Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci

Development and validation of three-step risk assessment method

for ship recycling sector
Karin Garmer a, Hasse Sjöström a, Anand M. Hiremath b, Atit K. Tilwankar b, George Kinigalakis c,
Shyam R. Asolekar b,c,⇑
a
Swerea IVF AB, Mölndal, Sweden
b
Centre for Environmental Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, India
c
Medimetal Limited, Uppsala, Sweden

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Disposal of end-of-life vessels in an environmentally sound and safe manner is a major challenge today.
Received 10 April 2014 In the present study an attempt has been made to develop a three-step risk assessment method – which
Received in revised form 5 January 2015 offers a systematic pedagogic approach for the ‘‘analysis team’’ comprising of production managers,
Accepted 12 February 2015
safety officers, safety supervisors and the designated expert monitor to reduce risks and enhance safety
Available online 24 March 2015
at ship recycling yards. The three-step risk assessment was performed in 35 ship recycling yards through
questionnaire surveys and door-to-door communication. Thus, 35 data sets from field personnel at the
Keywords:
ship recycling yards, each data set with 8 risk indexes (4 risk indexes each, before and after implementing
Ship recycling
Ship breaking
corrective actions) were collected. In addition, 9 data sets were collected to document the perceptions of
Risk assessment experts. In all, a total of 44 data sets were collected and used to validate the risk assessment method.
End-of-life vessels Validation of the three-step method, essentially addresses the differences (or similarities) in ‘‘perception
Occupational risk of risk’’ by several health, safety and environment (HSE) managers who volunteered for the risk assess-
ment exercise. In order to validate the risk assessment method, three validation protocols were devel-
oped. Consistency check on the data sets was also performed and it was found that the relationship
was linear with the slope close to unity. The example illustrating the application of Three Step Method
in identifying and minimizing risks provides clear understanding for the users of this method.
Evidently, the three-step risk assessment method developed in this research appeared to give consistent
results in a variety of scenarios of validation.
Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Disposal of end-of-life vessels was initially started by USA and

As per the estimation of International Maritime Organization, as
on 2010, nearly 150 nations contributed to total 104,304 world
fleet of merchant ships; which were involved in international trad-
ing activity. Vessels or ships are typically disposed off after a life
span of 22–25 years (Deshpande et al., 2012). Typically, the need
for disposal of ship arises under two circumstances. (1) When
the cost of operation of the ship becomes greater than the revenue
which it can generate. (2) When the age or market conditions make
a ship less profitable to operate for the owner (Asolekar, 2012;
Moen, 2008).
⇑ Corresponding author at: Centre for Environmental Science and Engineering,
Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, India. Tel.: +91 22 2576 7867; fax:
+91 22 2572 3480.
E-mail address: asolekar@iitb.ac.in (S.R. Asolekar).
some of the European Countries by dismantling them (typically
referred to as ‘‘ship breaking’’) as an on-shore business in the fifties
(Demaria, 2010). Eventually, the industry moved to developing
countries on account of the availability of cheaper labor as well as
potential market for recycled scrap steel and sheet metal – which
helped in improving economics of the ship breaking sector in
India, China, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Most of the ocean-going ships
are owned and operated for trade by the developed countries; but,
the dismantling and recycling of the ships at the end-of-life is being
transferred to the developing countries (Deshpande et al., 2012).
Ship recycling industry can be considered as a green industry as
almost entire product can be reused, recycled and resold (Sarraf
et al., 2010). It provides direct employment to approximately
50,000 workers in Bangladesh and 60,000 in India. It provides indi-
rect employment to approximately half a million workers in both
countries combined. Country like Bangladesh is scarce in terms of
Iron ore. Hence, it relies heavily on imported steel scrap for steel

