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Peirce's Approach to the Self

A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity

Vincent Michael Colapietro

state Uxliversiry of New York Press


Contents

System of Citation

Introduction

Chapter One Is I'eirce's Theory of Signs


I ' n ~ l yGeneral?

Chapter Two Semiosis and Subjectivity

Chapter Three The Relevance of Peirce's


Semiotics to Psychology

Chapter Four Peirce's Account of the Self:


A Develop~nentalPerspective

Chapter Five Inwardness and Autonomy

Notes

References
Introduction

In the words of Charles Sanders Peirce, "The man who puts


pen to paper to produce anything like a treatise should, for his
readers' sake, and for his own, begin by defining what his book
is intended to tell" (CN, vol. 2, 277; 1900). Indeed, it is nothing-
----
less than "the primary rule of the ethics of rhetoric that every
prose composition should begin by informing
.-_- the reader-
__.._-
what
its aim is. with sufficient recision to enable him to decide
whcther to read it or not. 1; the title can do this, all the better"
(CN, vol. 2,276). My hope is that the title of this study sufficiently
conveys my intention. If not, let me add here that my aim is to
present the innovative approach to the self that is implied by
Peirce's general theory of signs. To some extent, Peirce himself
articulated the view of the self i-m ~ l i e din this theory: however.
I -_._____-___-I

to a significant degree, he left this view implicit. Even so, what


--_--__
he has writtengoints out ? h - i n h h would have
developed his portrait of the person. In addition, there has been
some effort on the part of several commentators to trace the direc-
tion o f Peirce's thought in this context.
Nonetheless, the exposition of Peirce's views regarding the
self is no easy task. Part of the difficulty here stems from Peirce's
style, taking- this term in a broad sense to include both the way
he wrote and the way he thought (including, of course, the
way he philosophized). Yet, this is only part of the difficulty; for
what lJeirce specifically said about the self has appeared even to
deeply sympathetic comlnentators as a largely unsatisfactory
account. Hence. while the writings of Peirce, in general, pose a
number of challenges for any expositor of his thought, his view
of the self, in particular? presents difficulties of its own. Let me
comrnent on hoth sources of difficulty, beginning with the more
general ones.
7'11e first of' these is the d e ~ l s i t y p fPeirce's p o s e . Many naturally i n k r that he lacks talent for speech when he only lacks
--. . - - ._
intelligent persons of p o d will have experienced great d i f f i c u l ~ practice. (CN. vol. 111, 258-59)
.. - --
in readinq his \.. . writings.
..
He himself claimed: " 0 n e ' o f the most
extreme ancl most 1arnental)le of my incapacities is my incapacity
Whether it be due to a lack of talent o r a lack of practice, Peirce
for linguistic expression" (MS 632, 5 4 ) . This is, in- my esfim5-
. .. . felt himself deficient in his ability to use language. In addition,
rion, too I~arslian assessment of his own lincguisticfjcility; he could
his writings occasion enough difficulty for intelligent and
write with clarity and. .even grace. However, he was, on prhcipI<
-. - .. benevolent readers to think that his---sense of deficiency.. M ~ -~.ins , 7

comniit'tcri ti; s ~ ~ c r i ~ ' i . ~ i ! i ~ l ~elegance


i t e r--
a r.y- for scientific precision
.. .. . . .- some .measure, .justified.
(set., e.g., .5.13). Moreover, although he insisted that all thinking .. ---
' However,Peirce._ is.far less difficult and far more accessible
necessarily relies upon symbols, he admitted that his own think-
ing only infr-ecluently depended upon words (but one species of
s\.mbol). In filct, in h4S 619 ("Studies in i\/%nlng"), r e z e acknow-
ledgeti that \,isual
-
cIg21:ams constituted his "natural languageof
. .. - .
than mhtiy of. hii critics __ .- maint&What
-'--

way 'ofappreciating him is not -so 2.- -


much
riiost likely stands in the
-
his style
-
his style of _philosophizing. Peirce's way o F p h i l G p h i z i n g is at
I
of- writing
.-. -- .- -
as --

