ALMIRA VS Ltd.
10 there would have been less certitude displayed in the
B.F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES, INC.
FERNANDO, J.:p
What is readily apparent in this appeal from a decision of
respondent Court of Industrial Relations, declaring a strike
illegal because of the means employed, and dismissing
petitioners, was the high pitch of bitterness that marked the
relationship between labor and management in the
establishment of private respondent, B. F. Goodrich
Philippines, Inc. Even a cursory reading of the records will
make evident that on both sides, there was the feeling that
the other party was guilty of conduct the most reprehensible
resulting in the flagrant disregard of its rights. With such a
background, there was a greater need for objectivity in the
application of the authoritative legal norms to the facts as
found. It cannot be said that respondent Court, more
precisely respondent Joaquin Salvador, then the Judge
whose order is now on appeal, was fully cognizant that such
should be the case.1 It is hard not to lend credence to the
contention of petitioners that there was undue receptivity to
the claim of private respondent, no doubt induced by the
skill, competence, and resourcefulness of its counsel, Atty.
Manuel Chan. It was unfortunate that in some of the crucial
stages of the controversy, petitioners did not have the same
advantage.2 Nonetheless, as will be shown, the strike could
have been viewed with a little less disapproval and even if
declared illegal, need not have been attended with such a
drastic consequence as termination of employment
relationship. This last point is even more compelling
considering the security of tenure which is one of the notable
features in the present Constitution.3
The facts according to the appealed order follow: "As to the
conduct of the strike and the picketing, this Court's Order of
July 1, 1971 has fully described the same. In the course of
the mass picketing, illegal and unlawful acts were committed
by the respondents such as physically blocking and
preventing the entry of complainant's customers, supplies
and other employees who were not on strike, both in
complainant's premises in Makati and Marikina, Rizal.
Injuries likewise were inflicted on certain employees of
complainant. Such acts of violence and intimidation appear
to be of such a widespread nature so as to create an
impression that there is a common pattern of action set into
motion by the respondents. The actuations of respondents
are likewise illegal. In the premises of complainant at Makati,
Rizal, the respondents who picketed the same on April 20,
1971 were identified ... . Similarly, some of the respondents
who picketed the Marikina premises of complainants were
identified ....4 Further: 'The complainant caused the
publication of notices in both the Manila Times and Daily
Mirror, newspapers of general and wide circulation ... for all
employees not participating in the illegal strike to report for
work on or before April 23, 1971, otherwise such failure will
be considered as participation therein. Such notices were
accompanied by instructions to personnel at all levels on
how reporting for work will be accomplished, considering the
precarious situation in relation to the safety of employees
brought about by the strike of respondents. With respect to
this particular aspect, certain of the respondents who were
not seen in the picket line on or before April 23, 1971 were
identified as having failed to report for work ... . It would
appear, however, that these listed respondents who failed to
report for work likewise were seen picketing the premises of
complainant after April 26, 1971, ... ."5 Then came this
portion: "It would seem that the picketing by respondents has
continued up [to] the present under the same pattern of
coercive activities narrated in our Order Of July 1, 1971.
Physical injuries where inflicted on complainants personnel
manager. Mass picketing with the employment of
intimidatory statements have again started on January 3,
1972. The roof of the complainants Makati Recap Plant was
set on fire on January 13, 1972 ..."6
Based on the above facts, it was in the appealed order of
Judge Salvador; "On the basis, therefore, of the motivation
as well as the conduct of the strike, the respondent are
declared to have committed an illegal strike, which is
likewise an unfair labor practice"7 As consequence, in the
dispositive portion, petitioner where "declared to have lost
their status of employees of the complainant corporation as
of April 19, 1971"8 The appealed order was handed down on
February 4, 1972. Had greater awareness been displayed to
the approach followed by this court in a 1968 decision, Cebu
Portland Cement Co. v. Cement Workers Union,9 as well as
to Shell Oil Workers' Union v. Shell Co. of the Philippines,
opinion of Judge Salvador as to the correctness of its
decision. Moreover, as stated at the outset, if there be
deference to what of late has been so evident, even on the
assumption of the illegality of the strike, there need not be
the automatic termination of the employment relationship,
especially so in view of the command of the present
Constitution as to the security of tenure.
1. It is understandable why respondent Judge
Salvador was unsympathetic to a strike in which petitioners
participated, considering the pendency of a certification
election, just because management would not consider their
union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative.
At the very least, it was premature. Nonetheless, there was
this commendable admission in the appealed order of Judge
Salvador; "Lest we be miscontrued, the ilegality of the strike
for recognition as general proposition is not absolute. We
declare such strike illegal on the basis of the attendant
circumstances in this case." 11 It mentioned the attendant
circumstances, but as was apparent in an earlier portion of
such order, what respondent Judge apparently could not
resist was the compelling force of what by now should be an
outmoded view of a strike being "by its very nature ...
coercive ... ." 12 To display such a predisposition is to ignore
the leading case of Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Cement
Workers Union. 13 For, as was therein pointed out, the ruling
in National Labor Union, Inc. v. Philippine Match Factory 14
to the effect that a strike "is an economic weapon at war with
the policy of the Constitution and the law," resort to which "is
not, in plain terms, outlawed," 15 although certainly
discouraged, is obsolete, for as was so clearly pointed out by
Justice J. B. L. Reyes in Cebu Portland Cement Co. v.
Cement Workers Union: 16 "For a time, decisions on the
issue under consideration were characterized by strict
adherence to the ruling in the Philippine Match Factory
Case." 17 Further, it was stated by him: "The actual
break-away from the doctrine laid down in the Philippine
Match Factory case came in Dinglasan v. National Labor
Union, when the discretionary power of the Court of
Industrial Relations to grant affirmative relief was recognized.
... Thereafter, the doctrine enunciated in Interwood
Employees Association ... that good faith of the strikers in
the staging of the strike is immaterial in the determination of
the legality or illegality of the strike, was abandoned. In the
case of Ferrer v. CIR, et al. the belief of the strikers that the
management was committing unfair labor practice was
properly considered in declaring an otherwise premature
strike, not unlawful, and in affirming the order of the Labor
Court for the reinstatement without back wages of said
employees." 18 This 1968 decision of this Court, if present in
the consciousness of respondent Judge Salvador, certainly
could have caused, at the very least, a hesitancy on his part
to declare the strike illegal. This is not to deny that the labor
union ought not to have declared a strike under such
circumstances, but at least, while premature, it could have
been plausibly viewed as inspired by good faith, although
perhaps not guided by sound legal advice.
2. What was set forth in the facts as found by
respondent Judge Salvador would indicate that it was during
the picketing, certainly not peaceful, that the imputed acts of
violence did occur. It cannot be ignored, however, that there
were injuries on both sides because management did not,
understandably, play a passive role confronted as it was with
the unruly disruptive tactics of labor. This is not, by any
means, to condone activities of such character, irrespective
of the parties responsible. It is merely to explain what cannot
be justified. Nonetheless, did the acts in question call for an
automatic finding of illegality? Again, the order issued on
February 4, 1972 appeared to be oblivious of a 1971
decision of this Court, Shell Oil Workers' Union v. Shell
Company of the Philippines, Ltd. 19 There it was clearly
held: "A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be
placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however,
especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid
stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such
acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right
to strike, responsibility in such case should be individual and
not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of
course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is
pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately
resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably
concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes
illegal because of the means employed. 20 It must be
pointed out likewise that the facts as there found would seem
to indicate a greater degree of violence. Thus: "Respondent
Court must have been unduly impressed by the evidence
submitted by the Shell Company to the effect that the strike
was marred by acts of force, intimidation and violence on the
evening of June 14 and twice in the mornings of June 15 and
16, 1967 in Manila. Attention was likewise called to the fact
that even on the following day, with police officials stationed
at the strike-bound area, molotov bombs did explode and the
streets were obstructed with wooden planks containing
protruding nails. Moreover, in the branches of the Shell
Company in Iloilo City as well as in Bacolod, on dates
unspecified, physical injuries appeared to have been inflicted
on management personnel. Respondent Court in the
appealed decision did penalize with loss of employment the
ten individuals responsible for such acts. Nor is it to be lost
sight of that before the certification on June 27, 1967, one
month had elapsed during which the Union was on strike.
Except on those few days specified then, the Shell Company
could not allege that the strike was conducted in a manner
other than peaceful. Under the circumstances, it would be
going too far to consider that it thereby became illegal." 21
Then, mention was made of a decision "in Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees' Association v. Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. [where] there is the recognition by this
Court, speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing as such
being 'inherently explosive.' It is thus clear that not every
form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a
strike or to cause the loss of employment by the guilty party."
22
There was in that case a concurring opinion by Justice
Barredo which elicited the approval of the present Chief
Justice. Thus: "All these, however, do not mean, on the other
hand, that petitioner's strike should necessarily be held to be
illegal. It is always a wholesome attitude in cases of this
nature to give but secondary importance to strict
technicalities, whether of substantive or remedial law, and to
constantly bear in mind the human values involved which are
beyond pecuniary estimation. 23
It would seem, therefore, to reiterate a point, that on the date
of the appealed order of February 4, 1972, a less
condemnatory attitude to the appearance of violence as such
was part of the law of the land. It is to be admitted that this is
one of those close cases. What is merely emphasized is that
the imputation of illegality on the ground of the means
employed is not automatically called for.
3. This is not to say that the appealed order is totally
bereft of support in law. It is merely to point out that the facts
as found did not point automatically and unerringly to so
severe a result, namely the dismissal of petitioners. From a
perspective more attuned to the trend indicated in current
decisions of this Court, the three cited cases being
representative, the conclusion reached could have been cast
in a different mold. In labor law, as in constitutional law, it is
no doubt true that the issues submitted, in the language of
Justice Malcolm, may be "determined by the court's
approach to them." 24 It is submitted that the direction
indicated in the express language of both the 1935 and the
present Constitution, is that which leads to protection to
labor. 25
As previously noted, both petitioners and private respondent
were guilty of practices far from peaceful in character. The
original blame must of course be assumed by petitioners, for
they ought to have known that the picketing that comes
within the protection of the free speech guarantee is one that
is peaceful. It involves people marching to and fro with
placards to acquaint the public with the facts of a labor
dispute. So it has been ruled from Mortera v. Court of
Industrial Relations 26 a 1947 decision, to Chan Bros., Inc.
v. Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros
Trabajadores de Filipinas 27 decided in January of this year.
When they obstructed entrance into the premises of private
respondent, they ought to have known that they were inviting
reprisal. It has been observed of course that in labor
controversies the unstructured incoherencies of vehement
protest for grievances, sincerely even if erroneously felt, may
easily flare up into rowdy conduct. So it did come about. The
appealed order took note of the resulting melee. From the
standpoint of settling a dispute, it would not suffice just to
visit recriminations on either or both parties. The more
crucial question is what to do next.
We start with the circumstances that ought to be considered.
To repeat, the breach of the peace, though started by
petitioners, was not solely their responsibility as it turned out.
For criminal charges and counter charges were filed by one
group against the other. The reply brief of private
respondent, submitted on March 8, 1973, included a
memorandum from a certain Attorney Rolando A. Velasco,
speaking of the status of the criminal cases filed by the
group of petitioners against management men, 28 , and of
thirteen criminal cases as well as complaints against at least
thirty individuals identified with private respondent. 29 In
some of them the complainants did not press charges, and
the cases were dismissed. With the submission of such data,
its objection to the admission of information similar in
character as to the status of the criminal cases against
petitioners loses weight. What is more, it does not appear as
of this date as to who of the petitioners were found guilty of
what was referred to it in the Shell opinion as committing
serious acts of violence. As a matter of fact, the appealed
order merely referred to the instances of picketing conducted
illegally without specifically pin-pointing the culprits to whom
such kind of conduct could be ascribed. It would seem
therefore, that the wholesale dismissal of petitioners is far
from warranted. It is to be admitted though that on a showing
of having engaged in non-peaceful activities of a serious
character, the right to re-admission is defeated.
This conclusion is further fortified by the stress on the
security of tenure that is a notable feature of the present
Constitution. As pointed out in a decision rendered only last
month, Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Philippine Air Lines
Employees Association: 30 "The futility of this appeal
becomes even more apparent considering the express
provision in the Constitution already noted, requiring the
State to assure workers 'security of tenure.' It was not that
specific in the 1935 Charter. The mandate was limited to the
State affording protection to labor, especially to working
women and minors, ....
... That is to conform to the ideal of the New Society, the
establishment of which was to felicitously referred to by the
First Lady as the Compassionate Society. 31 To the possible
objection that in this Philippine Air Lines case, there was an
order of reinstatement, it suffices by way of an answer that
while the facts could be distinguished, the basic principle in
accordance with a constitutional mandate, in the language of
Justice Cardozo, speaks with a reverberating clang that
drowns all weaker sounds.
It would imply at the very least that where a penalty less
punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed
by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so
severe. It is not only because of the law's concern for the
workingman. There is, in addition, his family to consider.
Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on
those dependent on the wage-earner. The misery and pain
attendant on the loss of jobs then could be avoided if there
be acceptance of the view that under all the circumstances
of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their
means of livelihood. Nor is this to condone what had been
done by them. For all this while, since private respondent
considered them separated from the service, they had not
been paid. From the strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot be
too strongly stressed, to follow Davis in his masterly work,
Discretionary Justice, 32 that where a decision may be made
to rest an informed judgment rather than rigid rules, all the
equities of the case must be accorded their due weight.
Finally, labor law determinations, to quote from Bultmann,
should be not only secundum rationem but also secundum