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.02.007
0925-7535/Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
176 K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189
production to meet the infrastructural and other requirements of
the country. In the year 2004, Bangladesh ship breaking industry
contributed as high as 80% to the country’s steel production
(Kumar, 2009). Though a minuscule fraction when compared to
India’s steel production, the ship recycling sector typically recovers
nearly 100% steel from dismantling of obsolete ships and thereby
reduces the load on iron ore mining and ultimately avoids CO2 emis-
sions to that extent (Hiremath et al., 2014). Thus, the contribution of
this industry has been significant in the context of India in terms of
employment generation as well as production of steel with nearly
2.8 times smaller CO2 emissions (findings from a project on life cycle
assessment of steel recycling sector in progress).
Nearly half of the world’s ships are being dismantled and
recycled on India’s west coast along the Alang-Sosiya beach in
the Gulf of Cambay; located around 56 km from the City of
Bhavnagar, State of Gujarat. The Alang-Sosiya cluster has around
160 active ship recycling yards spanning along its 12 km stretch
of beach. The natural energy of tidal motion combined with some
unique geographical and coastal conditions at Alang (e.g. a slope of
10 degree of sandy beach and the relatively quiet ocean) has
helped the Alang-Sosiya cluster to achieve the objective of disman-
tling obsolete vessels for the past three decades without undertak-
ing any ecologically damaging construction or installing expensive
equipments (Reddy et al., 2003; Asolekar, 2006; Mahindrakar et al.,
2008; Demaria, 2010; Asolekar and Hiremath, 2012;Deshpande
et al., 2012; Hiremath et al., 2014). Cumulatively, more than one
ship of nearly 30,000 LDT (light displacement tonnage) is broken
every day in the Alang ship recycling yards. It is the destiny of
ocean-going ships like oil tankers, bulk carriers, general cargo, con-
tainer ships and others like passenger and cruise ships Reddy et al.
(2004). In 1990s the Alang-Sosiya established as largest ship recy-
cling yard in the World (Demaria, 2010).
There is a downside of the ship recycling sector involving expo-
sure to workers to a wide range of hazards and conditions that cause
a large number of near accidents resulting in ill health, injuries and
fatal accidents as well as contamination of surrounding environ-
ment Deshpande et al. (2012). For example, nearly 70% of the total
workforce is involved in the plate cutting activity at the yards using
the Oxy-LPG torches for plate cutting (Deshpande et al., 2013).
Most of the labor force for breaking obsolete ships is hired on a
short-term contract-basis and the entire operations are labor
intensive. The work place is temporary and workers are not highly
educated (Asolekar, 2006). To add to the complexity, the ship dis-
mantling yards in India is typically small and 150–200 workers work
on site and inside beached ship in almost every plot (Deshpande
et al., 2013). The unsafe work place conditions, episodic nature of
the ship dismantling and recycling activity, use of unskilled and
uneducated workers for executing manual activities in ship
breaking as well as proximity of work place to ocean-land interface
(beach, dry dock, floating platform, etc.) are some of the complicat-
ing factors associated with modernization of the ship dismantling
and recycling sector throughout the world (Asolekar, 2012).
However, the unorganized sector and several not-so-profitable
small and medium industries have not been able to adopt risk-
based approaches for improvement in the third world – especially
those sectors which are known for ‘‘risky’’ activities and hazard-
prone work environment. To complicate the process of up grada-
tion and improvement further, a variety of social, cultural and
enabling legal as well as bureaucratic strength may not be there
in the first place. In such instances, neither relevant data on work-
place accidents and exposure are available nor there exist intra-
sectoral collaboration to crank-start the process of improvement.
For example, the sector of ship dismantling is warming up in the
recent times to initiating the process of change.
Clearly, there is a room to improve such workplace through
implementation of modern management techniques, better
housekeeping, by infusing low-risk and high efficiency technolo-
gies and practices (Asolekar, 2012). It appears as though the ship
dismantlers in Alang, India are keen to improve themselves and
want to co-operate with the national and international regulatory
agencies by promoting safe and environmentally sound ship recy-
cling in India (Deshpande et al., 2012). While every nation would
like to have their obsolete vessels dismantled, it would be expected
that the ship breaking activity does not create polluted yards and
deteriorate beaches and coastal marine environment further.
This awareness and sense of responsibility has led the interna-
tional stakeholders including European Commission (EC) as well
as International Maritime Organization (IMO) to initiate dialog
among stakeholders and forge international convention and leg-
islation, respectively. Recently, the European Parliament passed
Legislation entitled ‘‘Ship Recycling Regulation’’ published in
Official Journal of the European Union on 10 December, 2013. Also,
the draft of ‘‘Hong Kong Convention’’ (HKC), which addresses ‘‘Safe
and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships’’, is being negotiated
multilaterally since May 2009 at the IMO Headquarters in London.
Highpoints of the Draft HKC include its insistence on prepara-
tion of yard-specific Ship Recycling Facility Plan (SRFP) as well as
ship-specific Ship Recycling Plan (SRP). Unfortunately, there exists
inadequate guidance on preparation of these plans in the present
draft of HKC – which may eventually be seen as the striking lim-
itation of the draft. This deficiency can be remediated by devising
a methodology to identify and assess the occupational risks posed
during a variety of activities during the course of ship breaking and
recycling.
It is well known that the high-tech industrial sectors (e.g. air-
craft and automobile manufacturing, electronics hardware manu-
facturing, sophisticated machines and tool manufacturing,
manufacturing of high value drugs and pharmaceutical, dyestuff,
paints and pigments, textiles, printing, etc.) as well as high-tech
service and logistics sectors (e.g. aviation, freight transportation,
logistics and ground-activity management, operation and mainte-
nance of commercial vessels through trained marine crew, ware-
house management, just-on-time delivery of spare parts as well
as finish products, etc.) have successfully employed risk assess-
ment approach for improving occupational health and safety as
well as minimization of risk of accidents during the industrial
activity. These industrial sectors have organized educated work-
force, nearly continuous operations and often are governed by pro-
fessional management systems. Such sectors are known for their
diligent data collection on consumption of resources, occupational
safety and health and workplace accidents.
Thus, it is not a coincidence that the high-tech modern indus-
trial sectors worldwide are engaged in implementation of strate-
gies to minimize work place accidents and enhance occupational
safety through periodic assessments of occupational risks. It will
be interesting to notice such efforts in those industrial sectors, as
referenced by Kurt-Karakus (2012) (indoor air pollution), Ehsani
et al. (2013), Bahn (2013), Zhang et al. (2014), Grant and Hinze
(2014), Hardison et al. (2014), Amponsah-Tawiah et al. (2014),
Fruhen and Keith (2014), Mohammadzadeh Moghaddam and
Ayati (2014) (workplace accidents), Li et al. (2012), Cao et al.
(2014) (heavy metals exposure in industry), etc.
The literature review was carried out to discover whether any
previously recorded methods were available to carry out risk
assessment specifically suitable for a low-tech and labor intensive
sector such as ship recycling industry. Interestingly, none among
the European Commission, International Labor Organization
(ILO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), British
Standard (BS), Occupational Health and Safety Assessment
(OHSAS) 18001:2007, and International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) 30000:2008 has provided useful guidelines.
Ideally we wanted to use the approach of applying conventional
 K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189 177

tools including what-if-analyses, check-lists, HAZOP, fault tree and
event tree methods to identify, classify and index risks and hazards
in ship dismantling sector (Harms-Ringdahl, 2001; Ayyub, 2003;
Reniers et al., 2005; Marhavilas et al., 2009, 2011). Our initial
efforts did not bear any fruits because there was no data available
and the sector happens to be informal and truly managed with the
help of traditional work-force, underdeveloped management prac-
tices and primitive technologies.
In summary, in light of the efforts initiated by the EC and IMO to
make the ship dismantling sector ‘‘safer and greener’’; there is a
need for a tool that can, on the one hand, help the sector to assess
the threats to work place safety and environment through a sim-
pler and manageable risk assessment exercise. On the other hand,
the risk assessment tool should be devised in a manner so that it
will help the sector in development of corrective measures through
repeated applications of the risk assessment exercise. Thus, the
present study focuses on the development and validation of a risk
assessment method which is easy to understand and implement in
the ship recycling sector. The specific objectives were as follows:
(1) to develop the three-step method to identify the occupa-
tional risks in ship recycling activities,
(2) to conduct the risk assessment exercise in ship recycling
yards in Alang using the three-step method and
(3) to validate the three-step risk assessment method using the
data from the Alang ship recycling yards.
In order to address these objectives, observations were made in
ship dismantling yards situated along the Alang-Sosiya Beach.
These observations were used in conjunction with an elaborate
consultation process and a novel three-step risk assessment
method was developed and employed in the yards for assessing
the risk of some critical steps. Further, the proposed three-step
assessment method was validated using the primary data specifi-
cally collected to serve the purpose.
2. The three-step risk assessment method
The first objective has been to articulate and implement work-
able strategies for minimization of risks in the work place as well
as to the surrounding environment. Therefore, a simplified yet
scientifically defendable protocol had to be evolved. It was felt that
though the ‘‘external experts’’ would assess the risks more profi-
ciently; there may not be sufficient number of such experts to go
around in the yards in Alang. As a result, management personnel
in the yards had to be motivated and placed on the locus of self-
help for implementing the spirit and substance of articulated
strategies. To achieve this, therefore, it was envisaged that the risk
assessment protocol will be developed and implemented with the
help of the ‘‘analysis team’’ comprising of production managers,
safety officers, safety supervisors and the designated expert moni-
tor. The real benefit related to risk reduction and enhancement of
health and safety conditions would be accrued by those yards
which embark on self-improvement exercise by undertaking
repeated cycles of risk assessment followed by implementation
of the interventions in the Alang ship dismantling yards. Fig. 1
depicts the steps involved in the ‘‘three-steps of the risk assess-
ment method’’.
It is to be noted that the three-step risk assessment method
covers all aspects of ship breaking and recycling starting from pre-
paration of the safe plan for ship recycling leading to the quan-
tification of risks and further suggesting the measures to
minimize those risks. The details of the three-steps are discussed
below.
2.1. First step: Preparation of plan for safe ship recycling
When the ship recycler takes over the vessel from a ship owner,
a certificate for dismantling should be available. It must be secured
that the basic requirements for ship recycling are fulfilled as well
as work activities and job tasks are identified (Document A) and
also safe ship recycling plan should be prepared (Document B).
Based on the literature review, important requirements stipulated
in various applicable international and national regulations and
conventions including the MARPOL (1973), ILO (2004), IMO
(2009), EU Ship Recycling Legislation (2013) were organized in
preparation of the documents A and B. The preparation of a safe
recycling plan should be led by a competent person who possesses
a thorough knowledge of safe ship breaking practices and proce-
dures (adapted to specific ships). The plan should be developed
for preparation, deconstruction and for the material (scrap) stream.
A drawing showing the general arrangements of decks, fire-fight-
ing equipment, position of cargo handling equipment, location of
holds, tank disposition, logbooks of tank substances, hydrostatic

