the past, in the sense of redress 8
for injury already sustained, but to prevent further injury.
A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
may be granted only when, among others, the applicant,
unless exempted by the court, files with the court where
the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the
party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the
court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or
person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
injunction or temporary restraining order if the court
should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled
thereto. Upon approval of the requisite 9
bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction shall be issued. At the trial, the
amount of damages to be awarded to either party, upon the
bond of the adverse party, shall be
_______________
6 Laureta, Wenceslao G., Comments and Jurisprudence of Injunction, p.

1, [1989].
7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58, Sec. 1.
8 Laureta, op. cit., note 10, at 6, citing Tree v. Larson, 84 Iowa 649, 54
NW 179, 35 Am S.R. 336.
9 Sec. 4(b), Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
386

claimed, ascertained, and awarded under 10

the same
procedure prescribed in Section 20 of Rule 57.
Rule 57, Section 20, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which is similarly applicable to preliminary injunction,
pertinently provides:
“Sec. 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular

or excessive attachment.—An application for damages on account
of improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed

before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the
judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching
obligee or his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing
his right to damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may
be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the
judgment on the main case.
“If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party
against whom the attachment was issued, he must claim damages
sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an
application in the appellate court with notice to the party in
whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties,
before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The
appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided
by the trial court.
“Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against
whom the attachment was issued from recovering in the same
action the damages awarded to him from any property of the
attaching obligee not exempt from execution should the bond or
deposit given by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the
award.” (mutatis mutandis)

The above rule comes into play when the plaintiff
applicant for injunction fails to sustain his action, and the
defendant is thereby granted the right to proceed against
the bond posted by the former. In the case at bench, the
trial court dismissed McADORE’s action for damages with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and eventually
adjudged the payment of actual, moral, and exemplary
damages against plaintiffapplicant. Consequently, private
respondent DECORP can
_______________
10 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58, Sec. 8.
387
VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 387

proceed against the injunction bond posted by

plaintiffapplicant to recover the damages occasioned by the
issuance by the trial court of the writ of injunction.
In order for the injunction bond to become answerable
for the abovedescribed
11
damages, the following requisites
must concur:
1. The application for damages must be filed in the

same case where the bond was issued;
2. Such application for damages must be filed before

the entry of judgment; and
3. After hearing with notice to the surety.

The records of this case reveal that during its pendency
in the trial court, DECORP filed its Answer raising
compulsory counterclaims for rescission of contract, moral
damages, 12exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.13 During the trial, Atty. Nonito Cordero
appeared as counsel for petitioner. PARAMOUNT as well
as the other sureties were properly notified of the hearing
and given their day in court. Specifically, notice was sent to
Atty. Cordero of the hearing on April 27, 1985, which was
set for the purpose of determining the liability of the
sureties. The counterclaims for damages of DECORP were
proven at the trial and yet PARAMOUNT did not exert any
effort to controvert the evidence presented by DECORP.
Given these circumstances, PARAMOUNT cannot hide
under the cloak of nonliability on its injunction bond on
the mere expediency that it was deprived of due process. It
bears stressing that what the law abhors is not the absence
of previous notice but rather the 14absolute lack of
opportunity to ventilate a party’s side. In other words,
petitioner cannot successfully invoke denial of
_______________
11 Jao, et al. v. Royal Financing Corp., et al., No. L16716, April 28,
1962, 4 SCRA 1210.
12 RTC Decision, Rollo, pp. 4647.
13 TSN, March 22, 1985, p. 2.
14 Rava Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 144.
388

due process where it was given the chance to be heard. As

aptly held by the Court of Appeals, viz.:
“The records of the case disclose that during the trial of the
case, PARAMOUNT was present and represented by its counsel
Atty. Nonito Q. Cordero as shown in the trial court’s order dated
March 22, 1985 (Annex “A” of Appellee’s Brief). In the said order,
PARAMOUNT was duly notified of the next hearing which was
scheduled on April 26, 1985. Evidently, PARAMOUNT was
wellapprised of the next hearing and it cannot feign lack of notice.
Having been given an opportunity to be heard during the main
hearing for the matter of damages, PARAMOUNT therefore,
cannot bewail that it was not given an opportunity to be heard

upon denial of its motion to cancel its injunction bond. Of what
use, therefore, is there to conduct another hearing when the issue
of damages has been the subject of the main action of which
PARAMOUNT had been duly notified? A new notice and hearing
prescribed by Sec. 20, Rule 57, is therefore a repetition and a
superfluity.
“Moreover, PARAMOUNT has only itself to blame when it did
not make any opposition or objection during the hearing for the
reception of DECORP’s evidence. Having manifested its desire to
cancel its bond, it should have asked for a deferment of hearing on
DECORP’s evidence but PARAMOUNT did not do anything of
this sort. Only when an adverse judgment was rendered by the
trial court against its principal McAdore did it whimper a denial
15
of procedural due process.”