caritatem.
4. This is all that needs to be said except to remind
petitioners that the basic doctrine underlying the provisions
of the Constitution so solicitous of labor as well as the
applicable statutory norms is that both the working force and
management are necessary components of the economy.
The rights of labor have been expanded. Concern is evident
for its welfare. The advantages thus conferred, however, call
for attendant responsibilities. The ways of the law are not to
be ignored. Those who seek comfort from the Shelter that it
affords should be the last to engage in activities which
negate the very concept of a legal order as antithetical to
force and coercion. What is equally important is that in the
steps to be taken by it in the pursuit of what it believes to be
its rights, the advice of those conversant with the
requirements of legal norms should be sought and should
not be ignored. It is even more important that reason and not
violence should be its milieu.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of February 4, 1972 as
affirmed in a resolution of March 14, 1972 is reversed and
set aside. Petitioners against whom no criminal charges filed
in relation to their acts referred to in this decision are still
pending are ordered reinstated to their employment, with the
right to backpay corresponding to eighteen (18) months, at
the respective rates of compensation they were being paid
on February 4, 1972, without any deduction corresponding to
any possible income earned elsewhere since their dismissal
to the present. Those petitioners against whom criminal
complaints have been filed shall be reinstated, with the right
to backpay as herein indicated, only upon the final dismissal
of said cases or their acquittal therein. Respondent Court is
hereby ordered to implement this decision as expeditiously
as possible. No costs.
CALALANG VS WILLIAMS
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as
a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition
for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D.
Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission;
Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio
Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of
Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of
Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic
Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from
1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague
Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from
the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that
the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18,
1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director
of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public
Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the
approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of
the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the
modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to
animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, in his second
indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works,
approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario
Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn
vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above
indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and
regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such
enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned
to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No.
548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval
of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is
authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the
regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national
roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is
untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule
has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case
decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude
of cases, namely: ’The true distinction therefore is between
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made.’ (Cincinnati, W.
& Z. R. Co. v. Comm’rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.)
Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v.
Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. v.
Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the
decisions is to give prominence to the ’necessity’ of the
case."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive
orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations,
with the approval of the President, may contain provisions
controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other
structures within a reasonable distance from along the
national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any
or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and
his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition
of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and
interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power
upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications. The authority therein
conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the
rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine
what public policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said
Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive
orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and
interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which
the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate
rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to
determine when and how long a national road should be
closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience
and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discretion of some other government official
to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the
proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be
said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the
law. As was said in Locke’s Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert
that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend
on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power
to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed
relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things
future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction
the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things upon which
the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend.
To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government.
There are many things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be known to the
law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of
inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."
(Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R. Nos.
46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in
Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service
Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940,
this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of
separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
legislation," not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of
separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent,
been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers
by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in
administrative and executive officials, not only in the
execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain
rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations
promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful
interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National
Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of
the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is,
to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare,
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere
with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will
fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education
and personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred
upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from
the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization
advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los
Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to
exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a
business lawful today may in the future, because of the
changed situation, the growth of population or other causes,
become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be
required to yield to the public good." And in People v. Pomar
(46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is
bringing within the police power of the state today things
which were not thought of as being within such power
yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly
increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an
increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the
government to look after and care for the interests of the
individuals of the state, have brought within the police power
many questions for regulation which formerly were not so
considered."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations
complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people. The
promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by
the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition
of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and
of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is
hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
PEOPLE VS CAWILI
FERNANDO, J.:
The difficulty that faces appellant Rodrigo Cawili, prosecuted
and convicted for the crime of rape in the lower court, arises
from the coherent and straight-forward story narrated by the
offended party, a thirteen-year old girl, who, while asleep in
her house was taken by surprise by the accused and thus
fell victim to his carnal desires. Nonetheless, there is in the
brief submitted by counsel a sustained effort to seek a
reversal predicated on the ground that an appraisal of the
testimony offered by the prosecution would reveal that the
constitutional presumption of innocence had not been
overcome.1 A careful study of the records, however,
discloses that the lower court did consider carefully and
meticulously the evidence of both the complainant and the
accused. It was his conclusion that there was enough proof
to satisfy the requirement that guilt be shown beyond
reasonable doubt. We are not justified in viewing the matter
differently. We affirm.
The victim of rape in this case is Elizabeth de Jesus, who, at
the time of the commission of the offense, was thirteen years
of age. She was in the sixth grade. She began by stating that
she was asleep in her house at Barrio Almacen, Hermosa,
Bataan, at about 10:00 in the evening of February 11, 1968.
Then she continued: "I was awakened by a certain weight
upon my body and when I was awakened, accused Rodrigo
Cawili was on top of me and [I] felt pain in my private
parts."2 She then pushed and kicked him and shouted at the
top of her voice "Inang" (Mother).3 Asked why she had felt
such pain, she answered that his genital organ was inserted
in hers.4 Obviously alarmed by her shout, Rodrigo Cawili
released her and ran downstairs; her mother, awakened by
the shout, went to the kitchen and came back with a bolo to
chase Cawili but she did not catch up with
him.5 On cross-examination, Elizabeth de Jesus admitted
that when she went to bed she had her panties on, but that
when she woke up, she noticed that not only was appellant
on top of her but also that she was divested of such
garment.6 The trial court itself did not merely accept her
story. It pursued the matter further.7 She explained that the
previous night, a Saturday, she had attended a party in
Barrio Pulo, Hermosa, Bataan, one that lasted until almost
morning. All day the next day, she pressed clothes. Thus it
was that on the night of February 11, 1968, she went to bed
tired and drowsy. She slept soundly. It was not unexpected
then for appellant to be able to remove such garment and for
him to place himself on top of her, without her immediately
noticing it.8 When the incident happened, on February 11,
1968, the young girl's father was not at home. When he
came back from work from Subic, Zambales, on February
17, 1968, his daughter was so ashamed of what had
happened to her that she did not even tell him specifically
that appellant had succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
her. It was only after she was brought to a doctor on
February 19, 1968, and it was discovered that she had a
swollen vulva, a swollen urethral orifice and a ruptured
hymen with two healed lacerations, 9 that she admitted to
her father that appellant succeeded in his designs. Rodrigo
Cawili, a neighbor and a "compadre" of the young victim's
mother, was readily recognized by Elizabeth de Jesus
because "the house was bright inside, it being lighted by a
lamp, second, there was a light on the post just opposite our
house, and third, it was a moonlit night." 10 The facts
narrated above gave rise to the charge of rape against
Rodrigo Cawili.
After trial duly had, he was convicted and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended
party and to recognize and support the offspring, if any. The
case is before us now on appeal. As noted at the outset, the
principal ground relied upon as the basis for reversal is that
the constitutional presumption of innocence had not been
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. While there is
a recognition that the appraisal of the lower court of the
evidence offered is accorded deference and respect, it is
submitted that such finding cannot prevail in the absence of
a showing that suffices to overturn what is so clearly
expressed in the fundamental law that guilt is not to be
presumed. 11 As a statement of juridical norm, that is
correct. This Court has repeatedly stressed that accusation
cannot be considered as synonymous with culpability, and
the evidence offered by the prosecution must meet the
required standard. Only then is a conviction warranted. 12 It
is on that basis that in several recent decisions, a person
accused of and sentenced for rape succeeded in obtaining a
reversal. 13 This is not, however, as already mentioned, one
such case.
1. In appellant's brief, the principal authority cited in
support of the plea that the constitutional presumption of
innocence had not been overcome is an excerpt from Justice
Laurel's opinion in People v. Manoji. 14 What was
conveniently left out was the opening phrase of the citation
which certainly casts a different light on the matter. Accuracy
demands that this particular sentence relied upon he quoted
in full: "In the light of the facts and circumstances of record,
we feel that it is better to acquit a man on reasonable doubt,
even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the
penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may
be innocent. ..." 15 As a matter of fact, the opening sentence
of that particular paragraph starts with this phrase: "Upon the
other hand, there are certain facts which if taken together are
sufficient to raise in the mind of the court a grave doubt as to
the guilt of the defendant-appellant, ..." 16 In this case, on
the contrary, the testimony of the offended party, so firm and
so categorical, does not give rise to any such misgivings.
When put on the stand by her counsel, she was able to
narrate clearly and concisely the untoward event that befell
her in the evening on question. Afterwards, she was
cross-examined intensively and exhaustively for two days.
17 Questions searching in character but unavoidable
considering the nature of the offense, quite embarassing for
a young girl of tender years, came not only from the defense
but also from the judge, desirous of ascertaining the truth
and conscious of the dire penalty that goes with conviction
for this heinous crime. At one stage, her counsel had to ask
the court for a recess of five minutes as she was evidently
under strain and she was feeling dizzy. 18 The court granted
a suspension of the session not for five minutes sought but
for ten minutes. Moreover, right afterwards, it was adjourned.
19 The grueling ordeal to which she was subjected
continued all throughout the next day when the hearing was
resumed. Her version of what transpired came under the
most rigorous scrutiny, again from both the defense and the
court itself. No contradiction was elicited although it was
quite obvious that she would rather not remember the details
of that unfortunate incident. Twice the session had to be
suspended because she was in tears. 20 The second time,
the court itself was moved to declare: "The witness is still
crying. Let us have a recess." 21
2. This notwithstanding, counsel for appellant would
have the temerity to assert that the testimony of complainant
was "evasive." 22 He would seek to impress on us that there
was not enough evidence to warrant conviction for the
offense of rape and would imply that perhaps only trespass
to dwelling was committed. Such a contention is devoid of
merit. As was stressed in People v. Baylon: 23 "The other
point raised in the brief for appellant that the crime of rape
was not shown to have been committed defies rationality, let
alone commonsense. Time and time again, this Court had
correctly observed that no woman, especially one of tender
age, would willingly expose herself to the embarrassment of
a public trial wherein she would have not only to admit but
also to narrate the violation of her person, if such indeed
were not the case. Far better it is in not a few cases to spare
herself the humiliation if there be some other way of bringing
the offender to justice. Here, there was such a testimony
coming from the offended party, firm, categorical,
straightforward. ... It is quite a strain on one's credulity to
believe that under such circumstances, the young girl's