FIRST STEP SECOND STEP THIRD STEP

Make a Work Procedure: Deeper Risk

Safe Ship 1. Identify the most hazardous Assessment
Breaking Plan Work Activities and Action when
2. Start with the most hazardous assessed NOK
Work Activity (e.g. work in confi- Document F
Document B ned space) and identify its detailed
Use Risk Matrix
Job Tasks (Document C) Document G
3. Use Screening Tool (Document D)
4. Fill in all Job Task No. (use Go back to 2nd
letters) and Job Task Names in step and continue
The Base the two first columns. Put the with the next
For Safe Job Tasks in sequential order hazardous Work
Ship (Document D) Activity
Recycling 5. Use the Checklist Job Task and so on
Hazards for Hazard Screening
Document A
(Document E). Assess each Job
Task Name, fill in horizontally Asssessment
OK/NOK/NA from 1-18. Report
(Document D)

Fig. 1. The schematic representation of the steps involved in the ‘‘three-step risk assessment method’’ developed for ship dismantling and recycling yards.
178 K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189
Table 1
Document D – Screening tool used for assessing the job tasks to be OK or Not OK with the associated hazard.
Template for each team member
Job task Sr. no. Job task name Hazard description
1 2 3 4 5 6
a
b
information, accommodation, etc., should be given consideration
when deciding the cutting plan.
2.2. Second step: Identification of hazardous job tasks
According to the principles of the ‘‘Job Safety Analysis’’ (Harms-
Ringdahl, 2001), it is important to identify the most hazardous work
activity initially and then identify the less important. Within each
hazardous work activity the different Job Tasks contained in it
should also be identified (Document C). The sequence of work
activities may vary depending upon the type of ship and nature of
recycling work. After identifying the hazardous work activity and
job tasks associated with it, the job tasks are systematically inserted
into the table called screening tool (Document D) as represented in
Table 1 which will be used for assessing the job tasks to be OK or
Not OK with the associated hazard.
In the present work, a hazard screening list (Document E) was
developed with the intention to find the causal risk factors for
the identified hazard. This hazard screening list is based on Job
Safety Analysis (Harms-Ringdahl, 2001), safety and health in ship
breaking, Guidelines for Asian Countries and Turkey, ILO, 2004,
occupational safety and health manual, for the ship recycling
workers in Bangladesh, ILO, Ministry of Labor and Employment
Bangladesh and United Nations Development Fund (UNDF) within
the Safe and Environment Friendly Ship Recycling (SAFEREC) pro-
ject, 2007 (see Table 2). The checklist (Document E) should be seen
as a reference when identifying hazards for filling Table 1.
2.3. Third step: Deeper risk assessment and recommendations for risk
minimization
When hazards are considered as Not OK, there is always a need
to go further into deeper analyses in the Third Step (Document F)
as shown in Table 3.
Once the hazardous job tasks are identified, the next task is to
quantify the risk in systematic way. The risk matrix frequently used
in a car manufacturing production plant (Volvo Cars AB, Sweden)
was chosen as a base and then refined further. It is based on proba-
bility and severity. Risk is defined as the combination of the proba-
bility of occurrence of harm and severity of that harm (Høj and
Kroger, 2002). According to International Standard ISO 14121-
1:2007, risk assessment can be effectively performed for every
identified hazardous job task (i.e. actions, situations, or practices)
by use of a risk level matrix. This risk can be mapped with the
experience of field personnel and utilized in assessing the risk
associated with prevailing practices of ship dismantling.
Consequently, the same approach can be used by the expert or
experienced personnel to estimate risk associated with alternate
potential improved actions/solutions or alternatively the options
can be prioritized on the basis of risk assessment. The risk matrix
(Document G) as shown in Fig. 2 helps in finding relevant risk levels
and also gives a help for prioritization of actions needed. Firstly, the
severity ‘‘S’’ of accident which can be divided starting from negligi-
ble injury till death of worker. Once the severity number for
Name:
Position:
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
particular accident is determined, probability ‘‘P’’ of occurrence of
accident is judged and probability number is taken from risk
matrix. Finally, the risk level ‘‘R’’, is found out from matrix on the
basis of S and P number. Based on the determined risk level, next
task is to suggest the safety measures to be taken to reduce the risk.
Several iterations might be needed to find final measures that
work in practice after actions are decided and responsible execu-
tors must be appointed. It is recommended to start the risk reduc-
tion process with the identified most hazardous work activity and
then continue with less hazardous work activities.
3. Methodology for conducting risk assessment
The complexities associated with ship breaking and recycling
sector around the world in general and as practiced in Alang in par-
ticular; the field investigation team of IIT Bombay embarked upon
a comprehensive door-to-door interview-campaigns. The safety
officers, yard owners and safety supervisors as well as production
managers from more than 50 ship recycling yards in Alang were
interviewed to articulate the work activities and the corresponding
job tasks (associated with each work activity). The data were brain-
stormed, deliberated and ground truths were established with
regard to each job task typically carried out during breaking and
recycling of obsolete vessels. The results were finally depicted in
a form of a flow diagram of work activities as shown in Fig. 3.
It would be interesting to notice that the time frames and frac-
tion of work force deployed for conducting different work activities
differ greatly (for further details, refer to Hiremath et al., 2014).
The work activities and job tasks obtained from the study were
used as a base for preparing ship recycling plan (Document A).
Also, the ship structure diagrams acquired from ship owner were
used for preparing the safe ship breaking plan (Document B).
Further, three-half day long workshops on risk assessment popu-
lated by (say) 60 persons in every session were conducted, where
people were asked to vote for identification of risky tasks as well
as casual risk factors and safety measures to minimize the risk
for vital work activities. In this exercise, Document C was provided
to identify the hazardous work activities.
The in-depth follow-up information obtained from ship recy-
cling yards, the field personnel involved in risk assessment when
they indicated in Document C (in the interviews) that certain
activities posed unacceptable levels of risk. The separate section
of data sheets (Document D) was prepared to use as screening tool
in identifying OK and NOT OK situations in performing each job
tasks in that work activity. In order to fill Document D, the support-
ing Document E was prepared to find the causal risk factors for an
identified hazard. The NOT OK tasks identified in Document D were
further analyzed in-depth using Document F. The conventional risk
level matrix (Document G) was used to fill Document F.
Finally, with the help of assessment documents in conjunction
with conventional risk level matrix are organized in a simple three
step manner. First step was, preparation of safe ship breaking plan
(Document A and B), second step was, identification of hazardous
 K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189 179

