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Aquinas, Seligman, and positive psychology: A

Christian approach to the use of the virtues in
psychology

Craig Steven Titus

To cite this article: Craig Steven Titus (2016): Aquinas, Seligman, and positive psychology: A
Christian approach to the use of the virtues in psychology, The Journal of Positive Psychology

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2016.1228005

Published online: 06 Sep 2016.

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The Journal of Positive Psychology, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2016.1228005

Aquinas, Seligman, and positive psychology: A Christian approach to the use of

the virtues in psychology
Craig Steven Titus 
Institute for the Psychological Sciences, Divine Mercy University, Arlington, VA, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This article addresses the significance of using virtues in psychology for research and interventions. Received 9 June 2015
It compares Martin Seligman’s secular or genetic approach to positive psychology and Thomas Accepted 24 November 2015
Aquinas’s Christian virtue theory, observing that amidst the similarities between these approaches,
KEYWORDS
there are marked differences that are rooted in their philosophical and theological assumptions and Virtue; Flourishing; Thomas
are seen in their accounts of virtues and character strengths. Explicitly acknowledging suppositions Aquinas; Christian approach;
opens the way to distinguish the three dimensions of virtue: the reason-based (moral aims and Martin Seligman
spiritual goals), act-based (acts and behavior), and agent-based (habits and dispositions) dimensions.
It also permits identifying the uniqueness of the human person as both an object of study and an
acting subject in therapy. The article explores the significance of these dimensions for research and
good practices by comparing flourishing in Aquinas’s Christian approach to the ‘connection of the
virtues’ and Seligman’s generic or secular approach to ‘integrity’.

In this article, I will answer several questions. How does
Aquinas’s Christian approach contribute to understanding
the human person in terms of the virtues and flourishing?
How does it relate to the complementary perspective of
positive psychology, in general? How does it compare with
Seligman’s view on flourishing, in particular? And what
input might it offer to future research and well-grounded
practices? In order to sketch a response to these questions,
I would like to set up a conversation between a genetic
or secular tradition and a particular communal perspec-
tive, a Christian tradition. I have chosen two leaders in the
field: first, Martin E. P. Seligman, who named the positive
psychology movement and is a well-known leader in the
field of psychology today and perhaps needs no further
introduction; second, Thomas Aquinas, who is considered
a perennial leader in Christian virtue theory and who rep-
resents common ground for many Christians and others
looking for a classic and systematic approach to virtue
theory.
In this context, first, the article assumes that psycho-
logical approaches (both theoretical and practical) rely
on philosophical and theological presuppositions about
the nature of the human person and relationships, as
well as the values and virtues that aid the person, fam-
ily, and society in flourishing. That is, it posits that there
is no value-neutral position that does not have implicit
philosophical and theological premises. A supposed
‘value-free’ system would take the values of the ambient
culture, schools of thought, and/or particular contribu-
tors. Awareness of the values embedded in particular tra-
ditions and communities, however, permits fine-tuning
to research and applications. This understanding matters
when observing individuals predictably as objects of study
or unpredictably as subjects of free will and action, inas-
much as the moral and spiritual doctrines of a tradition,
when internalized, actually influence the free actions and
flourishing of its adherents.
There is a growing understanding that every concep-
tualization of the human person rests upon its own world
view and value-system (Ashley, 2000; Fowers, 2012a; Linley
& Joseph, 2004). The psychological sciences are no excep-
tion, and some psychologists have recognized the signifi-
cance of the philosophical and religious presuppositions of
psychology and psychotherapy, be they religious (Bergin,
1980), atheistic (Ellis, 1980), agnostic, or secular/genetic. As
MacIntyre (1984, 1990, 2009) has argued, the philosophical
and theological presuppositions, which people wittingly
or unwittingly espouse, make a difference in their under-
standing and practice of the virtues. Aristotelian, Stoic,
Christian, Nietzschean, atheistic, agnostic, reductionist,
or materialist approaches offer different notions of the
person, virtue, and flourishing.
Second, the thesis of the article is that the differences
between Seligman’s and Aquinas’s view of virtue, globally

