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Informationand Influence:Lobbyingfor Agendas
and Votes*
1. Introduction
Interestgroupsare typicallyseen to influence policyin two ways:
through thegivingofcampaigncontributions andthrough thedistribution
ofspecialistinformation. Although logicallydistinct,thesetwoactivities
are surelyrelatedempirically.The basicpremiseofthe"access' viewof
campaigncontributions, in particular,
is thatgroupsmakecontributions
to securetheattention oftherelevantlegislator. Despitesuchinterrela-
tionships,thispaperis concernedexclusively withtheroleofgroupsas
sourcesofpolicy-relevant information. In thiscontext,lobbying is strate-
gicinformation transmission.
Policyis a meansto an endand notan endin itself.Legislatorscare
aboutpolicyonlyinsofaras theycareaboutitsconsequences.Suchcon-
sequencesmaybe purely"political"(e.g., How are reelectionchances
affected?),or theymaybe technical(e.g., How willa revisedClean Air
Act hurtemployment in the car industry?). If thereis no uncertainty
abouthowpoliciesmap intoconsequences,thenthereis no issue here.
However,suchomniscience is rare,and decisionmakersare frequently
*Thefirst
versionofthispaperwas writtenwhileI was VisitingProfessor
ofEconom-
ics andPoliticalScienceat theUniversity
ofIowa. I amgratefultoTimFeddersenandthe
anonymous referees formanyusefulcomments on earlierversionsofthepieceandto NSF
forfinancialsupport.All remaining
errorsare myresponsibility.
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8oo David Austen-Smith
choosingpolicieswithoutcompleteinformation on theirconsequences,
in whichcase, information becomesvaluable,and thosewhopossess it
are accordingly in a positionto influence policy.
In an important seriesofpapers,Gilliganand Krehbiel(1987,1989,
1990)studya legislativedecision-making processin whicha committee
is informed aboutthe consequencesof policydecisionsrelativeto the
majority of theHouse. Theirfocusis on theHouse's selectionofrules
forconsideration ofcommittee proposalsto changethestatusquo, espe-
cially:Whenwilla majoritarian House agreeto a closedrulethatsurren-
dersmonopolyagenda-setting powerto a minority committee? Loosely
speaking,theansweris whentheexpectedinformational gainsundera
closedruleoutweightheexpecteddistribution losses fromthatrule.In
effect, thedistributional loss is a pricepaid by the House in exchange
forthecommittee revealingmoreinformation abouttheconsequencesof
policy.For manydecisions,however,thedegreeofinformational asym-
metry betweencommittee membersand thelegislative bodyas a whole
is negligible.Instead,itis interest groupswhopossesstherelevantinfor-
mation(Rothenberg1989; Hansen 1991). Unlike legislators,interest
groupsorlobbyists haveno legislative decision-making rights.Butnever-
thelesstheycan,as observedabove,influence policythrough thespecial-
istinformation theyofferlegislators.
In whatfollows,I buildon the basic Gilliganand Krehbiel(1987)
modelby,interalia, introducing a lobbyistin additionto thecommittee
and theHouse. Legislativedecisionmakingis by closedrule,and only
thelobbyist may(butdoes notnecessarily) possesstechnical information
abouttheconsequencesof selectinganygivenpolicy.All theagents-
legislators and lobbyist-havepreferences overconsequencesthat,with
theirbeliefsabouttherelationship betweenpoliciesand consequences,
inducepreferences overpoliciesperse. Becausepreferences overconse-
quencesareprimitive, "influence"occursonlythrough changingbeliefs.
Andtheextentto whichanyinformation offered to alterbeliefsis effec-
tivedependson thecredibility ofthelobbyist tothelegislator inquestion.
Such credibility is endogenousto the modeland dependspartlyupon
how closelythelobbyist'spreferences overconsequencesreflectthose
ofthelegislator beinglobbied,andon howconfident is thelegislator
that
thelobbyistis in factinformed.
