Article 143(2)(b) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws actions
PUBLIC CORPORATION
PART I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011
Facts:
COA issued a resolution defining its policy in auditing the BSP,
characterizing the BSP as a public corporation (1) under CA 111
(amended by PD 460 and RA 7278), (2) in BSP v NLRC, the SC ruled
that it was a GOCC under its charter, and (3) regarded as an
instrumentality under the Administrative Code.
BSP National President Binay sought for reconsideration of the COA
through a letter. According to Binay, the BSP was classified as a GOCC
in BSP v NLRCbecause of government participation in the National
Executive Board of the BSP, however, when RA 7278 was enacted
after the decision was rendered, the statute eliminated substantial
government participation in the board. Further, the government does
not have funds invested in the BSP, neither does the BSP administer
special funds.
COA furnished BSP with a memorandum arguing the the (1) character
of the BSP’s purposes and functions, including teaching the youth of
patriotism, courage, self-reliance, etc., which are sovereign functions
enshrined in the Constitution and (2) the statutory designation of the
BSP as a public corporation evince that it is a public corporation within
COA’s jurisdiction. COA also argued that BSP is an attached agency to
the DECS.
Issue:
Is the BSP a public corporation such that it falls within the jurisdiction
of the COA?
Ruling:
Yes. The BSP is a public corporation subject to the jurisdiction of COA.
First, Art. 44(2) of the Civil Code makes the BSP a public corporation
since it is an institution created by law for public interest or purpose.
CA 111 which created the BSP lays out the functions of the entity.
Subsequent amendments in PD 460 and RA 7278 also contain
provisions supporting COA’s argument that BSP performs sovereign
functions. The BSP exists to implement the State policy declared in Art
II, Sec 13 of the Constitution.
Second, it is a public corporation under the 1987 Administrative Code.
Title VI, Chapter 8, Sec 20 lists the BSP as an attached agency to the
DECS. As an attached agency, there is at least one government
representative in its governing board.
Finally, the BSP is not subject to the test of government ownership or
control and economic viability. Art XII, Sec 16 of the Constitution
should not be construed to mean that Congress is prohibited from
creating a public corporation. BSP is a public corporation performing
functions that are impressed with public interest.
2. MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL v. HON BALINDONG,
GR No. 193340, Jan. 11, 2017
Facts:
Private respondents as heirs of Macalabo Ampo filed a complaint for
recovery of possession against Municipality of Tangkal with the Shari'a
District Court. The private respondents contend that since the parties
to the case are muslim, then Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over
the case. The premise is that since the Mayor of Tangkal is a Muslim
then as the representative of Tangkal it is now considered under
"wherein the parties involved are Muslims”
Municipality of Tangkal filed a motion to dismiss (MTD) on the ground
of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that the
municipality has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or
ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws. The Mayor was only a representative of the
Municipality but the real party in interest is the municipality and not
the mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction
in an action for recovery of possession filed by Muslim individuals
against a municipality whose mayor is a Muslim.
Ruling:
NO. Although the definition does not explicitly distinguish between
natural and juridical persons, it nonetheless connotes the exercise of
religion, a personal right which by nature is restricted to natural
persons. Juridical persons are considered persons only by virtue of
legal fiction. The Municipality of Tangkal falls under this category.
Under the Local Government Code, a municipality is a body
politic and corporate that exercises powers as a political
subdivision of the national government and as a corporate
entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. Furthermore,
as a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only
act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects-consistent with the non-establishment clause.
The Shari'a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing
principles, as it conceded that the Municipality of Tangkal "is neither a
Muslim nor a Christian." Yet it still proceeded to attribute the religious
affiliation of the mayor to the municipality. This is manifest error on
the part of the Shari'a District Court. The municipality has a separate
and distinct personality form the officers composing it.
In view of the foregoing, the Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction
under the law to decide private respondents' complaint because not all
of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.
3. EMMANUEL PELAEZ v.THE AUDITOR GENERAL
GR No. L-23825, December 24, 1965
Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos.
93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities
in 1964.
Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as
taxpayer, then instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to
restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Pelaez alleges that said executive orders are null and void on the
ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic
Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became
effective, Sec 3(3) of the acts provides that barrios may "not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except
by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon
petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in
which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez argues, accordingly: "If
the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he
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create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?"
The Auditor General alleges that the power of the President to create
municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue
delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona
vs. Municipality of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has
settled it.
Issue:
Is the act of the President in creating the municipalities through
Executive Orders valid?
Ruling:
No. President cannot create a municipal corporation; it is a legislative
function.
Whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or
settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may
partake of an administrative nature — involving the adoption of means
and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the
authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in
nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative
function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power".
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential that said law: (a) be complete in
itself and (b) fix a standard, to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy,
which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these
well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the
details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to
be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
Although under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the
President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As
indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not
an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently
legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public
interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. It is
"purely a legislative question", or a political question.
Even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it
certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative
Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the
subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly
incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.
The allegation of the Auditor General invoking the case of Municipality
of Cardona is likewise untenable for said case involved, not the
creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from
an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality
(Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said
transfer — in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act
No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities.
Thus, SC declared the Executive Orders in question null and void ab
initio and the Auditor General permanently restrained from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above
referred to.
4. MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ v. BAZ, JR
265 SCRA 182
Facts:
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No.
258.By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No 171, dated November
22, 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to
Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto, based on
the technical description in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of
Jimenez.
In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under
E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless
asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the
Municipality of Sinacaban.
Furthermore, Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with the decision in
Pelaez v. Auditor General, the power to create municipalities is
essentially legislative and consequently Sinacaban, which was created
by an executive order, had no legal personality and no right to assert a
territorial claim vis-a-vis Jimenez, of which it remains part.
Issue:
Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim.
Ruling:
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created
as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General
that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative
matter and therefore the President was without power to create by
executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. However, we have since
held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is
later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its
creation can no longer be questioned.
In this case, different factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban
the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that
its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and
officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when
Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the
validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created
in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned
and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired
for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66,
Sec. 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a
corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five
(5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed.
On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself
have recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative
Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by Sec.
31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129),
Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the
establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its
part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering
into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The
agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board
of Misamis Occidental.
Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative
districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of
the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the
ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., Sec.
442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to
have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision
states:
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Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
Second. Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 442(d) is
invalid, since it does not conform to the constitutional and statutory
requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new
municipalities.
This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously explained,
Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987
Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, it is not subject to the
plebiscite requirement. This requirement applies only to new
municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution.
Actually, the requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art.
XI, §3 of the previous Constitution which took effect on January 17,
1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal corporations
created before, such as the Municipality of Sinacaban in the case at
bar.
4. MUNICIPALITY OF NARCISO v. MENDEZ
Facts:
On 1958, Executive Order No. 353 created the municipal district of San
Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso
of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban,
Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
On 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo
warranto with the Regional Trial Court against the officials of the
Municipality of San Andres.The petition sought the declaration of
nullity of Executive Order No. 353. Invoking the ruling of this Court
in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the petitioning municipality contended
that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear
usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of
the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, , the
officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no
right to exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices
that righfully belonged to the corresponding officials of the Municipality
of San Narciso.
On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a
motion to dismiss alleging that the case had become moot and
academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 01
January 1991. The movant municipality cited Section 442(d) of the
law, reading thusly:
Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code
shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
Issue:
Whether the status of amunicipality created by a null and void
presidential order may be attacked
Ruling:
While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic ActNo.
7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de
facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition
for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law,
petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the
nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply
Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be
violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case
been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the
municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it
was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the
municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of
the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later
the Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the
powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the
same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster
or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can
abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with greatest
imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful
authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest
demands it.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being
the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a
choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at
least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not
in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Created in
1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San
Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24
December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The
ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the
case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the
State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of
San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district,
Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a
fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement
laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas PambansaBlg.
129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised
the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33,
dated 13 June 1978, issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of
San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of
San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the
municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15
October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives,
appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has
been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing
the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is
Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that
municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the)
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." The
power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature.
Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the
Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at
giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly
accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against
impairment of vested rights.
5. THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF
ALICIA, BOHOL
Facts:
The case revolves around the controversy on territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Alicia, Bohol.
It was adjudged by the RTC that Barangay Pagahat is within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Candijay. RTC permanently
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enjoined defendant Municipality of Alicia to respect petitioner's control,
possession and political supervision of Barangay Pagahat
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court. It ruled that the trial court committed an error in
declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Candijay. If allowed, the Municipality of Candijay will
not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of many other
barrios. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her
territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her.CA also found, after
an examination of the respective survey plans both plans are
inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary
lines.
Hence, the Municipality of Candijay now files a petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision of the CA
During the proceedings in the trial court, after presentation of
evidence by the Municipality of Candijay, the latter asked the trial
court to bar the Municipality of Alicia from presenting its evidence on
the ground that it had no juridical personality.
Petitioner contended that EO 265 issued by President Quirino on
September 16, 1949 creating respondent municipality is null and
void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, on which said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue
delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and
was therefore declared unconstitutional, per this Court's ruling
in Pelaez vs. Auditor General.
Issue:
Is petitioner Municipality of Candijay correct in arguing that
respondent Municipality of Alicia has no juridical personality in as much
as the EO creating respondent is null and void ab initio?
Ruling:
No. Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code states that:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
Respondent municipality's situation is strikingly similar to that of the
municipality of San Andres. Respondent municipality of Alicia was
created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years
ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in
existence for all ofsixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was
promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all
indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence
thereof (i.e. the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities
comprising the Third District of Boholunder the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution)
As such respondent municipality of Alicia should likewise benefit from
the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and
should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.
6. SULTAN OSOP CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, GR No. 161414, Jan. 17, 2005
Note: Correct me if I’m wrong, but no issue on creation or conversion
is identified in the case.
Facts:
Sultan Osop Camid, as a resident of Andong and private citizen, files a
petition for certiorari and mandamus contending that the legal
existence of Andong subsists despite its earlier nullification. (The
earlier case of Pelaez v. Auditor General [1965] nullified the Executive
Orders creating 33 municipalities, including Andong)
Camid presents various pieces of evidence (CENRO certification,
appointed officials, certification of 14,000 population) that prove its
recognition and certification, and states that Section 442(d) of the LGC
applies to the Municipality of Andong.
“Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code
shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.”
Issues:
1. W/N the executive department may create municipal corporations
2. W/N a municipality whose creation by executive fiat and later
voided by the SC may attain recognition in the absence of any
curative or reimplementing statute
Ruling:
Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit; Sec. 442(d) is not a blanket
curative law; Municipal corporations with a de facto status may be
cured by Sec. 442(d)
MODE OF ACTION TAKEN
The recognition of a de facto corporation requires factual
ascertainment; one that the trial court may look into. The Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts, thus the special civil action for certiorari
and mandamus should not be entertained.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT CANNOT CREATE MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS
As per ruling of Pelaez v. Auditor General, the SC held that Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the
executive branch and is unconstitutional.
ON THE MERITS (regardless of the wrong action taken by
petitioner)
EO 107 (which established Andong) was declared null and void ab
initio in 1965. The phrase ab initio means from the beginning, at first,
from the inception. The Pelaez case was never reversed by the SC but
rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San
Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,and Municipality of
Kapalong v. Moya.No subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez
as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been
passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these
facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not
exist as a duly constituted municipality.
Unlike the municipalities of San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, Andong
remained inexistent because there was no legislative enactment that
recreated it after the Pelaezcase. (San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinabacan
were listed as apportioned districts in an Ordinance appended to the
1987 Philippine Constitution)
Section 442(d) of the LGC was also admittedly not complied with. It
required elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
LGC. Camid admitted that there were no elected officials, but only
appointed ones.
The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of
elections in the municipality in the last four decades are indications of
its non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The
certifications relied upon by Camid, cannot be given weight because
these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the request of
Camid, to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of
Andong, Lanao del Sur, thus obviously conceding that the municipality
is at present inoperative.
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7. MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG v. BENITO (1969)
Facts:
The petitioner Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
while the respondent Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the
respondents are the councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the
same province. Balabagan was formerly a part of the municipality of
Malabang, having been created by E.O. 386 of the then President
Garcia. The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify E.O.
386 and to restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing
the functions of their respective office.