self-co~li~nurrion"
. . -.. .- .
(MS 619, 8).
. .. once i n t e n s e....-.-.
it is possible that his Zstinctive
--
l y n g. and currently unfashionable. Even so,
.. --- .-- c o n c e p t ~ ---o
--~n
--. T ~ ~ l o s o p h i c a l (
12:c acr, in efkct, a n interesting explanation of this personal inquiry more clearly reveals the way to a recovery of philosophy
~xopen"t\: 1\'hc11I'eirce attempts to capture the cast of' Alfred than any other contemporary conception. As Alfred North
Kus5rll \\:i;llilrii niinrl. Because of Wallace's disposition to express
Whitehead recognized, "philosophy is not-or at least. should -. . ..
hitnsell'in 11l;ll)san(\ diagrams, Peirce felt inclined to classifv hirn not ,be-a ferocious.db-ate between irritable professors" (1937,
as ;I rn;~tliel~li~tical thinker. But, to think in anv manner (mathe- 125). However, thisis-precisely what it still too often is.'Perhaps,
.. . ._
m;~ticalor otlier~visc)is to participate - in a...process analogous to
~ --_------__

-. _ _ . . .-.-.-- if we as philosophers can move toward a Peircean ideal -. of


the gi\,e.antl-take of: conversation. Early in his career, h e noted: cooperatixe inq.giry, philosophy will recover-rather than
-. ~_ ---- .-
"'ThougIlr.. s x..~.
a -Yl;.;to.
..
is--a silent speech of the soul with itself. If
dec'onstruct --itself. -- N o doubi, strong historicaEndndndcdtural fac-
-. .. ,
-- --
tliis 1)c. ;~tl~r~ittccf in~~nerise consequences fi)lIow; quite unrecog- torskontribute to the individualistic and antagonistic character
~ i i ~ c rI lIwlieve,
. Iiitherto" (W 2: 172; 1868).'Then, late in his life, of philosophical discourse; even so, historical and u l t u r a l forces
, , he wrote: "It cannot ,l>e_.too
tli;tl(!guP' (Ms283, 56 [variant]; 1905).
- -.
often rep~ated_t_hat..all..thu.t~ght
..
And, in fact, he did n o
is
t
also prompt.. -p h i l o s o p h t e c m e a commumal ~ ~ ~ ~ and'
- . -../ cooperative en..deavor.
, 1iesit;ttc to I-cpeat tliis ;~ssertion -- countless
. . ~ times. O n e such occa- I noted earlier that Peirce was, in principle, committed .to. ..
-.. --
~ i o n\\.as ;I rt>\,ic\vo f ;I I~iographyof W,lllace. Here, he stated: sacrificing literary elegance for scientific precision. In practice,
this Gjeaiit that he felt the *ec&sity~i6?uin t@khb-icalterms where
Rlcclir;~tioli
'.. is tli;ilog~e.
-.
"I says to myself, says 1," is the vernacular ordinary--.language ___- .. was&ly %precise. Thus, his writi~lgsare
;~c-co~llii-o-I' it: i111tl the niost minute ancl tireless study of logic
strewn with neoloqisms. Many of his linguistic inventions have
onl!. f01.tificsthis concel~tion.The majority of men commune ,-A,

\ v i ~ h tl~clnscl\~cs in worcls. The physicist, however, thinks of


forbidding visages.
cslx-l:imcliti~lg.()!'doingso~nethingand awaiting the resul~.-~he Peirce's
---__-..
need to coin new words was rooted in his concep- - -

;~ - r- -~ i again,
st. tliinks ;~l)o~!tpic.t~!!:es~,nti visual images, and largely
. . .~
__
tion of p h_i.-l o s o p ~ a saasciignce. ~ < w e v e r ,this very conception
i l l pic.t~~rc'd I)il.;:\,lGle thc ktusiciatl thinks ahouf. and in, tones. is in o u r time likely to pose an obstacle to an appreciation o f
. ..-- ---1-.---

I;inall\: t h r niatlie~n:~ticianclothes his thought in men-&I Peirce's contributions, for the v._ i e ~ that
l philosophy
. .-.- ought to aspire
7--- ....
tli;~gl:;uns.which csllil)lt regularities and analogies
~

- .. ~-- of
~.
abstmTt to the status of a science-is d e n by many tohave ~ e 3 - t ~ i ; r o u ' g h l y ~
li;;rn.; illlnos~quite h-cc f'roun the feelings that would acc-om- expG -.. d ~ d ~ ( eRorty
R, 1979; also 1982).To make matters even more
~XIII!' 1-(';11 ~)crc.cl>tiorls. A pu-son who from childhoocl 11as difficult, ~ e i - r c econceived philosophy .. - - be systematic
to
___d-__ - as wellas
l i ; ~ l ) i t ~ ~ n~i~ntle
ll\ his rcllcctions hy experimenting upon men- scientific; indeed, in his own mind. these were inseparable aspects
ti11 tli;~gl';~nls. \\.ill o~.clir~;~l-ilylack the readiness in conversation o f z adequate notion of philosophical inquiry. T h e various
t h ; ~ t I)clor,qs to 011c \\.lie i~l\r;iystlio~ghtin words, a n d will
.. - . ... -- - --- - - -- sciences are not simply a random collection of separate pursuits;
Introdurtzon xvii

they ought to be seen as parts of a system.