Table 2
Document E – Job task hazards and associated causal risk factors (adapted from ILO, 2004, Harms-Ringdahl, 2001; SAFEREC, 2007).

Hazard screening Causal risk factors

a a
S,E 1. Burning, explosion, gas – Hot work, lack of legal and updated gas free certificate,
Fire – from ignited insulation, matting, lagging, and residual fuel; and lubricants and other lack of gas meter
flammable liquids – Lack of tanks being properly ventilated, cleaned and
tested for explosive gas before commencing work
– Explosive materials
– Explosive gases
– Flammable materials
– Chemical reactions
– Dust
– Ballast water
– Evaporated rests in tank or mud bed
– Pipes containing gas
– Inadequate fire protection measures
– Lack of appropriate emergency response, rescue and first-
aid personnel services
– Uncoated tools when there is a risk for sparks
– Lack of explosion proof light or/and equipment
– Use of cylinders (dragged cylinders over the ground,
dropped or rolled or pulled cylinders, heat, valve used
as hold when carrying, standing in front of a valve when
it is being opened.
– Unprotected disposal/storage place of e.g. fuel, oil, grease
S 2. Falling on the same level-stumbling, slipping, etc. – Slipping on wet surfaces or on something laying or fas-
tening on the walking surface
S 3. Falling to a lower level – Falls from height inside ship structures or on the ground
– Access in progressively dismantled vessels (floor, stairs,
passageways)
– Collapse of structure
– Scaffolding, platforms, fixed and portable ladders
S 4. Impact with a falling object – Being stuck by falling objects
– Snapping of cables, ropes, chains, slings
– Wire and rope breakage, wear and corrosion of wire ropes
S 5. Impact with a flying object
S 6. Squeezing or crushing – Stuck by moving objects
– Caught in or compressed
– Shackles, hooks, chains
– Cranes, winches, hosting and hauling equipment
– Impact by tools
S 7. Hazardous Mechanical situations due to for example equipment/machinery – Failure of machinery and equipment
– Poor maintenance of machinery and equipment
– Rotation of machinery part or linear movement
– Lack of safety guards in machines
– Power driven hand-tools, saws, grinders abrasive cutting
wheels
– Structural failures
– Stored pressure (gas, steam, liquid, feathers, etc.)
a
H 8. Hazardous handling, overloading of part of the body – Handling heavy objects
– Repetitive strain injuries
– Awkward postures
– Repetitive work and monotonous work
– Excessive work load
S, H 9. Penetration of sharp objects – Sharp objects
– Sharp-edged tools
E 10. Vehicles – Trucks
– Transport vehicles
– Cranes
S 11. Electrical energy available – Electricity/electrocution
– Electrostatic recharging (could happen when using
powerful jet of water
H 12. Poisoning – Inhalation
H 13. Suffocating or drowning – Lack of control of Oxygen deficiency in confined spaces
(should be 20–22 volume percentage (less than 19.5 is
dangerous and one should not enter without PPE, if
higher than 22% there can be an explosive mixture))
– Lack of proper ventilation
– Lack of proper training when entering a confined space,
etc.
– Drowning for floating or partially floating structures
– Gases and fumes heavier than air which presses the oxy-
gen away
– Oxidation processes that consume oxygen (e.g. open
flame or welding)
– Closed entry to space

(continued on next page)

180 K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189

Table 2 (continued)

Hazard screening Causal risk factors

– Lack of rescue team standing standby and no attendant
(with correct PPE) being in constant contact with workers
inside a confined space)
H, E 14. Hazardous persons or animals – Toxic marine organisms
– Animal bites
– Risk of communicable diseases transmitted by pets, ver-
min, rodents, insects and other animals that may infest
the ship
– Vectors of infectious diseases (TB, malaria, dengue fever,
hepatitis, respiratory infections, etc.)
E 15. Exposure that can give effects in a long term: Hazardous substances and wastes – Asbestos fibers
– Asbestos – in hanger liners, mastic under isolation, cloth under isolation, cable, lagging and – PCBs and PVC and CFC’s
insulation on pipes and hull, adhesive, gaskets on piping connections, and valve packing – Heavy and toxic metals (lead, mercury, cadmium, copper,
– Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) – in rubber products such as hoses, plastic foam isolation, zinc, etc.)
cables, silver paint, habitability paint, felt under septum plates, plates on top of the hull – Dusts
bottom and primary paint on hull steel – Paints and coatings
– Hazardous materials and chemicals – including heavy metals in ship transducers, ballast, and – Combustible Materials
paint coatings; mercury in fluorescent light tubes, thermometers, electrical switches, light – Foam Insulation
fittings, fire detectors and tank level indicators; and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in self- – Welding fumes
contained refrigeration devices such as water coolers and freezer units. – Organic substances (TBT, isocyanates, etc. in marine
paint)
– Volatile organic compounds (solvents)
– Hydrogen sulfide H2S (has a distinctive smell-like rotten
eggs)
– Carbone monoxide (CO) has no smell, measured by
testing)
– Batteries
– Fire-fighting liquids
– Compressed gas under pressure
– Exposure to hazardous liquids or gases or material
substances
– Redundant gases
– Oil and fuel
– Cleaning compounds
– CO2
– Bilge and ballast water
– Radiation sources
– Timber
– Corroding
– Other chemicals
– Evaporated rests in tank or mud bed or leaking packing or
valves
– Hydrogen sulfide at microbiological activity or breaking
down
H, E 16. Exposure that can give effects in a long term: Hazardous Physical situation – Poor illumination
– Excess noise – associated with grinding, hammering,
metal cutting, and other activities
– Vibrations
– Extreme temperatures
– Radiation (UV, radioactive materials)
H, E 17. Hazardous psychosocial-situations – Mental stress
– Human relations (aggressive behavior, alcohol and drugs
abuse, violence)
– Long working hours
– Shift work
– Night work
– Temporary employment
– Poverty
– Low wages
– Minimum age
– Lack of education and social environment
– Poor work organization
S 18. Hazardous standard of work place – Lack of PPE (helmet, safety shoes (oil resistant), safety
goggles, gloves, ear plugs/ear muffs, dust mask or/and
gas mask (fresh air), safety belt and life line, apron, face
shield with color glass, fire extinguisher near cutting, fire
guard, when cutting: leather used as material PPE
– Lack of special routines and PPE when collect and dispose
fuel oil, grease and other combustible products, asbestos,
etc.
– Inadequate maintenance of PPE
– Housekeeping practices
– Safety signs
– Lack of health and safety training to carry out the work in
a safe manner
 K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189 181

