3.
Writ of Habeas Data
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party.
SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a
petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the
petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the
aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children
and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default
of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
or
SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the
Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent
resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place
where the data or information is gathered, collected or
stored, at the option of the petitioner.
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the
action concerns public data files of government offices.
SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the
writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge
thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Court of Appeals or the
Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be returnable
before such court or any justice thereof, or to any
Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the
place where the data or information is gathered, collected
or stored.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices,
it may be returnable before such Court or any justice
thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the
Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any Regional
Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent
resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place
where the data or information is gathered, collected or
stored.
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The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in
the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees
shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The petition
of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon
immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission
of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from
the filing of the petition.
SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ
of habeas data should contain:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner
and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or
databases, the government office, and the person
in charge, in possession or in control of the data
or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the
updating, rectification, suppression or destruction
of the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a
prayer for an order enjoining the act complained
of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and
equitable.
SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the
petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order
the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The
clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the
court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from
the issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice
or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand,
and may deputize any officer or person serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary
hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten
(10) work days from the date of its issuance.
SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the
Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after
its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve
the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge
for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary
actions.
SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be
served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by a
person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall
retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case
the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent,
the rules on substituted service shall apply.
SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a
verified written return together with supporting affidavits
within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which
period may be reasonably extended by the Court for
justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things,
contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security,
state secrets, privileged communications,
confidentiality of the source of information of
media and others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession
or in control of the data or information subject of
the petition;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information
about the petitioner, the nature of such
data or information, and the purpose for
its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the
respondent to ensure the security and
confidentiality of the data or information;
and,
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data
or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of
the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not
be allowed.
SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may
punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent who
commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to
make a return; or any person who otherwise disobeys or
resist a lawful process or order of the court.
SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. -
A hearing in chambers may be conducted where the
respondent invokes the defense that the release of the
data or information in question shall compromise national
security or state secrets, or when the data or information
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cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or
privileged character.
Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The
following pleadings and motions are prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return,
opposition, affidavit, position paper and other
pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory
orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
against any interlocutory order.
SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to
file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to
hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such
relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its
discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.
SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the
petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or
judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the
issues and determine the possibility of obtaining
stipulations and admissions from the parties.
SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment
within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted
for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act
complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or
rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant
other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable;
otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the
sheriff or any lawful officers as may be designated by the
court, justice or judge within five (5) working days.
SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed
the final judgment shall, within three (3) days from its
enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The
return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings
under the writ and a complete inventory of the database
or information, or documents and articles inspected,
updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the
petitioner and the respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was
enforced and complied with by the respondent, as well as
all objections of the parties regarding the manner and
regularity of the service of the writ.
SEC. 18. Hearing on Officer’s Return. - The court shall
set the return for hearing with due notice to the parties
and act accordingly.
SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final
judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from
the date of notice of the judgment or final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas
corpus and amparo cases.
SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of
a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the
filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.
SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed
subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter
shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed
subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the
petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall
continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the
petition.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When
a criminal action has been commenced, no separate
petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ
shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the
criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the
disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas
data.
SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of
Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily
insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on
February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation.
a.) Nature and Purpose
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual,
and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. (Manila Electric Co. v. Lim,
G.R. No. 184769, 5 October 2010)
It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends. (Roxas v. Arroyo, G.R.
No. 189155, 7 September 2010)
It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty
or security on the other. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No.
193636, 24 July 2012)
Essentially, habeas data allows families of victims of
enforced disappearance to petition the courts to compel
government and security officials to allow access to
documents about the missing person
b.) Coverage/ Grounds
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least
substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an
alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person.
c.) Proceedings under AM No. 08-1-16-SC
Vivares v. St. Theresa's College (G.R. No. 202666,
September 29, 2014)
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Facts: A group of graduating high school students of St.
Theresa's College (STC) while changing into their
swimsuits during a beach outing took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded on one of the students
Facebook profile.
Back at the school, a computer teacher at STC’s high
school department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres.
The teacher then asked her students if they knew who the
girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified them.
Using STC’s computers, the teachers students logged in
to their respective personal Facebook accounts and
showed her photos of the identified students, which
include them: (a) Drinking hard liquor and smoking
cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Along the streets of Cebu
wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety
of their black brassieres. What is more, the teachers
students claimed that there were times when access to or
the availability of the identified students’ photos was not
confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact,
viewable by any Facebook user.
Upon discovery, the teacher reported the matter and,
through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the
photos to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate
action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found
the identified students to have deported themselves in a
manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook.
As punishment, STC enjoined the group of graduating
students from joining the commencement exercises.
The parents of the group of students filed an action for
violation of the right to privacy and the issuance of a writ
of habeas data.
ISSUE:
whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued
given the factual milieu.
whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security
of the minors involved in this case.