Yer. this also suggests a vicw_of-~-,hilosophy that, for many
-
tion of the sciences are just this-attempts to m a p t t-.i e-p a. .t..-h.s..of 1:
inquiry, with special attention being paid to the precise points
torlay has heen co~!lpletely_~iscredited. For perhaps the major- of G-tersection alllong these paths. That is, their function is prin-
\-

it? of' intellectuals today, the will-tp_a_pystem represents, at best, cipally heuristic; they show the direction in which a path of inquiry
"a lack of integrity" (Niet~sche1889 [196H], 25) and, at worst, a might be pushed and the sources by which the footsteps of an
\sill to donlinatr- indeed to terroriw. In the words of Lyotard, inquirer might be illulninated. Thus, judging Peirce in terms of
the criterion he niost prized, we are obliged to say: If there is any
'l'he r~inctcenthand twentieth centurieshave_givenus as much value to what Peirce has written, it resides in the power of these
terror- i ~ swe can take. We have paid a high e~i%ughpiice for writings to op_en_fiel_ds ---of inquiry
~-~- and, once having opened these
the r~ostalgi;iof'the whole and the one, for the reconciliatio~l fields, to offer assistance on how to cultivate the areas. As Peirce
of'the concept ; I J I ~the sensible, of the transparent anrl the corn.
himself noted, hiswritings are "meant . for people _-
who roanl to
rnunical)le experience. [Jr~derthe general demand for slacken- , .

ing ; ~ r i t lli)r apl,e;tsernent, we can hear the mutterings of the


find out; and people who want philosophy ladled out to them can
dc,sirc: i.01- a I-et11l-no f terror, for the realization of' the fantasy goeisewhere. There are philosophical soup shops at every corner,
- -----
thank God!" (1.11).
to sc.ii.e I-ealityl'hc answer is: Let us wage a war ~.
o n totality. . .
. - _-
(I.\o~ardl!)79 I l984], 81 -82) Thinkers wlio above all else desire to find out how the truth
of things stands are, by virtue of that desire, scientists. Such
?'his clccp clist~.l~sr of all attempts to present a comprehensive thinkers exhibit a form---_ of pros, the ..love of discovering vhat is not
\.ision is rooted in the conviction that there is an intrinsic con- yet knc?wn. However, this for111 of vros has been filr too absent
-- - .. - .- . .
, ~ ~ e c t i oIwtween
n i1 theory of the totality and the practices of among philosophers. Not only did Peirce dl-aw a very sharp
I . .
,-L
totali~nri;~nr.
-. . . . Ho~rever,s11'cha kunnectron must be painstkikingly distinction between thinkers t.raincd in laboratories arid those
,
..,
est;~l>lishedand not simply assurnecl. educated in seminaries; lie clainiect that the inhntile condition
. ,." - -. . --
,

But. insofill- assuch assumptions are made today, there is a of philosophical inquiry was due to the fact that philosophy "has :
contempornr). ol~stacleto attaining an interior understanding of been pursued by men who have not been nurtured in tlissecting-
Peircc's philosopIiic;~lproject -for he desired to be both systematic rooms and other laboratories, and who consequently have not ,'

- .~
' and sciel~tific. I'eirce confessed in a letter td~ames:~luralisln"does been animated
_. ._- - by.t_het~~scientif'c~os; but who have on the '
not siltisfi,~ith . . her ~nj~.l,:ild o r my heart'' (8.262; 1F05).Yei.ill
~
contrary come . .- fi-om
~ - theological
- - A -. -- ..- -
seminaries, and have conse- ,

:\nottier Iettcl- to this same person, he acknowledged his debt to quently been inflamet1,-with a-Pesire-_._ to anlend the lives of
-- - - - - .
'