Table 2 (continued)

Hazard screening Causal risk factors

– Inadequate accident prevention and inspection
– Inadequate emergency
– Lack of regular exercises in emergency prevention, pre-
paredness and response procedures
– Escape routes not free for possible evacuation
– First-aid and rescue facilities
– Inadequate housing and sanitation
– Lack of medical facilities and social protection
– Lack of hazard communication (storage, labeling, mate-
rial safety data sheets
– Lack of standard work area and procedures. (There can-
not be a work system, which is standard but unsafe. Stan-
dard way of doing a work is definitely the safest way too.
Occupational safety ensures higher productivity).
a
S = Safety, H = Health and E = Environment.

Table 3
Document F – Third step – Deeper risk assessment and action plan.

Co-ordinate Causal risk Location in Potential effects, Risk level (R) Hazard Risk level (R) Responsible authority
of job task factor ship or e.g. harm before risk control/Safety after risk and finish date
ship yard reduction measure reduction
S P R S P R
a1
a2

Fig. 2. Risk matrix to estimate the risk level used in third step of three-step risk assessment method.

job tasks, associated with ship breaking and recycling (Document
C, D and E) and third step was deeper risk assessment and action
plan for safe ship recycling using risk matrix (Document F
and G). This combination of three steps was named as the
‘‘Three-Step Method’’ which is developed for the risk assessment
in ship recycling sector.
It must be pointed out that there is always a need for validation,
determining that the implemented measures functioning as
intended. In the three-step method all these checklists and
documents are combined in a logical order. It is most important to
keep a record in a protocol all through the different steps of the
method.
182 K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189

Fig. 3. Typical ship recycling plan practiced at Alang ship recycling yards and time required to accomplish each work activity.

3.1. Validation of the three-step risk assessment method Input Data

Xobs
Validation of the Three-Step Method, essentially addresses the
differences (or similarities) in ‘‘perception of risk’’ by several
Health Safety Environmental (HSE) managers who volunteered
for the risk assessment exercise. Although, their opinions differed
Assumpons Mathemacal Model Limitaons
person-to-person due to the fact that they belong to different yards
or have different years of experience; would they still collectively
suggest a similar level of risk in a given job task? Validation of
the risk assessment model was used to answer this question from
a statistical stand point. Output is the “Parameter”
As represented in Fig. 4 a validation protocol, in the context of
this study, may be conceptualized as a two-stage process. Input of independent
Terminologies used are listed in Table 4. In the first stage, a mathe- data set (Xobs)
Mathemacal Model
matical model is developed based on data sets listed in Table 5. In
the second stage, a different data set from same table is used to
validate the mathematical model developed in the first stage.
Using the appropriate statistics, the model is either confirmed or
Output is Ymodel
considered invalid at a specified level of statistical significance
(say 0.05 or 95% confidence).
In order to validate the risk assessment method, two validation
protocols were developed. Each of these protocols is framed as a Is Ymodel = Yobs
hypothesis as shown below: NO at acceptable level of
stascal significance?
Hypothesis 1. There is no significant difference between the
observed average risk index based on the field data and
the assigned risk index corresponding to the averaged YES
values when average is based on ‘‘large enough’’ number of
observations.
Fig. 4. Schematic representation of conceptualization of two-stage process of
validation protocol.
Hypothesis 2. There is no significant difference between the per-
ception of risk by experts and the perception of risk by the ‘‘analy- Hypothesis 3. There is no significant difference between an
sis team’’ comprising of production managers, safety officers, individual’s perception and the perception of the entire group as
safety supervisors and the designated expert monitor. long as the data set is large enough.
 K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189 183