HELD:
(a) THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IS NOT ONLY
CONFINED TO CASES OF EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS
AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE- Habeas data, to
stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom
from abuse in the information age." As such, it is
erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to
the Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of
Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed
out that:
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The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an
independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy,
more specifically the right to informational privacy. The
remedies against the violation of such right can include
the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of
the database or information or files in possession or in
control of respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases
outside of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
(b) MEANING OF "ENGAGED" IN THE GATHERING,
COLLECTING OR STORING OF DATA OR
INFORMATION - The provision, when taken in its proper
context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that
habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or
omissions of public officials and of private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data
about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a
business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take
part in something." It does not necessarily mean that the
activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What
matters is that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one
pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal
endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at
all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from
getting to said person or entity.
(c) PRIVACY ON FACEBOOK - To address concerns
about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed
to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as
information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South
Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to
"customize their privacy settings," but did so with this
caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it
makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these
privacy settings are not foolproof."
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or
her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this
case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to
keep certain posts private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.
And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through
the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words,
utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in
cyberworld, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a
privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or
profile detail should not be denied the informational
privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice.
Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless
exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo
or any personal information to his or her Facebook page
and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so
that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo
would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user
never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility.
Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy
tools of their function but it would also disregard the very
intention of the user to keep said photo or information
within the confines of his or her private space.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts
is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in
question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent
any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they
cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US
v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:
"person who places a photograph on the Internet
precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances
such as here, where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself."
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more
open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one
can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at
large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of
privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not
necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or
profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it
can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content. The
user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag
his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends
or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or
when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends
of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can
view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at
"Friends."
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in
question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor
students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to
affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the
minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the
records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare
assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings
to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few.
Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of
this case within the ambit of their protected zone of
privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
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expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in
question.
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted
were limited to the original uploader, through the "Me
Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has
been screened to limit access to a select few, through the
"Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for
in such instances, the intention to limit access to the
particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public
at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more
manifest and palpable.
(d) CYBER RESPONSIBILITY - It has been said that "the
best filter is the one between your children’s ears." This
means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and
internet consumers in general is the best means of
avoiding privacy rights violations. As a cyberspace
community member, one has to be proactive in protecting
his or her own privacy. It is in this regard that many OSN
users, especially minors, fail. Responsible social
networking or observance of the "netiquettes" on the part
of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the
widespread notion that teenagers can sometimes go too
far since they generally lack the people skills or general
wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due
diligence in their online dealings and activities and must
not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves
the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here,
requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in
safeguarding a right which they allege to have been
violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford
protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to
place the matter within the confines of their private zone.
OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of
privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the
information private, and to keep track of changes in the
available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook,
especially because Facebook is notorious for changing
these settings and the site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not
violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the
court a quo.
MERALCO vs Lim G.R. No. 184769 Writ of Habeas Data
JULY 5, 2018
FACTS: Respondent Cherry Lim works as an
administrative clerk at MERALCO. The HR directed the
transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in
Muntinlupa due to reports that there were accusations
and threats directed against her from unknown
individuals, which could possibly compromise her safety
and security. Lim appealed her transfer and requested for
a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and
misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature
of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing
the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to
Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions
on job security of their CBA, respondent expressed her
thoughts on the alleged threats to her security. Lim filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
petitioners claiming petitioners’ unlawful act and omission
consisting of the latter failing to inform her of the cause of
her transfer amounting to a violation of her right to privacy
in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data.
Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ
commanding petitioners to file a written return containing
the following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about
respondent in relation to the report purportedly received
by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and
security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its
collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the
confidentiality of such data or information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information
obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO
enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer.
The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing
petitioners to desist from implementing respondents
transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the
disclosures required. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Writ of Habeas Data is the
proper remedy.
RULING: The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with
MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to
the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for
information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners,
does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
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The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect
by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual.
It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the
truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty
and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas
data was conceived as a response, given the lack of
effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under prevailing
Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down
in Tapuz v. del Rosario that the writs of amparo
and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property
or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment constitutes a property right under the context
of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident
that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her
transfer – a legitimate concern respecting the terms and
conditions of ones employment – are what prompted her
to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data.
Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by
law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts
presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or
unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-
vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that
petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports
allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety
amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats
and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-
quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly
suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed
at all. And she even suspects that her transfer to another
place of work betray[s] the real intent of management] and
could be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Second
Generation)
A. Right to Development
Right of the development has been defined as “an
alienable human right by virtue of which every human
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in,
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and
political development, in which all human rights and
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.”
It also concerns the integrity of human rights as a legal
order by itself. The goal of the world economies is to fulfill
this human right of their people. Development is not only
economic prosperity but social, political and cultural
empowerment as well.
The Philippines need economic development in areas of
social reform, economic, agriculture, agrarian reform and
natural resources, infrastructure development,
governance and development financing. If people are
empowered, then the economic goals and objective for
growth and economic improvement would be achieved
since participation would be devolved down to the lowest
level of society.
B. Rights of Workers
Article 23 UDHR
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work
and to protection against unemployment.
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to
equal pay for equal work.
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and
favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his
family an existence worthy of human dignity, and
supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social
protection.
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions
for the protection of his interests.
Article 6 ICESCR
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to
the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely
chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to
safeguard this right.