Sclielling. noting: "one thing I admire-about 11imFchellingl.i~ themselves ancl others, - a spirit no doubt more important than
.
liis fi-eetloni t'rorn the tran~nlelsof system, and his holding hirnself the love of science, for men in average situations, but radically
.-... -.. . - - -. - -~
uncom~nittedr o ar1~.pre\~.ious.utterance. In that, he is like a scien- unfitting then1 for the task of scientific investigation" (1.620).
tific rlian" (I'crr~.1935, vol. 2, 415-16). Accordingly, the distinction between laboratory- and serninarv
1:inally i t is all too easy for those who have studied inten- trained philosophers rests not so much on where a person is
si\,ely the writings o f Peirce to get so caught u p in his "system" educated as on what a person loves. Thinkers w11n-- love only the
tllat they come to see it :IS a place in which to dwell rather than truth already i n - t l w i ~ p---___-.
o s s e s s i o nand, thus, conreive their task
:I point fi-on1which to proceed. Nevertheless, Peirce's outlines for . -
,-~ __
as isteadfast and uncomp~ornisi~g_defP~ise
-..--- of their property
21 c:l;tssification of'tllc sciences were not intended as a shelterfrom would count for Peirce as ser~iinar): .philosophers.
~_ In contrast,
- .
eitller the rc)ugh a n d t r ~ ~ i ~ lof > lordinary
e experience or the twists thinkers who 1ove:qbove - - -all- -else- - the
- t r ~ t K y - ~ t _ tbe
o d.isc_o~eretl
a n d tlll.ns o f s ~ i ~ ~ l t itliscovery;
fic they were intended as aids to and, hence. envision their role to be that of a painstaking a-;id
inql~ir!: J I I S I;IS l'circe thought that the most unpardonable cooperative inqui~:er \\;auld count for Peirce as laboratory \
ir~tclIcctrr;~l sin n;is to I)loc-k. the road of inquiry (1.135),Ti?~tliought
~
phi16;ophers. It sl~ouldbe n o surprise then (as Kcnnetli 1,;line '
th;~!;111lo11g t I i ( . rllost p~-ofitiiI)le int~liecti1~sl~~~o1.k was to map the Ketner points out) that "Persons wlin ha\,e had no actual sig-
l);ttl~s of' i11(111ir.\,((.I: Iicnt I!)S7. 1 7-19). FIis outlines for- a classifica- nificant experiences ~ v i t laboratol-y
l~ rnetllods have ;I Il;11itlic;11>
In,troduct ion x \I

'['lie first o f these is the d e n s i ~ ~ Y e i r r eprose. 's Many naturally infer that he lacks talent for speech when he o~llylacks
-_.
intelligent persons of' good will have experienced great difficulty
-I-.

.... _ _ .---- practice. (CN, vol. 111, 258-59)


in reading his.. writings. ... -
He himself claimed: "One of the most
extreme and most 1arnentaI)leof my incapacities is my incapacity Whether it be due to a lack of talent o r a lack of practice, Peirce !
) for linguistic expression" . ... (MS 632, 5-6). This is, in-l my estima- felt himself deficient in his ability to use language. In addition, \
tion. too harsh an assessment o f his own lin,guistic facility; he could
his writings occasion enough difficulty for intelligent a n d
tt.~-itewith clarity ancl even grace. However, he was, on prGiciple;
comn~itter~
~

t~~:s~crifi~inLql.~era~~eSan~e -. for scientific precision


benevolent readers to think that his-- sense --_--___ of deficiency was, in
/
--
some measure, iustified.
(see, e.g., 5.13). Moreover, although he insisted that ai1' thinking .__
* ~ o v k % ~ , P e i r_ is c efar -- less
___----difficult and - _far more accessible
necessarily relies upon symbols, he admitted that his own think-
-_I--

than many, of his critics maintain.-What most likely stands in the


ing only infi.eiluently clepended upon words (but one species o f -.--

.~ way 'ofaippreciating him is not so much his style of writing - as


svmbol). 111 filct, in MS 619 ("Studies in M<;=$"', Peirce acknow- -----\_
,....
his - style of philosophizing. ~2;;e's way ofphilds6phizing is at
-
I

ledged that \.isual dia~1:arns


.- constituted his "natural l a n p a g e o f once i n t e n s e T y 3 a m n g and currently unfashionable. . ..__ .. Even so,
,

re1 f-coniniunio~l"(14s 61 9, 8). it is possible t h a i - s i i d i s t i n c t i ~ e ~ n c e ~ t ~ - o n- ~ o- s o( ~ h i c a l


