LAST MINUTE POINTERS FOR LEGAL ETHICS
By: Atty. Edwin M. Carillo1
Based on the official syllabus, this year’s Bar Examinations
for Legal Ethics will also have a set of questions for Practical
Exercises, an essentially skills examinations. Often little weight is
given to Legal Ethics mainly because of the examinee’s fatigue or
his eagerness perhaps to go home usually because of the lure of
merriment outside the exam site. Don’t commit this mistake! Give
this last exam the importance it deserves and in this regard, you
are reminded to:
a. WATCH THE TIME. Time is critical. Consequently,
only the minimum requirements of the law must be reflected in
answering the problems and in drafting the document required by
the examiner;
b. AVOID FANCY, LONG, AND NEEDLESS WORDS.
Simple, concise and grammatically correct statements pack more
power and efficacy. More importantly, they save you precious
time;
c. AVOID ERASURES as much as possible because they
reduce your work’s impressiveness. To avoid erasures, map out a
plan for your answers using the questionnaire you received.
Remember that nothing comes between YOU and the EXAMINER
other than your written work. Thus, your work should mirror not
only legal aptitude but also neatness; if it cannot be avoided, one
line across such item/s will be adequate to indicate your intent to
delete; and,
d. PUT A DATE in all the legal documents that you will
draft as required.
The following principles in recent case law are significant:
Legal Ethics
1. A member of the Bar and officer of the Court is
required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards. Atty. Advincula cannot be sanctioned
with gravity because although his siring the child with a woman
other than his legitimate wife constituted immorality, he
committed the immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer.
The degree of his immoral conduct was not as grave than if he
had committed the immorality when already a member of the
Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot escape administrative liability.
Atty. Advincula’s manifestation of compliance by taking
a leave from work in the NBI to satisfy the two months
suspension is unacceptable. A lawyer like him ought to know that
it is only the (Supreme) Court that wields the power to discipline
lawyers. The IBP Board of Governors did not possess such power,
rendering its recommendation against him incapable of finality. It
is the Court's final determination of his liability as a lawyer that is
the reckoning point for the service of sanctions and penalties.
Moreover, his being a government employee necessitates that his
suspension from the practice of law should include his
suspension from office. A leave of absence will not suffice. This is
so considering that his position mandated him to be a member of
the Philippine Bar in good standing. The suspension from the
practice of law will not be a penalty if it does not negate his
1Atty. Carillo served as member of the College of Examiners in the 2011 Bar Examinations that handled Legal Ethics and the Skills Examinations for Trial
Memorandum. He is a professor of law and bar reviewer teaching courses like, Political and Constitutional Law, Land Registration Law, Administrative
Law, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Trial Technique, and Legal Forms and Writing for over two decades now. He is also an MCLE Lecturer. He served the
government in 1993 as Senator Raul Roco’s staff lawyer and in 2014 as an Assistant Government Corporate Counsel of the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel, an agency attached to the Justice Department. To date, he is a senior partner at The Law Firm of Creencia Carillo & Velasco.
continuance in office for the period of the suspension. If the rule is
different, this exercise of reprobation of an erring lawyer by the
Court is rendered inutile and becomes a mockery because he can
continue to receive his salaries and other benefits by simply going
on leave for the duration of his suspension from the practice of
law. (Clarissa Advincula vs. Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula, A.C.
9226, 14 June 2016, J. Bersamin)
2. This disbarment case centers on whether Atty. Kho
violated his lawyer's oath that he shall do no falsehood and that he
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct. According to complainant, a violation occurred when
respondent declared in his verified Certificate of Acceptance of
Nomination that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen. Although
the question of one's citizenship is not open to collateral attack, the
Court acknowledges the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline's
pronouncement that it had to make a limited finding on it, since
the alleged dishonesty hinged on such issue. The Court has
constantly ruled that an attack on a person's citizenship may only
be done through a direct action for its nullity. A disbarment case is
definitely not the proper venue to attack someone's citizenship. For
the lack of any ruling from a competent court on Atty. Kho's
citizenship, this disbarment case loses its only leg to stand on and,
hence, must be dismissed. (Plutarco E. Vazquez vs. Atty. David
Lim Queco Kho, A.C. 9492, 11 July 2016)
3. In this case, the lawyer undisputedly obtained several
loans from complainant beginning in 2008 or two years after they
established a lawyer-client relationship in 2006, and before they
terminated the same in 2009, in violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
It is unethical for a lawyer to obtain loans from Complainant
during the existence of a lawyer-client relations. Respondent even
exacerbated her infractions when she issued worthless checks to
pay for her debts, the existence of which was admitted. Regarding
the issue of commingling of funds, using a client's funds for the
lawyer's personal use and depositing the same in his personal
account is prohibited. Further, the failure of a lawyer to render an
account of any money received from a client and deliver the same
to such client when due or upon demand, is a breach of such rule;
and, a lawyer is liable for gross misconduct for his failure to retum
or repay money due to another person upon demand, even in the
absence of an attorney-client relations between them. Lawyers are
reminded that it is not only important to serve their clients with
utmost zeal and competence. It is also an equally important
responsibility for them to properly separate and account for any
money given to them by their clients, and to resist the temptation
to borrow money from their clients, in order to preserve the trust
and confidence reposed upon lawyers by every person requiring
their legal advice and services. (Dyquiangco vs. Atty. Dianna Lynn
Arellano, A.C. 10541; 12 July 2016; J. Caguio
4. Pieces of evidence have been adduced that indubitably
confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity,
and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant
— the real "Patrick A. Caronan" never took the Bar Examinations,
the IBP correctly recommended that such name be stricken off the
Roll of Attomeys. The IBP also correctly ordered that respondent,
whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from
admission to the Bar. In this case, respondent never completed his
college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year
later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993
without graduating. Clearly, respondent has not completed the
requisite pre-law degree. The Court does not discount the