honor remained unsullied, the nefarious design unfulfilled. To
repeat, appellant had not made out a case for a reversal." 24
The succeeding paragraph in the opinion therein rendered
likewise deserves mention: "Nor is this all. As was noted in a
recent case, People vs. Molina, it is manifest in the decisions
of this Court that where the offended parties are young and
immature girls like the victim in this case, there is a marked
receptivity on its part to lend credence to their version of
what transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The state, as
parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of
harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in
cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone.
The consternation it causes her family must also be taken
into account. It may reflect a failure to abide by the
announced concern in the fundamental law for such
institution. There is all the more reason then for the rigorous
application of the penal law with its severe penalty for this
offense, whenever warranted." 25
3. There is one other matter equally deserving of
attention. Counsel for appellant did not even mention the
defense offered by his client. It is understandable why. In the
statement of the accused taken before Corporal Cipriano
Vistan 26 and subscribed before the Municipal Judge
Bernabe T. Peñaflor of Hermosa, Bataan, he admitted
having entered the house of complainant with the
explanation that he made a mistake due to his being in a
state of intoxication, but denied having done anything
reprehensible. At the trial, he had another version. He would
rely on alibi. This is how the lower court disposed of the
matter: "The defense interposed by the accused is alibi. His
testimony is to the effect that starting from 9:00 o'clock in the
evening of February 11, 1968, he was in his house at
Almacen, Hermosa, Bataan, asleep with his wife and child.
He asserts that the filing of the instant criminal charge
against him was ill-motivated, because his wife and the
spouses Dominador de Jesus and Rufina Santos had a
misunderstanding; that the spouses used to buy goods on
credit from their store and failed to pay their account; that
prior to February 11, 1968, the spouses tried to get some
more goods on credit which he refused, because the old
debt was not paid; that because of the incident, the spouses
went to the extent of approaching Nicanor Sioson, the owner
of the lot where his store is erected for the purpose of having
him ejected from Sioson's lot. The accused further testified
that he was forced to give his statement, Exhibit C, and had
to sign it because he was mauled. He showed a scar on the
upper left eyebrow; and [said] that he signed his statement
not before the subscribing officer, Municipal Judge Peñaflor,
but in jail. The defense deserves no serious consideration.
The accused could not produce any one of the persons he
mentioned ... to corroborate his testimony. His claim that his
sworn statement, Exhibit C, was forcibly taken out of him as
evidenced by his swollen left eyebrow, was belied both by
Pat. Conrado Alvaro of the Hermosa Police Force, who
fetched the accused from his house to the Municipal Building
for investigation, and by P.C. Sgt. Cipriano Vistan. Pat.
Alvaro testified that when he made a preliminary inquiry, the
accused admitted to him having entered the house of
Dominador de Jesus on the night in question because he
was drunk. Pat. Alvaro denied having mauled the accused.
Likewise Sgt. Vistan declared that in the course of his
investigation, the accused revealed to him that he (accused)
was boxed by Dominador de Jesus, father of the
complainant, [thus explaining] the swollen face and cut on
the upper left eyebrow." 27 What had been stated earlier as
to the ordeal undergone by the offended party when she was
placed on the stand to give her credible and competent
testimony with a clear identification of the accused would
serve to bolster further the characterization of his defense as
undeserving of serious consideration. Moreover, there is this
excerpt from the recent decision of People v. Cudalina: 28 "It
suffices to state that this Court when confronted with the
defense of alibi in rape cases has invariably found it
unconvincing and unsatisfactory." 29
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of March 31, 1969 by
the then Judge Tito V. Tizon of the Court of First Instance of
Bataan is affirmed. Costs against appellant.
MALTO VS PEOPLE
CORONA, J.:
Whereas, mankind owes to the child the best it has to give.
(Final preambular clause of the Declaration of the Rights of
the Child)
This is a petition for review1 of the decision2 dated July 30,
2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25925
affirming with modification the decision3 of Branch 109 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in Criminal Case No.
00-0691 which found petitioner Michael John Z. Malto guilty
for violation of paragraph 3, Section 5(a), Article III of RA
7610,4 as amended.
Petitioner was originally charged in an information which
read:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF SECTION
5(b), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED,
committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of
November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a
professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption
College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to
indulge in sexual intercourse for several times with him as in
fact said accused had carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.5
This was subsequently amended as follows:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF SECTION
5(a), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED,
committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of
November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a
professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take advantage and exert influence, relationship
and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his student
at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17
years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused
has carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.6
Petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned; hence, the
trial court entered for him a plea of "not guilty." After the
mandatory pre-trial, trial on the merits proceeded.
The prosecution established the following:
At the time of the incident, private complainant AAA was 17
years old.7 She was a college student at the Assumption
College in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City. Petitioner, then
28, was her professor in her Philosophy II class in the first
semester of the school year 1997 to 1998.
On July 18, 1997, AAA was having lunch with her friends
when petitioner joined their group. He told them to address
him simply as "Mike." He handed them his organizer and
asked them to list down their names and contact numbers.
On October 3, 1997, while AAA and her friends were
discussing the movie Kama Sutra, petitioner butted in and
bragged that it was nothing compared to his collection of
xxx-rated films. To the shock of AAA’s group, he lectured on
and demonstrated sexual acts he had already experienced.
He then invited the group to view his collection.
On October 10, 1997, petitioner reiterated his invitation to
AAA and her friends to watch his collection of pornographic
films. Afraid of offending petitioner, AAA and two of her
friends went with him. They rode in his car and he brought
them to the Anito Lodge on Harrison St. in Pasay City. They
checked in at a "calesa room." Petitioner was disappointed
when he found out there was neither a video cassette player
(on which he could play his video tapes) nor an x-rated show
on the closed-circuit television. He suggested that they just
cuddle up together. AAA and her friends ignored him but he
pulled each of them towards him to lie with him in bed. They
resisted until he relented.
AAA and her friends regretted having accepted petitioner’s
invitation. For fear of embarrassment in case their
classmates got wind of what happened, they agreed to keep
things a secret. Meanwhile, petitioner apologized for his
actuations.
Thereafter, petitioner started to show AAA amorous
attention. He called her on the phone and paged8 her
romantic messages at least thrice a day. When semestral
break came, his calls and messages became more frequent.
Their conversation always started innocently but he had a
way of veering the subject to sex. Young, naive and coming
from a broken family, AAA was soon overwhelmed by
petitioner’s persistence and slowly got attracted to him. He
was the first person to court her. Soon, they had a "mutual
understanding" and became sweethearts.
When AAA secured her class card in Philosophy II at the
start of the second semester, petitioner told her that he gave
her a final grade of "3." She protested, stating that her
mid-term grade was "1.2." He gave her a grade of "1.5"
when she promised not to disclose his intimate messages to
her to anyone. He also cautioned her not to tell anyone
about their affair as it could jeopardize his job.
On November 19, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., AAA agreed
to have lunch with petitioner outside the premises of the
college. Since she was not feeling well at that time, he asked
her to lie down in the backseat of his car. She was surprised
when he brought her to Queensland Lodge9 on Harrison St.
in Pasay City. Once inside the motel room, he kissed her at
the back and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand
inside her blouse. She resisted his advances but he was too
strong for her. He stopped only when she got angry at him.
On November 26, 1997, petitioner asked AAA to come with
him so that they could talk in private. He again brought her to
Queensland Lodge. As soon as they were inside the room,
he took off his shirt, lay down in bed and told her, "halika na,
dito na tayo mag-usap." She refused but he dragged her
towards the bed, kissed her lips, neck and breasts and
unsnapped her brassiere. She struggled to stop him but he
overpowered her. He went on top of her, lowered her pants
and touched her private part. He tried to penetrate her but
she pushed him away forcefully and she sat up in bed. He
hugged her tightly saying, "Sige na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I
won’t hurt you." She refused and said, "Mike, ayoko." He
angrily stood up saying, "Fine, hindi na tayo mag-uusap.
Don’t come to the faculty room anymore. You know I need
this and if you will not give in or give it to me, let us end this."
She replied, "Mike, hindi pa ako ready and it was you who
said it will be after my debut" on December 3, 1997. He
insisted that there was no difference between having sex
then and after her debut. He told her, "kung hindi ko
makukuha ngayon, tapusin na natin ngayon." Pressured and
afraid of his threat to end their relationship, she hesitantly
replied "Fine." On hearing this, he quickly undressed while
commenting "ibibigay mo rin pala, pinahirapan mo pa ako"
and laughed. They had sexual intercourse.
In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship with petitioner. She
learned that he was either intimately involved with or was
sexually harassing his students in Assumption College and
in other colleges where he taught. In particular, he was
dismissed from the De La Salle University-Aguinaldo for
having sexual relations with a student and sexually
harassing three other students. His employment was also
terminated by Assumption College for sexually harassing two
of his students. It was then that AAA realized that she was
actually abused by petitioner. Depressed and distressed, she
confided all that happened between her and petitioner to her
mother, BBB.
On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands of
petitioner, BBB filed an administrative complaint in
Assumption College against him. She also lodged a
complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City
which led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691.
In his defense, petitioner proffered denial and alibi. He
claimed that the alleged incidents on October 3, 1997 and
October 10, 1997 did not happen. He spent October 3, 1997
with his colleagues Joseph Hipolito and AJ Lagaso while he
was busy checking papers and computing grades on
October 10, 1997. The last time he saw AAA during the first
semester was when she submitted her final paper on
October 18, 1997.
On November 19, 1997, between 10:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m.,
he sorted out conflicts of class schedules for the second
semester at the Assumption College. On November 26,
1997, he was at St. Scholastica’s College (where he was
also teaching) preparing a faculty concert slated on
December 12, 1997. At lunch time, he attended the birthday
treat of a colleague, Evelyn Bancoro.
On November 29, 1997, he attended AAA’s 18th birthday
party. That was the last time he saw her.
According to petitioner, AAA became his sweetheart when
she was already 19 years old and after he was dismissed
from Assumption College. On December 27 and 28, 1998,
they spent time together, shared their worries, problems and
dreams and kissed each other. On January 3, 1999, he
brought her to Queensland Lodge where they had sexual
intercourse for the first time. It was repeated for at least 20
times from January 1999 until they broke up in July 1999,
some of which were done at either his or her house when no
one was around.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution
sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction. On March 7,
2001, it rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty.10 The
dispositive portion read:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Michael
John Malto y Zarsadias guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Article III, Section 5(a)[,] paragraph 3 of RA
7610[,] as amended and hereby sentences him to reclusion
temporal in its medium period or an imprisonment of
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of
Php 75,000.00 and moral and exemplary damages of Php
50,000.00 to minor complainant with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.11
Petitioner questioned the trial court’s decision in the CA. In a
decision dated July 30, 2004,12 the appellate court affirmed
his conviction even if it found that his acts were not covered
by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610. It further observed that the trial court failed to fix
the minimum term of indeterminate sentence imposed on
him. It also ruled that the trial court erred in awarding
₱75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA as it was proper only
in a conviction for rape committed under the circumstances
under which the death penalty was authorized by law.13
Hence, the CA modified the decision of the trial court as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of conviction is
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that (1) appellant
MICHAEL JOHN MALTO y ZARSADIAS is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) Years and
One (1) Day of prision mayor as minimum, to Seventeen (17)
Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion
temporal as maximum; and (2) the sum of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity is DELETED.14
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in sustaining his
conviction although it found that he did not rape AAA. For
him, he should have been acquitted since there was no rape.
He also claims that he and AAA were sweethearts and their
sexual intercourse was consensual.
Petitioner is wrong.
The Offense Stated in the Information Was Wrongly
Designated
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.15 Pursuant thereto, the complaint or information
against him should be sufficient in form and substance. A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense and the place where
the offense was committed.16
The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances.17 If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.18 The acts or
omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used
in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.19
The designation of the offense in the information against
petitioner was changed from "violation of Section 5(b), Article
III" of RA 7610 to "violation of Section 5(a), Article III"
thereof. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA
7610 provide:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -
Children, whether male or female, who, for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce
child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
1. Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
2. Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by
means of written or oral advertisements or other similar
means;
3. Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a
child as a prostitute;
4. Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage
him as a prostitute; or
5. Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary
benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in
prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, that the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; and
xxx xxx x x x(emphasis supplied)
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces
child prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following
means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by
means of written or oral advertisements or other similar
means;
c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a
child as a prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage
him as a prostitute or
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary
benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in
prostitution;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in
prostitution and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age.
On the other hand, the elements of paragraph (b) are:
1. the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct;