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall
include technical and vocational guidance and training
programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady
economic, social and cultural development and full and
productive employment under conditions safeguarding
fundamental political and economic freedoms to the
individual.
Article 7 ICERSR
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable
conditions of work which ensure, in particular:
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(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a
minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal
value without distinction of any kind, in particular women
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in
accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant;
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his
employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no
considerations other than those of seniority and
competence;
(d ) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working
hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as
remuneration for public holidays
1.) Right to Work under Decent Living Condition
Basic fundamental in securing the economic well-being of
a person in his right to work with fair wages and under
decent working conditions. The covenant on economic,
social and cultural rights obligates states parties “to
recognize the right to work which includes the right of
everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work
which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take
appropriate steps to safeguard tis right. “
This right to work necessarily includes the right tp a
decent living wage, decent working conditions and
freedom of choice of work, freedom from discrimination
and the right to form trade unions. It includes the right to
fair wages, equal pay for equal work, a living wage and
adequate leisure time.
The Philippine Constitution declares that the State shall
afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all.
2.) Right to Self-Organization
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of
their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to
any obligations arising out of international economic co-
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of
its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including
those having responsibility for the administration of Non-
Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the
realization of the right of self-determination, and shall
respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Elegance v. CIR
Facts:
 Private respondents were employees of
petitioner Elegance, Inc. and members of the
PES Labor Association.
 A certification election was conducted in the
company between PES and Elegance
Employees and Workers Union. The latter won.
 Elegance Employees and Workers Union entered
into a CBA with Elegance Inc containing a
provision for a union-shop agreement:
"SEC. 3. — The COMPANY
agrees to a UNIONSHIP; All present
employees and workers in the bargaining
unit who are not now members of the
Union, must become members within
thirty (30) days after the signing of this
agreement as a condition of continued
employment, with the exception of
supervisors. If any dispute arises as to
whether an employee or worker is a
member of the UNION of good standing,
this dispute shall be disposed of as
grievance in the manner herein
provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
 Subsequently, in a letter dated April 5, 1960, the
contracting union demanded from the
management to dismiss from work the 14
complainants herein allegedly for failure to
affiliate themselves with the union within the
period provided for in the union-shop provision of
the collective bargaining agreement.
 As a result, on April 7, 1960, a notice signed by
the president of the company was posted on the
bulletin board, wherein it was announced that
effective April 8, 1960 the employees enumerated
therein were considered resigned from their
employment
 Complainants allege that their separation from
the service was illegal because, they were
already members of the PES Labor Association.
Nevertheless they still complied with the union-
8
shop provision by applying for membership with
the Elegance Employees and Workers Union
within the prescribed period of 30 days, through a
letter dated March 2, 1960, which they sent by
registered mail.
 Elegance Inc found no merit in this claim.
According to them, the end of the thirty-day
period required by the union-shop is April 2, 1960.
Considering that this date is so close to the time
when the letter of application was sent by
registered mail by complainants, the probability is
that said application must have been received by
the union beyond the prescribed period, hence
the union decided to compel the company to
dismiss complainants.
Issue:
 WON the dismissal of the 14 employees is valid
pursuant to the Union-Shop agreement in the
CBA between Elegance Inc and the Elegance
Employees and Workers Union
Held:
 No. The important fact which cannot be ignored
is that the private respondents did comply with
the union shop provision by applying for
membership with the union within the prescribed
period of thirty days, by means of a letter dated
March 25, 1960 and sent to the said union by
registered mail.
 It should be noted that they were already in the
service when the said contract was entered into,
and that only a clear and definite showing of their
failure to affiliate with the union within the period
fixed for that purpose would justify their dismissal,
assuming that the union shop clause was
applicable to them. Even this point, however, was
not altogether free from doubt at the time, for it
ran counter to the spirit of the Industrial Peace Act
which recognizes the right of the employees to
self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing.
 As stated in the case of of Freeman Shirt
Manufacturing Co., Inc., Et. Al. v. CIR:
"The closed-shop agreement authorized under
Sec. 4 subsec. a(4) of the Industrial Peace Act
abovequoted should, however, apply only to
persons to be hired or to employees who are not
 yet members of any labor organization. It is
inapplicable to those already in the service who
arc members of another union. To hold otherwise,
i.e., that the employees in a company who are
members of a minority union may be compelled
to disaffiliate from their union and join the majority
or contracting union, would render nugatory the
right of all employees to self-organization and to
form, join or assist labor organizations of their
own choosing, a right guaranteed by the
Industrial Peace Act (Sec. 3, Republic Act No.
875) as well as by the Constitution (Art. III, sec. 1
[6]).
3. Right to Strike
a.) Article 8 (d) ICESCR
The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in
conformity with the laws of the particular country.
b.) Definition of Strike
“Strike” is the temporary stoppage of work by concerted
of action of employees as a result of a labor dispute. (Gold
City Integrated Post Services vs NLRC 254 scra 647
{1995})
c.) Difference between Strike and Lockout
"Strike" means any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial
dispute. (RA no. 875)
"Lockout" means the temporary refusal of any employer
to furnish work as a result of an industrial dispute. (RA no.