possibility that respondent may later on complete his college
education and earn a law degree under his real name. However,
his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and
educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The
practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional
right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a
privilege limited to citizens of good moral character. Finally,
respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending
to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also
tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous
activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases
against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place
in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its
members is to uphold its integrity and dignity. (Patrick A.
Caronan vs. Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,
A.C. 11316, 12 July 2016, Per Curiam)
5. Atty. Ancheta should have very well known that a
decision that has attained finality is no longer open for reversal
and should be respected. A lawyer's duty to assist in the speedy
administration of justice demands recognition that at a definite
time, issues must be laid to rest and litigation ended. As such,
Ancheta should have advised complainants to accept the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and accord respect to the just claim of the
opposite party. He should have tempered his clients' propensity to
litigate and save them from additional expense in pursuing their
contemplated action. Instead, he gave them confident assurances
that the case could still be reopened and even furnished them a
copy of his prepared "motion to reopen case." Despite his
representation that he would file the motion, however, he did not
do so. Atty. Ancheta's deceit and evasion of duty is manifest. He
accepted the case though he knew the futility of an appeal. Despite
receipt of the P30,000.OO acceptance fee, he did not act on his
client's case. Moreover, he prevailed upon complainants to give
him P200,000.00 purportedly to be used to bribe the Justices of the
Court of Appeals in order to secure a favorable ruling, palpably
showing that he himself was unconvinced of the merits of the case.
"A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage
any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause. Atty. Ancheta's
misconduct betrays his lack of appreciation that the practice of law
is a profession, not a money-making trade. As a servant of the law,
Atty. Ancheta's primary duty was to obey the laws and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. Corollary to this duty is his
obligation to abstain from dishonest or deceitful conduct, as well
as from "activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system. Atty. Ancheta's advice involving
corruption of judicial officers tramps the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and the judicial system and adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law. The maintenance of a high standard
of legal proficiency, honesty, and fair dealing is a prerequisite to
making the bar an effective instrument in the proper
administration of justice. Any member, therefore, who fails to live
up to the exacting standards of integrity and morality exposes
himself or herself to administrative liability. (Spouses Tolentino vs.
Atty. Ferdinand Ancheta; A.C. 6387, Per Curiam, 19 July 2016)
6. Respondent's use of demeaning and immoderate
language (in a demand letter) put complainants in shame and
disgrace. Moreover, x x x several other persons had been copy
furnished with the demand letter. As such, respondent could
have besmirched complainants' reputation to its recipients.
A lawyer's failure to answer the complaint against him
and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his
flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his
despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule
138, Rules of Court. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful
and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of judicial forum. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but
not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. In this regard,
all lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the
courts and are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession, hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly. Thus, respondent ought to temper his words in the
performance of his duties as a lawyer and an officer of the court.
(Spouses Nuezca vs. Atty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia, A.C. 8210, 8
August 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
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7. What is patent from Respondent’s acts is that he has
mocked the judicial processes, disobeyed judicial orders, and
ultimately caused unjust delays in the administration of justice.
These acts directly contravene Rules 10.3 (requiring lawyers to
observe procedural rules and not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice) and 12.04 (requiring lawyers not to unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse court
processes) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Further, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath by disobeying the
legal orders of a duly constituted authority, and disregarding his
sworn duty to "delay no man for money or malice."
Reprimand is generally appropriate as a penalty when a
lawyer's negligence causes injury or potential injury to a client or
a party. In this case, respondent's injurious acts were clearly not
caused by his negligence in following procedures or court orders.
He knowingly abused the legal process and violated orders of the
HLURB Board and Regional Office with the intent of delaying the
execution of a judgment that had long been final and executory.
That he continued to do so even if a Complaint was already filed
against him proved that his acts were deliberate. (Avida Land
Corporation vs. Atty. Al Argosino, A.C. 7437, 17 August 2016, C.
J. Sereno)
8. To hold the lawyer amenable to disbarment by reason
of his or her having committed a crime involving moral
turpitude, it is not enough to show that there is a pending case
involving moral turpitude against him or her, because Section 27
of Rule 138 expressly requires that he or she must have been
found by final judgment guilty of the crime involving moral
turpitude. (Interadent Zahntechnik Phil., Inc. vs. Atty. Rebecca S.
Francisco-Simbillo, A.C. 9464, 24 August 2016, J. Bersamin)
9. Without a doubt, it has been established that
respondent habitually watches pornographic materials in his
office-issued laptop while inside the office premises, during office
hours, and with the knowledge and full view of his staff.
Obviously, the Court cannot countenance such audacious display
of depravity on respondent's part not only because his obscene
habit tarnishes the reputation of the government agency he works
for — the CAAP where he was engaged at that time as Acting
Corporate Secretary — but also because it shrouds the legal
profession in a negative light. As a lawyer in the government
service, respondent is expected to perform and discharge his
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence, and skill, and with utmost devotion and dedication
to duty. However, his aforesaid habit miserably fails to showcase
these standards, and instead, displays sheer unprofessionalism
and utter lack of respect to the government position he was
entrusted to hold.
Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial
evidence as opposed to preponderance of evidence is more in
keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential
considerations attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates,
"[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. (Carrie-Anne
Shaleen Carlyle S. Reyes vs. Atty. Ramon Nieva, A.C. 8560, 6
September 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
10. A perusal of the Special Power of Attorney issued by
Camino and her husband to Atty. Pasagui clearly shows that the
loan application with PHCCI was in their behalf and that the
property mortgaged was likewise their property. If it were true
that it was a personal loan to him, Atty. Pasagui failed to explain
why he used Camino's property as collateral. He also failed to
explain why the Caminos would allow such set up of applying a
loan for Atty. Pasagui’s personal benefit in using their own
property as collateral. In the absence of any agreement between
them, as in this case, it does not make sense that the Caminos
would allow their own residential property to be mortgaged to
finance something that will not benefit them. It is then plausible
that their true intention in designating Atty. Pasagui as attorney-
in-fact was to obtain a loan with PHCCI to finance the expenses of
the transfer of title in Camino's name. Thus, by his failure to make
good of their agreement to use the loan proceeds for the transfer
of the title in Camino's name, Atty. Pasagui not only betrayed the

