EMPATIA Uma Historia Intelectual de Edit PDF

DANILO SOUZA FERREIRA
EMPATHY: An intellectual history of Edith Stein 1891-1942

to Romain Rolland 1866-1944
Mariana
Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Sociais/ UFOP
2018
a) SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I - EDITH STEIN, TRAINING TIMES.
1.1.Edith Stein a Biography...........................................................................................06
1.2. Breslau between Psychology and History...............................................................14
1.3. Círculo Fenomenológico de Göttingen....................................................................25
1.4. Freiburg: Edith Stein as assistant to Husserl……....................................................38
CHAPTER 2 - EMPATHY A CONCERN OF A GENERATION
2.1. The Empathy from Edmund Husserl........................................................................44
2.2. From Husserl to Max Scheler - Looks of Phenomenology.....................................54
2.3. The Empathy from Max Scheler….........................................................................,65
2.4. Empathy in the sciences of the spirit Wilhelm Dilthey............................................73
CHAPTER 3 - FROM THE EMPATHY OF THE HUMAN PERSON TO THE

MODERN STATE
3.1. Empatia (Einfühlung) no contexto intelectual alemão ...........................................83
3.2. Edith Stein and the Empathy from the world-of-life (LebensWelt) .......................98
3.3 Edith Stein and the inner perception History...........................................................111
3.4 A Modern Concern: The Case of the German State: The Personal State of Edith
Stein…………………………………………………………………………………...120
3.5. Edith Stein's Sympathy for Oceanic Feeling..........................................................132
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES……………………….…………………......142
2
"What we know of ourselves is nothing but surface. The depth remains largely hidden"
Edith Stein
3
INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this project is to understand the conception of history and time,
and how these relate in the thought of Edith Stein, especially through the notion of
empathy (Einfühlung). To pursue this objective we chose to follow the guidance of
Ângela Alles Bello, "in order to understand the Steiniano philosophical itinerary, it is
necessary to begin the analysis from its first work to the last".1
Scholars in Edith Stein's work often explain that her philosophical production is
divided into three periods, which help us understand the coherence and continuity
between the author's biography and her intellectual production. The first phase can be
characterized as the phenomenological period, which extends from his doctoral thesis at
Göttingen in 1916 until his conversion to Catholicism in 1922; the second phase begins
in 1922 and goes until its passage through the convent of Carmel in Cologne, where the
focus of the study was the relationship between the human person and society through
the pedagogical-anthropological character; and the third phase that began in 1938 to
1942, this phase is known by eminently mystical writings with the focus of the dialogue
between the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and Husserlian phenomenology. 2
Through the concept of experiences (Erlebins) we will analyze works of the three
phases of Steiniano thought based on the relationship between the life mapped by the
letters - present in the complete works - and two biographies written by the author being
the works History of a Jewish family and Yellow Stars.
Among the writings of the phenomenological phase are mainly his PhD thesis - On
the Problem of Empathy, which he wrote under the guidance of Edmund Husserl
(defended in 1916), as well as an essay written in 1925, A Survey on the State.
Regarding this phase, I intend to focus on the problem of experiences (Erlebins). I will
analyze his doctoral thesis where he already outlines some important themes that will
lead to his later reflections, as well as his position in the phenomenology proposed by
Husserl especially after his transfer to Freiburg.
Among the works that make up the second period, we highlight the Intellect and the
Intellectuals, written in 1930, as well as the Structure of the Human Person, both belong
1
BELLO, Anagela Alles, Edith Stein. La passione per la verità. Messaggero, Padova,2003 .p.10
2
STEIN, Edith. Los caminos del Silencio Interior. Buenos Aires: Bonum , 2006 .p.13
4
to the pedagogical-anthropological period, are lectures in which Edith Stein tests her
phenomenological method to understand her own time.
In these works we will try to explain the hypothesis that Edith Stein presents a
harmonization between the application of the phenomenological method and the
questions of metaphysical character raised by St. Thomas Aquinas, having as a means
of this dialogue the historical processes that would make it possible to unveil the
essential structure common to all human beings and simultaneously discover the
ultimate essence that guarantees the uniqueness.
Anna Maria Pezzella3 points out that the understanding of individuation, of
uniqueness of the human person, is the crucial question for Steinian anthropological
thought, which will be more properly addressed in the third phase of Edith Stein's
works. At this moment she wrote her most breathtaking work - Finite Being and Eternal
Being: an ascent to the sense of being. We will seek to unveil the project of a
philosophy of history proposed by the author, which in general would start from a
phenomenological reading of the ancient philosophical tradition, medieval and
contemporary contemporary for which historical processes would empathize
(Einfühlung) among men.
3
PEZZELLA, Anna Maria. L’Antropologia Filosofica di Edith Stein: indagine fenomenologica della
persona umana . Roma : Città Nuova, 2003, .p.9
5
CHAPTER I - EDITH STEIN, TRAINING TIMES.
1.1 Edith Stein a Biography
In this chapter we seek to compose a short biography of Edith Stein, such work is
justified for two reasons: the first is the presentation of the philosopher who is little
known by the theory of history and by the history of Brazilian historiography, and the
second reason, as we will try to demonstrate, is the intimate relationship between your
life and your thinking. We propose to evidence the biography of Edith Stein from the
Arendtian understanding...
A definitive, English-style biography is among the most admirable

genres of historiography. Extensive, meticulously documented, densely
annotated and generously interspersed with quotations, it usually
appears in two large volumes and tells more, and more vividly about the
historical period in question than all the major history books. For,
contrary to other biographies, history is not treated here as the inevitable
background of a famous person's lifetime; it is rather as if the colorless
light of historical time were crossed and refracted by the prism of a
great character, so that in the resulting spectrum one obtains a complete
unity of life and of the world. Perhaps that is why it has become the
classic genre for the lives of great statesmen, but has remained
unsuitable for those whose main interest lies in the history of life, or for
the lives of artists, writers, and generally, men or women whose genius
forced them to keep the world at a certain distance, and whose meaning
resides chiefly in their works, artifacts which they have added to the
world, and not in the part which they have played in it. 4
Pope John Paul II defined Edith Stein as "a Jew, a philosopher, a Carmelite, a
5.
martyr who brings in her intense life a dramatic synthesis of our century" This
description made during the process of beatification of Edith Stein by the Catholic
Church on October 11, 1998, can be understood as a portrait of how the Steinian
biographies were thought, that is, Stein's life has been analyzed since the end of Second
World War, from a significant attention to his experience and reflection in the religious
field, including including the tendencies to the hagiographic interpretations of his life. 6
The writing hagiography aims at the construction of guiding its reader to present
a model of moral virtue, ie presents as a fundamental premise the aspects of sanctity, in
the case of biographies (hagiographic) written about Edith Stein, for example - the work
4
ARENDT, Hannah. Homens em Tempos Sombrios , São Paulo, ed:Companhia das Letras 1988 p.41
5
MARTINS, A. C. C. e FIGUEIREDO, M.A.P.C. (org.) “Papa João Paulo II- Primeira Homília- Festa
da Beatificação”, 1 de maio de 1987 , in Em nome de Deus , em nome da Igreja , em nome da
Humanidade, textos extraídos do Jornal L’Osservatore Romano , Bauru , Coleção Essência , Edusc,1998.
6
GREENE, Dana .K In Search of Edith Stein : Beyond Hagiography Notre Dame, ed: University of
Notre Dame Press, 2006 p.48-58
6
As Gold Purified by Fire and Edith Stein and the Holocaust among others - have for
didactic purpose an interpretation in which the whole narrative is constructed to present
a unique, a-historical sense, which, as pointed out by Greene 7, does not allow us to
perceive the nuances of Edith Stein's description of the great historical events of her
time such as the emergence of psychology, the emergence of phenomenology, feminist
thought in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the great wars for
presenting analyzes that emphasize the hagiographic profile of Edith Stein.
Edith Stein wrote two Yellow Stars biographies and History of a Jewish family,
as well as letters, and other documents that reveal ideas, feelings and mainly
descriptions of historical events, cities and people with whom she related, among them
influential intellectuals of the phenomenological current as notes Anne Levallois.
For the biographical, the interpretation consists of relating and

contextualizing the documents at its disposal, in order to reconstruct
the 'bricolage' of which the individual is made, always multiple under
an apparent unity, not forgetting that the complexity of the living
always exceeds what we can theorize and that the human person is not
an exception to this. 8
Edith Stein was born and lived together with part of her family until she was 21
years old in Breslau, Prussia, on the Silesian plain at the confluence of the Oder and
Ohle rivers. From 1740, with the conquest of Frederick the Great of Prussia, this region
that belonged to Austria became part of Germany remaining as a German domain until
the end of World War II, becoming part of Poland and being renamed Wroclaw.
There are records of the Stein family, the paternal great-grandmother Samuel
Joseph Stein and the maternal grandfather Jacob Courant, moving to this region in 1890,
due to the economic growth of the city, its industrial prosperity (Upper Silesia region ),
due to the great industrial growth and a subsequent demographic explosion in Germany.
During most of the 19th century, Breslau was the second most
populous city in the Prussian region after Berlin; Its population grew
from 100,000 in more than 1849 to over 200,000 in 1871, and
surpassed 500,000 by 1910. The city was the economic, political and
cultural center of Silesia and served as the capital of the Prussian
province.. 9
7
Idem, 2006 p.51
8
LEVALLOIS, Anne. Une Psychanayste Dans I’Histoire , Paris , ed: Campagne Première 2007, p.215
9
HOHORST , Gerd , Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch: Materialien zur Statistik des Kaiserreichs
1870–1918 , Munich ,1980. , p.45
7
And also because Breslau was the cultural and religious center of the Silesia
region, which already had, in 1810, the Salesian University Friedrich Wilhelm, formed
from the junction of the faculties of philosophy and Catholic theology of the Leopoldine
Academy and the University Viadrina of Frankfurt, which had the faculties of theology,
jurisprudence and medicine. The University had as its most illustrious members the
philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) and the economist Werner Sombart (1833-
1897). Edith Stein describes the University:
The old gray building over the Oder (painted yellow a few years ago)
"in the style of the time" soon became my home. When we had free
time, I enjoyed studying in an empty room, sitting in one of the large
windows and working. Looking at the river and the lively bridge at the
University, I imagined a young woman at the castle. 10
Edith Stein describes Breslau as a welcoming city to its Jewish people who had
strong commercial influence in the city and a significant social assimilation. It was
surrounded by the Oder River, with green parks and great avenues, tram rides. On
September 2, all the students would take a ride together to celebrate the victory at the
Battle of Sédan:
My challenge was the "Sedan celebration" on September 2nd. If the

weather was good, the whole school, except the smaller ones, would
go by big boat, beyond the Schaffgotsch garden. There, in the open
air, was a fiery patriotic speech. We sang patriotic songs and some had
to recite poetry. Luckily, I was never chosen, for this pathos was
foreign to me. I found it very painful to have to hear a few
declamations. The fact that the victory over the French continued to be
celebrated; I was not satisfied; I was not a pacifist, but this attitude
towards a defeated enemy seemed to me unseemly. 11
The presence of Jews in Breslau refers to the 13th century, in the medieval
period, with synagogues, ritual bath, and cemeteries. The Jews were expelled from
Breslau in 1453, the Franciscan friar John of Capistrano accused them of desecrating the
consecrated hosts, and as a punishment, forty-one Jews were accused, tried and
10
STEIN , Edith, Dalla Vita di uma Famiglia Ebrea e altri Scritti Autobiografici , Roma , Città Nouva
,Ed OCD 2007. , p.235
11
STEIN , Edith, Vida de una familia judía in Escritos Antropologicos y Pedagógicos: Magisterio de vida
cristiana, 1926-1933. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed., 2002., p.134
8
sentenced to the bonfire. This episode was described by Edith Stein's brother-in-law,
Hans Biberstein, in the unsuccessful attempt to stop her from entering Carmel. 12
In 1741, after the conquest of the region by Austria, the Jews were granted
permission to found a community of twelve families, and from this community was
created the cemetery built in 1761, as well as permission for the construction of a
synagogue with a Rabbi, with the increase in the number of Jews in the city of Breslau
(there were two thousand Jews residing in 1761).13
Till van Rahden points out that since 1860 the Jews exerted a great political
influence in the region of Breslau and other regions of Europe, so it is important to
emphasize that the political system of Breslau involved the participation of the three
estates which favored a more plural participation in the municipal bodies, including the
participation of teachers and civil servants who were mostly Jewish. 14
Between 1879 and 1882 there was a change in the relationship between the city
of Breslau and anti-Semitism, which Till van Rahden points to as one of the
consequences of the set of "totalitarian" movements that were already taking place in
Germany, for example the Berliner Bewegung ). What we can perceive from a brief
analysis of the Breslau newspaper - the Schlesische Zeitung -, which changed its
editorial line to support the anti-Semitic ideology. 15
However, this change of perspective was not supported by the population and
policies of the city of Breslau. From what Till van Rahden termed as a "situational
identity"16, we can see that there was a resistance attempt by the urban Jewish group -
relatively open, which participated in the social and political life of the city without
giving up its Jewish identity.
There were strategies of assimilation of Jews as the increase of the mixed

marriages, that increased four times between the years of 1890 to 1914, beginning of the
first world war. They made up 34 percent of the bourgeoisie in the Silesia region,
12
BATZDORFF. S. Edith Stein , Ma Tante. Tradução de I’américain par Cécile Le Paire Bruxelles , Ed
Lessius, Ed Racine , 2000, p.37
13
BERENBAUM Michael, Encyclopaedia Judaica. Eds 2 ed Detroit : Macmillan Reference USA , 2007,v
2 p.1354.
14
RAHDEN Till van, Words and Actions: Rethinking the Social History of German Antisemitism,
Breslau, 1870–1914.in : German History Vol. 18 No. 4 , 2000 , p.418.
15
BOEHLICH , Walter (ed.), Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit (Frankfurt/Main, 1965), p. 7.
16
RAHDEN Till van, Intermarriages, the “New Woman”,and the Situational Ethnicity of Breslau Jews
from the 1870s to the 1920s .in Central European History:, 2000 , p.149.
9
working in commerce, or as liberal professionals - doctors and lawyers. Edith Stein's
own sister, Erna Stein, will graduate in gynecology. Both were encouraged to study in
the public school of Victoria Schule, which also made possible the social interaction of
Jews with the other Germans. In his memoirs, a contemporary of Edith Stein, the
prominent rabbi and Zionist, Gerson Scholem, describes the relationship between the
Jews and the community of Breslau:
One more thing: the major sectors to which I refer, as well as political
intellectuals of Jewish origin, wanted to believe in assimilation and
integration into a society that was generally indifferent to them or did
not look upon them with sympathy. 17
Edith Stein's mother, Augusta Courant, was born to a family of merchants from
the town of Lublinitz in Silesia, and with the Jewish emancipation movement in Prussia,
Edith Stein's maternal grandparents, Salomon Courant and Adelheid Buchard Courant,
settled in in Breslau where they bought a store of spices in which they prospered.
Edith Stein's father, Siegfried, was born in the town of Gleiwitz, near Lublinitz.
Son of Simon Stein and the third wife Johanna Cohn Stein, who had twenty-six
children, had as their main source of income the locksmith shop in the town of Gleiwitz.
As Edith Stein points out, Siegfried met Augusta in 1858 and married on 2 August
1871. After their marriage they settled in Gleiwitz, where Siegfried worked in the
family's locksmith shop and where the first six children of the couple were born: Paul in
1872, Selma, 1873, Else, 1876, Hedwig, 1877, Arno, 1879 and Ernst 1880.
In March 1882, the newspaper Diário de Lublinitz published an announcement

by Siegfried Stein, where the dealer - owner of the company supplying wood and
construction materials - announced the construction of the coal warehouse near the
Kreuzburg-Tamowitz railway, which passed through Lublinitz, which was sold shortly
after the family moved to Breslau, as we can see in the advertisement published in the
newspaper in January 1890:
After my installation in Breslau, I intend to sell my wood and coal

company situated near the station with all the material there. 18
Lublinitz did not offer an economic perspective for the family business and with
the birth of four children of the Elfriede 1881, Rosa 1883, Richard 1884 and Erna 1890,
17
SCHOLEM, Gersom , De Berlim a jerusalém , Recordações da juventude, São Paulo , Perspectiva,
1991 ,v 2 p.43.
18
NEYER , Maria Amata , MULLER, Andreas Edith Stein , une femme dans le siècle , 2002, p.15
10
the couple decided to move to Breslau, where the eight family members lived in a small
rented apartment on Kohlenstrasse, with plans to start a new company as Stein describes
"the new company had many debts and had difficulties in establishing itself".19
On October 12, 1891, on the day of the Jewish feast of Yom Kippur, the day of
the great pardon, which is celebrated by the Jewish community with fasting and
penance, Edith Stein is born, her mother saw the birth of Stein on this date as a special
meaning.
Before Edith Stein was two years old in July 1893, her father died of sunstroke
that occurred while traveling to work on a hot summer day, being found by a traveler in
Fraunenwaldau to Goldschutz, Edith had no personal memory of her. father Siegfried
Stein, the information about him being preserved by Hans Bilberstein's brother-in-law
of Edith Stein, who became interested in family genealogy in the 1930s. 20
Edith Stein grew up and lived in Breslau, which as we have pointed out
previously, through assimilation processes like hybrid marriages, made possible great
commercialization between Jews and Catholics, which also allowed the city to become
more tolerant and religiously heterogeneous. The greatest symbol of this prospect was
the mayor of the city at the time when Edith Stein was born Wilhelm Salomon Freund, a
liberal left-wing political poet who was a member of various Jewish religious
associations and demonstrated that Breslau's civic pride was the rejection of anti-
Semitism and the emphasis on harmonious relations between citizens as described by
Till van Rahden:
In municipal elections throughout the 1880s, left-wing liberals

managed to recapture some of the seats they lost during the communal
elections of 1878 and 1880, successfully defending their majority in
the town hall until 1918. The renewed confidence of the Breslau
liberals found a appropriate expression when, in 1887, the City
Council elected Wilhelm Salomon Freund as its president. Freund,
who held the position of prestige and influence until 1915, embodied
all that the city's anti-Semites abhorred: he was a prominent member
of Breslau's left liberalism, he represented the Fortschrittspartei
(Progressive Liberals) in Prussian politics between 1876 and 1879 and
Reichstag between 1879 and 1881, and for many years he served as
president of the Jewish community. He was on the board of several
19
STEIN , Edith . “Live in a Jewish Family – her unfished autobiographical account” in The Collected
Works of Edith Stein , Washington , D.C. ICS, Publications ,1986 , p.15
20
BATZDORFF. Susanne . Edith Stein , Ma Tante. Tradução de I’américain par Cécile Le Paire
Bruxelles, Ed Lessius, Ed Racine , 2000, p.49
11
general and Jewish associations and one of the richest and most
successful lawyers in Breslau. 21
The policies implemented by Wilhelm Salomon Freund to encourage

assimilation, from which the approach to the non-Jewish community was encouraged,
as a way of preserving against anti-Semitism, while at the same time adapting to
preserve Jewish culture as a tradition , which deferred to be experienced at specific
times as festive days, this is the world in which the Stein family was inserted in which
will constitute as Edith Stein will understand childhood and its relationship with
Judaism.
Edith Stein presents a peculiar philosophical journey. Born in an austere Jewish

family on October 12, 1891, the eleventh daughter of Auguste Courant and Siegfried
Stein, she was characterized from a young age by a strong personality and singular
intelligence, as we can see in her autobiography:
The whole family defined me from the earliest childhood by two

qualities. I was blamed (rightly) for being ambitious and also called
me Edith list. Both things hurt a lot. The second because I interpreted
that something was meant about intelligence and, moreover, I thought
it was indicated that it was only list. From the first years of my life I
knew, on the other hand, that it was more important to be good than
ready 22
If we understand the autobiographical account as defined by Bourdie as a

description that seeks to guide and organize one's life from a retrospective and
prospective view, selecting certain moments to give meaning 23, the biography Estrella
Amarillas, written by Stein, allows us a greater understanding of author..
Stein writes a radical change in the desire to find the truth. At age 14, when
passing through a crisis in the dimension of life, Stein decides to stop studying because
he does not find the truth through this activity: "I began to worry about issues,
especially concerning the way of seeing the world, for which in school did not find
great answers"24.
21
RAHDEN Till van, Words and Actions: Rethinking the Social History of German Antisemitism, Breslau,
1870–1914.in : German History Vol. 18 No. 4 , p.421.
22
STEIN, Edith. Estrellas Amarillas. 2ª edição. Madri: Editorial de Espiritualidad, 1992. p. 129.
23
BOURDIEU, Pierrer. L’illusion biographique. Actes de la Recherche em Sciences Sociales, Paris,
1996.p. 184.
24
STEIN, Edith. Vida de una familia Judía. 2ª edição. Madri: Editorial de Espiritualidad, 1992. p. 127.
12
Through Stein's description we can see that since adolescence she demonstrates
a commitment to this which she calls truth, that is, with the search for the ontological
determination of reality, and at the same time a concern with ontic reality and the
system of teaching in which it was inserted:
I had no trouble saying goodbye to school. For one thing, she was
tired of learning. On the other hand, I did not feel special affection for
any of my teachers.25
During this period when Stein left formal school, she took care of the domestic
services and also took care of in Hamburg of its nephews, children of its sister Else.
Stein returned from Hamburg to take care of his nephew Harold, the son of his brother
Paul, who at two years old was sick with scarlet fever, a disease that had already killed
some members of his family, a nephew who died two days later. During this time Edith
dedicated herself to the study of the problem of the Bildung and of tragedies and works
of historical political content which she will call "daily bread", among the authors
mentioned are Franz Grillparzer, Henrik Ibsen, Friedrich Hebbel, William Shakespeare,
Baruch Spinoza and Arthur Schopenhauer. How do you write it:
(...) in this world, with strong paints of great passions and actions I felt
more at ease than in that everyday life. But once I got it. The World as
Schopenhauer's Will and Representation, my older sisters protested
energetically.26
In 1911, Stein sought to return to his studies by training in the gymnasium and
entering the University of Breslau, where the search for truth (ontology and description
of reality more properly) was manifested through intellectual interest. Edith Stein was
part of the group of Jewish intellectuals in central Europe who sought to show through
Jewish tradition a framework for responding to the concerns of the present, such an
epistemological exercise can not sustain or respond to the new meanings presented by
the present.
In writing about intellectuals of Jewish origin in Central Europe, Michael Lowy,
for example, states that during the golden period between the late nineteenth and the
thirties, a social phenomenon occurred in which a large part of the academics of Jewish
25
STEIN, Edith. Vida de una familia Judía. 2ª edição. Madri: Editorial de Espiritualidad,,, 1992. P. 132.
26
,Ed OCD 2007. , p.169.
13
origin in central Europe sought in isolation to further reflection on the world around
them.
The change in perspective of the world view of the Jews living in Germany,
through a greater engagement in the spiritual sciences as pointed out by Michael Lowy,
results in a rupture with regard to previous generations, which were composed, in their
majority, by owners of factories and merchants. His children, on the other hand, sought
social recognition through entry into universities and especially from the humanities.
In central Europe the situation is intermediate, there is a sense of
semi-exclusion, the intellectual considers himself as a kind of semi-
pariah. This semi-integration explains why the Jewish identity in
central Europe tends to be cultural and confessional, much more than
national. 27
This is the social and historical context in which Edith Stein was inserted, a
context marked by a "romantic" cultural formation, mainly in the denominated sciences
of the spirit (Geisteswissenschaften), which characterized the Jewish intellectuals of
central Europe. This "romantic" influence generally points to the attempt to question
characteristics of modernity as the "disenchantment of the world", which is based on the
valorization of rationalism, the philosophies of progress and the alienation of human
relations28.
This generation of intellectuals, as presented by Michael Lowy, was marked by

attempts at what we might call the re-enchantment of the world, with some fundamental
characteristics formulated through the return to the religious (tradition), the opposition
of the culture aspect (Kultur) civilization (Zivilisation), and community (Über ones) in
relation to the idea of society (Gesellschaft).29
1.2. Breslau between Psychology and History
Alasdair Maclntyre describes Edith Stein's approach to phenomenology as early

as the years of her formation at the University of Breslau, where Stein's subjects were
part of the Geisteswissenschaften (History of Philosophy), especially Germanistics.
Later, Stein attended the subjects of Philosophy, taught by Richard Hönigswald, and
27
LOWY, Michael. Notas sobre os Intelectuais Judeus . In: Judeus Heterodoxo Brasil: Editora
Perspectiva 2012. p.7.
28
LOWY, Michael. SAYRE, Robert. O Que é o Romantismo? Uma Tentativa de Redefinição. In: Revolta
e Melancolia Brasil: Editora Boitempo 2015.p.52.
29
LOWY, Michael. Walter Benjamin e Franz Rosenzweing Messianismo Contra Progresso.. In: Judeus
Heterodoxo Brasil: Editora Perspectiva 2012. p 29.
14
Experimental Psychology, taught by Louis Wiliam Stern, in which both professors
presented him the writings of Edmund Husserl. 30
We believe it is necessary at this moment to present these intellectuals and how
they contributed to Steiniano's thinking, in order to understand how this formation made
possible a plural interest and understanding of the human phenomenon, guarding its
question for truth, for ontology, without adhering to "conservatism" around preservation
of what would remain of tradition, nor to "relativism," which, in the face of modernity,
gave up affirming any common values. 31
Richard Hönigswald, of Jewish origin, taught in Breslau from the year 1906,
through the work Beiträge zur Erkenntnistheorie und Methodenlehre ("Contributions to
the theory of knowledge and the science of method"). 32Until 1915 he developed works
on the e-science of Mathematics and Theories of Cognition. He dedicated himself, in
particular, to the History of Philosophy through the inspiration of Neokantism, as did
Alois Riehl, with whom he exercised a strong dialogue:
In the years 1909-1915, Hönigswald published articles on the theory

of science, having as main focus the Theory of Mathematics, which
brings him closer to the works of Ernst Cassirer and Bruno Bauch,
who wrote about this subject in the same period. Later, he had written
about the History of Philosophy and questions of historiographic
profile. The originality of the Hönigswald project and the perception
that historical experiences would come through "monads" allow "the
validity of thought and will in the world", which can be seen in his
works Uber die Grundlagen der Pddagogik (Fundamentals of
Education, 1918) and Die Grundlagen der Denkpsychologie (Thinking
Psychology, 1921).33
Edith Stein describes Richard Hönigswald, professor of Philosophy and History,

as someone she admired for her keenness, for her strong "critical" sense, and for the
seductive manner in which she presented students with issues of Dialectic. He had a
30
MACINTYRE Alasdir. Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue 1913-1922. Maryland: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers,, 2006, p. 13.
31
LUCKMANN, Thomas; BERGER, Peter. Modernidade, pluralismo e crise de sentido: a orientação do
homem moderno. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2004, p.79.
32
WOLFGANG, Název originálu: Philosophie des ausgehenden 19. und des 20. Praha: Oikoymenh.
2006, p. 163-164.
33
MERZ-BENZ; PETER-Ulrich. Die Stufen zum Vernunftvermdgen. Richard Hdnigswalds Begriff der
Monas als Gegenstand erkenntniskritischer Reflexion . Basel, 1997, p. 133.
15
strong influence of Neokantism in his formation, which distanced him from the
understanding of Husserlian phenomenology. 34
Devoted exclusively to the exposition of their own neo-Kantian
positions [...]. If one wanted to introduce something that had not
grown up in this (neo-Kantian) soil, Hönigswald, with his convincing
dialectic and his incisive irony, would reduce it in silence ... an older,
independent student once told me "At the Hönigswald seminary,
things that no one dared even think during the lessons of Hönigswald.
Outside the classroom, I could not ignore them. In any case, his
classes had an excellent training in logical thinking, and that was
enough to make me happy.35
This logical formation from Neokantism was also present in the History of
Philosophy course, of which Edith Stein was a student, whose teacher she compared
with that of the course of Philology and History of Literature, which was described by
Stein as "pathetic" , as opposed to Hönigswald, described by her as clear and precise.
In the work History of a Jewish Family, Stein describes her period as a student at
the University of Breslau (in the fourth chapter, entitled "Breaking Academic
Freedom"). The author points out how striking was the fact that Hönigswald and Stern
had been hired teachers, or Privatdozeni, a term used to refer to teachers who were
admitted to teaching after undergoing a special examination, seeking to emphasize that
one of the factors hindering hiring of them was the fact that they were of Jewish.
The Jewish origin of Stern and Hönigswald was an inconvenience to

his academic career. The chair of Psychology in Breslau was not
profitable and Hönigswald was still a "hired teacher" and would
continue for many years, when he was given the Psychology chair it
was already too late because Stern had already signed a contract in
Hamburg, time later Hönigswald was contracted to minister in the
chair of philosophy in Munich, suffering visibly with the
transference.36
The denunciation here pointed out by Edith Stein refers to the fact that the
professors of contracted Jewish origin, or Privatdozeni, needed to undergo a
differentiated admission process, which consisted of the evaluation of their doctoral
theses. In addition, their salary was not paid by the university, but rather by an
agreement between the students and the teachers who ministered the disciplines.
34
STEIN, 2002,Escritos Antropologicos y Pedagógicos: Magisterio de vida cristiana, 1926-1933. Madrid:
El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed., p. 646.
35
Littlefield Publishers, 2006, p. 13.
36
STEIN, Edith. Escritos Autobiograficos y Cartas, Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 1., Ed., 2000. p. 298.
16
Apparently, this situation of gloomy anti-Semitism, present since that period in
universities, as well as in society in general, was also present in other situations. An
example of this is the case of the German sociologist of Jewish origin Georg Simmel,
who obtained an appointment as a professor at the University of Strasbourg, which, as
pointed out by Waizort, was a major non-major university such as Berlin, Munich or
Heidelberg, in which Simmel tried to enter in 1908, failing to obtain the chair. 37
In a letter written by Edith Stein on April 30, 1920, to the philosopher Fritz
Kaufmann, it is evident that she continues in dialogue with her former university in
Breslau. In this letter, she asks her friend to help young Nobert Elias, who was first
trained in Medicine and then in History of Philosophy under the guidance of Professor
Hönigswald. With this, we can see that criticism continues to the method of research
developed by the professor of History of Philosophy of Breslau because of his "critical"
attitude in relation to how we become aware of the world and seek to assist Elias to
attend Edmund Husserl's classes:
Dear Mr. Kaufmann,

I have not heard from you for a long time and I do not know if I would
locate you in Freiburg. The external reason of the present are two
favors I want to ask you. The first is related to an Ingarden case. [...]
The second favor is more innocent. A young man who has just arrived
in Freiburg wants to attend Husserl's classes, and I promised to
recommend him, which I should have done a long time ago. His name
is Norbert Elias (recognized by a blue-white insignia), his main or
secondary profession is that of doctor, philosophically formed by
Hönigswald; although it has been warned that he must put in
parentheses his critique to capture something of phenomenology. [...]
What can you do for him? My compliments, yours, Edith Stein. 38
The sociologist and culture philosopher Nobert Elias met Edith Stein through her
cousin Lilli Berg-Platau, who studied in high school in the same period in which Stein
and her sister, Erna Stein. According to Stein herself, both met again at the Universit y
of Breslau, where they studied common subjects, such as Philosophy and Psychology.
Despite studying Medicine, Platau expressed great interest in Philosophy.
In winter, we find ourselves alternately in our homes and in the

process, working something in common. Medicine students, for
example, asked philosophers something in favor of their general
background. Especially Lilli, who was very intellectually anxious and
37
WAIZORT, Leopold. As Aventuras de Georg Simmel, São Paulo : Editora 34 Ed.,2000, p. 538.
38
STEIN,Edith. Escritos Autobiográficos y Cartas, Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 1., Ed., 2002, p. 700.
17
interested in everything, expressed her fears about the danger of
possible simplism of experts. And, of course, we dive into Kant's
critique of pure reason.39
On May 31, 1920, we know that Fritz Kaufmann nominated Elijah to participate
in the course of Introduction to Phenomenology, in which he taught classes to those
who were not familiar with Husserlian terminology, a course idealized by Edith Stein. It
was presented as a justification for the indication that this researcher had a strong
influence of the current of "criticism" of Hönigswald, of who was doctoral student in
Breslau in 1924.40
Dear Mr. Kaufmann,