Table 4 One other shortcoming of the methodology adopted for con-

Terminology and definitions for the validation of three-step risk assessment method. ducting risk assessment exercise was that the workers were not
Variable Definition interviewed. This limitation was circumvented by interacting with
Yobserved average Average of risk index values obtained from field the ‘‘analysis teams’’ comprising of production managers, safety
personnel officers, safety supervisors and the designated expert monitor from
Yassigned for average Rounded off integer for average risk index values each participating dismantling yard. They were briefed by the
obtained from field personnel external experts (posted by the researching team by IIT Bombay)
Yassigned for average using model Average assigned risk index values calculated
from the regression model between Y averages
and encouraged to think, discuss with their work-force and col-
observed versus Y assigned for average leagues and articulate their opinions before presenting themselves
Yexpert average Average risk index values obtained from experts to participate in the risk assessment exercise.
Dobserved Absolute number obtained by subtracting
individual risk index assigned by field personnel
with average of individual risk index
4. Validation of the method
Dassigned Absolute number obtained by subtracting
individual risk index assigned by field personnel Risk can be mapped with the experience of field personnel and
with rounded off integer of average of assigned utilized in assessing the risk associated with prevailing practices of
risk index values calculated from the regression
ship dismantling. Consequently, the same Three Step Method
model
approach can be used by the expert or experienced personnel to
estimate risk associated with alternate potential improved
Table 5
actions/solutions or alternatively the options can be prioritized
Classification of risk data for application of validation protocols. on the basis of risk assessment. In order to validate the developed
three-step method following two validation protocols as well as
Group No. of No. of risk Description
data indexes
consistency check were carried out.
sets
Before After 4.1. Validation Protocol 1
A 12 4 4 Risk index as per field personnel
B 12 4 4 perception
C 11 4 4 Hypothesis: There is no significant difference between the
E 9 4 4 Risk index as per the expert’s perception observed average risk index based on the field
data and the assigned risk index corresponding
to the averaged values when average is based on
The risk assessment data were collected by interviewing several ‘‘large enough’’ number of observations.
field personnel at a number of ship recycling yards. Risk was deter-
mined before and after taking corrective action to reduce risk. The Model : Y assigned for average ¼ a  Y observed average where ideally a ¼ 1:
research group was able to collect 35 data sets from field personnel
at the ship recycling yards, each data set with 8 risk indexes (4 risk Calibration (i.e. Estimation of a): Data from Group A were used
indexes each, before and after implementing corrective action). In for calibration. As shown in Fig. 5, Yassigned for average for Group A was
addition, 9 data sets were collected to document the perceptions of plotted against the Yobserved average of Group A which yielded a straight
experts. Thus a total of 44 data sets were available to carry out the line with the slope of 1.064 and R2 = 0.918 by forcing it through
validation exercise. the origin. The 95% confidence interval for the slope was deter-
For the purpose of validation, all 44 data sets are divided into 4 mined to be ±0.217. The area between dashed lines on the graph
groups: Group A, B, C and E as shown in Table 5. Groups A and B represents the 95% confidence interval zone. The error bars for
consist of 12 data sets each, Group C consists of 11 data sets and individual data points are also shown.
Group E consists of 9 data sets. The 12 data sets of Group A in Validation: Validation was carried out using Group B data set.
Table 2 represent 12 field personnel, and each of the 12 data sets The ordinate for Fig. 6 (i.e. Yassigned for average using ‘‘model’’ for Group B)
consists of 8 risk indexes (4 before corrective action and 4 after was calculated using the model (the model equation for the
corrective action). Groups B, C and E are similarly structured. Group A data) developed in the calibration step and plotted against
field data (Yassigned for average for Group B). If the slope comes out to be
3.2. Limitations of study close to unity, the method can be believed to be validated. As seen
from Fig. 6, the slope was obtained by forcing it through the origin
In order to perform the risk assessment, ship recycling yards and was found to be 0.974 and R2 = 0.925. The slope was nearly
(plots) were not chosen randomly. Risk assessment was conducted equal to unity and the calculated 95% confidence interval was
only on those plots where yard management voluntarily took the ±0.261. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference
initiative to improve Health Safety and Environmental Quality between the observed risks index in the field and assigned risk
(HSEQ). The selection of the plots depended largely on the attitude index using model for a large enough data set is thus validated.
of the yard management and their perception on the value of the The area between dashed lines on the graph represents the 95%
information they gave out. It was essential to respect and accept confidence interval zone as shown in Fig. 6. The error bars for
the yard management’s decisions to share/not share information. individual data points are also shown.
It is to be noted that workers were not interviewed because of The analysis is based on the 12 data sets having 8 risk indexes
language limitations. English and Hindi (the Indian national lan- each. Averages of the 12 data sets are plotted along the X axis
guage) were used in the data collection and interview process. and assigned values of risk index (rounded-off to the nearest inte-
Since most of the workers came from different regions of the coun- ger) corresponding to the averages of the 12 data sets are plotted
try and were conversant only with their regional language, it was along Y axis. The regression yielded the slope (a) of 1.064 ± 0.217.
impractical to interview them in English or Hindi. Therefore, this The analysis is based on 12 data sets of Group B having 8 risk
risk assessment study focused on production managers, safety offi- indexes each. Averages assigned (rounded-off to the nearest
cers and safety supervisors because they were conversant with integer) of the 12 data sets are plotted along X axis.
English or Hindi. Yassigned for average using the model was plotted along Y axis by using slope
184 K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189

Fig. 5. Linear regression of Yassigned for average for Group A versus Yobserved average of Group A for
calibration of the risk assessment model based on Hypothesis 1. Fig. 7. Linear regression of Yobserved average of Group A versus Yexpert average of Group E for
calibration of model for risk assessment based on Hypothesis 2.

Fig. 6. Linear regression of Yassigned for average using ‘‘Model’’ for Group B (model data) versus Fig. 8. Linear regression of Yobserved average using model of Group E versus
Yassigned for average of Group B (field data) for the purpose of validation of the risk assessment Yaverage observed of Group C for the purpose of validation of the risk assessment model
model based on the Hypothesis. based on the Hypothesis 2.

value of calibration graph as shown in Fig. 6 multiplied with aver- origin. The 95% confidence interval for the slope was determined
age of data set of Group B. The regression yielded the slope of to be ±0.216. The area between dashed lines on the graph repre-
0.974 ± 0.261. sents the 95% confidence interval zone as shown in Fig. 7. The error
bars for individual data points are also shown.
4.2. Validation Protocol 2 Validation: Validation was carried out using Group C data set. If
the slope came out to be close to unity, the method was effectively
Hypothesis: There is no significant difference between the validated. The slope was obtained by forcing it through the origin
perception of risk by experts and the perception and was found to be 1.011 and R2 = 0.913. Since the slope was very
of risk by the ‘‘analysis team’’ comprising of close to unity and the calculated 95% confidence interval was
production managers, safety officers, safety ±0.295 hypothesis that there is no significant difference between
supervisors and the designated expert monitor. perception of risk by experts and perception of risk by field person-
nel is indeed validated.
Model : Y observed average ¼ b  Y expert average The area between dashed lines on the graph represents the 95%
confidence interval zone as shown in Fig. 8. The error bars for
Calibration (i.e. Estimation of b): Data from Group A was used individual data points are also shown.
for calibration. The ordinate for the validation plot The analysis for Yobserved average is based on 12 data sets of Group
(Yobserved average for Group A) was calculated using the field data and A having 8 risk indexes each and Yexpert average of Group E consists of 9
plotted against Yexpert average of Group E) which yielded a straight line data sets of Group E with 8 risk indexes each. The regression
with the slope of 1.036 and R2 = 0.956 by forcing it through the yielded the slope (b) of 1.036 ± 0.216.
 K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189 185

Fig. 9. Linear regression of Dassigned versus Dobserved where Dassigned = Abs
(Yobserved i  Yassigned for average using model for Group A) and Dobserved = Abs (Yobserved i 
Yobserved average of Group A). The regression yielded the slope of 1.012 ± 0.133. Graph
also represents number of repetition of data points.
Fig. 11. The linear regression with slope of 0.991 (R2 = 0.942) depicting the
consistency of the data groups mainly combination of Yaverge observed of group (B+C)
versus combination of Y averge observed of group (A+E). Both axes represent 24 data sets
each. The regression yielded the slope of 0.991 ± 0.209.

Table 6
Combination of data groups for consistency check of data set used in the analyses.

Combination Abscissa data set Ordinate data set

combination (X axis) combination (Y axis)
Yobserved average Yobserved average
1 Group (A + B) Group (C + E)
2 Group (A + E) Group (B + C)
3 Group (B + E) Group (A + C)

Fig. 12. The linear regression with slope of 0.991 (R2 = 0.942) depicting the
consistency of the data groups mainly combination of Yaverge observed of group (A+C)
versus combination of Yaverge observed of group (B+E). Both axes represent 24 data sets
each. The regression yielded the slope of 0.991 ± 0.128.