CONTACT  Craig Steven Titus  cstitus@divinemercy.edu

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2    C. S. Titus
speaking, are rooted in certain differences of their supposi-
tions about the human person. For oversimplified notions
of virtue, vice, and the person miss the nature of the cogni-
tive and affective capacities which virtues modify and the
flourishing at which virtues aim. In a complex view of vir-
tues, like that of Aquinas (1265–1273/1981), virtue does not
simply refer to good acts: virtuous acts of care and concern,
justice, patience, and perseverance (act-based dimension
of virtue). Virtue also modifies one’s cognitive and affec-
tive capacities and habits, giving virtuous tendencies to
act again to: make good practical judgments; manage
fear courageously; and temper desires rightly (agent-based
dimension of virtue). Moreover, underlying the subjective
dimension of the virtuous individual are the objective rea-
sons, standards, and values rooted in one’s understanding
of the human person, family, and society: the reasons that
make it just to return borrowed property to a neighbor, and
the standards that make it good to be faithful in marriage
(reason-based dimension of virtue). Thus, a so-called val-
ue-free, genetic or secular position will miss the interplay of
these three dimensions and their significance for research
and good practices. This weakness is found in Seligman’s
morally neutral approach to virtue (Kaczor, 2015).
It is this article’s thesis that differences between
Aquinas’s and Seligman’s views on virtue result from their
diverse presuppositions about the person and diversity
of their methods. In particular, the article will identify
how Aquinas’s and Seligman’s presuppositions about the
person result in differences in understanding ‘integrity’
(Seligman) and the ‘connection of the virtues’ (Aquinas)
in human flourishing.
Aquinas: Reason-based, act-based, and agent-
based dimensions of virtue and flourishing
Aquinas’s approach to virtue and the Christian life contin-
ues to be studied, especially in the contemporary renewal
of virtue theory. His thought and model of dialogue with
the sciences offer a constructive contribution to a Christian
perspective on positive psychology. This article will give a
simple introduction to his philosophical and theological
thought on flourishing and the virtues (Pinckaers, 2005;
Pope, 2002; Sherwin, 2005; Torrell, 2005).
The representation of Aquinas’s thought is often partial
and fragmented. In various circles of study, he is known
merely for either (1) his virtue approach, (2) his metaphys-
ical and ethical approach to human nature and natural
law, (3) his eudemonic or flourishing perspective on the
teleology of agency, or (4) his religious accent on divine
beatitude, grace, and exemplarity in Christian ethics (Titus,
2012). Nonetheless, I contend that only by integrating all of
these elements into a large metaphysical and theological
frame does his notion of flourishing and virtue crystallize.
By distinguishing reason-based, agent-based, and act-
based dimensions of virtue in Aquinas’s world view and
value-system, a complex notion of virtue emerges, one that
will lend itself conceptually to more meaningful research
and to more practicable applications. This approach will
aid in analyzing the person not only as object of empirical
study, but also as subject of action.
While not without controversy among Christian
approaches to action and ethics, Aquinas’s virtue theory
merits attention because of its ability to interrelate develop-
mental, purposeful, and ethical domains and for its capac-
ity to support a nuanced conversation between faith and
religious practices (theology), reason and wisdom-based
practices (philosophy), and measured observations and
therapeutic applications (the human sciences, especially
psychology). It serves as an explicitly integrative model,
drawing together insights into the person, value, virtue,
human nature, and grace from biblical, patristic, and other
Christian sources, in addition to classic Western philosophy,
especially Aristotle, Plato, the Stoics, and Arab philosophers.
How does Aquinas understand virtue? His Summa
Theologiae (Summary of Theology [henceforth referred to
as ST], 1265–1273/1981, I–II, 55.4) defines virtue as a good
operative disposition, which involves a firm and stable
quality to act well. Philosophically, ‘virtue denotes a deter-
minate perfection of a power’ that is, a particular strength
of a human operative capacity (ST I–II, 56.1). Theologically,
he uses a definition attributed to St. Augustine: ‘Virtue is a
good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of
which no one can make bad use, which God works in us,
without us’ (Augustine, 387–395/1993, II.19: PL 32.1268;
cited in ST I–II, 55.4). The last clause refers to infused virtue,
a type of virtue that is informed by God’s gifts of faith,
hope, and love. Vice, on the contrary, works against human
nature, reason, and the essence of virtue (ST I–II, 71.1).
As mentioned, there are at least three dimensions that
underlie Aquinas’s notion of virtue.  They are the act-based
(performative), agent-based (perfective and corrective),
and the reason-based (purposeful) dimensions  (Table 1).
Reason-based dimension: Flourishing as the goal
and norm for virtue
What is the standard and goal at which the person aims,
for Aquinas? What is the good of the person? Rooted in the
teaching of the Book of Genesis (1:27), the human capacity
for flourishing and virtue is found in being created in the
image of God. This capacity is manifest in human intelli-
gence, free will, and self-determination (Aquinas, ST I–II,
Prologue). The image of God flourishes in the human person
through the constancy and creativity of virtues, construed
as dispositions that fulfill the human person in partial, com-
plete, and ultimate ways. Aquinas addresses the different