Returning home yesterday from my Easter trip to Pentecost across the
Riesengebirge mountains, I found your letter and also a postcard to
Ingarden, who is returning to ask for work in Bergson. I am very
happy that this is already resolved. You should not apologize for Mr.
Elias, I think it would be good to go to the group of beginners. Well,
as you've already noted, it has the usual petulance of critics. I believe,
however, that if Elias had followed his advice, he would have been
accepted, but he would have been very sorry, if at his expense, failed
in Freiburg, for only with good will he (Elias) will learn something. 41
After returning from the First World War, Nobert Elias decided to attend
simultaneously the courses of Medicine and Philosophy; however, due to the demands
of the disciplines of the two courses, this became unfeasible, and the future sociologist
opted for the Philosophy course, being guided by Hönigswald, who was responsible for
his "critical" view of the philosophical subject and the phenomenological project.
However, the philosophical project of the two thinkers presented different forms of
openness to the problem of the relation between the perception of the "outer world" and
the "inner world". Hönigswald pointed out that the relation of man to the world was
given through the Kantian apriori42 that is, the human being would have timeless and
universal characteristics which, for Hönigswald, would not be influenced by the outside
world. That is, in the theory of cognition formulated by him, from the readings of Kant,
the apprehension of the world would be by three great devices: sensitivity, knowledge
and reason. Therefore, the essence of things would be impossible to grasp empirically;
39
STEIN, Edith Escritos Antropológicos y Pedagógicos: Magisterio de vida cristiana, 1926-1933.
Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed., 2002, p. 245.
40
MERZ-BENZ;PETER-Ulrich, Richard Honigswald und Norbert Elias – Von der Geschichtsphilosophie
zur Soziologie. Bonn, 1997, p. 180-182.
41
STEIN, Edith. Escritos Autobiograficos y Cartas, Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 1., Ed., 2002. 2002, p. 702.
42
MERZ-BENZ;PETER-Ulrich. Richard Honigswald und Norbert Elias – Von der Geschichtsphilosophie
zur Soziologie. Bonn,1997 1997, p. 167.
18
we could only perceive the phenomena. In this way we would have a transcendental
understanding of knowledge, which is criticized by Nobert Elias:
... was only an element of a system of overvaluation intended to avoid

any critical objection to the elementary procedures of philosophy, that
is, the reduction of time-observable processes to something timeless,
immutable, defying the ephemeral. 43
For Nobert Elias, the experience of men would make it possible to apprehend the
objective point in the simultaneity of the multiple human experiences, that is, we could
only find the objective point by means of the experience with the other men, and this set
of experiences would form a patrimony that could guide men and unveil their
fundamental characteristics. This understanding of Nobert Elias comes close to that of
Edith Stein, who argues that experience in the inner world, or spiritual, is intimately
linked to the experience of the world, and for both is necessary the unveiling of the
human being through experience with others men:
... the spiritual life presents itself as a psychic process, and everything
that is psychic appears connected to the material being. Objective
spiritual formations, in turn, appear to us as grounded in the being of
nature, and every natural being can become bearer of a spiritual sense.
Therefore, let us not marvel at whether, in the empirical sciences -
oriented towards the objects of experience, different methods are
intertwined to be differentiated.44
One of the points addressed by Honigswald in his disciplines was the

phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Despite his theoretical departure from this
philosophical conception, Breslau's professor of philosophy and history was astonished
when he discovered that Edith Stein intended to go to Göttingen to study with the author
of Logische Untersuchungen. In the same semester, Honigswald goes to Göttingen to
attend classes in the course of Psychology, when he is confronted with Husserlian
phenomenology:
With all the admiration I felt for Honigswald's subtlety, I could not
think that he dared to compare with Husserl. I was already convinced
that Husserl was the philosopher of our time. Since then, when at the
43
ELIAS, Nobert. Nobert Elias Por Ele Mesmo, Rio de janeiro: Jorge Zahar, Ed., 2001. p. 98.
44
STEIN, Edith. Psicologia e scienze dello spirito: Contributi per una fondazione filosofica. 2a ed., A.
Ales Bello, Apresent.; A. M. Pezzella, Trad. Roma: Città Nuova. 1999, p. 69.
19
seminary in Honigswald's discipline I was talking about
phenomenology, they used me as "expert."45
Edith Stein chose as subject matter that interested her the most during the four
semesters she studied in Breslau, the discipline Introduction to Psychology, taught by
Willian Stern, who was also a psychologist and philosopher, as well as a student of
Hermann Ebbinghaus. This one presented / displayed the school of thought of Wurburg,
founded by Oswald Kulpe, whose project consisted in the inquiry of how the contents
are apprehended by the conscience through controlled introspections; but with a focus
on thought alone, ignoring other aspects of consciousness.
One of William Stern's interests was the study of experimental psychology, the
cognitive development of children and young people. He developed intelligence tests
and was responsible for presenting the term "mental age" in Psychology, proposing the
calculation of intelligence coefficient. 46
Stern represented a specific type of Jewish humanism: he was in his

forties and had average height, but he seemed smaller because he was
leaning. His pale face was surrounded by a brown beard; his eyes
were intelligent and kind, and the look on his face and the sound of his
voice were extremely sweet and gentle. He always claimed that he
was a philosopher in the depths of his heart (thus criticized the
separation of philosophical and psychological chairs) and that his
great philosophical work Person and thing was more important than
anything else. Increasingly, Stern devoted himself to experimental
psychology, and his fame was due to his psychological works, which
were translated into all languages learned. [...] His books on Children's
Language and Child Psychology were based on the careful
observation of his own children and the meticulous diaries of his
intelligent and charming wife, who was his most faithful
collaborator.47
Edith Stein's description of Stern was based on his acquaintance with the teacher
not only in the discipline of Psychology, but also in the pedagogical group, formed by
students who had deep social engagement in the training of educators. At the time, Stern
developed works in the field of experimental psychology, in particular tests of
intelligence measurement.
45
STEIN, Edith. Escritos Autobiograficos y Cartas, Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 1., Ed., 2002, p. 600.
46
HERGENHAHN, B.R, An Introduction to the History of Psychology. Sixth Edition USA:
CengageLearning Int Ed, 2001, p. 657.
47
20
This group included Erna, Stein's sister, Hans Biberstein, Rose Guttmann, Lilli
Platau and the doctor and philosopher Georg Moskiewicz 48, one of the prominent
members of the group. He was trying to obtain Habilitationsschrift in Psychology under
the guidance of Hermann Ebbinghaus, a professor of experimental psychology in
Breslau. After the death of her mentor Moskiewicz, Edith Stein says she was in a
dilemma, for although she needed the qualification to practice as a teacher, she
disagreed with Stern's method of experimental psychology. Stein considered taking a
doctorate under the guidance of William Stern - whose studies were based on the careful
observation of his children, seeking to understand how the contents are apprehended
through controlled introspections - but criticized the focus given only to thought,
ignoring other aspects of consciousness. And this was Stein's main criticism of
psychology:
At that time he (Stern) was busy with methods to measure intelligence.
His procedure for examining professional attitudes, which he developed
in a practical way later in Hamburg, was prepared with him. We had
strong reservations against these things, as well as against its general
principle of "golden mean." His colleague Hönigswald, in an inquiry
into the introduction to school psychologists, said: "The school
psychologist will be the most powerful man in the state. He says what
every man should be. " Stern's bitterest enemies were precisely his most
assiduous pupils.49
Stein says that at the request of Stern he paid a visit to Otto Lipmann 50- a pioneer
Jewish psychologist in vocational counseling for young people who worked at the
Institute of Applied Psychology at Klein-Glieneke in Berlin - to show him his work on
the development of children's thinking. After the visit, Stein definitely decided that he
would no longer attempt the PhD process in psychology:
All my studies in psychology led me to the conviction that this science

was still in its infancy, for it lacked the necessary foundation of basic
and clear ideas and that it was not capable of elaborating these
presuppositions. On the other hand, what I already knew about
phenomenology excited me because it was essentially and essentially a
work of enlightenment and because, from the beginning, I had forged
the intellectual tools I needed. 51
48
49
50
American Journal of Psychology, 46, 152–54. Add. Bibliography: NDB, 1985 p. 14.
51
STEIN, Edith. Escritos Antropologicos y Pedagógicos: Magisterio de vida cristiana, 1926-1933.
Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed., 2002, p. 331.
21
During the semester of 1913, Professor Willian Stern suggested that his students
present a seminar whose theme would be the school of Würzburg, of which they were
part. In studying these authors, Stein has his first contact with Husserl's Logical
Investigations, which was constantly cited by the school's authors.
Through the guidance of Georg Moskiewicz, who was a student in Göttingen, he
studied the subjects of Edmund Husserl and presented the volume of the Investigations
Logicas to Edith Stein, warning that "in Göttingen nothing is done but to philosophize
day and night, in the food and down the street. Everywhere. There is talk of phenomena
only. "
In order to understand the influence that the phenomenological school thought had
on Edith Stein's work, it will be illuminating to demonstrate how the thought of this
philosophical school was present in Europe, most necessarily in the school of
Würzburg.
The approach of psychology to the phenomenological school can be noted
through Edmund Husserl's habilitation advisor in Halle, the philosopher Carl Stumpf.
His influence on Husserl's work can be seen in the fact that his main work Logical
Investigations was dedicated to Stumpf. 52 In addition to Husserl, the philosopher Franz
Brentano and the psychologists Wolfgang Köhler and Kurt Koffka were guided by
Halle's teacher.
Hebert Spiegelberg points out that unlike Husserl, his mentor, the psychologist
and philosopher Carl Stumpf possessed a greater openness to psychology and other
areas of knowledge; However, despite the methodological differences, both sought to
analyze the phenomenological method by means of a detailed description of the
immediate experience of the phenomena, and, from this description, to understand the
structure of the phenomena.53
Another researcher in the field of psychology who had a strong influence from
phenomenology was Professor at the University of Göttingen Georg Elias Muller, who
taught the discipline of Experimental Psychology from 1881 to 1921 (Edmund Husserl's
colleague) from a closer perspective of Carl Stumpf, that is, descriptive psychology,
which was strongly disapproved by the author of Logical Investigations, who thought
52
SPIEGELBERG, Herbert. The phenomenological movement: a historical introduction. Boston, MA:
Martinus Nihjhoff., 1982, p. 64.
53
SPIEGELBERG, Herbert. Phenomenology in psychology and psychiatry: a historical introduction.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972. p. 33.
22
the current of phenomenological thought as a philosophical line, and not only as a
method, this being the view defended by Georg Elias Muller. 54
About the confrontation of these two teachers, we have the description made by
Charles Edward Spearman, who studied in 1906 at the University of Göttingen under
the guidance of Georg Elias Muller, and sought to study the problems about memory
and intelligence measures. We know that Husserl gave lectures during the period 1905
to 1907, including Thing and Space, in which he sought to address the relationship
between the construction of spatiality and the internal consciousness of time. Among his
students was Spearman himself.
At the same university, that of Göttingen, I had the added advantage

of attending the lectures of Husserl, in his own way, a great man like
G.E. Müller. But paths followed by them led them to worlds apart. In
fact, the only thing that seemed common to both was the inability of
one to appreciate the other! For Müller, Husserl's refined analyzes
seemed to be a rebirth of the middle ages (as indeed they were broadly
but not necessarily as a disadvantage). For Husserl, Müller's attempts
to deal with psychological problems through experimentation was like
trying to unravel lace with a trident. Still, Husserl's procedure-as he
described it to me-differed only from that used by the best
experimentalist, dealing with similar problems, in which Husserl had
no one but himself as an experimental subject.55
We can see from this testimony that there was a strong resistance of Edmund
Husserl to the work of Georg E. Muller, because differently from Muller's work, which
sought to be based on a dialogue between Experimental Psychology and
Phenomenology, epistemology of this new field of science should be formulated from
the empirical experiments and the definition proposed by Husserl that the
phenomenological process first sought the epistemological refoundation of the natural
sciences from the transcendental logical exercises.
In this same period, the psychologist Oswald Külpe sought to develop the
experimental psychology program at the University of Würzburg, where the professor
intended to use the phenomenological method to describe the sensory experiences and
feelings that make up reality, and this perspective is also present in the Leipzig school.
He ends up being criticized by Husserl, because he believed that the perception based
54
ASH, Mitchell. G. Gestalt Psychology in German Culture, 1890-1967: Holism and the quest for
objectivity. New York: Cambridge University Press.1998. p. 225.
55
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972. p. 35.
23
on the sensorial56movement departed from his conception of phenomenological
constitution, in which access to reality would occur through the movement in which the
object is presented to consciousness, being before this movement the place where one
has access to the phenomenon. That is, for Husserl, the apprehension of a phenomenon
would manifest itself in a universalistic way, and could not be restricted to forms of
individual expression, as proposed in several currents of psychology of the time.
During the 1900s, Oswald Külpe and his students at the psychology school at the
University of Würzburg approached Husserl's phenomenological method to analyze
how psychic contents would occur and how these would relate to the multiple
expressions of thought among them sensations, images and feelings. The influence of
the phenomenological method as a form of the theory of knowledge can be seen in the
works of Oswald Külpe, as, for example, in the period from 1904 to 1905, experiments
were carried out that sought to analyze which were the influences of instructions carried
out on participants to stimulate patients in problem solving. The association of colors
with certain words represents a paradigm of this tendency, being the result formulated
through the phenomenological description of this phenomenon. 57
Mitchell G. Ash reveals that the very vocabulary used in the school of Würzburg
was modified to a greater adaptation of the model created by Edmund Husserl. This can
be seen during the year 1907 through the works of Oswald Külpe's students, including
August Messer58 who used the concept of an intentional Husserlian act to analyze
elements that do not have a physical image but are gifts in the world of awareness.
Another member of this school who sought to subject experimental psychology
to the phenomenological conception was Karl Bühler, who tried to describe three
classes in which thought was revealed in reality: the first would be simple thinking,
which would naturally occur; the second, starting from Husserl's interpretation of
retention, would be the thought of memory, where consciousness would present a
regularity; the third would be intentional thinking, in which the act of signification
would be formulated from the moment the phenomenon occurred, and not from what
had previously been formulated by memory.
56
objectivity. New York: Cambridge University Press.1998. p. 195.
57
PILLSBURY, W. B. The essentials of psychology. New York Mcmillan, 1911, p. 46.
58
objectivity. New York: Cambridge University Press.1998. 1998, p. 211.
24
The Würzburg school sought to interpret the phenomena of thought and
consciousness through a dynamic system in which the philosophical model formulated
by Edmund Husserl could place it at the center of the psychological and philosophical
thought of the period. However, Edmund Husserl, as he had already done in Göttingen,
disapproved of the use of descriptive psychology in Würzburg, since the philosopher's
interest was the metaphysical nature of thought, and not only the experimental study of
consciousness, in which the experimental apparatus alone provide an interim analysis of
the extent of certain conscious experiences under specific conditions.59
Eduardo González di Pierro points out that Edith Stein is also part of the same
group of criticisms of psychology as her master in Göttingen, Edmund Husserl. Such
criticism is based on a modern conception, "especially of the so-called" explanatory
"psychology, which refers to the psychic dimension of the human being, still linked to
the physical realm in which the human person must be understood in its plurality.
Precisely, Stein proposes a psychology that addresses the Spirit and not just the psyche,
to replace it with the old "soulless psychology" that Edith criticizes incessantly.”60
1.3. Círculo Fenomenológico de Göttingen
In April 1913, Edith Stein decided to leave for Göttingen, this change occurred
by several factors among them the own contact with the work Logical Investigations
that was presented by Willian Stern and Richard Honigswald. She is fascinated by the
work of Husserl, convincing himself that he should take lessons with the master
himself. Other factors were the publication in a magazine that contained the portrait of
Conrad-Martius, a young student of Husserl who had been awarded a philosophy prize
with the work Die erkenntis-theoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus (The
epistemological foundations of positivism) inspiring Stein. In addition, Richard
Courant, cousin of Edith Stein, had been appointed professor of mathematics in
Göttingen and offered to Mrs. Augusta Courant Stein to receive his daughters Edith and
Erna to complete there the university formation. 61
Dear old town of Göttingen! I believe that only those who studied
there between 1905 and 1914, in the short time of splendor of the
59
HUSSERL, Philosophy as rigorous science. New York: Harper & Row Publisher, 1965.p13.
60
GONZÁLEZ DI PIERRO, Eduardo. De la Persona a la Historia. Antropología fenomenológica y
filosofía de la historia en Edith Stein. 2004 p. 2004, p. 159.
61
MIRIBEL, Elisabeth. Edith Stein: como ouro purificado pelo fogo. 3 ed. Aparecida, SP: Editora
Santuário, 2001, p. 42.
25
Göttingen phenomenological school, can understand how this place
made us vibrate. 62
At the age of twenty-one Edith Stein arrives in the city of Göttingen and in her
daily Life of a Jewish family, tries to describe the city in contrast to Breslau and as a
"true university city" with 30,000 inhabitants, mostly immigrants constituting a city
plural. Where the past was a striking sign, especially in the architecture of buildings and
signs....
I was struck by the commemorative signs that were in almost every

old house: they indicated the famous people who had lived there. The
past remembered the house step: the Grimm brothers, the physicists
Johann Carl Friedrich Gauß and Wilhelm Eduard Weber and others
who belonged "to the seven of Göttingen", all, had lived and done
something here, and if they remembered their future memories
generations. 63
For Stein, Göttingen was a diving experience in the past, where great men such
as the brothers Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm lived, who were part of the "Göttingen group
of seven" together with the historians Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann and Georg
Gottfried Gervinus, as well as the very Otto von Bismarck who had been a student at the
university.
Following the advice of Georg Moskiewicz, who had received in Breslau that
"When she arrived in Göttingen the first thing she should do was go look for Adolph
Reinach and he would take care of the rest" 64 Adolph Reinach acted as assistant to
Edmund Husserl and was responsible for the course of initiation to phenomenology,
coming from Munich, was responsible for the first interview at the University.
Then someone was fast approaching, the door opened and Reinach.
He was of medium height, not very strong in constitution, but broad-
shouldered, with no beard, with a small dark mustache, big and high
forehead. Through his crystal glasses he had brown eyes, he seemed
intelligent and gentle. I was received with kindness; He made me sit
on the chair closest to the side of the table, then sat in the chair putting
the work aside, standing in front of me said "Dr. Moskiewicz wrote
me talking about you. Have you studied any phenomenology?" I gave
a brief information. Soon he was willing to admit me in his
"developed exercises," but I still could not specify the day and time
62
STEIN, Edith. Vida de una familia judía in Escritos Antropológicos y Pedagógicos: Magistério de vida
Cristiana, 1926-1933, Ed., 2002, p. 344.
63
STEIN, Edith. Vida de una familia judía in Escritos Antropológicos y Pedagógicos: Magisterio de vida
cristiana, 1926-1933. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed.,2002, p. 347-348.
64
cristiana, 1926-1933. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed.,2002, p. 352.
26
because he was meeting with the students to determine accurately. He
promised me to talk to Husserl about me. 65
Adolf Reinach sought the Hursselian phenomenology from the criticisms made
to psychologism generally centered on the figure of his former professor Theodor Lipps,
as well as the other members of the first circle of realistic phenomenology, the Lipps
project, and defined by Macintyre as the development of logic should be based on an
explanation of the mental activity provided by empirical psychology66 , a perspective
which, as we have pointed out before, was contracted by the Hursselian conception, for
whom submission of logic to psychology was a mistake that needed to be combated,
and this criticism is central to the work Logical Investigations, which for this first
generation of Göttingen's phenomenological circle, was "a work that redefined
philosophy for them". 67
Edith Stein was strongly influenced by Husserl's critique of psychologism and
philosophical project, as well as by the works of other members of the realist
phenomenological line such as Adolph Reinach, Hedwig Conrand-Martius and Hans
Lipps. However, as Eduardo González Pierro, Edith Stein will tread its own path within
the Göttingen Circle.
In different places and publications, we state our objections by placing
Edith Stein on the so-called realistic phenomenological line that
characterized the Munich-Göttingen school. Certainly, at the
beginning, our philosopher was strongly influenced by Reinach and
especially by his friend and godmother, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and
consequently broadly shared the realistic phenomenological
perspective. Very soon, this position began to be modified by Stein's
close collaboration with Husserl's own assistant. She alone followed
him to Freiburg and gradually gained a greater understanding of what
we might call the general scheme of Husserl's phenomenological
philosophy. She distanced herself from the positions occupied by
(besides Reinach) Hedwig-Conrad-Martius, Roman Ingarden, Jean
Héring and, though perhaps to a lesser degree, by other members of
the Göttingen Circle. 68
Edith Stein was delighted with her interview with Adolf Reinach, whom he
describes as "a pure-hearted person," so that after this encounter, Reinach was
65
66
67
68
GONZÁLEZ DI PIERRO, Eduardo. The Influence of Adolf Reinach on Edith Stein’s Concept of the
State: Similarities and Differences. 2016 p. 94.
27
responsible for initiating it into his class of introduction to phenomenology, every
second -Holidays in the hours of 18:00 to 20:00. Unfortunately she can not attend
because this was the time of the history seminar given by Max Lehmann. 69
In Göttingen, Stein continues to express his interest in history, under the
guidance of Max Lehmann, a Berlin historian 70, born in 1845, trained in philology and
history in Konigsberg, Bonn and Berlin, and has taught history at several universities
including Marburg and Göttingen, having taught the disciplines of medieval and
modern history, Edith Stein had contact with the work of Lehmann still in Breslau,
where he studied the biography of Baron Heinrich Friedrich Karl Von Stein, and Max
Lehamann himself received for this work the title of PhD honorary of the Faculty of
Law of the University of Giessen and the Faculty of Theology of the University of
Berlin. Edith Stein describes Max Lehmann's lectures:
Along with philosophy, the most important thing for me was working
with Max Lehmann. I had thoroughly studied in Breslau his extensive
work on Baron Von Stein, and rejoiced to know the author himself.
He watched his course on the epoch of Absolutism, the
Enlightenment, and a six-hour hour on Bismarck. I liked his
European-minded way of thinking, the estate of his great master
Ranke, and I was proud to be Ranke's grandchildren-thanks to him,
though I certainly could not agree with all his ideas, like an old
Hannoverian, his mentality was strongly anti-Prussian; His ideal was
English liberalism. This became apparent, as expected, especially in
his lesson on Bismarck. Given my tendency to oppose all partiality
that induced me to do justice to the opposition party, I was more
aware than in my home environment of the positive notes of the
Prussianissimo and my sympathy for him (Max Lehmann) increased. 71
Edith Stein describes her lessons with Lehmann, in the course of German
History, one of the evaluations of the course was a work done in pairs, on the theme of a
comparative history of the Constitution of the German empire, the Reich and the
constitution of 1849, having as evaluation two distinct stages the first one written work
and the second the presentation of a seminar.
The presentation of the seminar students sat on a horseshoe-shaped table in front
of Professor Max Lehmann, to answer their questions this organization of the room
intended, according to Lehmann himself, the approach and interaction between students,
69
cristiana, 1926-1933. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed., 2002, p. 354.
70
BENTIVOGLIO, Julio A Historische Zeitschrift e a historiografía alemã do século XIX ,in História da
Historiografia n 6, 2011 p. 90.
71
28
in addition to the teacher also have a rather weak view and not recognize students from
a distance. 72
The theme suggested to Edith Stein and her duo was the Assembly for the
constitution of the German empire of 1849, focusing on the action of the
parliamentarians, mostly professors or jurists, who met in St. Paul's Church in
Frankfurt. For the analysis of the event on March 28, 1849, Stein began to analyze the
volumes of collections that were bound in 1848 by the Heidelberg library.
After reading and analyzing the material for the comparison of the speeches made by
the assembly, Edith Stein began the transcription of the documents and presented them
as part of her writings which ended up propitiating a comic fact. Professor Max
Lehmann could not read the work until the end because it was unreadable, especially
due to the quality of the paint, but Edith Stein gets permission from Professor Lehmann
to deliver the typed work:
What would be of this seminary if there were no young ladies who

worked with so much application and clever! This seemed to me
somewhat exaggerated, I felt compelled to speak in favor of my fellow
men. Also my colleagues had worked. He was a bit surprised by my
answer, but admitted: "Oh! yes, some certainly, for example, your co-
worker has also done a good study. ".73
As a result of the work on the constitution of 1849, Max Lehmann suggested that
the work presented at the seminar was the subject of research that Stein was to submit to
the evaluation for the state examination, under his guidance in Breslau, however the
project suggestion is denied by Edith Stein, who had already decided that she intended
to be a student of Husserl and belong to the Göttingen Circle.
Now what I had to do immediately was to organize my relations with

Professor Stern. I sent him a report on the progress of the semester: I
did nothing in connection with my psychology work; on the contrary,
I was completely involved in phenomenology. Now, my ardent desire
was to continue working with Husserl. I received a very favorable
response: if it were really my wish to study phenomenology, I should
do my Ph.D. with Husserl. I also found no resistance in my relatives. 74
72
73
74
29
Despite his interest in the discipline of Modern History in Germany Edith Stein
decided to stop attending Lehmann's seminary because of the conflict of schedules with
the introduction group of phenomenology taught by Adolf Reinach, who in the semester
of 1913 studied the book " The Formalism in Ethics and the Material Ethics of Values.”
(Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik).
Max Scheler is another German philosopher (of Jewish origin) who would
greatly influence the work of Edith Stein, mainly from the concept of "human person"
and of empathy (Einfühlung), both proper to the catholic philosophical tradition, which,
it is worth emphasizing, Edith Stein little knew until then.
For me as for many others the influence (of Scheler) in those years
was very great, beyond the philosophical scope ... At that time he had
many Catholic ideas and he knew how to divulge them by using his
intelligence and powerful eloquence. That is how I first came into
contact with a world that until then was totally unknown to me. This
did not lead me to faith yet, but it opened up a field of "phenomena" to
which I could no longer be blind. It was not for nothing that he
recommended to consider each thing with eyes free of prejudice. 75
In 1899 Max Scheler had converted to Catholicism, but after a period of

estrangement returned to the Church in 1914, during this same period he was working in
Göttingen where he held seminars, where Edith Stein was a student. Stein felt closer to
Husserl for his "great intellectual honesty," but also admired the seminars given by
Scheler to whom he described as "brilliant and seductive, pure expression of the
phenomenon of genius."76
In the first part (of the problem of empathy), even based on some
Husserl guidelines in his lectures, I looked at the act of empathy as a
special act of knowledge. From then on, however, I had come to
something that I was very much at ease with and that I was involved
in all my later writings: the construction of the human person. As part
of this first work, this examination was necessary to understand how
the compression of intellectual attachments stood out from the mere
perception of psychological conditions. Concerning these questions,
lectures and writings of Max Scheler, as well as the works of Wilhelm
Dilthey that had been of great importance to me. 77
75
,Ed OCD 2007. , p306.
76
,Ed OCD 2007. , p305.
77
ZORDAN Paolo, Edith Stein e Max Scheler . Un Confronto a partire Dalle Analisi del Problema Del
l’empatia . p 66 .
30
From then on, Edith Stein finally meets Edmund Husserl and describes him as "a
typical teacher of medium stature, and dignified air." Adolph Reinach had informed
Husserl that Edith Stein had read the second volume of the book Logical Investigations,
the second complete volume which impressed Husserl, who admitted Stein with the
following words: "Edith Stein you are a heroine for having read my work. 78
Edith Stein's contact with phenomenology occurred very intensely, so that she
was deeply influenced by Husserl's phenomenological method. The philosopher used
the phenomenological method in his investigations, because he saw in phenomenology
a comprehensive, instigating and rigorous possibility of investigating the phenomena,
which aided in his search for the truth. Edith Stein's course in phenomenology was very
peculiar, since it was not restricted to Husserl's analysis alone. She also developed her
own conception of phenomenology. Stein had an intense life trajectory, dedicated
mainly to the questions concerning the human being and the search for the truth. It is
possible to affirm that his life and work are confused.
In his course on nature and spirit, Husserl had spoken that an outer,
objective world could only be experienced intersubjectively, and this
was done by a plurality of cognitive individuals who were situated in
cognitive exchange. Accordingly, the experience of other individuals
is presupposed. To this peculiar experience, Husserl, following the
works of Theodor Lipps, calls it "empathy" (Einfühlung), however,
did not specify what it consisted of. This was a gap that needed to be
explained: I wanted to investigate what "empathy" was. This fact did
not displease the master; however, he would face a bitter challenge:
(Husserl) asked me to do my work in confrontation with Theodor
Lipps.79
Edmund Husserl tells Stein that the source of the phenomenological project of a
universal philosophy, even in its different approaches or in the different ways of
reduction, is always and constantly the unveiling of one's being. Therefore, the purpose
of epoché, for example, would be the reduction to the absolute self as the center for the
understanding of any constitution.80
For Angela Alles Belo, a fundamental part of understanding "the new way"
proposed by Husserl in the text Crisis of the European Sciences is the epistemological
change, in which the human being becomes the central point for the description and
78
STEIN , Edith, Dalla Vita di uma Famiglia Ebrea e altri Scritti Autobiografici , Roma , Città Nouva ,Ed
OCD 2007. , p355.
79
STEIN , Edith, Dalla Vita di uma Famiglia Ebrea e altri Scritti Autobiografici , Roma , Città Nouva ,Ed
OCD 2007. , p356.
80
HUSSERL, Edmund La crisi delle scienze europee e la fenomenologia trascendentale,Saggiatore
Milano 1960, p. 213.
31
analysis of the universality of the human experience. This process is only possible for
Edmund Husserl from the perception that one can only understand the dimensions of the
human being as long as it is composed of body, psyche and spirit:
Human spirituality is certainly founded on human physis, every

individual human soul life is founded on corporeality, and therefore
every community is also founded on the bodies of the human
individuals who are members of that community.81
In this process for the understanding and unveiling of the human being and his
relationship with the singular and universal phenomena, the human sciences would be
the way to the understanding that, even in periods of instability such as that of the
Second Great War, through epoché, to create bonds of friendship and to understand that
even if the modern subject is plural he has universal characteristics which are shared. In
a similar way, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger understand that in modernity 82 the
concept of pluralism has reached a central aspect, such as tolerance, which makes
individuals with different values able to live together and share certain characteristics in
common.
With this procedure, humanity appears as a single life of men and

peoples, linked only by spiritual relations, with a profusion of types of
humanity and culture that, however, flow fluently to each other. And
as a sea, in which men and peoples are like waves that fleetingly form,
they change and disappear again, some more richly and complexly
curling, others more primitive. However, by a more consequential and
inward-looking consideration, we note traces of union and new and
peculiar differences. As much as European nations may be hostile,
they have a special internal kinship in spirit, which crosses all and
overrides national differences.83
This tradition of empathy, which can not be reduced to a pure hermeneutical

tradition, was present in the Göttingen phenomenological school through, for example,
the work on the question of the perception of Theodor Lipps under the influence of
84
Wilhelm Wundt and Edmund Husserl , as well as in the work of his colleague, Edith
Stein, for whom the central question is the human being in particular through the
81
Milano 1960, p. 13.
82
LUCKMANN, Thomas; BERGER, Peter. Modernidade, pluralismo e crise de sentido. A orientação do
homem moderno. Petrópolis: Vozes 2004, p. 38.
83
Milano 1960, p. 18.
84
LIPPS, Theodor “Die Aufgabe der Psychologie", Allgemeine Zeitung 1977, p. 141.
32
relation between phenomenology and philosophical anthropology, where the human is
thematized from its singularity and also its plurality. As Angela Alles Bello states: "To
dig into the interiority of the human being and at the same time to examine the external
manifestations is the task which the thinker considers most urgent to understand its
unique, unique and unrepeatable nature and, at the same time, the meaning of its
expressions and productions, which has an intersubjective value."85
In order to understand the human person in its plurality and from it to create ties
of empathy and affection, Edith Stein affirms that the human sciences, especially
History, could be the way for the restoration and the creation of bonds of identity and
orientation, since from the experiences (Erlebnis), as Dilthey had already shown, men
would perceive themselves as close. This means that they would have the capacity to
compensate for the specificity of the biological sciences, as we present in the critique of
psychologism.
We find the conception that psychology would be at the basis of
history in the manuals of the historical method ... We definitely do not
want to argue that the cognitions of psychology can not be useful to
the historian. These, however, help you to understand what is external
to your field and not offer you your own objects. I must explain
psychologically what I can not understand, but each time I do this, I
proceed as a student of the natural sciences and not as a historian. [...]
What needs to be "understood" is just how natural phenomena, when
presented, motivate the actions of the people in question and how
they, "motivated", also receive a historical significance. But in this
case such phenomena are no longer conceived as natural facts in a
way which must be explained by natural laws. If I had "explained" the
whole life of the past, I would have done a good job in the natural
sciences, but would have completely destroyed the spirit that was in
the past and would not have acquired even a grain of historical
knowledge. If historians consider that their job is to secure and explain
the psychological facts of the past, then there is no longer a science of
history. 86
Edith Stein describes At the Human Person Structure conference how Baden's
political science school, in particular the philosophers Heinrich Rickert and its advisor
Wilhelm Windelband, sought to define the sciences in two large groups: nomothetic
(seek universal laws) and (describing individual structures). However, unlike Rickert
and Windelband, human sciences could not be reduced to individual ones, because their
object, the human person, is composed of plurality; therefore, the conception of human
person for Edith Stein is necessarily modern.
85
BELLO Angela A. A Questão do sujeito humano., 2010, p. 6.
86
STEIN Edith. Il problema dell’empatia, de E. e E. Costantini, Ed. Studium, Roma,,1998, p. 199.
33
This division overlaps with what others define as the natural sciences
and the humanities. The natural sciences can be considered
nomothetic because - even where they proceed descriptively - they
seek a universal law of formation to study the individual only as an
example, and never in his individuality. On the other hand, it is not
possible to equate the idiographic sciences with those of the spirit
(human sciences). There are human sciences dealing with something
unique: history seeks to investigate and expose the march of humanity
over time, as it happened in a unique and unrepeatable way, in human
individuals and concrete peoples. 87
Edith Stein testifies that history - especially the philosophy of history - would
have universalist characteristics, just as the historian's own tools would make possible
an openness to the universal dimension, since they would continue to exist separate
from the materiality of the subject, such as objects of studies, letters, a testament, or a
literary text, which can survive in relation to the one who writes them and at the same
time can affect other men. Thus, the historian's preliminary task, for Stein, would be to
gather these sources; but it states that the main task would be to understand these
testimonies and from them "to penetrate into individuality through the language of these
signs."88It follows, then, that the historian's mission would be the passage from this
individuality to universality through writing, thus tensing the possibility of creating
bonds of affection, that is, feelings of empathy and understanding:
Next comes the mission of making others available to the individuality

that was captured. Such an end can not be achieved by giving to
individuality a universal denomination or enumerating many of its
characteristics (in turn, universally understandable), nor seeing it as
the intersection of different types. All of these are just tools that can
be used. But what is important is to allow someone to grasp an
individuality as an encounter with oneself in which one perceives
one's trajectory. In order for the act of understanding to be
cooperative, especially eloquent traits must be reported and, above all,
whenever possible, offer original expressions of the person in
question. 89
Eduardo González di Pierro states that the analysis of the historical object for
Edith Stein should start from the experiences (Erlebinis). This conception is contrary to
the interpretation of the sociologist George Simmel, for example, from which the actual
events are continuous, but the description about them - like historical events - seeks to
87
STEIN, Edith. Estrutura da pessoa Humana Madrid : El Carmen Ed., 1933, p.585.
88
STEIN, Edith. Estrutura da pessoa Humana Madrid : El Carmen Ed., 1933,p. 588.
89
STEIN, Edith. Estrutura da pessoa Humana Madrid : El Carmen Ed., 1933, p. 589.
34
create a certain orientation, through a narrative that presents these events as
encompassed in a unitary idea. Stein writes to Simmel: "By further decomposing this
unity, we will eventually reach atoms which no longer have a historical significance and
on which, therefore, history can no longer be constructed."90
Odo Marquard affirms that modern pluralism could contribute to what would be
the human sciences because when the social scientist tries to think a problem, he
approaches other scientists who think together or depart from the same objects, and can
propose different analyzes that would help to understand the phenomenon as a
whole. 91In a similar way, we can analyze the Steinian thought, which, when confronted
with that of Simmel, reveals that, although the multiple aspects of historiographical
writing contribute to apprehend the reality of the phenomenon studied, no one can
represent it exhaustively, because "Certainly the historian of politics, economics, and art
gives very different news of the same historical period. However, this simply means that
the content of the meaning of the original event was something multiform, not that each
assigned a different meaning to it. "92
With the advent of the First World War many of the members of the Göttingen
circle were summoned to fight on the battle front which, according to Hans Rainer
Sepp, interrupted the philosophical project of the circle, in addition, of course, from
Husserl's transfer to the University of Freiburg in the year 1916 93 The First World War
profoundly affected this group94 such as Dietrich von Hildebrand who acted as a nurse
in Munich, Adolf Reinhard who joined the army and received the Iron Cross dying in
battle of the Somme in Flanders on November 16, 1917, and Hans Lipps, a physician
and phenomenologist for whom Edith Stein may have fallen in love. Stein describes it:
Hans Lipps made a stronger impression than anyone else. At the age
of 23, he seemed much younger. Very strong, thin, but well made, had
a beautiful expressive face, so alive with that of a child (...). This
summer he can not come regularly (to the meetings of the
90
GONZÁLEZ DI PIERRO, Eduardo. De la Persona a la Historia .Antropología fenomenológica y
filosofía de la
historia en Edith Stein.2004 , p. 157.
91
MARQUARD, Odo. ¿El manifiesto pluralista? In: _____. Felicidad en la infelicidad. Buenos Aires,
Katz, 2006, p. 153.
92
STEIN, Edith. Introduzione alla filosofia, de A.M. Pezzella, A. Ales Bello (ed.), Città Nuova, Roma,
1998., p. 283.
93
SEPP, Hans Rainer . La postura de Edith Stein dentro del movimento fenomenologico, Anuário
Filosófico, v. 31, p. 709-729, 1998., p. 710 .
94
TERRICABRAS, Josep-Maria. Diciónario de Filosofia Tomo II , Ed Ariel , S.A. , Barcelona, 1994., p.
1230 .
35
Philosophical Society), since he was simultaneously preparing his
preliminary examinations of medicine and his thesis on the physiology
of plants, for his doctorate of philosophy. 95
During lectures and meetings of the philosophical society, Edith Stein and Hans
Lipps became friends and Stein wrote letters to him during World War I, sent gifts
when Hans Lipps was at the front, without revealing his feelings for him. Edith Stein's
best friend in the Göttingen circle, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, describes this relationship:
She loved Hans Lipps, the phenomenologist who was part of our
group, who later became a professor at the University of Frankfurt and
died as a doctor during the Battle of St. Petersburg. I'm also sure she
would have married him if he wanted to. But he did not want to. When
that became clear I had a conversation with her - about the picture of
him she kept on her desk, in our house in Bergzabem. He said that it
did not seem normal for me to devote myself totally to God and want
to devote myself totally to him, keeping under his eyes the picture of a
man who did not want to marry her. She was very touched by my
observation and shortly after ... the photo disappeared from her
office.96
Edith Stein was impelled to act in the first world war, to consider herself a "true
German citizen" and soon after the examinations provided of Greek and history in
Breslau, she got in contact with the Red Cross of the city to enlist, nevertheless , had as
answer that in Germany there was no demand since the picture would already be
complete. Nevertheless, there was a need in Austria especially at the Mährisch
Weißkirchen hospital. 97It was in the Moravia region where soldiers were sent with
cholera, typhoid, and other fevers or acute infections, which means that Mährisch
Weißkirchen was a place where the main activity was to take care of the quarantine
patients.98
I wanted to know more details. Mährisch Weißkirchen was half-way

by train from the Oderberg-Vienna section, which lasted about five or
six hours. There was a large military academy that had become a
95
STEIN, Edith. “Live in a Jewish Family – her unfished autobiographical account” in The Collected
Works of Edith Stein , Washington , D.C. ICS, Publications ,1986 , p.254
96
BATZDORFF, Susanne Never Forget-Christian and Jewish Perspectives on Edith Stein ,ICS
Publications , Institute of Carmelite Studies , Washington , DC, 1998 , p.265.
97
STEIN, Edith. Aus dem Lazarettdienst in Mährisch-Weißkirchen :Edited by Lucy Gelber; Romaeus
Leuven), Louvain, Nauwelaerts.., 1965, p.231. .
98
STEIN , Edith. Vida de una familia judía in Escritos Antropológicos y Pedagógicos: Magistério de vida
Cristiana, 1926-1933, Ed., 2002, p 415.
36
hospital for contagious. It would have 4,000 beds and was the
evacuation place facing the Carpathian mountains. 99
Even with great resistance on the part of her mother, Augusta Stein, who
threatened her not to give her blessing, what Edith Stein had felt should help her
country. She gives up the Greek exam that was marked before the war - in the
humanistic institute - and is warned by the director of the institute Mr. Thalheim:
I have no relation to you, but since you do not have a father, I feel it
my duty to warn you: do you know the situation of the military
hospitals? I (Edith Stein) did not know, but knew, as you suggested,
that the nurses had a bad reputation and that it would represent a
danger to morality. I thought it would be in those places that there
would be the greatest need for serious professionals. I thanked you
sincerely for showing your kindness in worrying about me, but I did
not let myself be dissuaded in my decision. 100
On April 7, 1915, Edith Stein sailed from Göttingen to Mährisch Weißkirchen,

with the red cross sign arriving at noon to the small and pleasant city, which had as a
central building the old military academy that had been transformed in hospital on the
direction of Margaret (an old nurse who worked in the city). Edith Stein was a staff of
one hundred and fifty nurses who worked in the hospital and was assigned to the ward
of patients with typhoid.
The hospital staff, doctors, nurses and nurses were mostly members of the
different nations belonging to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy ie Germans,
Czechs,Slovenes, Poles, Hungarians, Romans, Italians as well as Turks, Russians and
gypsies; so that for the good functioning of the hospital everyone followed a standard
book with questions and answers that was written in nine languages. 101
We believe that this contact led her to think about the problem of experiences
(Erlebins), that is, from contact with other people, especially from other nationalities,
she came even closer to analyzing the phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung). As we can
see in Edith Stein's description of one of her patients:
He was a young Italian merchant from Trieste. We only knew him by
his first name, which does not come to mind; I'll call Mario. The
disease had attacked him with extraordinary force. His mouth was
constantly filled with a phlegm mingled with blood. Nurse Loni told
me that every time she passed by her bed she would wipe her mouth
99
100
cristiana, 1926-1933. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed.,2002, p. 416- 417 .
101
37
with gauze. The sick man always thanked the service with his eyes. It
was impossible for him to speak, he had completely lost his voice. At
each visit it was less recognizable. Doctors and nurses talked by his
bed as if he understood nothing. But I could see in their large, bright
eyes they understood everything they said. Most of the time he was
calm, but he was following us with his eyes. The other sick with a
fever were in such a bad state that they did not perceive what was
happening to them. I intended to care for them as children, and I was
amazed to realize that some were beginning to recover, but typhus
caused some patients to suffer side effects. 102
Edith Stein devotes an entire sub-chapter of her biography "Life of a Jewish