4.3. Check for deviation of individual’s opinion from group average

Hypothesis: There is no significant difference between an

individual’s perception and the perception of the
entire group as long as the data set is large
enough.
Fig. 10. The linear regression with slope of 0.98 (R2 = 0.96) depicting the consis- Dassigned = Abs
tency of combination of data groups. Namely, combination of average observed of (Yobserved i  Yassigned for average using model for Group A)
group (A + B) versus combination of average observed of group (C + E). Both axes
represent 24 data sets each. The regression yielded the slope of 0.979 ± 0.178.
Dobserved = Abs
(Yobserved i  Yobserved average of Group A)
Dassigned = e  Dobserved where ideally e = 1
The analysis is based on 12 data sets of Group C with 8 risk
indexes each. Averages of the 12 data sets are plotted along X axis. All individual data points from Group A data set (96 points) were
Yobserved average using model of Group E was plotted along Y axis by using used in this analysis. Dassigned was plotted against the Dobserved, as
slope (b) of calibration graph as shown in Fig. 8 multiplied with shown in Fig. 9. As stated in the Hypothesis 3 if an individual field
averages of data set of Group C. The regression yielded the slope person’s perception is different than the perception of the entire
of 1.011 ± 0.295. group then the linear relationship will not be established through
186 K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189

linear model. The plotted graph yielded straight line with the slope Since the number of data points was large (96) an R2 value of
of 1.012 and R2 = 0.744 by forcing it through the origin. The 95% 0.744 may be considered acceptable. Further, since the confidence
confidence interval for the slope was determined to be ±0.133. interval was ±0.133 it indicates that the straight line can be fitted
The area between dashed lines on the graph represents the 95% con- through these data. Essentially there is no significant difference
fidence interval zone as shown in Fig. 9. between an individual field personnel’s perception and the percep-
tion of the group as a whole. This is indeed a remarkable result
Table 7 given the variability in personal views and affiliation with different
Summary of data consistency check analyses for linear regression of combination of yards and differences in levels of experience between individuals.
groups. Based on these results, it is safe to conclude that there is no signifi-
Sr. Abscissa data set Ordinate data set R2 Slope 95% cant difference between an individual’s perception and the percep-
no. combination (X combination (Y Confidence tion of the entire group as long as the data set is large indeed is
axis) axis) interval for validated.
slope
1 Y avg observed Y avg observed 0.960 0.979 ±0.178
for group (A + B) for group (C + E) 4.4. Check for consistency of data sets
2 Y avg observed Y avg observed 0.942 0.991 ±0.209
for group (A + E) for group (B + C) The consistency check on the data sets was also performed.
3 Y avg observed Y avg observed 0.942 0.991 ±0.128
for group (B + E) for group (A + C)
Table 6 shows the different Groups (A, B C and E) and total number
of data points within each group. For the data consistency check,
two of the four data groups were combined into one data set and
remaining two data sets were combined into another data set. For
Table 8 example, Groups C and E were combined and Groups A and B were
Job task operations for Work Activity 9 i.e. cutting of slice and transporting to combined as shown in Fig. 10 where Yaverage observed for Group (C+E) was
workplace at Alang.
plotted against Yaverage observed for Group (A+B). Also,
Job Job task name Yaverage observed for Group (B+C) and (A+C) were plotted against
tasks Yaverage observed for Group (A+E) and (B+E) in Figs. 11 and 12 respectively.
A Slice section falls by gravity in inter-tidal zone when water recedes If the relationship is linear with the slope close to unity, it
completely shows that there is consistency between data sets. Table 7
B Major cuts of the slice with gas cutter to make liftable pieces by
summarizes results from these analyses and also gives the 95%
cranes
C Cleaning of wastes emerged from slice (oil, rags, paint chips, tins, confidence interval for the slope for each analysis. Based on results
etc.) presented in Table 7 it is concluded that the data sets are indeed
D Loading for transportation onto cranes (wire ropes) consistent.

5. Case study: Application of three-step method

Table 9
Job task operations for Work Activity 10 i.e. segregation, grading, cutting and loading You may recall that Fig. 3 showed the typical ship recycling
for transportation activity.
procedure being followed at Alang. During the discussion with
Job tasks Job task name ‘‘analysis team’’ comprising of production managers, safety
A Work area; further cleaning and cutting of sections officers, safety supervisors and the designated expert monitor well
B Loading onto trucks using manual efforts or cranes as Regulatory Authority, it was realized that the major work force
for ship recycling is involved in the work activity no. 9 and 10.

Table 10
Work activity – Cutting of slice and transporting to workplace and the representation of identified Not OK job task – Major cuts of the slice with gas cutter to make liftable pieces by
cranes at Alang.

Job task Job task name Hazard description

Sr. #
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
A Slice section falls by gravity in inter-tidal zone
when water recedes completely
B Major cuts of the slice with gas cutter to make NOK OK NA OK NOK OK NOK NA OK NA NA NA NA NA OK OK OK OK
liftable pieces by cranes
C Cleaning of wastes emerged from slice (oil,
rags, paint chips, tins, etc.)
D Loading for transportation onto cranes (wire
ropes)

Table 11
Work Activity 10 – Segregation, grading, cutting and loading for transportation and the representation of identified Not OK job task – Work area; further cleaning and cutting at Alang.

Job task Sr. Job task name Hazard description

#
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
A Work area; further cleaning and cutting OK OK NA NA NOK OK OK OK OK OK NA NA NA NA OK OK OK OK
B Loading onto trucks using manual efforts or
cranes
Table 12
Sample representation of deeper risk assessment for Job task operation – Major cuts of the slice with gas cutter to make liftable pieces by cranes in work activity no. 9 of ‘‘Typical ship recycling plan’’ followed in ship recycling yards in Alang.

Co-ordinate Causal risk factors Location in ship Potential effects, Risk Level Hazard control/Safety measure Risk level Responsible position
of job task or ship yard e.g. harm (R) before (R) after (and finish date)
& hazard risk risk
description reduction reduction
S P R S P R
B1  Improper cleaning of fuel pipes and Primary zone Major and minor 3 3 3  Inspection by Safety officer 2 2 2 Safety officer, field
flammable materials physical injury  Proper fuel oil clean up supervisor (Not Given)
 Inadequate fire protection measures  Adequate fire protection
measures and emergency response
B5  Wire failure due to tension in rope/cable Primary zone Disability/Major 4 2 4  Inspection by Safety officer, Crane operator 2 2 2 Crane Operator, Safety
 Splitting of plate’s hole physical injury  Alarming siren while moving the objects officer (Not Given)
 Negligence by workers while crane is operating  PPE Mandatory for all the workers
B7  Failure of crane’s boom Primary zone Major and minor 5 3 4  Periodic maintenance and replacement 3 2 3 Safety officer (Not Given)
 Poor maintenance of winch, crane/wire rope physical injury of machinery

K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189

 Negligence of safety measures while working  Inspection by Safety officer, Crane operator

Table 13
Sample representation of deeper risk assessment for Job task operation – Work area; further cleaning and cutting in work activity no. 10 of ‘‘Typical ship recycling plan’’ followed in ship recycling yards in Alang.