trust and confidence reposed upon him but he is also guilty of
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct. Atty. Pasagui’s
failure to inform Camino of the status of the transfer of title
despite the release of the loan to finance the transfer of the title, is
a clear indicium that he converted the money for his own use and
constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession. He violated Canon 16 of
the CPR, which states that "[a] lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession." Atty. Pasagui is instead meted the penalty of
disbarment. (Eufemia A. Camino vs. Atty. Ryan Rey L. Pasagui,
A.C. 11095, 20 September 2016, Per Curiam)
11. The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much
to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the court and the public
from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from
the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of
office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in them as members of the bar. Thus, the power to disbar
attorneys ought always to be exercised with great caution, and
only in clear cases of misconduct which seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. (Datu Remegio Duque, Jr. vs. COMELEC
Chairman Sixto Brillantes, et al., A.C. 9912, 21 September 2016, J.
Peralta)
12. After collecting the full amount of her professional
and legal fees, Atty. Maravilla-Ona did not take a single step to
process the registration of land title in Bienvenida's name. Worse,
when asked to return the money she received from Bienvenida,
Atty. Maravilla-Ona issued a worthless check which
consequently bounced when presented for payment.
We also take note of the past disbarment complaints that
had been filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona. Clearly, she exhibits
the habit of violating her oath as a lawyer and the Code, as well as
defying the processes of the IBP. The Court cannot allow her
blatant disregard of the Code and her sworn duty as a member of
the Bar to continue. She had been warned that a similar violation
will merit a more severe penalty, and yet, her reprehensible
conduct has, again, brought embarrassment and dishonor to the
legal profession. It is clear that she did not learn any lesson from
her past experiences and since then has continued to exhibit traits
of incorrigibility. It is time to write finis to Atty. Maravilla-Ona's
professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession
and the interest of justice. (Bienvenida Flor Suarez vs. Atty.
Eleonor A. Maravilla-Ona, A.C. 11064, 27 September 2016, Per
Curiam)
13. It was not disputed that only the filing of the two-
paged Manifestation for Information constituted the respondent’s
rendition of professional services for the complainants. Although
he did claim that the filing of the Manifestation for Information had
prevented any intrusion on their property, thereby fulfilling his
end of the contract, the worth of such minimal effort was
exaggerated and disproportionate when taken in the context of
the attorney’s fees being Lot 37925-G with 300 square meters in
area. The two-paged Manifestation for Information was not even the
procedural precursor of the promised petition for certiorari.
Moreover, he did not actually file the petition for certiorari as he
had promised. And, lastly, he did nothing more after filing the
Manifestation for Information. He certainly transgressed the
Lawyer’s Oath by receiving property of a substantial value from
the complainants after having made them believe that he could
ensure their land from intrusion by third parties. He took
advantage of them who had reposed their full trust and
confidence in his ability to perform the task by virtue of his being
a lawyer. (Spouses Jacinto vs. Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr., A.C.
8494, 5 October 2016, J. Bersamin)
14. The respondent, in his capacity MTCC Tangub City
judge, presided over the case before eventually inhibiting himself
from further proceedings. His act of presiding constituted
intervention within the meaning of the rule (Cf. Canon 36 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics). It is also plain and
unquestionable that Canon 36, from which Canon (6 of the CPR)
was derived, prohibited him as a former member of the Bench
from handling any case upon which he had previously acted in a