Family" to describe how it related to the various patients in the hospital, and this contact
with the various peoples was what motivated her. She describes, for example, the
humble Slovene patients, who often came from peaceful villages and were now
bedridden and suffering from a war that was not their own, also refers to the bravery of
the Hungarian and Czech soldiers. When he was not caring for the sick Edith Stien
sought to continue his education by reading the two books he had chosen to take to the
hospital: Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and for a Phenomenological Philosophy:
General Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology and Homer's Odyssey. After five
months of hard work and dedication, Edith Stein noticed that her nerves were reaching
the limit and that she needed rest, and, at the same time, felt the need to return to her
studies from the set of experiences (Erlebins) that she had acquired. In this way she
returns to her home in Breslau in September, the Mährisch Weißkirchen hospital closed
a month later and. due to his dedication and devotion in working as a nurse, Stein
received the "red medal" of the red cross.
1.4. Freiburg: Edith Stein as assistant to Husserl
Edith Stein returned to Göttingen in the summer of 1916, and soon discovered
that Edmund Husserl103 had moved to the University of Freiburg where he would
continue as a teacher until his retirement in 1928. In this period, Stein returns to his
study on empathy; he understood that the work was necessary but would require
enormous effort, so that he went to work from six in the morning to midnight without
interruption with the support of the master.
This struggle for clarity provoked great torments in me and did not
give me peace day and night. (...) I was more and more drawn to
genuine despair. It was my will. (...) There came a point where life
102
Works of Edith Stein , Washington , D.C. ICS, Publications ,1986, p. 416.
103
Filosófico, v. 31, p. 709-729, 1998.., p. 711-712.
38
seemed unbearable. I often told myself that it did not make sense. If I
had not finished my thesis, the work would have been sufficient for
the state examination, and if I had not been a great philosopher, I
could certainly become a good teacher. But rational considerations
were useless. I could not cross a street without the desire for a car to
hit me. 104
In the next chapter we will look more deeply at the work "On empathy", in
which Stein sought to analyze the problem of experiences, especially that which warns
of the presence of another human being, intuitively recognized as alter ego - empathy.
During this phase two more great works are written: "Psychology and Science of the
Spirit", in 1922, in which Stein seeks to deepen the question of the essence of psychic
reality and the spirit, and to find the foundation to properly delimit psychology and
science of the spirit as a discipline, through the concepts of chance and motivation,
especially the problem of how the supra individual reality would have access to the
spiritual world. Soon after writing this text, he began the "Treaty on the State," as he
recounts in a letter to Roman Ingarden105 dated 9 October 1920, where he reveals that he
had sent some parts of this work to Hans Lipps and that he had liked the readings.
On August 3, 1916 Edith Stein received the top mark with her doctoral work,
Summ cum laude, and a recommendation for the academic career. She is one of the ten
first doctorates graduated in Germany, and the second one in philosophy, the first being
her friend and future godmother Hedwig Conrad-Martius.
From this conquest, which was celebrated at the home of Husserl, where she was
received with a basket of flowers, Edith Stein understands that she must continue to
dedicate herself to philosophy, to phenomenology. Describes this moment of great
happiness comparing to the joy of "a young couple at the time of their engagement"106,
receiving the invitation of Husserl to be his assistant and help him in the organization of
his work.
Becoming Husserl's assistant, he is responsible for transcribing the philosopher's
manuscripts, as well as teaching introductory classes to phenomenology, which he
called "kindergarten." However, Stein 107
began to feel dissatisfied with the arduous
104
Works of Edith Stein , Washington , D.C. ICS, Publications ,1986, p.327
105
STEIN, Escritos Autobiográficos y Cartas, Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 1., Ed., 2002, p.4171.
106
Works of Edith Stein , Washington , D.C. ICS, Publications ,1986, p.327
107
39
tasks assumed and the type of relation that had with Husserl. Unlike the imagined
exchange, Stein encountered a solitary Husserl, submerged in his reflections and not too
open to dialogue. With that, he became indisposed and decided to end the partnership
with the philosopher. As Edith Stein herself commented:
Basically, what I can not stand is the idea of being at someone's
disposal. I can put myself in the service of one thing and do it in many
ways for the sake of someone. But in short, staying at the service of a
person just to obey her, this I really can not. And, if Husserl does not
get used to treating me as a true collaborator, how I always perceived
our relationship and how he himself, in theory, also perceives, then the
way is to separate ourselves. 108
However, it is important to note that this breakup was only academic, since the
philosopher always had a sense of admiration and gratitude for his master. In addition,
she never ceased to be a phenomenologist, since she continued with her
phenomenological analyzes of various themes and problems. For example, the presence
of the phenomenological method can be clearly perceived even in later works, as in the
writing "The Structure of the Human Person", 1932, in which Stein realizes a
phenomenological anthropology.
As Hans Sepp points out, far from being a passive or subservient student, Stein
presented some disagreements with Husserl, thus developing his autonomous
conception of phenomenology.109However, it must be said that in spite of the differences
with his master, Edith Stein took into account many aspects of Husserl's ideas and, in
this sense, we understand that his critics were plausible and consistent, evidencing a
broad understanding of the phenomenological method.
To Phenomenology Phenomenology was a method of rigorous science that
would have as a basic principle the return of things themselves (Zu den Sachen Selbst)
and the search for essences. Returning to things themselves consists in seeking the first
foundations of knowledge. Due to the limitations of scientific knowledge, widely
denounced by Husserl, it is necessary to investigate the phenomena from the founding
experiences, considering the subject-object correlation.
Yet what are these things to which we must return? In the sense of the
philosopher, and in agreement with Husserl, things themselves correspond not only to
the perceptive contents of experience, but to the essence of things, that is, to their
108
109
Filosófico, v. 31, p. 709-729, 1998.., p. 726.
40
meaning. It is understood by essence "what is found in an individual's own being as
what he is," as Husserl pointed out. 110
Therefore, for Edith Stein phenomenology is not a deductive science, as it is not
part of a core of indemonstrable principles. Nor is it an inductive science, since it does
not seek universal truths by generalizing a set of particular propositions, as the natural
sciences do. On the contrary, phenomenology is based on the intuitive method, since
through it it is possible to grasp philosophical truths that are infinite, immutable and
evident.
Intuition is not only the sensitive perception of a particular and
particular thing, as it is here and now. There is an intuition of what the
thing is by essence, and this can have a double meaning: what the
thing is by its own being and what is by its universal essence. 111
In 1924, Edith Stein writes the text "What is philosophy?" From which the
philosopher seeks to go against some misconceptions about the phenomenological
method, seeking to clarify some obscure points. Thus, Stein approaches three
fundamental points: the objectivity of consciousness, intuition as method and the
question of idealism, where it discusses the so-called idealistic turn of Husserl.
In general terms, we can say that for Stein112 the Phenomenology is a philosophy
that is characterized by the rescue of the idea of absolute truth and objectivity of the
conscience, breaking with the philosophies considered by her empirical and relativistic,
such as naturalism, psychologism and historicism. Contrary to these philosophies,
phenomenology takes up the idea that truth is immutable and that the spirit must find it
instead of producing it. In the philosopher's sense, this made phenomenology confused
as merely a resumption of the great ancient philosophical systems, such as Platonism,
Aristotelianism, and Scholasticism.
The rescue of the notion of absolute truth is something dear to philosophy. The
idea of a changeable truth, that is, that changes with time and according to certain
conditions, makes the philosophical investigation lose its rigor, incurring sterile
relativisms. Thus phenomenology arose in opposition to these philosophies, and
especially to the positive sciences, seeking to rescue the rigor of philosophical inquiry,
110
HUSSERL, Edmund. Ideias para uma fenomenologia pura e para uma filosofia
fenomenológica.Aparecida: Ideias & Letras, 2006., p. 35.
111
STEIN, Edith. El método fenomenológico: La estructura de la persona humana. Madrid: Editora
Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos ,2002, p. 33.
112
STEIN, Edith. ¿Qué es la fenomenología? In: La Pasíon por la Verdad. Buenos Aires: Bonum, 2012,
p.39.
41
as a rigorous science, as Husserl pointed out in his 1911 article entitled "Philosophy as a
science of rigor" (Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft).
Like his master Husserl, who believed that phenomenology was a rigorous
method, that sought to understand the phenomena by themselves and not only by a
priori interpretations and representations. What, according to Professor Angela Alles
Belo, made it possible for women to join this philosophical school, such as Hedwig
Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein herself, would be the method itself, which would imply
an open attitude obtained by suspending of any consolidated belief, which according to
the author would seem a feminine characteristic. That is, the phenomenological method
would try to capture the relation between singularity and totality, and for that would
require a behavior not only intellectual in relation to the object, but also intuitive. 113
In Edith Stein we find not only a presentation of phenomenology, but also an
appreciation of the presence and impact of phenomenology in the philosophical thought
of its time. This can be seen in the text "The Meaning of Phenomenology as a
'Worldview'" (Die Weltanschauliche Bedeutung der Phänemenologie), written in 1932,
published posthumously.
Early in the text Edith Stein begins her presentation with two questions: 1 -
whether phenomenology could provide a "world view" or contribute to the elaboration
of this vision? And, in what way can Phenomenology contribute to the spirit of an
age?114 As Hans Rainer Sepp points out, responding to these concerns, Stein seeks to
draw a historical appreciation of phenomenology by highlighting mainly the experience
of its members. 115
Edith Stein makes a brief comparison between the three great exponents of the
phenomenological circle: Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger,
focusing on the main contrasts between these philosophers and how each of them
highlights one aspect of this school of thought. The first to be presented is Husserl
himself, who is described as an intellectual who was preoccupied with the method as
113
BELLO. Ângela Alles. A Fenomenologia do Ser Humano: Traços de uma Filosofia no Feminino.
Bauru: EDUSC ,2000, p. 23.
114
STEIN, Edith. La significacíon de la fenomenología como concepción del mundo.In: La Pasíon por la
Verdad. Buenos Aires: Bonum, 2012, p.53-70.
115
Filosófico, v. 31, p. 709-729, 1998., p. 712-713.
42
opposed to contemporary criticism, thus highlighting the systemic and traditional
character of this new science that would seek the essences. 116
Max Scheler, who became interested in phenomenology after his formation,
gives phenomenology the possibility of being applied in other fields as in ethics, in the
philosophy of religion and in a philosophical sociology. In his view, although he did not
share Husserl's phenomenological idealism, he, among the phenomenologists, most
carried out "fundamental investigations from the objective point of view and made him
totally confident in the force of intuition to the essences" and "who most strongly
opposed a fundamental critical attitude of the spirit" one of its main contributions being
the return of historicity to the pure self described in phenomenology. 117
Stein tries to describe Martin Heiddeger in opposition to Max Scheler, but in
close relation with Husserl, through the proposed universalist character of a basic
philosophy that would be based on "fundamental ontology".
He is distinguished from Scheler, but closer to Husserl, yet he does
not intend to investigate the essences in a pure surrender to objects,
forgetting oneself. On the contrary, he regards as a "fundamental
philosophical principle" the study of being (Dasein = being-there),
that is, in a more usual language: in the study of the Self or the
subject, which distinguishes itself from everything else that is, "It is
there for itself". Dasein competes irrevocably with the "being-in-the-
world."118
Of course, then Stein states that what Husserl understood by I does not apply
directly to Dasein, because the pure Self is the human being is not in a given existence.
In the second part of the text, Stein points out the significance that phenomenology had
for the beginning of another possible worldview construction. It is important to
emphasize that the philosopher understands the world view as the constitution of a
global vision of the world or as a way of contemplating the world. Thus, he asserts that
phenomenology provided a new meaningful worldview, mainly from the worldview of
these three phenomenologists, thus promoting a great influence on the philosophy and
culture of his time.
According to Stein, in Husserl it is possible to perceive a coherent view of the
world, in the sense of recognizing an absolute being to which all reality is referred. In
116
Verdad. Buenos Aires: Bonum, 2012, p.64.
117
118
43
Scheler, the philosopher claims that it is more difficult to find a coherent view because
of so many changes and oscillations of his thinking, but it is possible to identify a world
view, as the author explains, based on an image of the world of God. Finally, even if
prematurely, Stein comments that in Heidegger there is a nihilistic world-image, that is,
there is a marked position in "thought" as an essential component in death and
nothingness, as well as some other extreme formulations that induce an 'absence of
God'. "119
From the brief analysis of the texts in which Stein presents his conception and
understanding of phenomenology, we firstly noticed his unique apprehension of the
phenomenological method. In agreement with Husserl, Stein presents the
phenomenology as a method that seeks to return to the same things and reach the
essences of the phenomena. For this, phenomenology uses the intuitive method, through
which it is possible to apprehend the essences that are shown immediately.
Secondly, Stein also emphasized the resumption of Husserl's idea of absolute
truth and objectivity of consciousness with the publication of his "Logical
Investigations," which broke with the relativistic philosophies in force at the time and
rescued the rigor of philosophical inquiry: they can not satisfy us with meanings that
take life - when they take it - from distant, confused and improper intuitions. ".
The philosopher agreed with the master that philosophy, and especially the
sciences, lacked a radical foundation, which would elevate philosophy to a "science in
the strict sense." We conclude, therefore, that Stein presented an original conception of
Husserlian phenomenology. The philosopher remained faithful to the philosophy of his
master in many respects, while developing his own notions, seeking to complement the
Husserlian project without, however, mischaracterizing it. In this sense, the autonomy
and originality presented by Stein reveal his remarkable understanding of
phenomenology in the face of the many misconceptions that existed at the time.
CHAPTER 2 - EMPATHY A CONCERN OF A GENERATION
2.1. The Empathy from Edmund Husserl
The purpose of this second chapter is to analyze how the thinkers of Gottingen's
phenomenology school, and later Munich, discussed the phenomenon of Empathy
(Einfühlung), seeking in this way to demonstrate that empathy was a concern of the
119
44
members of this philosophical school, even becoming part structural structure of
phenomenological thought, especially from the Göttingen circle, from the influences of
Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, who also addressed this issue, as Edith Stein herself
states.
In relation to this first part of the work, it was necessary to investigate,

to make understandable, how to distinguish to understand the mental
interdependencies of the simple perception of dream situations. In
these matters, the courses and writings of Max Scheler, as well as the
works of Wilhelm Dilthey, were of great importance to me. In
reference to the extensive literature on empathy, which I worked on in
depth, I also added a few chapters on empathy from a social, ethical
and aesthetic point of view. 120
Ângela Alles Bello, presents that the Husserlian project was a universal
philosophy, which would have as its primary objective to know one's self, a project that
is present in all his work, even in his last work, the book Crisis of the European
sciences, in his own words of Husserl: Indeed, the source of a universal philosophy is
always and constantly, even in its different approaches, or in the different ways of
reduction, the self. 121
It is obscure how knowledge can reach the transcendent, the non-self-

giving, but the transcendent, the non-self-taught, but the trans-
intended, so certainly none of the transcendent knowledge and
sciences can help me in the face of clarity. What I want is clarity, I
want to understand the possibility of this apprehension, that is, if I
examine its meaning, I want to have before my eyes the essence of the
possibility of such apprehension, I want to intuitively transform it into
a given. 122
In order to "clarify" what the human being is in its universality, that is, what is
the relation between the human being and the set of experiences that make up the world
of life. It would be necessary to understand primordial phenomena, that is, phenomena
that belong to a primordial sphere in which the ego (ego) is aware of the relations with
others and with the world of life, one of them being the concept of "empathy"
(Einfühlung).
In order to understand this genesis of the alter-ego sense, it is

necessary to recall the great discovery that fuels Husserl's
reflections - the consciousness in which the transcendental ego
experiences the world is the consciousness by which the ego puts
120
Works of Edith Stein , Washington , D.C. ICS, Publications ,1986, p. 477.
121
BELLO, Angela A. Husserl – Sul problema di Dio, Studium. Roma 1985.
122
HUSSERL, Edmund. A ideia da fenomenologia. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1986. p.25.
45
itself into the world and the itself appears as a unit not only
psychic (seelisch) but also somatic (leiblich). In reflections ever
again resumed and never brought to a conclusive point, Husserl
attempts to circumscribe this process by which transcendental
consciousness in its becoming human reality in the world appears
to itself as the unity of a body and a psyche. 123
The concept of "empathy" (Einfühlung) is presented by Edmund Husserl, as a

fundamental part to undertake the craft of the human sciences, among them philosophy
and history, because from this phenomenon, the social scientist could access the world
of life , that is, to understand how people acquire knowledge, also to know the world,
we need to have a relationship with the other, starting from these experiences, as the
author states:
We lack here an authentic phenomenological explication of the

transcendental operability of empathy, and for that, because it is in
question, of an out-of-force validity of the others and of all the strata
of meaning of my surrounding world that for me grow validity of the
experience of others. It is precisely for this reason that it separates
itself into the domain of the transcendental ego, that is, in its realm of
consciousness, precisely its specifically proven ego-being, my
concrete peculiarity, such as that from which, from my ego
motivations, my analogue in empathy.124
We can see from this passage that the concept of "empathy" (Einfühlung) has for
Husserlian thought, validity as a form of apprehension of knowledge, in which the
subject becomes aware of the world through the perception of experiences, in the world
of life.
For Edmund Husserl, the conception of "empathy" (Einfühlung) has a
fundamentally ethical character, because through contact with the other, that we can
recognize the phenomena in the world of life in which we are inserted, being that
through this perception, that the thinker of the human sciences can overcome the
egological movement 125, where it manifests in a primordial way in consciousness, in
which all knowledge is elaborated, and in an official way, if the formulated concepts are
123
ALVES, P. Empatia e Ser-para-outrem: Husserl e Sartre perante o problema da intersubjectividade.
Revista Psi: Estudos e Pesquisas em Psicologia – UERJ. Ano 8,nº 2. p.10.
124
HUSSERL, Edmund. Meditações Cartesianas e Conferencias de Paris.; editado por Stephan Strasser;
tradução de Pedro M. S. Alves. 1. Ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2013. p.68.
125
According to Abbagnano, EGOCENTRISM (in Egocentrism fr. Égocentrisme, al. Egozentrismus, it
Egocentrism). Scheler has designated by this term the attitude that consists in confusing the world that
immediately surrounds us with the "world" in the proper sense of the term, that is, in assigning to the
immediate environment a universal or cosmic function. With E. so understood Scheler refracted
solipsism, selfishness, and autoerotism. Solipsism is the egocentric attitude that presides over the
conception of real-world objects; egoism is the E in its practical or volitional aspect; self-eroticism is the
attitude egocentric in love life in : Dicionário de Filosofia. 4 ed. São Paulo : Martins Fontes , 2000.p 318.
46
not submitted by the experience of the contact with the other, it would reinforce the ego,
which Freudianly would represent the conscious part, that is, the interaction between
subjects and external environments, the "principles of reality" that would be our
functions of perception, memory, feelings and thoughts.126
We have experiences originating from physical things in "external
perception," no more, however, in recall or anticipatory anticipation;
we have original experience of ourselves and our states of
consciousness in the so-called inner perception of self, but not of
others and of their lived in "empathy"; "We observe what is lived by
others" based on the perception of their bodily exteriorisations. This
observation of empathy is, of course, an intuitive act, a donor, but no
longer originally a donor. The other and his soul life are brought to
consciousness as being "themselves there" and together with the body,
but unlike it, not as originally given. 127
The phenomenological thought proposed by Husserl on empathy would differ

from other forms of knowledge, such as perception or memory, because empathy would
start from a relationship with the other, in which he would seek to recognize the other
and his experiences, in which these ideas would be organized through an eidetic
description, to arrive at "the same things", in other words to pure experiences.
This discussion starts from the project of a universalist science, proposed by

Husserl in phenomenological philosophy, whose mirror is the exact sciences, such as
mathematics, physics and geometry, that would seek not the representation of
experience but to go to the "essence of the lived" 128 , that is, the lived phenomena that
would be recorded by the conscience that would guide the subjects, as described by
Abbagnano:
Intentionality as referring to or reporting from the act of consciousness

to something else, to something that is not the act of consciousness
itself. For Husserl, this notion defines the very nature of consciousness
in general, which is therefore a transcendent that constitutes a relation
with the object "in person" and not with an image or representation.
(...) However, for Husserl, intentionality does not exhaust the essence
of consciousness, which is a chain of experiences and apprehends
itself in a direct and privileged way, which is nothing more to do with
intentionality. 129
126
HARTMANN, Heinz. Ensayos sobre la psicologia del Yo. México: Fondo de Cultura Econômica,
1969. p.22.
127
HUSSERL, Edmund. Ideias para uma fenomenologia pura e para uma filosofia fenomenológica:
Introdução geral a fenomenologia pura. Trad. Márcio Suzuki. Aparecida SP. Ideias & Letras, 2006 p 158.
128
Introdução geral a fenomenologia pura. Trad. Márcio Suzuki. Aparecida SP. Ideias & Letras, 2006 p 33-
34.
129
ABBAGNO, Nicola. Dicionário de Filosofia. 4 ed. São Paulo : Martins Fontes , 2000.p 191.
47
Edith Stein, in describing the difference between philosophy and thought
developed by Edmund Husserl in comparison with that of Martin Heidegger, to which
"Husserl's phenomenology is a philosophy of essences, while Heidegger is a philosophy
of existence"130. This understanding of reading, of these two notable names in
Göttingen's phenomenological cycle, is necessary so that we can understand how
Husserl thought "empathy" (Einfühlung) as a method for accessing the essences of
phenomena.
Silvestre Grzibowsky, presents that phenomenologically, the ego "I", when

manifested in consciousness, removes the subject from the natural and cultural world 131
this results in a thought that reinforces the hedonism of the subject, in relation to the
world of the life. In order to deepen this process of unveiling, the relation between the
ego "I" and its relation to the world of life, through the process of empathy
(Einfühlung), as Edmund Husserl himself states:
We put out of action the general thesis inherent in the essence of

natural orientation, we put in parentheses all that is encompassed by it
in the ontic aspect: that is, this whole natural world that is constantly
"for us there", "at our disposal", and that it will always remain there as
"effectiveness" for the consciousness, even when it is convenient for
us to place it in parentheses. If I do so, as is my full freedom, then I do
not deny this "world," as if I am a sophist, I do not doubt its existence,
as if I were skeptical, but I effect the "phenomenological" epoché,
which totally prevents me from doing any judgment on space-time
existence. 132
In seeking to understand, as the subject would have experience with the other,
Edmund Husserl calls it the "primordial sphere," that is, the experience of the self-
dictation of intersubjectivity first, in seeking to understand the other as a foreign
consciousness, only in a hedonistic way, this is my own being, but what would belong
to this original sphere would be the perception of the other as subject through the
experiences of empathy (Einfühlung).
It is not possible for the ego to have them in its representation, which
does not prevent it from effecting an intentional penetration into the
130
STEIN, Edith. La pasión por laverdad: Introducción, traducción notas del doctor Andrés Bejas. Buenos
Aires; Bonun, , 2003.p96.
131
GRZIBOWAKY, Silvestre. A Fenomenologia no Pensamento de Edith Stein. In: Edith Stein: A pessoa
na filosofia e nas ciências humanas./ Organizado por Gilfranco Lucena dos Santos; Moisés Rocha Farias.
São Paulo: Fonte Editorial, 2014.
132
Introdução geral a fenomenologia pura. Trad. Márcio Suzuki. Aparecida SP. Ideias & Letras, 2006 p 81.
48
primordial sphere of the Other's experiences. Husserl recognizes the
existence of a kind of empathic introspection in the primordial
community. In the words of the philosopher, such dynamics "is a link
that is in principle sui generis, an effective communion, which is
precisely the transcendental condition of the existence of a world, of a
world of men and things."133
For Husserl, empathy (Einfühlung) would demonstrate that this phenomenon

would allow an opening of "my own" (Mir-eigene) to a "world of men and things" this
opening would be possible, because during the empathic process, that the ego has of the
other.
The other can only be recognized as presentation (Appräsentation), but never as

presentation (Gegenwartigung) that is, understood in its totality, ie the other is not only
an extension of my own ego, but through an opening to the other, which in a dynamic
would form "a connection that in principle is sui generis, an effective communion,
which is precisely the transcendental condition of the existence of a world, a world of
men and things".134
In making an epoché of the phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung), Husserl

considers that the first form of access to the other by analogy is the first act when
realizing that the other does not belong only to my ego and my conscience, I try to look
at the other, through perception first and by analogy, I seek to understand the other.
The perception of the other always begins from the identification of its
corporeality of the recognition of the ego of the other, and perceiving it as a body
foreign to my ego, this is a living body is a being, imbued with intentional experiences,
which Edmund Husserl, would denominate zero point 135
of an infinite horizon of
possibilities, shared in a common world to which they are inserted.
If I introduce myself to the other by thought, and penetrate further into

the horizons of what belongs to it, then I am confronted with the
following fact: just as your bodily organism is in my field of
perception, so mine is in his field, and he usually apprehends me just
133
Introdução geral a fenomenologia pura. Trad. Márcio Suzuki. Aparecida SP. Ideias & Letras, 2006 p 33-
87.
134
tradução de Pedro M. S. Alves. 1. Ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2013. p 142.
135
49
as immediately as another to him, just as I apprehend him as "another"
to me. 136
From this movement, we seek according to the Husserlian thought to identify the
alter ego, because it is precisely in the movement of recognizing the other, that we
perceive and form our own ego, as Edmund Husserl describes "at first, I need to make
explicit, as such, what belongs to me properly, in order to understand that in the "own"
the "non-own" acquires, also he, his existential sense, mainly by analogy ".137
By perceiving by analogy that is before the other, the solipsist subject, 138 that the
philosophical conception from which I alone exist and that all other beings (men and
things) are only my ideas139 , becomes aware that there is another, that is, the subject
becomes aware that he is inserted in an existence, as the author himself says "one,
among many" that is, inserted in a society, a community.
During this understanding, in which the subject (ego) becomes aware of another
subject is from this understanding, one perceives its own corporeity, in relation to the
other, in the face of this phenomenon, empathy (Einfühlung), the subject has an opening
through consciousness with to the world of life, the subjects and objects that compose it:
What a knower knows in logical objectivity (...) may know equally

every cognoscent, as long as he fulfills the conditions which all
cognoscents of such objects must satisfy. This means here: you have
to experience things and the same things; if you have to know this
identity as well, you have to meet the cognitive others in empathy; it
has to have for that corporeity and to belong to the same world, etc.140
We can see that for Edmund Husserl, empathy (Einfühlung), has as its main
foundation, the possibility of understanding and recognition of human beings, through
the perception that they have a singular corporeality, belong to the same world of life,
that through empathy recognizes the other as the human subject, as body, through
intersubjectivity.
136
137
138
Segundo Abbagnano , O mesmo que solipsismo (v.).EGOLOGIA (In. Egology fr. Égologie; ai.
Egologie, it. Egologia). Segundo Husserl, a esfera própria do ego obtida mediante a epoché
egológica, com a qual, no campo da experiência fenomenológica, se abstrai de tudo o que pertence aos
outros eus (Cart. Med., § 44). in : Dicionário de Filosofia. 4 ed. São Paulo : Martins Fontes , 2000.p 319.
139
ABBAGNO, Nicola. Dicionário de Filosofia. 4 ed. São Paulo : Martins Fontes , 2000.p 929.
140
HUSSERL, Edmund. Ideas Relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica: Libro
Segundo: Investigaciones fenomenológicas sobre a constituição. Tradução Antonio Zirión Q. México;
UNAN, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, 2005.p 115.
50
Husserl describes the formation of the individual, as a manifestation of the body
itself, this awareness is constituted by dimensions of consciousness and corporeity,
which unite (LeibKörper), occurs when one subject perceives the encounter with the
other, as affirmed Ângela Alles Belo
In fact, the source of a universal philosophy, as Husserl defines it, is

always and constantly, even in its different approaches, or in the
different ways of reduction, the self. Therefore, any epoché must be
consciously transformed into a reduction to the absolute self, the self
as the ultimate functional center of any constitution. 141
According to Hurssel's thought, it is only through empathy (Einfühlung) that we can

come to understand the goal of universal philosophy, that is, the self, through contact
with the other, that we can become aware of our own corporeality, experience with the
other, that we come to act before the world of life, in other words, our intersubjective
experiences.
The Hursselian function of empathy (Einfühlung) is closely linked to the body,
which is as a whole connected with perception: all our sensory organs allow us to have
access to objective nature, and through this first contact between the solipsist subject
and nature, allows us to meet the phenomena of the world of life, perceiving himself as
a subject, who is aware that he is in a world.
In vision, the eye is directed to the visa and passes through corners,
surfaces, etc. On palpation, the hand slides over objects. Moving
closer I close my ear to listen. Perceptual apprehension presupposes
contents of sensation which play their necessary part in the
constitution of schemata and therefore the apparitions of these real
things themselves. And, of course, this is also the distinctive feature
that makes the body the bearer of a zero point of orientation, the here
and now, from which the pure self intuits space and the whole world
of the senses. 142
From this first contact, through the sensations and perception of the embodiment
of individuals, we conceptualize the phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung), we can only
unveil the phenomena present in the world of life, or rather, nature from the opening
with the other, that is to say, we can go the same things, through the empathic process.
For Edmund Husserl, we perceive that we are inserted in the world of life, nature
in which other individuals are inserted, by which I perceive, by the embodiment, being
141
BELLO, Ângela Alles. A Questão do Sujeito Humano. in Apund: Anais IV Seminário Internacional de
Pesquisa e Estudos Qualitativos, 2010. p1.
142
UNAN, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, 2005.p88.
51
this one level in which the empathy is manifested, so that its capacity of moderator of
the intersubjective experiences. 143
Angela Alles Bello, shows us that in the thought of Edmund Husserl to that of
Edith Stein, the relation between perception of the world of life and the inner formation
of the subject occurs in a double dimension, the first being the essential structure of the
subject (ego) and the second in the world of life, that is, of the experiences (Erlebnisse).
If we are interested, however, in the analysis of interiority-and this is

affirmed both by Husserl and by Stein-then we dispense with the
existing thing and focus our attention on the perceived-perceived
relationship, as living within the subject (for example, that of
perceiving) as the possibility of perceiving itself - also in other
subjects, and this thanks to a new lived, which we call empathy. 144
Thus, we can understand one of the levels of empathy, both for Husserl and for
Edith Stein is the ability to perceive the other and the power to understand what he
feels, through a repertoire present in the consciousness of lived experiences, which are
necessary for the recognition, so that the subject (ego) recognizes in the other subject,
with whom shared experiences and experiences, through empathy (Einfühlung).
The second level of the empathic phenomenon occurs according to the

Husserlian thought through the community, that is, when I relate to the other subjects in
a society or community, the perception dynamics of the other is transfigured by this new
configuration, sense of assimilation and reciprocity, in which subjects seek to reflect the
other.
For Edmund Husserl, when inserted in a community, before other subjects, in

which I share experiences with other human beings, I have a relationship of empathy
(Einfühlung) through the experiences (Erlebnisse), in community we form a new
dynamic with others, either say, a dynamic of reflection.
Our "theory" of strange experience, of the experience of "others",

wanted and could not do anything else but to explain from the
constitutive work of experience the very meaning of the position of an
143
UNAN, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, 2005.p 147.
144
Pesquisa e Estudos Qualitativos, 2010. p1.
52
"other" and, starting from the corresponding syntheses, to explain the
meaning of "the true existence of others”.145
When we become aware that we are inserted in a community with others, we

develop reciprocity, as a response to the movements in which we are inserted, through
the experiences (Erlebnisse) that we have with others, that is, through a larger set of
experiences with the other, I search in the consciousness of how to orient myself before
a community, in the face of a new phenomenon, I try to act as a reflex, through the
register that we have apprehended in our consciousness, through empathy (Einfühlung),
in other words, an opening for understanding and participation before a community.
The understanding of this dynamic, between the formation of the empathic

process as a constituent in a double dimension, according to the Husserlian and
Steiniano thought, in which the first dimension is the inner formation the subject (ego)
through the consciousness and embodiment and the second the external formation , this
is the experiences (Erlebnisse) from the reciprocity, when we are inserted in a
community, through reflection, brings us closer to the understanding of history and the
historian, formulated by François Hartog:
The Histories are certainly this mirror in which the historian has never
ceased to look, to question himself about his own identity: he is the
one who looks and is looked at, questioned-questioned - in the end,
always led to decline his titles and his qualities. What is he: historian
or liar? Hence the importance, in the history of Herodotus'
interpretations, of marking the caesura between the historian of the
Medical Wars and the Herodotus of others, generally treated as
another Herodotus. Where is he: at the service of a prince or a city,
playing the role of an eye and of written memory? Hence the
importance of the debates on the relations between Herodotus,
Pericles and Athens. Who does he talk to and why? Where the
questions about the audience of Herodotus, about Herodotus lecturer,
paid or not.146
As Hartog, writing about Herodotus, sought to point out that the actuality of the
book Stories was to demonstrate that in addition to the formation of an identity, the
latter would be concerned with otherness, and therefore the Histories of Herodotus,
criticized as a apology of solipsism. 147 However, François Hartog points out that in fact,
145
HUSSERL, Edmund. Méditations Cartésiennes. Trad. G. Peiffer e E. Lévinas, Paris: Vrin, 1996. Trad.
brasileira (Frank de Oliveira): Meditações Cartesianas. São Paulo: Madras, 2001.p161.
146
HARTOG, François. O espelho de Heródoto: Ensaios sobre a representação do outro. Trad.Jacyntho
Lins Brandão, Belo Horizonte , 1999.p38.
147
HARTOG, François. O espelho de Heródoto: Ensaios sobre a representação do outro. Trad.Jacyntho
Lins Brandão, Belo Horizonte , 1999.p16.
53
this work seeks through description, an experience of otherness, in other words, it is the
preservation of the memorable facts of knowledge and the opening of other peoples.
This is the only way of deciding whether the telos which, with the
birth of Greek philosophy, became innate to European humanity, the
telos of - in the infinite movement of latent reason to manifest, and in
the infinite effort of self-formation through this truth and genuineness
of the humanity - to want to be a humanity from a philosophical
reason, and to be only as such, is a mere historical delusion, an
accidental acquisition of an accidental humanity, in the midst of many
humanities and historicities; or if in Greek humanity for the first time
it did not break out in the first place, that in humanity as such it has, in
its essence, defined itself as an entelechy. 148
In a similar way, as we seek to present in the text the self-explanatory subjects

explain Hursselian, search through the phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung), break
with a solipsistic understanding of subject and learn in the world of life the "own", the
through alterity, that the maximum proposal can be reached by Edmund Husserl, being
to go the same things.
Only through empathy (Einfühlung), that we can apprehend the world of life,
from the zero point of orientation, that is, we receive through knowledge and
experiences (Erlebnisse) knowledge of others, through the reading of records, as the
description historical, from which, are shared over time 149
, through the historians'
description of episodes, landscapes, hagiographies and biographies, which concretize
the knowledge of things, as Edmund Husserl
In the sense of a human community and in the sense of man, which in