An important issue hereconcernsidentifying thecircumstances un-
derwhicha lobbyist choosestolobbythecommittee attheagenda-setting
stage,or to lobbythe House at the subsequentvotingstage,or both.
Clearly,thecharacterof theinformation thatmightbe transmitted and
thenatureoftheinfluence thatmight be exertedis likelytodiffer between
thesestages.Amongthe resultspresentedbelow are, first,thatthere
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 8oi
2. Model
Agents and Decision Sequence
Thereis an exogenouslygivenstatusquo policy,s E R. Changes
fromthestatusquo are governedby a closedrulewherebya committee
has the sole legislativerightto proposean alternative policy,following
whichthelegislature as a wholevoteson whether to acceptthecommit-
tee's proposalor to retainthestatusquo. Assumethatthecommittee is
a unitaryactor,C, and thatthereis a pivotalvoterinthelegislature as a
whole(theHouse),H. BothC andH haveprimitive preferences overthe
consequencesof policydecisionsthat,ex ante, are knownonlywith
uncertainty. In additionto C and H, thereis a thirdinterested party,a
lobbyistL, who has no legislative decision-making rightsbuthas access
to boththecommittee and theHouse. Moreover,relativeto bothC and
H, L mightbe betterinformed aboutthe consequencesof legislation.
Consequently, lobbyingin thismodelis strategic information transmis-
sion,in whichL seeksto persuadeC or H to behavein certainwaysby
providing information aboutthe consequencesof theirlegislativedeci-
sions(Austen-Smith and Wright 1992).The sequenceofeventsanddeci-
sionsdetailedbelowis summarized in Figure1.
Threecentralaspectsof themodelare, first, thatonlythelobbyist
L has theopportunity to acquireinformation abouthowpoliciesmapinto
consequences;second,thatifL does acquiresuchinformation, it is pri-
vateinformation to L; and third,whether L has acquiredinformation is
itselfprivateinformation to L. However,withrespectto thislastpoint,
I assume,on theone hand,thatifL choosesto lobbysomelegislative
actorj E {C, H}, thenL can costlesslyprovetoj thatL has acquiredthe
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802 David Austen-Smith
Figure 1
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 803
2jt is worth
noting thatL learnsthetruevalueoftis considerably
thattheassumption
stronger thannecessary.Makingtheassumption theexposition.
facilitates
3Assuming thatL cannotlobbyH, orbothC andH together, at thisstage,is substan-
(FarrellandGibbons1989)andwillbe discussedfurther
tivelyrestrictive intheconcluding
section.Formally relaxing theassumption to subsequent
is deferred work.
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804 David Austen-Smith
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 805
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8o6 David Austen-Smith
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 807
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8o8 David Austen-Smith
4. Results
In whatfollows,let c* denotean arbitrary
equilibrium.Unlessex-
plicitlystatedotherwise, statements
equilibrium referto mostinfluential
equilibria.Formalstatementsof,andproofsfor,resultsare containedin
theappendix.
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 809
Proposals, Outcomes
7r(s, t)
Xc W/ t) = 7r - t
~~~~~y(IT, I
XC
.L ~ ~~~~~~
\
y(s, t) =s - \
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8io David Austen-Smith
Proposals, Outcomes
r\
< 7r~~~~(S,
t)
s yi r, t) = IT - t
XCW --
XH
sX + XC s+ 3xc 1
_ X
Y(S, t) = S - t\
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 8II
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8I2 David Austen-Smith
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 8I3
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8I4 David Austen-Smith
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LOBBYING
FORAGENDAS
ANDVOTES 8I5
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8i6 David Austen-Smith
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 8I7
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8I8 David Austen-Smith
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 8I9
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820 David Austen-Smith
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Figure 4. Equilibriumin Example 2
Outcomes
ir*Mr(m,s)
IT 1T(~,~S)
XL
(irr* + s)2
XH 0 i
t 121
S, t) = s t
y(IT*, t) T* - t
Key:
\ = Outcomey(., t),givenL informed
* = C's and H's expected (t, outcome) given L "stays
home"at theagendastage
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822 David Austen-Smith
Example 3
In thisexample,bothagendastageandvotestagelobbying
areinflu-
theclaimsofProposition
ential,illustrating 5.