2. the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse and
3. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or
connected with child prostitution. It contemplates sexual
abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words,
under paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit.
On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child
exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to
other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a
child is abused for profit but also one in which a child,
through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.20
The information against petitioner did not allege anything
pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It did not
aver that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged was
that petitioner had carnal knowledge or committed sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was
induced and/or seduced by petitioner who was her professor
to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and
AAA was a 17-year old minor. These allegations support a
charge for violation of paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), of
Section 5, Article III, RA 7610.
The Real Nature of the Offense is Determined by Facts
Alleged in the Information, Not By the Designation
The designation in the information of the specific statute
violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and
to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly. However, the failure to designate the offense by
statute,21 or to mention the specific provision penalizing the
act,22 or an erroneous specification of the law violated23
does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly
recite the facts constituting the crime charged.24 What
controls is not the title of the information or the designation of
the offense but the actual facts recited in the information.25
In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of
the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that
determines the crime being charged in the information.26
The facts stated in the amended information against
petitioner correctly made out a charge for violation of Section
5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate
courts followed the wrong designation of the offense,
petitioner could be convicted of the offense on the basis of
the facts recited in the information and duly proven during
trial.
Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as
amended
The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610
pertains to the act or acts committed by the accused. The
second element refers to the state or condition of the
offended party. The third element corresponds to the
minority or age of the offended party.
The first element was present in this case. Petitioner
committed lascivious conduct against and had sexual
intercourse with AAA in the following instances: (1) on
November 19, 1997, when he kissed her at the back and
neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her
blouse to gratify his lust; (2) on November 26, 1997, when,
with lewd designs, he dragged her towards the bed of the
motel room and forcibly kissed her on the lips, neck and
breasts and (3) when he exerted moral influence on her and
pressured her until she surrendered herself to him on
November 26, 1997. His acts were covered by the definitions
of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct under Section 2(g)
and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to
implement the provisions of RA 7610, particularly on child
abuse:
(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use,
persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to
engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching,
either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of
any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or public area of a person.
(emphasis supplied)
The second element was likewise present here. The
following pronouncement in People v. Larin27 is significant:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any
other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group. (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 1997, due to the influence of petitioner,
AAA indulged in lascivious acts with or allowed him to
commit lascivious acts on her. This was repeated on
November 26, 1997 on which date AAA also indulged in
sexual intercourse with petitioner as a result of the latter’s
influence and moral ascendancy. Thus, she was deemed to
be a "child subjected to other sexual abuse" as the concept
is defined in the opening paragraph of Section 5, Article III of
RA 7610 and in Larin.
The third element of the offense was also satisfied. Section 3
(a), Article I of RA 7610 provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) "Children" refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years
of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition; (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 2007 and November 26, 2007, AAA was a
child as she was below 18 years of age. She was therefore
within the protective mantle of the law.
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the
conviction of petitioner was proper.
Violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 and Rape are
Separate and Distinct Crimes
Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape. The offense for which
he was convicted is punished by a special law while rape is a
felony under the Revised Penal Code.28 They have different
elements.29 The two are separate and distinct crimes. Thus,
petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding that he did not commit
rape.
Consent of the Child is Immaterial in Criminal Cases
Involving Violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches
and consented to have sexual intercourse with him. They
engaged in these acts out of mutual love and affection. But
may the "sweetheart theory" be invoked in cases of child
prostitution and other sexual abuse prosecuted under
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610? No.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and
rape, felonies committed against or without the consent of
the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was
consensual. It requires proof that the accused and the victim
were lovers and that she consented to the sexual
relations.30
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in
child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is
unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual
intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases
involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The
mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution
or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a
malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil
laws.31 This is on the rationale that she can easily be the
victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as
parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of
harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully.32 Those of tender
years deserve its protection.33
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a
sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her
than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her
from the harmful consequences34 of her attempts at adult
sexual behavior.35 For this reason, a child should not be
deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity
and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical
intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special
protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination.
(Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified,
or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair
game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent
to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.361âwphi1
This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally
enshrined State policy to promote the physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth.37
This is consistent with the declared policy of the State
[T]o provide special protection to children from all forms of
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development; provide
sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for
prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in
situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination.38
(emphasis supplied)
as well as to
intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian,
teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or
is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination or when such acts against the child are
committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person
having care and custody of the same.39 (emphasis supplied)
This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of
the child’s best interests in all actions concerning him or her.
The best interest of children shall be the paramount
consideration in all actions concerning them, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative
bodies, consistent with the principles of First Call for Children
as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote
the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a
useful and happy life.40 (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner May Enjoy the Benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law
The penalty prescribed for violation of the provisions of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by the law.41
Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law, petitioner
may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.42 Since the penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from
the range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is
covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.43 Thus, he is entitled to a maximum term
which should be within the range of the proper imposable
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (ranging
from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) and a
minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its
medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period
(ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months).
The Award of Damages Should Be Modified
The trial court awarded AAA ₱75,000 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000 as moral and exemplary damages. The CA deleted
the award for civil indemnity. It correctly reasoned that the
award was proper only in a conviction for rape committed
under the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by law. Consistent, however, with the objective of
RA 7610 to afford children special protection against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination and with the principle that
every person who contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the
same,44 civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case
involving violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
Every person criminally liable is civilly liable.45 The rule is
that, in crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable
for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of.46 Thus,
₱50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto shall be awarded in cases
of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.47
Moreover, the CA erred in affirming the grant of ₱50,000 as
"moral and exemplary damages." The rule is that, in every
case, trial courts must specify the award of each item of
damages and make a finding thereon in the body of the
decision.48 Thus, moral damages and exemplary damages
should be separate items of award.
AAA testified that she was "emotionally devastated" and "lost
touch of her inner self" as a result of what petitioner did to
her. Because of the mental anxiety and wounded feelings
caused by petitioner to her, she had several sessions with
the dean for student affairs49 and the guidance counselor of
Assumption College as well as with a psychiatrist. This was
corroborated by her mother and the dean of student affairs of
Assumption College. Thus, she is entitled to moral damages
of ₱50,000. However, in the absence of an aggravating
circumstance, the grant of exemplary damages is
unwarranted.50
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner
Michael John Z. Malto is hereby found guilty of violating
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended, for which
he is sentenced to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion
temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. He is further ordered to pay AAA ₱50,000 as civil
indemnity and ₱50,000 for moral damages.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY,
petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
MARILYN ABUCAY, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The only issue presented in the case at bar is the legality of
the award of financial assistance to an employee who had
been dismissed for cause as found by the public respondent.
Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, was accused by two
complainants of having demanded and received from them
the total amount of P3,800.00 in consideration of her
promise to facilitate approval of their applications for
telephone installation. 1 Investigated and heard, she was
found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the
service.2 She went to the Ministry of Labor and Employment
claiming she had been illegally removed. After consideration
of the evidence and arguments of the parties, the company
was sustained and the complaint was dismissed for lack of
merit. Nevertheless, the dispositive portion of labor arbiter's
decision declared:
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is dismissed for lack of
merit.
Considering that Dr. Helen Bangayan and Mrs. Consolacion
Martinez are not totally blameless in the light of the fact that
the deal happened outhide the premises of respondent
company and that their act of giving P3,800.00 without any
receipt is tantamount to corruption of public officers,
complainant must be given one month pay for every year of
service as financial assistance. 3
Both the petitioner and the private respondent appealed to
the National Labor Relations Board, which upheld the said
decision in toto and dismissed the appeals. 4 The private
respondent took no further action, thereby impliedly
accepting the validity of her dismissal. The petitioner,
however, is now before us to question the affirmance of the
above- quoted award as having been made with grave
abuse of discretion.
In its challenged resolution of September 22, 1987, the
NLRC said:
... Anent the award of separation pay as financial assistance
in complainant's favor, We find the same to be equitable,
taking into consideration her long years of service to the
company whereby she had undoubtedly contributed to the
success of respondent. While we do not in any way approve
of complainants (private respondent) mal feasance, for which
she is to suffer the penalty of dismissal, it is for reasons of
equity and compassion that we resolve to uphold the award
of financial assistance in her favor. 5
The position of the petitioner is simply stated: It is conceded
that an employee illegally dismissed is entitled to
reinstatement and backwages as required by the labor laws.
However, an employee dismissed for cause is entitled to
neither reinstatement nor backwages and is not allowed any
relief at all because his dismissal is in accordance with law.
In the case of the private respondent, she has been awarded
financial assistance equivalent to ten months pay
corresponding to her 10 year service in the company despite
her removal for cause. She is, therefore, in effect rewarded
rather than punished for her dishonesty, and without any
legal authorization or justification. The award is made on the
ground of equity and compassion, which cannot be a
substitute for law. Moreover, such award puts a premium on
dishonesty and encourages instead of deterring corruption.
For its part, the public respondent claims that the employee
is sufficiently punished with her dismissal. The grant of
financial assistance is not intended as a reward for her
offense but merely to help her for the loss of her employment
after working faithfully with the company for ten years. In
support of this position, the Solicitor General cites the cases
of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v.
Lariosa 6 and Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, 7
where the employees were dismissed for cause but were
nevertheless allowed separation pay on grounds of social
and compassionate justice. As the Court put it in the
Firestone case:
In view of the foregoing, We rule that Firestone had valid
grounds to dispense with the services of Lariosa and that the
NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering his
reinstatement. However, considering that Lariosa had
worked with the company for eleven years with no known
previous bad record, the ends of social and compassionate
justice would be served if he is paid full separation pay but
not reinstatement without backwages by the NLRC.
In the said case, the employee was validly dismissed for
theft but the NLRC nevertheless awarded him full separation
pay for his 11 years of service with the company. In Soco,
the employee was also legally separated for unauthorized
use of a company vehicle and refusal to attend the grievance
proceedings but he was just the same granted one-half
month separation pay for every year of his 18-year service.
Similar action was taken in Filipro, Inc. v. NLRC, 8 where the
employee was validly dismissed for preferring certain dealers
in violation of company policy but was allowed separation
pay for his 2 years of service. In Metro Drug Corporation v.
NLRC, 9 the employee was validly removed for loss of
confidence because of her failure to account for certain
funds but she was awarded separation pay equivalent to
one-half month's salary for every year of her service of 15
years. In Engineering Equipment, Inc. v. NLRC, 10 the
dismissal of the employee was justified because he had
instigated labor unrest among the workers and had serious
differences with them, among other grounds, but he was still
granted three months separation pay corresponding to his
3-year service. In New Frontier Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, 11 the
employee's 3- year service was held validly terminated for
lack of confidence and abandonment of work but he was
nonetheless granted three months separation pay. And in
San Miguel Corporation v. Deputy Minister of Labor and
Employment, et al ., 12 full separation pay for 6, 10, and 16
years service, respectively, was also allowed three
employees who had been dismissed after they were found
guilty of misappropriating company funds.
The rule embodied in the Labor Code is that a person
dismissed for cause as defined therein is not entitled to
separation pay. 13 The cases above cited constitute the
exception, based upon considerations of equity. Equity has
been defined as justice outside law, 14 being ethical rather
than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law.
15 It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on
any sanction of positive law. 16 Hence, it cannot prevail
against the expressed provision of the labor laws allowing
dismissal of employees for cause and without any provision
for separation pay.
Strictly speaking, however, it is not correct to say that there
is no express justification for the grant of separation pay to
lawfully dismissed employees other than the abstract
consideration of equity. The reason is that our Constitution is
replete with positive commands for the promotion of social
justice, and particularly the protection of the rights of the
workers. The enhancement of their welfare is one of the
primary concerns of the present charter. In fact, instead of
confining itself to the general commitment to the cause of
labor in Article II on the Declaration of Principles of State
Policies, the new Constitution contains a separate article
devoted to the promotion of social justice and human rights
with a separate sub- topic for labor. Article XIII expressly
recognizes the vital role of labor, hand in hand with
management, in the advancement of the national economy
and the welfare of the people in general. The categorical
mandates in the Constitution for the improvement of the lot
of the workers are more than sufficient basis to justify the
award of separation pay in proper cases even if the
dismissal be for cause.
The Court notes, however, that where the exception has
been applied, the decisions have not been consistent as to
the justification for the grant of separation pay and the
amount or rate of such award. Thus, the employees
dismissed for theft in the Firestone case and for animosities
with fellow workers in the Engineering Equipment case were
both awarded separation pay notnvithstanding that the first
cause was certainly more serious than the second. No less
curiously, the employee in the Soco case was allowed only
one-half month pay for every year of his 18 years of service,
but in Filipro the award was two months separation pay for 2
years service. In Firestone, the emplovee was allowed full
separation pay corresponding to his 11 years of service, but
in Metro, the employee was granted only one-half month
separation pay for every year of her 15year service. It would
seem then that length of service is not necessarily a criterion
for the grant of separation pay and neither apparently is the
reason for the dismissal.
The Court feels that distinctions are in order. We note that
heretofore the separation pay, when it was considered
warranted, was required regardless of the nature or degree
of the ground proved, be it mere inefficiency or something
graver like immorality or dishonesty. The benediction of
compassion was made to cover a multitude of sins, as it
were, and to justify the helping hand to the validly dismissed
employee whatever the reason for his dismissal. This policy
should be re-examined. It is time we rationalized the
exception, to make it fair to both labor and management,
especially to labor.
There should be no question that where it comes to such
valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply with work
standards, the grant of separation pay to the dismissed
employee may be both just and compassionate, particularly
if he has worked for some time with the company. For
example, a subordinate who has irreconcilable policy or
personal differences with his employer may be validly
dismissed for demonstrated loss of confidence, which is an
allowable ground. A working mother who has to be
frequently absent because she has also to take care of her
child may also be removed because of her poor attendance,
this being another authorized ground. It is not the
employee's fault if he does not have the necessary aptitude
for his work but on the other hand the company cannot be
required to maintain him just the same at the expense of the
efficiency of its operations. He too may be validly replaced.
Under these and similar circumstances, however, the award
to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable
under the social justice policy even if the separation is for
cause.
But where the cause of the separation is more serious than
mere inefficiency, the generosity of the law must be more
discerning. There is no doubt it is compassionate to give
separation pay to a salesman if he is dismissed for his
inability to fill his quota but surely he does not deserve such
generosity if his offense is misappropriation of the receipts of
his sales. This is no longer mere incompetence but clear
dishonesty. A security guard found sleeping on the job is
doubtless subject to dismissal but may be allowed