Table 1. Aquinas on the three dimensions of virtue.
Dimension Aspect of virtue Contribution
Act-based Acts Good acts and behavior
Agent-based Habits or habitual disposi- Capacities modified (personal & rela-
tions tional): cognition (reason), volition
(will), affective (emotions)
Reason-based Reasonable standards, rela- Objective reasons, norms, values
tional goals, moral norms,
and spiritual aims
types of flourishing according to their being acquired or
received as gifts, that is, on the one hand, acquired moral
virtues (practical wisdom, justice, courage, and self-control)
and acquired intellectual virtues (wisdom, understanding,
science/knowledge, as well as art and practical reason) or,
on the other hand, theological virtues (faith, hope, and
love) and the infused moral virtues that they inform.
His (and our) interest in virtue is more than a functional
one. It does involve how cognitive and affective capaci-
ties become strengthened and virtuous and the way they
interrelate, but it also involves the purposeful reference for
flourishing, which is found in the human person (Aquinas,
I, qq. 75–102; Wojtyla, 1960/1993), as understood through
experience, reason, faith, and love. Human nature and
the human person provide a standard for love and the
other virtues, what Wojtyla calls the ‘Personalistic Norm’
and what Aquinas calls the good. Flourishing is not sim-
ply identified with the function of the virtuous person’s
biopsychosocial capacities per se, but in the interplay of
the finality (goals) and goods that fulfill at personal and
social, natural and supernatural levels (ST I–II, qq.1–5).
Ultimately, Aquinas’s view of complete and perfect virtue
involves a reason-based and faith-informed imitation of
Christ, who is the Divine model and mentor and the pri-
mary exemplar of all true and complete virtue.
In order to apply this approach to future research and
good practices, we need to be attentive to Aquinas’s under-
standing of nature and grace (ST I, 1.8, ad 2). How is grace
understood to inform nature? That is, how does God’s
interaction with people build up human nature instead of
destroy it? I do not need to convince psychotherapists of
the reality of human suffering and pathology. But there is a
utility in introducing the notion of sin and vice. According
to Aquinas (ST I–II, 71–89), true virtue is contrasted not only
to semblances of virtue, but also to the influence of sin
and vice: (1) negative human experiences of suffering and
separation from God (effects of original sin), (2) estrange-
ment from our neighbors and ourselves (influence of per-
sonal and social sin), and (3) entanglement with negative
spiritual forces (evil influences). Sin and vice do not directly
cause mental disease (John 9: 2–3). However, inasmuch as
humans make bad choices and engrain those choices in
vices, the effects of sin (original, person, and social sin)
continue to plague human flourishing, even when there is
The Journal of Positive Psychology   3
Goal Cause/condition
Free moral acts Efficient
Moral and spiritual develop- Material and formal
ment and character
Personal flourishing and Final
spiritual beatitude
a significant conversion or healing (Aquinas, ST I, 49.1; I–II
qq. 71–89).
While sin may be seen as the negative aspect of
Aquinas’s vision (like the negative approach to psychol-
ogy), it is his Christian conviction and hope that God’s plan
offers new sources of healing and forgiveness that come
through recognition of weakness (2 Cor. 12:9–10) and the
effect of grace, especially the theological virtues of faith,
hope, and love (Rom. 5:15; 1 Cor. 13), and their influence
on the other virtues in the life of the Spirit (Rom. 8).
Where do we start to discuss the use of virtue in psychol-
ogy? For Aquinas, we start with the goal (end), which serves
as the standard or norm for virtue. The primary referent, for
Aquinas’s view of virtue, is the person’s ultimate goal, the
complete flourishing or the beatitude that has God as its ori-
gin, means, and final end (Mt. 5; Lk. 6; Aquinas, ST I–II, 3.8; I–II,
5.6; I–II, 69; & II–II, 188.6). The vocation of flourishing is to be in
accord with natural law (rational creature’s participation in the
eternal law; ST I–II, 91.2) and Divine Law, especially the Divine
Law of love (ST I–II, 106–108; Mk 12:30–31). Bodily strength,
mental health, ethical soundness, and spiritual well-being
are all framed by this ultimate end. The difference between
these aspects of flourishing has not been understood in rad-
ical reductionist or dualist two-substance anthropologies,
which have often seen the conflict between these goods in
tragic terms.
Aquinas avoids the befuddlement of incommensura-
bility and tragic conflict theses by recognizing a twofold
order (duplex ordo) in such things (as mental health and
spiritual well-being) that seem to lack a common mean.
There is an ordering among diverse goods and an order-
ing to an absolutely ultimate goal and purpose; that is,
the ordering of the goods of mental health and acquired
virtues (including partial aspects of spiritual well-being)
must also be oriented toward the absolutely ultimate goal
of personal union with God (McInerny, 2006). This ultimate
goal has two roles in Aquinas’s action theory: it is the first
in intention and the last in execution and enjoyment. By
our natural and spiritual inclinations of body and soul, we
are drawn to this ultimate goal or end. It is the origin of
human action, as its primary aim. Knowing and loving a
goal permits one to direct life accordingly. Another param-
eter for flourishing and moral development is established
by the created origin of mankind (ST I, 75–102; I–II, 94.2).
4    C. S. Titus
However, in light of evolutionary sociobiology, this posi-
tion is anything but uncontroversial.
The debate on common nature, ethical value, and psy-
chological normalcy is complex and longstanding. Even
in the midst of a multitude of contingencies and disor-
ders, at personal, interpersonal/social, and environmental
levels, Aquinas’s view retains a non-relativist position. Of
Aquinas’s numerous contributions to this ongoing debate,
one is particularly helpful: the distinction between basic
human nature and second-nature, that is, between nature
and nurture. On the one hand, human beings share a bed-
rock commonality, called human nature, which grounds
universal ethical principles and makes the person an
object of rational study; it involves the essential stability
of mankind. On the other hand, human persons are unique
and acquire a ‘second nature’ by the effect of nurture, the
exercise of free will, and the application of ethical princi-
ples as an acting subject (ST I–II, 52.1).
Act-based dimension of virtue: Free and responsible
acts, behavior, and practices
A Christian virtue approach to psychology also recognizes
the importance of acts, their consequences, and the nature
of freedom. In order to be considered virtuous, acts must
be free and responsible. Aquinas’s Christian metaphysi-
cal virtue approach to free acts cannot be explained by a
reductionist concept of the body (material causes), that
is, by the person’s genome (DNA and epigenetic develop-
ment) and neural-activity alone. Explaining experiences
of free will requires more than reporting of phenomena
as well. It requires what Aquinas calls efficient, formal,
and final causes or conditions (Spitzer, 2010) that com-
plement the material causes found in the genes and brain
and expressed in non-conscious processes and observa-
ble behavior, which all should be considered personal and
interpersonal. Virtuous acts are the result of the person
moving him or herself to act (efficient cause or condition).
Aquinas’s perspective recognizes, however, that the per-
son is also moved by God in particular acts, such as the
infused virtues of courage, hope, faith, and so on (ST, I–II,
q. 68; Titus, 2006). Moreover, virtuous acts must express
the measure of human nature, and one’s commitments
to truth and personal unity of capacities of body and soul
(formal cause or condition). Lastly, people freely act toward
everyday goals that also can be aimed at ultimate flourish-
ing (final cause or condition).
On these counts (efficient, formal, and final conditions),
it is Aquinas’s conviction that the human person has the
capacity to be influenced by divine grace as well as a com-
munity of faith, without compromising human free will (ST
II–II, 52.2 ad 3; Schmitz, 2009). However, this discussion
of free moral acts requires further considerations of the
relationship between acts and moral character, that is, the
agent’s disposition to act virtuously, inspired by flourishing
and the reason-based dimension of virtue as well as by
material causes and conditions.
Agent-based dimension of virtues: The contribution
of character to flourishing
Virtuous and vicious acts imply not only ‘what we do’ (mat-
ter of the act) and ‘why we do it’ (the reason, intention, and
motivation, and value underlying the act) but also ‘who we
become through our acts’ (the character established by
the acts). Virtuous and vicious acts constitute our moral
character and dispose us to act in particular ways. As pope
John Paul II (1993) says in Veritatis Splendor, while citing
Aquinas (ST I–II, 1.3), ‘Human acts are moral acts because
they express and determine the goodness and evil of the
individual who performs them’ (n. 71). They delineate the
‘profound spiritual traits’ (n. 71), the good and evil charac-
teristics that mark the person who performs them.
For Aquinas (ST I–II, 51.3, 63.1; 2 Thes. 2:13), the habit-
ual disposition of virtue involves the type of good moral
development that requires effort and assistance in build-
ing up human capacities to think, will, and feel (ST I–II,
94.2). He defines an operative disposition as an acquired
quality that we change only with great effort (ST I–II, 55.1),
in contrast to biological predispositions which he holds
are even more resistant to change. For example, habitual
dispositions to act for justice and respect for the basic dig-
nity of each person become second nature by internalizing
the good that is in accord with human nature and reason,
and natural and divine law. This habitualization brings sta-
bility, continuity, and also flexibility to rational, volitional,
or emotional capacities. Nonetheless, these capacities are
neither impervious to change, for better or for worse, nor
are they deterministic and mechanical.
Furthermore, Aquinas holds that the gift of grace builds
up natural inclinations and habitual dispositions of human
nature in the process called sanctification (or deification,
as Orthodox Christians would say, or theosis as Methodists
would say). Dispositions are strengthened, as the person
uses reason to move toward prosocial values and virtues
and away from disvalues or evil, following divine law and
grace, through which the human agent moves him or her-
self while being moved by God (ST II–II, 52.2 ad 3).
Vice also works at the level of the habitual dispositions
of emotion, will, and reason. But, in contrast, vice internal-
izes the semblance of good or patent evil that in reality
runs counter to human nature, reason, natural law, and
flourishing. For example, the dispositional aspect of evil
is found in vices, such as injustice or a lack of self-control,
as well as in addictions to substances and in disordered
attachments, such as hatred, pornography, or adultery.

