DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs.
SANTIAGO HELD:
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the orders and
decision of the respondent Judge, and mandamus to order the respondent
Judge to give due course to the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial. The
petitioner also prays for the dismissal of the respondent corporation’s
application for registration.
On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by
respondent Garcia in the CFI of Bataan. A copy of the application was
forwarded to the SolGen thru the director of Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the
Director of lands filed an opposition to this application, and at the same time
the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized the Provincial Fiscal to
appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same. Subsequently, respondent
IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., with the conformity of the respondent
Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria Garcia to
Imperial Corp without amending the boundaries of the area stated in the
original application. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge
Santiago.
A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties
concerned, with the warning that a party who failed to appear would be
declared in default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official
Gazette and posted by the sheriff as required by law.
On Jan. 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor
his counsel was present; an order of general default was issued by the
respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the evidence for the
applicant before the clerk of court, the respondent Judge rendered the
questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor of the respondent
corporation.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that
the failure of his counsel to appear at the initial hearing was excusable and
that the decision was contrary to facts and to law. The motion was however
denied.
ISSUES: WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following
orders and decisions:
1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the
parcels of land in favor of respondent corporation,
2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default
3. Denying the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial
The petition is GRANTED; the Order of general default against the
petitioner, and the Order denying the Motion for New Trial, the Decision
dated February 17, 1975, as well as the decree of registration issued pursuant
thereto, if any, are all declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The respondent
corporation’s subject application for land registration is hereby DISMISSED.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
The lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the
respondent corporation’s application for registration, without sufficient proof
that the applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is
registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by
Republic Act 6236, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
The Supreme Court is not convinced with the conclusion of the
respondent Judge and with the arguments of the respondent corporation that
the latter, through its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years.
Issue #1: First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin,
from whom the respondent corporation purchased the subject lots, have
pending sales applications as evidenced in the plans submitted to the
land registration court by Maria Garcia herself. As such sales applicants,
they manifestly acknowledge that they do not own the land and that
the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of
Lands, to which the applications were submitted. Therefore, their
possession was not that of an owner, as required by law. (The private
respondents were conspicuously silent on this point, as if they were trying to
conceal this vital fact)
More than anything else, however, registration in this instance
can not be granted on the basis of Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public
Land Act as said provision applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the
public domain. It appears from Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-
1157, dated April 28, 1971, that the subject land were forest lands and
only later declared as alienable or disposable by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the assumption that the
applicant herein, through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession
for at least thirty years, such possession never ripened into private
ownership. The respondent Garcia and Vicente Obdin must have applied for
sales patents precisely because they wanted to acquire ownership over the
subject lands. An examination of the dates will show that the filing of the sales
applications, apparently on October 24, 1971, was done after the lands had
been declared as alienable and disposable.
Issue #2: The opposition or answer filed by the Director of Lands,
which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally filed prior to the
issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing, it was improper for the respondent
Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to declare the oppositor in
default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial
hearing. The declaration of default against the petitioner was patently invalid
because when the same was made, he had already entered an appearance and
filed his opposition or answer.
The pertinent provision of law which states: “If no person appears and
answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the
applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be
recorded …,” cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard
the answer before it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation
would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust.
Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as
the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the respondent
Judge should have received the applicant’s evidence and set another date for
the reception of the oppositor’s evidence. The oppositor in the Court below
and petitioner herein should have been accorded ample opportunity to
establish the government’s claim.
Issue #3: The respondent Judge, in denying the petitioner’s Motion
for New Trial, ignored the established rule that courts should be liberal in
setting aside a default judgment. “The Court, in the exercise of wise discretion,
could have restored their standing in court and given them an even chance to
face their opponents.
The Supreme Court no longer deem it imperative to order a new trial
of this case which would only prolong the litigation unnecessarily, for as it
said in a recent case, the remand of a case to the lower court for Lither
reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before on the records before it.
In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State, courts must scrutinize with care applications to private
ownership of real estate. But this the respondent Judge sadly failed to heed;
the tax declarations and plans submitted by the private respondents were not
carefully analyzed, and the allegations in the petitioner’s opposition to the
application were so casually ignored.
NOTES:
1. The respondent corporation maintains that the appropriate remedy in this
instance is appeal, which is expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, and not certiorari. In Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation
vs. Vallejos the Supreme Court laid down the doctrine that appeal is not an
adequate remedy where a party is illegally declared in default. Thus, it stated:
The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule (i.e. Sec. 2, Rule 41) is
properly, though not exclusively, available to a defendant who has been
validly declared in default. It does not preclude a defendant who has been
illegally declared in default from pursuing a more speedy and efficacious
remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment by default set aside
as a nullity.
2. Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act, to wit: The following
described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:…
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter. ..
 SPOUSES PALOMO vs. CA
FACTS:
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land
in Tiwi, Albay which form part of the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park." The
facts of the case are as follows.
Then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, William
Cameron Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for
provincial park purposes. Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land
covered by Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of
these lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo
two months before his death in April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost
during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 1970. The
Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911,
3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954
President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area
embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park,"
under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct
Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to
disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable
under the Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however, continued in
possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced
improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8,
1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and
Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of
P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
Trial Court:
1. Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated
September 14, 1953, as well as the Original Certificate of Titles.
2. Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all
improvements on the lands in question that are found therein and
introduced by the defendants;
3. Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9,10, 11 and 12, Plan II-9299
and Lots 1, 21, 11 3 and 4 of Plan II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot
Spring National Park;
4. and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered
to cancel the alleged Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169,
173 and 176, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T-
3913 and T-3914
The CA affirmed he decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-
American War at the end of the 19th century recognized the property rights of
Spanish and Filipino citizens and the American government had no inherent
power to confiscate properties of private citizens and declare them part of
any kind of government reservation. They allege that their predecessors in
interest have been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject
lands for 20-50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917. Hence, the
reservation of the lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then Governor-
general Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of private property without
due process of law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number
of decisions of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of
the United States of America which state that the predecessors in
interest of the petitioners' father Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open
and adverse possession of the lands from 20 to 50 years at the time of their
registration in 1916. We are not convinced.
HELD:
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and
conquest in the 16th century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our
lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of
land could only be acquired through royal concessions which were
documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2)
Concesion Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by
Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title
obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of
January 26, 1889. Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners'
predecessors in interest derived title from an old Spanish grant.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in
interest were in open, adverse and continuous possession of the lands for 20
to 50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed
only in December 1913, the very same year they were acquired by Diego
Palomo. Curiously , in February 1913 or 10 months before the lands
were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government had already surveyed
the area in preparation for its reservation for provincial park purposes. If
the petitioners' predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of
the lands for a number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917,
they would have undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these
properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this
point to argue that the government had no right to include these
properties in the reservation when the question should have been
raised 83 years ago.
As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as they obtained
the titles without government opposition, the government is now estopped
from questioning the validity of the certificates of title which were granted. As
correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of
estoppel, does not operate against the Government for the act of its
agents.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not
alienable lands of the public domain. They form part of the forest zone. It is
elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no
matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands
are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
HEIRS OF BATIOG LACAMEN vs HEIRS OF LARUAN
FACTS:
Petitioners-appellants are the surviving heirs of Batiog Lacamen,
while respondents-appellants are the heirs of Laruan.
Laruanexecuted a Deed of Sale in favor of Batiog Lacamen.
mmediately after the sale, Laruan delivered the certificate of title to
Lacamen. Thereupon, Lacamen entered in possession and occupancy of
the land without first securing the corresponding transfer certificate of
title in his name. He introduced various improvements and paid the
proper taxes. His possession was open, continuous, peaceful, and adverse.
After his death in 1942, his heirs remained in and continued possession and
occupancy of the land. They too paid the taxes.
After the last Global War, Lacamen's heirs "started fixing up the
papers of all the properties" left by him In or about June, 1957, they
discovered that Laruan's heirs, respondents-appellants, were able to procure
a new owner's copy of Certificate of Title No. 420 by a petition filed in court
alleging that their copy has been lost or destroyed. Through this owner's
copy, respondents-appellants caused the transfer of the title on the lot in
their names.
Refused of their demands for reconveyance of the title, petitioners-
appellants sued respondents-appellants praying among other things, that they
be declared owners of the subject property.
In answer, respondents-appellants traversed the averments in the
complaint and claim absolute ownership over the land. They asserted that
their deceased father, Laruan, never sold the property and that the Deed of
Sale was not thumb marked by him.
TRIAL COURT:
Declaring the sale null and void.
COURT OF APPEALS:
/same
The 1917 Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu declares in
its Section 145 that no contract or agreement relating to real property
shall be made by any person with any non-Christian inhabitant of the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu, unless such contract shall bear the
approval of the provincial governor of the province wherein the contract was
executed, or his representative duly authorized for such purpose in writing
endorsed upon it.
The Public Land Act provides in Section 118 thereof that
"Conveyances and encumbrances made by persons belonging to the so-
called 'non-Christian tribes', when proper, shall not be valid unless duly
approved by the Director of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes." Any violation
of this injunction would result in the nullity and avoidance of the transaction
under the following Section 122.
Under the Commonwealth Act, "Conveyances and encumbrances
made by illiterate non-Christians shall not be valid unless duly approved by
the Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu.