its singularity already brings with it the sense of being a member of a
community (a thing that transposes itself into animal sociability), there
is a being-one-to-other -multiple, which involves an objectifying
assimilation of my being-there and of all others: therefore, I - and
anyone else - as a man among other men. 150
For Husserlian thought, each subject is formed by a set of his own experiences
(Erlebnisse), in other words, by his own stories, being that when we are in contact with
others, we share experiences and with them presentifico the world as Emilio Morais La
148
HUSSERL, Edmund. A Crise das Ciências Européias e a Fenomenologia Transcendental: uma
introdução à filosofia fenomenológica. trad. Diogo F. Ferrer. Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitária,
2012.11.
149
tradução de Pedro M. S. Alves. 1. Ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2013. 166-169.
150
tradução de Pedro M. S. Alves. 1. Ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2013.p 56.
54
Barrera states: "When I pass from my original gift the presentiment of the world in the
community of monads experienced through empathy, it has reached for Husserl to
capture others as others".151
2.2. From Husserl to Max Scheler - Looks of Phenomenology
In 1901 at the University of Jena, Max Scheler took over as Professor where in
the previous year he had defended his habilitation thesis on the guidance of Rudolf
Eucken with the title Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode (The
transcendental and the psychological method) 152
, in this university the first meeting
between Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler took place through the interest in the work
Ideas of a phenomenology, being one of those meetings described by Malvine Husserl.
Malwine Steinschneider Husserl the wife of Edmund Husserl, who as Edith
Stein points out an active presence in the phenomenological movement, but was not an
intellectual, nor an academic 153, such a departure is justifiable due to the financial
difficulties experienced by the family to which Edmund Husserl had to support the
family as a "teacher" before becoming a full professor, leading Malwine Steinschneider
Husserl to advise the three children of the couple Elizabeth, Gerhart and Wolfgang not
to pursue any academic activity in the field of philosophy, which he considered "the
great misfortune of his life "154
Alasdair Macintyre writes that in the circle of Gottingen there was a mixture of
social and intellectual life, being the main responsible for this more intimate
atmosphere, being responsible for this approach to Malwine Steinschneider Husserl in
the words of Macintyre himself "It was Malwine who made the achievements of
Possible Husserl "155, because Edmund Husserl is described as distant and insensitive, in
relation to his assistants and students, Malwine Steinschneider Husserl although
inconvenient and without interest in the subjects of philosophy, in which he attended the
151
BARRERA, Emilio Morales de la. Cuatro Sentidos de la Epoché y El Problema de la Intersubjetividad
en Husserl. Fenomenología y Hermenéutica / Actas del I Congreso Internacional de Fenomenología y
Hermenéutica / 2008. 193.
152
COSTA , José Silveira da (1996). Max Scheler: o personalismo ético. São Paulo: Moderna. 1996.p 36
153
154
HUSSERL, Malvine Steinschneider. Skizze eines Lebensbildes von E. Husserl. Em: Schuhmann, Karl.
“Skizze eines Lebensbildes von E. Husserl”, Husserl Studies 5 (1988): 105-125.Tradução em espanhol
RABANAQUE, L. R. "Malvine Husserl, Esbozo de una semblanza de E. Husserl". 1988. p 203
155
55
lessons of the husband only to count the number of students present. 156 As Edith Stein
describes::
Malwine was small and thin. Her shiny black hair was soft. She had
dark eyes, which looked with vivacity and curiosity, as in constant
astonishment before the world. His voice was sharp and hard, as if he
wanted to amaze, but mixed with humor was softened. He was always
worried about what might happen, because he (Husserl) often said
things that were disconcerting. (...), but I liked his sympathy when I
was a young and insignificant student. When she had meetings with
her husband Edmund Husserl, she (Malwine) interrupted us often
saying that she wanted to greet me. (The best dialogues were cut like
that at the moment). Malwine regularly attended Husserl's classes, and
she later confessed to me, occasionally, that he used to have fun
counting the number of listeners (whom we all knew a long time
ago). 157
Malvine tells us that only from the publication of Logical Investigations did the
rise of Edmund Husserl as an intellectual and teacher in Göttingen, who received
acceptance with the group of Munich students guided by Theodor Lipps, which aroused
the interest of these students to wish to study with Husserl thus forming the Göttingen
phenomenological circle, being cited by Malvine Husserl: Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von
Hildebrand, Max Scheler, Conrad-Martius and Erhard Schmidt; students who left
Munich for Göttingen, and who became students and friends, some more interested,
others curious. In addition to describing the ritual to which Husserl always preferred his
students, he opened the doors of his house several days a week, including Sundays
when he received one or two more advanced students at his "family table.” 158
These intellectuals were the first to compose the first circle of the Gottingen
phenomenological movement, as the historian of the phenomenology Herbert
Spiegelberg has defined, the circle can be defined through the concept of "movement",
this choice was made by the historian to present the metaphor, This movement is always
in a dynamic way formed by researchers from different parts of the world and with
different levels of formation, highlighting mainly the role of Max Scheler who was part
156
157
cristiana, 1926-1933. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed., 2002., p.356.
158
HUSSERL, Malvine Steinschneider. Skizze eines Lebensbildes von E. Husserl. Em: Schuhmann, Karl.
“Skizze eines Lebensbildes von E. Husserl”, Husserl Studies 5 (1988): 105-125.Tradução em espanhol
RABANAQUE, L. R. "Malvine Husserl, Esbozo de una semblanza de E. Husserl". 1988. p 06.
56
of the phenomenological movement when he was already graduated from the University
of Jena.
Development is determined by its intrinsic principles, as well as by
'things', by the structure of the territory it encountered' (...) as a flux, it
comprises several parallel currents which are related but not
homogeneous, and can move in different speeds "; and, finally, it can
be said that the Phenomenology was definitely a movement because it
has "a common starting point, but does not need to have a defined and
predictable common destiny", being compatible with the character of a
movement that its components branch in different directions. 159
The most select members of Gottingen's circle of phenomenology were invited

to join the "philosophical society," this group of researchers aimed at a more in-depth
study of some of the works of discussion around ideals for a pure phenomenology
second volume, such as according to Enrique V. Muñoz Perez, Scheler's manuscripts on
empathy (Einfühlung) were unknown to Scheler, we may suppose that by his
participation as a member of philosophical society Scheler was involved in the
atmosphere of the discussions made by the group organized by Husserl. 160
We have the detailed description by Edith Stein of the "Philosophical
Society"161 meetings which she was invited to attend during her first semester in 1913.
But the members of this group of researchers, as noted by Edith Stein, had a strong
nationalist character. according to the author in "Göttingen, the Americans and the
British formed separate colonies and remained mostly with each other.162
The society met once a week to study a particular work and the work chosen for
the debate of that semester was the text Formalism in the ethics and material ethics of
values (Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik) written by Max
Scheler published in almanac (Jahrbuch) that same year163. With the participation of
Max Scheler himself, who is described by Edith Stein:
Scheler's first impression of me was fascinating. It had never been

presented to a person who could describe it as the "phenomena of a
genius." His big blue eyes, he seemed to have the glow of a higher
world. Her face was handsome and noble, but life had left traces of
159
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972. p.02
160
PÉREZ, Enrique V.M. El concepto de empatía (Einfühlung) en Max Scheler y Edith Stein. Sus
alcances religiosos y políticos .2017, VERITAS, p.81
161
162
163
SÁENZ, Jaime Vélez, Max Scheler in: Ideas y Valores, Universidad Nacional de Colombia ,1990.p1
57
unhappiness, Betty Heymann said that it recalled the portrait of
Dorian Gray: that mysterious painting in which the disordered life of
the original traced is deforming lines while the person maintained its
beauty youthful Scheler spoke very incisively, even with dramatic
vivacity. The words that pleased him especially (for example, "the
pure truth"), He spoke them with devotion and tenderness. When I
argued with an alleged opponent, he adopted a derogatory tone. At
these conferences He dealt with the issues that are the subject of his
book that had just appeared: Phenomenology and Theory of
Sympathy. For me, they were very important in a special way, because
it was precisely there that I cared about the problem of "empathy". 164
We can see from this description by Edith Stein that Max Scheler made a strong
impression on the pupils of the Gottingen circle like Dietrich von Hildebrand and
Rudolf Clemens as described by Stein, like many other young people, were very
influenced by Scheler and ended up being dependent of him intellectually and moving
away from the project formulated by the master Edmund Husserl, being as observed by
Edith Stein, the members belonging to the group of Munich turned away from the
project formulated by Husserl and they became adversaries of the master.
The relations between Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler are observed by Edith
Stein as troubled, for whenever an opportunity arose Max Scheler who had known the
"master" in the city Jena where he lived and next to the University of Munich stated that
he had not been a student of Husserl and who had independently found the
phenomenological metho
Relations between Husserl and Scheler were not entirely calm. Scheler
did not miss the opportunity to state that he was not a disciple of
Husserl, but that he had independently found the phenomenological
method. He had heard his classes as a student, but Husserl was
convinced of his dependence. They met for many years. When Husserl
was a non-cash teacher in Halle, Scheler lived in nearby Jena. They
met frequently and maintained a fruitful exchange of ideas. How easy
it was for Scheler to appropriate the suggestions of others is known to
everyone who knew him, or at least to those who had carefully read
his writings. Ideas came to him, and in him they developed
progressively, without him noticing the influence he had received. So
he could say with a good conscience that they were his property. The
issue of priority pruritus was a serious concern for Husserl in relation
to his students. He strove to educate us with the strictest objectivity
and solidity in "radical intellectual honesty".165
164
165
58
According to Edith Stein, one of the main differences between the two
researchers namely Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler is that Scheler's reflections had
the genius of dealing with subjects close to life, that is the vital character, which
generated admiration for the young while for Husserl's interest is for the things
themselves and as the phenomena are apprehended by the consciousness this is more
"dry and abstract" themes but much deeper.
Edith Stein points out that Max Scheler's coming from Munich to Gottingen was
due to a very unpleasant personal situation in his life, that is the divorce and the
scandalous process in Munich, which deprived him of teaching, having to live for some
years of his writings, much of the time in Berlin alongside his second wife Marit
Furtwangler166, making frequent trips when invited to minister lectures to which he was
invited each semester by the "Philosophical Society," as stated in a letter written by
Stein already with the name of sister Teresa Benedita of the Cross to the priest and
professor of philosophy of Amsterdam Jan Hille Note on the 29 of November of 1941.
Reverend Father: Now I have finally finished reading your two

articles - and once again, I thank Your Reverence sincerely for the
great kindness you have shown in giving me. I am very happy that in
the Netherlands there is so much interest in phenomenology. A little
confused, I am about the chronology related to Scheler. I heard his
lectures at Göttingen in 1913 and 1914 (when he did not belong to any
university and he was invited by us to speak to us privately for a few
weeks). I am almost certain that he belonged to the Catholic Church at
the time: he spoke with the most enthusiasm about Catholic ideas, in
1914 it was also said that his wife (the second: Márit Furtwangler)
returned to the Catholic Church, but this happened a lot after
conversion. 167
Due to the issue of divorce and the second marriage with Márit Furtwangler
Scheler could not minister his lectures at the university of Gottingen, so his lectures
were given to "philosophical society" were taught in hotels or cafes, during the
beginning some nights during the week but due to the group's inquiries were extended
to all days of the week.168
166
STEIN , Edith, Vida de una familia judía in Escritos Antropológicos y Pedagógicos: Magisterio de vida
167
168
59
Edith Stein describes that after the lecture ended many of the students influenced
by the charismatic personality is distracted from Max Scheler continued after the
lectures for hours in the cafes, Edith Stein herself says that in one of those moments
found Scheler entertained as a child looking at a shelf of hats trying to remember where
he had lost his hat 169,his pleasant tone only changed when he talked about Husserl,
which annoyed Stein, for he was against idealism and spoke of Edmund Husserl with a
tone of arrogance and disdain , which allowed some of his students according to Stein to
use an ironic tone that made Stein, to move away from the lectures and to consider
Scheler disrespectful and ungrateful as we can perceive by the continuation of the
written letter to Jan Hille Nota:
(...) I can also tell Your Reverence something about the relationship
between Scheler and Husserl, which you do not yet know. Scheler
always said that he was not a disciple of Husserl, but that he came to
phenomenology alone. Of course he was in Jena, when Husserl was in
Halle. At that time they talked to each other often, and there is no
doubt that these conversations had a profound influence on Scheler. It
was tremendously quick to understand not only what another said, but
even what was not said. You saw that the difference between these
two men was very deep. To me, Scheler has always been the true
"phenomena of genius", like no other person I've ever met. Of course,
Husserl was also a genius, but at the same time a genuinely German
scholar with a very sensitive intellectual consciousness. Scheler often
stayed in his first thoughts, which were not always the best. It was not
his method to work or to wait a long time until an intuition arrived.
This is the reason why he is not a consistent phenomenologist. "I
would also like to say this about Heidegger," which is not consistent
because he is very fast (when he wants, he is a master at the sharpest
analyzes), but because of his metaphysics. 170
We can see that although they start from similar problems, this is the related
phenomena in the world of life, Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, presented different
perspectives regarding the scientific approach, Husserl tried to formulate a scientific
method to achieve the same things that is the primordial essence of phenomena such as
empathy (Einfühlung).
Max Scheler as Stein describes, was not concerned with a scientific method in
but rather in how this manifests itself in the relationship between man and the world in
169
cristiana, 1926-1933. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed., 2002., p.365-366
170
60
which he was inserted, that is the schelerian concern is before the phenomenon itself,
think it through experiences, this is how they manifest in the relationship between men.
In order to reach their objectives the authors use different methodologies,
Husserl to try to understand the phenomena present in the sensible world, through the
language to describe the founding acts of the knowledge of the things that are objects of
the positive sciences, for that would be necessary, a differentiation of the sciences
natural in particular the psychology that in this same period sought to establish their
identity through the experimentation of the natural world:
In the natural sphere of inquiry, a science can simply build itself up on

another, and one can serve the other methodically, if only to some
extent, determined and defined by the nature of the respective field of
inquiry. Philosophy, however, finds itself in a completely new
dimension. It needs entirely new starting points and an entirely new
method, which distinguishes it in principle from all natural science. 171
The new method formulated by Edmund Husserl is perceived in the work

"Logical Investigations," in which the author sought to describe innumerable acts of
thought, sought to separate them into non-objectifying acts that are not fillers of
meaningful intentions and founders of effective knowledge about the essence of things,
and acts that are objectifying that are the formators of knowledge about the internal or
subjective experiences of extreme importance for the experiences between men. 172
From this movement of clarification of the phenomena, this is the search of the
essential beings and as these are apprehended by the conscience is that the
phenomenology made possible to make objectivable several subjective experiences, as
non-objectifying acts become objects of objectifying acts such as the phenomenon of
empathy (Einfühlung).
Max Scheler as described by Edith Stein has as its central concern the values as
accessible essences through feelings, this is how the primordial essences thought by
Husserl manifested themselves in the natural world this is with others, unlike the
universalistic design of a model of a new scientific method formulated by Edmund
Husserl, to go to the same things, Max Scheler is interested in the philosophical
question of what is the man is how this man manifests before the other.
171
HUSSERL, Edmund. A ideia da fenomenologia. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1986. p.47.
172
UNAN, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, 2005. p.170.
61
Scheler's greatest preoccupation is the objects of the anthropological world and
with the possibilities of describing through the experiences as they sought to manifest
themselves subjectively in the pre-scientific consciousness, according to the preface of
the book "The position of man in the cosmos" his last written work in 1928, a few
months before his death, he cites eight works that would compose the project of
developing an elaborate philosophical anthropology, being resentment in morals,
formalism in ethics, Essence and forms of sympathy among others, being the central
point of the junction of these works the descriptive phenomenology as method is the
anthropological question as a possibility of encounter with man as, Scheler himself
writes
From the first awakening of my philosophical consciousness, the
questions: what is man? and what is your position within the being?
they occupied me more essentially than any other philosophical
question. The efforts of many years, in the midst of which I
surrounded the problem everywhere, have been summarized since
1922 to the elaboration of a major work dedicated to this questioning.
(...) I am pleased to note that the problems of a philosophical
anthropology have now become the focal point of the whole
philosophical problem in Germany, and that, far beyond the circle of
philosophers, there are biologists, physicians, psychologists, and
sociologists working on a new image of the essential constitution of
man.173
The search for the understanding of what man is, led Max Scheler to encounter
phenomenology because through it he would elucidate the ways of knowledge of
objects that with the access of the natural sciences, especially psychology, were
progressively despised by the sciences of the spirit, or were never relegated to fields of
subjectivity, such as values, affections, even the most recent sciences of the spirit such
as sociology and anthropology that gained more prominence in this period of the
beginning of the twentieth century, sought to legitimize themselves through a
perspective more quantifiable and classifying the social facts, through the
phenomenological school and that a new world of objects opened up among them the
very empathy.
In 1913 Max Scheler was working and writing the text of phenomenology and
the theory of feelings of sympathy and love of hatred, which was presented in his
lectures to philosophical society, which presented an appendix entitled essence and
173
SCHELER, Max. Para a idéia do homem. In SCHELER, Max. A posição do homem no cosmo. Trad.
Marco A. Casanova. Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitária, 2003. p.3.
62
forms of sympathy, in which to address the question of the other within a larger
framework of the "spheres of being" the sphere of the absolute or divine; the "Mitwelt",
that is, the world of "you" or the community; the external world.
As Timothy A. Burns shows, this understanding often allows us to confuse the
phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung) and sympathy (Mitgefühl) that is belonging to
spheres of being174, is different from the Hursselian conception for which empathy
would allow an opening for the understanding of the other through an opening to the
feeling itself, in the words of Max Scheler himself "to have an experience similar to that
of another person has nothing to do with understanding of it.175
Max Scheler identifies an additional reason to reject ST. A model of

simulation plus projection does not distinguish between empathy - like
the experience of the inner life of another - and other forms of social
cognition, especially emotional contagion (Gefühlsansteckung) and
sympathy (Mitwerfühl) (Scheler, 1979, pp. 14-18 ). The simulation of
the mental state of another may well be an example of emotional
contagion. (...) In emotional contagion, I do not know from whom I
receive emotional states, and in a real sense, I do not receive them
from anybody in particular, but from the multitude. 176
The mental simulation, that is, the reaction we have to an emotional contagion
(Gefühlsansteckung) for Max Scheler would not be part of the "spheres of being", that is
the phenomenon of sympathy (Mitgefühl) or empathy (Einfühlung), but rather would be
a reaction to this phenomenon, to have Max Scheler himself sought to illustrate the
relationship between the first knowledge of Mitwelt and the separation of the
understanding of this subject through society, with the figure of the emerged in the
formalism of the gnosiological Robinson.
It was to imagine a human being who had never had contact with others, directly
or indirectly, for example, through a book, an image or even a historical understanding,
for Scheler, this being the "gnosiological Robinson" would have an a priori evidence
and intuitively grounded in the existence of a "you" in general and of your belonging to
a community.
174
BURNS ,Timothy A. . Empathy, Simulation,and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case Against
Simulation-Theory. In : Phenomenology and Mind, n. 12 – 2017. p.214.
175
SCHELER ,Max . The nature of sympathy (Engl. Transl. by P. Heath). London: Routledge & Kegan
(Original work published 1923).1979 p.11.
176
BURNS ,Timothy A. . Empathy, Simulation,and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case Against
Simulation-Theory. In : Phenomenology and Mind, n. 12 – 2017. p.213.
63
Such a Robinson would never think: There is no community there, or I
belong to none, I am alone in the world, nor would you lack the
intuition of the essence and idea of a community in general, if not that
I would think: 'I know there are communities and I belong to one, to
several but I do not know the individuals who constitute them, nor the
empirical groups those with whom the existing communities are
composed. 177
This being a priori the "gnosiological Robinson" would present itself as

Mitmensch this is someone who even not inserted in a community has the intuition that
it is inserted in the world and that has the existence of others, thus, for Scheler, the
evidence that the "Gnosiological Robinson" is aware of an emptiness, the positive
intuition of non-existence, which Robinson would experience each time he performed
acts such as guilt, gratitude, love of neighbor, obedience, promise, sympathy. Evidence
of your existence in general does not need the actual experience of the other, nor the
perception of your body; on the contrary, it is based on the awareness of the
impossibility of realization (Erfüllung) of social and emotional acts, such as those just
mentioned.
An intuitive base needs, namely, the precise and well-defined
consciousness of emptiness, the "consciousness of lack of something,"
the "consciousness of not being alone" that Robinson would live by
imperative essential laws , whenever he carried out the spiritual and
affective acts that can only form an objective unity with mutual and
reciprocal senses. From these essentially precise voids (...) would
emerge for him, in our opinion, the intuition and positive idea that
would be there as the sphere of the you in a community, only that
would know no copy. 178
This strategy is methodologically similar to Edmund Husserl's analysis of the

empirical phenomenology (Einfühlung) of the experience of the other in the sense that
both philosophers abstract from strangeness to make their experience explicit. In both
the primordial reduction and the Robinson hypothesis, we find the impossibility of
performing the acts that point or imply the other. However, apart from the
transcendental character that characterizes Husserl's reflex and which Scheler rejects,
there is another difference whose importance we expect in the next chapter. Empathy is
177
SCHELER ,Max . Ética. Nuevo ensayo de fundamentación de un personalismo ético. Tomos I e II.
Trad. Hilario Rodríguez Sanz. Buenos Aires: Revista de Occidente, 1948. (Trata-se da edição em
espanhol de “O formalismo na ética e a ética material dos valores”) p.327.
178
espanhol de “O formalismo na ética e a ética material dos valores”) p.328-329.
64
not for Husserl neither a social act nor an ethical act as it is for Scheler, but the
condition of these, because they suppose a common world.
2.3. The Empathy from Max Scheler
As for Edmund Husserl, for whom things have an essence that allows us to
unveil phenomena and become aware of the objects present in the world, but Max
Scheler also attributes things and phenomena that are values 179 that would be carriers of
"good" qualities, of essences are not inherent to man, for example sympathy (Mitgefühl)
and empathy (Einfühlung), are essences, which have values, that can provoke a
sentimental state of pleasant and unpleasant:
Just as - in the natural attitude - we are "given" in the theoretical

domain of things, then, also in the practical realm, we receive the
goods. Only in second term do we receive the values we feel in these
goods and, in turn, this "feeling of them"; completely independent and
only thirdly is the respective sentimental state of pleasure or
displacement which we refer to the effect of goods upon us (if this
effect a lived excitement is thought causally). In the latter, the states -
intertwined with these other states are given of pleasure and
displacement - of the specifically sensitive "feeling" (...) The latter
they are separately apprehensive because we look at different parts of
the body endowed with extension and limbs (.. .) and then link (...) the
sentimental peripheral states with the qualities of pleasant or with
qualities entwined in goods.180
To Max Scheler we have two spheres in understanding a phenomenon, the first

being the essence, that is the things in themselves, and the second the "goods" and
179
According to Abbagnano, The relation between feeling and value is the same one observed between the
representation and its object: the intentional relation. While an act of reflection is necessary to relate a
state emotional relationship with the object of which it is a sign or which we think provoked, value relates
to its specific object, value, immediately, as it happens, when we feel the beauty of the snow-covered
mountains at sunset. The intentional connection between feeling and value has nothing to do with a causal
link between value and object, and it also depends on the individual psychic causality, that is, on the laws
that govern the psychic life of the individual. In fact, when the requirements of values are not
satisfied, we suffer, p. because we do not feel as joyful as the value of an event or because we do not feel
so sad about the death of a loved one as this would require. Thus, according to Scheler, the feeling. gives
access to a world of objects as real as things or the facts that constitute the object of representation, but
that have nothing to do with them, because they are not things nor facts, but values. Scheler therefore
agrees with Kant in holding that the S. is not an "article of knowledge," but disagrees with it as to judge
that it has no object and is therefore devoid of intentional character. Only the sensitive emotions are
devoid of object and therefore they constitute pure emotional states, whereas the vital and psychic
feelings can always reveal intentional character (refer to an object-value); the spiritual S. necessarily
reveal it (for the distinction between emotional degrees, V. EMOTION). Scheler's analysis is very
important because it sheds new light on man's emotional life. in : Dicionário de Filosofia. 4 ed. São Paulo
: Martins Fontes , 2000.p 877.
180
65
"values" that are imbued, as Nathalie Barbosa de la Cadena 181,these goods are
intimately linked to the experiences and experiences of the subjects before the
phenomena in which they are inserted.
Therefore in the Max Scheler analysis the essence is perceived by consciousness,

but the values allow connections between the essences, which are manifested in the
experience lived during a certain phenomenon, but have no origins in the subjects, but
are unveiled this is the essence of a certain phenomenon , are a priori universal
The proper basis of all a priori (and specifically moral) estimation is

value knowledge, value intuition based on sentimental perception,
preferring, and ultimately loving and hating, as well as intuition of the
connections that exist between values , among them being "superior"
and "Low", that is, "moral knowledge." This knowledge is realized,
well, by specific functions and acts that are different from perceiving
and thinking, and constitute the only possible access to the world of
values. Values and their hierarchies do not manifest themselves
through "inner perception" or observation (in which only the psychic
is given), but in a lively and sentimental exchange with the universe
(whether psychic or physical or any other) in preferring and
postponing, in loving and hating oneself, that is, in the trajectory of
the execution of these intentional acts. 182
Access to the world of phenomena is manifested through perception and in the

process of intuition we unveil values and we hierarchize the experience in this
movement Max Scheler approaches Edmund Husserl in understanding that the
experience of the subject is the solipsist, because values are not formulated to from the
subject, but rather from the experiences of the subject, as pointed out by Francisco
Romero:
As for the essence and forms of sympathy, it brings together three

groups of problems: those of sympathy or affective participation;
those of love and hatred, feelings that Scheler are independent of
others, and questions about the perception of the foreign self, for
which it gives a solution as personal as it dared. The whole book is
governed by a general conception which is also one of the pillars of its
ethics: the thesis that following the causal laws and psychophysical
dependence that link emotional life to phenomena physically, there are
others of an autonomous nature that govern certain forms that are
181
CADENA, Nathalie Barbosa de. Scheler, os valores, o sentimento e a simpatia, in: Revista Ética e
Filosofia Política – Número XVI – Volume II 2013. p.77-78.
182
SCHELER, Max. Ética. Nuevo ensayo de fundamentación de un personalismo ético. Tomos I e II.
66
superior to emotional ones, and they give irreducible meaning to any
psychophysical relationship. 183
For Scheler, through experience, and seeking to understand the values and
relations of hierarchy present among them, empathy (Einfühlung) would have a
fundamental part in this movement, but Scheler adds that the phenomenon of empathy
(Einfühlung) has an affective tone, which allows a person to feel the values before a
phenomenon like feeling joy or sadness of the other, denominated this capacity of
sympathy (Mitgefühl). 184
It does not happen, as assumed by the theory of empathy (Theodor

Lipps and Edmund Husserl), that from a particular material "in the
first instance" (zunächst), our own experiences were images of other
people's experiences, but an indifferent stream of experience flows in
the first instance, which contains both its own experiences and aliens
in an inseparable way and mixed with the others; and in that flow are
gradually formed and configured swirls, which always slowly tow
new elements of the current in your circle. 185
As we can see from Max Scheler's quotation, there are two dimensions of the
empirical phenomenon (Einfühlung), namely the perception in the first instance of the
other and the second dimension that would be called sympathy (Mitgefühl) that would
provide us with an "affective unification" this is the possibility of feeling the same as
the other. 186
According to Alexis Emanuel Gros, two conceptions marked German thinking

about the human sciences during the first half of the twentieth century, mainly on the
understanding of the phenomenon of empathy, following the theory of knowledge by
analogy (Analogieschlusstheorie) in which the subject sought to understand the
experiences of the other through the assimilation of the movements of the body so the
alter-ego, seeks similar experiences to understand analogous experiences.
The ego performs bodily movements that somehow express their
experiences. You may infer then that if the alter-ego performs a
movement similar to yours, you will also be experiencing an
analogous experience. If, for example, the ego sees the "cry" of the
alter ego and wants to know what happens to it, it performs a
183
ROMERO, Francisco. Max Scheler y el puesto del hombre en el cosmos in: SCHELER, Max. Ética.El
puesto del hombre en el cosmos. Traducido por José Gaos. Buenos Aires: Editora Losada, 1994.p.7-8.
184
SCHELER, Max. Esencia y formas de la simpatía. Traducción directa del alemán: José Gaos. Buenos
Aires: Editorial Losada, S.A., 2004.p 120.
185
186
67
deduction by analogy that can be expressed as follows: "When I feel
sad, I express this feeling through crying if the other weeps, he must
be experiencing a sadness similar to the one I feel in those cases. 187
Different from the understanding expressed by Theodor Lipps from which the
criticism of the theory of knowledge by analogy (Analogieschlusstheorie) would occur
because for Lipps empathy is understood only as an instinct, rejecting the idea that
intellectual activity is necessary to access the psychic states of the other. When the ego
sees an alter ego gesture, it tends to imitate it; imitation produces the appearance of the
psychic state associated with the said movement of the body, and this evoked
experience is finally "projected" or "transferred" to the neighbor. 188
Since this was the second conception of German thought about the human
sciences during the first half of the twentieth century, it was the theory of affective
projection (Theorie der projektiven Einfühlung)189,formulated by Theodor Lipps that
influenced the thinking of Edmund Husserl through the response formulated the theory
of Lipps, Max Scheler responds
Everything that seems to us to be something objective, real is given,

be it body, traditions, individual mental Processes, science, art,
religion, are the facts of consciousness we will become certain
through experience. Every philosophical contemplation, we call
Epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, can not do
another task has to establish how certain series of facts of
consciousness describe, classify and causally explain its genesis. 190
Max Scheler disagrees with this understanding from the notion that phenomena
teach us how we can know the psychic states of others without having to experience
them, as in experiences with animals, linked to bodily movements that we are unable to
imitate or reproduce. This happens, for example, when we understand the happiness of a
dog by the movement of its tail or its sadness by its howls, being then a first sphere of
analysis of the phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung).
187
SCHELER, Max. Wesen und formen der Sympathie, Francke, Bern, 1973, p. 238.Apud : GROS,
Alexis Emanuel. El debate de Alfred Schütz con Max Scheler en torno a la empatía.2012.p 4
188
ZAHAVI, Dan, “Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz”, en
Inquiry, vol. 53, Nº 3, 2010.Apud: GROS, Alexis Emanuel. El debate de Alfred Schütz con Max Scheler
en torno a la empatía.2012.p5
189
190
SCHELER, Max. “Die Transzendentale und die Psychologische Methode. Eine grundsätzliche
Erörterung zur philosophischen Methodik”,1900.p 308.In: FIDALGO, António Carreto. O Realismo da
Fenomenologia de Munique. Covilhã , 2011.p 44
68
For Scheler it is not in the phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung), that we come
to understand the other, that is, we have an openness to perceive the other as individual,
but in the dimension of sympathy (Mitgefühl) that we organize it from the feelings in
the experiences in community.
"In the first instance" the human being lives more in others than in
himself, more in the community than in his own individual. It is
evidence of him both the childish behavior and the deeds of the
primitive soul life of the communities. 191
Although it has these characteristics, sympathy should be practiced, enhanced by

experiences, so that it is possible to increasingly participate in the feeling of the other.
In this sense, Scheler speaks of a basic law of the evolution of the feelings that applies
to the child's development for the adult, from animal to man and from primitive to
civilized. The more able to participate in the feeling of the other, the more intense is the
affective unification, the greater the development.
For sympathy is bound by an essential law with the fact that it is the
subject with whom it is sympathetic. It disappears, therefore, when in
place of the subject considered by real appears a subject given as
fiction, as "image". The complete overcoming of autoeroticism, of
self-centered egocentrism, of real solipsism and selfishness takes
place precisely in the act of sympathizing. Therefore, the emotional
"realization" of Humanity as a genre must be carried out with
sympathy, so that the love of man in this specific sense is possible. 192
As described by Sergio Sánchez Migallón Granados, through the

phenomenological method Max Scheler, he sought to use as an object of analysis the
meaning of life, especially questions related to existence, seeking to unveil the sphere of
values among them the phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung), is sympathy (Mitgefüh)
being the fundamental question for an opening the philosophical anthropology
Perceptive, sympathy and love. All this shapes the structure of ethical
life, which articulates in a personal way: the person tries to train
according to a valuable personal model. And the question of what is
and how the person transforms opens the field of anthropology, where
Scheler shows a very different posture in different phases of his life. 193
191
192
193
GRANADOS, Sergio Sánchez Migallón. Philosophica Enciclopedia filosófica : Max Scheler Aires:
Editorial Losada, S.A., 2007.p 8.
69
From the understanding of empathy (Einfühlung), this is the act of purely
cognitive awareness that gives us access to the experience of others, we move on to
another experience of sympathy (Mitgefüh) which according to Dan Zahavi would
imply the affective involvement of the ego with the alter- ego, that is, an opening for
affective unification.
Empathy and sympathy, for truth, they should not be confused.

Empathy (Empathy) (...) is the name for our experience (Erfahrung) of
the experiences of another. Sympathy supposes more than this, here it
is, as the word already points out, also of compassion (Mitgefühl). 194
The problem that bothered Scheler was the grounding of the ethics of
compassionate relations, and of various altruistic feelings in the name of sympathy.
Thus, the term sympathy had been considered a synonym for all the altruistic feelings in
which it was sought to base the ethics, especially in the work of Smith. 195
From the perception of the experiences Max Scheler, points out that from a
universalist perspective of childhood and just as in a macroscopic way the life of
"primitive" societies, human beings need to live in communities is therefore needs
phenomena such as empathy (Einfühlung) and sympathy (Mitgefüh), become
fundamental to live ethically, that is, to focus on the values present through the
experiences, so different from Husserl phenomenology does not become a method to
investigate a phenomenon, but a form of focus on the experiences.
In the first place, phenomenology is not the name of a new science,
nor a substitutive term for philosophy, but it is the name given to a
peculiar focus of spiritual contemplation through which one obtains a
vision or an experience that would remain hidden without this focus. It
is, therefore, a realm of 'facts' of a particular nature. I say 'approach'
and not method, because the latter is a procedure of 'thinking' with a
view to an end, and deals with 'facts', as for example with induction
and deduction. But in our case it is, first, new 'own facts', previous to
all logical fixation, and secondly, a 'contemplating' procedure. The
purposes of this approach are offered, however, by the philosophical
problematic of the universe as it has been formulated for the most part
by philosophy through an ancient work. This does not mean, on the
other hand, that in pursuing this approach, the more precise
formulation of these problems can not, however, undergo multiple
modifications.196
194
ZAHAVI, Dan, Phänomenologie für Einsteiger, W. Fink, Paderborn, 2007, p. 71.Apund : GROS,
Alexis Emanuel, El debate de Alfred Schütz con Max Scheler en torno a la empatía, 2012.p.3
195
SMITH, Adam.Teoria do sentimentos morais. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2005.
196
SCHELER, Max. Fenomenologia y gnoseologia . In La esencia de la filosofia.1913.p62.
70
According to Max Scheler, using the phenomenological method with a focus on
the observation of children, he realized that they do not have individuality or self-
consciousness, rather he formulates them from his family (Geist family), absorbing the
experiences of living with relatives, as well as Scheler societies called "primitive"
would have before a conception of individuals, would organize themselves from an
organized life around the collective this is in the soul of the community
(eingeschmolzen).197
Thus the phenomenon of sympathy (Mitgefüh) has for Max Scheler a community
norm, that is during the period of conflict as the first war, societies have through
sympathy (Mitgefüh) an opening to the affective tonality that unites the people as
identity historical, for the maintenance of values as stated in the second edition of his
book of the 1919 turnaround of values.
If these violent events signify something above all essential and the
European structure of value-giving, and not only for the distribution of
vital goods among peoples, nations and states in accordance with old
value attributions, here is a question whose answer is shown only in
the form of conjectures. 198
According to Alexis Emanuel Gros, the process of individualization is a late

phenomenon for Max Scheler199, for which the subject can only be understood as a
monad200in European modernity, thus in "primitive" societies, the withdrawal from
197
GROS, Alexis Emanuel. El debate de Alfred Schütz con Max Scheler en torno a la empatía.2012.p7
198
SCHELER, Max. Da Reviravolta dos Valores. Ed: Editora Vozes , .2012.p15.
199
GROS, Alexis Emanuel. El debate de Alfred Schütz con Max Scheler en torno a la empatía.2012.p8
200
According to Abbagnano, MÔNADA (lat Monas, in Monad, fr Monade, a Monade, Monade). Because
it has a different meaning from Unity (v.), This term designates a real, inexhaustible, and therefore
spiritual unity. Giordano Bruno was the first to use this term in this sense, conceiving M. as the minimnm,
as an indivisible unity that constitutes the element of all things (De minimis, 1591, De Monade, 159 D.
The term was taken up in the same sense by Neo-Platonists, especially by H. More, who elaborated the
concept of the "physical", inexhaustible, and therefore spiritual, as components of nature (Enchiridion
Metaphysicum, 1679, 1, 9, 3) .As of 1696, Leibniz According to Leibniz, M. is a spiritual atom, a
substance devoid of parts and extension, therefore indivisible. As such, it can not be disintegrated and is
eternal, only God (MKI-NTIDADKDOS INDISCI-RKIVKIS) Every M. constitutes a point of view of the
world, which is to be found in the , therefore, the whole world from a certain point of view (Monad.,
1714, § 57). The fundamental activities of the M. are perception and apetition, but the M. have infinite
degrees of clarity and distinction, those provided by memory constitute the souls of animals, and the
provided of reason constitute the human spirits. But matter is also constituted by M., at least the second
matter, since the first matter is the simple passive power or inereial force (Op., Germar, III, pp. 260-61).
The totality of the M. is the universe. God is "primitive unity or simple substance originating, all created
or derived, are their productions and are born, so to speak, by continuous fulguration of divinity from
moment to moment" (Monad., § 47). The characteristics of this Leibniz doctrine reappear whenever
philosophers resort to the concept of M., and are substantially present in the metaphysical doctrines of
contemporary spiritualism. Consider the Leibnizian flavor of the following passage by Husserl: "The
constitution of the objective world consists essentially of a harmony of M., more precisely a particular
harmonious constitution in each M. and, therefore, a genesis that takes place harmoniously in the M
particular" (CartMed., § 49) in : Dicionário de Filosofia. 4 ed. São Paulo : Martins Fontes , 2000.p 680-
681.
71
common life and the formation of an individual and unique personality are seen as
pathological features, while in the modern Western world they are considered positive
values.
Another point for understanding the phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung) is
understanding the notion of inner perception (inere Wahrnehmung) according to the
prevailing theoretical developments at the time - whose representatives include Wilhelm
Dilthey and Edmund Husserl -, inner perception is a process of consciousness that gives
us access to our psychic states in a way analogous to how sensitive perception allows us
to know transcendent objects, as described by Edith Stein.
What does "own" and "alien" mean in the context in which Scheler
uses it? If you take your discourse of the undifferentiated flow of
experiences seriously, it is not possible to understand how to achieve a
differentiation within it. However, this same flow of experience is an
unfeasible idea, since each experience is an experience of an I, and
each experience from a phenomenal point of view is in absolute mode
inseparable from this self. "Own" and "alien" mean belonging to
different individuals, that is to say to different qualitatively formed
substantial psychic subjects. Such individuals, in their experiences,
must be accessible in the inner perception. I do not feel my feelings,
but the feelings of others, this means that the feelings of the other
person are infused in my individual. Originally, I found myself
surrounded by a world of psychic events, that is, as I find my living
body inserted in the world of my external experience. 201
For Max Scheler, inner perception is self-perception, it occurs only through the
cognitive movement of each subject who has only access to his own experiential flow,
making the flow of consciousness alien to that of the other, inaccessible. This is the
main point of disagreement formulated by Edith Stein on the understanding of the
phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung), described by Scheler because, according to the
author, "the alien self with its experience is perceived equally as the self." 202
Experiences including not only the rational process but also the sphere of values
for Max Scheler would be closely related to the consciousness of inner perception
would enable us to participate in the universal psychic life, every subject has access, at
least potentially, not only to their own experiences, but also of the members of the
community in which we are inserted.
201
STEIN,Edith. Il problema dell’Empatia.Trad. de Elio Costatini e de Erika SchulzeCosgtantini.
Edizioni Studium – Roma,.2003.p105-106
202
STEIN,Edith. Il problema dell’Empatia.Trad. de Elio Costatini e de Erika SchulzeCosgtantini.
Edizioni Studium – Roma,.2003.p105-106
72
In the sense of our interpretation, we would have to say: the act of
internal intuition (inere Anschauung) of A encompasses not only
processes of its own soul (eigene Seelenvorgänge), but in law and as
possibility all kingdom of souls for the time being as an
undifferentiated chain of experiences (ungegliederter Strom von
Erlebnisse). 203
Mariano Crespo shows that the main criticism of the concept of empathy
(Einfühlung) and the sympathy (Mitgefüh) formulated by Max Scheler is the one that
defends the existence of a current of experiences (Erlebnisse) that are not naturally
crystallized through existence itself.
Stein, with his thesis on the problem of empathy, helps to clarify the
aspects that lead us to perceive the other, since each experience is
essentially an experience of a self and is phenomenally inseparable
from it at all. 204
As Paolo Zordan describes when we consider Edith Stein's autobiographical
testimony, there is a section of the Problem of Empathy205about which she claims to
have been inspired more by Scheler's work than by Husserl, and is the fourth section
devoted to analyzing empathy as an understanding of spiritual people:
In a first part of the Problem on Empathy, still based on some of
Husserl's suggestions in his lectures, I had examined the act of
empathy as a particular act of knowledge. From there, however, I
came to something that he was particularly close to my heart and I
dealt with all my subsequent writings: the construction of the human
person. Under this first work, this examination was necessary to make
people understand how the compression of intellectual links was
distinguished from the simple perception of psychic conditions. In
regard to these questions the lectures and writings of Max Scheler, as
well as the works of Wilhelm Dilthey had been of great importance to
me. 206
2.4.Empathy in the sciences of the spirit Wilhelm Dilthey
During the Easter holidays of 1916, Edith Stein returned to her mother's home in
Breslau where she began to write her doctoral work with the help of her cousins
Adelheid Burchard and Grete Pickm, both of whom worked in shorthand and proposed
to assist during this period to Stein writing his thesis are following the guidelines of the
master Edmund Husserl, to follow his lessons from which the understanding of empathy
203
204
CRESPO, Mariano. El valor ético de la afectividad. Estudios de ética fenomenológica. Universidade
Católica do Chile: Ediciones UC, 2012.p 95-96
205
ZORDAN, Paolo . Edith Stein e Max Scheler.Un Confronto a partire dalle analisi del Problema dell
empatiauc,, 2012.p 3
206
STEIN,Edith. Dalla Vita di uma Famiglia Ebrea e altri Scritti Autobiografici , Roma , Città Nouva ,Ed
OCD 2007..p360
73
(Einfühlung) and sympathy (Mitgefüh) as a phenomenon for cognitive access, and in the
second part seeking to understand the empathy (Einfühlung) as a fundamental character
for the understanding of the human person in its totality and the relations between the
human person and the communities, trying to use for this analysis the classes of Max
Scheler and the works of Wilhelm Dilthey. 207
Dilthey names the historical works of Taine as an instructive example
of the consequences of this conception. Wilhelm Dilthey's life goal
was to give the science of the spirit its true basis. He pointed out that
explanatory psychology is not capable of this and wanted to put in its
place a "descriptive and analytical psychology". We believe that the
correct word was not found, for descriptive psychology is also the
science of the soul as nature, and can hardly give the key to the
conduct of the sciences of the spirit as well as of the sciences of
nature. Clarity about the method of the sciences of the spirit and the
sciences of nature is provided by the reflective investigation of the
respective scientific consciousness, as phenomenology asserts. Dilthey
did not come here to complete clarity and also sees in "self-
knowledge" the way to an epistemological foundation. 208
According to Juvenal Saviani209, in order to have access to the concept of the