separation pay since his conduct, while inept, is not
depraved. But if he was in fact not really sleeping but
sleeping with a prostitute during his tour of duty and in the
company premises, the situation is changed completely. This
is not only inefficiency but immorality and the grant of
separation pay would be entirely unjustified.
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a
measure of social justice only in those instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where
the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual
intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft
or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer
may not be required to give the dismissed employee
separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other
name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues,
have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring
employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the
punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay
has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of
course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the
company is granted separation pay even as he is validly
dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar
offense in his next employment because he thinks he can
expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of
misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general
any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by
those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the
Constitution.
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the
underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it
certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the
poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when
the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.
Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels
any more than can equity be an impediment to the
punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice
may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives
blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor.
This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the
protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of
it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with
the blemishes of their own character.
Applying the above considerations, we hold that the grant of
separation pay in the case at bar is unjustified. The private
respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty, as found by
the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she
herself has impliedly admitted. The fact that she has worked
with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be
considered at all, should be taken against her as it reflects a
regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened
instead of betraying during all of her 10 years of service with
the company. If regarded as a justification for moderating the
penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize for
disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and
undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all
undesirables.
The Court also rules that the separation pay, if found due
under the circumstances of each case, should be computed
at the rate of one month salary for every year of service,
assuming the length of such service is deemed material.
This is without prejudice to the application of special
agreements between the employer and the employee
stipulating a higher rate of computation and providing for
more benefits to the discharged employee. 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged
resolution of September 22,1987, is AFFIRMED in toto
except for the grant of separation pay in the form of financial
assistance, which is hereby DISALLOWED. The temporary
restraining order dated March 23, 1988, is LIFTED. It is so
ordered.
JEROME M. DAABAY, PETITIONER,
vs.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., RESPONDENT.
REYES, J.:
This resolves petitioner Jerome M. Daabay’s (Daabay)
Verified Petition for Review1 , which assails the Decision2
dated June 24, 2011 and Resolution3 dated December 9,
2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
03369-MIN.
The case stems from a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, unfair labor practice and monetary claims filed
by Daabay against respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils.,
Inc. (Coca-Cola) and three officers of the company.4 The
records indicate that the employment of Daabay with
Coca-Cola as Sales Logistics Checker was terminated by
the company in June 2005,5 following receipt of information
from one Cesar Sorin (Sorin) that Daabay was part of a
conspiracy that allowed the pilferage of company property.6
The allegations of Sorin were embodied in an affidavit which
he executed on April 16, 2005.7 The losses to the company
were also confirmed by an inventory and audit conducted by
Coca-Cola’s Territory Finance Head, Silvia Ang. Such losses
comprised of cases of assorted softdrinks, empty bottles,
missing shells and missing pallets valued at
₱20,860,913.00.8
Coca-Cola then served upon Daabay a Notice to Explain
with Preventive Suspension, which required him to explain in
writing his participation in the scheme that was reported to
involve logistics checkers and gate guards. In compliance
therewith, Daabay submitted an Explanation dated April 19,
2005 wherein he denied any participation in the reported
pilferage.9
A formal investigation on the matter ensued. Eventually,
Coca-Cola served upon Daabay a Notice of Termination that
cited pilferage, serious misconduct and loss of trust and
confidence as grounds. At the time of his dismissal, Daabay
had been a regular employee of Coca-Cola for eight years,
and was receiving a monthly pay of ₱20,861.00, exclusive of
other benefits.10
Daabay then filed the subject labor complaint against
Coca-Cola and Roberto Huang (Huang), Raymund Salvador
(Salvador) and Alvin Garcia (Garcia), who were the
President and Plant Logistics Managers, respectively, of
Coca-Cola at the time of the dispute.11 On April 18, 2008,
Executive Labor Arbiter Noel Augusto S. Magbanua (ELA
Magbanua) rendered his Decision12 in favor of Daabay. He
ruled that Daabay was illegally dismissed because his
participation in the alleged conspiracy was not proved by
substantial evidence. In lieu of reinstatement and
considering the already strained relations between the
parties, ELA Magbanua ordered the payment to Daabay of
backwages and separation pay or retirement benefits, as
may be applicable. The dispositive portion of ELA
Magbanua’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the dismissal of complainant Jerome
Daabay as illegal, and ordering respondents to pay
complainant his backwages in the amount of [P]750,996.00.
Additionally, respondents are hereby ordered to pay
complainant his separation pay at one (1) month for every
year of service, or his retirement benefits based on the latest
Collective Bargaining Agreement prior to his
suspension/termination.
Other claims are hereby ordered dismissed for failure to
substantiate.
SO ORDERED.13
Dissatisfied, Coca-Cola, Huang, Salvador and Garcia,
appealed from ELA Magbanua’s Decision to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Daabay filed a
separate appeal to ask for his reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights, the payment of backwages instead of
separation pay or retirement benefits, and an award of
litigation expenses, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
The NLRC reversed the finding of illegal dismissal. In a
Resolution14 dated August 27, 2009, the NLRC held that
there was "reasonable and well-founded basis to dismiss
[Daabay], not only for serious misconduct, but also for
breach of trust or loss of confidence arising from such
company losses."15 Daabay’s participation in the conspiracy
was sufficiently established. Several documents such as
checkers receipts and sales invoices that made the
fraudulent scheme possible were signed by Daabay.16 The
NLRC also found fault in Daabay for his failure to detect the
pilferage, considering that the "timely recording and
monitoring as security control for the outgoing [sic] of
company products are necessarily connected with the
functions, duties and responsibilities reposed in him as Sales
Logistics Checker."17 Notwithstanding its ruling on the
legality of the dismissal, the NLRC awarded retirement
benefits in favor of Daabay. The dispositive portion of its
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of
complainant is DENIED for lack of merit, while that of
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. is
GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed 18 April 2008 Decision of the
Executive Labor Arbiter is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the
present complaint for want of evidence.
Let, however, this case be REMANDED to the Executive
Labor Arbiter or the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin for
the computation of complainant’s retirement benefits in
accordance with the latest Collective Bargaining Agreement
prior to his termination.
SO ORDERED.18
Coca-Cola’s partial motion for reconsideration to assail the
award of retirement benefits was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution19 dated October 30, 2009. The NLRC explained
that there was a need "to humanize the severe effects of
dismissal"20 and "tilt the scales of justice in favor of labor as
a measure of equity and compassionate social justice."21
Daabay also moved to reconsider, but his motion remained
unresolved by the NLRC.22 Undaunted, Coca-Cola
appealed to the CA.
The CA agreed with Coca-Cola that the award of retirement
benefits lacked basis considering that Daabay was
dismissed for just cause. It explained:
We are not oblivious of the instances where the Court
awarded financial assistance to dismissed employees, even
though they were terminated for just causes. Equity and
social justice was the vague justification. Quickly realizing
the unjustness of these [s]o-called equitable awards, the
Supreme Court took the opportunity to curb and rationalize
the grant of financial assistance to legally dismissed
employees. Thus, in Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, the
Supreme Court recognized the harsh realities faced by
employees that forced them, despite their good intentions, to
violate company policies, for which the employer can
rightfully terminate their employment. For these instances,
the award of financial assistance was allowed. But, in clear
and unmistakable language, the Supreme Court also held
that the award of financial assistance should not be given to
validly terminated employees, whose offenses are iniquitous
or reflective of some depravity in their moral character. x x
x.23 (Citation omitted)
Thus, the dispositive portion of its Decision dated June 24,
2011 reads:
FOR THESE REASONS, the writ of certiorari is GRANTED;
the portion of the Resolution promulgated on 27 August 2009
remanding of the case to the Executive Labor Arbiter or the
Regional Arbitration Branch of origin for computation of
retirement benefits is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.24
Daabay’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution25 dated December 9, 2011; hence, this petition.
It bears stressing that although the assailed CA decision and
resolution are confined to the issue of Daabay’s entitlement
to retirement benefits, Daabay attempts to revive through the
present petition the issue of whether or not his dismissal had
factual and legal bases. Thus, instead of confining itself to
the issue of whether or not Daabay should be entitled to the
retirement benefits that were awarded by the NLRC, the
petition includes a plea upon the Court to affirm ELA
Magbanua’s Decision, with the modification to include: (a)
his allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent in the computation of his backwages; (b) his
actual reinstatement; and (c) damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.
We deny the petition.
We emphasize that the appeal to the CA was brought not by
Daabay but by Coca-Cola, and was limited to the issue of
whether or not the award of retirement benefits in favor of
Daabay was proper. Insofar as CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN
was concerned, the correctness of the NLRC’s
pronouncement on the legality of Daabay’s dismissal was no
longer an issue, even beyond the appellate court’s authority
to modify. In Andaya v. NLRC,26 the Court emphasized that
a party who has not appealed from a decision may not obtain
any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what
he had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision
is brought up on appeal.27 Further, we explained in Yano v.
Sanchez,28 that the entrenched procedural rule in this
jurisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign
such errors as are designed to have the judgment modified.
All that he can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors
or to argue on issues raised below only for the purpose of
sustaining the judgment in his favor.29 Due process
prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not
appeal.30 Considering that Daabay had not yet appealed
from the NLRC’s Resolution to the CA, his plea for the
modification of the NLRC’s findings was then misplaced. For
the Court to review all matters that are raised in the petition
would be tolerant of what Daabay was barred to do before
the appellate court.
Before the CA and this Court, Daabay attempts to justify his
plea for relief by stressing that he had filed his own motion
for reconsideration of the NLRC’s Resolution dated August
27, 2009 but the same remained unacted upon by the NLRC.
Such bare allegation, however, is insufficient to allow the
issue to be disturbed through this petition. We take note of
Daabay’s failure to attach to his petition a copy of the motion
which he allegedly filed with the NLRC. It is also quite
baffling why Daabay does not appear to have undertaken
steps to seek the NLRC’s resolution on the motion, even
after it remained unresolved for more than two years from its
supposed filing.
Granting that such motion to reconsider was filed with the
NLRC, the labor tribunal shall first be given the opportunity to
review its findings and rulings on the issue of the legality of
Daabay’s dismissal, and then correct them should it find that
it erred in its disposition. The Court cannot, by this petition,
pre-empt the action which the NLRC, and the CA in case of
an appeal, may take on the matter.
Even as we limit our present review to the lone issue that
was involved in the assailed CA decision and resolution, the
Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA.
Daabay was declared by the NLRC to have been lawfully
dismissed by Coca-Cola on the grounds of serious
misconduct, breach of trust and loss of confidence. Our
pronouncement in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC31 on the
issue of whether an employee who is dismissed for just
cause may still claim retirement benefits equally applies to
this case. We held:
At the risk of stating the obvious, private respondent was not
separated from petitioner’s employ due to mandatory or
optional retirement but, rather, by termination of employment
for a just cause. Thus, any retirement pay provided by PAL’s
"Special Retirement & Separation Program" dated February
15, 1988 or, in the absence or legal inadequacy thereof, by
Article 287 of the Labor Code does not operate nor can be
made to operate for the benefit of private respondent. Even
private respondent’s assertion that, at the time of her lawful
dismissal, she was already qualified for retirement does not
aid her case because the fact remains that private
respondent was already terminated for cause thereby
rendering nugatory any entitlement to mandatory or optional
retirement pay that she might have previously possessed.32
(Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
In ruling against the grant of the retirement benefits, we also
take note of the NLRC’s lone justification for the award, to
wit:
Where from the facts obtaining, as in this case, there is a
need to humanize the severe effects of dismissal and where
complainant’s entitlement to retirement benefits are even
admitted in [Coca-Cola’s] motion to reduce bond, [w]e can
do no less but tilt the scales of justice in favor of labor as a
measure of equity and compassionate social justice, taking
into consideration the circumstances obtaining in this
case.33 (Emphasis ours)
Being intended as a mere measure of equity and social
justice, the NLRC’s award was then akin to a financial
assistance or separation pay that is granted to a dismissed
employee notwithstanding the legality of his dismissal.
Jurisprudence on such financial assistance and separation
pay then equally apply to this case. The Court has ruled,
time and again, that financial assistance, or whatever name
it is called, as a measure of social justice is allowed only in
instances where the employee is validly dismissed for
causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on
his moral character.34 We explained in Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC35:
[S]eparation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social
justice only in those instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the
valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an
offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual
relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be
required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or
financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on
the ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues,
have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring
employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the
punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay
has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of
course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the
company is granted separation pay even as he is validly
dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar
offense in his next employment because he thinks he can
expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of
misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general
any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by
those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the
Constitution.36 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, considering that Daabay was dismissed on the
grounds of serious misconduct, breach of trust and loss of
confidence, the award based on equity was
unwarranted.1âwphi1
Even the NLRC’s reliance on the alleged admission by
Coca-Cola in its motion to reduce bond that Daabay is
entitled to retirement benefits is misplaced. Apparently, the
supposed admission by Coca-Cola was based on the
following:
In support of its motion to reduce bond, Coca-cola seeks
leniency for its failure to include in the posting of the bond
the monetary award for [Daabay’s] retirement benefits which,
as directed by the Executive Labor Arbiter, should be
computed in accordance with the latest Collective Bargaining
Agreement prior to his termination. Coca-Cola explains that
the amount of the retirement benefits has not been
determined and there is a need to compute the same on
appeal. x x x.37
It is patent that the statements made by Coca-Cola were in
light of ELA Magbanua’s ruling that Daabay was illegally
dismissed. Furthermore, any admission was only for the
purpose of explaining the non-inclusion of the amount of
retirement benefits in the computation of the appeal bond
posted with the NLRC. Coca-Cola’s statements should be
taken in such context, and could not be deemed to bind the
company even after the NLRC had reversed the finding of
illegal dismissal. And although retirement benefits, where not
mandated by law, may still be granted by agreement of the
employees and their employer or as a voluntary act of the
employer,38 there is no proof that any of these incidents
attends the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
June 24, 2011 and Resolution dated December 9, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, in his capacity as Chairman
of the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,
vs.
FLORENTINO VELOSO, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
We review the petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court by petitioner Francisco T. Duque III, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), assailing
the decision1 and the resolution2 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA)3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 01682-MIN. The CA
modified CSC Resolution No. 061714,4 finding Florentino
Veloso (respondent) guilty of dishonesty, by reducing the
penalty imposed by the CSC from dismissal from the service
to suspension from office for one year without pay.
The Facts
The records show that the respondent, then District
Supervisor of Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee
Corporation (Quedancor), Cagayan de Oro City, was
administratively charged with three (3) counts of dishonesty
in connection with his unauthorized withdrawals of money
deposited by Juanito Quino (complainant), a client of
Quedancor. The complainant applied for a restructuring of
his loan with Quedancor and deposited the amount of
₱50,000.00 to Quedancor’s cashier for his Manila account. In
three (3) separate occasions, the respondent, without notice
and authority from the complainant and with the assistance
of Quedancor’s cashier, managed to withdraw the
₱50,000.00 deposit. Upon the discovery of the withdrawals,
the complainant demanded the return of the money and
called the attention of the manager of Quedancor in
Cagayan de Oro City, who issued to the respondent a
memorandum requiring him to explain the withdrawals and to
return the money.
In compliance with the memorandum, the respondent
returned the money. The respondent admitted having
received the ₱50,000.00 from Quedancor’s cashier knowing
that it was intended for the complainant’s loan repayment.
From the established facts, the respondent was charged by
Quedancor with dishonesty, and was subsequently found
guilty of the charges and dismissed from the service. The
CSC affirmed the findings and conclusions of Quedancor on
appeal.
Dissatisfied with the adverse rulings of Quedancor and the
CSC, the respondent elevated his case to the CA which
adjudged him guilty of dishonesty, but modified the penalty
of dismissal to one (1) year suspension from office without
pay. The CA cited the case of Miel v. Malindog5 as
supporting basis and relied on Section 53, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases (Uniform Rules)
which allows the appreciation of mitigating circumstances in
the determination of the proper imposable penalty. The CA
took into account the following mitigating circumstances: (1)
the respondent’s length of service of 18 years; (2) the prompt
admission of culpability; (3) the return of the money; and (4)
the respondent’s status as a first time offender.
The Present Petition
The CSC argues that the CA disregarded the applicable law
and jurisprudence which penalize the offense of dishonesty
with dismissal from the service. The CSC also argues that
there are no mitigating circumstances to warrant a reduction
of the penalty, for the following reasons:
(1) The respondent’s length of service aggravated his
dishonesty since the respondent took advantage of his
authority over a subordinate and disregarded his oath that a
public office is a public trust. The respondent’s length of
service cannot also be considered mitigating given the
number of times the dishonest acts were committed and the
supervisory position held by the respondent.