875)
d.) Requisites for a valid strike
for a strike to be valid, it must comply with Article 26316 of
the Labor Code, which requires that: (a) a notice of strike
be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15
days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike vote be
approved by a majority of the total union membership in
the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot
in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice be
given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike.
These requirements are mandatory, and the union’s
failure to comply renders the strike illegal.17 The 15 to 30-
day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the
opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the
assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the
9
seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an
opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really
carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union
members.18
e.) Do government workers have the right to strike?
Government workers does not have the right to strike.
According to the SC, since the term and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law, government
employees cannot use the same mechanisms employed
by the workers in private sector to secure concessions
from their employers. (Social Security System Employee
Associates vs CA 175 scra 686 [1989]).
GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICE, INC v.
NLRC
 The employees of Gold City Integrated Port Service,
Inc. (INPORT) stopped working and gathered in a
mass action to express their grievances regarding
wages, 13th month pay and hazard pay.
o The employees were members of the Macajalar
Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers (MLU-
FFW) with whom INPORT had an existing CBA.
 On that same morning, the strikers filed individual
notices of strike with the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment.
 With the failure of conciliation conference, INPORT
filed a complaint before the LA for Illegal Strike with
prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction.
 NLRC issued a TRO.
 Majority of the strikers returned to work leaving
respondents, who continued their protest. Counsel for
respondents filed a manifestation that INPORT
required prior screening conducted by the MLU-FFW
before the remaining strikers could be accepted back
to work.
 Counsel for MLU-FFW filed a Motion to Drop Most of
the Party Respondents From the Case.
o The 278 employees on whose behalf the motion
was field, claimed that they were duped or tricked
into signing the individual notices of strike.
o After discovering this deception and verifying that
the strike was staged by a minority of the union
officers and members and without the approval
of, or consultation with, majority of the union
members, they immediately withdrew their notice
of strike and returned to work.
 LA granted their prayer to be excluded as
respondents.
 INPORT’s complaint was directed against the 31
respondents who did not return to work and continued
with the strike.
 LA found the strike illegal for not having complied with
the formal requirements in Art. 264 of the Labor Code.
o The workers who participated in the illegal strike
did not, however, lose their employment, since
 there was no evidence that they participated in
illegal acts.
o After noting that INPORT accepted the other
striking employees back to work, LA held that the
respondents should similarly be allowed to return
to work without having to undergo the required
screening.
o As regards the respondents who were union
officers, they could not have possibly been duped
or tricked into signing the strike notice for they
were active participants in the conciliation
meetings and were thus fully aware of what was
going on.
 NLRC affirmed with modification.
o The concerted activity was more of a protest
action than a strike.
o Respondents, including the 6 union officers,
should also be allowed to work unconditionally to
avoid discrimination.
o In view of the strained relations between the
parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of
reinstatement.
 Upon INPORT’s MR, NLRC modified:
o Since respondents were not actually terminated
from service, there was no basis for
reinstatement.
o It awarded 6 months’ salary as separation pay or
financial assistance in the nature of equitable
relief.
o The award for backwages was deleted. In lieu of
backwages, compensation equivalent to P1,000
was given.
 INPORT filed a petition for certiorari alleging that
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
awarding respondents separation pay and
backwages despite the declaration that the strike was
illegal.
ISSUE: Whether the strike was illegal. – YES.
RULING:
Respondents and their co-workers stopped working and
held the mass action to press for their wages and other
benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the
cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a
labor dispute.
The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for
failure to comply with the requirements of Art. 264 (now
Art. 263) pars. (c) and (f) of the Labor Code.
The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not
conform to the notice required by the law to be filed since
they were represented by a union which even had an
existing CBA with INPORT. Neither did the striking
workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-
off period and reporting requirements. The cooling-off
10
period and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote report
were intended to be mandatory.
The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Art. 265 (now
Art. 264) make a distinction between workers and union
officers who participate therein. A union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared
to have lost their employment status. An ordinary striking
worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed
illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other
hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly
participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers,
when he commits an illegal act during a strike.
INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers,
including union officers, back to work. Respondents were
left to continue with the strike after they refused to submit
to the screening required by the company. The question
to be resolved now is what these remaining strikers,
considering the circumstances of the case, are entitled to
receive under the law, if any.
The striking union members among respondents are
entitled to reinstatement, there being no just cause for
their dismissal. However, considering that a decade has
already lapsed from the time the disputed strike occurred,
it would be more practical and appropriate to award
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. No backwages will
be awarded to private respondent-union members as a
penalty for their participation in the illegal strike. Their
continued participation in said strike, even after most of
their co-workers had returned to work, can hardly be
rewarded by such an award.
The fate of private respondent-union officers is different.
Their insistence on unconditional reinstatement or
separation pay and backwages is unwarranted and
unjustified. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike,
the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated
from employment.
f.) Right to Strike vis-a—vis Property Rights
In PBM Employees vs PBM Steel, the Court ruled that
what was a stake is a human rights of the employees
against property rights of the employer. The primacy of
human rights over property rights can be lost by
prescription but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished then at the Bill of Rights
ceases to passage of time, be an efficacious shield
against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and oligarchy, political, economic
or otherwise.