Both acts and dispositions of virtues and vices have typi-
cal characteristics. While virtues are in accord with reason
(and from a Christian view, as infused, depend on divine
grace), the vices involve disobedience to the natural law
and the law of love as in a lack of the rational measure that
ought to be present in an act or disposition. We will return
to Aquinas’s virtue foundation and frame, and implications
for its use in psychology later.
Positive psychology
The positive psychology movement has established an
important frame for research and interventions using vir-
tues in psychology. It has recognized the significance of
positive goals, virtues, character strengths, and situational
themes for research and good practical applications. The
human goals identified by the positive psychology move-
ment are assumed, being drawn from amidst a survey of
distinct philosophies and religions from across human
experience (Peterson & Park, 2011; Peterson & Seligman,
2004). The choices about these presuppositions define
and limit the positive psychology synthesis. This is not
a bad thing in itself. Having presuppositions is not only
the nature of any such an endeavor, it is the cost of any
endeavor, including genetic ones, that is, since assump-
tions open and close possibilities of discourse, understand-
ing, and interventions.
Virtues and flourishing in positive psychology
There are several reasons that the positive psychology
approach is of particular interest for any virtue tradition.
A first interest is moral. Positive psychology focuses con-
temporary research on additional dimensions of moral
development that are not found in exclusivist stage theo-
ries (Titus, 2013). It addresses the goals, values, purposes,
and reasons or ends that motivate people in developing
and healing. In order to do so, it presses into the service
of moral psychology a fuller concept of virtue than that
of Piaget (1932/1997) or Kohlberg (1981). In particular, it
employs a wide range of virtues, character strengths, and
situational themes in order to circumscribe psychologi-
cal flourishing, moral development, and social well-be-
ing. A second interest is analytical. Positive psychology
is comprehensive in coverage and multidisciplinary in its
sources. It joins biopsychosocial research to psychological
concern for positive experience, traits, and flourishing. A
third interest is contrastive. Explicit acknowledgment of
positive psychology’s world views and value-systems per-
mits comparative studies and helps to avoid falling into
incommensurable comparisons.
For the readership of this journal, this article does not
need to present Seligman’s virtue theory and empirical
The Journal of Positive Psychology   5
research on flourishing and the development of the vir-
tues (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Seligman, 2012), and
space limits do not permit it. Instead, I will now move
on to address the ethical and purposeful references for
his work, what philosophers call the normative basis
(the positive standard and goal) for the person and
flourishing.
Ethical reference and normative basis for positive
psychology
In its analysis of positive subjective experiences,
­individual traits, and the institutions that enable them,
positive psychology seeks moral references for good
character in two ways: (1) through the nature of virtue
and its criteria and (2) through the notion of a positive
human nature.
First, Peterson and Seligman (2004) associate positive
psychology’s consensual classification with lessons from
a long philosophical tradition concerned with morality
explained in terms of virtues. The very first Greek philos-
ophers asked, ‘What is the good of a person?’ (Peterson &
Seligman, 2004, p. 10). Their moral framework ‘led them
to examine character through particular virtues. Socrates,
Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and others enumer-
ated virtues, regarding them as the traits of character that
make someone a good person.’
While adopting this descriptive, pre-empirical moral
anthropology of virtue, however, Peterson and Seligman
(2004) distance the inner motivation of the virtues from
moral laws, which they suppose to be merely external dic-
tates. They critique the moral law theory that they find in
ethical egoism, utilitarianism, as well as in social contract
and divine command theories. Their psychological ven-
ture, as they say, ‘needs to downplay prescriptions for the
good life (moral laws) and instead emphasize the why and
the how of good character’ (Peterson & Seligman, 2004,
p. 10), which are found in the virtues and character
strengths. They thus separate the normative from the
descriptive, that is, the reflection on ethical standards from
the observation of psychological function.
Seeking to justify and emphasize psychology’s specific
competency in the domain of virtue, they employ the work
of Yearley (1990) to identify three related realms of phil-
osophical ethics that constitute a good character. These
three realms are:
(1)  injunctions, commands, and prohibitions, for
example, the ‘thou shalt nots’ and the occa-
sional ‘thou shalts’ in the Ten Commandments;
(2)  
the virtuous predispositions to act in ways
leading to a recognizable human excellence or
instance of flourishing (usually hierarchically
organized); and
6    C. S. Titus