On the other hand, the respondents, nevertheless argue that the
municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation. It is
contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be
collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an
action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an
individual like the petitioner Balindong.
Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation
and if it is, can it be collaterally attacked?
Ruling:
The court ruled that said Municipality was not a de facto corporation.
(However, this is not the important topic here).
Can it be collaterally attacked? Yes. It is indeed true that, generally,
an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the
State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and
that only in a few exceptions may a private person exercise this
function of government. But the rule disallowing collateral attacks
applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de
facto corporations. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de
facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be, questioned
collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose
rights or interests ate affected thereby, including the citizens of the
territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct from
doing so.
8. ZOOMZAT, INC., vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ROMULO S. RODRIGUEZ, JR., et.al.
Facts:
Gingoog City passed resolution No 261 which resolved to express
willingness of the City of Gingoog to allow Zoomzat to install and
operate a cable TV system. Zoomzat applied then for a mayor’s permit
but was not acted upon by the mayor’s office. Subsequently the City
passed an ordinance (Ordinance No. 19) which granted a franchise to
GingoogSpacelink Cable TV to operate for a period of 10 years/ Hence
Zoomzat filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman to
against respondents (Members of the SangunianPanlungsod of
Gingoog City) fpr violation of RA 3019. The case went to the
Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan asked the Special Prosecutor to
restudy the case, where the latter recommended it’s dismissal. The
Sandiganbayan then issued a resolution ordering the withdrawal of the
petition. This was assailed in the instant petition.
Zoomzat disagrees with the finding of the prosecutor that it is the NTC
(National Telecommunications Commission) that has the power to
allow or disallow the operation of cable television and not the LGU. It
contends that under the LGC, the LGU can grant permits licenses and
franchises by virtue of their regulatory or revenue raising powers.
Zoomzat also contends that the grant of exclusive franchise to
Spacelink for a period of ten (10) years subject to automatic renewal,
contravenes Section 2 of Executive Order No. 205, which provides that
a certificate of authority to operate a CATV by the Commission shall be
on a non-exclusive basis and for a period not to exceed 15 years.
Issues:
1. Who has the power to authorize the operation of cable television in
the City of Gingoog City? The LGU or NTC?
2. Was the LGU in violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019
Ruling:
1. THE NTC
EO 205, expressly provides that the LGU does not have the authority
to issue licenses and permits pertaining to the operation of Cable TV,
only the NTC has.
Hence, the City of Gingoog was not authorized or charged with the
grant of licenses.Our pronouncement in BatangasCATV, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals is pertinent:
“…Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only persons,
associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a
Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install,
operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable
television service within a service area”
Plainly, the SangguniangPanlungsod of Gingoog City overstepped the
bounds of its authority when it usurped the powers of the NTC with
the enactment of Ordinance No. 19.
2.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concession
Hence, the officer involved should be authorized to issue permitrs and
other concessions. Being a void legislative act, Ordinance No. 19 did
not confer any right nor vest any privilege to Spacelink. As such,
petitioner could not claim to have been prejudiced or suffered injury
thereby. There is no violation of said law because the LGU was not
authorized to give permits.
In addition, petitioner could not impute manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of the respondents
when they enacted Ordinance No. 19. A perfunctory reading of
Resolution No. 261 shows that the SangguniangPanlungsod did not
grant a franchise to it but merely expressed its willingness to allow the
petitioner to install and operate a cable television.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED
9. RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
LUIS T. SANTOS G.R. No. 93252, August 5, 1991
Facts:
Ten administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ganzon, mayor
of Iloilo, by various city officials for various charges of abuse of
authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral
conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and
arbitrary detention. The Department of Local Government of Iloilo,
acting through the Secretary of Local Government, ordered for
Ganzon’s three successive 60-day preventive suspension. Ganzon filed
a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from
implementing the said orders. His primary argument is that the
Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority
5
to suspend and remove local officials, since under the 1987
Constitution, he merely exercises supervisory powers to support and
strengthen local autonomy.
Issue:
Can the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego,
suspend and/or remove local officials?
Ruling:
Yes.The president, as granted by Constitution, is granted the power of
supervision over local government officials. Supervision is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.
Difference between Power of Control and Power of
Supervision
The two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which
differ one from the other in meaning and extent. "In administration
law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter."
It cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the
President over local government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.
Caveat (from transcript in previous years)
Bretch: But note that this was the ruling before where the president
still has the power to remove local officials under the previous LGC.
However, under Sec. 60 of the present LGC, the president can no
longer remove local officials. Such power is already lodged to the
regular courts.
10. CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 79956
Facts:
The constitutionality of EO 220 which created the Cordillera
Administrative Region is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-
empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the
creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the
approval of the act through a plebiscite.
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President Aquino in the
exercise of her legislative powers, created CAR to accelerate economic
and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of
the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main function is to
coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services
in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government
units as well as with the executive departments of the National
Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying,
planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the
region. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national
and local government projects in the region. The CAR and the
Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the
autonomous regional government is established and organized.
Issue 1:
W/N EO No. 220 pre-empted the enactment of an organic act by the
Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Ruling:
No. E.O No. 220 did not pre-empt the enactment by Congress of an
organic act.
1. E.O. No. 220 simply provides for the consolidation and
coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and
agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the
administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of
autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for
transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic
act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares
the ground for autonomy.
2. The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in
the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and
legislature and special courts with personal, family and property
law jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220
did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a
region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with
the main objective of coordinating the planning and
implementation of programs and services.
3. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing
local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous
government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for
an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments,
the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic
groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
Issue 2:
W/N EO 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial
and political subdivision.
Ruling:
E.O. No. 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or
merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. CAR is not a public
corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a
separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and
municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally
granted to public corporations. As stated earlier, the CAR was created
primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs
and services in the covered areas.
Issue 3:
Whether the creation of CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee
of local autonomy for the provinces which compose the CAR.
No. As mentioned earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating
agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a
group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying
local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested
with political autonomy.
11. PIMENTEL v. AGUIRRE, July 19, 2000
Facts:
President Ramos issued Administrative Order 372 which was a cash
management measure adopted by the government to match
expenditures with available resources which were presumably depleted
at the time due to economic difficulties brought about by peso
depreciation. Petitioners filed instant petition to (1) nullify Sec. 1 of AO
372 which directs the LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% and
(2) enjoin respondents from implementing Sec. 4 of such AO which
withholds 10% of the internal revenue allotments (modified to 5% by
AO 43) pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation.
Petitioners contend that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect
6
exercising the power of control over LGUs, not merely general accountable not to the central
supervision which was granted to it by the Constitution. It relieves the central government authorities but to its constituency.
of the burden of managing local
Issue: affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns.
WON Sections 1 and 4 of AO 372 are valid exercises of the President’s
power of general supervision over local governments Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, national government
has not completely relinquished all its powers over LGUs. Only
Ruling: administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions, the purpose of which is to make governance more
While the wordings of Section 1 have a commanding tone, the Court directly responsive and effective at the local levels.
accepts that it is merely advisory and does not constitute a mandatory
or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. In this regard, Fiscal autonomy
Section 1 is deemed valid. Section 4, on the other hand, is invalid since
it encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to
create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share
Jurisprudential precepts in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as
the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own
Supervision v. Control priorities. It does not however rule out any manner of national
Section 4 of Constitution vests in the President the power of general government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that
supervision over LGUs. Such power excludes the power of control. local programs are consistent with national goals. The President, being
Control and Supervision are different in meaning and extent. the head of economic and planning agency of the government, may
interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that:
Control Supervision 1. There is unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
Means the power of an officer to Overseeing or the power or government.
alter or modify or nullify or set authority of an officer to see that 2. There are consultations with presiding officers of the Senate and
aside what a subordinate officer subordinate officers perform House of Reps and the presidents of the various local league.
has done in the performance of their duties. If the latter fail or 3. Corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of DOF, DILG,
his duties and to substitute the neglect to fulfil them, the former and DBM
judgment of the former for that of may take such action or step as 4. Adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of
the latter. prescribed by law to make them the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the 3 rd fiscal
perform their duties. year preceding the current one (Sec. 284, LGC)
Includes restraining authority over Mere oversight over an inferior
inferior body body Section 1 is valid exercise of power of general supervision
Officers lay down the rules in the It does not cover laying down of
performance or accomplishment of rules. Officer merely sees to it The Court agrees that the requirements are not satisfied: (1) no
an act. If these rules are not that the rules are followed; they showing of unmanageable public sector deficit, and (2) no
followed, they may, in their do not have the discretion to consultations with league of local governments. However, the Court
discretion, order the act undone or modify or replace them. accepts the assurance of solicitor general that Section 1 is merely
redone by their subordinates or advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for
even decide to do it themselves. fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. It is understood,
however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their
Under the present system of government, executive power is vested in officials who do not follow such advice.
the President. Members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are
merely alter egos; as such, they are subject to the power of control of Section 4 is not valid exercise
President. On the other hand, heads of political subdivisions are
elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the Basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
electorate, therefore, they are subject to the President’s supervision shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue, as mandated by the
only, not control. Constitution. LGC provides that the release shall be made directly to
LGUs and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
Extent of Local Autonomy imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. Term
“shall” is a word of command that must be given compulsory meaning.
Hand in hand with constitutional restraint on President’s power over
local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy. Local Section 4 orders the withholding of 10% of IRA pending the
autonomy signified a more responsive and accountable local assessment by Development Budget Coordinating Committee. This is
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. equivalent to a holdback which means something held back or
Decentralization means the devolution of national administration, not withheld, often temporarily. Temporary nature of retention does not
power, to local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the matter. Any retention is prohibited.
central government as the law may provide.
12. PIMENTEL, et. al, v Executive Sec. OCHOA and
Decentralization of Decentralization of power (DSWD) Sec. JULIANO-SOLIMAN, July 17, 2012
administration
The central government This involves an abdication of Assailed in a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is the
delegates administrative powers political power in the favor of constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 10147 or the General
to political subdivisions in order to LGUs declared to be autonomous. Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2011 which provides a P21 Billion budget
broaden the base of government The autonomous government is allocation for the Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) headed by
power and in the process to make free to chart its own destiny and the DSWD. Petitioners sought to enjoin respondents from
local governments more shape its future with minimum implementing said program on the ground that it amounts to a
responsive and accountable and intervention from central “recentralization” of government functions that have already been
ensure their fullest development authorities. devolved from the national government to the LGUs.
as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective This power amounts to self- Ruling: The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an intervention
partners in the pursuit of national immolation since the autonomous program formulated by the national government itself but
government and social progress. government becomes implemented in partnership with the local government units to achieve
7
the common national goal development and social progress can by no
means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.
Facts:
Petitioners challenged before the Court the disbursement of public
funds and the implementation of the CCTP (Conditional Cash Transfer
Program) which are alleged to have encroached into the local
autonomy of the LGUs. They admit that the wisdom of adopting the
CCTP as a poverty reduction strategy for the Philippines is with the
legislature. They take exception, however, to the manner by which it is
being implemented, that is primarily through a national agency like
DSWD instead of the LGUS to which the responsibility and functions of
delivering social welfare, agriculture and health care services have
been devolved pursuant to Sec. 17 of RA 7160, also known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, in relation to Sec. 25, Art. II&Sec. 3,
Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners assert that giving the
DSWD full control over the identification of beneficiaries and the
manner by which services are to be delivered or conditionaities are to
be complied with, instead of allocating the P21 Billion CCTP budget
directly to the LGUs that would have enhanced the delivery of basic
services, results in the “recentralization” of basic government
functions, which is contrary to the precepts of local autonomy and the
avowed policy of decentralization.
Issue:
Whether or not the local autonomy of LGUs enshrined in Art. II, Sec.
25 & Art. X, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sec. 17 of
the LGC of 1991 had been violated.
Ruling:
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the
autonomy of local governments and even devotes a full article on the
subject of local governance which includes the following pertinent
provisions:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
x xx
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development
councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials,
regional heads of departments and other government offices, and
representatives from non-governmental organizations within the
regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen
the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and
social growth and development of the units in the region.
(Underscoring supplied)
In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful
autonomy that would develop them into self-reliant communities and
effective partners in the attainment of national goals, Section 17 of the
Local Government Code vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions
pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. – (a) Local government
units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon
them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code.
Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the
basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x
xx.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon
them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of
the same provision [section 17, LGC] provides a categorical exception
of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services, thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public
works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and
services funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and
those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered
under this Section, except in those cases where the local government
unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services. (Underscoring supplied)
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national
government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In Pimentel v. Aguirre, the Court defined the extent of the local
government's autonomy in terms of its partnership with the national
government in the pursuit of common national goals, referring to such
key concepts as integration and coordination. Thus:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local
governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative
powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The
purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political
and social development at the smaller political units are expected to
propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable
the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national
goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress.
Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance to the local
government unit as to preclude any and all involvement by the
national government in programs implemented in the local level would
be to shift the tide of monopolistic power to the other extreme, which
would amount to a decentralization of power explicated in Limbona v.
Mangelin as beyond our constitutional concept of autonomy xxx. A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government is,
thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially where it
is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.
13. LIMBONA v. MANGELIN
Facts:
Petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of
the SangguniangPampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region
XII, representing Lanao del Sur.On March 12, 1987 petitioner was
elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao. Subsequently, Congressman
DatuGuimidMatalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of
the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook
Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his
capacity as Speaker of the Assembly. Consistent with the said
invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny
Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be
no session in November as "our presence in the house committee
8
hearing of Congress takes precedence over any pending business in
batasangpampook. Acting secretary sent a telegram to members of the
assembly informing them of the cancelled assembly on that certain
day.
However, despite the prior notice, the assembly still met and a
meeting took place. After declaring the presence of a quorum, the
Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On
Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in
attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat
of the Speaker vacant.
Petitioner prays for the injunction of the said action done by the
assembly. He also prays that the assembly be considered invalid.
Pending further proceedings, this Court, received a resolution filed by
the SangguniangPampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA
FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS
REGION XII," on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner
"had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying the salaries and
emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing
his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of
Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the
record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by
Abdula was ever made . . ." and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in
paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the
Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly,"
that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much
amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the
salaries and emoluments of some Assembly.”
Issues:
1. Whether or not they Limbona was afforded due process?
2. Whether the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as
they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national
courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government
given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
Ruling:
I.
We hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the
first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an
investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his
defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given
the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the
records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents)
that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not
set foot at the SangguniangPampook." "To be sure, the private
respondents aver that "The Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture,
wanted him to come to Cotabato City," but that was "so that their
differences could be threshed out and settled." Certainly, that avowed
wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory
it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing
contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in
administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party
need only be given the opportunity to be heard, it does not appear
herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he
had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues.
It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to
rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled
amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
II.
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions
IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618. Among other things, the
Decree established "internal autonomy" in the two regions "within the
framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," with legislative and
executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities
specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all
internal administrative matters for the respective regions," except to
"act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of
the National Government," "which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and
quasi-banking, and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or
utilization of all natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing.
In relation to the central government, it provides that "The President
shall have the power of general supervision and control over the
Autonomous Regions.”
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments "more responsive and accountable,"
"and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress." At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over
them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-
immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government
becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim
Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to
decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question
foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local
government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present
Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in
this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the
proper time and in the proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy
in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy. 30
9

xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter
category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision
of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). 32 If the SangguniangPampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category
only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central
government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No.
1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."
33 In the second place, the SangguniangPampook, their legislative
arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the SangguniangPampook. The
SangguniangPampook shall exercise local legislative powers over
regional affairs within the framework of national development plans,
policies and goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous
Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the
Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in
this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established
by the Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and
other social services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages
and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the
enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people in the
Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to
assure that enactment and acts of the SangguniangPampook and the
LupongTagapagpaganapngPook are in compliance with this Decree,
national legislation, policies, plans and programs.
The SangguniangPampook shall maintain liaison with the
BatasangPambansa. 34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the
validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review
the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
14. MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION
Facts:
In 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand their casino operations into
Cagayan de Oro and leased a portion of a building owned by Pryce
Properties. The city along with other civic groups wanted to stop
PAGCOR from operating a casino in Cagayan de Oro (herein, CDO),
calling such an “affront to the welfare of the city.”
Therefore, the SangguniangPanlungsod (herein, SP) of CDO enacted
Ordinance 3353 which would prohibit and cancel business permits of
establishments allowing or using its premises (or a portion of it) for
casino operations. Furthermore, the SP enacted another Ordinance
(Ordinance 3375-93) which outright prohibits the operation of Casinos
as a “measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and
general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity
pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social
and moral welfare of the community.”
Pryce Properties (owner of the portion of the lot to be leased to
PAGCOR) assailed both mentioned ordinances before the CA which
succeeded. The CA subsequently declared the ordinances invalid.
However, the Mayor brought the case to the SC to have the ordinances
declared to be valid.
The Mayor’s argument for the validity of the assailed ordinances
prohibiting operating casinos in CDO are as follows:
1. CDO is empowered to enact ordinances and vested with police
power under the General Welfare Clause (Section 16 of the
LGC) and pursuant to such Clause, a Local Government Unit’s
Powers, Duties, Functions (Section 458 of the LGC) include the
power to “enact ordinances to prevent, suppress, and impose
appropriate penalties for…..gambling and other prohibited games
of chance.”
2. Under these provisions, the SP has the power to prohibit casinos
and all other games of chances in the city. Even if PD 1869
(PAGCOR’s charter) permits operating casinos, it is subordinate to
whatever ordinances enacted by the LGU pursuant to the LGC
3. The Mayor also argues that this is consistent with the policy of
local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.
4. Using Statutory Construction, the fact that the LGC expressly
authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress
gambling and other prohibited games of chance, it meant all forms
of gambling. Ubilex non distinguit, necnosdistingueredebemosor
where the law does not distinguish, one does not distinguish. It
further argued that if the law would have expressly excluded
gambling authorized by special law, it would have done so. Instead
of stating “gambling and other prohibited games of chance” it
should have stated “gambling and other prohibited games of
chance EXCEPT those authorized by special law”
5. The Mayor also argues that the LGC has already modified PD 1869
since the LGC was a later enactment than PD 1869. Basing on this
argument, the LGC has “modified pro tanto” or modified PD 1869
only to the extent regarding operation of casinos in LGUs. The
mayor argues that with the enactment of the LGC, PAGCOR which
used to have the power to operate casino’s anywhere in the
country, can now only do so without objection from the local
government unit where it will be operating since the LGC has
modified PD 1869.
6. Lastly, the mayor argues that gambling is intrinsically harmful
Issue:
Can a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare clause
and Section 458 of the LGC, enact an ordinance to prohibit the
operation of Casinos within its territorial jurisdiction despite the fact
that PAGCOR’s charter (PD 1869) empowers it to operate casinos
nationwide?
Ruling:
10
No, a local government cannot enact an ordinance in contravention of
a statute.
An ordinance is valid provided it follows the following substantive
requirements:
1. It must not contravene the constitution or any statute
2. It must not be unfair or oppressive
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory
4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. It must be general and consistent with public policy
6. It must not be unreasonable
Under Sec. 458, LGU’s are empowered to prohibit “gambling and other
prohibited games of chance.” The SC explained that what the LGU is
allowed to prohibit are games of chance that are prohibited. Logically,
an LGU is not allowed to prohibit, by ordinance or otherwise, games of
chance that are no prohibited by law.
Furthermore, the ordinances enacted by the SP of CDO are invalid
since it contravenes a statute (PD 1869). The argument of the Mayor
that the LGC “modified pro tanto” PD 1869 so that PAGCOR can now
only operate casinos if the LGU’s do not object to it, is flawed.
As pointed out by the SC, the Mayor’s argument was merely “playing
with words” when they averred that the LGC “modified pro tanto” PD
1869. What the Mayor was actually saying in that argument was that
the LGC has already repealed PD 1869 since the Code, using the
Mayor’s argument, has “shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and
regulate casinos.” Basically, the SC explained that using the Mayor’s
argument that Section 458 mandates the prohibition of all kinds of
gambling (illegal or legal) by the LGUs, then PAGCOR can no longer
operate casinos anywhere at all. Therefore, there is a clash between
the LGC and PD 1869 IF we were to use the argument of the Mayor.
However, there is no proof of express repeal of PD 1869 by the LGC
since the repealing clause (sec. 534) listed down the laws and
provisions expressly repealed by the LGC and PD 1869 is not included.
Furthermore, there is also no implied repeal in this case given the
principle that implied repeal is frowned upon by our legal system and
the Court must exert all effort to harmonize all laws before accepting
an implied repeal. In the case at bar, there is no indication at all of an
implied repeal of PD 1869. In fact, PD 1869 and the LGC can be
harmonized: under the LGC, local government units shall suppress all
kinds of gambling EXCEPT those allowed by statutes like PD 1869.
15. LINA V. PANO, GR No. 129093, Aug. 30, 2001
Facts:
Calvento was appointed as agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install a terminal for the operation of
lotto. He was also tasked to apply for the necessary mayor’s permit to
operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro.
Unfortunately, no permit was issued for Calvento on the ground that
KapasiyahanBlg. 508 Taon 1995, a local ordinance of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan of Laguna, prohibited gambling (i.e.
operation of lotto).
Calvento filed an action for Declaratory Relief with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
The trial court ruled the issue in favour of Calvento and thus enjoining
the Province of Laguna from implementing the prohibition on
gambling.
Issue:
1. WON KapasiyahanBlg. 508, Taon 1995 of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan of Laguna is valid
2. WON the consequent denial to issue a mayor’s permit due to the
prohibition of the said ordinance is valid
Ruling:
Both are invalid.
KapasiyahanBlg. 508, Taon 1995 merely states the disfavor of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan to gambling. In itself is not self-executing as
it is merely a policy statement on the part of the Sanggunian. Thus, it
cannot be held as a valid ground to justify any act of prohibition on the
proliferation of gambling and all its forms in Laguna, including the lotto
system subject of the inquiry.
If we were to look at the policy statement in itself, the existence of
such is valid as the Sanggunian is allowed by law to raise and forward
their sentiments through resolutions or other legislative measure. This
is a manifestation of the local autonomy of the local government units;
they are free to air out their views. However, this does not give the
local government units the power to enact ordinances that will
contravene the laws created by Congress. Hence, the prohibition of the
Sanggunian of the operation of the lotto system based on the ground
of a mere policy statement is an error on their part. It went beyond
the scope of its authority.
Also, ordinances should not contravene the Constitution as well as
national legislations. This is grounded on the idea that local
governments are mere agents of the national government, thus, their
local councils only exercise delegated legislative powers from
Congress. The delegate cannot be superior than the principal and as
such, is prohibited to exercise powers higher than those of the
principal’s. “The spring cannot be higher than its source.”
The question if gambling should be prohibited is one that is lodged in
the Congress. Applying in the case at bar, since Congress allowed
PCSO to operate lotteries in Laguna, the SanggunianPanlalawigan of
the latter therefore does not have the authority to nullify the said
operation.
16. SAN JUAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSSION
GR No. 92299, April 19, 1991
Facts:
This case involved a vacancy in the position of Provincial Budget
Officer of Rizal (PBO). The governor of Rizal, a certain San Juan
nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter quickly
assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and
recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO because
she was the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently
approved by the DBM through the issuance of a circular. Petitioner
protested the appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil
Service Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His
arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right
and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of
PBO and that the appointee should come only from his
nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 112.
Issue:
Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not
expressly nominated by the provincial governor.
Ruling:
NO. Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to
recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws
for the position of PBO. Consequently, if the recommendations
made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards,
the appointing authority, public respondent DBM is expected
to reject the same. However, if the appointee is not qualified, DBM
does not have the right to appoint their own choice.
Petitioner’s arguments are on point. Petitioner states that the phrase
11
of said law: "upon recommendation of the local chief executive
concerned" must be given mandatory application in
consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X,
Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot
validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public
respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing
vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification
requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget
Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
This case involves the application of a most important constitutional
policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in
Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the
scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local
governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law."
The President controls the executive departments. He has no
such power over local governments. He has only supervision
and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by
statute.
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The
DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list
of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary
eligibilities and qualifications.
17. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CA
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through
Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any
project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals
and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to
mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments
the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within
their municipal waters.
Issue:
Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development
Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region —
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs
insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
Ruling:
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above,
specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region,
including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority
to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan
may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or
other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the
municipal waters.