judicial capacity. In this context, he not only exercised the power
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to influence the outcome of the proceedings but also had a direct
hand in bringing about the result of the case by virtue of his
having the power to rule on it.
The restriction extended to engagement or
employment. The respondent could not accept work or
employment from anyone that would involve or relate to any
matter in which he had intervened as a judge except on behalf of
the body or authority that he served during his public
employment. The restriction as applied to him lasted beyond his
tenure in relation to the matters in which he had intervened as
judge. Accordingly, the fact that he was already retired from the
Bench, or that he was already in the private practice of law when
he was engaged for the case was inconsequential.
The respondent has pleaded for the sympathy of the
Court towards his plight of "poverty." Although we can
understand his current situation and sympathize with him, his
actuations cannot be overlooked because they contravened the
express letter and spirit of Rule 6.03 of the CPR. (Atty. Rutillo B.
Pasok vs. Atty. Felipe G. Zapatos, A.C. 7388, 19 October 2016, J.
Bersamin)
15. The present administrative case should be resolved by
the Office of the Ombudsman, considering that complainants have
filed a complaint before it on 12 February 2009. In the case of (DOJ
Secretary) Gonzalez, his death on 7 September 2014 forecloses any
administrative case against him.
The Ombudsman’s authority to act on complainants'
administrative complaint is anchored on Section 13(1), Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides that: "[t]he Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties: (1) investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient."
Under Section 16 of RA 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance committed by any public officer or employee during
his or her tenure. Section 19 of RA 6770 also states that the
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to
acts or omissions which are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, or
discriminatory.
Considering that both (Undersecretary) Exconde and
(Representative) Madrona are public officers being charged for
actions, which are allegedly unfair and discriminatory, involving
their official functions during their tenure, the present case should
be resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman as the appropriate
government agency. Indeed, the IBP has no jurisdiction over
government lawyers who are charged with administrative offenses
involving their official duties. For such acts, government lawyers
fall under the disciplinary authority of either their superior or the
Ombudsman. Moreover, an anomalous situation will arise if the
IBP asserts jurisdiction and decides against a government lawyer,
while the disciplinary authority finds in favor of the government
lawyer. (Spouses Buffe vs. Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, et al., A.C.
8168, 21 October 2016, Acting C.J. Carpio) (See also Eduardo R.
Alicias Jr. vs. Atty. Myrna V. Macatangay, et al., A.C. 7478, 11
January 2017, J. Carpio, where the Supreme Court held that the
allegations in Alicias' complaint against Atty. Macatangay, Atty.
Zerna, Atty. Ronquillo, and Atty. Buenaflor, which include their (1)
failure to evaluate CSC records; (2) failure to evaluate documentary
evidence presented to the CSC; and (3) non-service of CSC Orders
and Resolutions, all relate to their misconduct in the discharge of
their official duties as government lawyers working in the CSC.
Hence, the IBP has no jurisdiction over Alicias' complaint. These
are acts or omissions connected with their duties as government
lawyers exercising official functions in the CSC and within the
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of their superior or the
Office of the Ombudsman.)
16. Clearly, the relationship between the Spouses De
Guzman and the Zalamea brothers is actually one of business
partners rather than that of a lawyer and client. Atty. De Guzman's
acquisition of the Speaker Perez property was a valid consequence
of a business deal, not by reason of a lawyer-client relationship (so
proscribed by Article 1491 of the Civil Code), for which he could