PBM Employees vs PBM Steel
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973]Bill of Rights: Section
4 - Freedom of Expression
FACTS:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization(hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a
legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the
respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas,Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcuand Rodulfo Munsod
are officers and members of the petitioner Union.PBMEO
decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of
Malacañang toexpress their grievances against the
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. Petitioners claim that
on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M.
to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third
shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
P.M.,respectively); and that they informed the respondent
Company of their proposed demonstration.
The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting
with the leaders of the PBMEO after learning about the
planned mass demonstration. During the meeting, the
planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it
was stressed out by the union that the demonstration was
not a strike against the company but was in factual
exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to
freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom
for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for
it would interrupt the normal course of their business
which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed
up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would
lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company
reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular
shifts should not absent themselves to participate,
otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late
to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of
the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of
the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming
Mills Co.,Inc., and the officers of the PBMEO were found
guilty of bargaining in badfaith. The PBMEO’s motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
ISSUE: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike
violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement?
11
RULING:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights,
the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity."
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription;
but human rights are imprescriptible.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil
rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment
of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can
participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline
of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these
rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate
governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees
C. Right to Social Security
Article 9 ICESCR
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to social security, including social
insurance.
Baker vs Social Security System (1963)
Facts: Petitioner-appellant Franklin Baker Company of
the Philippines is engaged in the manufacture of
dessicater coconut in San Pablo City. The deceased,
Tomas Zamora was one of its employees. Both were
compulsory members of the Social Security System.
Due to the annual overhauling of its machinery and also
to lack of production orders from its mother company in
the United States petitioner temporarily ceased its
operations from December 22, 1957 to February 18,
1958. Zamora rendered no actual services during that
period. He then went on sick leave without pay from
March 9, 1958, up to the day of his death, June 13, 1958.
On July 10, 1958 the System received a death claim
application from petitioner for and in behalf of the
designated beneficiaries of the deceased employee. After
processing the. claim the System found that no premium
remittances had been made for him for the months of
February, March, and June, 1958. Of the unpaid
premiums, P5.85 was chargeable to the employee while
P8.18 was due from the employer-petitioner. The
employee's share of the unpaid premiums was
subsequently deducted from the death benefits awarded
to his beneficiaries and the System billed petitioner for, its
share.
Under Resolution No. 139, Series of 1958, the Social
Security Commission adopted the rule that "employers
are liable to the 3 1/2% company's share during the
months when there are no premiums remitted, if there is
existing employer-employee relationship between them
during those months." Petitioner excepted to the System's
demand for payment by filing a petition for reconsideration
with the Commission. On April 28, 1960 the Commission
resolved to dismiss said petition, and the case is now
before us on appeal from the resolution of dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not the employer is not liable for its
share of the premiums during the period when the
employee is on leave without pay since he receives no
compensation?
Held: The Court ruled that as long as there was an
employer- employee relationship, the employer has the
obligation to remit the social security premium even if the
employee was not rendering service.
The legislative policy of social security system is to
provide social security, which means funds for the
beneficiary, if the employee dies, or for the employee
himself and his dependents if he is unable to perform his
task because of illness or disability temporary lay-off due
to strike.
Tecson vs Social Security System (1961)
Facts: The facts attendant are as follows: The late Lim
Hoc, a former employee of the Yuyitung Publishing
Company, was, at the time of his death on November 3,
1957, a member of the System, having qualified as such
on September 1, 1957. In the SSS-Form E-1
accomplished and filed by him with the System, he gave
his civil status as married, but made no mention of the
members of his family or other relatives. Instead, he
designated therein the petitioner Jose P. Tecson,
reportedly a friend and co-worker of his, as his
beneficiary. After the death of Lim Hoc, petitioner, in his
capacity as the designated beneficiary, filed with the
System a claim for death benefits.
Issue: Whether or not the co-owner as beneficiary can file
a claim for death benefits?
Held: The Court denied his claim on the ground that the
legislation intend of the Social Security System to afford
protection to the employee as well as his family.
D. Right to Rest and Leisure
Article 24 UDHR
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including
reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic
holidays with pay.
12
Rules on Working Hours
Labor Code of the Philippines
Art. 83. Normal hours of work. The normal hours of
work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a
day.
Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a
population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in
hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one
hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight (8)
hours a day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for
meals, except where the exigencies of the service require
that such personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight
(48) hours, in which case, they shall be entitled to an
additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of
their regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes
of this Article, “health personnel” shall include resident
physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dietitians, pharmacists,
social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical
technicians, psychologists, midwives, attendants and all
other hospital or clinic personnel.
Art. 84. Hours worked. Hours worked shall include (a) all
time during which an employee is required to be on duty
or to be at a prescribed workplace; and (b) all time during
which an employee is suffered or permitted to work.
Rest periods of short duration during working hours shall
be counted as hours worked.
Art. 85. Meal periods. Subject to such regulations as the
Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be the duty of
every employer to give his employees not less than sixty
(60) minutes time-off for their regular meals.