SPECIAL LAW vs GENERAL LAW
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not
necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake
Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority
over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express
provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the
Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part
of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments.
The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No.
7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law.
It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later
legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have
repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that
"a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is
not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions
and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest,
although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the
cases embraced in the special law."
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute,
the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as
an exception to the general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied
repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given
to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority,
which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and
sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative
intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.
"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a
national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced
growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to
the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this
part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this
need when they passed this LLDA law — the special law designed to
govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources."
POWER OF LGU TO ISSUE FISHING PRIVILEGES
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges
was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from
the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code
empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied
in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the
heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other
Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the
purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in
the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and
for lake quality control and management.
It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most
pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State
powers including the power of taxation.
Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a
valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de
Bay.
12
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages
and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3
of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees
collected.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.
Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion
of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such
powers as are by its charter vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will
render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the
Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power
would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if
not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local
Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.
18. THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ROMULO
G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004
Facts:
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 48 entitled ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION
ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION. The Oversight Committee
(referred to as the Devolution Committee in E.O. No. 48) constituted
under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government
Code of 1991) has been authorized to issue the implementing rules
and regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of
said fund to the LGUs.
In Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations (GAA) of 1999, the program was renamed as the
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF). Under
said appropriations law, the amount of P96,780,000,000 was allotted
as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes. Internal
Revenue Allotment of Rep. Act No. 8745 contained the following
proviso:
... PROVIDED, That the amount of FIVE BILLION PESOS
(P5,000,000,000) shall be earmarked for the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund for the funding requirements of projects and
activities arising from the full and efficient implementation of devolved
functions and services of local government units pursuant to R.A. No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That such amount shall be released to the local
government units subject to the implementing rules and regulations,
including such mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations
and distribution of said fund among local government units subject to
the guidelines that may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee on
Devolution as constituted pursuant to Book IV, Title III, Section 533(b)
of R.A. No. 7160. The Internal Revenue Allotment shall be released
directly by the Department of Budget and Management to the Local
Government Units concerned.
Under Rep. Act No. 8760, otherwise known as the GAA of 2000, the
amount of P111,778,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in
the internal revenue taxes. As in the GAA of 1999, the GAA of 2000
contained a proviso earmarking five billion pesos of the IRA for the
LGSEF. This proviso, found in Item No. 1, Special Provisions, Title
XXXVII A. Internal Revenue Allotment, was similarly worded as that
contained in the GAA of 1999.
In view of the failure of Congress to enact the general appropriations
law for 2001, the GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted, together with
the IRA of the LGUs therein and the proviso earmarking five billion
pesos thereof for the LGSEF.
The Oversight Committee passed OCD Resolutions providing for the
allocation schemes covering the said five billion pesos and the
implementing rules and regulations therefor. The release of the LGSEF
to the LGUs only upon their compliance with the implementing rules
and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms, prescribed
by the Oversight Committee.
Issue:
WON the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs and the OCD
resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the amount of five billion pesos
of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and
imposed conditions for the release thereof, violate the Constitution and
the Local Government Code of 1991.
Ruling:
The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000
and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating the constitutional precept on local
autonomy.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them.
The Local Government Code of 1991, among its salient provisions,
underscores the automatic release of the LGUs just share in
this wise:
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. Local government
units shall have the power and authority to establish an organization
that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation
of their development plans, program objectives and priorities; to
create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
charges which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and
which shall be retained by them; to have a just share in national
taxes which shall be automatically and directly released to
them without need of further action;
...
Sec. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each local
government unit shall be released, without need of any further
action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer,
as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) days
after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to
any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government
for whatever purpose.
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share
of local government units under existing laws.
Construing Section 286 of the LGC, we held in Pimentel, Jr. v.
Aguirre,viz:
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National
internal revenue. As a rule, the term SHALL is a word of
command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, IMPERATIVE.
To the Courts mind, the entire process involving the distribution and
release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is
part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. To
subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the
implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines
and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight
Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD
resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant
violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the
just share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them.
The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight
Committee.
The concept of local autonomy was explained in Ganzon v. Court of
Appeals in this wise:
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means a more
responsive and accountable local government structure
13
instituted through a system of decentralization. The
Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the
monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local
governments and as put by political adherents, to liberate the local
governments from the imperialism of Manila. Autonomy,
however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and local
government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of
federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local
governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation,
however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit
paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution
of national administration but not power to the local
levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments more responsive and accountable
and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress. At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises general supervision
over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in
the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication
of political power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units
declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of
power amounts to self-immolation, since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.
Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal
autonomy. The fairly recent case of Pimentel v. Aguirre is particularly
instructive. The Court declared therein that local fiscal autonomy
includes the power of the LGUs to, inter alia, allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities:
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having
administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local
governments have the power to create their own sources of
revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national
taxes released by the national government, as well as the power
to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It
extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn
have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated
at the national level and imposed on local governments, whether they
are relevant to local needs and resources or not ..
Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
constitutionally mandated automatic release of the shares of
LGUs in the national internal revenue.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
and the OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of
the IRA. They put on hold the distribution and release of the five
billion pesos LGSEF and subject the same to the implementing rules
and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms prescribed
by the Oversight Committee from time to time. Like Section 4 of A.O.
372, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the
OCD resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed
by the LGUs and must be struck down. They cannot, therefore, be
upheld.
19. TANO vs. SOCRATES
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing
the constitutionality of:
(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsodng
Puerto Princesa City entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE
SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND
PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF";
(2) Office Order No. 23, which then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero
issued to implement said city ordinance, requiring any person engaged
or intending to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or
profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a
permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayor’s permit and
authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary inspections on
cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto
Princesa; and
(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 enacted by the
SangguniangPanlalawigan, Provincial Government of
Palawan, entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING,
GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLGING AND
SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL DWELLINGAQUATIC ORGANISMS”
The petitioners contended that:
1. the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under
which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other
words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine
whether or not to issue permit.
3. As Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether
prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and
shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any
distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful
fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-
fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as
petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are
concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their
vocation and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary,
and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a
successful conclusion.
Public respondents defended the validity of the ordinance arguing that:
1. It is a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power under
the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]),
2. Its specific power to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment
under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and
Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC.
3. They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the Province of
Palawan had the right and responsibility to insure that the
remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory
remain healthy for the future generation.
4. The Ordinance covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded
other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral
reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5) years to
protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged
to regenerate.
5. There was no violation of due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were
conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which,
undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable
14
 means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed
between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of
selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no
intention at all of selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium
cyanide while the latter does not. Further, the Ordinance applied
equally to all those belonging to one class.
Issue:
Are the Ordinances contrary to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2
and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution?
Ruling:
No, the Ordinances are not contrary to Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as having been
transgressed by the Ordinances.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as
a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan is described as a private association
composed of Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia
Lim, as merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim to be
fishermen, without any qualification, however, as to their status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the
terms subsistence or marginal fishermen, they should be construed in
their general and ordinary sense.
Amarginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose
margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by
existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the
cost of gathering the fish.
A subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the
irreducible minimum for his livelihood.
Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer
or fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence farming or
fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of
agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate
family. It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding
that any petitioner falls within these definitions.
Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of
communal marine and fishing resources, but of their protection,
development, and conservation. The ordinances in question are meant
precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that
their enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only for the
present generation, but also for the generations to come.
The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to
the use of marine resources is not at all absolute, since it is limited by
the Regalian Doctrine.
Decentralization
Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as
expressly mandated by the Constitution. Devolution refers to the act
by which the National Government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on
devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes
enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws
within the municipal waters.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution
enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government
units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under
Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi),
which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity
of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal
objectives or purposes:
(1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic
animals covered therein for a period of five years, and
(2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto
Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to
illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the
devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters,
such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of
closed seasons. The devolution of such power has been expressly
confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994
between the Department of Agriculture and the Department
of Interior and Local Government.
The realization of the second objective falls within both the general
welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate
thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment
and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment.
The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92
of the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one
hand, and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully
obvious. In sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the
Ordinances may not then be controverted.
As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor
Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto Princesa, we find nothing
therein violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. The
Order refers to the implementation of the challenged
ordinance and is not the Mayors Permit.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
20. LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
DENR AND SECRETARY
GR. No. 175368, April 11, 2013
Petitioner: League of Provinces - a duly organized league of local
governments incorporated under the Local Government Code; it is
composed of 81 provincial governments, including the Province of
Bulacan
Respondent: DENR and DENR Secretary Angelo Reyes
Other parties:
Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) –
applicant for a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA);
filed before Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Regional Office No. III
(MGB-RO); application was denied twice
Mercado, Cruz, Cruz and Sembrano (MCCS) – applicants for Quarry
Permit; filed before the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) of Bulacan
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) – applicant for
Exploration Permit; filed before the PENRO of Bulacan
Facts:
Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO. On April 29,
1998,MGB-ROdenied GoldenFalcon’s application for FTAA on for failure
to secure the required area clearances from the Forest Management
Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR-RO. Golden Falcon
appealed the denial with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-Central
Office (MGB-CO).
On February 10, 2004, pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO,
MCCS filed with the PENRO of Bulacan their applications for quarry
permit covering the same area subject of Golden Falcon's FTAA
15
application.MGB-CO finally denied Golden Falcon’s appeal on July 16,
2004.
AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration
permit covering the same subject area on September 13, 2004.
Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping applications of AMTC
and the persons applying for quarry permits – the contention was the
date the area of Golden Falcon’s application became open to other
permit applications from other parties
On October 19, 2004, upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog,
DENR-MGB Director Ramos stated that the denial of GoldenFalcon’s
application became final on August 11, 2004, or fifteen days after
Golden Falcon received the order of denial of its application. Hence,
the area of Golden Falcon’s application became open to permit
applications only on that date.
Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal
opinion on the issue, stating that the subject area became open for
new applications on the date of the first denial on April 29, 1998
(MGB-RO’s order of denial), as MGB-CO’s order of denial on July 16,
2004 was a mere reaffirmation of the MGB-RO’s April 29 order; hence,
the reckoning period should be April 29.
Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RODirector Cabantogendorsed the
applications for quarry permit, now apparently converted to
applications for small-scale mining permit, to the Governor of Bulacan.
PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the Governor the approval of said
applications. Eventually, the Governor issued the small-scale mining
permits. AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary.
The DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and
cancelled the governor’s issuance of small-scale mining permits. It
agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos that the area was open to
mining location only on August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-CO
denial). Hence, the applications for quarry permit filed on February 10,
2004 were null as these were filed when the area was still closed to
mining location. On the other hand,AMTC filed its application when the
area was already open to other mining applicants, hence, its
application was valid. The small-scale mining permits were also issued
in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of
the Governor pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942 because the area was
never proclaimed to be under the small-scale mining program.
The petitioner League of the Provinces of the Philippines filed this
petition saying that that this is not an action of one province alone, but
the collective action of all provinces through the League, as a
favorable ruling will not only benefit one province, but all provinces
and all local governments.
Issues:
1. Whether DENR’s act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits
amounts to executive control, not merely supervision and usurps
the devolved powers of all provinces, as the DENR Secretary
substituted the judgment of the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
2. Whether or not Section 17, b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code
and Section 24 of the Small-Scale Mining Act, which confer upon
DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are
unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and
Exec Depts) has the power of supervision only, not control over
acts of LGUs
Ruling:
[The Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this petition
because it is tasked under Section 504 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the provincial level; adopt
measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its
officials and employees; and exercise such other powers and perform
such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the
welfare of the provinces.]
DENR Sec’s act was valid and authorized pursuant to its power of
review under the RA 7076 and its IRR; Assailed statutes did not
overcome the presumption of constitutionality, hence, are not
unconstitutional.
Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the
provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. 7061 or The
LocalGovernment Code of 1991; (2) R.A. 7076 or the People's Small
ScaleMining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995.
Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his/her duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter. Supervision
isthe power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform
their function in accordance with law.
The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article X, Sec. 2
of the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of the LGUs
or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local
governments within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve
devolution of powers, but it is still subject to limitations, like following
national policies or standards and those provided by the Local
Government Code, as the structuring of LGUs and the allocation of
powers/responsibilities/resources among the LGUs and local officials
are placed by the Constitution to Congress under Article X Section 3.