not be penalized by the Court. De Guzman and his wife are very
well allowed by law to enter into such a transaction and their
conduct in this regard was not borne out to have been attended by
any undue influence, deceit, or misrepresentation. (Manuel
Enrique L. Zalamea and Manuel Jose L. Zalamea vs. Atty. Rodolfo
P. De Guzman, Jr. and Perlas De Guzman, Antonio, Venturanza,
Quizon-Venturanza, and Herbosa Law Firm, A.C. 7387, 7
November 2016, J. Peralta)
17. A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks
complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with
malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant
and BMGI (Belo Medical Group, Inc.). Calling complainant a
"quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and
"Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing
people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an
intention to besmirch the name and reputation of complainant, as
well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon
complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured
("binaboy") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein
Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services — all these
despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already
filed against complainant. He even threatened complainant with
conviction for criminal negligence and estafa — which is contrary
to one's obligation "to act with justice."
In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and
obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and
undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject
Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of …
the CPR (.) (Ma. Victoria G. Belo-Henares vs. Atty. Roberto
“Argee” Guevarra, A.C. 11394, 1 December 2016, J. Perlas-
Bernabe)
18. While Atty. De Castro's repeated requests for resetting
and postponement of the trial of the case may be considered as
contemptuous if there was a showing of abuse on his part, the
Court, however, finds that Chua failed to show that Atty. De
Castro was indeed moved to cause delays by malice, or dishonesty,
or deceit, or grave misconduct as to warrant a finding of
administrative liability against him. The operative phrase for
causing delay in any suit or proceeding under Rule 1.03 is "for any
corrupt motive or interest." Considering that this matter concerned
Atty. De Castro's state of mind, it absolutely behooved Chua to
present sufficient evidence of the overt acts committed by Atty. De
Castro that demonstrated his having deliberately intended thereby
to do wrong or to cause damage to him and his business. That
demonstration, however, was not made by Chua. (Joseph Chua vs.
Atty. Arturo De Castro, A.C. 10671, 5 December 2016, J. Reyes)
19. In this case, Commissioner Robles observed that while
Atty. Ching denied having notarized the Deed by showing the
discrepancy between his purported signature therein and the
specimen signatures he submitted in his Answer, he miserably
failed to explain how the Deed ended up in his notarial books..
While there may be reasons to give Atty. Ching the
benefit of the doubt as to who signed the Deed, the Court does not
and cannot lose sight of the fact that Atty. Ching still failed in
ensuring that only documents which he had personally signed and
sealed with his notarial seal, after satisfying himself with the
completeness of the same and the identities of the parties who
affixed their signatures therein, would be included in his notarial
register. This also means that Atty. Ching failed to properly store
and secure his notarial equipment in order to prevent other people
from notarizing documents by forging his signature and affixing
his notarial seal, and recording such documents in his notarial
books, without his knowledge and consent. This is gross
negligence.
Such gross negligence on the part of Atty. Ching in
letting another person notarize the Deed had also unduly put
the Castelo heirs in jeopardy of losing their property. To make
matters worse, the real property subject of the Deed was the
residence, nay, the family home of the Castelo heirs, a property
that their parents had worked hard for in order to provide them
and their children a decent shelter and the primary place where
they could bond together as a family — a property which had
already acquired sentimental value on the part of the Castelo
heirs, which no amount of money could ever match. One can
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just imagine the pain and anguish of losing a home to
unscrupulous people who were able to transfer title to such
property and file a case in court in order to eject them — all
because of the negligence of a notary public in keeping his
notarial books and instruments from falling into the wrong
hands. (Orlando S. Castelo, et al. vs. Atty. Ronald Segundino C.
Ching, A.C. 11165, 6 February 2017, J. Caguioa)
20. The oral instruction (given by Commissioner Funa
directing respondent to return the P80,000.00 in the IBP’s
August 18, 2004 hearing) was not a juridically binding order.
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court sanctions and spells out the
terms of the IBP’s involvement in cases involving the
disbarment and/or discipline of lawyers. The competence of
the IBP is only recommendatory. Under Article VIll, Section
5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, only this Court has the power to
actually rule on disciplinary cases of lawyers, and to impose
appropriate penalties.
Rule 139-B merely delegates investigatory functions to
the IBP. With the exercise of its delegated investigatory power,
the IBP refers proposed actions to this Court. Recognizing the
IBP’s limited competence in disciplinary cases impels a
concomitant recognition that, pending favorable action by this
Court on its recommendations, its determinations and
conclusions are only provisional. Therefore, rulings on
disciplinary cases attain finality and are enforceable only upon
this Court's own determination that they must be imposed.
The oral instruction given to respondent in the August
18, 2004 hearing has, thus, not attained such a degree of finality
as would immutably require him to comply, such that failure to
comply justifies additional or increased penalties. Penalizing
him for non-compliance is premature. (Anita Santos Murray vs.
Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes, A.C. 5408, 7 February 2017, J.
Leonen)
21. The respondent acknowledged authorship of the
petition for annulment of marriage, and of the simulation of the
decision and certificate of finality. His explanation of having done
so only upon the complainant's persistent prodding did not
exculpate him from responsibility. For one, the explanation is
unacceptable, if not altogether empty. Simulating or participating
in the simulation of a court decision and a certificate of finality of
the same decision is an outright criminal falsification or forgery.
One need not be a lawyer to know so, but it was worse in the
respondent's case because he was a lawyer. Thus, his acts were
legally intolerable. Specifically, his deliberate falsification of the
court decision and the certificate of finality of the decision
reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part, and made
a mockery of the administration of justice in this country. He
thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the
Bar.(Flordeliza Madria vs. Atty. Carlos Rivera, A.C. 11256, 7
March 2017, Per Curiam)
22. Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in
the discharge of her duties as a government official. However, if
such misconduct as a government official also constitutes a
violation of her oath as a lawyer and the CPR, then she may be
subject to disciplinary sanction by this Court.
Atty. Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the Code
of the Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." As a
special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration, she is the
representative, not of any private party, but of the State. Her task
was to investigate and verify facts to determine whether a ground
for deportation exists, and if further administrative action — in the
form of a formal charge — should be taken against an alien.
Had respondent carefully reviewed the records of Fuji,
she would have found out about the approval of Fuji's application,
which would negate her finding of overstaying. Because of her
negligence, Fuji was deprived of his liberty for almost eight
months, until his release on March 23, 2016.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as a failure to give
attention to a task due to carelessness or indifference. In this case,