person according to Edith Stein, we should understand it in its entirety: individuality,
legality of reason and apperception of values, influenced by the conception of empathy
(Einfühlung) and sympathy (Mitgefüh) formulated by Max Scheler, to understand the
sphere of feelings, existence according to an a priori way of reason to operate and
according to the possibility of realizing objects that are not mere phenomena, but
phenomena that request a judgment of adhesion or repulse the dimension values.
Both personality traits can not be predicated of a merely physical or merely
psychic dimension, but require an appropriate dimension, the spirit, the realm of
consciousness, will and feeling (whereas the soul in a specific sense or psychic life
would be the dimension on life energy and emotion, in order to understand this dynamic
Edith Stein uses a work by Wilhelm Dilthey to criticize it, entitled Contribution to the
study of individuality (Beiträge zum Studium der Individualität), but instead of talking
about individuality, Edith Stein prefers to speak of personality. 210
207
208
STEIN, Edith, La Empatia como comprensión de personas Espirituales. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4,
Ed., 2002., p.177
209
FILHO, Juvenal Saviani, A antropologia filosófico-teológica de Edith Stein na história do conceito de
pessoa.2016., p.14
210
FILHO, Juvenal Saviani, A antropologia filosófico-teológica de Edith Stein na história do conceito de
pessoa.2016., p.13
74
For Edith Stein, the reading of Wilhelm Dilthey's work would be criticized
because historians would seek to apply laws and theories to explain the teleology of the
natural laws of the past, rather than to understand and describe the experiences and from
this description to become aware and As Stein states, if historians have the task of
checking and explaining psychological facts of the past, then there is no science of
history211,so Edith Stein approaches the conception of worldviews formulated by
Wilhelm Dilthey, according to
From reflection on life is born the experience of life. The singular

events that the bundle of impulses and feelings in us arouse in its
confluence with the surrounding world and with destiny become in it
an objective and universal knowledge. Just as human nature is always
the same, so the fundamental traits of the experience of life are
common to all. The forfeiture of human things, and in it, our strength
to savor the hours; a tension, present in strong or weak natures, to
overcome this caducity by building a firm structure of its existence
and, in the milder or more ponderous natures, dissatisfaction and
nostalgia for something truly enduring in an invisible world; the
uncontainable power of the passions that make, like a dream, ghostly
images until in them the illusion dissipates. Thus the experience of life
in individuals is shaped in different ways.212
Thus through the understanding that from the description as a way of

approaching the sciences of the spirit Wilhelm Dilthey approaches Edmund Husserl in
the reading formulated by Edith Stein. The foundation of the human sciences and the
reflection of man's actions in time generated what Dilthey defined as a "cosmic bond"
with the formation of historical consciousness which, in his view, will help men to
overcome the scandalous contradiction between the pretension to validity universal
home philosophical system and the historical anarchy of such systems.213
In a scenario of questioning the existence of the human sciences, it was
necessary to establish their need through the ontological encounter, theoretically
investigating the human being as a being made up of differences. Differences that
Dilthey, in describing this perception of each individual, will call worldviews, since
they can differentiate themselves to each different look, being possible through life.
These different worlds are only possible to be realized through life. And, within the
211
STEIN, Edith, La Empatia como comprensión de personas Espirituales. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4,
Ed., 2002., p.175-176
212
DILTHEY, Wilhelm. Os tipos de concepção de Mundo e o seu desenvolvimento nos sistemas
metafísicos .Tradução: Artur Mourão 4, Ed.Lusofia, 1992., p.10-11
213
metafísicos .Tradução: Artur Mourão 4, Ed.Lusofia, 1992., p.9
75
human sciences for writing to be effective, there is a need to take an interest in what was
previously. Just have some kind of empathy with the past, one of the so-called tears -
the others are present and future, models to differentiate and distinguish time, the author
calls trait. This is admitted to the central idea of Dilthey which consists in the
development of this conception of life, and the human sciences appear as a necessity of
writing these experiences.
Worldviews are not products of thought. They do not spring from the
simple will to know. The apprehension of reality is an important
moment in its configuration, but nevertheless it is only one. (...). The
elevation of life to consciousness in the knowledge of reality, in the
valorization of life and volitional realization is the slow and arduous
work that humanity has given in the development of the conceptions
of life. 214
The concept of experiences (Erlebins) as a sharing of experiences described as

part of the historical procedure and that would allow through the phenomenon of
empathy (Einfühlung) to share values and feelings between the reader and those who
experienced this moment through the "cosmic bond" is present both in Edith Stein
through the influence of Wilhelm Dilthey from which
The exposition of the parts and connections that appear uniformly in
all developed human psychic life, entwined in a single connection,
which is not inferred or interpolated by thought, but simply lived. This
psychology consists, therefore, in the description and analysis of a
connection that is always given to us in an original way, as the life
itself .... Its object is the regularities in the connection of the
developed psychic life. 215
On February 21, 1928, Edith Stein, who had already been converted to Carmel,
was invited to give a lecture for Catholic professors entitled The Types of Psychology
and its Meanings for Psychology216 where it sought to present the various trends and
schools of psychology, and to analyze their incidence in pedagogy. In presenting the
comprehensive psychology or humanistic sciences Stein names as its chief
representative Wilhelm Dilthey
He regarded all psychic life as a unit full of meaning, whose links can
be revived, understood. It is not intended to destroy this unity of life,
but to understand exactly its significant global constitution, its
structure (structural psychology), and to design the various types of
214
metafísicos .Tradução: Artur Mourão 4, Ed.Lusofia, 1992., p.19
215
DILTHEY, Wilhelm. Psicologia y Teoria del Conocimiento. Trad. ÍMAZ, Eugenio. México: Fondo de
Cultura Econômica. 1945, p.204.
216
STEIN, Edith, Los tipos de psicología y su significado para a pedagogía. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4,
Ed., 2002., p.89
76
such understandable bonds (the type of "hero", the theoretical man,
aesthetic,etc.), and thus highlight the fundamental concepts with
which the spiritual sciences work. If in his investigations he comes
from the activity of life, then the search for the links presupposes the
unity of the soul. In a special way, this indivisible unity is accentuated
in individual psychology.(...) Efforts to build a science were, however,
sporadic and always fell into oblivion again; Only in our time did they
begin to take solid forms.217
Marina Massimi points out that in the reading formulated by Edith Stein of the
work of Wilhelm Dilthey sought to develop the perspective of a new psychology away
from positivism and naturalism trying to approach the scope of the historical
phenomena, being the main characteristic of this approach with the sciences of the
spirit, its temporal nature, because the phenomena of psychology would be experienced
immediately and even when narratives the past events would come to the present, thus
being the psychological discipline necessary for the understanding of man as a spiritual
and historical subject 218
, therefore deferia follow a methodological conception of the
historical method this is to be descriptive and analytical.
Understanding is in itself an inverse operation of the actual course of
the event. A full revival requires that understanding walk in the same
line as it does. (...) Thus we advance along with the history itself, with
an event from a distant country or with something that happens in the
soul of a person close to us. Perfection is obtained when the event
passes through the consciousness of the poet, the artist or the historian
and is now before us permanently fixed in a work. 219
According to Anna Jani220,the influence of Dilthey's thought on Edith Stein's

work came from Edmund Husserl's approaches to criticism of psychologism, especially
to what extent the psychological elements participate in the constitution of phenomena,
but different from the master, Edith Stein considered to explore independent areas of the
relation between apprehension of knowledge, this is an analysis of the phenomena with
the constitution of the person that brought it to the reflection of Wilhelm Dilthey in two
perspectives being them the question of the individual that for Edith Stein will be
presented like personality and the comprehensiveness of the sciences of the spirit as
217
STEIN, Edith, Los tipos de psicología y su significado para a pedagogía. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4,
Ed., 2002., p.93
218
MASSIMI, Marina e CARDOSO, Carolina de Resende Damas. Contribuições de Edith Stein para a
Fundamentação Filosófica da Psicologia Científica, in: Psicologia em Pesquisa | UFJF | 7(2)Ed., 2013.
p.191
219
DILTHEY, Wilhelm. Gesammelte Schriften, VII. Stuttgart, B. G. 1986, p.280.
220
JANNI, Anna. Von der Welterfahrung zur geistigen Welt. Spuren der Dilthey-Rezeption in Edith
Steins frühen Schriften apud Da experiência do mundo ao mundo espiritual. Vestígios da recepção de
Dilthey nos primeiros escritos de Edith Stein. 2017, p.2
77
responsible for the descriptions of the experiences and their relation with the psychic
elements as constitutional elements.
The separation between psyche and spirit is of extreme importance to

the theory of science, because from it and only after that it is possible
to establish a limit of principle between psychology and the human
sciences and to achieve to understand the mutual relationships that
exist between them. Many things that have been written about this will
be explained only by the existence of complete confusion and lack of
clarity in relation to the foundations that presuppose the elucidation of
these questions. It has been intended that psychology is the basis of
the sciences of the spirit, which is a "universal human science," as it
says. And, on the other hand, the spirit sciences were conceived as a
collection of materials for psychology. The tacit assumption of all this
is that psychology has to do with "spirit" and that the sciences of the
spirit have to do with the "psyche" of men. In other words, it has been
argued that between the psyche and the spirit there is no difference,
that is, the exact opposite of what our investigations have attempted to
show ... Recently, the recognition of the necessary separation has
gradually opened the way to understanding the demand for a "spirit-
science-oriented" psychology together with a "natural science-
oriented" psychology, a "comprehensive psychology" together with an
"explanatory psychology" of "descriptive and analytical"
psychology. 221
Edith Stein, in investigating psychical causality, conceded that individuality and

personality would not develop in a solipsistic way, as Edmund Husserl had
demonstrated, that is in a microcosm, but rather develops in relation to others, that is to
experience phenomena and experiences arising "outside"” 222,as for example, for Edith
Stein to understand the individual psyche in all its aspects, it must follow two
orientations: that of the insertion in the connection of the material nature and of the
insertion in the connection of the spiritual world, both using psychology descriptive
proposed by diltheyniana reflection
In the essential historicity of being there historiography is founded

existentially. "The theme of life is not something that can be
something that has been generalist about the question of life, the idea
that it is really important": the possibilities that reiterate the historical
being are defined in terms of history. continuity with the analysis of
historicity is related to its connection with the work of Wilhelm
Dilthey and his effort for the development of the sciences of the
spirit). Nietzsche's trichotomy, monumental, antiquary and critical, is
a necessary division to correspond to the three bases of temporality. 223
221
STEIN, Edith, Estudio Segundo: Individuo y Comunidad. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed., 2002., p.505
222
STEIN, Edith, Estudio Segundo: Individuo y Comunidad. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed., 2002., p.343
223
STEIN, Edith, Apêndice il la filosofía existencial de Martin Heidegger. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed.,
2002., p.1155
78
Dilthey's descriptive psychology would start from the understanding that
phenomena that are learned by consciousness would interrelate through the spirit,
applying in a macroscopic dimension, all men make up their individuality, but through
the spirit these individualities are presentiated through the phenomenon empathy that
allows them to live in collectivity, to find common and joint values of all individuals, to
articulate historical moments as the formulation of an identity of a state, society and the
formation of a subject.
Thus for Wilhelm Dilthey, unlike positivism, it would not be the natural sciences
that are responsible for being the basis of all science, but the sciences of the spirit
through the basis of a descriptive psychology from which individuals would seek to
formulate through the knowledge present in their "consciousness", mechanisms to read
the connections of the historical-social reality present in the communities in which they
are inserted.
I mean by descriptive psychology the exposition of the parts and
connections that appear uniformly in all developed human psychic
life, woven into a single connection, which is not inferred or
interpolated by thought but simply lived. This psychology consists,
therefore, in the description and analysis of a connection that is always
given to us in an original way, as the life itself (...) Its object is the
regularities in the connection of developed psychic life. Exposes this
inner connection to a typical man. 224
The proposal of a descriptive psychology proposed by Diltheynean reflection is

closely linked with the apprehension of experiences and the need to understand the
world that is inserted this is reality, and the researcher of the human sciences must be
concerned with all the forms that make up the reality of the 'external world' being
accessible through his consciousness thus describing the values that are the feelings,
which would have as a philosophical undertaking in the sense of ensuring the
conceptual existence of the 'external world' is no more than a mere intellectual exercise,
devoid of interest practical.
The external reality is given in the totality of our self-consciousness
not as mere representation, but as reality, while acting, resisting the
will and existing for the feeling as pleasure and pain. In voluntary
impulse and resistance to the will we see within the context of our
representations one self and, apart from it, another. But this other,
with its predicative determinations, exists only for our consciousness,
224
DILTHEY, Wilhelm. Ideas acerca de una psicologia descriptiva y analitica, apud CARVALHO 1993,
p92.
79
and the predicative determinations only illuminate relations with our
senses and our consciousness: the subject or subjects themselves are
not in our sensory impressions. Thus, we know that there is a subject,
but surely not what it is.225
As Hebert Spiegelberg describes226Karl Stumpf, who had been Edmund

Husserl's adviser in his habilitation thesis, who recommended to Wilhelm Dilthey, his
colleague at the University of Philosophy in Berlin, the reading of Logical
Investigations, which soon aroused relevance in Dilthey's thinking in 1904, sought to
minister seminars as a basis for the work Logical Investigations, just as in 1905, in
which he offered a set of lectures at the Berlin academy, "The Psychic Structure," in
which he argued that Logical Investigations could be understood as the development
and the realization of some applications of his ideas, among them descriptive
psychology227, as we see in the words of Edmund Husserl himself, who was invited by
Wilhelm Dilthey, to meet him in Berlin the same year.
I was initially not a little surprised to hear personally from Dilthey that
phenomenology, in particular the descriptive analysis of the second,
specifically phenomenological part of Logical Investigations, was in
essential harmony with his "Ideen" and could be considered as the first
piece for a mature methodological execution of psychology that he
had in mind as an ideal. Dilthey has always placed great weight upon
this coincidence of our investigations, in spite of the different starting
points, and even in old age, he has once again taken up with youthful
enthusiasm his investigations of the sciences of the spirit, which he
had left asid. 228
This meeting gave Edmund Husserl a great stimulus for the writing of Ideas for
a pure phenomenology and for a phenomenological philosophy, according to a letter
229
written in 1929 , the approach between these thinkers was for the critique to the
"transcendental psychologism", that is, the belief that all epistemology on the basis of
225
DILTHEY, Wilhelm. Ideas acerca de una psicologia descriptiva y analitica, apud CARVALHO 1993,
p381.
226
227
HUSSERL, Edmund . Phänomenologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925. Haag,
Alemanha: Martinus Nijhoff. 1962, p35.
228
Alemanha: Martinus Nijhoff. 1962, p35.
229
80
consciousness taken as a natural entity, as stated in the article Phenomenology and
Psychology written by Husserl and organized by Edith Stein.. 230
In the 1911 paper Philosophy as a Science of Reason (Philosophie als Strenge
Wissenschaft), Edmund Husserl refers to Dilthey, through the concept of "World
Vision" (Weltanschauung), interpreting it as an attempt to derive nature of the
philosophy of the empirical study of history231that is, Husserl believes that the world
views (Weltanschauung), having on a smaller scale the individual as well as a larger
scale a people or a community is conditioned by the historical situation, but different
from Dilthey , for Edmund Husserl this methodological procedure would only reveal the
individualities and not the laws of a universal science that would demarcate the quest to
unveil the essences of a certain phenomenon that would only be possible through
universal laws for the phenomena and not only the descriptions made about them
The creative origin of a work of art becomes individually intelligible,

finds a purely individual explanation if we are successful in projecting
ourselves into the artist, into his spiritual life, into the surrounding
environment that motivates him spiritually - and of course, on the
basis of an interpretation of historical data.232
Rudolf A. Makkreel describes that in spite of the criticisms made by Edmund

Husserl the conception of history and the concept of "World Vision" (Weltanschauung)
made to Wilhelm Dilthey were softened by the exchange of correspondence between the
two philosophers in which Husserl affirmed who acknowledged that Dilthey's proposal
was correct in proposing a methodology that prioritized an approximation between the
psychology of the sciences of the spirit is that his criticism was not directed specifically
to him, but the interpretation they might cause, namely that of relativism. Husserl insists
to Dilthey that there is no serious opposition between them and that he is confident that
"a long conversation would lead us to full agreement." Husserl ends by observing that
the point to be observed is that they worked on similar problems, but at different levels.
While he himself worked at the level of the structure of the elements, Dilthey focused
230
231
MAKKREEL, Rudolf. A. Dilthey, philosopher of the human studies. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press. 1975, p. 272.
232
Alemanha: Martinus Nijhoff. 1962, p. 12.
81
on a broader phenomenological analysis, the morphology and typology of cultural
formations.233
Starting from this understanding of Edmund Husserl, from which the
phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung) and sympathy (Mitgefüh), would have from
Wilhelm Dilthey a greater scale of analysis in the relationship between individuals and
the world of culture. Edith Stein follows this understanding that the first sphere of
individuals with the outside world, based on bodily and corporeal contact, was
surrounded by an understanding of ethics with values, which we can call "World View”
(Weltanschauung) 234, which according to Anna Janni this process of transition from a
smaller scale perspective to a larger scale of analysis of phenomena, led Edith Stein to
note that in the process of apprehending knowledge, from Dilthey's ideas on descriptive
psychology, a great progress towards establishing an unscientific humanistic method,
that is, an opening to the field of experience. 235
According to Stein, Dilthey's goal in life is to give the humanities their

true foundation, which has something in common with the goal of
phenomenology - the reflective investigation of the scientific
consciousness in question. However, as far as Dilthey's method of
human sciences is concerned, Stein finds a naturalistic attitude derived
from descriptive psychology. Stein interprets the concept of "self-
reflection" in Dilthey's introduction to the humanities as an
understanding of the "spiritual life of the past."236
In this way, Edith Stein understands that descriptive psychology would allow us
a greater openness to the humanities that is from the "Worldviews" (Weltanschauung)
would allow access to the phenomena of empathy (Einfühlung) and sympathy
(Mitgefüh) that is to phenomena in the field of culture of which history is part as
described by Edith Stein, this is the understanding of the "spiritual life of the past."
The movement presented by Edith Stein starts from Edmund Husserl's
understanding that by cognitively grasping the subject, the subject would need the
perception of the world, that is, from the act of empathy (Einfühlung) to overcome the
purely solipsistic character, that is, to a certain extent an understanding of Dilthey's "law
of rationality", according to which historical events would hold values that could only
233
MAKKREEL, Rudolf. A. Dilthey, philosopher of the human studies. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press. 1975, p. 277.
234
SONDERMANN, Maria Antonia . Zum Problem der Einfühlung, Volume 5 ,Parte 1. 2010, p. 110.
235
236
82
be apprehended from the experiences in community in which they are inserted, as he
affirms Edith Stein herself. "Motivation is the legality of the spiritual life, the context of
experience, spiritual matters are an experienced (original or empathetic) and
understandable meaning as such."237
According to Dilthey, the "law of rationality" of the spiritual life

arises from such typical qualities, which constitute a universal
knowledge of the values of all possible personal types, and whose
realizations appear in empirical persons. Stein completely agrees with
this concern of Dilthey and leads the constitutional process back to the
act of empathy. 238
Even agreeing with this perception is that Edith Stein seeks to develop the
criticism of Wilhelm Dilthey, the transition between the individual apprehension of
knowledge by the sciences of the spirit and the transition to the sphere of community,
which for Stein would constitute a fundamental part of the human person, thus
preferring to use the term of personality than that of individuality proposed by Dilthey.
Stein's methodological distinction between the natural sciences and

the humanities leads to the phenomenological analysis of the person.
In her dissertation, she proposes the act of empathy as a method for
the humanities, which is further investigated and demonstrated
discursively in her subsequent works on the basic structure of the
person. 239
CHAPTER 3 - FROM THE EMPATHY OF THE HUMAN PERSON

TO THE MODERN STATE
3.1. Empathy (Einfühlung) in the German intellectual context
In her diary Edith Stein reflecting on her time as a nurse in the field at Mährisch
Weißkirchen240 in 1915 where she worked with typhoid patients of various Italian,
Turkish, French, German, and other nationalities, such experiences of suffering
provided a greater reflection suffers the phenomenon of empathy during the six months
237
238
239
ZOLLER, Beate Beckmann., FALKOVITZ Hanna-Barbara Gerl .Edith Stein: Themen - Kontexte -
Materialien (Englisch) Taschenbuch .2015, p.110
240
STEIN, Edith, Historia de Nuestra Familia: Encuentros y Decisiones Interiores. Madrid: El Carmen,
vol. 1, Ed., 2002., p.461
83
in which he acted as a volunteer on the Red Cross, as he confessed to his friend and
colleague in the phenomenological circle of Göttingen and Freiburg Roman Ingarden
At this moment, when so many human issues affected me and affected

me in my interior, I nevertheless gathered all my strength to carry out
my work, which weighed on me tremendously for more than two
years.241
The Mährisch Weißkirchen hospital was a former military cavalry academy that
was turned into a hospital during World War I, and when Stein served as a nurse she
had 4,000 beds242,especially dedicated to patients with contagious typhus and
diphtheria, and was mainly responsible for vaccination and for the care of patients
during this experience Stein owes her first contact with the consciousness of death.
No one saw him with his eyes open or heard him say a word. The last
night I gave him a few injections, and in the meantime I heard the
breath of my position-there was a moment when he stopped-or I went
to his bed: his heart did not beat. So I had to do what we were told in
such cases: pick up the few personal things he had there to give to the
military office (most things were removed on arrival and kept until
departure); call the doctor for the death certificate he gave me; go to
the guard at the door and ask the men to take you on a stretcher;
finally remove the clothes from the bed. When I ordered his few
things, a small card came from the diary of the deceased: he had a
prayer for his life to be saved and his wife to have given it. It broke
my soul. I understood, right now, that humanly meant that death. 243
Edith Stein presents the medical team and even the patients' team at the
Mährisch Weißkirchen hospital as a cosmopolitan institution, made up of doctors and
nurses and mainly patients from many places, who formed associations and
communities, even living experiences such as the pain of sufferings of the wounds of
war and the insecurity before the war being that in response, they tried to group in
clubs:
They greeted me warmly and laughed when I told them, "The
Hungarian club is already together." What attracted them to that place
was the big jug with lemonade and red wine. The "German club" was
gathered by the bed of that young Bohemian German, who still could
not get up. They commented on the vicissitudes of the war, criticizing
the political situation. "After the war I will register in Germany," said
241
vol. 1, Ed., 2002., p.461
242
STEIN, Edith, Escritos Filosóficos Etapa fenomenológica: 1915-1920. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 2, Ed.
2002, p. 26.
243
vol. 1, Ed., 2002., p.430-431
84
the boy. His house was not far from the border with Bavaria. I ran
through the queues of beds and made sure the condition of the patient
was serious. When it was time for the patients to sleep, and there was
nothing special to do, I would sit at the small desk and write letters or
read. I had brought only two books to WeiBkirchen: Edmund
Husserl's Ideals is Homer.244
To understand social phenomena, Edith Stein proposes a phenomenological

reading of social groups such as clubs as she observed during her stay as a nurse in the
hospital in her various relationships, as Edith Stein asserts that modern man's social
being is revealed in all its plurality: “Man performs social acts; maintain social
relations; is a member of social structures; is a social type” 245
Let us first recall what has become clear to us in the investigation of

the elements of a supra-individual current of life. To this chain belong
all the experiences constituted by means of individual experiences,
and whose correlates are supra-individual objects - things or values,
empirical objects or ideas - and, in addition, all the activities of the
respective community to the world of its objects and of all purely
inner experiences (that is, not related to an external object) that are
common to a plurality of subjects.246
This perception of empathy as a pluralistic phenomenon is defined by Michele

247
Summa who states that starting from the understanding proposed by Edmund Husserl
that empathy has an egological structure, Edith Stein sought to understand the layers
that make up this phenomenon, that is, as in First, we can become aware of others in
relation to ourselves.
According to Stein's definition, empathy plays a key role in mutual

understanding and intersubjective recognition. 248His work highlights precisely, first, the
essential and basic structures of our experience of others; Subsequently, it proceeds to
explain higher levels of complexity in empathic experience.
When I look at a man in his eyes, his gaze answers me. Let me
penetrate your inner, or well, refuse me. You are master of your soul,
and you can open and close your doors. You can get out of yourself
and get into things. When two men look at each other, they face each
244
vol.1, Ed., 2002., p.451
245
STEIN, Edith, La estructura de la persona humana. Madrid: Espiritualidad, 1998, p. 246.
246
STEIN, Edith, Obras Completas, II Escritos filosóficos: etapa fenomenológica, Madrid: Monte
Carmelo, 2005, p. 377. La estructura de la persona humana. Madrid: Espiritualidad, p. 377.
247
SUMMA, Michaela, Empathy and Anti-Empathy. Which Are the Problems?Apud. Elisa Magrì &
Dermot Moran (eds.). Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood. Essays on Edith Stein’s Philosophical
Investigations. Dordrecht: Springer 2017,p. 87-107.
248
STEIN, Edith, Sobre el problema de la empatía .Madri ed:editorial Trotta, 2004, p. 20-21.
85
other. It can be a meeting at the door or a meeting inside. If it is a
meeting inside, the other I is a you. The look of the man speaks. A self
I own and awake watches me from these eyes. 249
As defined by Odo Marquard from which pluralism does not have an absolutist
stance, this is "it is not possible to absolutize the position that there is no absolute
position"250, and a historical observation is necessary in order to perceive the this
mechanism of pluralism occurs that however manifested in different cultural groups this
is nationalities, they still shared characteristics beyond their homelands, so to
understand the phenomenon of empathy should take into consideration beyond the
aspects of knowledge apprehension the cultural aspects from which it is inserted
"Empathy" is not only an act of human knowledge. In order to

understand this "mechanism" one must first have a deeper and more
objective understanding of the human being. "Empathy" shows him,
without any doubt, that man is a spiritual being, transcendent, open,
called to be realized in the depths of his being, but without
confronting the other.251
During the period she was working as a nurse Edith Stein, presented a double
training that would be the knowledge of the patients, listening to their essential stories
as the fear of dying, the hope that touched them mainly of the typhus section, as well as
the readings of the books who were handed over by her brother, in whom she had
received the draft of her dissertation252, being admired by the medical staff, especially
Dr. Schan253,who discovered that Stein was not a training nurse and introduced her as
"nurse Edith, civil philosopher, "freeing her so she could study what bothered her
because she believed she was not devoting herself to her patients.
I received my draft of what imprisoning to study as a doctoral thesis.

In fact, it was my brother that I love who brought it to me. He had
visited me at Pentecost. He came in his squad uniform and came with
the supplies sent by the Red Cross of Breslau (...). So I had a thick
249
STEIN, Edith, Estructura de la persona humana. Em Edith Stein. Obras Completas, V.IV: Escritos
Antropológicos y Pedagógicos. (F.J. Sancho, OCD; J. Mardomingo; C. L.Garrido; C. Díaz; A. Pérez,
OCD; G. F. de Aginaga, Trad.). (pp. 555-749). Burgos: Editorial Monte Carmelo; Vitória: Ediciones El
Carmen; Madrid: Editorial de Espiritualidad, p. 648.
250
MARQUARD, Odo. ¿El manifiesto pluralista? In: _____. Felicidad en la infelicidad. Buenos Aires,
Katz, 2006, p. 134.
251
STEIN, Edith, Obras Completas, I Escritos Autobiográficos y Cartas. Historia de Nuestra Familia:
Encuentros y Decisiones Interiores. Madrid: El Carmen, vol.1, Ed., 2002., p51-52
252
vol.1, Ed., 2002., p.454
253
vol.1, Ed., 2002., p.438-439
86
manuscript and sometimes I looked at it, I was also reading a lot, for
an hour, my Homer. 254
Edith Stein returned to the field nurse at Mährisch Weißkirchen because of the
reduction in the number of patients, but was accused of lecturing at the Breslau war
court and a second trial at Ratibor, but the Breslau Red Cross intervened and asked the
absolution of Stein and his availability in service and his dedication to the sick 255,
especially the dying, suggested he receive the Red Cross's medal of honor.
Homer's Odyssey was a must-read because Edith Stein, upon arriving in Breslau,
sought to study Greek for the integrative examination for classical maturity, where she
had the assistance of Julius Stenzel and his wife Bertha Stenzel256who had studied Plato
and after graduating from work as professor of classical languages at the Johanneum
school, where in October was held by the linguistics coordinator Professor Landien.
Moreover, Landien was the director of the model of ancient times:

majestic and of great goodness at the same time. His external
appearance already imposed respect on his gallant figure with a long
white beard divided in two, for the performance of the test allowed me
to do it in his own work room, the subject chosen for the evaluation
unfortunately was not Plato as expected, but yes the speech of
Lysias.257
During the Greek examination, the two professors Stenzel and Landien were
curious to know why Edith Stein was taking the exam at the humanist institute
Johanneum, because it was rare in Breslau, to take the exam because it could carry out
the certificate of high school in secondary schools of modern languages, fact that
enchanted the applicators because the young one added the certificate of scientific lycee
also the classic lycee.
With passing the Greek exam, Stein sought to devote himself entirely to the
writing of the thesis, although in Breslau far from Edmund Husserl, the relationship
between the two authors becomes more "warm and affectionate" due to the exchange of
letters between them. Edmund Husserl had been transferred to the University of
254
vol.1, Ed., 2002., p.449
255
Encuentros y Decisiones Interiores. Madrid: El Carmen, vol.1, Ed., 2002., p.451
256
STEIN, Edith . “Live in a Jewish Family – her unfished autobiographical account” in The Collected
Works of Edith Stein , Washington , D.C. ICS, Publications ,1986.p.358
257
87
Freiburg in Brisgovia, such an approach occurred because Husserl had also allowed his
two sons also to enlist in the volunteer battalion of Göttingen, and the youngest
Wolfgang died in the war. Edmund Husserl suffered the death of his young son "You
have to bear it," and found in Stein someone with whom he could vent.
He followed my activity with affectionate participation, wrote me long

letters with a fine, fine and accurate spelling and took advantage of
my reports. He was also moved because he was in Moravia, his native
land. He then asked me if the hospital could see L'Altvater, his
birthplace, Prosnitz. Of course, it was always for me to receive a letter
from the master. 258
Just as for Edmund Husserl, the horrors of the War decisively marked the
members of the group of this generation of phenomenology, both in personal matters
and in intellectual formation, through the correspondence exchanged between them we
can see that many also volunteered Edith Stein received the letter of Adolf Reinach,
with the following words, "Dear Nurse Edith, now we are comrades of war” 259, as well
as Franz Kaufmann, who during the volunteer service was afraid that a long interruption
of his studies would make him lose everything, being reassured by Stein who wrote her
a letter a summary of the course of logic given by Husserl before the war. Unlike
Kaufman and Reinach, who felt uncomfortable with war, Edith Stein points out to us
Hans Lipps, who in the war had freed himself from the conventions of civil life, in the
author's own words on Lipps
The unpredictability of wartime was very good for his character, so

that in a permit he said, "What am I going to do when peace begins?"
His relationship to philosophy was so visceral that no environment
and no strange activity disturbed him.He was able to study natural
sciences and medicine, and temporarily practice as a physician,
without prejudice to his philosophical progress. 260
This was the atmosphere that made up the group of phenomenologists after the
First World War, which in 1916 will accompany Edmund Husserl and Malwine to
Freiburg261,to succeed Heinrich Rickert who had been transferred to Heidelberg where
258
STEIN, Edith, Storia di una famiglia ebrea. Lineamenti autobiografici: l’infanzia e gli anni giovanili.
Roma: Città Nuova Editrice,1992,. Madrid: El Carmen, Ed., 1992., p.335
259
STEIN, Edith . “Live in a Jewish Family – her unfished autobiographical account” in The Collected
Works of Edith Stein , Washington , D.C. ICS, Publications ,1986.p.456
260
vol.1, Ed., 2002., p.455.
261
LYNE, Paty.Edith Stein Discovered: A Personal PortraitRoma: Città Nuova Editrice2000,. Roma: El
Carmen,, p.38.
88
he would take the chair occupied by Wilhelm Windelband who had died in the year
former both members of the Baden school, as Edith Stein points out.
But I was not finished when I received the shocking news that Husserl
had been summoned to Freiburg to succeed Heinrich Rickert and that
he had accepted. Rickert went to Heidelberg for the chair of the late
Wilhelm Windelband. These two figures of the "School of Baden" had
already worked together and exerted a great influence. It was no easy
task for phenomenology to gain ground there. But Husserl did not
hesitate to accept the call. With this he was freed from the painful
situation in which he was for many years in the Faculty of Philosophy
of Göttingen and went to one of Germany's most prestigious
philosophy schools.262
The interlocution between the phenomenology and the school of Neokantina of

the southwest of Germany, that is Baden would constitute a fruitful source of dialog, I
try like central figures of Windelband that in 1884, that wrote the essay Contributions
for the doctrine of the negative judgment (Beiträge zur Lehre vom negativen Urteil)
addressed to Franz Brentano master of Husserl, but certainly the great source of
interlocution of this dialogue and just to whom Husserl will succeed in Freiburg this is
Heinrich Rickert.263
Among the tests that allow us to perceive the approximation of these two authors
are the private seminars organized by Rickert, in his house, for selected groups had as
bibliography Logical Investigations of Husserl being members of this group Richard
Kroner, Reinhar Kynast, Friedrich Kreis and Rudolf Zocher who will write works and
critiques of phenomenological thought, and part of these criticisms will be answered by
Husserl's advisor Eugen Fink in 1933 through Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological
Philosophy in Contemporary Critique (Die Phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund
Husserls in der Gegenwärtigen Kritik).264 As we can see in a letter written by Edith
Stein to his friend Roman Ingarden265, on 11 November 1921 in the city of Bergzabern.
As a reaction to the sending of the book to the conversations of
Conrant, came a postcard of Edmund Husserl, very kind in which one
could see how impressed he was. Yesterday we wrote him a long and
affectionate letter, inviting him to visit us, since we can hardly be
absent from the plantation at the same time. (...) I would consider a
criticism of Rickert very timely, and I can not imagine Husserl
262
vol.1, Ed., 2002., p.467.
263
RESENDE, José, Em busca de uma teoria do sentido: Windelband , Ricket,Husserl, Lask e
Heidegger.São PauloEDUC, FAPESP, 2013, p.3.
264
RESENDE, José, Em busca de uma teoria do sentido: Windelband, Ricket,Husserl, Lask e
Heidegger.São PauloEDUC, FAPESP, 2013, p.4-5.
265
89
refusing, for he was always ready for discussion. I just heard this
Heidegger design such thing, which would definitely require a second.
The object of knowledge that I will gladly lend you.266
The book The Object of Knowledge that Edith Stein lent to Roman Ingarden was
the first book published by Heinrich Rickert after his doctoral thesis in 1892, according
to Aida Rita Tedesco Silva presented considerable editorial success as we can perceive
to be reedited six times267, being an introduction general theory of knowledge, which
aimed to assist students who began their course in philosophy.
We believe that the sociological school of Baden, as well as the
phenomenological school of Breslau, which will later replace the former in Gottingen,
originated as a development of the post-March German philosophical movement. This
is the period of the 1848 revolution in which the academies sought to formulate a
scientific philosophy, privileging especially epistemological questions, such as the
theory of knowledge and ethics.
The revolution of February 24 in Paris which overthrew Louis
Philippe provoked throughout West Germany the same kind of
response that had been brought about by the events of the great
revolution of 1789, but this time on a larger scale. In almost every
state there were fierce disputes between rulers and people. 268
Such a movement proposed by these philosophical schools had as