Co-ordinate of job task Causal risk factors Location in ship Potential effects, Risk level (R) Hazard control/ Safety measure Risk level (R) Responsible
& hazard description or ship yard e.g. harm before risk after risk position (and
reduction reduction finish date)
A5  Splitting of plate’s hole Secondary Zone Disability/Major 4 3 4  Inspection by Safety supervisor, Crane operator 3 2 3 Crane Operator, Safety
 Negligence by workers physical injury  Alarming siren while moving the objects officer (Not Given)
while crane is operating

187
188 K. Garmer et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 175–189
Therefore, this case example is concentrated on these two work
activities for implementing the three-step risk assessment method
at ship recycling yards at Alang. As represented in Table 8, the
work activity no. 9 i.e. cutting of slice & transporting to work place
was divided into four job task operations. It is to be noted that
more than 70% of the workforce is involved in these two activities.
Further, the work activity 10 i.e. Segregation, grading, cutting
and loading for transportation is divided into two job task opera-
tions as mentioned in Table 9.
Further, as part of the three-step risk assessment method,
questionnaires were designed to elicit information from ‘‘analysis
team’’ comprising of production managers, safety officers, safety
supervisors and the designated expert monitor of the ship
recycling yards with respect to perceived risks. Team went door-
to-door, interviewed the analysis team and collected pools of data
specific to work activity and job task. Similar activity was
continued with more than 35 ship recycling yards in Alang. Thus,
in-depth follow-up information was obtained from ship recycling
yards, the field personnel involved in risk assessment when they
indicated (in the interviews) that certain activities posed unaccept-
able levels of risk.
Table 10 shows that the Document D was used for job task
operation B i.e. ‘‘A major cut of the slice with gas cutter to make lif-
table pieces by cranes’’ was checked in detail by using the checklist
for ‘‘Job tasks Hazards for Hazards Screening’’ (1–18, from
Document E). Table 10 also represents the identified NOT OK job
tasks in work activity no. 9. Similarly, Table 11 represents the job
task A i.e. work area; further cleaning and cutting was checked in
detail using Document E. The NOT OK job tasks in work activity
10 are also mentioned in Table 11.
Once the NOT OK job tasks are identified, the next step is to use
Document F to perform in-depth risk assessment. Table 12 repre-
sents the deeper risk assessment for the job task ‘‘Major cuts of
the slice with gas cutter to make liftable pieces by cranes’’.
Table 13 shows the deeper risk assessment for the job task
‘‘Work area; further cleaning and cutting’’. To determine the risk
level, Risk Matrix (as shown in Fig. 2) of Document G was used.
The causal factors which were responsible for this hazardous situa-
tion, potential harm and risk level were mentioned before the
implementation of the safety measures. Further, discussing with
the safety manager and the safety delegate, the safety measures
that can be implemented to minimize the risk level are identified
and listed in Tables 12 and 13 respectively. The reduced risk level
for those hazardous situations is also mentioned. Hence, using the
three-step risk assessment method, the risk is identified; and the
improvement measures were suggested to minimize the risk.
6. Conclusions
Based on an extensive literature review, checklists as well as
assessment documents were developed. The conventional risk
level matrix (can also be called as index) was used in conjunction
with these checklists as well as assessment documents and orga-
nized in the so-called Three Step Method for application in ship
recycling and ship repairing sector.
Three-step risk assessment method developed and validated in
this study using pedagogic approach, is easy to learn, use and
administer in ship recycling yards. The so far gained experience
of the Three Step Method indicates that this method could be a dia-
log tool for the ‘‘analysis team’’ comprising of production man-
agers, safety officers, safety supervisors and the designated
expert monitor and serve as a systematic method for risk reduction
to enhance health and safety in ship yards. It is an advantage for
the Alang ship yard, if only one method has to be maintained. If
they have to learn and administer different methods tailored for
only one subsystem, it will make the whole risk reduction work
much more complicated and time consuming.
The three-step risk assessment was performed in 35 ship recy-
cling yards through questionnaire surveys and door-to-door com-
munication. Thus, 35 data sets from field personnel at the ship
recycling yards, each data set with 8 risk indexes (4 risk indexes
each, before and after implementing corrective action) were col-
lected. In addition, 9 data sets were collected to document the per-
ceptions of experts. In all, a total of 44 data sets were collected and
used to validate the risk assessment method. Validation of the
three-step method, essentially addresses the differences (or simi-
larities) in ‘‘perception of risk’’ by several health, safety and
environment (HSE) managers who volunteered for the risk assess-
ment exercise. In order to validate the risk assessment method,
two validation protocols were developed. The first protocol with
the slope of 0.974 and R2 = 0.925 validated the hypothesis that
there was no significant difference between the observed average
risk index based on the field data and the assigned risk index
corresponding to the averaged values when average is based on
‘‘large enough’’ number of observations. The second protocol with
the slope of 1.011 and R2 = 0.913 validated the second hypothesis
that there was no significant difference between perception of risk
by experts and perception of risk by field personnel. Further, it was
validated that there was no significant difference between an
individual’s perception and the perception of the entire group as
long as the data set was large enough on the basis of the obtained
slope of 1.012 and R2 = 0.744. Lastly, the consistency check on the
data sets was also performed and it was found that the relationship
was linear with the slope close to unity. The example illustrating
the application of Three Step Method in identifying and minimiz-
ing risks provides clear understanding for the users of this method.
Evidently, the three-step risk assessment method developed in this
research appeared to give consistent results in a variety of scenar-
ios of validation. Indian policy makers and regulators of ship dis-
mantling sector are in the process of making amendments in the
existing laws by bringing the developed Three Step Method for
minimizing occupational risks in ship breaking and recycling
yards. This method is also implementable in any ship recycling
yard in the world.
Acknowledgments
The authors of this paper acknowledge the Ship Recycling yards
at Alang for their interest and for applying our ideas in real-life in a
ship recycling context. Authors also acknowledge the European
Union funded project ‘‘DIVEST’’ and Gujarat Maritime Board
funded project ‘‘Green Alang Initiative’’ as well as Indian Institute
of Technology Bombay for partial funding for this work. Inputs
for field work and generous co-operation offered by Pradip P.
Kalbar and Paritosh C. Deshpande is highly acknowledged.
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