Art. 86. Night shift differential. Every employee shall be
paid a night shift differential of not less than ten percent
(10%) of his regular wage for each hour of work
performed between ten o’clock in the evening and six
o’clock in the morning.
Art. 87. Overtime work. Work may be performed beyond
eight (8) hours a day provided that the employee is paid
for the overtime work, an additional compensation
equivalent to his regular wage plus at least twenty-five
percent (25%) thereof. Work performed beyond eight
hours on a holiday or rest day shall be paid an additional
compensation equivalent to the rate of the first eight hours
on a holiday or rest day plus at least thirty percent (30%)
thereof.
Art. 88. Undertime not offset by overtime. Undertime
work on any particular day shall not be offset by overtime
work on any other day. Permission given to the employee
to go on leave on some other day of the week shall not
exempt the employer from paying the additional
compensation required in this Chapter.
Art. 89. Emergency overtime work. Any employee may
be required by the employer to perform overtime work in
any of the following cases:
a. When the country is at war or when any other
national or local emergency has been declared by
the National Assembly or the Chief Executive;
b. When it is necessary to prevent loss of life or
property or in case of imminent danger to public
safety due to an actual or impending emergency
in the locality caused by serious accidents, fire,
flood, typhoon, earthquake, epidemic, or other
disaster or calamity;
c. When there is urgent work to be performed on
machines, installations, or equipment, in order to
avoid serious loss or damage to the employer or
some other cause of similar nature;
d. When the work is necessary to prevent loss or
damage to perishable goods; and
e. Where the completion or continuation of the work
started before the eighth hour is necessary to
prevent serious obstruction or prejudice to the
business or operations of the employer.
Any employee required to render overtime work under this
Article shall be paid the additional compensation required
in this Chapter.
Art. 90. Computation of additional compensation. For
purposes of computing overtime and other additional
remuneration as required by this Chapter, the “regular
wage” of an employee shall include the cash wage only,
without deduction on account of facilities provided by the
employer.
Regular vs Special Non-Working Holidays; Rules on Pay
Exceptions
This rule shall apply to all employees except:
 Those of the government and any of the political
subdivision, including government-owned and
controlled corporation;
 Those of retail and service establishments
regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;
Domestic helpers and persons in the personal
service of another; Managerial employees as
defined in Book Three of the Omnibus Rules to
Implement the Labor Code of the Philippines;
 Field personnel and other employees whose time
and performance is unsupervised by the employer
including those who are engaged on task or
contract basis, purely commission basis, or those
who are paid a fixed amount for performing work
13
irrespective of the time consumed in the
performance thereof.
Source: Book 3, Rule IV, Section 1, Omnibus Rules to
Implement the Labor Code of the Philippines
Holiday pay of certain employees
 Private school teachers, including faculty members
of colleges and universities, may not be paid for the
regular holidays during semestral vacations. They
shall, however, be paid for the regular holidays
during Christmas vacation;
 Where a covered employee is paid by results or
output, such as payment on piece work, his holiday
pay shall not be less than his average daily
earnings for the last seven (7) actual working days
preceding the regular holiday; Provided, however,
that in no case shall the holiday pay be less than
the applicable statutory minimum wage rate;
 Seasonal workers may not be paid the required
holiday pay during off-season when they are not at
work;
 Workers who have no regular working days shall
be entitled to the benefits provided in this Rule.
Source: Book 3, Rule IV, Section 8, Omnibus Rules to
Implement the Labor Code of the Philippines
E. Right to Adequate Standard of Living
Article 25 UDHR
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and
necessary social services, and the right to security in the
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care
and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Article 11 ICESCR
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living
conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps
to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this
effect the essential importance of international co-
operation based on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant,
recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free
from hunger, shall take, individually and through
international co-operation, the measures, including
specific programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and
distribution of food by making full use of technical and
scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the
principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming
agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most
efficient development and utilization of natural resources;
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-
importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an
equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to
need.
F. Protection of and Assistance to the Family; Family as
a Basic Social Institution
1. Article 10 ICESCR
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
that:
1. The widest possible protection and assistance should
be accorded to the family, which is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its
establishment and while it is responsible for the care and
education of dependent children. Marriage must be
entered into with the free consent of the intending
spouses.
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers
during a reasonable period before and after childbirth.
During such period working mothers should be accorded
paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits.
3. Special measures of protection and assistance should
be taken on behalf of all children and young persons
without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or
other conditions. Children and young persons should be
protected from economic and social exploitation. Their
employment in work harmful to their morals or health or
dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal
development should be punishable by law. States should
also set age limits below which the paid employment of
child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.
2. Article II Section 12, 1987 Constitution
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.
3. Article XV Section 1 and 2 1987 Constitution
SECTION 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as
the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.