respondent's negligence shows her indifference to the fundamental
right of every person, including aliens, to due process and to the
consequences of her actions.
Lawyers in government service should be more
conscientious with their professional obligations consistent with
the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust.
The ethical standards under the CPR are rendered even more
exacting as to government lawyers because they have the added
duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high standard
of ethics, competence, and professionalism in public service. In
this case, respondent's negligence evinces a failure to cope with
the strict demands and high standards of public service and the
legal profession. (Liang Fuji vs. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz, A.C.
11043, 8 March 2017, J. Leonen)
23. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate
remedy where judicial recourse remains available, such as a
motion for reconsideration, an appeal or a petition for certiorari.
(The action of complainant remains pending and active) (Spouses
Chua vs. Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa Tan-Sollano, et
al., A.C. 11533; 6 June 2017, J. Reyes) [See also Clemente Atoc, vs.
Edgardo A. Camello, et al. I.P.I. 16-241-CA-J, 29 November 2016,
J. Perez, where the Supreme Court stated in dismissing the
complaint against three Court of Appeals Associate Justices that
administrative complaints against magistrates cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties
aggrieved by the erroneous orders or judgments of the former.
Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review
nor do they cumulate thereto, where such review is still available
to the aggrieved parties and the cases not yet been resolved with
finality.
24. Atty. Echanez’s acts of: (a) not complying with two
MCLEs for two compliance periods; (b) repeatedly indicating false
MCLE compliance numbers in his pleadings before the trial
courts; and, (c) repeatedly failing to obey legal orders of trial
court, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and also the Supreme
Court despite due notice, taken together, constitute serious cases
that merits disbarment. (Mapalad vs. Atty. Echanez; A.C. 10911; 6
June 2017, J. Tijam)
Judicial Ethics
1.Verily, Judge Mislang manifested serious lack of
knowledge and understanding of the basic legal principles on
prejudicial question and on jurisdiction in petitions for
suspension of criminal action based on prejudicial questions, as
prescribed by Sections 6 and Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules
and settled jurisprudence. A judge may also be administratively
liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to
apply settled law and jurisprudence. Though not every judicial
error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in
good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the same
applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment. Such, however, is not the case with Judge Mislang.
Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, failure
to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. A judge is presumed to have acted with
regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions.
But a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions
of a statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars enjoining their
strict compliance, upends this presumption and subjects the
magistrate to corresponding administrative sanctions.
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the
assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the
performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous
but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was
moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like
motive. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws, They must know
the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial
competence requires no less. Thus, unfamiliarity with the rules is
a sign of incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his
hand. When a judge displays utter lack of familiarity with the
5
rules, he betrays the confidence of the public in the courts,
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges owe it
to the public to be knowledgeable, hence, they are expected to
have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes
and procedural rules; they must know them by heart.
(Department of Justice vs. Hon. Rolando Mislang, A.M. RTJ-14-
2369, 21 July 2016, Per Curiam)
2. Respondent's act of not wearing the judicial robe during
court sessions violates Administrative Circular 25 of 9 June 1989,
which is mandatory. Under Section 9(4), Rule 140 of the Revised
Rules of Court, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars is considered a less serious charge and punishable under
Section I I(B) of the Revised Rules of Court with suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
month nor more than three months, or a fine of more than
P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.00. (Jocelyn Mclaren, et al. vs.
Hon. Jacinto C. Gonzales, A.M. MTJ-16-1876, 26 April 2017, J.
Peralta)
3. Judge Samson violated Canon 2 of the Code on
Judicial Conduct (on Impropriety) when she accepted the
application for a judicial post of a probationer before his
discharge from probation and even recommending him for such
post. As presiding judge she should have been more circumspect
and waited for the final discharge from probation of her
recommendee, as it is only upon the final discharge from
probation that his criminal case is deemed terminated and all his
civil rights lost or suspended are restored. (The Anonymous Letter
Complaint vs. Judge Samson, et al. A.M. MTJ 16-1870; 6 June
2017, J. Peralta)
4. Judge Barcillano commits conduct unbecoming a judge
when he: embarrassed a lady police officer and repeatedly asked
her to stand and sit beside him; insulted the lady police when he
repeatedly asked her name and said “PO1 ka lang”; and held her
gun and cocked it in public. (PO1 Myra Marcelo vs. Judge Ignacio
Barcillano, A.M. RTJ 16-2450; 7 June 2017, J. Peralta)
5. The conduct of Judge Laron fell short of this exacting
standard (of propriety). By carrying an affair with a married
woman, Judge Laron violated the trust reposed on his office and
utterly failed to live up to noble ideals and strict standards of
morality required of the members of the judiciary.
The Court also finds Judge Laron guilty of gross
misconduct for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct, another
serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court.
The illicit relationship started because Melissa sought Judge
Laron’s help with respect to her pending B.P. Blg. 22 cases and,
apparently, he entertained the request for assistance.
Judge Laron's immorality and serious misconduct have
repercussions not only on the judiciary but also on the millions of
overseas Filipino workers (OFW) like Wilfredo. While Wilfredo
was working hard abroad to earn for his family, Judge Laron was
sleeping with his wife in his bed, in his house and spending his
hard-earned dollars. What was even worse was the flaunting of
the illicit relationship before his young boys (aged 13 and 14) who
related it to him upon his return from abroad. This is the
nightmare scenario of every OFW — to be confronted upon their
return with stories from their own children about the "other man
or woman" sleeping in their house while they were away enduring
the bitter cold or searing heat, homesickness, culture shock, and
occasional inhumane treatment just to earn the dollars for the
food, shelter, clothing, and education of their family back home.
(Wilfredo F. Tuvillo vs. Judge Henry Laron, A.M. MTJ-10-1755;
Melissa J. Tuvillo vs. Judge Henry Laron, A.M. MTJ-10-1756, 18
October 2016, Per Curiam)
6. In this case, Judge Perez’s explanation was too flimsy.
His being inexperienced as a newly appointed judge and his
explanation that the delay was not intended to prejudice the
plaintiffs are not persuasive because it is his duty to resolve the
cases within the reglementary period as mandated by law and the
rules. These excuses only show his lack of diligence in discharging
administrative responsibilities and professional competence in
court management. A judge is expected to keep his own listing of
cases and to note therein the status of each case so that they may be
acted upon accordingly and without delay. He must adopt a