(2) The admission of guilt and the restitution by the
respondent were made in 2003, while the misappropriation
took place in 2001. The respondent admitted his culpability
and effected payment not because of his desire to right a
wrong but because he feared possible administrative
liabilities.
(3) The respondent was charged with, and admitted having
committed, dishonesty in three separate occasions.
(4) Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules imposes
dismissal from the service for dishonesty, even for the first
offense.
In compliance with our Minute Resolution dated May 31,
2011, the respondent filed his comment to the petition. The
respondent begs the Court to apply jurisprudence where the
Court, for humanitarian reasons, refrained from meting out
the actual penalties imposed by law, in the presence of
mitigating circumstances. In this case, the respondent calls
attention to the following circumstances: (1) that he is the
sole breadwinner of his family; (2) his length of service with
Quedancor; and (3) other than this case, no other
administrative case had been filed against him for his past
21 years of government service.6
The Issue
The issue in this case is the determination of the proper
administrative penalty to be imposed on the respondent.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
Dismissal from the service is the prescribed penalty imposed
by Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules for the
commission of dishonesty even as a first offense. The
aforesaid rule underscores the constitutional principle that
public office is a public trust and only those who can live up
to such exacting standard deserve the honor of continuing in
public service.7 It is true that Section 53, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules provides the application of mitigating,
aggravating or alternative circumstances in the imposition of
administrative penalties. Section 53, Rule IV applies only
when clear proof is shown, using the specific standards set
by law and jurisprudence, that the facts in a given case
justify the mitigation of the prescribed penalty.
In appreciating the presence of mitigating, aggravating or
alternative circumstances to a given case, two constitutional
principles come into play which the Court is tasked to
balance. The first is public accountability which requires the
Court to consider the improvement of public service, and the
preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the
government by ensuring that only individuals who possess
good moral character, integrity and competence are
employed in the government service.8 The second relates to
social justice which gives the Court the discretionary leeway
to lessen the harsh effects of the wrongdoing committed by
an offender for equitable and humanitarian considerations.
A significant aspect which the CA failed to consider under
the circumstances is the inapplicability to the present case of
the Court’s ruling in Vicente A. Miel v. Jesus A. Malindog,9
which in turn cited Apuyan, Jr. v. Sta. Isabel10 and Civil
Service Commission v. Belagan.11 The rulings in these
three (3) cases were rendered under different factual
circumstances involving dishonest acts, i.e., submission of
false entries in the Personal Data Sheet, the solicitation of
money, or the non-compliance with the prescribed court
procedure, among others. In terms of seriousness and
gravity, these dishonest acts differ from the dishonest acts
committed by the respondent who used public funds under
his responsibility for his own personal benefit. Unlike the
cases cited by the CA, we also take into account the nature
of Quedancor’s business – it is a credit and guarantee
institution where the public perception of the official’s
credibility and reputation is material.
In the clearest of terms, the CA upheld that factual findings
of the CSC. Thus, it is on the basis of these findings that we
must now make our own independent appreciation of the
circumstances cited by the respondent and appreciated by
the CA as mitigating circumstances. After a careful review of
the records and jurisprudence, we disagree with the CA’s
conclusion that mitigating circumstances warrant the
mitigation of the prescribed penalty imposed against the
respondent.
First, we have repeatedly held that length of service can
either be a mitigating or an aggravating circumstance
depending on the facts of each case.12 While in most cases,
length of service is considered in favor of the respondent, it
is not considered where the offense committed is found to be
serious or grave;13 or when the length of service helped the
offender commit the infraction.14 The factors against
mitigation are present in this case.
Under the circumstances, the administrative offense of
dishonesty committed by the respondent was serious on
account of the supervisory position he held at Quedancor
and the nature of Quedancor’s business. Quedancor deals
with the administration, management and disposition of
public funds which the respondent was entrusted to handle.
The respondent’s dishonest acts carried grave
consequences because Quedancor is a credit and guarantee
institution, and the public’s perception of its credibility is
critical. In this case, the sanction of dismissal imposed on the
respondent as a dishonest employee assures the public that:
first, public funds belonging to Quedancor are used for their
intended purpose; second, public funds are released to their
proper recipients only after strict compliance with the
standard operating procedure of Quedancor is followed; and
lastly, only employees who are competent, honest and
trustworthy may manage, administer and handle public funds
in Quedancor.
Like a bank, Quedancor as a credit and guarantee institution
is expected to observe the highest degree of competence
and diligence as it is a business imbued with public
interest.15 To promote trust and confidence, employees in
Quedancor are expected to possess the highest standards of
integrity and moral uprightness. The respondent’s dismissal
from the service is a measure of self-protection and
self-preservation by Quedancor of its reputation before its
clients and the public.
We additionally note that length of service should also be
taken against the respondent; the infraction he committed
and the number of times he committed the violations
demonstrate the highest degree of ingratitude and
ungratefulness to an institution that has been the source of
his livelihood for 18 years. His actions constitute no less than
disloyalty and betrayal of the trust and confidence the
institution reposed in him. They constitute ingratitude for the
opportunities given to him over the years for career
advancement. Had it not been for the respondent’s length of
service, he could not have taken the subject funds for his
own use as he could not have held a supervisory position. In
addition, the respondent’s length of service allowed him to
take advantage of his familiarity with Quedancor operations
and employees – a factor that made the misappropriation
possible.
Second, the circumstance that this is the respondent’s first
administrative offense should not benefit him. By the express
terms of Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules, the
commission of an administrative offense classified as a
serious offense (like dishonesty) is punishable by dismissal
from the service even for the first time. In other words, the
clear language of Section 52, Rule IV does not consider a
first-time offender as a mitigating circumstance. Likewise,
under statutory construction principles, a special provision
prevails over a general provision.16 Section 53, Rule IV of
the Uniform Rules, a general provision relating to the
appreciation of mitigating, aggravating or alternative
circumstances, must thus yield to the provision of Section
52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules which expressly provides
for the penalty of dismissal even for the first commission of
the offense.
While we are not unmindful of the existing jurisprudence17
cited by the respondent where the penalty of dismissal from
the service was not imposed despite the clear language of
Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules, the respondent
failed to clearly show exceptional and compelling reasons to
justify a deviation from the general rule.
Finally, we reject as mitigating circumstances the
respondent’s admission of his culpability and the restitution
of the amount.1âwphi1 As pointed out by the CSC, the
respondent made use of the complainant’s money in 2001
while the restitution was made only in 2003, during the
pendency of the administrative case against him.18 Under
the circumstances, the restitution was half-hearted and was
certainly neither purely voluntary nor made because of the
exercise of good conscience; it was triggered, more than
anything else, by his fear of possible administrative
penalties.19 The admission of guilt and the restitution
effected were clearly mere afterthoughts made two (2) years
after the commission of the offense and after the
administrative complaint against him was filed. With these
circumstances in mind, we do not find it justified to relieve
the respondent of the full consequences of his dishonest
actions.
All told, in reversing the CA’s decision, we emphasize that
the principle of social justice cannot be properly applied in
the respondent’s case to shield him from the full
consequences of his dishonesty. The Court, in Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC,20 clearly recognized
the limitations in invoking social justice:
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the
underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it
certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the
poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when
the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.
Social justice cannot be permitted to be [the] refuge of
scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to
the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice
may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives
blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor.
This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the
protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of
it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with
the blemishes of their own character.21 [Emphases
supplied.]
Prejudice to the service is not only through wrongful
disbursement of public funds or loss of public property.22
Greater damage comes with the public’s perception of
corruption and incompetence in the government.23
Thus, the Constitution stresses that a public office is a public
trust and public officers must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.24 These constitutionally-enshrined
principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere
rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be
taken as working standards by all in the public service.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the
petition, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated
August 20, 2010 and the resolution dated March 8, 2011
issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
01682-MIN. The resolutions of the Civil Service Commission,
affirming the decision dated August 11, 2004 of the Quedan
and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation, imposing upon
respondent Florentino Veloso the penalty of dismissal from
the service, with the accessory penalties of cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government service,
for dishonesty, are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION),
petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and
RAMON PILONES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent was removed by the petitioner and
complained to the Ministry of Labor. His complaint was
dismissed by the regional director, who was, however,
reversed by the public respondent. Required to reinstate the
separated employee and pay him back wages, the petitioner
has come to us, faulting the Deputy Minister with grave
abuse of discretion. We have issued in the meantime a
temporary restraining order. 1
The public respondent held that Ramon Pilones, the private
respondent, was already a permanent employee at the time
of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure. The
alleged ground for his removal, to wit, "pulmonary
tuberculosis minimal," was not certified as incurable within
six months as to justify his separation. 2 Additionally, the
private respondent insists that the petitioner should have first
obtained a clearance, as required by the regulations then in
force, for the termination of his employment.
The petitioner for its part claims that the private respondent
was still on probation at the time of his dismissal and so had
no security of tenure. His dismissal was not only in
conformity with company policy but also necessary for the
protection of the public health, as he was handling
ingredients in the processing of soft drinks which were being
sold to the public. It is also argued that the findings of the
regional director, who had direct access to the facts, should
not have been disturbed on appeal. For these same reasons,
it contends, the employee's reinstatement as ordered by the
public respondent should not be allowed.
The original findings were contained in a one-page order 3
reciting simply that "complainant was employed on a
probationary period of employment for six (6) months. After
said period, he underwent medical examination for
qualification as regular employee but the results showed that
he is suffering from PTB minimal. Consequently, he was
informed of the termination of his employment by
respondent." The order then concluded that the termination
was "justified." That was all.
As there is no mention of the basis of the above order, we
may assume it was the temporary payroll authority 4
submitted by the petitioner showing that the private
respondent was employed on probation on February 16,
1978. Even supposing that it is not self- serving, we find
nevertheless that it is self-defeating. The six-month period of
probation started from the said date of appointment and so
ended on August 17, 1978, but it is not shown that the
private respondent's employment also ended then; on the
contrary, he continued working as usual. Under Article 282 of
the Labor Code, "an employee who is allowed to work after a
probationary period shall be considered a regular employee."
Hence, Pilones was already on permanent status when he
was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after he
ceased to be a probationer.
The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private
respondent earlier because the x-ray examination was made
only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not
immediately available. That excuse is untenable. We note
that when the petitioner had all of six months during which to
conduct such examination, it chose to wait until exactly the
last day of the probation period. In the light of such delay, its
protestations now that reinstatement of Pilones would
prejudice public health cannot but sound hollow and
hypocritical. By its own implied admission, the petitioner had
exposed its customers to the employee's disease because of
its failure to examine him before entrusting him with the
functions of a "syrup man." Its belated concern for the
consuming public is hardly persuasive, if not clearly insincere
and self-righteous.
There is proof in fact that the private respondent was first
hired not on February 16, 1978, but earlier in 1977. This is
the 1977 withholding tax statement 5 issued for him by the
petitioner itself which it does not and cannot deny. The
petitioner stresses that this is the only evidence of the private
respondent's earlier service and notes that he has not
presented any co-worker to substantiate his claim. This is
perfectly understandable. Given the natural reluctance of
many workers to antagonize their employers, we need not
wonder why none of them testified against the petitioner.
We are satisfied that whether his employment began on
February 16, 1978, or even earlier as he claims, the private
respondent was already a regular employee when he was
dismissed on August 21, 1978. As such, he could validly
claim the security of tenure guaranteed to him by the
Constitution and the Labor Code.
The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked
against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code reading as
follows:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. — Where the
employee suffers from a disease and his continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or
to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not
terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a
competent public health authority that the disease is of such
nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a
period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment.
If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the
employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the
employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such
employee to his former position immediately upon the
restoration of his normal health.
The record does not contain the certification required by the
above rule. The medical certificate offered by the petitioner
came from its own physician, who was not a "competent
public health authority," and merely stated the employee's
disease, without more. We may surmise that if the required
certification was not presented, it was because the disease
was not of such a nature or seriousness that it could not be
cured within a period of six months even with proper medical
treatment. If so, dismissal was unquestionably a severe and
unlawful sanction.
It is also worth noting that the petitioner's application for
clearance to terminate the employment of the private
respondent was filed with the Ministry of Labor only on
August 28, 1978, or seven days after his dismissal. 6 As the
NLRC has repeatedly and correctly said, the prior clearance
rule (which was in force at that time) was not a "trivial
technicality." It required "not just the mere filing of a petition
or the mere attempt to procure a clearance" but that "the
said clearance be obtained prior to the operative act of
termination. 7
We agree that there was here an attempt to circumvent the
law by separating the employee after five months' service to
prevent him from becoming a regular employee, and then
rehiring him on probation, again without security of tenure.
We cannot permit this subterfuge if we are to be true to the
spirit and mandate of social justice. On the other hand, we
have also the health of the public and of the dismissed
employee himself to consider. Hence, although we must rule
in favor of his reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his
fitness to resume his work, as certified by competent
authority.
We take this opportunity to reaffirm our concern for the lowly
worker who, often at the mercy of his employers, must look
up to the law for his protection. Fittingly, that law regards him
with tenderness and even favor and always with faith and
hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nation's future. It
is error to take him for granted. He deserves our abiding
respect. How society treats him will determine whether the
knife in his hands shall be a caring tool for beauty and
progress or an angry weapon of defiance and revenge. The
choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should,
we must resolve to lighten "the weight of centuries" of
exploitation and disdain that bends his back but does not
bow his head.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
temporary restraining order of November 18, 1981, is
LIFTED. The Order of the public respondent dated July 14,
1981, is AFFIRMED, but with the modification that the
backwages shall be limited to three years only and the
private respondent shall be reinstated only upon certification
by a competent public health authority that he is fit to return
to work. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CESAR S. DUMDUMA, Petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1
assailing the January 31, 2008 Decision,2 as well as the
April 10, 2008 Resolution,3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 98207, which affirmed the order of the
respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) dismissing
petitioner Cesar S. Dumduma (Dumduma) from government
service.
Factual Antecedents
Dumduma entered public service in 1979 as a patrolman in
the then Integrated National Police.4 He steadfastly rose
through the ranks until he was promoted in 1991 as Senior
Police Officer 4 (SPO4) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP). He was then designated as officer-in-charge of San
Miguel Police Station in San Miguel, Leyte.5 On December
15, 1998, he took the Career Service Professional
Examination in Quezon City.6
On March 7, 1999, Dumduma filled out a Personal Data
Sheet (PDS) pursuant to his promotional appointment as
Police Inspector. On Item No. 18 of the PDS, Dumduma
stated that he passed the Career Service Professional
Examination Computer-Assisted Test in Quezon City on
December 15, 1998 with a rating of 81%.7 His appointment
was then forwarded to the PNP-CSC Field Office on April 16,
1999 for verification and approval.8 It was then discovered
that Dumduma did not have the proper civil service eligibility,
contrary to what he disclosed in his PDS. His name was not
included in the CSC-National Capital Region (CSC-NCR)
Regional Register of Eligibles for the Career Service
Professional Examination conducted on December 15, 1998;
instead, his name appeared in the Regional List of
Passing/Failing Examinees with a rating of 25.82%.
Accordingly, the director of the CSC-NCR, Adoracion F.
Arenas disapproved Dumduma’s appointment on the ground
of spurious eligibility.9 On June 6, 2002, the CSC-NCR
formally charged Dumduma with Dishonesty.10
Dumduma denied the charge.11 His version of the
circumstances surrounding his alleged eligibility is as follows:
Prior to the date of the examination, Dumduma met a certain
Salome Dilodilo (Dilodilo), who was allegedly a retired CSC
director. Dilodilo promised Dumduma her "total support in
[Dumduma’s] x x x examination [but] (i)n return, she asked
[Dumduma] to convince [his] close friend x x x to sell x x x a
property x x x [to her]."12 On the day before the
examination,13 Dumduma and Dilodilo went to the CSC
Office located at Kaliraya Street, Quezon City in order to
facilitate an early examination schedule14 for Dumduma.
The following day, December 15, 1998, Dumduma took the
Career Service Professional Examination.15 A week later,
he received his Certificate of Eligibility16 from an unnamed
person, who claimed to be Dilodilo’s emissary.17 The
Certificate of Eligibility stated that Dumduma passed the
examination with a rating of 81%.18 Dumduma then wrote
the said information in his PDS, allegedly in good faith that
the Certificate of Eligibility was authentic.
Dumduma waived the formal investigation and submitted the
case for resolution based on the available documents.19
Decision of Civil Service Commission-National Capital
Region20
The CSC-NCR held that the Certificate of Eligibility relied
upon by Dumduma in making his PDS entry was spurious
because it was contrary to the CSC’s Regional List of
Eligibles. The Regional List prevails over the Certificate of
Eligibility because the former is the primary official record of
eligibles hence is presumed genuine and accurate, unless
proven otherwise. Since Dumduma failed to satisfactorily
explain the discrepancy posed by his Certificate of Eligibility,
the presumption is that the same was falsified for his
benefit.21 Based on CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15,
series of 1991, Dumduma’s procurement and use of a
spurious Certificate of Eligibility constituted the offense of
Dishonesty,22 which merited dismissal from government
service with all the accessory
penalties.23
Ruling of the Civil Service Commission
Dumduma appealed the adverse CSC-NCR Decision to the
CSC. Dumduma maintained his good faith in relying on the
Certificate of Eligibility that was delivered to his residence.
Any defect in his Certificate of Eligibility must be blamed on
some unnamed and unknown CSC personnel, who most
probably authored the falsification. Without any proof that he
colluded with these CSC personnel, Dumduma contended
that he cannot be found guilty of dishonesty.24
In its Resolution No. 06009825 dated January 23, 2006, the
CSC found Dumduma’s version of how he obtained his
certificate of eligibility implausible. The CSC noted that the
standard operating procedure for the Career Service
Professional Examination Computer-Assisted Test is to
hand-over the certificates of eligibility of the passers
immediately after the examination. Since Dumduma did not
get his certificate in the standard manner, he had the burden
of explaining what merited the unorthodox procedure. This
he failed to do.26