On the same point, PARAMOUNT argues that contrary
to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, there is a need for a
separate hearing for the purpose of presenting evidence on
the alleged damages claimed by DECORP on petitioner’s
injunction bond. PARAMOUNT contends that a separate
hearing is needed as no evidence dealing with DECORP’s
claim for damages on petitioner’s bond was presented
during the hearing wherein petitioner’s counsel attended
nor in the next hearing
_______________
15 Decision penned by Associate Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos and

concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente V. Mendoza (now Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court) and Jorge Imperial, Rollo, pp. 2829.
389
VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 389

wherein petitioner was notified but failed to attend. Since

no hearing was held for the purpose of establishing its
liability on the injunction bond, PARAMOUNT concludes
that it is released from its obligation as surety.
Contrary to petitioner’s thesis, it is neither mandatory
nor fatal that there should be a separate hearing in order
that damages upon the bond can be claimed, ascertained
and awarded, as can be gleaned from a cursory reading of
the provisions of Rule 57, Section 20. This Court agrees
with the appellate court’s ruling that:
“Jurisprudential findings laid down the doctrine that a final

adjudication that the applicant is not entitled to the injunction
does not suffice to make the surety liable. It is necessary, in
addition, that the surety be accorded due process, that is, that it
be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of its solidary
liability for damages arising from a wrongful injunction order.
Withal, the fact that the matter of damages was among the issues
tried during the hearings on the merits will not render
unnecessary or superfluous a summary hearing to determine the
extent of a surety’s liability unless of course, the surety had been
impleaded as a party, or otherwise earlier notified and given
opportunity to be present and ventilate its side on the matter
during the trial.
“The exception under the doctrinal ruling abovenoted is extant
16
in the case at bar.”

What is necessary only is for the attaching party and his
surety or sureties to be duly notified and given the
opportunity to be heard. In the case at bench, this Court
accords due respect to the factual finding of the Court of
Appeals that “PARAMOUNT was present and represented
by its counsel Atty. Nonito Q. Cordero as 17 shown in the trial
court’s order dated March 22, 1985 x x x.”
As stated, PARAMOUNT also argues that assuming it is
liable on its injunction bond, its liability should be limited
only
_______________
16 Rollo, p. 28; citing Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. v. Court of

Appeals, 179 SCRA 468.
17 Id.
390

to the amount of damages accruing from the time the

injunction bond was issued until the termination of the
case, and not from the time the suit was commenced. In
short, it claims that the injunction bond is prospective and
not retroactive in application.
This Court does not agree. Rule 58, Section 4(b),
provides that a bond is executed in favor of the party
enjoined to answer for all damages which he may sustain
by reason of the injunction. This Court already 18
had
occasion to rule on this matter in Mendoza v. Cruz, where
it held that “(t)he injunction bond is intended as a security
for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction
ought not to have been granted. It is designed to cover all
damages which the party enjoined can possibly suffer. Its
principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party against
loss or damage by reason of an injunction.” No distinction
was made as to when the damages should have been

incurred.
Moreover, when petitioner issued its injunction bond in
favor of DECORP, it was done with the full knowledge of
the relevant facts obtaining in the controversy between
DECORP and McADORE. At the time the injunction bond
was issued, DECORP was already claiming arrears in
electric bills and damages from McADORE.
It bears stressing that McADORE was found liable to
pay actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and costs of the suit. To argue therefore that
PARAMOUNT is only liable on its injunction bond from the
time of its issuance and not from the time the suit was
commenced is preposterous if not absurd. Indeed, it would
be impossible to determine the reckoning point when moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
the suit were supposed to have been incurred.
Consequently, it can be safely deduced that the bond
answers for any and all damages arising from the
injunction, regardless of whether it was sustained before or
after the filing of the injunction bond.
_______________
18 94 SCRA 821, at 826 [1979]; italics provided.
391
VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 391