The contracting parties, Lacamen and Laruan, are bound by the
foregoing laws, since both of them are illiterate Igorots, belonging to the "non-
Christian Tribes" of the Mountain Province and the controverted land was
derived from a Free Patent or acquired from the public domain.
 Laruan's sale of the subject lot to Lacamen could have been valid were
it not for the sole fact that it lacked the approval of the Director of the Bureau
of Non-Christian Tribes.
For notwithstanding the invalidity of the sale, the vendor Laruan
suffered the vendee Lacamen to enter, possess and occupy the property in
concepto de dueño without demurrer and molestation, from 1928, until the
former's death in 1938; and when respondents-appellants succeeded to the
estate of their father, they too kept silent, never claiming that the lot is their
own until in 1957 or after almost 30 years they took "advantage of the [non-
approval of the sale] as their lever to deprive [petitioners-appellants] of
this land" with a motive that was "out and out greed." Even granting,
therefore, that no prescription lies against their father's recorded title,
their quiescence and inaction for almost 30 years now commands the
imposition of laches against their adverse claim. (Miguel, footnote 27) It
results that as against Laruan and his heirs, respondents-appellants
herein, the late Batiog Lacamen and his heirs, petitioners-appellants
herein, have superior right and, hence, have validly acquired ownership of the
litigated land. Vigilantibus non dormientibos sequitas subvenit.
ARANDA vs CA
FACTS:
Subject of a petition for original registration before the RTC is a
parcel of land. The petition was originally filed by ICTSI Warehousing, Inc.
(ICTSI-WI) represented by its Chairman, Enrique K. Razon, Jr. The Republic
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its opposition on
grounds that the land applied for is part of the public domain and the
applicant has not acquired a registrable title thereto under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 6940.
ICTSI-WI sought leave of court to amend the application. The trial
court admitted the Amended Application for Registration of Title this
time filed in the name of Ramon Aranda, herein petitioner. Petitioner
prayed that should the Land Registration Act be not applicable to this case, he
invokes the liberal provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, having been in continuous possession of the subject land in the
concept of owner, publicly, openly and adversely for more than thirty (30)
years prior to the filing of the application.
In support of the application, petitioner’s sister Merlita A. Enriquez
testified that in 1965 her father Anatalio Aranda donated the subject land to
his brother (petitioner), as evidenced by documents "Pagpapatunay ng
Pagkakaloob ng Lupa" which she and her siblings executed on June 7, 2000.
She came to know the land for the first time in 1965 when she was eight years
old and his brother Ramon has been tilling the land since then, planting it with
rice and corn. His brother did not introduce any permanent improvement and
also did not hire a tenant to work on the land. As to the donation made by his
father to his brother Ramon, she recalled there was such a document but it
was eaten by rats.
Another witness, Luis Olan, testified that his father Lucio Olan
originally owned the land and that he had known about this property since he
was six (6) years old as he used to accompany his father in going to the land.
TRIAL COURT:
It granted the application and ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration in favor of petitioner.
COURT OF APPEALS:
The CA held that petitioner’s evidence does not satisfactorily establish
the character and duration of possession required by law, as petitioner failed
to prove specific acts showing the nature of the possession by his
predecessors-in-interest.
HELD:
Petition denied.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
We also agree with the CA that petitioner’s evidence failed to show
that he possessed the property in the manner and for the duration required
by law.
Petitioner presented tax declarations and the deeds of confirmation of
the 1946 sale from the original owner (Lucio Olan) to Anatalio Aranda and the
1965 donation made by the latter in favor of petitioner. But as found by the A,
the history of the land shows that it was declared for taxation purposes for
the first time only in 1981. On the other hand, the Certification issued by the
Municipal Treasurer of Malvar stated that petitioner, who supposedly
received the property from his father in 1965, had been paying the
corresponding taxes for said land "for more than five consecutive years
including the current year [1999]," or beginning 1994 only or just three years
before the filing of the application for original registration. While, as a rule,
tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or constructive possession – they constitute
at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
Petitioner likewise failed to prove the alleged possession of his
predecessors-in-interest. His witness Luis Olan testified that he had been
visiting the land along with his father Lucio since he was 6 years old (he was
70 years old at the time he testified), or as early as 1936. Yet, there was no
evidence that Lucio Olan declared the property for tax purposes at anytime
before he sold it to Anatalio Aranda. There is also no showing that
Anatalio Aranda declared the property in his name from the time he bought it
from Lucio Olan. And even assuming that Lucio actually planted rice and corn
on the land, such statement is not sufficient to establish possession in the
concept of owner as contemplated by law. Mere casual cultivation of the land
does not amount to exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to
ownership. Specific acts of dominion must be clearly shown by the applicant