(3)  the ways of life protected by the injunctions and (p. 270) in order to adjudicate moral conflicts and evil
picked out by the virtues (as cited in Peterson & desires. While there are multiple pathways to flourishing,
Seligman, 2004, p. 85). evil is not one of them. They say that those who do evil ‘are
unlikely to thrive because their motives and personality
Peterson and Seligman (2004) note that the second
dispositions are incongruent with positive human nature
and third realms, while vaguer than the first, constitute
and universal psychological needs’ (pp. 269, 270). However,
the expertise of the positive psychology classification pro-
this is only a probabilistic argument. For while they refer
ject. Although the hierarchy of the virtues is somewhat
to a positive human nature and value-based virtues, they
ambiguous, the virtues continuously attest: (1) the need
also admit that this conception of virtue theory does not
for rationality and choice; (2) the need to reflect upon one’s
satisfy the philosopher, who argues in support of basic
own dispositions and expressions of the major areas of
moral principles and adjudicates between conflicting eth-
virtue; and (3) the influence of life-commitments and of
ical norms. Peterson and Seligman (2004) distinguish their
culture on the development and on the expression of the
approach to positive psychology by situating their ‘richer
virtues. Each virtue, in psychological language, is ‘a prop-
psychological content and greater explanatory power’
erty of the whole person and the life that the person leads’
(p. 88) not at a normative ethical and philosophical or
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 87). This moral psychology
spiritual and theological level but at a descriptive level
of virtue theory describes moral motivation and how to
of character strengths based in a wide view of virtue and
resolve psychological conflicts in terms of pertinent vir-
study of the semblances of virtue.
tues. For example, Peterson and Seligman (2004) claim
Considering the implications for professional ethics,
that resolving conflicts of partiality is accomplished by
Handelsman, Knapp, and Gottlieb (2011) address var-
recognizing that ‘we should love our friends and family
ious themes and variations in what they call ‘Positive
members (partiality) and be benevolent to people in gen-
Ethics’. They encourage a change of perspective from
eral (impartiality)’ (p. 88).
an approach of minimal rules to one of aspirational
Within this frame, Peterson and Seligman (2004) identify
ethics, in which practitioners seek to follow ‘higher
ten criteria for virtues and character traits, which  must:
ethical ideals’ (p. 105), while also adhering to profes-
(1) lead to flourishing by a good life; (2) correspond with
sional rules and duties. They encourage three levels to
moral values; (3) not diminish others; (4) have a non-
expand: self-awareness; professional awareness (and
felicitous opposite; (5) be a character trait or be trait-like;
ethical acculturation); and global awareness (cultural,
(6) be conceptually identifiable; (7) be supported by a
political, and civic diversity issues). They call for ethi-
consensus (8) be identifiable in prodigies and (9) in selective
cal excellence, but make no mention of human nature,
absences; and (10) be supported by cultural, institutional,
the human person, or flourishing as a standard for pos-
and social practices. These criteria (especially items 1
itive ethics. This result is less than satisfying since they
through 4) have a more or less explicit moral dimension.
employ ‘professional rules with personal principles and
By referring to the stability of human nature and the
values’ (p. 105), but without conviction in a non-relativ-
possibility of empirically verifying value-based personal-
ist moral reference point. Like Peterson and Seligman
ity traits and virtues, the positive psychology classification
(2004), Handelsman et al. (2011) express suppositions
resists the reductionist positivism of the early twentieth
that tend toward moral relativism, or at least, lack affir-
century (Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 59). Nonetheless,
mation of objective moral boundaries.
what are Peterson and Seligman’s assumptions? Emerging
out of the same project at the Values in Action Institute,
Aquinas and positive psychology on the use of
Linley and Joseph (2004) describe how implicit assump-
the virtues in psychology
tions about human nature direct the practice of positive
psychology. They also explicitly recognize the restrictive This article has given overviews of Aquinas’s and Peterson
influence of Western liberal individualism on positive psy- and Seligman’s conceptions of virtue, flourishing, and
chology’s construal of character strengths, human nature, normativity (positive anthropological standards, values,
and society (Linley & Joseph, 2004, p. 719). Fowers (2012a), and goals). My goal now is to identify how their world
for his part, also warns that the contemporary revival of views and value-systems influence their understanding
virtue and flourishing in psychology has been marked by of virtue’s role in flourishing and the use of the virtues in
hidden or disguised suppositions of individualism and psychology. In order to demonstrate how Peterson and
instrumentalism. Seligman’s approach compares to Aquinas’s, I will focus
In their boldest explicit affirmation about a founda- on ‘integrity’, one of positive psychology’s strategic char-
tional supposition, Peterson and Seligman (2004), for their acter strengths, and on the ‘connection of the virtues’, as
part, call upon the concept of a ‘positive human nature’ a dynamic needed to approach flourishing.