It is the DENR which is in-charge of carrying out the State’s
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development and utilization of the country’s
natural resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section 17,
b(3)(III) of the LGC. Hence, the enforcement of the small-scale
mining law by the provincial government is subject to the supervision,
control and review of the DENR. The LGC did not fully devolve to the
provincial government the enforcement of the small-scale mining law.
RA 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining program was established
to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other
government agencies (Section 4, RA 7076). Section 24 of the law
makes the Provincial/ Mining Regulatory Board under the direct
supervision and control of the Secretary, its powers and functions
subject to review by the same.
Under Section 123 of DENR AO No. 23, small-scale mining applications
should be filed with the PMRB and the permits shall be issued by the
provincial governor, for applications outside the mineral reservations.
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 (1992) which contains the IRR of
RA 7076 likewise provides that the DENR Secretary shall exercise
direct supervision and control over the People’s Small-Scale Mining
Program, and that the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board’s
(PMRB) powers and functions shall be subject to review by the DENR
Secretary. DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 or the Revised IRR of
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 provides that applications for Small-
Scale Mining Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City
Mayor through their respective Mining Regulatory Boards for areas
outside the Mineral Reservations, and further, that the LGUs in
coordination with the Bureau/Regional Offices shall approve
applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel, quarry xxx and
gravel permits not exceeding 5 hectares.
Petitioner’s contention that the aforementioned laws and rules did not
confer upon DENR and DENR Secretary the power to reverse,
abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial
Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board are
without merit because the DENR Secretary was granted the power of
review in the PMRB’s resolution of disputes under Sec. 24 of RA 7076
and Section 22 of its IRR. The decision of the DENR Secretary to nullify
and cancel the Governor’s issuance of permits emanated from its
power of review under RA 7076 ad its IRR. Its power to review and
decide on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits
by the Provincial Governor is a quasi-judicial function which involves
the determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the
contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and
16
on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their
respective rights.
The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076
and its IRR to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts, or
litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial power of the
DENR can neither be equated with “substitution of judgment” of the
Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor “control”
over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of
the rights of the AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, the Court held that every law has in
its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond
reasonable doubt. In this case, the grounds raised by the petitioner to
challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 17b(3)(iii) of the LGC and
Section 24 of RA 7076 has failed to overcome the constitutionality of
the said provisions of the law.
Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
21. JAMES M. IMBONG vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Its constitutionality is
assailed on ground that RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of
Local Government Units. It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the
ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs under Section 17
of the Local Government Code and the ARMM.
Issue:
Does the RH Law amount to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments?
Ruling:
No. While Section 17 of LGC of 1991 endeavors the LGUs to take on
the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved
upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for
basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph
(c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of
cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services. The essence of this express
reservation of power by the national government is that,
unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing
agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has
been provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it.
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it
pertains to the establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring of
skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health
workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to national priority
programs which the local government is called upon to implement like
the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely
encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording
of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these
services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said
that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
22. CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS vs. COA
One Liner: In order to be able to deliver more effective and efficient
services, the law allows local government units the power to
reorganize. In doing so, they should be given leeway to entice their
employees to avail of severance benefits that the local
government can afford. However, local government units may not
provide such when it amounts to a supplementary retirement benefit
scheme.
Facts:
Then mayor of General Santos City, issued EO no. 40, series of 2008,
creating management teams pursuant to its organization development
program. Then, the city enacted ordinance no. 08, series of 2009,
which was an ordinance establishing the GenSan Scheme on Early
Retirement for Valued Employees Security (GenSan SERVES). It
provides:
Section 5. GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of
GSIS and Pag-Ibig Benefits – Any personnel qualified and
approved to receive the incentives of this program shall be
entitled to whatever retirement benefits the GSIS or Pag-Ibig
is granting to a retiring government employee.
Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive an early
retirement incentive provided under this program at the rate
of 1 and ½ months of the employee’s latest basic salary for
every year of service in the City Government.
Section 6. GenSan SERVES Post-Retirement Incentives –
Upon availment of early retirement, a qualified employee
shall enjoy the following in addition to the above incentives:
a. Cash gift of 50,000.00 for the sickly employees;
b. Lifetime free medical consultation at General Santos
City Hospital;
c. Annual aid in the maximum of 5,000.00 if admitted to
hospital;
d. 14 karat gold ring as token.
Respondent Commission on Audit declared that Ordinance no. 08,
series of 2009, partakes the nature of a supplementary retirement
benefit plan proscribed by Section 28, paragraph (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 186 as amended.
Issue:
Whether COA acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared the entire
ordinance as contrary to the GSIS Act because Section 6 of the said
ordinance is valid.
The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports
petitioner city’s issuance of EO no. 40, series of 2008, creating change
management teams as an initial step for its organization
development masterplan, , and consequently, ordinance no. 08,
series of 2009.
Section 5, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code states that
“any provision on a power of a local government unit shall
be liberally interpreted in its favour, and in case of doubt,
any question thereon shall be resolved in favour of
devolution of power x x x.”
Unfortunately, these allegations of good faith are not enough to
declare the program created by the petitioner city as a reorganization
that justifies the creation of a retirement benefit plan.
Section 28 paragraph b of Commonwealth Act no. 186 (GSIS
Act) – Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers
or employees shall be created by any employer. All
supplementary retirement or pension plans heretofore in
17
 force in any government office, agency or instrumentality or
corporation owned and controlled by the government, are
hereby declared inoperative or abolished: Provided, That the
rights of those who are already eligible to retire thereunder
shall not be affected.
Hence, Section 5 of Ordinance no. 08, series of 2009, refers to an
early retirement incentive, the amount of which is pegged on the
beneficiary’s years of service in the city government. Consequently,
this provision falls under the definition of a retirement benefit.
On the other hand, Section 6 of the ordinance on post-retirement
incentives provides for benefits that are not computed based on
years of service. They are lump sum amounts and healthcare
benefits. It provides for a form of severance pay to those who
availed of GenSan SERVES, which was executed in good faith.
The benefits provided in Section 6 serve its purpose of inducing
petitioner city’s employees, who are unproductive due to health
reasons, to retire early. Furthermore, the benefits under GenSan
SERVE were only given to a select few – the sickly and
unproductive due to health reasons. Certainly, this negates
the position that the benefits provide for supplementary
retirement benefits that augment existing retirement laws.
The proscription under section 28 paragraph (b) of CA no. 186 does
not apply to section 6 of the ordinance. Thus, the cash gift for the
sickly employees, lifetime free medical consultation in petitioner city’s
hospital, and other similar benefits under section 6 of the ordinance is
valid.
23. VILLAFUERTE, JR. VS ROBREDO
Facts:
In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination
and audit on the manner the local government units (LGUs) utilized
their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the calendar years 1993-
1994. The examination yielded an official report, showing that a
substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was
not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to
expenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of R.A.
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC). Thus, on December 14, 1995, the DILG issued MC No. 95-216,
enumerating the policies and guidelines on the utilization of the
development fund component of the IRA. It likewise carried a
reminder to LGUs of the strict mandate to ensure that public funds,
like the 20% development fund, "shall bespent judiciously and only for
the very purpose or purposes for which such funds are intended."
On September 20, 2005, then DILG Secretary Angelo T. Reyes and
Department of Budget and Management Secretary Romulo L. Neri
issued Joint MC No. 1, series of 2005, pertaining to the guidelines on
the appropriation and utilization of the 20% of the IRA for
development projects, which aims to enhance accountability of the
LGUs in undertaking development projects. The said memorandum
circular underscored that the 20% of the IRA intended for
development projects should be utilized for social development,
economic development and environmental management.
On August 31, 2010, the respondent, in his capacity as DILG
Secretary, issued the assailed MC No. 2010-83, entitled "Full Disclosure
of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings," which
aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency
and accountability of LGUs.
On December 2, 2010, the respondent issued MC No. 2010-138,
reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be utilized for
desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes essential to
the attainment of the constitutional objective of a quality oflife for all.
It also listed the enumeration of expenses for which the fund must not
be utilized. Non-compliance with the foregoing shall be dealt with in
accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
On February 21, 2011, Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur,
joined by the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur, filed the instant
petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the assailed issuances of the
respondent for being unconstitutional and having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Does the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local
and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC?
Ruling:
No. The assailed memorandum circulars do not transgress the local
and fiscal autonomy granted to LGUs.
It is the petitioners’ contention that the respondent went beyond the
confines of his supervisory powers, as alter ego of the President, when
he issued MC No. 2010-138. They argue that the mandatory nature of
the circular, with the threat of imposition of sanctions for non-
compliance, evinces a clear desire to exercise control over LGUs.
The Court, however, perceives otherwise.
A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration
of an existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to
remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in
Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA
for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to
examine themselves if they have been complying with the law. It
must be recalled that the assailed circular was issued in
response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of
the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually
utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses
more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the
LGC.
Contrary to the petitioners’ posturing, however, the enumeration
was not meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the
utilization of their funds. It was meant to enlighten LGUs as to
the nature of the development fund by delineating it from
other types of expenses. It was incorporated in the assailed circular
in order to guide them in the proper disposition of the IRA and avert
further misuse of the fund by citing current practices which seemed to
be incompatible with the purpose of the fund. Even then, LGUs remain
at liberty to map out their respective development plans solely on the
basis of their own judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the
only restriction that 20% thereof be expended for development
projects. They may even spend their IRAs for some of the enumerated
items should they partake of indirect costs of undertaking development
projects. In such case, however, the concerned LGU must ascertain
that applicable rules and regulations on budgetary allocation have
been observed lest it be inviting an administrative probe.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
24. LUCENA DEMAALA vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
Pursuant to an ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan, which provides for an additional levy on real property tax for
the special education fund at the rate of 0.5%, the Municipality of
Narra collected from owners of real properties an annual tax at the
rate of 0.5% as special education fund.
However, an Audit Observation by the COA questioned the levy of the
special education fund at the rate of only 0.5% rather than 1%, as
provided in Section 235 of RA 7160. The Regional Cluster Director of
COA then held Demaala, mayor of Narra Municipality, and the
municipal treasurer liable for the deficiency. Demaala filed an MR,
which was denied. Upon appeal, COA still hed Demaala, the municipal
18
treasurer, and the special education fund payors, jointly & severally
liable.
Issue:
Can a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, a city, or a
province may have an additional levy on real property for the special
education fund at the rate of less than 1%?
Ruling:
Yes.
Setting the rate of the additional levy for the special education fund at
less than 1% is within the taxing power of local government units. It
is consistent with the guiding constitutional principle of local
autonomy.
The basis for the taxing power of local government units are provided
under Article X, Section 5 and Article II, Section 25 of the 1987
Constitution. The taxing power granted by constitutional fiat to local
government units exists in the wider context to “ensure the autonomy
of local governments.”
Also, this power must be read in relation to their power to effect their
basic autonomy. Consistent with the 1987 Constitution’s declared
preference, the taxing powers of local government units must be
resolved in favor of their local fiscal autonomy.
In City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes, the Court ruled that:
The power to tax is primarily vested in Congress.
However, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised
by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by
virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant
to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X
of the Constitution.
The important legal effect of Section 5 is that
henceforth, in interpreting statutory provision on
municipal fiscal powers, doubts will have to be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations.
Hence, the limits on the level of additional levy for the special
education fund under Section 235 of the Local Government Code
should be read as granting fiscal flexibility to local government units.
Section 235’s permissive language is unqualified. Moreover, there is
no limiting qualifier to the articulated rate of 1% which unequivocally
indicates that any and all special education fund collections must be at
such rate. At most, there is a seeming ambiguity in Section 235.
Consistent with what has earlier been discussed however, any such
ambiguity must be read in favor of local fiscal autonomy.
25. BENJAMIN P. ABELLA vs COMELEC and ADELINA Y.
LARRAZABAL | G.R. No. 100710
ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL vs COMELEC and SILVESTRE DE LA
CRUZ
Facts:
Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene)
filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal
from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she
misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as
Kananga, Leyte. The position of petitioners De la Cruz and Abella was
that respondent Larrazabal is neither a resident nor a registered voter
of Kananga, Leyte as she claimed, but a resident and registered voter
of Ormoc City, a component city of the province of Leyte, but
independent of the province pursuant to Section 12, Article X of the
Constitution, thereby disqualifying her for the position of governor of
Leyte. Eventually, COMELEC found that petitioner Larrazabal was
neither a resident of Kananga, Leyte nor a registered voter thereat.