The CSC further held that Dumduma failed to rebut the
presumption that he, as possessor of a falsified document,
was the author thereof. His bare assertion of good faith could
not stand against the presumption.27 The CSC thus affirmed
the CSC-NCR’s Decision. The dispositive portion of the
CSC’s January 23, 2006
Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Cesar S. Dumduma is hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 19,
2004 of the CSC-NCR, finding him guilty of Dishonesty and
imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in the government service is hereby
AFFIRMED. Further, since this involves disbursements of
funds for the salaries and benefits of Dumduma after his
appointment was disapproved, let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Commission on Audit for its appropriate action.
The CSC-NCR is hereby ordered to monitor the
implementation of this Resolution.
Quezon City, January 23, 2006.28
Dumduma filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same
was denied in CSC Resolution No. 07030629 dated
February 19, 2007.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Dumduma reiterated his defense of good faith in his appeal
to the CA,30 but the appellate court was unconvinced. The
CA found substantial evidence supporting the conclusion
that Dumduma’s Certificate of Eligibility was spurious. It was
contrary to the entries in the Regional List of Passing/Failing
Examinees and those in the Regional Register of Eligibles.
Moreover, it was delivered to Dumduma contrary to the
standard operating procedures of CSC.31
The CA held that Dumduma’s possession and use of the
falsified certificate for his own benefit created the
presumption that he was the author of such falsification. It
was incumbent upon Dumduma to overcome the said
presumption with controverting evidence. His bare assertion
of good faith did not suffice as a rebuttal.32
The CA disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. The assailed CSC Resolutions STAND.
SO ORDERED.33
Dumduma moved for a reconsideration but the CA denied
the same in its Resolution dated April 10, 2008.34
Our Ruling
Petitioner Dumduma is now before us questioning the
sufficiency of the evidence against him. He is of the
impression that he was found guilty of dishonesty on a mere
presumption – that the holder of a forged document is the
forger – despite the presence of contrary evidence.35 His
alleged contrary evidence consist of the apparent
authenticity of his Certificate of Eligibility (which did not alert
him to any irregularity therein)36 and the absence of
evidence that he colluded with CSC personnel to falsify the
certificate.37
The question raised by Dumduma regarding the CA’s
appreciation of the evidence against him is ineluctably one of
fact, which is beyond the ambit of this Court’s jurisdiction in a
petition for review on certiorari. It is not this Court’s task to
go over the proofs presented below to ascertain if they were
appreciated and weighed correctly, most especially when the
CA and the CSC speak as one in their findings and
conclusions.38 While it is widely held that this rule of limited
jurisdiction admits of exceptions, none exists, or is even
alleged as existing, in the instant case.
The Court agrees with the CSC and the CA that the
undisputed facts, as revealed by the evidence, make out a
clear case of dishonesty against Dumduma. When
Dumduma’s claim of eligibility was contradicted by the CSC
Register of Eligibles and the List of Passing/Failing
Examinees, it became incumbent upon Dumduma to explain
why he made the incorrect entry in his PDS. Unlike his PDS
entry, the CSC records are presumed correct and made in
the regular course of official business.39 In explaining his
action, however, Dumduma dug a deeper hole from which he
could not extricate himself.
He admitted in his Counter-Affidavit that Dilodilo, a retired
CSC official, promised to help him with his CSC examination
in exchange for a personal favor. They then proceeded to
the CSC Office together and Dilodilo was welcomed by her
former colleagues. After Dumduma took the exam, he went
home without knowing the result thereof (a procedure that is
contrary to CSC practice). Several days later, Dumduma
professed that he received his Certificate of Eligibility from a
man sent by Dilodilo, who is a retiree hence without official
ties with the CSC. Instead of exculpating him, Dumduma’s
explanation completed the evidence against him. He not only
failed to explain the discrepancy, he even explained how he
obtained a spurious Certificate of Eligibility.
Dumduma asserts that, despite the questionable
circumstances, he is in good faith and that the blame is with
the CSC personnel who gave him a Certificate of Eligibility.
Their actions should not be attributable to him, unless there
is evidence that he colluded with them.
Dumduma’s contention is in stark contrast to his admissions
and does not merit belief. The concept of good faith in
administrative cases such as this one is explained in a
recent case in this wise:
Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind
denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge
of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry;
an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, even through
technicalities of law, together with absence of all information,
notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render [a]
transaction unconscientious. In short, good faith is actually a
question of intention. Although this is something internal, we
can ascertain a person’s intention not from his own
protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from
evidence of his conduct and outward acts.40
In the instant case, the facts and circumstances surrounding
Dumduma’s acquisition of the Certificate of Eligibility cast
serious doubts on his good faith. He made a deal with a
retired CSC official and accepted the Certificate of Eligibility
from her representative. These circumstances reveal
Dumduma’s knowledge that Dilodilo could have pulled
strings in order to obtain his Certificate of Eligibility and have
it delivered to his residence. How else would a retired
employee obtain the said certificate? Dumduma cannot feign
innocence given his unquestioning cooperation with Dilodilo.
Besides, whether some CSC personnel should be held
administratively liable for falsifying Dumduma’s Certificate of
Eligibility is beside the point. The fact that someone else
falsified the certificate will not excuse Dumduma for
knowingly using the same for his career advancement.
Dumduma maintains that it is entirely possible that his
Certificate of Eligibility is correct and that the CSC’s Register
of Eligibles and the List of Passing/Failing Examinees are
the ones with incorrect entries. In light of the circumstances,
the Court cannot accept this theory. As Dumduma himself
admitted, he did not obtain the Certificate of Eligibility from
the CSC but from a representative of his facilitator, Dilodilo.
The official records kept by the CSC deserve credence
compared to a certificate that admittedly originated from a
dubious source.1avvphi1
This is not the first time that a government employee had
been dismissed from service for falsification of his eligibility
for appointment purposes.
Maniebo v. Court of Appeals41 is analogous to the instant
case. Maniebo denied any participation in the preparation of
her spurious Certificate of Eligibility. She maintained that she
only received the same through the mails and was in good
faith in submitting the same for her appointment. The Court
held that the presumption of good faith does not apply when
the employee’s Certificate of Eligibility conflicts with the
CSC’s Masterlist of Eligibles. Moreover, the Court did not
accept Maniebo’s long and satisfactory government service
in order to mitigate the penalty of dismissal. The Court noted
that Maniebo was undeserving of the mitigation given her
refusal to own up to, and her lack of remorse for, her
dishonesty.