Seligman on integrity
Integrity is a significant moral theme in positive psychol-
ogy. In Flourish, Seligman (2012) situates ‘integrity’ as a
virtue strength needed for the development of courage
and gives ‘integrity’ a place in the Values in Action Institute
Survey of Character Strengths (pp. 250, 251). Integrity is
also a significant moral theme in the Oxford Handbook of
Positive Psychology (Lopez & Snyder, 2011), especially the
article on ‘Positive Ethics’ (Handelsman, Knapp, & Gottlieb,
2011). But the most significant account of integrity is found
in Character Strengths and Virtues, where Peterson and
Seligman (2004) construe the virtue of courage as having
four character strengths, which ‘entail the exercise of will
to accomplish goals in the face of opposition’ (p. 199). As
one of the character strengths of courage, integrity is sig-
nificant for understanding the moral texture and vision of
flourishing embodied in the positive psychology approach.
Peterson and Seligman (2004) define integrity as:
a character trait in which people are true to themselves,
accurately presenting – privately and publicly – their
internal states, intentions, and commitments. Such per-
sons accept and take responsibility for their feelings and
behaviors, owning them, as it were, and reaping substan-
tial benefits by doing so. (pp. 249, 250)
More succinctly, they say that it involves ‘moral probity and
self unity’ (p. 250).
In this definition of integrity, Peterson and Seligman
(2004) hold up the ideal of being true to oneself, which is
at times influenced arguably by individualist biases, either
as a transient stage in moral development or as a relativ-
ist cultural phenomenon. However, as philosopher Taylor
(1991) has argued in The Ethics of Authenticity, the moral
ideal of being true to oneself need not be identified with
debased forms of relativism or an individualism of selfish
fulfillment. Alexis de Tocqueville (1835/2012), moreover,
identifies the potential prosocial influence of enlightened
self-interest. It is significant, furthermore, whether ‘integ-
rity’ is viewed as having specifically psychological ends,
such as the calming of disruptive emotions or a sense
of self-unity, or as having moral ends, as constancy in
intending and doing the good. Our question here is: Does
Peterson and Seligman’s notion of integrity avoid the trap
of individualism – selfish flourishing – and the relativist
eclipse of moral ends? Furthermore, does its vision of the
person influence positive psychology’s research goals and
suggestions for clinical practice? How does it compare to
a Christian approach to positive psychology?
First, as we can see in their definitions of integrity,
Peterson and Seligman (2004) attempt to connect the
emotional and moral domains. They make references to
the ethics of intentions, commitments, responsibility,
feelings, and behavior. They also speculate that feelings
of psychological integrity should correlate with behavioral
The Journal of Positive Psychology   7
and observer-based measures of honesty and authenticity
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 270).
Second, Peterson and Seligman employ the notion of
the self to morally evaluate the content of psychological
integrity. By recognizing the roles of goals, talents, and val-
ues in identity and integrity development, they effectively
resist theories that construe the self as a mere fiction or a
set of evolving images or sentiments (Peterson & Seligman,
2004, pp. 250–265). According to them, everyone strug-
gles for greater integrity. Nevertheless, the question of evil
poses problems for this concept and human flourishing in
general. Attempting to resist a value-free stance, Peterson
and Seligman (2004) state:
From our own perspective, evil people can be authentic;
that is, their sense of self can be true to antisocial motives
and personality dispositions. However, these people are
unlikely to thrive because their motives and personality
dispositions are incongruent with positive human nature
and universal psychological needs. Still, developing a
sense that accurately represents one’s personality may be
an important first step in changing the personality – evil
people who realize who they have become can then be
motivated to become something different. (pp. 269, 270)
Peterson and Seligman thus move from considerations of
the coherency of psychological function to a normative
statement about the content of flourishing. In order to
address the problem of evil, they distinguish three levels
of moral allegiance: (1) the self (sense of self and its rep-
resentations), (2) one’s personality dispositions and com-
mitments, and (3) positive human nature and universal
psychological needs. The first two are based normatively
in the third, ‘positive human nature’ (Peterson & Seligman,
2004, p. 270), which is their source for ethical standards
and fundamental values.
Furthermore, they conduct a meta-analysis of stud-
ies measuring moral integrity, honesty, and authenticity
and the factors that promote or inhibit them (Peterson &
Seligman, 2004, pp. 255–270). Several insights from these
studies have implications for virtue theory. First, develop-
mental studies since Piaget (1932/1997) have identified
different moral reasoning styles indicating that honesty
and integrity intensify during childhood but do not nec-
essarily continue to increase in adolescence (Gallup News
Service, 2000, as cited in Peterson & Seligman, 2004). This
finding suggests that the development of virtue is not
complete with the attainment of a mature level of rea-
soning. Even though cognitive-developmental theory sug-
gests that higher order abstractions (formal operational
thinking) are a crucial factor for integrity, high levels of
cognitive intelligence and university education do not cor-
relate with higher integrity scores (Harter, 1999, as cited
in Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Harter & Monsour, 1992,
as cited in Peterson & Seligman, 2004). This shows that
integrity is determined as much by other factors, namely
8    C. S. Titus
values and life experience, as by cognitive ability (Peterson
& Seligman, 2004, p. 265).
In this regard, the Moral Integrity Survey suggests that
a person needs not only reflection upon moral integrity
but also felt attraction to it and coherent behavior (Olson,
1998, as cited in Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 262). A study
on the achievement of identity status suggests that an
interconnection of moral cognition, affect, and behavior
passes through stages, although no singular stage theory
seems predominant at present (Waterman, 1993, as cited
in Peterson & Seligman, 2004, pp. 264, 265). Developmental
studies have also indicated the significance that role mod-
els and culture play in leading toward either honesty or
dishonesty and toward more or less individual or social
notions of authenticity (Peterson & Seligman, 2004,
pp. 265–267). Furthermore, positive psychology has
started to correlate neurobiological integration and envi-
ronmental conditions ‘that both promote and prevent
authentic self-experience and self-development’ (Peterson
& Seligman, 2004, p. 270).
In sum, Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) notion of integ-
rity promotes a unity of affections, intentions, and com-
mitments that are congruent with ‘positive human nature
and universal psychological needs’ (p. 269). Integrity, taken
with positive psychology’s notion of practical wisdom (as
underlying intentions, commitments, and every virtue),
yields a rich description of the psychological function of
good character and virtue. Peterson and Seligman assume,
however, that positive psychology is not competent to
address moral considerations and ethical norms (which
they state is the task of moral philosophers). Positive psy-
chology can only describe psychological function, which
restricts its reach to only certain significant aspects of the
person’s life that are needed to account for the efficacy of
mental health practice. This assumption underlies a major
difference between Seligman and Aquinas’s understand-
ing of the virtues and flourishing, in terms of the connec-
tion of the virtues, as we shall now see.
Aquinas on connecting the virtues
Aquinas’s philosophical understanding of the person
and flourishing recognizes the need to attain wholeness
through personal unity (unitas personae) and an intercon-
nection of the character strengths and their principal (or
cardinal) virtues (ST III, 19.2 ad 4). Without extensive dis-
cussion of psychological states and their developmental
paths toward or away from flourishing (this is a particular
strength and contribution of positive psychology), Aquinas
construes the connection of the virtues as a positive goal
or calling and life-long project inasmuch as each virtue has
a role in guaranteeing the moral exercise or excellence of
the others. However, this approach is more than analytical.
It involves biopsychosocial well-being (including psycho-
logical function), while also being existential, metaphys-
ical, and ethical. At philosophical and theological levels,
Aquinas, along with Aristotle and Augustine before him,
argues that the drive toward a connection of the virtues
is the core of a life of excellence, defined as a good and
flourishing life sought through everyday friendship, love,
and the contemplation of the divine (ST I–II, 65.1–5).
In Aquinas’s virtue theory, practical wisdom has a spe-
cial role in interconnecting the other acquired virtues. For
the practically wise person makes conscious judgments
with and concerning their family, friends, and colleagues,
treating them justly, mustering courage in the face of fear-
ful situations, and managing one’s desires with self-control.
This is not a rationalist or individualist vision; it includes the
goods of reason, will, and emotion, that is, of psychologi-
cal function and personal action as rooted in and tending
toward biopsychosocial, moral, and spiritual flourishing.
Each aspect of virtuous character not only participates in
practical reason but is also required for practical wisdom.
We need the virtue strengths of reason, will, and the emo-
tions (cognitive and affective capacities expressing psy-
chological function and prosocial strengths), that is, each
aspect of virtue, to express a complete sense of what is
true, good, and right tends toward the promotion of per-
sonal well-being, social goods, and spiritual flourishing.
Thus, the major virtues furnish the conditions needed for
the proper exercise of practical wisdom. For psycholog-
ical function (including promptness, ease, and joy, or at
least being freed from distress or compulsivity) gets its
practical moral bearings from virtuous dispositions. This
view on the interconnection of the virtues is intellectually
convincing and humanly viable only if the virtues shape
mature psychological function with personal, moral, and
spiritual content. For Aquinas, the virtues involve psycho-
logical function but more. They involve apt means toward
fitting ends, including personal and just interactions with
others and an ultimate, divine end. Practical wisdom tends
toward an interconnection of the intellectual, volitional,
emotional, and relational aspects of life, which includes
but cannot be reduced to biopsychosocial health and
function.
Aquinas’s Christian approach to positive psychology
also recognizes a primacy of the theological virtues and
their role in connecting the virtues. In the writings of St.
Paul, faith, hope, and love are the interwoven core of the
Christian life, ‘and the greatest of these is love’ (1 Cor. 13:13).
These three inform the self-understanding and life of the
Christian, along with the Gifts of the Holy Spirit (such as
wisdom, understanding, counsel, courage; Isaiah 11:2–3)
and the Beatitudes (Mt 5; Lk 6). In act-, agent-, and rea-
son-based dimensions, the theological virtues also serve
to progressively transform the cognitive, volitional, and