Ll'e get, in effect, a n interesting explanation of this personal
inquirv
. -d-.more clearly reveah the way to a recovery of philosophy
poljensitv \\,hen Peirce attempts to capture the cast of Alfred
than any other contemporary conception. As Alfred North
Kossrll \~';ll;rre'smind. Because of Wallace's disposition to express
Whitehead recognized, "philosophy is not-or at least. should .. . . ... I
I
hiniuelf in n~ill>s and diagrams, Peirce felt inclined to classify him
;IS n rnnthe~n;tticalthinker. But, to think in anv manner (mathe-
not.be-a ferociou.s.de&e3.getweeiirritable professors" (1037. -
..-p 125). However, this is-precisely ..- what - it still
- too often----.
iCPerhaps,
. . -
nl;~tic;~l or othc~.wise)is to participate in a process analogous to

".l'h(~)r~gtlt, savs .
- - . ... ..
the give-antl-take of'conyersation. Early in his career, h e noted:
.. 1'TLito. is-a .silent
-

v e e c h of the soul with itself. If


.~.
this' i)e :;(illlil fed i ~ n n ~ e n sconseqGGnces
e
_. .

follow: Guile unrecog ..,


--- if we as philosophers can move toward a Peircean
coopera_t~i)ii~~u-iry.
deconstruct-- -itself. -.
philosophy -- --
No dotXt, strong historlcaEn3~
--
will recover-rather ... than i
-.- - o t \
-- --- ---ideal

c a t u r a l fac-
tors.cohtr'ibute to the individualistic and antagonistic character
ni~ecl.I bclie\:e, hirlierto" (W 2: 172; 1868). 'Then, late in his life, of philosophical discourse; even so, historical, and cultural forces
11.1
he wrote: "It citnllot I>e_.toooften repeated._th_at-all. --
thaught is also promptqhilosophy.to~.bccome-a~,m_C~re,~~nn~o~~al
. . and-.
, ~.-
cli:tlogue" ( M S 283. .5(i [variant]; 1905). ..-
And, in fact? he did not cooperative endeavor.
;
hesititre to rc'peat this assertion countless times. O n e such occa-
-. -.. .--.-.....- .----- I noted earlier that Peirce was, in principle, committed to. ~.
~ i o n~\.as;I ~.e\,ic~\f o f a I,iog~.itphy of' Wallace. Here, he stated:
sacrificing literary elegance .- . . . for. . scientific precision. In practice,
....

this-Gearit that h e felt the n e c-_- e s s - iC____.___._.--.-.-~


t ' technical
~ ~ terms where
;\lc,dit;rtio~~ is.di;~lop~e.
. "I says to myself, says I," is the vernacular o r d i n a r y _ ! ~ n - ~yas-u.gd~*-@prqcise.
a~ Thus, his writings are
;~ccoruii.c~'i' it: ; ~ n t lthc rnost minute and tireless study of logic --
strewn with neologisms. - Many of his l i n p ~ i s t i cinventions have
or~l!.fi)rtif'ir'ithis 1-c)nc.eption.?'he majority of men commune
\\,it11 tllrrnscl\,cs in \vortls. T h e phpicist. however, thinks gf
forbidding visages.
rr~~crinlc:nti~~g.
--...
of' doing solnething and awaiting the res6lt.The
tion
Peirce's
.- ----
__
_ of philos2ms
need to coin _
a
.-- new words was rooted in his concep-
science. However, this very conception
.- -

;~ - r-~. i sa lq,r i l ~ t. l ~ i n h- s.aljour


. .
images, and large1y
pi~t~!r~~s~r~~cI~\~isu;~l
. -
_------
__

i l l ~>iccr~~.ctl 1)ils: \\,liilc thc ~nusicia~~ thinks'a6bu~~. and in, tones. is in our time likely to pose an obstacle to an appreciation o f ;
,.--.
-----
I.'i~l:rlly. thc ni;~tliemi~tician clothes his thought in rnen-kl Peirce's contributions, for the view that philosophy ought to aspire . .

cli;:lg~:;uns.
7 -- - -~ .. ~..
\vllicli csll~~?l.egrtlaritiesand analogies of ahstr~rf
-
to the status
. ~. of a ~cience-is tjk&kj;mahy tohave E~i---fEh?oughly -- . .-.