system of record management and organize his docket to monitor
the flow of cases for a prompt and effective dispatch of business.
Under Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, undue delay in rendering a
decision is a less serious charge punishable by either (a) suspension
from the service without salary and other benefits for not less than
one month nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than
PI 0,000.00 but not more than P20,000.00. (Trinidad Gamboa-Roces
vs. Judge Ranhel Perez, A.M. MTJ-16-1887, 9 January 2017, J.
Mendoza)
7. Archiving of cases is a generally acceptable measure
designed to shelve cases but is done only where no immediate
action is expected. Here, when Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the
warrants, she also archived the case without citing any ground in
A.C. No. 7-A-92 for the suspension of the proceedings. What she
did was unprecedented. She did not even bother to wait for the
return of the warrants or wait for the six-month period. By doing
so, she exhibited bias, if not incompetence and ignorance of the
law and jurisprudence. It could also be that she knew it, but she
opted to completely ignore the law or the regulations. Certainly, it
was a case of grave abuse of discretion as her actuations were not
in accord with law or justice.
Judge Cabrera-Faller also showed manifest bias and
partiality, if not gross ignorance of the law, when she issued the
June 13, 2013 Order recalling the warrants of arrest against
accused Alim, Amante and Rosales claiming that they were issued
inadvertently.
Judge Cabrera-Faller recalled the warrants of arrest
against three of the accused but failed to explain why she issued
the warrants inadvertently. She merely wrote that the warrants of
arrest were "inadvertently issued" without any explanation why
there was such inadvertence in the issuance. The Court cannot
accept this. There was clearly an abdication of the judicial
function. The records of the case were forwarded by the OCP and
they contained not only the information but all the supporting
documents.
It could only mean that she failed to comply with her
constitutional mandate to personally determine the existence of
probable cause before ordering the issuance of the warrants of
arrest. As the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of
the Information, to first and foremost determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. It
was incumbent upon her to assess the resolution, affidavits and
other supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor to
satisfy herself that probable cause existed and before a warrant of
arrest could be issued against the accused. If she did find the
evidence submitted by the prosecutor to be insufficient, she could
order the dismissal of the case, or direct the investigating
prosecutor either to submit more evidence or to submit the entire
records of the preliminary investigation, or she could even call the
complainant and the witness to answer the courts probing
questions to enable her to discharge her duty.
Most probably, she did her duty to examine and analyze
the attached documents but because she took pity on the young
accused (never mind the victim), she chose to ignore or disregard
them. Nonetheless, “when the inefficiency springs from failure to
consider so basic and elemental a rule, law or principle in the
discharge of duties, the judge is either insufferably incompetent
and undeserving of the position she holds or is too vicious that
the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and
in grave abuse of judicial authority.” (Judge Martonino Marcos
(Retired) vs. Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller, A.M. RTJ-16-2472, 24
January 2017, J. Carpio)
8. Far from exhibiting remorse and reformation, the
tenor of respondent's petition (for judicial clemency) only
demonstrates her attitude of impenitence, self-righteousness,
and even, vindictiveness, which unquestionably renders her
undeserving of judicial clemency. Neither did she show
compliance with the other requisites for judicial clemency as
cited above. Accordingly, there is no quibble that the instant
petition should be denied.
The Court, in numerous cases, has come down hard
and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the
6
judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of
judicial conduct. Judicial clemency is not a privilege or a right
that can be availed of at any time, as the Court will grant it only
if there is a showing that it is merited. Verily, clemency, as an act
of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced
with the preservation of public confidence in the courts.
(Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Judge Victoria Villalon-
Pornillos, A.M. RTJ 09-2183, 14 February 2017, Per Curiam)
Practical Exercises
1. Based on the 2018 Bar Syllabus for Legal Ethics,
examinees need to be fairly familiar with the following new
additional issue on basic conveyancing - - (1)
Jurats/Acknowledgments. By this time, it should be all together
clear that if a party presents to a notary public a draft affidavit, the
proper notarial act to accompany it is a Jurat. On the other hand, if
a party presents to a notary public a contract, the proper notarial
act to accompany it is an Acknowledgment. Under the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice (A.M. 02-8-13-SC), both Jurats and
Acknowledgments may take various forms depending on certain
circumstances. Here are the various Jurat forms sanctioned under
the 2004 Rules:
a. The affiant is personally known to the notary.
SIGNED AND SWORN before me in Manila, this 3
July 2018 by affiant Angel T. Cruz, whom I personally
know.
* Details of the Notary’s Register
** Details of the Concluding Part of the Notarial Certificate
(Cf. Section 2, Rule VIII, 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice)
b. The affiant presents a current ID sanctioned by the rules
to the notary.
SIGNED AND SWORN before me in Manila this 3
July 2018 after Angel T. Cruz presented his Driver’s
License N10-68-054678 that expires on 24 May 2019.
(Add the concluding part of the Notarial Certificate and
details of the Notary’s register.)
c. The affiant has no ID but is identified by one credible
witness.
Requirements: (a) The notary knows personally the
witness identifying the affiant; (b) the witness personally
knows the affiant; (c) the witness is not privy to the
document or transaction; and, (d) the witness takes an
oath or affirmation.
SIGNED AND SWORN before me in Manila this 3
July 2018 and affiant Angel T. Cruz proved his identity to
me through witness Mario A. Pineda, whom I personally
know. Mario A. Pineda, under oath, declares that he
personally knows Angel A. Cruz, who is without a valid
ID for notarization purposes, to be same person who
voluntarily signed the foregoing affidavit and that he is
not privy to this signed affidavit.
(Add the concluding part of the Notarial Certificate and
details of the Notary’s register.)
d. The affiant has no ID but is identified by two credible
witness.
Requirements: (a) both witnesses personally know the
affiant; (b) both witnesses presented their valid ID’s; (c)
neither witness is privy to the document or transaction;
and, (d) the witnesses take their oath or affirmation.
 7