Let s = XL = 0.3 and xc = 0.05. Then a* is such thatp* = 0.0789;
X*(t,s) = 0 V t < t* and X*(t, s) = m E Mc V t : t*, where t* =
0.3318. Hence, rr*(+,s) = 0.5478, and ar*(m,s) = 0.7159. In thiscase,
thereare L(t) that preferthe statusquo to the proposal Trr*(+,
s),
T(Qr*(4,s), s) = [0, 0.1239]; and thereare no L(t) preferring
the status
quo to a*(m, s), T(rr*(m,s), s) = 0. By Proposition 1, thereexistsan
influential
votingstagelobbyingstrategy, sinceE,H[tI t E T(,ar*(+,s), s)]
< (s + rr*(+, s))12. In particular,
as predictedby Proposition 5.3(ii),it
is thoseL(t) who did notlobbythecommittee activelywho nowlobby
the House actively; T(,ar*(@,s), s) C T?(s) = [0, t*). The relevantvote
stagelobbyingstrategy is thusXA*(t, ) n E MH V t E T(rr*(+,s), s),
and X*(t, ) = v t E T\T(rr*(q),s), s). So H votes for s against
V
Tr*(O, s) if and onlyifH is lobbiedand hearsthe speechn, and votes
againsts in all othercircumstances.Figure5 illustrates
theequilibrium.
(It is worthobservingherethatthe existenceof influentialvote stage
lobbyingbiases the committee'sproposals,relativeto the case of no
influentialvotestagelobbying;thisis a generalproperty.)
Example 4
In contrastto Example1, thesituation hereis one inwhichno influ-
entialagendastagelobbying is possible,butthereis influential
votestage
lobbying.However,as remarked inthediscussion followingProposition3,
the existenceof influential vote stage lobbyingper se is sufficient to
bias thecommittee's proposal.For althoughthecommittee receivesno
informationwhenchoosinga proposal(all informed L(t) "stay home"),
C recognizesthatdifferent agendaswillelicitdifferent votestagelobbying
behaviors.Consequently, C tradesoffchoosinga mostpreferred alterna-
tiveon thebasisofitspriorinformation on t alone,againstthelikelihood
thatsucha proposalwillelicitsuccessfullobbying onbehalfofthestatusquo.
Let s = 0, xc = 0.4, and XL = -0.2. ThenCr* is suchthatXaQ)
+ (byProposition 4.1); p* = 0.0734;andC's bestresponseis (see appen-
dix) 1r*(+, s) = 0.6647. (Note that 7r*(+, s) < b(s) = 0.9.) However,
T(rr*(dC,s), s) = [0, 0.5324] and so E,H[tIt E TQ(r*(4,s), s)] = 0.2662 <
(r*(+, s) + s)/2 = 0.3324.Therefore, by Proposition 1, thereexistsan
influentialvotingstagelobbyingstrategy suchthatX*(t, ) E MH v t E
T(Qr*(q,s), s) and X*(t, 4)= otherwise.Figure6 illustrates theequi-
librium.