presuppositions a philosophy that was based on a return to the foundation of the
"sciences of reality"269 and not only to a character of the philosophies of existence or
life, according to Aída Rita Tedesco Silva 270this perception is also present in the
philosophy of Rickert, and for him the main problem was the specialization of the new
sciences that would not allow access to the "whole" of the studied object, being this the
foundation of the human sciences this is the historical science in the words of the own
Heinrich Rickert.
All bodily processes and all spiritual processes are now objectively
studied by the singular sciences, and philosophy has only to accept the
266
267
SILVA, Aída Rita Tedesco. Conceitos Individualizantes e Valores na teoria da história de Heinrich
Rickert. 2016. 158f. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) – Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Sociais,
Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto, Mariana/MG, p.51
268
TAYLOR, Alan.John. The Course of German History.Londres, Routledge Classics, 2001 p.75
269
MATA, Sergio da. Heinrich Rickert e a fundamentação (axio)lógica do conhecimento histórico. In :
VARIA HISTORIA, Belo Horizonte, vol. 22, 2006 p.75
270
90
results of this work. (...) Faced with effectiveness, philosophy can
only have one task: in opposition to the singular sciences, which are
always restricted to one of its parts, philosophy must be the science of
the whole. 271
The revolution of March 1848 in the Germanic states provoked a change in the
perception of the understanding of philosophical doing because many of the prominent
philosophers of the literate bourgeoisie actively participated in the movements for the
unification and modernization of the German states, the failure of the movement must
as a result a departure from political approaches in universities such as the removal of
intellectuals such as Ludwig Feuerbach, Arnold Ruge, Bruno Bauer, the Koko Fischer
himself and the predecessor of Windelband in Heidelberg would be denied permission
to teach about the accusation of political involvement. 272
As a consequence, the later schools of philosophical thought of the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries such as the New Southwest German school of
Gottingen and the phenomenological school of Gottingen. As a consequence, the later
schools of philosophical thought of the late nineteenth century and early In the twentieth
century, such as the New Southwest German school of Gottingen and the
phenomenological school of Gottingen, they began to dedicate themselves to the
apprehension of knowledge as the history of philosophy and the theory of knowledge,
an interest that had been growing with the industrialization and specialization of the
human sciences . As Aida Rita Tedesco affirms, "The post-March period saw, therefore,
sciences to become an inescapable point in redefining the role of philosophy, both with
respect to its objects and with respect to its methods."273
Heinrich Rickert's model of the Neo-Kantian school in Baden can be understood

as an example of an intellectual inserted in this intellectual project of thinking
epistemology and the determination that the role of philosophy was to unveil scientific
truths, as can be perceived from his earliest works of 1892, The Object of Knowledge,
from which he defined:
271
RICKERT, Heinrich. Le système des valeurs et autres articles. Paris, Vrin, 2007.Apud SILVA, Aída
Rita Tedesco. Conceitos Individualizantes e Valores na teoria da história de Heinrich Rickert. 2016. p.66
272
273
91
In fact, there is one thing we have presupposed so far, and we must
therefore deal with an objection. We assume without any proof that
the truth, i.e., unconditionally valid judgments, exists; and that we find
ourselves in possession of it in the case of undoubted judgments. (...)
The assertion that all truth is relative can only mean that it is not
absolutely necessary to always answer a question with yes or no, both
positions being possible. (...) The existence of just relative truths
would thus mean that there is no difference between silly superstitions
and scientific research. The word truth totally loses its meaning, which
only exists when a truth can be contrasted with the various individual
opinions.274
The philosophical project proposed by Heinrich Rickert exerted a strong

influence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially among
philosophers and historians such as Karl Lamprecht, Georg Von Below, Eduard Meyer,
Johan Huizinga, Ernst Troeltsch and Max Weber 275 Since this last Weber had a "lasting
friendship"276as described by Marianne Weber, this friendship influenced the
constitution of Weber's own vocabulary and the logical foundation of "the sciences of
reality" and its application in understanding sociology, as described by Guy Oakes:
Much of the philosophical vocabulary that Weber employs in his

methodological writings borrows from Rickert, for example the notion
of the irrationality of the real, the idea of a hiatus irrationalis between
concept and reality, and concepts such as historical individuality and
value relationship . (...) Weber's critique of positivism, its logical
differentiation between cultural and natural sciences, its division
between practical value judgments and theoretical value relations, and
its view of methodology as a doctrine of concept formation - all of this
is based on arguments carefully presented in Rickert's work. 277
Max Weber sought to analyze the meaning of social action through a new
science, this is comprehensive sociology, this is "a science that intends to interpret
social action interpretatively and thus causally explain it in its course and in its
274
RICKERT, Heinrich. Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis: Ein Beitrage zum Problem der philosophischen
Transcendenz. Freiburg: J.C. Mohr, 1892 p. 73 -74. Apud : SILVA, Aída Rita Tedesco. Conceitos
Individualizantes e Valores na teoria da história de Heinrich Rickert. 2016. 158f. Dissertação (Mestrado
em História) – Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Sociais, Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto,
Mariana/MG, p.51
275
MATA, Sergio da. Heinrich Rickert e a fundamentação (axio)lógica do conhecimento histórico. In :
VARIA HISTORIA, Belo Horizonte, vol. 22, 2006 p.02
276
WEBER, Marianne. Weber: uma biografia. Niterói: Casa Jorge, 2003, p. 273 Apud:MATA, Sergio da.
Heinrich Rickert e a fundamentação (axio)lógica do conhecimento histórico. In : VARIA HISTORIA,
Belo Horizonte, vol. 22, 2006 . p.04
277
OAKES, Guy. Die Grenzen kulturwissenschaftlicher Begriffsbildung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1990, p.15Apud: MATA, Sergio da. Heinrich Rickert e a fundamentação (axio)lógica do conhecimento
histórico. In : VARIA HISTORIA, Belo Horizonte, vol. 22, 2006 . p.04
92
effects."278 Like Alfred Schutz, both thinkers sought to demonstrate that all sociocultural
phenomena originate from the intimate relationship between the individual and his own
action in the midst of social interaction.
For other purposes of knowledge it may be useful or necessary to

conceive the individual, for example, as an association of 'cells' or a
complex of chemical reactions, or their 'psychic' life as consisting of
several individual elements (however skilled workers). Of course,
valuable knowledge (causal rules) is thus obtained. However, we do
not understand the behavior expressed in rules of these elements. Nor
do we understand when it comes to psychic elements, let alone the
greater the precision, in the sense of the natural sciences, with which
they are conceived: this is never the right way to arrive at an
interpretation based on the intended sense. 279
In his Comprehensive Sociology project, Max Weber as a way of understanding

the mechanisms composes the social and historical phenomena by means of ideal types,
being typified in four categories, being the rational related related, rational referring to
values, affective and traditional this typology, as Carlos Eduardo Sell affirms, "the
differentiation between (the four types of action) involves consideration of the different
degrees of rationality present in the action itself. 280,as we can perceive from the
comment made by Gabriel Cohn in the introduction of the book Economy and society,
written by Weber
the term 'society' (Gesellschaft) does not express a central concept in

Weberian terminology, in which it is replaced at decisive moments by
an expression that more properly designates the constitutive
interindividual relations of society than it is as a network of relations
already given. 281
Alfred Schutz began to study the book Economy and Society of Max Weber in
1922 from the subsequent years of 1924 to 1928 seeking an approximation of the
Weberian sociological perspective and the epistemological methodology of the
Husserlian phenomenology.
278
WEBER, Max. Conceitos sociológicos fundamentais. In: Economia e sociedade: fundamentos da
sociologia compreensiva. Tradução de Régis Barbosa e Karen Elsabe Barbosa. Revisão técnica de
Gabriel Cohn. 4. ed. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 2012 p.03
279
WEBER, Max. Conceitos sociológicos fundamentais. In: Economia e sociedade: fundamentos da
sociologia compreensiva. Tradução de Régis Barbosa e Karen Elsabe Barbosa. Revisão técnica de
Gabriel Cohn. 4. ed. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 2012 p.08
280
SELL.Carlos Eduardo. Racionalidade e racionalização em Max Weber. Rev. Bras. Ciências
Sociais,[São Paulo], v. 27, n. 79, p. 153-233, jun. 2012b.p.163
281
COHN, Gabriel. Alguns problemas conceituais e de tradução em Economia e sociedade.In: Economia e
sociedade: fundamentos da sociologia compreensiva. Tradução de Régis Barbosa e Karen Elsabe
Barbosa. Revisão técnica de Gabriel Cohn. 4. ed. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 2012.
v.1.,p.13
93
Emmanuel Lévinas282 describes that the understanding of the design philosophy
of a social theory from the phenomenological philosophical conception proposed by
Alfred Schutz, would echo the influence of Edmund Husserl and we believe of Edith
Stein, mainly in the description of the world of the life and the perception by the
consciousness of realities multiple social networks.
One lesson that Schutz learned early in life and continued to teach to
the end was the need to base any social theory on a philosophical
foundation. From the beginning he found the basis for his own
philosophy in Husserl more than in any other, but also in Bergon,
Wiliam James, Georg Simmel, Max Scheler and others. 283
Alfred Schutz sought to develop the project of phenomenological foundations of

understanding sociology, trying to develop a theory of social action that is, to
investigate the nature of intersubjectivity and the social construction of knowledge,
current that influenced thinkers like Harold Garfinkel, Anthony Giddens, Peter Berger
and Thomas Luckmann284in his excellent work The Social Construction of Reality,
published in 1966.
As João Carlos Correa points out, the project formulated by Alfred Schutz
sought to relate the relations between scientific knowledge and the knowledge of daily
life, that is, the world of lived experience (Lebnswelt)285, before the natural world we
seek to achieve the epoché of suspension of subjectivity full and accepting the world as
existing the subject seeks to adapt his actions to the social structure in which it is
inserted, in the words of the author himself.
In our daily life (...) we accept without question the existence of the
outside world, the world of facts that surround us. In fact, it may be
that we doubt any fact of this outer world, it may be that we distrust as
many experiences of this world as we please; but the naive belief in
the existence of some outside world, that (general thesis from the
natural point of view) will subsist, imperturbable. 286
282
LÉVINAS, Emmanuel. Descobrindo a existência com Husserl e com Heidegger, Lisboa, Piaget, 1997,
p.61.
283
BRODERSEN, Arvird. Editor’s Note in Alfred Schutz, Collected papers, Vol.II: Studies in social
theory. The Hague, Martinus Nijoff, 1976,p.18
284
CORREIA, João Carlos. Fenomenologia e Teoria dos Sistemas : Reflexões sobre um encontro
improvável in : Revista Filosófica de Coimbra n 23, 2003, p.184.
285
CORREIA, João Carlos. Fenomenologia e Teoria dos Sistemas: Reflexões sobre um encontro
improvável in: Revista Filosófica de Coimbra n 23, 2003, p.184.
286
SCHUTZ, Alfred. William James's concept of the stream of thought phenomenologically interpreted in
Collected papers, vol. 111, The Hague, Martinus Nijoff, 1975,p.5
94
Helmut Wagner in the work points out that Schutz understood that knowledge is
not an individual issue but rather inserted in the dynamics between intersubjective and
socialized world because "The world of life is simply the whole sphere of everyday
experiences, directions and actions through which individuals deal with their interests
and business, manipulating objects, dealing with people, conceiving and realizing
plans"287, so we do not have to theorize about this world, but rather from describing the
actions of subjects in the world of life, the social scientist could formulate his
hypotheses.
Behavior refers to all kinds of subjectively projected spontaneous

experiences of meaning, whether those of the inner life or those which
are embedded in the external world (...)The behavior planned in
advance, that is, based on a preconceived project, it will be called
action, be it manifested or latent.288
Both Alfred Schutz, Max Weber, Max Scheler, and how we will further
demonstrate Edith Stein are in a category of analysis of the intellectuals who sought to
understand human actions from a diachronic movement that is seeking to define human
actions in a macro state analysis and society to the micro, this is the components present
in the alter ego that according to Alexis Emanuel Gros289prevailed in the German
intellectual debate as for example the theory of rationing by analogy
(Analogieschlusstheorie) and the theory of affective projection (Theorie der projektiven
Einfühlung), but both theories would depart not only from the conception of empathy
but also from sympathy, both are actions of the subject because empathy is cognitive
awareness that allows us to have access to the experiences of others, while sympathy
necessarily implies an affective involvement of the ego with the alter- ego as Dan
Zahavi points out to us:
Empathy and sympathy, for truth, they should not be confused.

Empathy (Empathy) (...) is the name for our experience (Erfahrung) of
the experiences of another. Sympathy supposes more than this, here it
is, as the word already points out, also of compassion (Mitgefühl).290
287
WAGNER, Helmut. Fenomenologia e relações sociais- Colectânea de textos de Alfred Schutz, Rio de
Janeiro, Zahar Editora, p. 16
288
SCHUTZ, Alfred. El problema de la realidad social: escritos I. Compilado por MauriceNatanson.
Tradução de Néstor Míguez. 2. ed. Buenos Aires: amorrortu,, 2008,p.200
289
GROS, Alexis Emanuel. El debate de Alfred Schütz con Max Scheler en torno a la empatía.,2012,p.4
290
ZAHAVI, Dan, Phänomenologie für Einsteiger, W. Fink, Paderborn, 2007,In: Zahavi, Dan, mpathy,
Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz, en Inquiry, vol. 53, Nº 3, 2010.p.
71.
95
In 1932 Alfred Schutz writes the book The Meaningful Construction of the
Social World (Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt), where he seeks to present a
critique of Max Weber's comprehensive sociology, surrounding this debate the question
of empathy plays a central role in the argumentation of the proposed theory by Schutz's
understanding of the other (Fremdverstehen) that emerged from the confrontation of
schelerian theory perception of the other (Fremdwahrnehmung). 291
The theory of perception of the other (Fremdwahrnehmung) formulated by Max

Scheler, has as a point of reflection that different from the previous perspective as the
affective projection (projektive Einfühlung) formulated by Lipps, would not be a
process of rationalization in which the subject would become aware of the other, more
simply and immediately, empathy, would be a cognitive act analogous to the perception
of the sensitive.
For Scheler the experiences of the alter-ego are perceived immediately by the
ego but not as pure objects but as an amalgam formed by bodily movements and
phenomena of expression (Ausdrucksphänomene) that are perceived and from the
experiences (Erlebnisse) are understood.
It is true, indeed, that we believe to have joy directly in laughter, in

sorrow the pain and sorrow of the other, in his blush his shame, in his
pleading hands, pleading, in the loving look of his eyes, his love, in
his teeth grinding her fury, her menacing fist threatening her, etc. 292
Like Max Scheler, he elaborated a theory that sought to think empathizing this
and the theory of the perception of the other (Fremdwahrnehmung), Alfred Schutz also
sought to develop in his book The Meaningful Construction of the Social World (Der
sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt), where he sought dialogue with Max Weber and
Edmund Husserl.
According to Alexis Emanuel Gros, the main criticism made by Alfred Schutz of
the theory formulated by Max Scheler and that this one would believe in a process of
total empathy (totale Einfühlung) according to which the subject would have the
capacity from the conscience to have direct access to the experiences293, is that the
291
Aires: Editorial Losada, S.A., 2004.p.20.
292
Aires: Editorial Losada, S.A., 2004.p.21.
293
GROS, Alexis Emanuel. El debate de Alfred Schütz con Max Scheler en torno a la empatía.,2012,p.11
96
"direct application of the method of eidetic reduction to unenlightened notions of
common-sense thinking or equally unclarified concepts of the empirical social
sciences"294 Alasdair MacIntyre points out that this criticism extended to Edith Stein and
the members of the first generation of phenomenology. 295
For Schutz, the error of this generation was to disregard that the other can also
change its nature in the face of the perception of the other, as the Schutz firm needs to
clearly distinguish the interpretation of the person's perceptions, the authentic
understanding of the experiences of others (echtes Fremdverstehen).296 The Viennese
sociologist claims that when the ego sees the alter ego making a certain bodily
movement - it sees it "crying" - and immediately understands its experiences - "it is sad"
- it is not understanding the other authentically, but interpreting its own perceptions of
the foreign body. That is, the ego projects a phenomenon of the external world, the body
movements of the other, under one of its acquired interpretive schemes, giving it a
name.
Lauren Wispé297 points out that the phenomenological analyzes on empathy and
composed by the tripod of intellectuals formed by Alfred Schutz, Max Scheler and
especially Edith Stein, because even with an emphasis on solipsism is intimate relation
between consciousness and apprehension of knowledge, phenomenological analysis
raised the basic psychosocial question of how a person knows the mental life of another
person, as we can see from Steinman's own writing about how he decided to study this
phenomenon.
At that time, when so many human questions affected me and affected

me in my interior, I nevertheless gathered all my strength to carry out
my work, which weighed on me tremendously for more than two
years. When in Weisskirchen I looked through the thick pile of notes
and diagrams, I felt intimidated. He still had not forgotten the terrible
winter of 1913-1914. Now I have decidedly set aside all that came
from the books and started from the beginning: an investigation of the
problem of "empathy" according to the phenomenological method.
(...) For now I could ask the question and find ways to give body. and
294
SCHUTZ, Alfred. Husserl’s Importantance for the social sciences. in Collected Papers: I. The
problem of social reality. La Haya, Martinus Nihoff, 1967,p.140.
295
Littlefield Publishers, 2006, ,p.134
296
SCHUTZ, Alfred. Husserl’s Importantance for the social sciences. in Collected Papers: I. The
problem of social reality. La Haya, Martinus Nihoff, 1967,p.36.
297
WISPÉ, Lauren. The Psychology of Sympathy, Plenum Press ed Springer,1991.p.61.
97
as soon as one thing became clear, new questions were posed on
different sides. (Husserl used to call this "new horizons"). 298
3.2. Edith Stein and the Empathy from the world-of-life (LebensWelt)
Faced with the new perspective of approaches to human sciences presented

earlier, Husserl's tradition of phenomenology has reintroduced the notion, the way in
which a person understands another person, or engages with other people, has generally
been treated under the general title of Empathy (Einfühlung) term that originated in the
German philosophical aesthetics and psychology of the nineteenth century. 299
Starting from the new horizons pointed out by Edmund Husserl300, this is to go to
the essence of the phenomena that are studies, not only evidencing a reduction of the
physical or psychophysical world but rather through the scales that is how a
phenomenon is in consciousness and the realization of this phenomenon in the world of
experience, it is also necessary to describe the practical dimension of phenomena but
not forgetting to maintain the original character of this phenomenon.
In her thesis on 'the problem of empathy in her historical development

and from a phenomenological perspective', Miss E. Stein presents, in
the first place (part I) in an erudite form, the history of the problem of
empathy, from pioneering studies of Herder's treatment to the present.
However, the major merit is mainly focused on the systematic essays
of Part II to IV, about a phenomenology of empathy and its
application to clarify the phenomenological origin of ideas; body,
soul, individual, spiritual personality, social community and
community structure. 301
We can see from Edmund Husserl's evaluation in 1916 302, that Edith Stein's
trajectory for understanding the empathy phenomenon was based on a historical
analysis of this phenomenon, in which she would leave through the perception of
historical ballast where she sought to analyze that the phenomenon of empathy for
itself, in its generic identity, how to feel the other, would start from the perception that
298
vol.1, Ed., 2002., p.455.
299
STUEBER, Karsten. Rediscovering empathy: Agency, folk psychology, and the human
sciences.Cambridge: MIT Press.2006,p. 5.
300
fenomenológica.Aparecida: Ideias & Letras, 2006., p. 27.
301
STEIN, Edith. Il problema dell’Empatia.Trad. de Elio Costatini e de Erika SchulzeCosgtantini.
Edizioni Studium – Roma, 2003.,p. 29.
302
98
in the experience that originated and gives feeling to the acts and perceptions in which
the subjects are inserted.
In analyzing the work of ideas for a pure phenomenology and for a

phenomenological philosophy, Edith Stein that every process of knowledge and an
intellectual act that would start from a sense called by Husserl of intuition, which would
manifest in the language of the world of life, "From the meaning of the word sharply
distinguishes the various meanings that correspond to this word in its normal use and
being put in evidence of a certain signification, advances progressively to a reality
itself."303
I can question the existence of the thing that I see before me, while
there is a possibility of deception: For this I must put off the "being in
existence" (Existenzsetzung) and I will not be allowed to do so; this
thing that I can not put off circuit, which is beyond doubt, is my lived
experience of the thing (its affirmation in perception or recall or in any
other way) along with its correlate, that is, the "Phenomenon of the
thing" in its fullness.304
For Edith Stein when we take the first contact with a phenomenon this is by the
perception and when we become aware of this phenomenon, the scientist must have
consideration because it can present the possibility of deception even when I observe
some phenomenon I can apprehend a dream or a hallucination, then to analyze the
phenomena, not only as a particular phenomenon this is of existence
(Existenzsetzung)305, but inserted in the world of experiences is that of historicity..
My experience can not be put off circuit. One can doubt the Self, this
empirical Self, which is given a name, a social position and which
results in particular qualities, truly exists. All my past can be a dream
and its memories a mistake, by which it can be moved out of circuit
and only remains as a phenomenon the Object of my consideration.
But "I", the Subject of the experience, consider the world and my
person as phenomena, "I" am in the experience and only in this I
remain, by which it is not possible that we are excluded or doubted,
experience. 306
303
304
305
STEIN, Edith. Introduzione alla Filosofia. Traduzido do Alemão por Anna Maria Pezzella.
CittàNuova, Roma,2001,, 2003.,p. 45.
306
EdizioniStudium – Roma, 2003.,p. 69.
99
Like Francesco Alfieri; points out that after the epoché of a certain phenomenon
this is The world as a phenomenon, and the self, that is, the subject of the experience,
Edith Stein seeking to show the dynamics from which the phenomenon present in the
world of life and the relation of orientation from the consciousness of how to act in the
face of this phenomenon, through the phenomenon of knowledge by Empathy
(Einfühlun), thus allowing "the intropathic experience, through a continuous experience
of the other, allows the individual to be perceived in its dual constitutive aspect: as a
body itself / experienced (Leib) and as a personality "307
As Thomas Szanto and Dermot Moran point out, since his early work on
empathy, Edith Stein prefigured these two "social turnings" an inner conception, that is
intersubjective and external this is the discussions of empathy and collective
intentionality, Stein developed an account of a third form of social relation above or
beyond - or better intermediary between - empathy and collective intentionality, that is,
sociocommunicantes or social acts.
For Edith Stein empathy is an act of pure consciousness, which allows human
beings to understand the acts of consciousness of others, that is, the sphere starting from
the individual sphere intersubjective experiences as the wider sphere that is approaching
the community dimension this is the ability to perceive the experience of others,
therefore seeking a more comprehensive approach as André Bejas stated:
Located on the frontier between philosophy and empirical psychology,

Stein's study takes account of all the relevant literature known in his
time, but together, using with great insight, the phenomenological
method derived from his master. Husserl, obtaining brilliant results
and original perspectives, and opens new perspectives to study the
theme of empathy.308
As occurs the process of apprehension of knowledge and formation of the

person, starting from Edmund Husserl for which knowledge was a form of intentionality
that would enable epoché (suspension of the world of life) and understood as a
phenomenon of existence, that is, not there is the separation between object and world
of life, or only understood by consciousness as a psychic phenomenon.
307
ALFIERI, Francesco.Pessoa humana e singularidade em Edith Stein: uma nova fundação da
antropologia filosófica.Organização e tradução de Clio Tricarico; prefácio de Juvenal Savian Filho. – 1.
ed. – São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2014.,p.69.
308
BEJAS, Andrés.“Introdución,tradución y notas”In: STEIN, Edith..La pasión por laverdad:
Introducción, traducción notas deldoctor Andrés Bejas. Buenos Aires; Bonun, 2003.,p. 12.
100
The phenomena are not a representation of the real in the world of life, but rather
experienced, as described by Ursula Rosa da Silva, "consciousness is like a bundle of
intentional lived experiences and never a reservoir, because the object does not enter
consciousness."309,this is not only a process of apprehension of knowledge by the
consciousness of the US (noema) but rather the intentional perception of the
phenomenon experienced.
The human personality observed as a whole, presents itself to us as a

unit of qualitative characteristics formed by a nucleus, by a formative
principle. It is composed by the soul, the body and the spirit, but the
individuality manifests itself in a pure way, devoid of any mixture,
only in the soul. Neither the material living body nor the perceived
psyche as the substantial unity of each psychic-spiritual sentient being,
and the life of the individual, are determined integrally by the
nucleus.310
As we can see for Edith Stein, the human being is constituted of body soul and
spirit of this his thesis in 1916, according to Michela Summa 311, Stein understood that
the empathy (Einfühlung) while living was experienced from these multiple layers, that
is the empathy and the medium from which the subject (Self) manifests itself in the
world and in relation to the Other (I strange), in the first chapter called the Essence of
the Act of Empathy, this dynamic in which the subject as a psychophysical individual
different from a physical object, to which it is necessary to attribute a body, not so much
as a physical body, but as a phenomenon called a self-body (Leib, living body, animate
body). According to Edith, this very body is:
Endowed with sensibility, as a body that belongs to an I capable of

having sensations, of thinking, of feeling and of wanting, finally, as a
body that is not only part of my phenomenal world, but is the center of
orientation of a similar phenomenal world, of which I am, and with
which I am in reciprocal exchange. 312
Michela Summa points out that the phenomenological understanding of empathy

proposed by Edith Stein would start from the understanding of the other not only as a
309
SILVA, Úrsula Rosa da. 1996. O Conceito de corpo-proprio em Edith Stein e em Merleau-Ponty,
2014,p.2
310
STEIN, Edith, Psicologia e scienze dello spirito. Contributi per una fondazione filosofica. Roma: Città
Nuova, 1996. Roma: El Carmen,Ed., 1996, p.255
311
312
STEIN, Edith, Il Problema Dell´Empatia, Halle: Stamperia dell´Orfanotrofio,Ed., 1917, p.70
101
reality given as presented by David Zahavi313, but as the possibility of apprehending and
understanding what the other is feeling or thinking of an occasion questions about our
ability to be. touched from the expressions of feelings of the other, to the ability to
understand the significance of episodic experiences within the context of the life story
of the other..
This leaves us quite clear as to how we should understand more basic

ways of experiencing others, or how we can first become aware of
others as centers of experience different from ourselves. According to
Stein's definition, empathy plays a key role in mutual understanding
and intersubjective recognition. His work highlights precisely, first,
the essential and basic structures of our experience of others;
Subsequently, it proceeds to explain higher levels of complexity in
empathic experience.314
The dynamics of the relation to the perception of the other and the constitution
of the Self this is the constitution of intersubjectivity through empathy (Einfühlung),
resuming the conception of Max Scheler explained that the Self and the Other (I
strange), but how they are perceived in the same way before the "undifferentiated flow
of lived experience"315 but Stein criticizes Max Scheler's conception that the inner
perception would be differentiated by the perception of reflection, for for Edith Stein the
reflection always and actualized by the experience lived in the present, this is, when we
are experiencing an experience before an Other "strange subject," our consciousness
seeks to grasp the act of will of this other, thus enabling an empathic understanding or
act, but this attitude would depart from "my will" before the other, being so fundamental
I have the awareness of my own body:
The possibility of sensory empathy (...) is guaranteed by the

apprehension of my own body as body and my body as its own body,
thanks to the fusion of external perception with the perception of the
body itself; is still guaranteed by the possibility that this body has to
assume diverse positions in the space; and finally is guaranteed by the
possibility of changing in the fantasy the real characteristic of the
body.316
313
ZAHAVI, Dan. Empathy and other directed intentionality. Topoi. An International Review of
Philosophy 33,2014,p.130.
314
Investigations. Dordrecht: Springer 2017,p. 89.
315
EdizioniStudium – Roma, 1997.,p.104.
316
EdizioniStudium – Roma, 1997.,p.150.
102
For Edith Stein, the primeval in the phenomenology experience of empathy
(Einfühlung) and the total understanding that orientation has zero point of orientation
my own body this is the basic reference, from my corporeity I can approach or move
away from objects which makes up the world of life in which I am inserted, but also the
corporeality itself becomes the maximum extension of my Self understood here as the
layer of the body itself, as the author states:
The distance from the parts of my own body relative to me is

completely incomparable with the distance from the physical body of
others. The body as a whole is situated at a zero point of orientation,
whereas on the contrary all bodies are situated outside this point (...).
My own body is constituted in a double way-as a sentient body
perceived bodily and as a physical body of the external world
perceived externally-in this double mode of giving itself is
experienced as the same body, occupies a post in outer space and fills
a part of this space.317
This perception allows us to understand that at the zero point of orientation and
coming from corporeity, since all distance in the world of life is intimately linked to this
phenomenon, that is, we perceive that we are inserted in the world of life through our
corporeality318 this contact allows us to feel the instincts before the environment and we
learn that when we approach a flame of fire, I feel the heat and I move away, at the
same time when I present before a foreign body a music that I like for example that
awakens me feelings or approach is to feel that it is pleasant, and this perception is
reflected from the language in the world in which we are inserted.
An illustration of movement, of perception by the empathic movement
(Einfühlung), and the work done by the American historian and sociologist Richard
Sennett, Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization,319 where he set
out to rethink the history of urban organizations through bodily experience, analyzing
the relationship of sociability in the figures of William Hogarth in 1751 to his time in
1994 when his first publication occurred.
Obviously, the relationships between human bodies in space are what
determine their mutual reactions, how they are seen and heard, how
they touch or distance themselves. For example, the place where we
watched the war movie influenced the passive reaction of people to
the mechanical hand of my friend. We were in a downtown shopptng
317
318
319
SENNETT, Richard. Carne e Pedra: O Corpo e a cidade na civilização ocidental – tradução de
Marcos y ed. Aarão Reis. - 3" ed. - Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2003. p.18.
103
on the outskirts, north of New York. There is nothing special about
that set of more or less thirty shops, a few cinemas, surrounded by
large parking areas, built a generation ago, in the recent process of
urban transformation that has drawn the population from densely
populated centers to smaller, amorphous: housing complexes,
shopping malls, commercial buildings and industrial facilities. If a
suburban cinema is a place conducive to the enjoyment of violence in
the comfort of air conditioning, the geographic transfer of people into
fragmented spaces produces a much more devastating effect,
weakening the senses and making the body even more passive. 320
Another more intrinsic and fundamental point for the perception of the body and
its action as a zero point of orientation and that we can perceive our own corporeity,
when we touch our body we can feel it as a constituent of them, independent of any
spatiality or geographic location, I can go to a movie theater in the north of New York
as Richard Sennett did, but this space does not limit the author's singularity, as Edith
Stein tries to demonstrate, I perceive things and I also perceive, however, there is a
relationship between sensations and perception of the body itself.
In describing the behavioral relationship of William Hogarth's figures dating
from 1751, with his experience of sociability, the historian starts from an initial
perception of his own body that is, the author observes the images and through this
apprehension the subject I seeks relates it to experiences. This is the pattern of
comparisons of other peoples as in the villages of southern Italy and I am aware that it is
strange to my own body and its empathic relationship (Einfühlung), with the society in
which it is inserted.
Two engravings of William Hogarth, dated 1751, Beer Street and Gin
Lane, seem strange to our eyes. In them, the author intended to
represent images of order and disorder of the London of his time. On
Beer Street, in a group of people sitting, drinking beer, the men
embrace the women. For Hogarth, bodies touching themselves are a
sign of social connection, harmony. Something similar occurs now in
villages in southern Italy, where people talk, holding hands and
forearms of their interlocutors. Gin Lane's leading figures, on the other
hand, are turned to each other, drunk with gin, without noticing each
other or the steps, benches, and buildings around them. The lack of
physical contact expresses Hogarth's view of disorder in urban space.
An artistic conception far removed from the one that the architects of
the closed communities stimulate in their clients who are afraid of the
crowd. Nowadays, order means just a lack of contact.321
320
SENNETT, Richard. Carne e Pedra: O Corpo e a cidade na civilização ocidental – tradução de Marcos
y ed. Aarão Reis. - 3" ed. - Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2003.,p.19.
321
104
This pursuit of contact Edith Stein has a complementary perception presented by
Richard Sennett, because for the phenomenology the phenomenon of empathy
(Einfühlung), that is, the whole experience of experiencing a phenomenon is an
empathic phenomenon that must be observed in its multiple layers to be unveiled and
which have innumerable constitutions of sense from the experience of a phenomenon as
Stein points out in the footnote in his thesis on empathy: "The data of the various
'senses' are not located in the same way and consequently do not contribute in the same
way to the constitution of the body itself ” 322
. How can we perceive, for example, when
we play on a table:
If the tip of my finger touches the table, I have to make some
distinctions: first, the tactile sensation, that is, the tactile data not later
analysable; second, the hardness of the table and the correlative act of
external perception; thirdly, the tip of the finger that touches the
correlative act of "perception of the body itself". That which is
intimately close to the link between sensation and perception of the
body itself is in the fact that the body itself is given as sentient and
sensations are given on the body itself.323
In the empathic movement (Einfühlung), described by Richard Sennett, to

observe the figures of William Hogarth and to constitute an experience from it the
apprehension of the own body proposed by Edith Stein, the relation between when I am
constituted my perception of own body while I perceive the world in which I am
inserted through the sensations, this is the strangeness of the author, that is, in each
lived experience or empathic contact (Einfühlung), I pass through a set of sensations
and perceptions even temporal, approaching the proposal of Richard Sennett, for whom
"before whom the studied body belongs. "The human body" conceals a kaleidoscope of
times, a division of the sexes and races, occupying a characteristic space in past and
present cities. "324
For Edith Stein the bodily dimension before the world of life, where we are
inserted in a huge set of empathic experiences that can be fused and associated in a great
322
STEIN, Edith. Obras completas, II: Escritos filosóficos (Etapa fenomenológica: 1915 – 1920).
Bajoladirección de Julen Urzika y Francisco Javier Sancho.Traduzido do alemão por Constantino Ruiz
Garrido e José Luiz Caballero Bono. Editora Monte Carmelo,Burgos- Espanha, 2005.,p.941.
323
Garrido e José Luiz Caballero Bono. Editora Monte Carmelo,Burgos- Espanha, 2003.,p.128-129.
324
105
number of senses325, but its essences remain and are unveiled before the representation
or feeling more of the experiences that are experienced, take as an example the painting
The Starry Night, by Vincent Van Gogh, painted in 1889, however this object is a
representation he has characteristics that allow me to feel that it is a night that near me
is a tree and a chapel in the distance, because I encounter these characteristics when my
own body observes the scene and awakens my conscience before this new phenomenon
of experiences a essence of experiences that I had to observe the starry sky and this
experience reminds me of other representations lived by me, this is the process of
empathy proposed by Edith Stein..
Through our corporeality we have perfected and extended our knowledge, as
Stein says: "Every step of the way reveals a new piece of the world, or that old man
shows me a new side "326 , the layer of corporeity itself allows us to be aware that we
are immersed in the world of life and before various phenomena we seek to form the
senses and unveil the essences of these phenomena.
This search for the truth passes through the external perception of the own body
that depends on the relation that I have with recognizing the own body of the other, this
is for Stein we establish a relation with "a self capable of having the sensation, of
thinking, of feeling , of wanting, of acting, as a body that is not only part of my
phenomenal world, but is itself the center of orientation of a similar phenomenal world
... with which I am in a reciprocal exchange. "327
Empatizing, I put myself in the other's point of view, it reveals to me a