fi;rn~s;~lnlostclr~itrfree fi-on1 t h e feelings that woulcl acrom- expcded


..- (e.& Rorty 1979: also 1982). Tc] make matters even more
pall\ I.C;II ocrcVl>tions.A pc-rson w h o fronl childhood has difficult, Peirce conceived philosophy to -
.-
be systematic
--- - as well a s
I ~ : ~ l . ) i r r l ; t l l ! 111;tcIc liis rcllcction~by experitne~ltingupon 11leIl- scientific; indeed, in his own mind, these were inseparable aspects
ti11 tli;~gt.;~~ils. \\.ill o~.clil~;tril\
lack the re;~disiessin conversation o f a n adequate notion of philosophical inquiry. The various
t l i ; ~ t I ) c 4 o n ~ s10 O I I ~\\:ho
- . in.-
-- - -words,
. -. .. .
and will sciences are not simply a random collection of separate pursuits;
xviii 1~7lrodz~ctiun Introduclion xix

to overcome in achieving an understanding of Peirce's work" The two minds must be capable of co11ag to a n ~~ntlerstanding '
(19831). 81 11. 24). and_-- of observing when it is reached. 'l'his supjoses a power - - of
So m r ~ c lthen, ~ . tor those aspects of Peirce's style that are likely deliberate self-controlled thinking. Now nothillg can bccon-
to erect stumlAing blocks for many contemporary readers. In addi- - --

trolled that cannot be observed while -- it is in action. It is there :


tion to these general I>arriet-sto understanding, there are Pejrce's requisite that both rninds[=nt especially the Graphist-mind[,] .-

specific tliscussions of'tlle .self. A number of commentators appear should have a power of self-observation. Moreover, controxup-
to think tililt these disc~issionsd o not add u p to a theory of the poses a capacity in that which is to be controlled - of acting in!,
w - - ,

accordance
- .---.- with definite
._- general t e n d e n w f a tolerably stable! -.. .
self; but even if they do, this theory is woefully inadequate. Indeed,
naLu,u_ye,which impl~esa reality in this governing principle. But
I'eirce is h-equrntly taken to have expressed wildly inconsistent these habits. . .must be capable of being modified according
a n d sin~plywilt1 views about the nature a n d status of the self. In to some ideal in the mind of the controlling agent: and this
t';lct. his treatment of.this topic is taken to he, even by sympathetic controlling agent is to be the very same as the agent controlled,
. ..
ant1 i ~ ~ t i ~ r ncommentators
~eci (e.g., ~ a n l e ~" h o n ~ i s and' o n ~ichard the control
- extending even to the modes of control --
themselves,
Rcrnsrcin). tlir tveakest part of his erltire,philosophy. In Chapter ___-
since we suppose that the interpreter-minzunder the guidance
Forr~;I shi~llcsplic:itly defend Peirce against the specific charges --- ---discusses the---rationale
of the Graphist-mind ----. of logic
--.- itself. E k -

of rllcsc (ilnd othei.) critics. ing all these factors into account, we should corne to the same
conclusion that common-sense would have jumped to at the
Soulcn.h;lt late i l l his life, Peirce came to recognize the true
outset; namely, that the Graphist-mind
-. and interpreter-mind
-- ----
sigr~ifiril~lrc of' wh;tt h e called the normative sciences (cf. Potter must have all the characters of __ personal i~itellects~~p_c)s~sse_c!~~~_f~-
I!lfi7. 3: I < ~ - I II!)H'i,
~ 15). Individually, these sciences are aesthetics,
----__--_CI

ctl1ic.s a n d logic.. (:ollrctively, the task of' these sciences is to


.+ - moral < z r z . - @ 4 S ~ m n 3t 1-32)
'--
b, clisc.ovc.1."IIOIV
.. .----- I.Peli~~g, . --(:onduct., a n d Thought, wight to b e con.
. -
11-ollctls ~ ~ p p o stlic~n i ~ ~ gt o I>esubject in a nzpnsurr, a n d only in a Accordingly, Peirce's general theory of signs, insofar as it is
> ...
a normative account of reasoning, entails a commonsensical
' /
, Lr
rllc.;lsrr~-(:, t o scll-c(iiiii(3,kxekci3t.dt)y-men 6TSelS-criticism, a n d
-
tlrc p ~ ~ r p o s i \fi)r~n;~tiotl
.e
- .
.--- --
o f lli~bit]as common sensFtXT? us they
..~.
_ - . - _-
understanding -
- human agency. In light of this und;rstgnding,
of
arc i l l i t I ~ I ~ ; I S I con I I ~ tn)llal>le"(MS 655. 24; 11)10).Part and parcel agents-are beings who possess the _power to--
__._ ___-----
exercise real, although
-4

ol'P~irc.6 c \~. c \ I I ~ ~ I ;rccog~litior~


I~ of the central significance of the limited, control over
- - -- ---- the course
- - -- of t ~ c o n d u c t . ~ ; t hconclu-
e

