Laperal vs.

Republic
GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962

FACTS:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on
March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that,
she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed
this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by
the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming
that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific
provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his
husband.

HELD:

In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the
vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue
confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of
legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had
automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to
hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

Petition was dismissed.

TANADA VS TUVERA
Facts:

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise
provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of
the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished
Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should
be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means
complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required
by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when
necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.

Held:

(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.

(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the laws.

Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his
wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed
with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage
Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.

Republic v. Iyoy
This is a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals. CrasusIyoy was married to
FelyIyoy in 1961 and this marriage gave birth to five children. FelyIyoy eventually left for the States to
provide for their family in 1984 and in lessthan a year sent Crasus documents to sign with regard to a
divorce that she applied for. Crasus eventually found out that Fely married Stephen Micklus in 1985 and
their relationship has conceived of a child. Crasus eventually questioned the validity of Fely’s
subsequent marriage. The Court of Appeals in deciding this case sided with Fely.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid and recognized in
the Philippines.

RULING:

The court decided in the negative and reversed the Appellate Court’s decision. Basing from the facts,
Fely only became a citizen in 1988 and acquired the divorce in 1984, marrying Micklus a year after. This
means that paragraph two of Article 26 cannot be applied in such a way that, Fely is not yet considered
an alien at the time the divorce was acquired and therefore she does not have the capacity to remarry
and the marriage is still considered as subsisting. The Civil Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with
regard to family laws and status are governed by Philippine laws regardless of where they are. Fely,
being a Filipino Citizen then, is not permitted by our laws to acquire a divorce decree since such is not
recognized in the Philippines.

“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

“WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A
DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER
TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE
LAW.”

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Article 15.Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

CASE DIGEST: QUITA V. CA

Facts:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. No
children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31,
1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning
the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to
be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the
petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death
of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void
since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issues:

1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

Held:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to
the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there
are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them
as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.

Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito
under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.

The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

CASE DIGEST: SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS

EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.

G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.

Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also
ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

Held:

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership,
it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven.

Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24,
1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On
June 26,1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace
Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer,
Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to
marry Grace.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground that
the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no more marital union to
nullify or annul.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

RULING:

1st issue: The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s
marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance
with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

2nd issue:

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The
Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.

MOY YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

FACTS:

Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien visiting the Philippines, whose authorized stay in the Philippines was to expire,
claims herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Solicitor General
opposes the ground that the marriage of the alien to a Filipino citizen does not automatically confer on
the latter Philippine citizenship. Plaintiff-appellant does not possess all the qualifications required for
applicant for naturalization (CA 473), even she has proven that she possesses none of the
disqualifications in said law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen.

RULING:

Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto,
provided that she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)

DJUMANTAN v. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, GR No. 99358, 1995-01-30

Facts:

Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in
accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.

On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old Marina and nine-month
old Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a
friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitality... extended to him during his
stay in Indonesia.
When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13,
1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.

Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating inter alia, that:

As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.

Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of
the Immigration Act of 1940.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a
complaint for "concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two.
This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.

On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of
permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an
alien certificate of registration.

the Board of Commissioners finds the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan
irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa
previously granted to her

Issues:

whether the power to deport her has prescribed.

The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.

Ruling:

When public respondents revoked the permanent residence... visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect,
ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien.

Principles:

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the
public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). This right is based on the fact... that since the aliens are not part of
the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which
creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).