SIGNED AND SWORN before me in Manila this 3 July 2018 and affiant Angel Cruz proved his identity to me through witnesses:

1. Tomas S. Balatan Passport CC123330 1-05-2019/Baguio City

2. Juan N. Buelta Passport JJ200345 1-17-2020/Manila

Both witnesses, of legal ages, under oath declare that: Angel A. Cruz is personally known to them; he is the same affiant in
the foregoing affidavit; he does not have any competent evidence of identity and he cannot obtain one within a reasonable time;
they are not privy to or are interested in the affidavit he signed.

(Add the concluding part of the Notarial Certificate and details of the Notary’s register.)

Note well that these variants of the Jurat can equally apply in Acknowledgments.

2. While ordinarily Petitions follow the usual Judicial Forms, the syllabus for Ethics particularly stated a Change of Name
Affidavit. In this regard, Republic Act 9048 should be read, as it is relevant. Indeed, Section 5 of the law requires that “the petition shall be
in the form of an affidavit.” The law authorizes only a change in the first name on the following grounds: “(1) (t)he petitioner finds the first
name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) (t)he new first name or
nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that by that first name or
nickname in the community; or (3) (t)he change will avoid confusion.”

Thus, the following problem can possibly be asked.

5. Spouses Benjamin and Leonor Relova approached you seeking help for their son, Batman Bruce. They
disclosed that they wanted to have their son’s name changed by dropping the first of his two first names, as this current
name has caused him to be the butt of jokes from both friends and relatives. They want that this issue be addressed
soonest hopefully before their son finishes law in San Sebastian College. Draft the needed document to carry out what
they want without any notarial act.

The suggested answer:

5.

Republic of the Philippines)

City of Manila ) S.S.

AFFIDAVIT
(To Petition a Change of Name)

I, BATMAN BRUCE RELOVA y ROSALES, Filipino, single, of legal age and residing at 8 Enders St. Filinvest
Homes East, Cainta, Rizal, under oath, declare that:

1. I was born on 13 May 1999 from the union of Benjamin P. Relova and Leonor C. Rosales and was given the first
name “BATMAN BRUCE” as shown by my birth certificate, here enclosed, recorded on such date in the Manila Local
Civil Registrar’s Office (LCRO) under registry number 1234567.

2. The first name to be changed is from “BATMAN BRUCE” to plain “BRUCE.”

3. I execute this affidavit to support a change of my first name because my given first name is downright ridiculous
and has caused me dishonor ever since.

4. To support this, I also enclose here the following documents:

a. A certified true copy of the registry book page containing the entry sought to be changed;
b. My elementary and high school transcripts of record where the name “BATMAN BRUCE R. RELOVA”
appears and upon which the change shall be based;
c. The affidavits of Mrs. Maria R. Buenaventura and Mr. Pedro C. Vitug, my elementary school and high school
classmates, both stating separately that I have been known in school as “BATMAN BRUCE R. RELOVA,
and upon which the change shall be based;
d. A certification of posting;
e. A certification from Barangay Santo Domingo, Cainta, stating that I am known in the community as BRUCE
R. RELOVA;
f. Separate certifications from the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation that I
have no pending administrative, civil or criminal cases, or any criminal record;
g. An affidavit of publication from the Manila Bulletin confirming the requisite publication under the law;
and,
h. A copy of the newspaper clipping from Manila Bulletin.

5. I have not filed any affidavit-petition and that, to the best of my knowledge, no other similar affidavit-petition
is pending with any LCRO, court, or Philippine Consulate.

6. I will file my affidavit-petition at the Manila LCRO in accordance with Republic Act 9048 and its implementing
rules and regulations.

SIGNED this 10 September 2017, in Manila.

(SGD.) BATMAN BRUCE R. RELOVA

Affiant

(Jurat is Omitted as Required)

 8
3. Judicial affidavits have dual functions, namely: (a) they take the place of direct testimonies; and, (b) they identify and authenticate
documentary or object evidence in the case. A sample (sans the Affidavit proper or the Questions and Answers that elicit facts relevant to the
issues) is found below:

Case Caption

JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT

I, JORGE B. REYES, of legal age, Filipino, holding office at Lexicon Building, John Hay Special Economic Zone,
1088, 2600 Baguio City, under oath, state:

Preliminary Statement

Atty. Julie Anne T. Rabe examines me here. She holds office at the Dela Cruz Law Office, 3rd Floor, Prestige
Tower, Balara, Quezon City, the same place where she examines me. I answer her questions fully conscious that I do so
under oath and that I may face liability for false testimony or perjury. Her questions are:

Q1.________________________________?
A1. ________________________________.

SIGNED this 8 June 2018 in Quezon City.

(SGD.) JORGE B. REYES

Affiant
SSS ID 2454345569

Attestation

I, Julie Anne T. Rabe, of legal age, counsel for Plaintiff Jorge B. Reyes, attest under oath, that I faithfully recorded
the questions I asked him and the corresponding answers he gave me; and neither I nor any other person then present or
assisting me coached the witness regarding his answers.

SIGNED this 8 June 2017 in Quezon City.

(SGD.) Atty. JULIE ANNE T. RABE

Affiant
Driver’s License NO9143-55667
Expires on 12-12-19

JURAT

SIGNED AND SWORN before me in Quezon City, this 9 June 2018 after I identified affiants Jorge B. Reyes and
Julie Ann T. Rabe through their respective competent evidence of identities stated above.

(Notarial Certificate plus details in the Notarial Book)

oOo

-------------------------------- END --------------------------------

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