emotive capacities underlying practical wisdom, justice,
courage, and self-control, with their associated infused
virtues.
Aquinas’s developmental virtue theory, furthermore,
identifies intermediate states that, in a practical sense,
approach full connection of the virtuous dispositions. It
is, however, not all or nothing, virtue or vice, flourishing
or languishing. The goal establishes a set of complete vir-
tues that are properly disposed to participate in the good
of well-formed practical wisdom (ST I–II, 58.1, 58.2; II–II,
47–56). Developmental and corrective therapeutic paths
strengthen the connection of one virtue with the others;
for example, growth in a mother’s hope for her child’s
academic success can support the exercise of self-control
and patience in relating to the child. However, virtues are
imperfectly connected when these capacities are disposed
toward contrary aims, for example, when one masters fear
in order to do evil, such as when one effectively controls
one’s anxiety about being caught in the act of adultery,
fraud, or murder. Such semblances of virtue and imperfectly
connected virtues, which do not yet have the full support
of the other domains of virtue, fight one against the other.
In sum, the virtues are drawn toward coherency, aim-
ing at a moral standard or goal, by practical wisdom (pru-
dence) and by friendship-love (charity). On a philosophical
level, the acquired cardinal virtues (justice, courage, and
self-control) work together directly through the virtue of
practical wisdom, which discerns, adjudicates, and exe-
cutes a good way to the goal, seeking a balance or middle
ground so as not to err by excess or defect (ST I–II, 64.2 &
65.1). On a theological level, friendship-love is the princi-
pal motor for the connection of the infused cardinal vir-
tues. Love, along with the virtues of faith and hope, make
explicit a theological purpose in life and grace-empow-
ered action that is not possible by natural human means
alone (ST II–II, 24.4–9). Christian love urges the practice of
self-giving in all the virtues, even in the face of weaknesses
and struggles due to the influence of past errors and ills.
Implications for a Christian approach to positive
psychology
At this point, I would like to ask: How do Aquinas’s sup-
positions about the person provide a basis for a Christian
approach to using virtues in positive psychology? And
how do Seligman’s insights on integrity and flourishing
compare with Aquinas’s insights on the connection of the
virtues and flourishing? In order to answer these ques-
tions, we need to distinguish how their perspectives share
functional and descriptive competencies, but differ as to
normative competency due to their respective world views
and value-systems, that is, their basic assumptions about
the person.
The Journal of Positive Psychology   9
First, Seligman’s approach explicitly seeks to be descrip-
tive, even though it involves implicit normative or moral
assumptions about virtue and flourishing. Empirical stud-
ies and meta-analyses within positive psychology identify
factors that illustrate the functioning and development
of virtue-specific situational themes at social, cogni-
tive, volitional, motivational, and neurobiological levels.
Certainly, such positive psychology research offers a type
of descriptive nuance far and above Aquinas’s effort. For
example, Seligman’s account of integrity helps explain the
connection of the virtues at the level of situational themes
or concrete practices. For instance, moral efficacy demands
a psychological basis that integrates thought, sentiment,
motivation, and behavior. Seligman’s work also helps to
explain how diversity at the situational level (based on
genetic predispositions, environmental and educational
factors, personal commitments, and so on) does not con-
tradict the connection of the major virtues (and character
strengths) at higher levels.
As another point of comparison, Seligman sets his
account of the phenomena of the internalization of ends
in terms of the psychological efficacy of ‘authentic goals’.
Studies on interiorized goals, such as that of Sheldon &
Elliot  (1999) indicate that remaining committed to and
internalizing one’s goals (goal self-concordance) predicts
enduring investment of effort and greater attainment of
goals, which in turn contribute to sustained satisfaction of
needs and a sense of global well-being and flourishing (as
cited in Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 263).
What is comparable between Seligman and Aquinas, in
this respect? Seligman’s understanding of internalization
offers enrichment at a psychological level of function. In
contrast, Aquinas’s understanding of the internalization of
moral goals and laws (from an external source to an internal
personal source) is primarily about the ethical and spiritual
level, while recognizing the input of the material disposi-
tions found in emotions and the senses (ST II–II, 24). To fully
understand the phenomena of internalization we need to
address the threefold moral standard influencing: (1) moral
acts, (2) the development of character, and (3) the goal of
spiritual and moral flourishing (John Paul II, 1993; Pinckaers,
1978/1998). Without attention to the reason-based aspect
of virtue (dimension 3), research and practices will miscon-
strue a significant developmental dynamic. Aquinas recog-
nizes the importance of the reason-based dimension in the
three stages of development found in friendship-love and
the other virtues. First, moral goals initially seem burden-
some and external. But the moral standards represented in
the person and the goal of flourishing shape our actions.
For example, acts of kindness to a difficult, aged neighbor
are challenging, especially at the beginning when a person
struggles, counting the cost. Second, people progressively
make these values and goals their own. They grow in the
10    C. S. Titus
thoughtfulness, willingness, and feeling in their tendency
to be friendly and caring to the neighbor. Finally, they truly
consider the difficult, aged neighbor a friend and anticipate
service to render as an expression of their sentiment for
him or her, who is considered another self (ST II–II, 23.1;
Rm. 8; Pinckaers, 1985/1995). There is spiritual and moral
depth throughout these three stages, and progressively a
spontaneity that resembles what positive psychology calls
flow (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2011). Underlying the
generosity, they come to a progressively greater under-
standing, love, and feeling for the neighbor, as another
child of God and as friend.
Conclusion: Assumptions and reasons that
underlie virtue and flourishing