With these findings, the COMELEC disqualified the petitioner as
governor of the province of Leyte.
Issues:
1. Does Larrazabal meet the residence requirement to run for
Governor of the Province of Leyte?
2. Does the prohibition against the 'city's registered voters' electing
the provincial officials necessarily mean, a prohibition of the
registered voters to be elected as provincial officials?
Ruling:
1. NO
Sec. 42. Qualification. — (1) An elective local official must
be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years
of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such
in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he
proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one
year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy,
and able to read and write English, Pilipino, or any other
local language or dialect.
Adelina Larrazabal lacks the required residence on the evidence of
record to the effect that despite protestations to the contrary made by
the her, she has established her residence at Ormoc City from 1975 to
the present and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her attempt to purportedly
change her residence one year before the election by registering at
Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to ran for the position of governor of the
province of Leyte clearly shows that she considers herself already a
resident of Ormoc City.
Mere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue
studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient
to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. The
determination of a person’s legal residence or domicile largely depends
upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and
utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or left
his residence or origin must show and prove preponderantly such
abandonment or loss.
In this case, there is no evidence to prove that Larrazabal temporarily
left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in to pursue any calling,
profession or business. What is clear is that she established her
residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a
resident therein. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte
through the years does not signify an intention to continue her
residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places
where we formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and
relatives therein although for intents and purposes we have already
transferred our residence to other places.
Also, the evidence shows that Adelina Larrazabal’s supposed
cancellation of registration in Ormoc City and transfer of registration in
Kananga, Leyte, is not supported by the records. She was not in the
list of voters. The certification of the Election Registrar of Kananga
states that Mrs. Adelina Larrazabal was not a registered voter in any of
the precincts in Kananga.
2. YES
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law,
and component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall
be independent of the province. The voters of
component cities within a province, whose charters
contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of
their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179 creating the City of
Ormoc provides:
Election of provincial governor and members of the
Provincial Board of the members of the Provincial
19
 Board of the Province of Leyte — The qualified voters
of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to
vote in the election of the provincial governor and the
members of the provincial board of the Province of
Leyte.
Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12, Article X of the
Constitution one comes up with the following conclusion: that Ormoc
City when organized was not yet a highly-urbanized city but is,
nevertheless, considered independent of the province of Leyte to
which it is geographically attached because its charter prohibits its
voters from voting for the provincial elective officials.
Larazzabal alternatively argues that if the prohibition to run was
indeed intended, the provision should have been phrased "Shall not be
qualified TO RUN in the election FOR provincial governor." A comma
should have been used after the word qualified and after the word
"vote" to clearly indicate that the phrase "in the election of the
provincial governor" is modified separately and distinctly by the words
"not qualified" and the words "not entitled to vote.
The SC ruled that the conjunction and between the phrase shall not be
qualified and entitled to vote refer to two prohibitions as ruled by the
COMELEC in relation to the demonstrative phrase "in the election of
the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the
Province of Leyte."
26. MMDA vs BEL-AIR VILLAGE
Facts:
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air is a non-stock, non-profit corporation
whose members are homeowners of Bel-Air Village in Makati City. Bel-
Air is the registered owner of the Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air
Village. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received
a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-
Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune
Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to
regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA
law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was
appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. The respondent, to stop the
opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent
claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court
decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of
the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune
Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can
practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Issue:
Is MMDA mandated to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant
to its regulatory and police powers?
Ruling:
No.
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise
police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National
Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government
units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political
government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power
because it cannot be delegated to them.
It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924
does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police
power. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector
for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area.
PART II. CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER,
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF BOUNDARY OF LGUs, AND
ABOLITION
27. TAN vs. COMELEC
Facts:
A new law was passed by congress creating a new province which will
be taken from the northern part of the existing province of Negros
Occidental and is to be called Negros del Norte. The said law provided
that a plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province
which are the areas affected where the people voted in the affirmative.
Now respondents argue the constitutionality of the law and the
plebiscite creating Negros del Norte arguing that the new provinces’
land area is only around 2800 Sq km which is below the required 3500
and that the plebiscite should have included the mother province as it
is part of the areas affected.
The new officers of Negros Oriental on the other hand argue that
when the LGC required a 3,500 territory it did not only mean land area
but also the maritime waters. Thus it meets this requirements. On the
issue on the plebiscite, respondents cite the case of Governor Zosimo
Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President
wherein a new municipality was formed by taking barangays from an
existing one and the plebiscite only included the barangays that
formed the new municipality.
Issues:
Who are referred to as areas affected? And was the plebiscite valid?
What does “territory” include?
Ruling:
Territory refers only to land mass and does not include maritime areas.
Section 197 of the LGC says the "territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this
particular provision of the Local Government Code clearly reflects that
"territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area
and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.
The plebiscite was void as it should have included the mother
province.
The reliance of respondents on the case of Paredes vs Executive
secretary is understandable. However, the ruling should not be taken
as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein
that "it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when certain
Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new
one, all the voters therein are affected."
The very case itself acknowledges that the decision is based merely on
the discretion and opinion of the court. Now this court believes that a
contrary view should now be adopted. Plus the instant case is not on
all four squares with the cited case. The Paredes case only involved
removing barangays, the smallest political unit from a municipality.
The instant case involves removing cities and municipalities from a
province, the largest unit.
Hence, this court now decides that when the Constitution speaks of
"the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the proposed
unit and those of the parent unit.
28. PADILLA vs. COMELEC
Facts:
20
RA 7155 created the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the province of
Camarines Norte, composing of 12 barangays, all located in the
Municipality of Labo of the same province.
Pursuant to this law, and following Section 10, Article 10 of the 1987
Constitution, Comelec issued Resolution No. 2312, setting the date of
the plebiscite in the areas or units affected, namely the barangays
comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the
remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo.
During the plebiscite, only 2,890 voted for the Municipality’s creation,
while 3,439 voted against. As a result, the creation of the Municipality
of Tulay-Na-Lupa was disapproved.
Hon. Roy Padilla, then Governor of Camarines Norte, through a special
civil action of certiorari, sought to set aside the plebiscite conducted
and prayed that a new one be undertaken. It is his contention that the
plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were
invalid and illegal because the plebiscite should have been conducted
only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays
comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. According to him, it
should not have included the remaining areas of the mother unit of the
Municipality of Labo.
Issue:
Is the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother
Municipality of Labo valid?
Ruling:
Yes.
Article 10, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “No province,
city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected."
When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the
political units directly affected," it means that residents of the
political entity who would be economically dislocated by the
separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said
plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase "political
units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which
would participate in the plebiscite.
Logically, in this case, those to be included in such political areas are
the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of
Labo.
The plebiscite conducted was thus valid.
Petition is dismissed.
29. ABBAS vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Abbas challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 6734 or “An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao”. Specifically, the challenged provision is Article 2, Section 1.
It provides that the ARMM “shall be composed of the provinces and
cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for that purpose.”
Petitioner Abbas contends that the tenor of the above provision makes
the creation of the autonomous region absolute, such that even if only
two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would
still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable
votes were obtained. Further, he argues that the law unconditionally
creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, which according to him
violates the constitution since the latter only provides that the creation
of such region shall be dependent upon the outcome of the votes in
the plebiscite taken as a whole.
Issue:
May the ARMM be validly created and be composed only of the
provinces and cities that voted favorably in the plebiscite?
Ruling:
Yes.
Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution, in fact, provides that “the
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by majority of votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
The majority referred to by the Constitution is simply a majority in
each of the constituent units and not a double majority of the
votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the
individual constituent units. This is so because if the framers
intended otherwise, they could have simply adopted the same
phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution –
“majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.”
In this case, Article 2, Section 1 of R.A. 6734 merely followed what the
constitution mandates.
Thus, R.A. 6734 is constitutional.
30. LOPEZ vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay
Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007. A petition
praying for his disqualification on the ground that he is an American
citizen was filed. In his Answer he argued that he is a dual citizen, a
Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003. He returned to the Philippines and resided in
Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to
run for Barangay Chairman. He won the election but Comelec
disqualified him saying that he was not able to regain his Filipino
citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to the poll body,
to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez should have
made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship which he failed to do.
Issue:
Whether Lopez can run for office.
Ruling:
No.
Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections, petitioner argues that his
filing of a certificate of candidacy operated as an effective renunciation
of foreign citizenship.
We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Courts
ruling in Valles are substantially different from the present case. In
Valles, the candidate, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, was a dual citizen by
accident of birth on foreign soil. Lopez was born of Filipino parents in
Australia, a country which follows the principle of jus soli. As a result,
she acquired Australian citizenship by operation of Australian law, but
she was also considered a Filipino citizen under Philippine law. She did
21
not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the
Philippines.
In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought
American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on
became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship. More
importantly, the Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by
the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly
provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino
citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Sec. 5 states
that those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
As what Comelec said, the affiant must state in clear and unequivocal
terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective.
In the instant case, Lopez’s failure to renounce his American
citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the
contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with
the positive mandate of law.
31. ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA
Facts:
Petitioners assail the validity of RA7720 entitled An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City
to be known as the City of Santiago.
Petitioners assert that the certification issued by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance of the Department of Finance which indicates
Santiago’s average annual income of P20M+ for the last two
consecutive years is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue
Allotments were not excluded from the computation. They claim that
that IRAs are not actually income but transfers/ budgetary aid from
the national government and that they fluctuate, increase, or
decrease, depending on factors like population, land, and equal
sharing.
Issue:
Is the IRA included in the computation of the average annual income
of a municipality for the purposes of its conversion into an
independent component city?
Ruling:
Yes, Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of LGUs.
Income is defined in the LGC to be all revenues and receipts collected
or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the LGU.1
According to the SC, IRAs are items of income because they form
part of the gross accretion of the funds of the LGU. The IRAs
regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without
need of any further action on the part of the LGU. They thus constitute
income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the
source of much needed funds.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the LGC provides that the average
annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non- recurring income. To
reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is
there a basis to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since
IRAs have a technical definition and meaning of its own as
used in the LGC that unequivocally makes it distinct from
special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of
funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities
and GOCCs.
1 objective which is the purpose of the law
Section 306 (i), LGC
TN: no number 32 and 33 in the assignments
34. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILS V. COMELEC (2008)
Facts:
The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills
converting 24 other municipalities into cities.The 12th Congress
enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30,
2001 and amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress sought to exempt from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills
were not approved in the 11th Congress.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to
the Senate for approval in order to exempt the 24 municipalities left.
The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the
16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA
9009. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve
of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
We grant the petitions.
FIRST ISSUE
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the
LGC and not into any other laws.
The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because
they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.”
The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly
followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in
determining the “just share” of local government units (LGUs) in
national taxes.
SECOND ISSUE
The Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption
from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted from
the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009."
This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification
standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities
from those that are not exempted.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on
substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government
22

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending
cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have
pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality
from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or
determine the level of income of a municipality.
35. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC
(2009, Motion for Reconsideration)
Facts:
Sixteen (16) cityhood bills which sought to convert sixteen (16)
municipalities into cities were under deliberation by Congress. During
the pendency of these cityhood bills, Congress passed Republic Act No.
9009 which amended the Local Government Code by increasing the
income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from PhP 20
million average annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated
income. Congress then passed all the cityhood bills which contain a
common provision exempting the municipalities covered from the PhP
100 million income requirement.
This had prompted the petitioners to file a case before the Court
seeking to nullify the cityhood laws for being unconstitutional on the
ground that it violates Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and the equal
protection clause.
In a 2008 decision, the Court granted the petition and nullified the
cityhood laws. The affected LGUs then filed a motion for
reconsideration which is now the subject of this case.
Issues:
a) Do the cityhood laws violate Sec. 10. Art. X of the
Constitution?
b) Do the cityhood laws violate the equal protection
clause?
Ruling:
FIRST ISSUE
No, the cityhood laws do not violate Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution.
Art. X, Section 10 of the Constitution provides that, “No province, city,
municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
The only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause
"in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can
impose the criteria. These criteria need not be embodied in the local
government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as
much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after
making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing
layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may
reduce the same.
In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified
income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end
of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the
enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a
particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned.
Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the
already codified indicators.
Thus, the cityhood laws do not violate Sec. 10. Art. X of the
Constitution.
SECOND ISSUE
No, the cityhood laws do not violate the equal protection clause.
As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal
protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations
imposed. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all
members of the same class.
In this case, as things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the
sixteen (16) municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial
distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the
erstwhile PhP 20 million income criterion instead of the stringent
income requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially different
from other municipalities desirous to be cities. Looking back, we note
that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood bills before the passage of
RA 9009. There lies part of the tipping difference. And years before the
enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondents LGUs had already
met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991.
Thus, the cityhood laws do not violate the equal protection clause.
36. LEAGUE OF CITIES vs. COMELEC (2010) – NOT
CONTROLLING!
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration for the decision of the court in the
same case in the year 2009 regarding the constitutionality of the
Cityhood Law which requires that any municipality desiring to become
a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement.
Issue:
Should the constitutionality of the Cityhood Law be upheld?
Ruling:
NO, Cityhood law is unconstitutional as it violates Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution and equal protection clause.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city,
including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot
write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear
intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and
other political units must follow the same uniform, non-
discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government
Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the
Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to
increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for
the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence,
from that moment the Local Government Code required that
any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy
the P100 million income requirements. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.
23
Another point is that, there is no substantial distinction between
municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the
income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income
of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress might even have lower annual income than
municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the
classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of
the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities
from converting into cities.
Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress
limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of
passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen
again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification
must not be limited to existing conditions only. In fact, the
minority concedes that the conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills)
adverted to can no longer be repeated.
37. LEAGUE OF CITIES VS COMELEC
Facts:
The petitioners argue that the 16 cityhood bills violate article 10
section 10 of the constitution. They argue that the exemption clauses
found in every 16 cityhood bills are not found in section 450 of local
government code, and in effect unconstitutional. The exemption
clauses provide for the exception of the 16 municipalities from the 100
million income requirement provided in RA 9009. RA 9009 is an
amendatory law to LGC. It is worthy to recall that these 16
municipalities applied to become component cities before Senate Bill
no. 2157 now RA 9009 was enacted. During the deliberation of RA
9009 Senator Drilon specifically asked the sponsor of RA 9009 whether
the law applies to the 16 municipalities who are the respondents of
this case. Senator Pimentel answered in the negative.
Issue:
Does the 16 cityhood laws violate the constitution?
Ruling:
No, the 16 cityhood laws did not violate the constitution and therefore
not unconstitutional. The cityhood laws accordingly amended the RA
9009. The Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the
exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly
exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No.
9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC
itself. The intent of the congress to exempt the 16 municipalities from
the requirements of RA 9009 is clearly shown by the exchanges of
Senators Drilon and Pimentel.
38. LEAGUE OF CITIES vs. COMELEC (April 2011)
Facts:
This is an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners
on the Feb 15, 2011 Resolution declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws
constitutional.
Issues:
1. WON Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of
Article X of the Constitution,
2. WON Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause, and
3. WON Cityhood Laws violate the right of local governments to
a just share in the national taxes.
Ruling:
1. No. Congress clearly intended that the local government units
covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of
R.A. No. 9009.
Xxx The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the
exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws
are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent
to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the
coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by
necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of
the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption
clauses.
2. No. xxx the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws
belong to a class of their own. They have proven themselves
viable and capable to become component cities of their
respective provinces. They are and have been centers of trade
and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich
havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and
flourishing tourism spots.
3. No. The share of local government units is a matter of percentage
under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount.
We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities
covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending
during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the
requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No.
9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that
justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by
stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative
intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of
Congress.
WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the
Decision dated 15 February 2011) is denied with finality.
1) PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GRP
Facts: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
MILF, through the chairperson of their respective peace negotiating
panels were scheduled to sign a memorandum of agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement of Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This MOA-AD is the result of peace negotiations between the
Government of the Philippines and the MILF. This is in the hopes of
finally stopping the conflict. The MOA-AD talks about the birthright of
all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines the
Bangsamoro people as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao
and its adjacent islands including Palawan and Sulu archipelago at the
time of conquest or colonisation, and their descents whether mixed or
of full blood, including their spouses.
Then, it also describes the Bangsamoro homeland. The core of the BJE
is defined as the present geographical area of the ARMM: Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. It also
includes, municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in
the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. Outside its core, it also covers other
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays which are grouped into
two categories: A and B.
It is stipulated in this MOA-AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over
all natural resources within its internal waters. It also states that it is
free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with
foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade mission
in those countries. As to its external defense, it remains the duty and
obligation of the Central Government. The Central Government is also
bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in
international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the
specialized agencies of the UN. It also has an associative relationship
24
between the Central Government with the Government, characterised
by shared authority and responsibility.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the
existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid
amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in
the Comprehensive Compact. The controversy hangs on the legality of
this provision.
10th round of exploratory talks between the GRP and the MILF ended
in Feb 7, 2006. A joint statement on the Memorandum of Agreement
on Ancestral Domain was signed by the Chairperson of the peace panel
and by Mohagher Iqbal on behalf of the MILF Panel in 2008. In the
Joint Statement, it was declared that the final draft of the MOA-AD has
already been initialed. It was announced that "both sides reached a
consensus to initial the final draft pending its official signing by the
Chairmen of the two peace panels in early August 2008, in Putrajaya,
Malaysia."
The Joint Statement triggered the filing of the petitions at bar. These
Petitions, sought among others, to restrain the signing of the MOA-AD.
The Province of North Cotabato and its Vice-Governor filed a petition
for Mandamus and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of writ of
Preliminary Injunction and TRO. Invoking the right to information on
matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-
AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the
MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and
the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
The City of Zamboanga, represented by its Mayor and two
representatives pray for similar injunctive reliefs, praying that the City
of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD
be declared null and void.
The City of Iligan filed for injunction and/or declaratory relief, praying
that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same
had already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
The Procaine of Zamboanga del Norte, represented by its Governor,
Vice Governor, representatives ad the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed a petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition, praying inter alia, that the MOA-AD be
declared null and void and without operative effect, and that
respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
There were also individuals who filed a petition for prohibition, like
Maceda, Jejomar Binary, And Aquilino Pimentel III, as well as
intervenors which includes Senator Manual A. Roxas, Franklin Drilon,
Atty. Adel Tamano, the city of Isabel represented by its Mayor, etc.
In the course of the case, it was found that the PAPP failed to carry
out consultations. The MOA-AD was agreed upon furtively. In this
respect, the respondents invoked the doctrine of executive privilege.
Issue:
Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated
and later initialed the MOA-AD?
Held:
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern,
involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct
public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is
manifestly provided by E.O No. 3. The perambulatory clause of EO
No. 3 declared that there is a need to further enhance the contribution
of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalising
the people’s participation.
E.O No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to
effectuate continuing consultations, contrary to respondents position
that plebiscite is more than just sufficient consultation. The said law
establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace
agenda as a corollary to the constitutional right to information
and disclosure.
PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out
the pertinent consultation.
As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it
is not tenable under the premises. The argument defies sound reason
when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing
consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The
executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's
right even before the GRP makes its official recommendations or
before the government proffers its definite propositions.
Petitioners assert that the LGC of 1991 declares it a state policy to
"require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, non-
governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors
of the community before any project or program is implemented in
their respective jurisdictions" is well-taken. The LGC chapter on
intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy:
“Prior Consultations Required. “ No project or program shall be
implemented by government authorities unless the consultations
mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That
occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall
not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided,
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro
people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora
or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
2) MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999
FACTS: On May 5, 1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the
municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city.
On July 4th,1994, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of
Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it
amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of
provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago
in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that
the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an
independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not
involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units,” therefore, a
plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to
provide that the conversion of the city of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city should be submitted
to its people in a proper plebiscite.
RULING: We hold that the Constitution requires a plebiscite.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
25
 altered except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of
the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter
boundaries of local government units belongs to Congress. The
resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading
falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional
provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve
a common denominator - - - material change in the political and
economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well
as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the
Constitution requires the approval of the people in the political units
directly affected. The changes that will result from the
downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be
characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the
city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed
under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The
resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to
be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be
collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province.
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of
Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it
required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the
purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should
not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when
R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is
more reason to consult the people when a law substantially
diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is
in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of
LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or
LGUs affected.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in
character, so long as they result in a material change in the local
government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political
and economic rights of its people.
3) AURELIO UMALI vs COMELEC, JULIUS VERGARA, and the
CITY GOV’T OF CABANATUAN
Topic: Creation and/or Conversion; Plebiscite Requirement
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed a
resolution requesting the President to declare the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija
into a highly-urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the
President issued Presidential Proclamation 418, proclaiming the City of
Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to “ratification in a plebiscite by the
qualified voters therein”, as provided for in Sec. 453 of the LGC. Acting
on the proclamation, COMELEC issued the assailed resolution, for
purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of the Cabanatuan City
from component city to HUC, only those registered residents of
Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.
Petitioner Aurelio Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a verified
Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion
in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of
Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Sec. 453 of the LGC should be
interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. 10 of the Constitution. The
phrase “qualified voters therein” used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should
then be interepreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly
affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city
proposed to be upgraded. Private respondent Julius Vergara, city
mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that
Sec. 10, Art. 10 of the Constitution does not apply to conversions. He
argues that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as couched,
allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the
plebiscite.
COMELEC ruled against petitioner maintaining that Cabanatuan City is
merely being converted from a component city into an HUC and that
the political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the
city itself. It argues that no political unit will be created, merged with
another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that no boundaries
will be altered. Thus, the participation of the voters of the entire
province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.
ISSUE: May the qualified registered voters of the entire province of
Nueva Ecija participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC?
RULING: Yes. Registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija
may participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.
Sec. 10, Art. 10 of the Constitution should be the basis for determining
the qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite. Sec. 10, Art.
10 reads: “No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”
In identifying the LGU/s that should be allowed to take part in the
plebiscite , what should primarily be determined is whether or not the
unit/s that desire to participate will be “directly affected” by the
change. In Tan vs COMELEC, it has already been settled that LGUs
whose boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be
affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite.
Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to
Cabanatuan City if it is converted into an HUC. This includes the right
to be outside the general supervision of the province. The provincial
government stands to lose the power to ensure that the local
government officials of Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its
prescribed powers and functions, among others. Likewise, registered
voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for provincial
officials. The city will be separated from the territorial jurisdiction of
the province. The provincial government will no longer be responsible
for delivering basic services for the city residents’ benefit. Ordinances
and resolutions passed by the provincial council will no longer cover
the city.
In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the
province of Nueva Ecija and its residents, the entire province certainly
stands to be “directly affected” by the conversion of Cabanatuan City
into an HUC. Hence, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija
should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that
purpose.
4) JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
FACTS: Petitioners Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with
the residents of Taguig suing as Taxpayers, assail Section 2 of RA
7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City to be Known as the city of Makati”) as unconstitutional
on the ground that it did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds with technical
26
descriptions, in violation of Sec. 10, Article X of the 1987 consti in
relation to Secs. 7 and 450 of the LGC.
And they contended that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment cannot made by a
special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in
the title of the bill and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990
census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
ISSUES:
1. Is the Petitioners correct in arguing that RA 7854 did not
actually identify the metes and bounds as it would amount a
violation mandated by law
2. Is the Petitioners correct in arguing that an addition of
another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the
reapportionment cannot be made by a special law
RULING:
1. No. The Supreme ruled that, Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati (without metes and bounds) will
cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did
not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land
area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer,
section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise
the present territory of the municipality.
To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no
cadastral type of description was used in the law would
serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then
becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of
the other way around. This could not be the intendment of
the law.
The requirement that the territory of newly-created LGU’s be
identified by metes and bounds is intended to provide the
means by which the area of the LGU may be
reasonably ascertained, i.e., as a tool in the
establishment of the Local Government Unit. As long as the
territorial jurisdiction of the newly created city may be
reasonably ascertained – by referring to common
boundaries with neighboring municipalities – then, the
legislative intent has been sufficiently served. [Note: RA
7854, which converted Makati into a city, did not define the
boundaries of the new city by metes and bounds, because of
a territorial dispute between Makati and Taguig, which was
best left for the courts to decide.]