t o mitkin: its irle;~sc l e ; ~must


_
I ~ ~ \ , ~ is that anv theory o f signs trulv colnmitrerl
I ~ O I . I I I ~ sc.iencw
~. b ~ j ! i . g ~ n t ~ o ~ ~ i n e n c e
- - - .-
sion of Chapter Four a n d a t the cent& of Chapter Five, Yeirce's
semiotic portrait of human agencv is examined in detail. His
with the Cartesian
;IS ;tg:nc.!.
-.
anrl autonomy. I n the context o f semiotics as a theorv - - ---.....--
refusal --
to eliminat_e_theactings_ubject -- __ along-
~

01'1-e;rsoj~i~rg
.-
~ i .n. g. . - - the form o f sem~osis
( ~ - c ; ~ s o ~itsell'lzeing _-__- in ~ r h i c h
- -
-,/ co,qito is o n e of the important respects in which Peirce's semiotic
.-
1'eirc.c \ ~ ; I S~ ~ l o(leeply st i~~terested),
.---------
he argues that self-qovernance
.'
-
visTon is superior__to the antihumanist orientation of Saussure's
-.
--
-

is ~ - o o r ~i ltl l sell-ol)se~.\,;~tion and self-criticism. ?'his position is -


structuralist a n d poststructuralist offspring. For these offspring,
. .. - .. . -- -.__ the decyntering o f t ~ ~- j eamounts

-
._
-

pc.1-11al)snrost c-leal-1).ii)~.ii~ulatecl in MS 280 ("The Basis of c t to nothing less than the


t'1.;1g11i;tri~-is111" (.. 190.5). Herr, Peirce admits that "The concep-
f?x~eirce,
~ i ~ u - i d ~ t i o- ~ ~ f ~ ~ ~ the t-; - - -
e n repudiation of the Carte-
ti011 oI'tI1c Iir~lc~~i~~-~i-~-~guflasijin, as sr~cli,is a liar_d.one$ analyze" sian_ startily: point means the recovey -- o_fflesh-and%lood actors
(\IS L'SO. \ ' ; \ I . ~ ~ I I ~30).I Kvcli SO. o n e appro~lchw o ~ ~ be
.....
l d to analyze who are c o n t i n X ( 6 ~ f ~ f i n l themselves
-----\
ng through
- - the& give-iid-
t l ~ i sl i ~ ~ ~ c t i oint ~tcl-111s i ~ ~ ogf iln exc-li;~ngebet~veana graphist ancl take relationsllips
--- with
- both the natural world a n d each other.
an intc.r1)rv~c1; ;I ~)roducc:~: o f signs and a receiver of'them. If the ere is a difference that surely makes-a difference (cf. 5.404).
-. ..- . Let me conclude this Introduction by revealing more tully
c s c ~ l l ; ~ ~I)cr\vc.c.n
~gc rllc r\vo ~ ~ a l - r iis e sto o p e r a t e a t the level of'
than 1 have thus far the character a n d the course of the follow-
al-gtllllc.llc;llio~~ ((.I.. (;.-l.5(;). tllrn \vh;~tmust ure assume about the
ing discussion. This \tudy of Peirce is neither strictly systematic
c,ll;~r;~c.rc~ oI' I ) o t 1 1 tile gr;~l>liisl-n~intl a11t1tlie interpreter-mind!
nor straightforwardly i.hronological,
- though i t is deeply informed
111 I'c-i~.c.c;sO \ V I I \~ortls.
l ~ yboth a desire to h e faithful to Peirce's architcctoaic r o n c r p -
tion of' scientific. inquiry and an awareness of how his views
evolved. T ~ ~ c - ' t ) ~chapter ird takes the most explicit account of' In the context of this critique, a semiotic account of human sub-
Peirce's system of the sciences, while the fourth a n d fifth chapters jectivity (and a distinctively Peircwn account at that) is outlined.
21-r most explicit about the way in which his understandirlg of In Chapter 'Three ("The Relevance of Peirce's Seuliotics to
nerniosis and, thus, of subjectivity developed over the course of Psychology"). n theme hinted at in the previous chapter is explored
- -- - ---. -.- more fully; namely, how Peirce himself corlceived the relation-
his career ils an invesrigator Gf~thes i ~ n sof the sell:
, -- _ _.- . ship between the general theo~y-ofsignsand the experimenol
Tile first chapter considers ~ e i r c e ' s ~ t ~ n & ~ t of i l isigns
e ~ r ~as
study_of---- the d d . In <;haper Four ("Peirce's ~ c c u u n t the-~Gif'),
~f
such, ~.\-he~-eas the following four examine specific applications
of this theory (in particular, Peirce's semiotic approach to self and I trace the stages in the evolution of Peirce's semiotic account of
mind). In C;hapter O n e ("Is Yeirce's Theory of Signs Truly human selfhood; a n d in the final chapter ("Inwardness a n d
- . . ..- -.
(kneral?"), a fc~ntlamentalconceptual revolution--js noted. In A u t o n o m T r I investigate the way in which Peirce, within his
,' op1:x)sition to the'dorninant GF<fa.~.fFiZGonthat has defined
. . -- -- . sen~iot.~~,fr_am~new~$,
un~ompromisinglv .. - accounts for the inward-
siglls ;IS thc expressions ot' mitGdsTYeirce proposed a t h o r o u g h -
. ~-. ness a n d autonomy characteristic of hlrrnan agents.
going senliotic perspective . i ~ ~ w h i c h - t hreality e of mind is seen This book draws u p o n not only Peirce's published writings
-._.- ----_ but also his unpublished man-usr-ipts. Moreover, it does not
;IS essentjall!~the development of a system of signs. T h e mind is -- -
.. .. .--- . . ..- - -.- ..
a sp,rcir.c o f st:rniosis. Accordingly, signs a r e not to Ire explained discuss Peirce in isola-tion from other figures either in the history
1r1. ~-cfcrenc.e ttr some occult and intrinsically private power called
of semiotics o r the philosophy of the mincl hut rather c o n ~ p a r e s
'~nind.'I ) r ~ trhc nlincl itself is to be explained in terms of those and contrasts him with such figures. T h e hope underlying this
book is to show that Peirce's study_.ofsignsis1>_0w~f~1Qn-a-~y
-
mall ik~t ; ~ n dinliel-cntly intersubjective processes called sernioses.
(Ffo\+.c.\,e.~:a s I argue in the conclildil~gchapter, this conceptual that has . bcen l i t ~ ! e ; l y p r ~ ~ a t ~Itd provides
. an important and, ,
rc~olutiondoes not cntail a reducti(?nistic.view-of human con- 1 believe, indispensable means to realize more cL~p>:th_'>;cratic-,;
- ideal of knowing ourselves.
..
scior~sness:the sc~ni;)ticapproach to mind a n d subi<ctiviti does - . ~ - \~