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Figure 5. Equilibriumin Example 3
Outcomes
IT -=lT~s
IT(C S)\ \
S - XL
XC
XH = 1
y(IT*, t) T*- t
yQrr0, t) = ITO t
y(s, t) = s, t
Key:
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824 David Austen-Smith
in Example4
Figure6. Equilibrium
Outcomes
I _ 7T(4, S)
XC
-~~~~~~~~~~~~
S XH= 0
XL
\ X~~~~~~~~Y(M"
t) w' t
sr, s t) = - t
Key:
\ = Outcome
y(.,t)givenL informed
6. Conclusion
Thispaperis concernedwiththeextentto whichinterestgrouplob-
bying,modeledexclusivelyas information can be informa-
transmission,
tiveor influential
at agenda-setting
and votingstagesoflegislativedeci-
sionmaking.Amongtheresultsare thatinformed whochoose
lobbyists
notto lobbyat theagendastageare thosewhoseinformation is "low"
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 825
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826 David Austen-Smith
APPENDIX
(e2) 8 *() = 0 A
Xe 8; *0() = 1 Ea V t E T,
s), v*(A, 'Tr*,s)]
A*(t, s) E argmaxE[UL(. )|t, AX*,Tr*(X,
XEZC
(e3) V m E Zc, r*(m,s) E argmaxE ,[uc( )Im, {*(, b, s), X*( , b, s), v*(, b, s)];
(e4) V (p, b) E [0, 1] x R, 8*(p, b, s) = 1 iff,
8*(p, s) = 0 and E[UL()IAX*(-,b, s), v*] - p : E[UL(O)IV*];
(eS) 8* + V = 0 > X* e * + V > 0 =a V t E T,
X*(t, b, s) E argmaxE[uLO)It, v*(, X, b, s)];
XEZH
(e6) V (k, m, b) E ({C} U ) x ZH x R, v*(k, m, b, s) = 0 (E [0, 1]) [= 1] as
E,1H[UL(b)Ik, m, b] < (=) [>] E"H[UL(S)|k, m, b];
(e7) pc and ALHare derived fromthe priorsand a* by Bayes Rule where defined.
Because H may only randomizein equilibriumif H is indifferentbetween the status
quo and the committee'sproposal, Lemma 1 in the textamountsto thefollowingstatement.
LEMMA 1: Let Tr*(.) = b.
(1) If XA*()is not influentialthen,
E H[UH(b)Ik, m, b] = E1H[UH(s)Ik, m, b] > v*(k, m, b, s) = 1;
(2) If XA*()is influential
then,
E"H[UH(b)Ik, m, b] = E"H[UH(s)Ik, m, b] > v*(k, m, b, s) E {O, 1}.
PROOFOF LEMMA 1.1: This followsfromsequential equilibriabeing subgame perfect:
specifically,ifv* E (0, 1) thenC can do betterthanb by choosingsome proposal arbitrarily
close to b thatH strictlyprefersto s; but thenthisis not a best response, since C's strategy
space is R; hence, the equilibriumrequirementof mutualbest responses impliesH cannot
randomizewhen indifferent (see, e.g., Banks and Gasmi 1987).
LEMMA 1.2: Follows easily from Lemma 1.1 and the definitionof most influ-
ential. QED
The formalstatementof Lemma 2 is simply,
LEMMA 2: 8*( ) = 0 is alwaysa bestresponse.
PROOF:Let nr0be the proposal C offersif C is not lobbied by L. Since C cannotverify
thatL is not informed,nr0will be offeredirrespectiveof L's data acquisitiondecision. Since
this is a pure strategydecision, nr0 (in equilibrium)is fullyanticipatedby L. Therefore,
because L is free to choose not to lobby C at the agenda stage and because the price of
information is invariantbetween stages, L can never be made worse offby choosing to
acquire information at the startof the process ratherthanafterthe agenda is set. QED
PROOF OF PROPOSITION1: Supposeb > s. Usingequation(3), deduce:
uj(b) > (-) uj(s) as E[t I -I > () (b + s)12 - xj,Vj E {C, H, L}. (A. 1)
-
By (A.1), t(b, s) = {t E Tit (b + s)12 - XL}. Let XA(t,b, s) = n V t E t(b, s), and Xv
(t, b, s) = 4aV t E T\t(b, s), and suppose v(, n, b, s) = 0 < v(, X, b, s) = 1. By sequential
rationality,XjQ) is a best response to H's strategyv. And since t is uniformly distributed
on T = [0, 1],
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 827
PROOF:Fix Xa(-) and let ?(ml) s ti(m2) s . . . st i(mN). Thenin equilibrium, (e3)
requiresthe followingincentivecompatibilityconditionsto hold (whetheror not vote stage
lobbyingis influential):
:
EJc[uc(T*(mi, s)) I ?(mi), ] E,c[uc(Tr*(mj, s)) It(mi), ], V i,j. (A.2)
s)
Tr*(mi, Is) i = 1,. . ., N - 1. (A.3)
And, using (3), the inequalities(A.2) hold iff,
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828 David Austen-Smith
Therefore,if T' C T is such that rr*(Xr*(t, s), s) = iTr*(Xa(t,s), s) V t, t' C T', thenT' must
be an interval,as required. Let t E T, send the message, say m E Mc, that elicits 'r.