"zero point of orientation", while from here my zero point, it seems
like a point in space like the others, and my physical body as a thing
spatial as the others, perceivable to all and without connection with
the subject who perceives it and its position regarding it can vary to
taste.328
But this relation with the other from which I perceive my point "Zero of
orientation" is not a relation of inquilinismo, that is, in which a subject totally deponent
325
326
327
EdizioniStudium – Roma, 2001,p. 217.
328
EdizioniStudium – Roma, 2001,p.70
106
of the other to constitute itself, but an experience in which we would seek to know the
world in which we are inserted and to know the other, this is to perceive it and to
constitute an empathic experience with this subject, therefore for Edith Stein, the
process of corporeity, can not be confused with another means of orientation or even
objectified:
A body, considered only as such, can no longer be conceived as a
"principle of order" of other Objects. On the other hand, the
statements of the other subjects about their phenomenal world are
always incomprehensible [...], if not for the possibility of empathy, to
transfer to this orientation.329
In the dynamic in which the subject is constituted from the corporeal dimension
in which it is the Zero point of orientation, the individual experiences his own set of
experiences thus constituting his own phenomenal world, this is beyond a simple
material component and mechanic but with a psychophysical capacity, that is as much
as two subjects can share similar experiences of others, have different capacities of
interpretation and levels of unveiling. 330
In such a way, one's own body is given with its organs as furniture.
Free mobility is strictly linked to the other constituent elements of the
individual. We must therefore conceive of this very body by
empathizing in this living movement and no longer conceiving of the
proper movement of a physical body as the living movement. 331
Therefore we can understand that the empathic movement is closely linked, the
perception of the subject in the world, that is, as the phenomenon of empathy
(Einfühlung), and constituted in its different levels of apprehension, that in the
philosophical tradition, are elements that constitute meaning and sense in the analysis of
this phenomenon, therefore Edith Stein sought in her dissertation to present the factors
of external perception and internal perception..
When I touch myself, I have a double tactile feeling: when my hand
touches my arm, both the hand and the arm reciprocally have an active
and at the same time passive sensation; It's not the same thing I feel
when I play a book. This is a trivial example only to elucidate what
we could distinguish here as inner and outer perceptions, though our
perception does not act in an inside and an outside. In this way, it is
329
Edizioni Studium – Roma, 2001,p.159.
330
331
107
easy to admit that each of us can only have sensory perceptions, but
they extend to all dimensions of psychic affections. 332
In her work On the Problem of Empathy in the chapter Description of empathy

in comparison with other acts, where Edith Stein sought to reflect on the external
perception of the empathic phenomenon, this category of perception becomes
fundamental because it allows the differentiation between psychophysical individual
that is the one that has the ability to think, suffer, desire, therefore and recognized by me
as another and is not simply incorporated into the phenomenal world studied by the
scientist.333
Starting from Michela Summa's proposed understanding, from which the
concept of empathy for Edith Stein presents a sophistication by presenting basic layers
of understanding334, we will seek that Edith Stein proposes an original perception for the
external perspective, that is, even demonstrating that before psychic-spiritual
experiences, it is not possible to grasp its meaning by an "external perception" and even
psychophysical experiences can not be detailed in their genuineness based on external
perception.335 It compiles fundamental part of the analysis of the empathic phenomenon
(Einfühlung).
Seeking to present in a didactic way, as occurs the empathic phenomenon

(Einfühlung), Edith Stein presents the case of a subject who lost a loved one, and his
pain is perceived, through his features because his face is pale and frightened, his voice
hoarse and depressed, may also express her pain with words. All of these are, of course,
research topics, but that does not matter to me here. What I want to know is this, what
the perception itself is, not by what path I come to it.
It is clear that an external perception of pain is not possible, whereas

external perception is a characteristic of acts, in which the cosmic
space-time being and its happening happens in flesh and blood. Such
events are here before me, turning to me now on one side, now on the
other; the side that, in the meantime, is facing me, is in flesh and
332
ed. – São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2014.,p.64-65.
333
STEIN, Edith. Sobre el problema de la empatía .Madri ed:editorial Trotta, 2004.,p.80.
334
335
STEIN, Edith. Sobre el problema de la empatía .Madri ed:editorial Trotta, 2004.,p.83.
108
blood in a specific sense, or in an original way in relation to the
coparticipant sides that are not directed towards me. 336
Starting from external perception, it is my own body to look at the Other (I am

strange) and I perceive in my consciousness that this is not only an object, but a
Psychophysical individual and I recognize in him physical traits, which composes my
experience, but only with himself to reach this layer in the movement of empathic
phenomenon because different from how presented by Max Scheler in the
"undifferentiated flow of lived experience," this is a reflection of an experience I
experienced previously, Edith Stein points out that we can not get to the essence of this
experience , because that experience has similarities to those experienced by me in the
past because they belong to the present and carry with them a progressive perception of
an individual who has a different trajectory from mine. "I can consider each side that I
want in principle, but I do not reach an orientation 'in which before that expression, it is
given to me in the same pain." 337
In self-perception, the corporeal perception prevails, which is realized
as the apprehension of the living body, while in the experience of the
other, external perception prevails. Therefore, it is clear that, first of
all, the processes of development come from the acts that only the
experience of the other gives us reason to search ... the particularity
that corresponds to that own living body. 338
The dynamics of the external perception of the empathic movement (Einfühlung)

presents for phenomenological reflection a luminous path not the total reflection of the
essence of my friend's pain, but rather the external perception of this other subject and
an opening for possibilities in apprehending the original phenomenon is mainly to
present this phenomenon by recognizing the subject as a psychophysical individual,
who shares an experience with me.
Within the same empathy, there are differences in production
(correspondingly the differences of experiences), consistent in the
degree of "luminosity" and correspondingly of clarity and
intelligibility in reflective observation, possible in empathy as in each
presentiment. And anything that in empathy does not seem to be
possible can present itself as impossible in a more clear-cut. The
clearer empathy, however, assures only the possibility of a
336
337
Edizioni
Studium – Roma, 2003,p.72.
338
CittàNuova, Roma, – Roma, 2001,p.204.
109
corresponding original vital process and without the confirmation of
external perception has no value of experience. 339
In front of the field of experiences in perception the perception of the outer layer
that is of the own body presents as a sense of originality the possibility of a new
experience through the opening of the empathic movement, because it is not only the
physical traits that give meaning to the feeling of a person, that is, a person may be
going through an extremely delicate situation and not demonstrating in his sensitive
appearance the moment he lives, and only through his complete explanation can we
empathically perceive his pain, capturing the meaning of his experience both the aspect
of external and internal perception.
Empathy does not have the character of external perception, though it

has any analogy with it, in the sense that its object is revealed here and
now. We thus know that external perception is a biddable originating
act. However, admitting that empathy is not an external perception, it
can not yet be said that it lacks the character of originality. 340
As Ricardo Gibu points out, the luminosity character present in the outer
perception layer, recognizing the other not as an object but as a living body (Leib), this
recognition that reveals that external perception is in constant relation with the inner
perception, and not only as a representation of physical traits but an opening for the
sharing of experiences and from it the presentification of the empathic movement.
In fact, the other presents itself not as a thing between things, but as a
living body (Leib). Now, what is proper of this donation? Certainly,
its most proper attribute is not related to the movements perceived by
external perception, but rather to a tension expressed from the inside
to the outside, captured more properly by an inner perception. The
apprehension of the living body not only presents itself in the scheme
that links me to a reality in 'flesh and blood', but to a scheme that has
revealed the nature of a subject that synthesizes the different parts and
acts of the physical body in an experience unitary. 341
As Ricardo Gibu has shown, the empathic movement of external perception can
only be understood from its relation of tension between the multiple layers that compose
this act of apprehension of the living body (Leib), also party of this understanding
339
340
341
GIBU, Ricardo. La empatía como problema de consituición em la obra filosófica de Edith SteinLa
lamapara de Diógenes, enero-junio, juliodiciembre,año / vol. 5, numero 008 e 009,Benemérita
Universitad Autónoma de Puebla –Puebla México, 2004, p., 2004,p.53.
110
Michela Summa342, points out that Edith Stein does not is only interested in
distinguishing psychophysical and bodily empathy from spiritual empathy, but rather
compose the distinction of the constitutive moments of empathy that characterize three
distinct levels, the first as described by Dan Zahavi 343, through the perception of the
body or living body (Leib) , we have the tendencies to explain what the other is
experiencing, and this leads us to turn to the intentional object of the experience of the
other.
The first moment is the emergence of experience. Here we have a

perceptual intuition and still vague about the experience of the other.
This is based on the passive synthesis of representation. The second
moment is that of satisfactory explication, based on a change in the
empathetic's focus: as empathy, we follow the tendencies to explain
what the other is experiencing, and this leads us to turn to the
intentional object of the experience of the other. Given what we have
said above, such a satisfactory explanation does not have the character
of a complete appropriation of the experience of the other, but
remains, in principle, realization in the mode of presentiment. The
third moment is that of recapitulative objectification. Here, the
purpose of my intention is again the experience of the other. However,
having been explained through the presentiment of the intentional
object of experience, this moment of empathy produces a deeper
understanding. These three moments are to be found in
psychophysical and personal empathy. 344
3.3. Edith Stein and the inner perception History
As Angela Alles Belo describes, the theme of being human in its entirety becomes the
central concern of the Steiniana analysis, that is, the main interest of the author's approach and
understanding the human being, both in relation to their singularity, and in relation to the
productions cultural, as evidenced by the choice of subjects in the university years from which it
sought to dig into the interiority of the human being 345, at the same time, to examine external
manifestations, is the task which the thinker considers more urgent to understand its unique,
unique and unrepeatable nature and, at the same time, the meaning of its expressions and
productions, which has an intersubjective value.
342
Investigations. Dordrecht: Springer 2017,p.15.
343
ZAHAVI, Dan. Empathy and other directed intentionality. Topoi. An International Review of
Philosophy 33 (1):129-142.2014,p.15.
344
345
BELLO, Angela Alles. A Questão do Sujeito Humano : Edmund Husserl e Edith Stein. Tradução–
Aparecida Turolo Garcia (Irmã Jacinta)In: Anais IV Seminário Internacional de Pesquisa e Estudos
Qualitativos.2010,p.4
111
The human personality observed as a whole, presents itself to us as a
unit of qualitative characteristics formed by a nucleus, by a formative
principle. It is composed by the soul, the body and the spirit, but the
individuality manifests itself in a pure way, devoid of any mixture,
only in the soul. Neither the material living body nor the perceived
psyche as the substantial unity of each psychic-spiritual sentient being,
and the life of the individual, are determined integrally by the
nucleus.346
In order to unveil the layers of the lived experience, in his thesis Edith Stein
describes that when initiating a reflection one must grasp the phenomenon that we are
observing, putting in brackets every interpretation already given and also every form of
being that could be placed in doubt, to give rise to the lived experience of the thing
itself with its correspondent, that is, the phenomenon of the thing itself.
Edith Stein intends to enter into the dimension in the ethics-noematic, this is to
show the relation of the dimension of the experience and its unfolding as object,
carrying to understand the phenomenon of empathy in its totality is to excavate the
inner world, that is, the perception of the phenomenon of empathy, how the relation to
the conscious being is given by being understood not only as an object or act of
reflection but rather as "an inner light that illuminates the flow of living, and in the very
outflow, clarifies it for the I live, without it being "straightforward."347
During the process of empathy as affirmed by Edith Stein, not everything that is
experienced can be illuminated by external perception, which allows us to contemplate
only the surfaces of what we are experiencing, then it becomes fundamental for an
analysis of this process to consider the motivations and spontaneities that are presented
in the empathic relation, with the data of internal motivations, as Stein says:
First and foremost of the living being, we can empathize its external
appearance correlative to its "vital state," as full of might or tired,
health or illness, youth, maturity or serenity (here in theory excluding
the spiritual side of these vital states). As in the empathy of the
movement, here too the position of the inner condition can attain its
character of certainty from the perception of the external appearance
346
STEIN, Edith, Psicologia e scienze dello spirito. Contributi per una fondazione filosofica. Roma: Città
Nuova, 1996. Roma: El Carmen,Ed., 1996, p.255
347
STEIN, Edith, Introduzione alla Filosofia. Traduzido do Alemão por Anna Maria Pezzella.
CittàNuova, Roma,2001, p.131
112
which it motivates. And again the content of empathy in no way needs
to match at all with the vital conditions to be identified. 348
The internal perception, as Ricardo Gibu 349 points out, allows us to understand
that during the phenomenon of empathy Edith Stein allows the distinction of the other
not only as an object to be analyzed but also as a living body (Leib), this perception
occurs not only through perception external, but also the tension between externally
perceived phenomena, but also the set of experiences learned by the conscience and
manifested in the internal perspective, as Francesco Alfieri states.
Edith gave us the possibility to understand that our uniqueness can not
be touched by anyone; even in the most adverse situations, we can
always be ourselves. If we allow ourselves to be influenced by the
external environment, by virtue of our social condition or for any
other reason, and if we have seen to fade away, the responsibility for
this decline is not entirely on the side of what is outside us (the State,
Society, politics); we are also responsible, because we can give in to
the external attacks, disconnecting us from our inner foundation. We
let our self-consciousness become dull.350
As Timothy A. Burns asserts, Edith Stein's objective in analyzing the empathic

experience (Einfühlung) is to understand the consciousness that belongs to a self that is
not the self-emancipating self, since among the experiences that a conscious subject has,
experiences of other subjects, their experiences and their conscious lives; the concept of
empathy is intended to describe the intentional structures of these experiences,351 this is
in the empathic process, even starting from an experience of consciousness of the living
body (Leib), this is the external perception, part of the consciousness that is the inner
perception that the other exists, and thus seek the experience of others.
The inner perception allows us to aim at the essence of the experience of others,
because not everything a person is experiencing can be perceived only by external
perception as the physical aspects, but also we must apprehend the phenomenon in its
348
CittàNuova, Roma,2001, p.203
349
GIBU, Ricardo. La empatía como problema de consituición em la obra filosófica de Edith SteinLa
lamapara de Diógenes, enero-junio, juliodiciembre,año / vol. 5, numero 008 e 009,Benemérita
Universitad Autónoma de Puebla –Puebla México, 2004, p., 2004,p.53.
350
ed. – São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2014.,p.74.
351
BURNS, Timothy. Empathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological case Against
Simulation -Theory, 2017.,p.211.
113
totality also considering the internal motivations as feelings that must be captured in the
empathic process.
Starting from the confrontation with the theory of empathy proposed by Max
Scheler in his dissertation On the Problem of Empathy, Edith Stein sought to
demonstrate that in the process of internal perception, different from Scheler's point that
"the alien I in his experience is perceived as equally as his own" 352, in the empathic
process he would not perceive the feeling of the other, but in every experience we
should ask ourselves whether what I am feeling is an experience of its own, or of the
other.
What does "own" and "alien" mean in the context in which Scheler
uses it? If you take your discourse of the undifferentiated flow of
experiences seriously, it is not possible to understand how to achieve a
differentiation within it. However, this same flow of experience is an
unfeasible idea, since each experience is an experience of an I, and
each experience from a phenomenal point of view is in absolute mode
inseparable from this self. "Own" and "alien" mean belonging to
different individuals, that is to say to different qualitatively formed
substantial psychic subjects. Such individuals, in their experiences,
must be accessible in the inner perception. I do not feel my feelings,
but the feelings of others, this means that the feelings of the other
person are infused in my individual. 353
According to Timothy A. Burns, for Edith Stein the phenomenon of empathy has
a unique intentional structure, this is an original experience with non-original content,
with the main objective and the perception of a foreign experience, starting from
external observation, observe physical data , and I realize that the other is in pain, I do
not fully understand what he is experiencing, but I share with him this pain and share a
primordial experience. However, I feel the pain like his, but not like him. The content of
the empathic experience is originally given as belonging to another subject. 354
For Edith Stein to each contact I have with the other, I experience an original
experience, that is, the Self, feels individually, this feeling differs from the
undifferentiated flux of experiences proposed by Max Scheler, because each subject has
a feeling of his own, which he does is updated in the face of the empathic encounter and
352
STEIN, Edith, Il problema dell’Empatia.Trad. de Elio Costatini e de Erika SchulzeCosgtantini.
Edizioni Studium – Roma, 2003.p.104
353
Edizioni Studium – Roma, 2003.p.105
354
114
the experience of a new phenomenon355, and the set of previous experiences can guide
the subject before an unprecedented experience, but each experience is unique.
The inner perception is unique in each experience, in which the subject is

inserted, so the process of empathy is intimately linked to the environment and culture
in which the contact of the subject I with the world of life is inserted, Edith Stein
exemplifies that when a young lady volunteers in the army, as the author herself did, she
could believe that she was acting out of pure love for her country356, but in reflecting on
this decision I understand that I am led to perform this act by the influence derived from
the taste for adventure or because I am dissatisfied with the situation in which I am, that
is, I am guided by an inner perception in the face of an experience of others.
If in my environment I am forced to nourish a feeling of hatred and

contempt against those belonging to a particular race or party ... then
this hatred is genuine and sincere, only that it builds on an empathized
valuation, instead of an originating value [...]. I'm not mistaken when I
catch my hatred. The mistakes I can make here are mistakes of value
(while I think I grasp a lack of value that does not exist at all), on the
other hand, a mistake about my person, when I imagine myself to
nurture those feelings on the foundation of my own conviction and I
take by "opinion capacity" my partiality in transmitted pre-
judgments.357
Therefore in the process of empathy proposed by Edith Stein, in this dynamic we

can be led to a mistake in relation to the valuation of the empathic object, as Edith Stein
herself perceived and suffered the consequences of the rise of the German totalitarian
regime is the hatred of her people, and the very extermination and creation of
concentration camps in Germany.
The phenomenon of empathy has for Edith Stein, a formation in multiple layers
that is a dynamic in which through external perception, apprehending the facial features,
I hear it, I convert and from this first perception I become aware of the experience of the
other and in the second layer we seek from our experiences orient and have an
assimilation on the other subject that is before me and I try to show the experience of
355
Edizioni Studium – Roma, 2003.p.106.
356
357
115
this phenomenon, therefore to perceive the other as the experience of others, as Stein
states:
As the individual himself expresses himself in his own experiences, so

in the empathized experiences the individual is manifested. However,
let us also see this difference: in one case the giving of the constituent
experiences is originating, in the other it is non-originating. If a living
feeling as the feeling of another, this comes to me from the side as
originating as if it were mine, on the other hand as non-originating,
through empathy obviously, as an originally alien feeling. And it is
proper to not originate the empathized experiences that induce me to
refute the common title of "internal perception", to indicate the
apprehension of own and others' experiences. 358
The main differentiation that Edith Stein seeks to refute the concept of inner
perception as a whole, but rather to understand it as a phenomenon of apprehension of
the experiences of others, therefore the phenomenon of empathy and original is singular
because, as Edmund Husserl asserted, the person does not has access to the physical
thing, this is non-originating experiences359,Husserl classified them into four types:
memory, expectation, fantasy and empathy, to exemplify will analyze the phenomenon
of memory.
The object of memory is not present in the same way as the object of
external perception. The object of memory is present, but not in an
original way; is there as remembered as having been previously. It can
be remembered as having originally been present; for example, you
may remember seeing a particularly beautiful sunset. The sunset was
"therein" in previous experience, but its presence in memory is
different in the form of its presence in the perceptual experience. 360
The question of the originating and non-originating aspect is of fundamental

importance for the understanding of the phenomenon of empathy for Edith Stein. Just as
memory, the phenomenon of empathy originates in its content, but its apprehension
through consciousness are analyzed as non-originating acts, Edith Stein defines that the
358
359
HUSSERL, Edmund .Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological
philosophy: First book (Engl. Transl. by F. Kersten). Edmund Husserl: Collected Works, 2. Dordrect &
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.1983.p.05.
360
116
phenomenon of originality, which for her are "(...) all our experiences intense gifts as
such ".361
For Edith Stein, empathy is a phenomenon that takes place in the sense that it is
apprehended as an original act, but when it is apprehended by the conscience it becomes
a non-original act, because it tries to apprehend the perception of this experience of
others, for example, when Edith Stein sought to reflect on when a young woman
voluntarily enlisted in the army, sought in her biography an original experience, but in
bringing to memory a meeting between the Self (Edith Stein who was writing her
thesis) and the Other I (Edith Stein who volunteered as a nurse in the First World War)
this is an experience of others, as Edith Stein herself states.
the memory, the hope, the fantasy do not have their object before him,
present in flesh and bone, only is apprehended in the present, and the
character of presentiment is an essential moment immanent of these
acts, not a determination obtained from the objects. 362
Therefore, the non-originality of acts is found in the perception that their

experiences have to be presentied through the experience of others, that is, empathy and
a phenomenon in which we seek to present the experience of the other, we do not live it
as originating, but rather , we can live in a non-original way by an empathetic
presentiment of the experience of others.
It is an act that originates while experienced in the present, while it is

non-originating in its content. And such content is an experience that,
as such, can be implemented in multiple ways, as in the form of
memory, hope, fantasy.363
Thus the process of empathy seeks, as Dan Zahavi364 points out, the empathic
proposal of Edith Stein, plays a fundamental role in mutual understanding and
intersubjective recognition. His work highlights precisely, first, the essential and basic
structures of our experience of others; Subsequently, it proceeds to explain higher levels
of complexity in empathic experience.
361
362
363
364
ZAHAVI, Dan. Self and Other. Exploring Subjectivity Empathy, and Shame.Oxford: Oxford
University Press.,2014.p.102
117
According to Edith Stein, when the subject is in the empathic movement
(Einfühlung) is before another human being, therefore the relation between the subject
who experiences empathy is always original, which acts with the non-originating
experiences of the Other. The content analyzed by the empathic subject is non-
originating, because it is not happening "with him" in flesh and blood, but rather "with
the Other" and only empathy gives the complete perception of his experience. In this
way, empathy is distinguished from other acts of consciousness, as Stein states:
Now, empathy, as a presentiment is an original experience, a present

reality. He who presentites, however, is not a past or future
"impression" but a vital, present, and originating way of another that is
not in a continuous relationship with my living, and I can not be
confused with that, me port into the perceived body as if I were in its
vital center and I make a "almost" impulse of the same type as that
which could cause a movement, perceived almost from the internal,
that could be made to coincide with that perceived externally. 365
Edith Stein proposes that in the phenomenon of empathy the original sense is
realized in the experience of the other, that is, from the experiences a new phenomenon
occurs from an original act in which are present the experiences of both involved in the
process of empathy, that is, what belongs to the inner perception of the other is
originating from it, just as my inner perception and previous experiences belong to me,
but before the empathic process (Einfühlung), I can from the contemplation of the other,
that is, as presents itself to me, its appearance, manner of speaking, of perceiving I
perceive that I share some similarities with it and therefore an immediate act as it
presents Ângela Alles Bello:
The act Einfühlung, Intropatia, means that I feel the existence of

another human being, like me; is, therefore, an apprehension of
immediate resemblance (...). All humans perform the same act when
they encounter other humans. This act is distinguished from
perception, recall, imagination, fantasy, intuition, so it is a sui generis
act.366
For Edith Stein, the character of originality comes from her own experiences
specifically, it is from this contact as they produce meaning during this new experience,
therefore the original reflection present in the empathic phenomenon, we have the
365
CittàNuova, Roma, 2001,.p.200.
366
BELLO, Ângela Ales. Introdução à Fenomenologia. Trad. Ir.Jacinta Turolo Garcia e Miguel Mahfoud.
Bauru, São Paulo: EDUSC, 2006. p.63.
118
essential perception of the other as a living body, that is, during this process I go beyond
an external perception of the other I seek to share an original act, as demonstrated
Natalie Depraz:
In addition to the perceptions, of the common sensations, the empathic

experience presents itself as an interfaith proof, where each one
receives from the other affection that constitute him as such. 367
In the experience (Erlebnis) of the empathic phenomenon, we have the perception

that according to Angela Alles Bello "perception is a door, a form of entrance, a passage
to enter the subject, that is, to understand how the human being is made"368, in this
understanding I live the original act of empathy, for I am at the moment from which the
subject is being empathically affected by the experience of the Other, while in a deeper
layer I experience non-originating acts, for I search in the consciousness of my Self
own, to present this phenomenon from previous experiences present in my
consciousness. The empathy (Einfühlung) is a unique phenomenon, because it has a
double constitution as a phenomenon originating at the moment in which the subjects
experience and non-originating phenomenon, that is, the result by which one arrives at
the end of the analysis of the experience of the Other is non- originating. Here's the
problem, as Stein points out:
For each experience there is the possibility of giving origin, that is to

say, the possibility of existing already as bodily proper for the
reflexive turn of the living I in it. There is also the possibility of a non-
originating way of giving oneself of the own experiences, as in the
memory, the expectation, the fantasy. After these considerations, we
can return to ask: is it possible to attribute empathy to originariness
and in what sense should it be understood? 369
As Thomas Szanto and Dermot Moran asserted, empathy in the Steinian

conception, and a sui generis form of intentional experience of others, that is, empathy
and a genuine experience directed at the perception of the other, but also of the
constitution of self, the phenomenological understanding of empathy as an original
phenomenon in its internal and external double perception is not necessarily a sharing of
367
DEPRAZ, Natalie. Compreender Husserl. Tradução de Fábio dos Santos. 2. ed. – Petrópolis, RJ:
Vozes, 2008,, 2008. p.84.
368
BELLO, Ângela Ales. Introdução à Fenomenologia. Trad. Ir.Jacinta Turolo Garcia e Miguel Mahfoud.
Bauru, São Paulo: EDUSC, 2006. p.63.
369
119
emotions370,that is, purely an affective state, but rather a "basic sensibility and
understanding of others"371
Stein's contribution to the philosophy of sociability is more often

considered confined to the limits of interpersonal relations and in
particular to his singularly detailed analysis of empathy in his famous
dissertation. However, sociability, for Stein, is not exhausted in
dyadic, face-to-face, or interpersonal relationships. Instead, social
reality encompasses a much more complex range of properties and
facts, such as collectives, societies, various institutional entities
(ranging from universities to nation states), and more or less cohesive
communities, typically united by shared values, traditions , rituals. ,
shared habits, collective memories or even collective emotions.
Consequently, empathy is not the only one, in fact it is not enough to
understand all aspects and dimensions of sociability - at least common
forms of interpersonal empathy, if there are others in the first place. 372
3.4. A Modern Concern: The Case of the German State: The Personal State of
Edith Stein
Edith Stein of this September 1919, with the writing of the text Individual and
Community sought to develop the realization of the empathic process inserted in other
people's experience that is, the dimensions of sociability, the following year in October
1920, began to develop A research on the state, as we can see from a letter to his friend
Roman Ingarden on 9 October.
Dear Mr. Ingarden: The mail was reasonably quick to bring me the
letter with the news of the birth of your first child, I was very happy to
know, you will not be a bad parent, you will do well, And of course
there must be somebody in Zakopane, who can photograph all her
family, I would be delighted to receive one of these photos, since I
have little hope of seeing the originals in front of me ... Have I told
you that I started work on the State? I am curious to know what you
will think about my work in the Yearbook. Are you going to like it
better than the dissertation? The truth is that this subject has been of
great interest to me, and I am often sorry that he did not appear in the
bookstores. "Many cordial greetings. Edith Stein. 373
Based on Eduardo Gonzalez di Pierro's understanding, Edith Stein seeks political

action from the Weimar Republic, especially with the party of Social Democrats who
370
ZAHAVI, Dan., Self and other: Exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame. Oxford: Oxford
University Press2015, p.84
371
ZAHAVI, Dan., e ROCHAT, Phillipe. Empathy = sharing: Perspectives from phenomenology and
developmental psychology. Consciousness and Cognition 2015.p.25
372
SZANTO, Thomas.. How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis. Phenomenology and
the Cognitive Sciences, 2014, p.99 .
373
STEIN, Edith. Obras Completas: escritos autobiográficos y cartas. Trad. G.Ezequiel Rojo, OCD, Jesús
García Rojo, OCD, F. F. Sancho Fermín, OCD, Constantino Ruiz-Garrido. Madrid: Monte Carmelo,
2002, p. 708.
120
presented proposals to support the female vote and actively participated 374, for Edith
Stein the dimension of the political act is intimately linked to political reflection
understood as analysis of sociabilities, how we perceive the world, others and the
experience of others is understood in ourselves through internal perception.
As Angela Alles Belo has stated, the central theme of the Steinian work is the
human being and the multiple human associative forms, that is, the intellectual project
of Edith Stein, presents a contiguity of the perception of the relations to its singularity
as well as the human cultural productions, therefore to understand the phenomenon of
empathy for Stein, one must also analyze the manifestation of this phenomenon in the
State, understood as collectivity, that is, the noetic-noematic dimension375, through the
experience as unfolding and complement of the phenomenon of empathy.
With this perspective, of understanding the empathic movement from the

multiple forms of human association that Edith Stein will continue in two months the
writing of his work on A research on the State, as we can perceive in a letter written on
December 6, 1920 , in which Edith Stein demonstrates the importance of this reflection
for which she gave up teaching some disciplines to develop the work in the middle of
her sister's marriage.
Dear Mr. Ingarden: On the day of Saint Nicholas, I receive your letter.
And I hope I'll reply you later this year, I must write to you
immediately. I recently heard from Husserl about the issues relevant
to the Yearbook. (...) again I am busy with various disciplines. But I
got time to develop my work on the state that is well advanced. I sent
parts of the work to Hans Lipps, and he replied that he liked it a lot. I
am also busy with the revision of the volume of Reinach (already
printed more than half), and related, I entered into negotiations with
Niemeyer and the other editors. Finally, in recent months in my house
there was a lot of work and movement, since my favorite sister?
(gynecologist) married on December 5 and needed to prepare many
things. Since he could not find housing, my mother had to enable her
the attic of our house; I had here before your 'study spaces. 376
374
GONZÁLEZ DI PIERRO, Eduardo. Dos Fenomenológas piensan la república:María Zambrano y
Edith Stein. In: Open Insight V.1. 2010 p.76.
375
Pesquisa e Estudos Qualitativos, 2010. p.5.
376
STEIN, Edith, Obras Completas: escritos autobiográficos y cartas. Trad. G.Ezequiel Rojo, OCD, Jesús
2002, p. 709.
121
Thus in months Edith Stein concluded her work A survey of the state, for in June
1921, in Bad-Bergtabem at the house of her friend Hedwig Conrad-Martius, 377 the night
she was famous for her talk to Catholicism where she will read the book of the life of
Santa Tereza de Avila and from the impact of this reading he sought to convert to
Catholicism.
Edith Stein, part of the understanding that objectively the common and
perceptible feature of the state is that this is a form of association, the subjects live in
communities and seek to develop within the organization certain functions for the
maintenance of this corporation, that would be the initial layer, the size of the state, the
empathic movement being understood as a sense of solidarity, as Edith Stein herself
says, "a sense of social solidarity that is insolently strong, a sense of solidarity with all
humanity and also with the community". 378
The multiple dimensions in which human forms can be articulated

phenomenologically, by Edith Stein, can present themselves in four distinct
possibilities: mass, community, society and State. These groupings have as starting
point the analysis of the experiences of the person, identifying the experience (Erlebnis)
considered as properly the phenomenon of human associations, that is the types of
experiences of the individual in relation to the others. Therefore, the way in which the
experiences are shared, welcomed, manipulated, will define a character typical of the
social grouping identified as community, society or mass.
The human grouping called the mass shows that in this association the
individuals do not recognize each other as subjects, they act in a superficiality, being
379
defined as "a connection of individuals that behave with uniformity" , in the mass we
are taken by the psychic level, by a as a reaction to the herd, for example, where they
are driven by desires and impulses Edith Stein, showed that Nazism, like all totalitarian
377
STEIN, Edith, Obras Completas: escritos autobiográficos y cartas. Trad. G.Ezequiel Rojo, OCD, Jesús
2002,, p. 921.
378
STEIN, Edith. Storia di uma famiglia ebrea. Lineamenti autobiografici: l’infanzia e gli anni giovanili,
Tradução. Bárbara Venturi, Città Nuova, Roma, 1992, p. 173.
379
STEIN, Edith. Psicologia e scienze dello spirito: contributi per una fondazione filosófica. Tradução.
Bárbara Venturi, Città Nuova, Roma, 1992, p. 259.
122
forms, was rooted in some psychic aspects of the human being, for example, aggression
and insecurity. 380
By engaging within the empathic movement (Einfühlung), it develops the

superficial layer, that is n mass and founded by the excitability of the individual psyche,
which will manifest itself in different forms of psychic contagion, but in this
relationship the subject does not present a freedom of individual positioning, but rather
has a reactive posture based on the excitability of desires and the reaction to an external
stimulus, so the individual inserted in the mass needs a guide that indicates how to act
and can transmit the dominant ideas, this "psychic contagion"381,allowing a In the
analogy with the contagion of diseases of the body, Edith Stein points out that the
individuals inserted in the mass do not present a free decision but an ideological
proposal, in which the idea that can be presented as good, useful, but, in fact, view,
makes a certain organization follow the interests of those who propose it, forming the
mass: people together without a in a specifically specific way, an "alien project," which
is not revealed as psychical but intellectual; and so it can be good or bad, but, from the
outset, it is already addicted to the question of morality.
The second form of association pointed out by Edith Stein is the community that
is considered as organic structure in which different from the masses, individuals have
an interdependence, that is, the empathic movement (Einfühlung)382 has a deeper layer
in the community individuals possess an interdependence in relation to the emotions
and desires more at the same time are affected by the positioning of each individual, that
is inserted in the community, as affirms Ângela Alles Bello.
in the community has as its main characteristic reciprocity, that is,

each member considers his freedom, just as he needs the freedom of
the other, verify what the joint project is, which may be useful to the
community, but should be useful for each member.383
In the community we are affected and we affect the dynamics from which we
take the position of the people before the others, is denominated by Edith Stein as
380
STEIN, Edith. Una ricerca sullo Stato. 2. ed. Trad. Ângela Ales Bello. Roma:Città Nuova, 1999.p. 142.
381
STEIN, Edith. Una ricerca sullo Stato. 2. ed. Trad. Ângela Ales Bello. Roma:Città Nuova, 1999.p. 142.
382
STEIN, Edith. Psicologia e scienze dello spirito: contributi per una fondazione filosófica. Tradução.
Bárbara Venturi, Città Nuova, Roma, 1992, p. 259.
383
BELLO, Ângela Alles. Introdução à Fenomenologia, tradução : Ir. Jacinta Turolo Garcia e Miguel
Mahfoud. Bauru, SP: EDUSC, 2006.p 73
123
"partner acts" that present a positive position valorization like friendship, loyalty or
negative like anger, prejudice as Edith Stein herself lived, but later in the concentration
camp, in the community occurs the process of construction or degradation of
interpersonal relationships, there is a dynamic of openness and recognition of the other,
that is the empathic process, which is essential for understanding of the educational
process as it points out.
In this relationship of dealing with one another, the child, if such a

relationship should have educational effects, since from the beginning
itself is not only an object, but also a subject that contributes to shape
this educational relationship, if not on an equal footing. Thus, any
external influence affects in a way the formation of the personality of
the boy. There is in this sense an anonymous coeducation through
society, but still throughout the environment. 384
So in the community, according to Edith Stein individuals live from an act of

solidarity that is, a position of openness to the other that is considered as fundamental
ethos for the community, that is, the members of a community share a common
responsibility , in which the position of one is not without effect on the other 385 but
stimulates and develops its own effectiveness: this is community life; therefore, both
members are a totality and without this reciprocal relationship the community is not
possible.
The human association of the community defined by Edith Stein has as main
characteristic therefore the fact that the individuals live "with each other", that is,
different from the mass individuals are not absorbed by the whole acting by instinct or
living momentary this is the the living body (Leib) but rather from its internal
dimension chooses to empathically join (Einfühlung) to this community, thus being
affected by the social acts of the other and sharing life with him.
In this dynamic of the community, the individual is not absorbed in its totality by
the group, but as Angela Alles Bello 386 points out, its particularity and intimately
necessary for the configuration of the personality and the proper character of this
384
SPAEMANN, Robert. Sobre el Ánimo para la Educación. In : Límites Acerca de la dimensíon ética del
actuar, Ed: Etica y Sociedad ,1978.p 467
385
STEIN, Edith. Una ricerca sullo Stato. 2. ed. Trad. Ângela Ales Bello. Roma:Città Nuova, 1999.p.
232.
386
BELLO, Ângela Alles. Introdução à Fenomenologia, tradução : Ir. Jacinta Turolo Garcia e Miguel
Mahfoud. Bauru, SP: EDUSC, 2006.p 75
124
community is even identified with the typical community traits in person, traits of
character similar to the other members, still it can preserve its individual peculiarity. 387
In the community, individuals are open to one another, where one's

position is not without effect on the other, but stimulates and develops
his own effectiveness: in this is community life; therefore, both
members are a totality and without this reciprocal relationship the
community is not possible. 388
The community would develop to Edith Stein, and would pass the third form of
human association that is called by the author as a society, this progression would occur
because it enters more a layer of the empathic movement (Einfühlung), that is from the
community the individual seek to share experiences and ground an identity, and then the
tradition and the history itself is formulated by acts known, this is acts in which all the
members of a community have decisions in which they are part of the public scope.
Therefore, in the association of society, the individual inserted in the

community, seeking to guarantee his freedom and also recognizing the existence of the
other by empathy (Einfühlung), and sharing experiences (Erfahrungen), develop an
opening of "my own" for the other and thus seek to develop acts known for greater
understanding between them389 as well as in the exercise of the law and in the execution
of the duties, without the clear conception that the acts strengthen the bonds of the
community, never weakening them.
Thus in the text An investigation of the state written in 1925, Edith Stein seeks to
demonstrate how Eduardo Gonzalez de Pierro has affirmed the evolution of the
empathic process from the individual monocytically constituted to a possible
collectivity390,just as the dimension of society for Edith Stein emerges in community life
through the understanding of the other as a living being (Erfahrungen), and through the
bonds of empathy (Einfühlung) the creation and formulation of acts devised, described
by tradition and history.
387
232.
388
142.
389
STEIN, Edith. Una ricerca sullo Stato. 2. ed. Trad. Ângela Ales Bello. Roma:Città Nuova, 1999.p.242.
390
Edith Stein. In : Open Insight V.1 2010 p.78.
125
Eduardo Gonzalez di Pierro points out that the state understanding for Edith
Stein, part of an analogy between State and Individual (person), will soon realize that
the concrete state identity in relation to its genesis, functionalism, limitations,
manifestations and to finalize linking the values of justice, ethics, law and religion,
when analyzing the many models of governmental organization, the author understands
that the model that most fits in an articulated conception between individual freedom
and the rule of law would be precisely the Weimar Republic. 391
As Thomas Szanto and Dermot Moran392 presents to empathy (Einfühlung) for