PARAMOUNT further 19
maintains that it is liable to pay
actual damages only. However, Rule 58, Section 4(b),
clearly provides that the injunction bond is answerable for
all damages. “The bond insures with all practicable
certainty that the defendant may sustain no ultimate loss
in the event that the injunction could finally be dissolved.
Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to
account to the defendant in the injunction suit for all: (1)
such damages; (2) costs and damages; (3) costs, damages
and reasonable attorney’s fees as shall be incurred or
sustained by the person enjoined in case it is determined
20
that the injunction was wrongfully issued.” Thus,
PARAMOUNT is liable, jointly and severally, for actual
damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and costs of the suit, to the extent of the amount of the
bond.
Be that 21as it may, a scrutiny of petitioner’s Indemnity
Agreement with McADORE shows that the former agreed
“to become surety” for the stated amount “in favor of
Dagupan Electric Corp.” It should be noted that 22McADORE

was already in arrears starting from June 1979 up to the
time it entered into an Indemnity Agreement with
PARAMOUNT on July 17, 1980.
It may not be amiss to point out that by the contract of
suretyship, it is not for the obligee to see to it that the
principal pays the debt or fulfills the contract, but for
23
the
surety to see to it that the principal pay or perform. The
purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant
against loss or damage by reason of the injunction in case
the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled
to it, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly. Thus,
the bondsmen are obligated to account to the defendant in
the injunction suit for all damages, or costs and reasonable
counsel’s fees, incurred
_______________
19 Rollo, p. 10.
20 Laureta, op. cit., note 10, at 133134.
21 Rollo, p. 41.
22 Decision, p. 7, p. 41, Rollo.
23 50 Am. Jur 904; Judge Advocate General v. CA and Alto Surety Co.,
L10671, October 23, 1958.
392

or sustained by the latter in case24it is determined that the

injunction was wrongfully issued.
The posting of a bond in connection with a preliminary
injunction (or attachment under Rule 57, or receivership
under Rule 59, or seizure or delivery of personal property
under Rule 60) does not operate to relieve the party
obtaining an injunction from any and all responsibility for
the damages that the writ may thereby cause. It merely
gives additional protection to the party against whom the
injunction is directed. It gives the latter a right of recourse
25
against either the applicant or his surety, or against both.
In the same manner, when petitioner PARAMOUNT issued
the bond in favor of its principal, it undertook to assume all
the damages that may be suffered after finding that the
principal is not entitled to the relief being sought.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant
petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 30, 1993 in CAG.R. CV No. 11970 is
AFFIRMED. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Melo, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ.,

concur.
Petition denied; Reviewed decision affirmed.
Note.—The injunction bond answers only for damages

which may be sustained by the party against whom the
injunction is issued, by reason of the issuance thereof, and
not to answer for damages caused by actuations of plaintiff,
which may or may not be related at all to the
implementation of the injunction. (Valencia vs. Court of
Appeals, 263 SCRA 275 [1996])
——o0o——
_______________
24 Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111401, 263 SCRA 275 (1996).
25 Ponce Enrile v. Capulong, G.R. No. 88373, 185 SCRA 504 (1990).
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G.R. No. 110086. July 19, 1999. Paramount Insurance Corporation, Petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Dagupan Electric CORPORATION, Respondents

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G.R. No. 110086. July 19, 1999. Paramount Insurance Corporation, Petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Dagupan Electric CORPORATION, Respondents

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6/3/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 310

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 377

PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

Actions; Injunctions; Injunction is an extraordinary remedy

litigation expenses. During the trial, Atty. Nonito Cordero

378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

for petitioner. PARAMOUNT as well as the other sureties were

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 379

bond is prospective and not retroactive in application. This Court

wrongfully issued.” Thus, PARAMOUNT is liable, jointly and

380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 381

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private

382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“WHEREFORE, there being preponderance of evidence, the

1. Actual damages consisting of total arrearages for electric

“While this case was under litigation, the court issued a

1 Decision, Rollo, p. 48.

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 383

I. APPELLANT SURETY WAS NOT GRANTED DUE

II. APPELLANT’S SURETY BOND, BEING AN

“FIRSTLY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PARAMOUNT asserts that “(t)he bone of contention in

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 385

claiming, ascertaining and awarding damages upon the

6 Laureta, Wenceslao G., Comments and Jurisprudence of Injunction, p.

386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

claimed, ascertained, and awarded under 10

“Sec. 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular

of improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed

10 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58, Sec. 8.

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 387

proceed against the injunction bond posted by

1. The application for damages must be filed in the

2. Such application for damages must be filed before

388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

due process where it was given the chance to be heard. As

cannot bewail that it was not given an opportunity to be heard

15 Decision penned by Associate Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos and

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 389

wherein petitioner was notified but failed to attend. Since

“Jurisprudential findings laid down the doctrine that a final

16 Rollo, p. 28; citing Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. v. Court of

390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

to the amount of damages accruing from the time the

was made as to when the damages should have been

18 94 SCRA 821, at 826 [1979]; italics provided.

VOL. 310, JULY 19, 1999 391

Dagupan Electric Corp.” It should be noted that 22McADORE

392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

or sustained by the latter in case24it is determined that the

Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Melo, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ.,

Petition denied; Reviewed decision affirmed.

Note.—The injunction bond answers only for damages

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