Because -ris the smallestactivelyelicited proposal, (A.6) implies Tl = [0, tl) for some t,
< 1. Since T?(s) = 0, Ec,[tIm] = t1/2< 1/2.But (A.4) and -rr< -r implyEj[t|m] =
tj/2 > 1/2: contradiction.The remainingcase (XL < 'M' - 1) follows similarly.So the
suppositionthat a *(\* (t, s), s) =#a' V t C T mustbe false. This proves thelemma. QED
LEMMA 5: Suppose XL # Xc and assume X*(-) is most influential.
Then T?(s) # 0.
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 829
Now suppose, first,that s is such that there can be no influentialvote stage lobby-
ing.11Then by Lemma 1 and (e3), the House always chooses the committee'sproposal. Let
A XL - XC > 0 (a symmetricargumentapplies forA < 0 and is omitted).By Lemma 3,
Tr*(mi,s) = i(mi) + xc, and (A.7) can be solved (Crawfordand Sobel 1982) to yield the
conditioncharacterizingany equilibriumpartition:
wherep is the equilibriumprice above which L chooses not to acquire information (that
this is well defined is proved below). Now, since s is irrelevant,Lemma 3 implies
lr*(X*(-),s) = xc + EJ[tja*( )], in which case (A.7) (which necessarilyholds in equilib-
rium)and (A.10) can be solved to yield the system(*):
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830 David Austen-Smith
Finally,
Therefore,V A E (1/4, 1/2),3(p(t0), to(p)) E (0, 1) x (0, 1) solving (A.13) and (A.14).
Mutatismutandis,a symmetricargumentshows that,V A E (- 1/2,- 1/4),therecan exist
an influentialequilibriumin which X,(t,s) = m # 8 V t < to, X,(t,s) = V t : to. Since
8
the numberof elicited actions in a most influentialequilibriumis nonincreasingin A, this
establishesthe requiredresultfors - (-xc, xc + 1). Clearly,ifthereexists no equilibrium
when s is essentiallyirrelevant,there can exist no influentialequilibriumagenda stage
lobbyingwhen s mightbe elicited; hence, the bounds derivedabove are necessaryforsuch
equilibriumstrategies.To see thattheyare not sufficient, suppose XL = 3/4 - ?, ? > 0 and
small, and xc = 1/4.Then A = 1/2- ?, and by the precedingargument,thereis a unique
influentialequilibriumpartitionof T, (0, to, 1), if, say, s > 7/4; furthermore, Xa(t,s) =
41 V t S tonecessarily.By (A.13) and (A.14), (to,p) (0, 0), so E,c[tI1] = 1/2- Xq,ir(, s)
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 83I
= XC + 1/2 - I and r(m, s) = Xc + 1/2 + 'q', with ,' > O and small.Now lets =
1/2.Then,s - xc = 1/4< 1/2 - Jt I?] < s = 1/2.Butby Lemma3, s willbe elicited
by Xa(t, s) = ?. Hence, (0, to, 1) cannotbe an equilibriumpartition,in whichcase, ifthere
is an influentialequilibriumhere, s mustbe elicitedby the message ?. Let t' be the type
indifferent between elicitings and elicitingthe proposal (1 + t')/2. By (A.1 1), t' = 2[s -
XL + 1/2 - A]/3. Substituting,t' = 2[2, - 1/4]/3< 0, which is absurd. So thereis no
influential agenda stage lobbyingin this case.