14
JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
109 Phil 273
FACTS: Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint praying of
a decree annulling his marriage with Remedios
Canizares. He claimed that the orifice of her genitals was
too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis
for copulation. He also claimed that the condition of her
genitals existed at the time of marriage and continues to
exist. The wife was summoned and served with a copy of
the complaint but she did not file an answer. The court
entered an order requiring defendant to submit to a
physical examination by a competent lady physician to
determine her physical capacity for copulation. Defendant
did not submit herself to the examination and the court
entered a decree annulling the marriage. The City
Attorney filed a Motion for Reconsideration, among the
grounds that the defendant’s impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had
not been physically examined because she refused to be
examined.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on
the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband
who claimed and testified that his wife is impotent.
HELD: The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds
that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to
annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the
marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of
his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is
really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established because from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the
decree she had abstained from taking part therein.
Although her refusal to be examined or failure to
appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from
such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred
because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful
and shy and would not submit to a physical examination
unless compelled to by competent authority.
A physical examination in this case is not self-
incriminating. She is not charged with any offense . She
is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.
“Impotency being an abnormal condition should
not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of
potency.” The lone testimony of the husband that his wife
is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient
to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife.
Ruling: The decree appealed from is set aside and the
case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings
in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement
as to costs.
G. Right to Education and Development of Human
Personality
1. Article 26 UDHR, Article 13 ICESCR
Article 26.
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall
be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental
stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.
Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally
accessible to all on the basis of merit.
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of
the human personality and to the strengthening of respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among
all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the
activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of
peace.
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of
education that shall be given to their children.
Article 13
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to education. They agree that
education shall be directed to the full development of the
human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall
strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable
all persons to participate effectively in a free society,
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among
all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and
further the activities of the United Nations for the
maintenance of peace.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
that, with a view to achieving the full realization of this
right:
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available
free to all;
(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including
technical and vocational secondary education, shall be
made generally available and accessible to all by every
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appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive
introduction of free education;
(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to
all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means,
and in particular by the progressive introduction of free
education;
(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or
intensified as far as possible for those persons who have
not received or completed the whole period of their
primary education;
(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels
shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system
shall be established, and the material conditions of
teaching staff shall be continuously improved.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake
to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when
applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children
schools, other than those established by the public
authorities, which conform to such minimum educational
standards as may be laid down or approved by the State
and to ensure the religious and moral education of their
children in conformity with their own convictions.
4. No part of this article shall be construed so as to
interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to
establish and direct educational institutions, subject
always to the observance of the principles set forth in
paragraph I of this article and to the requirement that the
education given in such institutions shall conform to such
minimum standards as may be laid down by the State.
2. Article XIV Section 1 and 2 1987 Constitution
SECTION 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as
the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.
3. Article II Section 17, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 17. The State shall give priority to education,
science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress,
and promote total human liberation and development.
4. Rights of Student; Academic Freedom
Garcia vs The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology
FACTS: 1. Petitioner has been barred from being allowed
re-admission into the respondent school, which is a
seminary for the priesthood in collaboration with the
Ateneo de Manila University. Petitioner was taking her
studies leading to an M.A. in Theology at the time, but was
no longer allowed to enroll in the Academic Year of 1975-
1976.
2. Petitioner contends that the reason behind the
respondent’s refusal to re-admit her (as stated in a letter
from the respondent), which is due to the fact that her
frequent questions and difficulties that were slowing down
the progress of the class, does not constitute valid legal
ground for expulsion for they neither present any violation
of any of the school’s regulation, nor are they indicative of
gross misconduct. She was advised to enroll in the
University of Santo Tomas Graduate School
(Ecclesiastical Faculty), where she will have to take up
Philosophy (4-5 years, compared to 2 years in Ateneo)
before she will be allowed to take Theology. She was,
however, allowed to take some courses for credit, free of
charge, during the summer sessions of the respondent
school in 1975, but was not acknowledged to be enrolled
in any degree program.
3. Petitioner then filed for a writ of Mandamus to compel
the respondent to allow her admission.
ISSUE/S: 1. Whether the petitioner is deemed to possess
a right to be respected by the respondent in terms being
denied re-admission?
2. Whether the Faculty Admission Committee had to
authority to bar the petitioner from continuing her studies
in their institution?
RULE/S: ARTICLE XIV SEC. 1 The State shall protect
and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at
all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all. SEC. 5 (2) Academic freedom
shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
ANALYSIS: 1. Due to the fact that the respondent school
the petitioner was enrolling to was a seminary for
priesthood and for men, the most she could claim for is a
privilege, and not a right. Furthermore, she was
admittedly enrolling into a course that was not for the
priesthood. Besides, even if, for the sake of argument,
she was qualified to study for the priesthood, there is still
no duty on the part of the respondent to admit her for the
discretion to accept or reject qualified applicants still lies
on the respondent school.
2. Also, taking into consideration Sec. 5 of Art. XIV, the
aforementioned discretion is backed by the Constitution.
CONCLUSION: Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
TANGONAN VS PANO
Facts: Petitioner brought suit for mandamus to compel the
Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing to admit her for
the academic year 1976-1977. She had been previously
provisionally admitted the previous schoolyear, but she
16
failed in Psychiatric Nursing. She tried to take the course
again in another school, but she was refused admission
bec. she tried to bribe the dean of the school. When she
tried to re-enrol at the Capitol Medical Center, she was
denied admission. She brought the matter on certiorari.