In Bacsasar v. Civil Service Commission,42 Bacsasar

obtained her Certificate of Eligibility from a private individual
and not from the CSC. The CSC verified the spurious nature
of her eligibility because Bacsasar was not included in the
CSC Masterlist of Passing/Failing Examinees. The Court
rejected Bacsasar’s defense of good faith given that she did
not even take the civil service exam.

In Civil Service Commission v. Cayobit,43 Cayobit received

her Certificate of Eligibility through mail and maintained that
she believed the same to be genuine. The Court found her
guilty of dishonesty given that she failed to explain the
discrepancy in her passing grade in the certificate and the
failing grade reflected in the CSC masterlist.

Like Dumduma, the dismissed employee in Re: Tessie G.

Quires44 also maintained that she was merely a victim of
fixers operating within the CSC Office. The Court did not
accede to her pleas and meted the prescribed penalty for
dishonesty.

Disapproved Appointment of Limgas45 also involved an

employee who maintained that she acted in complete
reliance that the Certificate of Eligibility she received after
taking the CSC examination was authentic. Limgas claimed
that "she was a victim of an injustice perpetrated by fixers,
insiders and syndicates operating in the Regional Offices of
the CSC."46 In rejecting her plea, the Court expressed its
disbelief that a fixer would act for Limgas’ benefit, without the
latter having any knowledge of the anomalous
transaction.1avvphi1

Guided by the foregoing cited authorities, the Court holds

that the CA did not err in affirming the penalty of dismissal
and all its accessory penalties imposed by the CSC. Only
those who can live up to the constitutional exhortation that
public office is a public trust deserve the honor of continuing
in public service.

Dumduma makes a final plea for leniency but the law and
the prevailing jurisprudence binds the hands of this Court.
We cannot change the imposable penalties for a clear case
of dishonesty without at the same time, visiting injustice
against all the other government employees that were
similarly placed but received the full force of the law.

Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that petitioner was once

an outstanding member of the police force. He risked life and
limb serving the citizenry of Region 8 with total dedication
and hard work. His service record shows that, since his
original appointment in 1979, he patiently rose through the
ranks until he was promoted to SPO4 in 1991. While justice
exhorts that petitioner suffer the full penalties imposed by
law, temperance cries out that he be recognized for
whatever good he has done prior to his mistake. Thus, the
Court deems proper, on a pro hac vice basis, to extend
financial assistance of ₱50,000.00 to petitioner, which
amount shall be taken from his forfeited retirement benefits.
This award in no sense mitigates his offense but is made
solely out of equity and humanitarian considerations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed

January 31, 2008 Decision and April 10, 2008 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98207 are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is extended a
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE of ₱50,000.00, to be taken from
his forfeited retirement benefits on a pro hac vice basis.

SO ORDERED.