Edith Stein presented as an contribution an enlargement of the dyadic relations that is
the interpersonal relationship, but also a much more complex range of properties and
facts such as: mass, society entities institutional and more or less cohesive communities,
typically united by shared values, traditions, rituals, shared habits, collective memories
or even collective emotions.
In this way, Edith Stein sought to continue her reflection on the relationship
between empathy on a double scale of the state and the role of the intellectual. Stein was
invited to speak by Emil Vierneisel, who was a university professor at Heidelberg.
which we can confirm through the letter written by Stein on September 27, 1930, as
follows:
Dear Sir, The delegation of Spire has decided that it is for me to report
on Salzbrgo, Ocorrera on the second in the afternoon. For October,
November, and February, I'm compromised elsewhere. So the
Heidelberg conference could be in December. These extraordinary
commitments can not be very close (...). I still do not know what the
conference theme will be. It will hardly be St. Augustine, because this
topic very rarely and only in homeopathic doses would be possible to
perform. For these engagements I will be able to do anything in
Heidelberg only one Nico Sunday of October. But if I could stop here
for a couple of hours and bring your winter program, I'm very
pleased. 393
391
Edith Stein. In : Open Insight V.1 2010 p.72
392
393
STEIN, Edith. Obras Completas: escritos autobiográficos y cartas. Trad. G.Ezequiel Rojo, OCD, Jesús
2002, p. 877.
126
On December 2 the conference was marked at the University of Heidelberg,
because as previously said Miss Stein has other international conferences such as "On
the idea of formation" she presented on 18 October in Speyer and on 8 November in
Bendorf where she presented the conference "Foundations of the formation of women".
Dear Dr. Vierneisel, I am very glad that St. Thomas has awakened so
much satisfaction for you. We returned home very glad, and after half
an hour we disembarked at the door of the convent. Thank you from
the heart, also your dear wife, for your kind cares. Can you please tell
Professor Lossen that I spoke to the Mother of the boarding school
and that she is willing to fulfill her wish, even though this Passover is
hardly possible? The definitive answer will come when I will speak
with Reverend Mother, who is currently traveling. 394
In the letter presented earlier, written by Edith Stein on December 6, 1930, he

shows that upon his return to Speyer, Stein was grateful to have aroused Professor
Vierneisel's interest in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas and to have been welcomed
by Gertrud Vierneisel's wife of Professor Emil.
Unfortunately the original conference manuscript was not saved just a sheet with
content, as Miribel biographer Elizabeth points us in her work on Edith Stein. Most of
the letters written by the Carmelite philosopher were destroyed by a process of memory
erasure, stemming from the fear on the part of those who lived with Edith of anti-
Semitic persecution:
The few letters left - we know of some thanks to Sister Aldegonde,

Benedictine, and Mrs. Biberstein - reveal such a rich humanity, such a
rare intelligence that this destruction has become even more
pitiable. 395
By analyzing the content of this conference we can see that Edith Stein's greatest
concern is not the role of the intellectual, but the human being, as can be seen
throughout her work, for example in About the Problem of Empathy, in which Stein's
concern is the relationship of the individual to the other and how it is affected through
dialogue, a thesis advocated in 1916, and The State Survey written in 1925 where Stein's
concern is about how humans are affected in his dialogue with the other:
394
STEIN, Edith Obras Completas: escritos autobiográficos y cartas. Trad. G.Ezequiel Rojo, OCD, Jesús
2002, p. 886.
395
MIRIBEL, Elisabeth. Edith Stein: como ouro purificado pelo fogo. 3 ed. Aparecida, SP: Editora
Santuário, 2001, p. 2.
127
The tendency for the person is objectively justified and valuable
because, in fact, the person is above all objective values. All truth
must be recognized. All truth needs to be recognized by people, all
beauty needs to be seen and evaluated by people, In that sense, all
objective values are there for people. Behind all that is valuable in the
world is the person of the creator who, as a prototype, encloses within
himself all imaginable values and exceeds them. Among the creatures,
the highest is that which was created in his image exactly in the
personality, that is, in the scope of our experience - the human being.
Edith Stein. 396
As an observer of her present Edith Stein, she proposes an analysis of the present
as a phenomenon to be understood within the empathic movement, that is to say that her
work The Intellect and the Intellectuals is intimately connected with the restlessness of
the present, this is the ascent of Nazism and holding could serve as a denunciation
against the regime and at the same time a possibility of empathic openness
(Einfühlung), with the readers and especially with the listeners of this conference.
It is through a perception of her present that Edith Stein sought to define the
ethical importance397 of her work the Intellect and Intellectuals, where the beginning of
the reflection describes an alert about the role of the intellectuals when they see
themselves as the leader.
In Edith Stein's analysis, the intellectual's acting as a leader is worrisome

because they perceive the other as a mass, that is, an object that could be influenced
according to the needs of their projects, since these intellectuals would not delve into
the empathic movement (Einfühlung), that is, they would not allow themselves to be
affected by the other and so would not share the experiences (Erfahrungen), because
they consider themselves greater than the men of will, and therefore perceive them as a
theoretical object and not living body. Thus Edith Stein makes a forceful critique of the
leaders of the fascist regimes, as the conference text itself points out:
This explains the influence of the Socialist leaders who "came from
below." He who, with gentle and well-cared hands, with slight and
flexible movements, reveals himself as one who does not know hard
bodily labor, who speaks to the people in the fluid and correct
396
KUSSANO, Mariana. A Antropologia de Edith Stein: Entre Deus e a filosofia. PUC-SP 2009, p.7..
397
STEIN, Edith Obras Completas: IV Escritos Antropológicos y Pedagógicos (Magisterio de vida
cristiana, 1926-1933). Trad. G.Ezequiel Rojo, OCD, Jesús García Rojo, OCD, F. F. Sancho Fermín,
OCD, Constantino Ruiz-Garrido. Madrid: Monte Carmelo, 2002, p. 215.
128
language of the "cults," and flies unconcernedly over the harsh
realities of daily struggle for life, and beforehand suspicious. 398
In the analysis proposed by Edith Stein, the class of men who could fit into the
role of leaders would be men of will and action, who, although not intellectuals, would
not present their concerns mainly from a theoretical perspective, but from experience
(Erfahrungen), that is, through an empathic movement (Einfühlung), more immediate
because their concerns are inserted from the world of life, that is the society, and would
be able to have a faster action in the face of situations presented by the world of life,
from the guidance of the intellectuals who would contribute by reflecting on the
problems and advising the leaders.
Edith Stein departs from this separation by understanding that the state
understood as the highest human association by allowing individuals from their freedom
to perceive the other as a living body (Leib), to share experiences with them
(Erfahrungen), thus enabling empathy (Einfühlung), that is, for Steinian thinking,
society differentiates itself from the mass, by the internal perception and understanding
that the other is equal to the one who is experiencing the phenomenon, as affirmed by
the author
Every society, from the smallest, the family, even the most extensive,
all humanity, and indeed an organism whose members and organs are
formed by individuals and various human groups. The fundamental
forces of soul and body are the same in all men, but they are arranged
and are organized and developed in different proportions and
proportions, and to this corresponds the position that corresponds to
individuals and groups in the social set and the function that them.
Therefore, according to the respective proportion of forces, different
human types can be distinguished in their social meaning.399
Starting from this perception Edith Stein, it was integrated in a great historical
tradition according to which the hierarchized state and represented by the image of the
body used like metaphor, as we can perceive by the two models chosen by the author
being first a fable written by Agripa Menênio Lanato, call the limbs and stomach, in
which the members refused to work to the stomach is this was weakened and the second
398
399
129
representation of the Greek philosopher Plato presented in the work Politeia where the
system of organization of the social organism is presented.400
The authors chosen by Edith Stein, the Roman Agrippa Menênio Lanato and the
Greek philosopher Plato, are present in the tradition of thinking the State, understood as
a human association from a metaphor of the human body, this present from this Greco-
Roman antiquity and influenced modernity as present in the writings of the physician
and philosopher Cláudio Galeno, as presented to us by Albert Lyons and Joseph
Petrucelli.
In view of the complexity of Galen's works, we must ask why they

exercised such profound and undeniable influence over a thousand
and five hundred years (that is, throughout the Middle Ages). The
causes seem to lie, first, in the unstable conditions of the Middle Ages,
which engendered a vehement desire for certainty and authority both
in Islam and in Europe. His dogmatic style, didactic and also pedantic
was adapted to the "absolute", since Galen did not leave a question
unanswered. In addition, Galen included reasonings of the teleological
type that congratulated his adoption by the Christian Church. 401
Cláudio Galeano, like the philosophers Agrippa Menênio Lanato and Plato,
tried to develop a relation between the internal and external dimensions, Galen was one
of the first physiologists, studying mainly the fluids and his and the structures attached
to the heart; place where they produced the vital spirits. It was he who demonstrated the
structure of the spine, described the glossopharyngeal nerve and showed that the nerves
were born in the central nervous system; place where the animal spirits remained as well
as the liver, his writings were fundamental for the theory of the four humors.
This theory proposed that all men were composed of four organic fluids
consisting of varying proportions of blood (hot and humid), phlegm (cold and moist),
yellow bile (hot and dry) and black bile (cold and dry) . The individual who had the four
balanced fluids would enjoy a state of health, while the one who had excess or scarcity
would manifest illness. And these fluids would be responsible for the relationship of
individuals their internal dimension with the external dimension that is, how these
individuals relates to the environment in which they were inserted, for example a blood
400
401
LYONS, Alberty e PETRUCELLI, Joseph.. História da Medicina. Manole: São Paulo, 1997, p. 259.
130
individual and more considered to become a warrior because would have the tendency
to violence, and these traits are considered by psychology as Jan Strelau said.
Temperament refers to basic, relatively stable traits, expressed mainly

in the formal characteristics of reactions and behavior. These traits
would be present from the beginning of life in the child. Primarily
determined by mechanisms of biological origin, temperament would
be subject to changes caused by maturation and individual - genotype
- environment interaction.402
Starting from this understanding from which individuals would possess the same
fundamental traits that would be present in the soul (internal dimension) and in the body
Leib (external dimension) but from the experiences (Erfahrungen), these would develop
from different measures403,being proposed by Edith Stein, a new state structure,
understood through the empathic movement (Einfühlung), in which the disposition and
level of development of the fundamental traits would correspond to the position of
individuals and groups as a whole, as well as their role. According to the proportion of
the forces resulting, the different types of professionals present in the organizational
structure of society would be distinguished.
Thus we can understand that the Steinian analysis of society, where this human
grouping is perceived as hierarchical, but each group depends on the organization of the
other classes, thus forming a "body politic" that would be responsible for guaranteeing
the social order and the possibility of an association which privileges solidarity is
empathy as a founding value, in this conception Edith Stein approaches the philosopher
John of Salisbury:
However, the appropriateness of the idealized image is well evident

in the expression "political body" as a condition of the social order.
The philosopher John of Salisbury may have formulated the simplest
and most literal definition of this concept by stating in 1159 that "the
(resposible) state is a body." He meant that a ruler functions as a
human brain; his counselors, as the heart; traders are the stomach of
society; the soldiers, their hands; peasants and manual workers, their
feet. It is a hierarchical image, according to which the social order is
part of the brain, organ of the ruler. 404
402
STRELAU,Jan. (1998). Temperament: A Psychological Perspective. New York:Plenum., 1998, p. 165.
403
404
131
Thus John Saliabury, who presented the social organization through an analogy
from which the human body and the representation of the state being reflected in the
very organization of cities whose organs so that the head stood the political and
religious center, markets would be the digestive system and the dwellings the feet and
hands, as a consequence the forms of action of individuals in society would depart from
this representation, as Richard Sennett describes, people should move slowly in the
cathedral, since the brain is a reflexive organ, and more quickly in the market, since the
digestion is processed like a spark in the stomach405,thus Edith Stein understands that
hierarchization and a form of organization not as an authoritarian point but as a concrete
possibility of harmonious coexistence of individuals in which from their potentialities
each subject would try to compose an organ that would be dependent on the other, for a
better functioning as a whole..
John of Salisbury wrote as a scientist and, unraveling the workings of

the brain, believed he could teach the kings the art of lawmaking. The
objectives of modern sociobiology and medieval science have not
distanced themselves much as one investigates how society should
function under the dictates of nature. The concept of a political body,
in both medieval and modern conceptions, organizes the nation by
imposing rules on the image of the human body. 406
3.5. Edith Stein's Sympathy for Oceanic Feeling
Starting from the understanding of the State through the analogy of the Political
Body, from which the individual in his inner perception is intimately connected to his
external dimension, and in his role as a member of this human association, from which
the subject's action is imbricated with the community, as witnessed by his friend Roman
Ingarden in 1979, in the text On Edith Stein's philosophical research published in the
Freiburg Magazine of Philosophy and Theology
What interested her the most was the question of defining the
possibility of mutual communication between human beings, that is,
the possibility of establishing community. This was more than a
theoretical concern for her; belonging to a community was a personal
need, something that vitally affected his identity. [...] It is also clear,
as I learned from her memories, that she needed to belong to a
national community - to think of herself as a member of a particular
country. I still remember how she went through the war with the
attitude of someone always about to start a one-man battle. She was
405
406
132
determined to serve; there was no doubt about it. During her time as a
Husserl post-graduate assistant, she wrote me letters by letters asking
if she had the right to waste time on philosophy and other nonsense
when there were people dying around whom we should be helping.
Thus we can see that it was essential to her personally that such a
community existed, and that what she was doing was to examine the
theoretical foundations necessary for such a community. Later in "The
Individual and the Community" she considered the various ways in
which relationships can be established between individuals, and here
again empathy appears precisely as one of these possibilities. All these
questions were closely intertwined in his thinking. 407
As Marianne Sawicki defines it, she sought to understand this beginning through
psychology, to understand the dimension of human life, understood through the multiple
layers, and how she had not found answers in this science that was being born
Behaviorism, thus seeking this understanding of the perception of consciousness and
formation This is the internal formation of the individual and its unfolding in human
associations in their collectivities such as the community and the state, community
based on phenomenology, and the systematic study of the phenomenon of empathy
(Einfühlung).
She wanted to understand how the mind works, what problems afflict
the heart, and how to heal the soul. Remember, now, that the year is
1911, Edith is 19, and the sciences that support today's psychiatry and
psychology are not yet born. In Vienna, Sigmund Freud is intrigued
by those neurotic patients, while in Susquehanna, a 7-year-old boy
named B. F. Skinner is trying in vain to train squirrels. The term
"psychology" still means a branch of philosophy. In other words,
psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and other fundamental theories of
psychology, as we know it, are only taking shape. University
professors and their students are planning the first controlled
laboratory experiments to investigate the processes of sensory
perception. They are trying to figure out, if they want, how to think
about thinking, how to do it reliably, productively and scientifically.
Some are guided in this enterprise, as Edith discovers, by a two-
volume work called Logical Investigations, published in 1900-01 by
Edmund Husserl. Thus, Edith Stein, 21, decides to transfer to the
University of Göttingen to study with Husserl and become initiated
into the new philosophy of science called "phenomenology". 408
This desire to try to understand human nature in its multiple spheres, this is the
internal dimension (psyche) and the external dimension (society and the body) through
an empathic movement, and especially an attempt to unveil through psychology and
407
INGARDEN, Roman. Über die philosophischen Forschungen Edith Steins. Freiburger Zeitschrift für
Philosophie und Theologie, 26, 1979. p.472. APUD.RIPAMONTI, Lidia. Edith Stein’s Critique of Martin
Heidegger: Background, Reasons and Scope, 2013.p 27
408
SAWICKI, Marianne. Personal Connections: The Phenomenology of Edith Stein. Yearbook of the Irish
Philosophical Society: Voices of Irish Philosophy, Maynooth, 2004. p.148.
133
consequently a disenchantment with psychology near Edith Stein of another thinker the
French writer and Nobel of Literature Romain Rolland.
The French writer Romain Rolland, reportedly a Germanophile was introduced

to psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud, his friend the writer Stephen Zweig both as well as
Edith Stein were heterodox Jews who according to Michael Lowy, lived in central
Europe and sought social recognition through entry into Universities and especially
from the human sciences. 409
Lidia Ripamonti, the understanding of the empathic movement and its emergent
application in the external dimension, that is, the conception of the State, can be
understood by its experience as a volunteer of the Red Cross during the event of the first
world war as well as the growing hatred for the Jews too were behind Stein's decision to
write an autobiography entitled Living in a Jewish Family, which she began composing
in September 1933.
As explained in the introduction, she wanted to give an honest account

of the experience of the Jewish population, which was not made up of
"rich capitalists, political subversives and impudent intellectuals" as
presented by the propaganda machine, but of officials, neighbors and
schoolmates. of German citizens, whom she grew to know in time, as
they lived nearby. condemnation of totalitarian indoctrination, which
also emerges in his essay on the state he published in 1925 of Stein. 410
Thus Edith Stein was from this the beginning against a militarization perspective
of her country as described in her Life of a Jewish Family biography, where in reflecting
on the event of the commemoration of the battle of Sedan on September 2, describes
how the fact of commemorating the victory over the French in the 1870s, and the use of
this narrative for growing patriotism in 1925 was a painful attitude is unseemly for
her.411
Similarly, Romain Rolland was deeply affected by World War I, as Horacio
Crespo describes, unlike other French and German intellectuals who sought to adhere to
the prevailing patriotic mood of their respective countries, Rolland sought to record in
his journal the profound tragedy that perceived by the support of these intellectuals, is
409
LOWY, Michael. Notas sobre os Intelectuais Judeus . In: Judeus Heterodoxo Brasil: Editora
Perspectiva 2012. p.7.
410
RIPAMONTI, Lidia. Edith Stein’s Critique of Martin Heidegger: Background, Reasons and Scope,
2013.p 23
411
STEIN , Edith, Vida de una familia judía in Escritos Antropológicos y Pedagógicos: Magisterio de
vida cristiana, 1926-1933. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed., 2002., p.134
134
the militarization which for Rolland 412
showed the variations of the European political
and moral climate during the course
I'm stunned I wish I was dead. It is horrible to live in the midst of this
demented humanity and helplessly aid the bankruptcy of civilization.
This European war is the greatest catastrophe in history for centuries,
the ruin of our holiest hopes in human fraternity (...)The most
characteristic feature of this European twist is, as I said, "unanimity"
for war; unanimity even of the parties most opposed to the national
war, by definition and by moral essence: like the Socialists and the
Catholics. (...) I find myself alone, excluded from this bloody
communion.413
From these negative memories present in the first war, they would decisively
influence the contact of the writer Roman Roland who had taken refuge in Switzerland
to maintain his pacifist ideas, wrote a letter to the psychologist Sigmund Freud, where
on February 22, 1923, seeks to demonstrate the deep admiration he feels for Freud and
for the method proposed by psychology.
Dear Mr. Freud Let me take this opportunity to tell you that if, now
your name is illustrious in France, I was one of the first French to read
and know your works. About twenty years ago I found some of his
books in a Zurich bookstore, and I was fascinated by his subliminal
visions, which answered some of my intuitions ... I've talked about
you a few times with my friend Stefan Zweig who has an affectionate
feeling for you .... If it is sad to be like you in a country succumbed by
war, believe that it is no less sad to be like myself in the country of
victory and not being able to associate: because I I always have more
love for those who make suffer. These times, unfortunately! (And the
insanity of the peoples) took care to equalize everything: every victory
ruins the winner and the wheel of misfortune never ceases to turn. I,
however, do not despair, although the political ruin of Western Europe
seems to me right ... With my feelings of respect and admiration.
Roman Rolland. 414
So too in describing her present, that is, the time in which the philosopher
Edith Stein is inserted, she presents what the experience of the First War meant to her, a
feeling of powerlessness present in institutions that could be responsible for sensitized
412
CRESPO, Horacio, Intelectuales frente a la Primera Guerra Mundial. Espiritualismo Humanista ,
Pacifismo y Patriotismo Confrontados en La polémica Roman Rolland / Thomas Mann, 2015., p.160
413
ROLLAND, Romain, Journal des années de guerre 1914-1919 (1952), Éditions Albin Michel, París
[edición en castellano: Diario de los años de guerra 1914/1919. Notas y documentos para servir a la
historia moral de la Europa de ese tiempo (1954), 3 vols., texto establecido por Marie Romain Rolland,
prefacio de Louis-Martin Chauffier, prólogo a la versión castellana de Bernardo Koremblit, Librería
Hachette, Buenos Aires].p.6-7
414
VERMOREL, Henri. e Madeleine. Sigmund Freud et Romain Rolland correspondence1923-
1936.Historie de la Psychanalyse. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1993.p.216
135
and guided individuals in the face of reality, these being the culture and the reason, as
we can perceive by a letter written in 1918, that is, before the letter quoted above, when
reflecting on the course of the First War the author points to a belief that individuals
through institutions such as culture and reason (human spirit) could overcome the
experience of war, as we can see below:
Dearest Erna: (...) I am very sorry to find in you and in Rose such
pessimistic expressions, I would like to convey to you something that,
after each new stroke, gives me new energy. I can only say that, after
what I lasted last year, I give a yes to life with more decision than
ever. (...) Certainly, sometimes I think we have to get used to the idea
that the end of the war will not be seen. Even so, do not despair. What
has to be done is not limited to the piece of life that covers our eyes,
much less what is very clear on the surface. It is very true that we are
at a critical point in the development of the human spirit, and we
should not complain if the crisis lasts longer than anyone in particular
would like. All that is now so horrible and that I, of course, do not
want to disguise, is the spirit that must be overcome. Well, the new
spirit is already there and will no doubt end up imposing itself. We are
very clear in philosophy and at the beginning of the new art:
Expressionism (...) Good and evil, knowledge and error are mixed
everywhere, (...) whether of cities or of festivals. 415
Both intellectuals Edith Stein and Roman Rolland sought to reflect on the
negative experience of the First World War, unlike other intellectuals who sought to
exalt nationalism, but also sought to evidence a view that intellectual work could
provide stability, to experience this period of extreme violence. From this
understanding, Roman Rolland presented his criticism to authors of the German
socialist movement, such as Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin and Franz
Mehring, who, in the face of the irrationality of war, would give up intellectual
production as a possibility of producing an empathic movement with the other.
who have consecrated life to their international socialism and who, at

the first opportunity, reject it in thought and action; is that they are not
religious, they only believe in reason; and the reason is not enough to
combat unreason. 416
415
STEIN, Edith, Vida de una familia judía in Escritos Antropológicos y Pedagógicos: Magisterio de vida
cristiana, 1926-1933. Madrid: El Carmen, vol. 4, Ed., 2002. p. 630.
416
Hachette, Buenos Aires].p.7
136
As Francisco Javier Sancho Fermín points out, the importance of the study of the
empathy phenomenon for Edith Stein would go beyond the limits of the theory of
knowledge, but also in the sphere of experience. This is highlighting the importance of
anthropology in the dynamics of the empathic movement " to resolve is that of the
person as a spiritual subject. It is the foundation of all his later investigations in which
anthropological interest is his primary concern”. 417
Therefore the understanding of the phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung) for

Edith Stein must be understood in its entirety, that is the relation between the living
body (leib) with "the feelings" (die Gefühle) the soul "(Seele) and with the "will"
(Wille), being a condition of possibility of the constitution of the perception of the
experience of others, this is the formation of intersubjectivity for Edith Stein, this
closely related to the perception of the other as living being. 418
Thus the analysis of empathy starts from the understanding of the constitution of
the human person and the learning process could help in a better relationship between
people and a possibility of the development of a positive state by Empathy, that is, the
development of a philosophical anthropology inspired by the Edith Stein's thinking goes
through the understanding of empathy as something constitutive of the human being.
The ability to experience empathy, or empathic power, is not something specific to one
or another individual as a subjective exclusivity, but it is a universal experience. The
clarification of this problem passes through the philosophical understanding of the
individual and its constitution. 419
A counterpoint to this positive view of humanity proposed by philosopher and

phenomenologist Edith Stein is by the novelist and historian Romain Rolland, from
which even the extremely negative conjuncture of the First World War and the rise of
totalitarian regimes in Europe, proposed a possibility of acting of the intellectuals in
developing a movement of recognition of the other through not rationalization but of
affection is proposed by Sigmund Freud in his letter responding to Rolland on March 4,
1923, from which:
417
.FERMÍN, Francisco Javier. 100 fichas sobre Edith Stein (PARA APRENDER Y ENSEÑAR) Burgos:
Monte Carmelo,2005p.100
418
STEIN,Edith. Il problema dell’empatia, de E. e E. Costantini, Ed. Studium, Roma, 1998., p.37.
419
STEIN,Edith. Il problema dell’empatia, de E. e E. Costantini, Ed. Studium, Roma, 1998., p. 77.
137
Very revered sir, Until the end of my life I will remember the joy of
being able to exchange a greeting with you. For his name is bound by
us most precious of all beautiful illusions, the extension of love to all
the children of men. I certainly belong to a race that in the Middle
Ages was responsible for all the national epidemics and to which
nowadays one takes the blame: Austria from the decadence of the
empire and Germany from the loss of war. From these experiences,
we become disillusioned and unlikely to believe in illusions.
Moreover, I have truly used a great deal of the work of my life to
destroy my own illusions and those of humanity .... If we do not learn
throughout evolution to divert from our fellowmen our impulse to
destruction, if we continue to be massacred for a small profit (...) My
writings can not be what they are: consolation and comfort for readers
... I take the liberty of addressing you a small book, certainly not yet
known by you: "psychology of the masses and analysis of self" made
in 1921, not that I have produced these writing to succeed but it shows
the path that leads the analysis of the individual to the understanding
of society. 420
In Freud's 1921 text, Mass Psychology and Self-Analysis, the author seeks to
demonstrate how the dimension of the emotional and intellectual impulses that
constitute an individual are inhibited or reinforced by the condition of the group in
which they are inserted, and are then repressed and manifested in the form of prejudices
and violence, just as Freud seeks to analyze how his people and his race as well as that
of Edith Stein was persecuted from the Middle Ages until the events of the First World
War.
We thus have the impression of a state in which the particular

emotional impulses and the intellectual acts of an individual are too
weak to arrive at something by themselves; for this they depend
entirely on being reinforced by their equal repetition in the other
members of the group. We are reminded of how many of these
phenomena of dependence are part of the normal constitution of
human society, how little originality and personal courage can be
found in it, how much each individual is governed by these attitudes
of the group mind that present themselves in forms such as
characteristics racial prejudices, class preconceptions, public opinion,
etc. 421
So that on May 14, 1924, through a meeting organized by Stefan Zweig at the
request of Romain Rolland who was in Vienna, Sigmund Freud was deeply joyful to
consult some patients and invited them to have a cup of tea in the house , during the
meeting Freud asked Rolland to read the text Introductory Lecture to psychoanalysis in
420
421
FREUD, Sigmund. Psicologia das Massas e Análise do Eu e Outros Textos. 1920-1923, trad. Paulo
César de Souza.ed:Companhia das Letras Sp. p 30.
138
counterpart Romain Rolland offered him the recent biography on the pacifist leader
Mahatma Gandhi, both thinkers had strong influence on one another as described in his
daily.
Visit to Professor S. Freud, Bergasse-He inhabits rather somber

pieces, open to a small garden (...) Freud and lean, and his head is
somewhat simian, the lower jaw, eroded by cancer, has been replaced
by a rather well-concealed device: Freud stands against the light to
speak to me. It shows a vitality, an impressive vivacity, although it has
been tipped over since the last six months: "My time is past". He is 68
years old. Despite his science his renown, he is not a full professor of
the University, and should still give six hours of class a day is not
complains. He thinks it's okay like this ... Freud talks about his
isolation being touched by the knowledge that I read it twenty years
ago. He was believed to have no echo: he almost never receives a
sympathetic testimony from France. In Germany, it is treated with
hostility. In America, he is celebrated, but, "they do not understand at
all."422
Thus according to Henri Vermorel, the feelings of loss that occurred during the
First World War influenced the two authors and which corresponded to the themes dealt
with are deeply marked the relations between eternity and religiosity, 423, this profound
intellectual exchange can be perceived in the introduction of book The Evil Being in the
Civilization, written in 1930.
One of these exceptional men declares himself my friend in letters he

wrote to me. I had sent him the small work in which I treat religion as
an illusion, and he replied that he agreed with my judgment on
religion, but regretted that I had not properly appraised the source of
religiosity. This would be a peculiar feeling, which he himself never
abandons, which he has confirmed by many people and can suppose
existing in millions of others. A feeling he would like to call a sense
of "eternity," a feeling of something unlimited, without barriers, as
"oceanic." (...) Based only on this oceanic feeling one could consider
himself religious, even if he rejected all faith and all illusion. 424
The work dealt with was The Future of an Illusion where, in dealing with the
understanding of the religious phenomenon, Sigmund Freud as a collective and cultural
phenomenon starting from the same criticism that presented the freedom in Masses and
422
Hachette, Buenos Aires].p240.
423
424
FREUD, Sigmund. O Mal-Estar na Civilização, Novas Conferencias Introdutórias à psicanálise e
outros textos (1930-1936) trad. Paulo César de Souza. ed:Companhia das Letras Sp. p 10.
139
Analysis of the Self, from which the religious phenomenon had as objective the
repetition and erasure of individual freedom and subjectivity. So on December 5, 1927,
Roman Rolland sought to respond to Freud on this analysis where despite praise for the
work, Rolland presents the difference of perception between the two conceptions of
religious the first collective and institutional and the second individual and subjective,
this is the perception of eternity or oceanic feeling..
Dearest is respected friend, I thank you for sending me your lucid and
courageous little book. With a calm common sense, and in a subdued
tone, he starts the sale of the eternal teenagers, all of us, whose
amphibious spirit floats among the illusion of tomorrow. His analysis
of religions is just. But I would have liked to see you make the
analysis of spontaneous religious feeling or, rather, of religious
feeling, which is totally different from the religions themselves, and
much more durable. I understand this: - it is completely independent
of all dogma (...) It is the simple and direct fact of the sensation of the
eternal (...) And a contact. And as I have recognized, identical (with
multiple nuances) in a great number of souls, who share a free flowing
life. (...) please believe, dear friend, in my affectionate respect to
RR.425
Thus this sentiment described by Romain Rolland from which the religious is
understood, as a form of recognition that all the "living souls" share through the
experiences the eternal perception that would be for Rolland independent of the
religious institutions but constituting the human in their totality and will allow to
develop ties of affinity and recognition of the other that we can understand like
empathy, this conception influenced very Sigmund Freud, as we can observe by the
letter written 14 of September of 1929.
Very venerable friend. His letter of December 5, 1927, and his

remarks about the sentiment he calls oceanic, gave me no rest. It
happens that in a new work for the time being unfinished, I start from
its incitement, I mention this oceanic feeling and try to interpret it in
the sense of our psychology. My essay extends among other things: it
deals with happiness (...) I do not mention your name, but I give an
indication that will make you guess.426
As Lydia Ripamonti described the work developed by Edith Stein and

understood by the interconnection between philosophy, religion and ethics as the
guiding thread of the human being in its totality, that is, Edith Stein sought to
425
VERMOREL,Henri e Madeleine. Sigmund Freud et Romain Rolland correspondence1923-
1936.Historie de la Psychanalyse. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1993.p.303-304.
426
VERMOREL,Henri e Madeleine. Sigmund Freud et Romain Rolland correspondence1923-
1936.Historie de la Psychanalyse. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1993.p.308.
140
understand the human being as a philosophical object and analyzes it under different
points of view: ontology, psychology, politics and social studies, gender, education,
theology, value theory and mysticism427. It is an impressively multifaceted and
interrelated body of work, which forms a complete theory of the person.
In this sense, the empirical movement (Einfühlung), understood as the

"experience of the consciousness of others in general" (Erfahrung von fremdem
Bewußtsein überhaupt), approaches the concept of oceanic movement developed by
Roman Rolland, both theoretical formulations seek to understand the human
phenomenon in its totality not only as soul (Seele) and will (Wille) or just embodiment
(Leib), but through shared experiences (Erlebnisse) the subject would recognize the
other.
The "living body" of others also has its importance for the constitution of my
"individual self." By perceiving inwardly our soul-self, with its qualities and defects, we
can have an idea of how others come to us. The overcoming of my naive attitudes
towards my experiences and other individuals leads me to take on new objects of
reflection. With this change of intellectual posture, one begins to apprehend the real
meaning of the experience, which is of fundamental importance for the development of
each individual as a person.428
In a different way, there is the apprehension of the experiences of the other. The
seizure of another person does not take place in an original way, which is already an
object, appearing as a physical body outside my reference point of location, which is my
own body. There is an understanding here of the similarity of the self with the alien to
me. With my reflective attitudes I get the image that the other has of me, put another
way, the other helps to show who I am. Why does it happen? Because in fact he is an
individual among so many who can have other visions to me and in this way the self is
assuming his being in relation to the contact with the others. Here it is not a determining
427
RIPAMONTI, Lidia. Edith Stein’s Critique of Martin Heidegger: Background, Reasons and Scope,
2013.p 20
428
141
relation, but we can say of help, because the other will not determine my essence nor
my reactions to my self I live. 429
By engaging Edith Stein, the intellectual has a commitment to the world in

which he is inserted and to the development of the empathic movement (Einfühlung),
that is, intelligence and will allows us to be aided by what is revealed to us: the other ,
from the moment we are affected by it and, on the other hand, with our work we can
assist him in his anguish and suffering. For Edith Stein the intellectual, can not be seen
as a guide but rather as a craftsman who with his reflections on the real, should help in
the construction of a society. Being that to both acknowledge its limits as defined by the
author:
We must be clear that this attitude distances us from the great mass.
Outside the university, one struggles with the needs of life in its many
forms. It is enough that we leave our reflective activities to meet them,
we find ourselves among the people to whom we owe help. Therefore,
we should not feel like strangers living in a world inaccessible to them
(...). He sees that the human intellect can not unveil the ultimate and
ultimate truths and that in the most essential matters, bearing, in the
practical configuration of life, a simple man with a light of superior
origin can surpass the greater sage. 430
429
430
142
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DANILO SOUZA FERREIRA

EMPATHY: An intellectual history of Edith Stein 1891-1942

Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Sociais/ UFOP

CHAPTER I - EDITH STEIN, TRAINING TIMES.

1.1.Edith Stein a Biography...........................................................................................06

1.2. Breslau between Psychology and History...............................................................14

1.3. Círculo Fenomenológico de Göttingen....................................................................25

1.4. Freiburg: Edith Stein as assistant to Husserl……....................................................38

CHAPTER 2 - EMPATHY A CONCERN OF A GENERATION

2.1. The Empathy from Edmund Husserl........................................................................44

2.2. From Husserl to Max Scheler - Looks of Phenomenology.....................................54

2.3. The Empathy from Max Scheler….........................................................................,65

2.4. Empathy in the sciences of the spirit Wilhelm Dilthey............................................73

CHAPTER 3 - FROM THE EMPATHY OF THE HUMAN PERSON TO THE

3.1. Empatia (Einfühlung) no contexto intelectual alemão ...........................................83

3.3 Edith Stein and the inner perception History...........................................................111

3.5. Edith Stein's Sympathy for Oceanic Feeling..........................................................132

A definitive, English-style biography is among the most admirable

For the biographical, the interpretation consists of relating and

My challenge was the "Sedan celebration" on September 2nd. If the

There were strategies of assimilation of Jews as the increase of the mixed

In March 1882, the newspaper Diário de Lublinitz published an announcement

After my installation in Breslau, I intend to sell my wood and coal

In municipal elections throughout the 1880s, left-wing liberals

The policies implemented by Wilhelm Salomon Freund to encourage

Edith Stein presents a peculiar philosophical journey. Born in an austere Jewish

The whole family defined me from the earliest childhood by two

If we understand the autobiographical account as defined by Bourdie as a

This generation of intellectuals, as presented by Michael Lowy, was marked by

1.2. Breslau between Psychology and History

Alasdair Maclntyre describes Edith Stein's approach to phenomenology as early

In the years 1909-1915, Hönigswald published articles on the theory

Edith Stein describes Richard Hönigswald, professor of Philosophy and History,

The Jewish origin of Stern and Hönigswald was an inconvenience to

Dear Mr. Kaufmann,

In winter, we find ourselves alternately in our homes and in the

Dear Mr. Kaufmann,

... was only an element of a system of overvaluation intended to avoid

One of the points addressed by Honigswald in his disciplines was the

Stern represented a specific type of Jewish humanism: he was in his

All my studies in psychology led me to the conviction that this science

At the same university, that of Göttingen, I had the added advantage

I was struck by the commemorative signs that were in almost every

What would be of this seminary if there were no young ladies who

Now what I had to do immediately was to organize my relations with

In 1899 Max Scheler had converted to Catholicism, but after a period of

Human spirituality is certainly founded on human physis, every

With this procedure, humanity appears as a single life of men and

This tradition of empathy, which can not be reduced to a pure hermeneutical

Next comes the mission of making others available to the individuality

I wanted to know more details. Mährisch Weißkirchen was half-way

On April 7, 1915, Edith Stein sailed from Göttingen to Mährisch Weißkirchen,

Edith Stein devotes an entire sub-chapter of her biography "Life of a Jewish

2.1. The Empathy from Edmund Husserl

In relation to this first part of the work, it was necessary to investigate,

It is obscure how knowledge can reach the transcendent, the non-self-

In order to understand this genesis of the alter-ego sense, it is

The concept of "empathy" (Einfühlung) is presented by Edmund Husserl, as a

We lack here an authentic phenomenological explication of the

The phenomenological thought proposed by Husserl on empathy would differ

This discussion starts from the project of a universalist science, proposed by

Intentionality as referring to or reporting from the act of consciousness

Silvestre Grzibowsky, presents that phenomenologically, the ego "I", when