VV.
ISSUE: WON the school can be compelled by the court to
re-admit petitioner.
HELD: No. Any duty on the part of the school to enrol pet.
is not merely a ministerial duty but one w/c involves the
exercise of discretion not compellable by Mandamus.
Capitol was perfectly justified in refusing to admit her, its
refusal (being) sanctioned by the Manual of Regulations
of Priv. Schools w/c considers academic delinquency &
violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for
refusing enrollment of a student.
Further, to grant relief to pet. would be doing violence to
the academic freedom enjoyed by Capitol enshrined
under Act. XV sec. 8 (2) Consti. Academic freedom
includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified
persons to inquire, discover, publish & teach the truth as
they see it in the field of their competence subject to no
control or authority except of rational methods by w/c
truths and conclusions are sought and established in
these disciplines, but also the right of the school or college
to decide for itself how best to attain them - the grant being
to institutions of higher learning - free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the over-
riding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide
spread of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of
students. Said constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.
That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent
Magtibay vs Garcia
Facts: On March 12, 1966, Lt. Col. Santiago Q. Garcia,
then Commander of the, U.P. ROTC Cadet Corps, issued
General Orders No. 23 relieving Arleo E. Magtibay of the
rank of cadet colonel and as battalion commander of the
lst BCT of the U.P. Cadet Corps, and designating in his
stead Cadet Col. Marcelo Javier. In the same order,
Magtibay was excluded from the roll of the graduating
class of the ROTC Advance Course for having flunked the
subject MS-42, a subject necessary for the completion of
the Advance Course.
On March 23, 1966, Magtibay filed with tile President of
the University of the Philippines an administrative case
against Lt. Col. Garcia charging the latter with abuse of
discretion and seeking his relief as commandant of the
U.P. ROTC Cadet Corps. 1 The Honorable Carlos P.
Romulo, then President of the U.P., appointed a
committee to investigate the complaint and "to review the
case of Mr. Magtibay and to evaluate his scholastic
record, including his examination papers, if any, in MS-
42, and to make recommendations in accordance with the
procedure described in paragraph 2, section 374 of the
Revised U.P. Code."
Upon the filing of the petition, the lower court issued a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, ordering Magtibay's
reinstatement to his former rank and command. Pursuant
to said writ, appellant was "reinstated commander of ist
BCT U. P. ROTC Unit, and Javier relieved of such
command." 3
After joinder of issues, hearing was conducted, and
thereafter the lower court issued the questioned order
dismissing the petition and lifting the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. The court rationalized the order of
dismissal,
Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the courts may review the exercise
of discretion of a public officer on matters in which it is his
duty to act?
Held: We dismiss this appeal for being moot and
academic. The records disclose that during the pendency
of this case before the lower court, Lt. Col. Garcia had
been relieved as commandant of the U.P. ROTC Corps of
Cadets and assigned to another post, while Cadet Col.
Javier had long graduated from the U.P. Moreover,
pursuant to the writ of the preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by the lower court, appellant was
reinstated to his former rank as commander of the 1st
BCT of the U.P. ROTC Cadet Corps, which command he
held up to the end of the school year 1965-66.
At any rate, appellant's prayer to compel Lt. Col. Garcia
to include him in the roster of graduates of the ROTC
Advance Course is absolutely bereft of any legal basis to
stand on. He was not allowed to graduate because he
flunked the subject MS-42, a required subject for the
completion of the ROTC Advance Course. That he
flunked said subject is not disputed by the appellant. True,
an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to
afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the
course they seek to pursue. However, when a student
commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain
the required academic standard, he forfeits his
contractual right; and the court should not review the
discretion of university authorities.[4]
This Court has consistently adhered to the rule that a writ
of mandamus will not issue to control or review the
exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law
imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to
exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which he
is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised
and not that of the court.[5]
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
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H. Right to Enjoy Economic, Social and Cultural Life
1. Article 27 UDHR, Article 15 ICESCR
Article 25.
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of
his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
in circumstances beyond his control.
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care
and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Article 15
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone:
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the
present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this
right shall include those necessary for the conservation,
the development and the diffusion of science and culture.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake
to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific
research and creative activity.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and
development of international contacts and co-operation in
the scientific and cultural fields.
.
2. Article 27 ICCPR
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
language.
3. Article XIV Section 10 and 11 1987 Constitution
SECTION 10. Science and technology are essential for
national development and progress. The State shall give
priority to research and development, invention,
innovation, and their utilization; and to science and
technology education, training, and services. It shall
support indigenous, appropriate, and self-reliant scientific
and technological capabilities, and their application to the
country’s productive systems and national life.
SECTION 11. The Congress may provide for incentives,
including tax deductions, to encourage private
participation in programs of basic and applied scientific
research. Scholarships, grants-in-aid, or other forms of
incentives shall be provided to deserving science
students, researchers, scientists, inventors,
technologists, and specially gifted citizens.

I. Right to Health

1. Article 25 UDHR, Article 12 ICESCR

Article 25.
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of
his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care

and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

2. Article XIII Section 11, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 11.
The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall
be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

18