Seligman and Aquinas’s approaches to flourishing and
virtue have commonalities and differences at the levels
of functional description and normative evaluation due to
their different world views and value-systems, as well as
to the methods that they employ due to their respective
approaches or disciplines. They both have a positive stance
toward the person and psychology. However, there is no
value-free position. They each have foundational assump-
tions that influence their conception and use of virtues
in understanding flourishing and languishing. Peterson
and Seligman’s (2004) secular or genetic style is ‘morality
explained in terms of virtues’ (p. 10) and ‘the social science
equivalent of virtue ethics, using the scientific method to
inform philosophical pronouncements about the traits of
a good person’ (p. 89). Its approach to morality and virtue
ethics, however, does not satisfy ethicists, be they secular
or religious. Moreover, it neither facilitates adjudication of
moral conflicts, nor integrates the spiritual dimension of
virtue and flourishing. However, Peterson and Seligman
(2004) do not really claim to do otherwise. Positive psychol-
ogy’s empirical studies add descriptive knowledge about
the function and development of the virtues. Further pos-
itive psychology research, however, would have a deeper
scope, if it were to attend to its presuppositions about the
moral and spiritual content operative in a person’s virtues,
character strengths, and practices. As useful as the current
descriptions may be, more is needed in addition to dis-
tinguishing eudemonic well-being from hedonic well-be-
ing (Fowers, 2012b), distinguishing mature/intrinsic from
immature/extrinsic religious orientation (Allport & Ross,
1967), improving criteria to identify spiritual flourishing
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004, pp. 600–613), and expanding
qualitative methodologies (Joseph & Linley, 2006).
Aquinas supposes that human persons are ethical and
spiritual beings, who are free to a large extent. They are
members of moral and spiritual communities that have
a coherency even in the midst of cultural differences and
moral errors. Aquinas’s approach recognizes, furthermore,
the effect of practical wisdom (reason) and friendship-love
(faith-informed reason and love as communion and self-
gift) in seeking flourishing by connecting the virtues, that
is, by seeking wholeness. The moral implications and con-
tent of this wholeness are arguably the proper domain of
philosophical and religious approaches to psychology and
ethics. But collaboration is not only possible, it is needed
for the human sciences to be pertinent. Human beings
are whole, although suffering from personal and interper-
sonal divisions. An integrated approach will recognize the
significance of practical reason and belief, including the
influences of communities of faith and religious author-
ity. I suggest that we need to consider how integrated
approaches, which include moral and spiritual referents,
can be more present in practical applications. But in order
to do so, the ethical convictions and religious beliefs that
influence people’s life of virtue need to be better observed
and accounted for in empirical research, narratives, and
other qualitative methodologies. If the ethical and spiritual
content is identified as pertinent to research, psychological
function can be studied in relation to the moral content of
the virtues and a more integrated notion of flourishing. But
if the moral and spiritual content of values and the virtues
are ignored as relative or irrelevant (Joseph & Linley, 2006,
p. 36) an opportunity for integration is lost.
In sum, Seligman and Aquinas’s differences in concep-
tualizing virtue come from their differences in assump-
tions about the person. Aquinas’s assumptions leave a
way to recognize moral and spiritual content, motivation,
and intention within virtues, which aids to explain certain
twists of moral psychology, the semblances of virtue, and
the diverse paths of connecting the virtues that lead to
positive moral development and human flourishing. This
approach furthermore, affirms the need to account for
act-based, agent-based, and reason-based dimensions of
virtue and flourishing and integrate them in research and
practical interventions. Seligman’s approach contributes a
wealth of observations. However, his approach itself leaves
little room to consider the reason-based dimension of vir-
tue (i.e. the implications of moral and spiritual supposi-
tions) when studying the acts and habitual dispositions
of the agent. These differences do not deny the real and
important contributions that Seligman has made to psy-
chology, e.g., the descriptive approach to ‘integrity’ and the
other virtues. Rather, opening the method to synthesize
the insights from both Seligman’s and Aquinas’s notions
of integrity and the connection of the virtues, respectively,
demonstrates an example of how to bring together com-
plementary elements for better understanding flourishing
and languishing.
Lastly, considering the distinctive qualities of Aquinas’s
assumptions about the person, his rich virtue theory, and

his emphasis on the connection of the virtues gives a hum-
ble theoretical contribution toward a Christian approach to
positive psychology. Further study on the influence of phil-
osophical and theological suppositions, moreover, should
contribute to understanding the use of virtues in positive
psychology, in general, and to a Christian approach to
psychology, in particular, bringing further clarity to the
role that virtues play in identifying the uniqueness of the
human person as both an object of study and an acting
subject in therapy.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank a number of colleagues for their invalua-
ble input, especially Frank Moncher, Paul Vitz, William Nordling,
Phil Scrofani, and Alex Ross, as well as two very insightful anon-
ymous reviewers from the Journal of Positive Psychology, as well
as Eric Johnson, the special editor of this volume. I would also
like to acknowledge the input from participants at three con-
ferences (at Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford; at a Society of
Christian Ethics annual convention; and at Conference organ-
ized by the Society for Christian Psychology), where previous
versions of this text were delivered. I would also like to express
my gratitude to my research assistants Kelsey Clemson, Maura
McGlynn, and especially Kaleb Long.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
ORCID
Craig Steven Titus   http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4839-1832
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