not i:i)ill~nitirnc to a n epiphenornenalist . . _ _position.)


__ Although this
colic.cptu;~lrc\~olutionin how to investigate the mind is noted in
the opening cl~aptel;the focus of the chapter is Peirce's general
theory of'signs ratliel- than any specific application of this theory.
>,lorespccif'ic;illy,the focus is a correct understanding of the cen-
tral concept o f Peir-cean serniotic, namely, semiosis o r sign-activity.
I n (:hiipter 'Iivo ("Semiosis a n d ~ u b j e c t i v i t y " ) ~ ~ h x a the ~ike
I-alidit).of n position tlefencled by Umberto Eco in A Throrjl of
sSo,niolic.s. In this work, Eco contends that a general t h e o y of signs
-- . -_ __._ .
cir~~rlot. in pri~lc:iple.consider - the concrete user
... - -..-. ~ ~.
oTs~gns.Tno h e r
~ ~ o r &\shirr . 1'c.irc.r called semiotic and Eco calls semibtics can-
not dc,i~Iwit11 sul)jecti\~ity.In arguing for this position, Eco appeals
101. siij:Yport to tlic I V ~ ' ; ~ ; I I ~ S of I'eirce. O n e of my objectives in this
cli;~pteris to s l l o ~thal, . ~ although a general, formal theory of signs
, . ~

ncccss;~~.il\. :~I>str;~cts t'ron~the


[ . . -.~ . . . -
concrete, historical participants in
sen~iOsis;si-ic1lT -I icor). nonethelesiYyields $;'array of concepts
tli;lt ; I I . ~ . il~dispc~ns;~l.)le f i ) ~ .an understanding of subjectivity.
, \ n o t h c ~~. o a is l to clt'nlo~lstratcthat. ;I fdithf~llintefpretation of
l'c.irc.c;111sclr~iofic.~ 1)oints in es;ictly the opposite rlirection of'Eco7s
~ , ~ t l U C ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , l w & l ~ C ~ S &s*-*m.-
& * & ~ , ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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