Proposition4.2: Let {'rr*,'r* . . . . n} denote equilibriumproposals; where 'rr*=
rr*(mi,s), mi E Zc. Let P(s, N) = (tO 0, tl,..., tN a 1) be such thatV t E [ti-1,ti),
X*(t,s) = m E Zc, i = 1, . N - 1, ml# mi-I. Set mj = +. Then(el) implies8*(p,
s) = 1 iff,
i=N
By (A.7),
E T(-rr*1,
EF,H[tIt s)] r* + s]l2 and E H[t(tE s)] ? ['rrs+ s]12
(-rrl,
musthold. But given (A.7) and s exogenous, this is nongeneric.
Proposition5.3(ii): Let XL > Xc and considera mostinfluential equilibrium0r*in which
exactly two committeeproposals are elicitedby Xa(). let rl = {n', r*} be the proposals,
whereTrr= r*(4,s); by Proposition 3 andXL > Xc, ro < rr*.Since\*( ) is influential by
assumption,s ? II. By Proposition5.3(i), s _[,r', ar*]. Now suppose the resultis false, so
s > ar*.Then, since s ? II, a* = r*(m, s) withm = X*(t,s) E Mc V E [tl, 1]. By X*( )
3 t' > t1 such that:V t E [t', 1], X*(t,Tr*, s) = n # 4; V t < t', X*(t, ar*,s) =
influential,
4; and v*(C, n, rr*,s) = 0 < v(C, 4), rr*,s) = 1. (In words, thereexists a set of L(t) that
activelyelicita proposal (specifically,rr*)at the agenda stage, some of whichsubsequently
activelylobby the House to secure a vote forthe statusquo against rr*.)By (A.1), t' = (s
+ rr*)/2- XL. By (A.7), t1 = (rr?+ rr*)/2- XL. But by (e7), on hearingthe agenda stage
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832 David Austen-Smith
message "m," C knows for sure thatL is informed.So given the partition(O a tO, t1, tN
1), C knows for sure thats will be the outcome ifL(t) is such thatt : t'; in particular,
given{s, at', rr*},t' is commonknowledgeand a knownfunctionof 'r*. Hence, sequential
rationalityrequires
Clearly, rr*S argmax. Ec[uc(b)jtj S t S 1] = b(tl), C's best response if X*(-) is not
By (A.1) andXL > xc> O,therefore,ifeverboth *(-) and *(-) canbeinfluential
influential.
as specifiedhere,thentheymustbe so when s is such thatt' = 1 - ?, ? > 0 and arbitrarily
small. For ? sufficiently
small, t' 1, prob[t> t'l ] 0, and so r*- b(tl). Consider s =
2(1 + XL - ?) - b(tl). Then s > rr*.(If not, s S -r b(tl), implying(1 + XL - ?)
b(tl). Now b(tl) < 1 + xc by (e3), so (1 + XL - ?) < 1 + xc; but thisis impossiblesince
= O0 and XL > Xc.) By Proposition1, XA*()influential
implies,
And since XA*()is influential,s will be the outcome if H hears the message n when the
agenda is {tr , s}. So given {s, r0, it}, the argument for Proposition 4.2 yields
Hence, we can write p (in equilibrium) as a function of irr, x, and s: p = p(it0, x, s). Hence,
prob[L informedI ] can also be writtenP = P(ita, x, s). Finally,note
prob[tS t'i X*(t,s) = 4 and L is informed]= t'It?,
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LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 833
max. V(Qr0,
x, s) P.{Q. EFC[uc(s) t < t'] + (1 - Q). E,c[uc(r0) It E (t', t?)]}
+ (1 - P).E*c[uc(,r0)ItE T].
This problemis solved numericallyfor the parameterization(x, s) given in the text. The
impliedvalues for to, t', p, and -r are then recovered fromthe solution (which is unique
given ar0E [0, 1]). By construction,these values constitutean equilibriumso long as the
impliedvalue of ('r0 + s)/2 satisfiesthe conditionsforinfluentialvote stage lobbying(cf.
Proposition1); and it does. QED
REFERENCES
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