2. These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case
of Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through
a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unless otherwise fixed by law.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section
provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati
as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since
it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000).
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that
the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati
should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In
the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the
policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one
title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be
sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a
law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely
catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to such general
subject."
5) BENIGNO C AQUINO III vs. COMELEC
FACTS: The petitioners as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek
the nullification of Republic Act No. 9176 entitled “An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment”. The
said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law
by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
Due to this, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the
province. Hence, 5 first district municipalities were combined with two
second district Municipalities to form a new second legislative district.
This resulted to the proposed first district ending up with a population
of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act
No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of
a legislative district. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that
if population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be
stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum population
requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing?
2. Whether or not the contention of the petitioners is tenable?
RULING:
1. Yes. This Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v.
Guingona,Tatad v. Executive Secretary,Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, just to
name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party
seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to
craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive
Secretary, this Court held that in cases of transcendental
importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely,
and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal
stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v.
Gonzales
In the case at bar, given the weight of the issue raised in the
instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The beaten
path must be taken. Hence, They have a legal standing
2. NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
constitution states that: “ Each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.”.The use by the subject provision of a comma
to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point
to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population
is only required for a city, but not for a province.
The Court further held based upon the Mariano case that while
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have
a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by
another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. The Court
held that if an additional legislative district created within a city is
not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order
to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional
27
 district in a province, considering moreover that a province is
entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.
Furthermore, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income,
as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant
prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable
requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement
In the case at bar , the court does not say that in the
reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of
Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting
additional district should not be considered. The Court ruled that
population is not the only factor but is just one of several other
factors in the composition of the additional district. Such
settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and
the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the
Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this
petition.
Hence, the contention of the petitioners is untenable
6) MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ VS. BAZ, JR.
DECEMBER 2, 1996
FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order
No. 258 of then President Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The claim was filed with the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of
Jimenez. In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding
that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban,
nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had
with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement was approved by
the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77,
dated February 18, 1950, which fixed the common boundary of
Sinacaban.
Petitioner questioned the legal existence of Sinacaban that it was not
validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v.
Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is
essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without
power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban.
ISSUE: May the Municipality of Sinacaban legally exist even if it was
created by an Executive Order by the President and not by Congress?
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court said, Sinacaban had been in
existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was
decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258
creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40
years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had
laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This
fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of
Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its
charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act
complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and
even the municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacabans
corporate existence. Under Administrative order no. 33 dated June 13,
1978 of this Court, as reiterated by 31 of the judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of municipal
circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized
Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding
their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution
no. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.
Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative
districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of
the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover following the
ruling in Municipality of san Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured
any defect in the creation of Sinacaban.
7) MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO QUEZON VS. HON.
ANTONIO V. MENDEZ SR.,
FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued,
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres,
Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the
same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban,
Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios. By virtue
of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by
President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres
was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class
municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1515.
On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition
for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, in Gumaca,
Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres.
Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the
petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a
presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the
legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation
of powers.
Respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way
of affirmative and special 28efences, that since it was at the instance
of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San Andres was given
life with the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner
municipality) should be deemed estopped from questioning the
creation of the new municipality; 5 that because the Municipality of San
Andred had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality
could no longer be assailed; and that, considering the petition to be
one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party
to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting
through the Solicitor General.
ISSUE: Should the San Narciso be considered as a municipality
considering that in the case Pelaez v. Auditor General, the Supreme
Court ruled that E.O. No. 353, creating San Narciso as a municipal
district, was considered as unconstitutional?
RULING: Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity
for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power, the Municipality of San Andres have at least attained a status
that of a de facto municipal corporation. Certain governmental acts all
pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the
Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a
municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality
of San Andres as a fifth class municipality and the Municipality of San
Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San
Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
Under the Ordinance apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to
be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of
the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the
Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have
their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities."
8) THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, acting through
its Sanguniang Bayan and Mayor vs.
28
 COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA,
BOHOL
FACTS: The municipality of Candijay petitioned the RTC of Tagbilaran,
Bohol, claiming that its boundary line actually covered barrio Pagahat,
since the municipality of Alicia claims to ha ve curr ent
terr itor ial jur isdic tion over said ba rrio. The lower court's
decision, among other things, declared "barrio/barangay Pagahat as
within the territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay,
Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part and parcel of its territory,
therefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality", and further
permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia "to respect
plaintiff's control, possession and political supervision of barangay
Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and
ownership over the same barrio".
On appeal, the respondent Court lead to the conclusion that the trial
court committed an error. It further rejected the boundary line being
claimed by petitioner based on certain exhibits, since it would not only
engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but also eat up a big chunk of
territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law
creating her. The respondent Court, after weighing and considering
the import of certain official acts, including Executive Order No. 265
which created the municipality of Alicia from out of certain barrios of
the municipality of Mabini, and Act No. 968 of the Philippine
Commission which set forth the respective component territories of the
municipalities of Mabini and Candijay, concluded that "Barrio Bulawan
from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the
barrios constituted as part of defendant-appellant Municipality of Alicia.
Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of plaintiff-
appellant Municipality of Candijay."
Thus, applying the rule of equiponderance of evidence with Candijay
as plaintiff and Alicia as defendant in the lower court, the court must
rule in favor of the defendant. The equiponderance of evidence rule
states:“Where the scale shall stand upon equipoise and there is
nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other,
the court will find for the defendant. Under said principle, the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of
defendant’s claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger
than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on
his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of
action.”
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent municipality of Alicia lacked
juridical personality because the Exec. Order No. 265 issued by
President Quirino creating respondent municipality is null and void ab
initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on
which said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue
delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and
was therefore declared unconstitutional, per this Court's ruling
in Pelaez vs. Auditor General.
RULING: The ruling of this Court in Municipality of San Narciso,
Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr. is applicable, therein it was stated that;
"Petitioner's theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case
been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the
municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it
was only after almost thirty (30) years, that the municipality of San
Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order.
In the meantime, the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of
San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority
of a duly created local government unit. Granting that Executive Order
No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar
circumstances obtaining hardly could offer a choice other than to
consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a
status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact
attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Equally significant is
Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that
municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." The
power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature.
Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving
"validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws,
as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in
this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment
of vested rights.
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in
the province of Quezon must now be conceded."
Respondent municipality's situation in the instant case is strikingly
similar to that of the municipality of San Andres. Respondent
municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265
in 1949, or ten years ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and
therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez
vs. Auditor General was promulgated. Various governmental acts
throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and
acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under
Administrative Order No. 33, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by
the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of
Bohol. Also, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the
Third District of Bohol.
Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as
the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the
effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should
henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.
9) NAVARRO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
(2010)
Topic: Specific Requirements in the Creation and Conversion
of a Province
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking to nullify Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, otherwise known
as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being
unconstitutional.
The main province of Surigao del Norte which was created and
established under R.A. No. 2786 is composed of three main groups of
islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and
Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island. Based on the official 2000
Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National Statistics
Office (NSO), the population of the Province of Surigao del Norte as of
May 1, 2000 was 481,416, broken down as follows: Mainland-281,111,
Surigao City-118,534, Siargao Island & Bucas Grande- 93,354, Dinagat
Island-106,951.
Under the Local Government Code, a province may be created if it has
an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991
constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a
population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the
NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average
annual income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for
calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices
was P82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed province is 802.12
square kilometers.
The Office of the President, advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the Province of Surigao del Norte of the deficient population in the
proposed Province of Dinagat Islands.
The Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special
census, with the assistance of an NSO District Census Coordinator, in
the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual population in support of the
house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. The special census
29
yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants. The NSO, however,
did not certify the result of the special census.
Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively,
passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was
approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006
by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
On Dec. 2006, the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
that the creation of Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct
province was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite.
Petitioners questioned the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands
on the following grounds:
1. There was non-compliance with the population requirement or the
land area prescribed by the Local Government Code. Although a
special census was conducted, there was no NSO certification.
2. The plebiscite conducted was not credible.
Respondents contended that there was compliance with the population
requirement because the special census conducted yielded a
population count of 371,576 inhabitants. They added that the census
is credible since it was conducted with the aid of a representative of
the NSO. It was further alleged that the lack of certification by the
NSO was cured by the presence of NSO officials, who testified during
the deliberations on House Bill No. 884 creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands, and who questioned neither the conduct of the special
census nor the validity of the result.
As to the land area requirement, respondents argued that the Lands
Management Bureau certified that though the land area of the
Province of Dinagat Islands is 802.12 square kilometers, it is composed
of one or more islands; thus, it is exempt from the required land area
of 2,000 square kilometers under paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code which
states that: “the land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands”.
ISSUES:
1. Has R.A. 9355 creating the new province of Dinagat Islands
complied with the constitutional and statutory requirements under
Sec. 461 of R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991?
2. Was the plebiscite conducted credible?
RULING:
1. No. Although the income requirement has been complied with,
the respondents failed to comply with the land area nor the
population requirement. With regard to their contention that the
exception on the land area requirement applies to them, the
Supreme Court, citing Tan vs. COMELEC held that the provision in
Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that "the land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands" is null and void. The IRR went beyond the
criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code
when it added the italicized portion above stating that "the land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands." Nowhere in the Local
Government Code is the said provision stated or implied. Under
Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the only instance
when the territorial or land area requirement need not be
complied with is when there is already compliance with the
population requirement. The Constitution requires that the criteria
for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such
criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. There
is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law
and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the
basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
The contention that the presence of the NSO representative and
his failure to question the results of the special census cured the
lack of NSO certification is without merit. Although the NSO
representative to the Committee on Local Government
deliberations dated November 24, 2005 did not object to the
result of the provincial government’s special census, which was
conducted with the assistance of an NSO district census
coordinator, it was agreed by the participants that the said result
was not certified by the NSO, which is the requirement of the
Local Government Code. These are based on the pertinent
portion of the deliberation on House Bill No. 884. Moreover, the
NSO representative, Statistician II Ma. Solita C. Vergara, stated
that based on their computation, the population requirement of
250,000 inhabitants would be attained by the Province of Dinagat
Islands by the year 2065. The computation was based on the
growth rate of the population, excluding migration.
2. Petitioners alleged that R.A. No. 9355 was ratified by a doubtful
mandate in a plebiscite held on December 2, 2005, where the
"yes votes" were 69,9343, while the "no votes" were 63,502.
They contend that the 100% turnout of voters in the precincts of
San Jose, Basilisa, Dinagat, Cagdianao and Libjo was contrary to
human experience, and that the results were statistically
improbable. Petitioners admit that they did not file any electoral
protest questioning the results of the plebiscite, because they
lacked the means to finance an expensive and protracted election
case.
The SC ruled that allegations of fraud and irregularities in the
conduct of a plebiscite are factual in nature; hence, they cannot
be the subject of this special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which is a remedy designed only for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners
should have filed the proper action with the Commission on
Elections. However, petitioners admittedly chose not to avail
themselves of the correct remedy.
10) NAVARRO VS. ERMITA
GR NO. 180050; APRIL 12, 2011
FACTS: On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved
into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands) with a population of 106,951, land area of 802.12 sq.
km. and an income of 82.69 yearly. On December 3, 2006, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory
plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the
Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943
affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With
the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao
del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President
appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of
office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14,
2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of
provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
On February 10, 2010, RA 9355 was declared unconstitutional for
failure to meet the minimum land area requirements. The said decision
had then become final and executory on May 18, 2010. COMELEC
Resolution 8790 declared that if the decision on the 2010 case was
declared final and executory, the Dinagat Islands would revert to its
former status as a non-province. Consequently, the results of the May
2010 elections would have to be nullified, and a special election would
have to be conducted for various positions like the Governor, Vice-
Governor, etc. for Surigao del Norte.
Hence the intervenors became real parties in interest with the
declaration finality of the 2010 case decision. Cong. Matugas etal had
petitioned to intervene before, but were declared to have no standing
since at that time, they were still candidates in the May 2010 elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not a territory composed of two or more islands is
exempt from the minimum land area requirement set forth in the Local
Government Code.
RULING: Yes, a territory composed of more than one island is exempt
from the minimum land area requirement.
30
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both
executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to
implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress
understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately
translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress,
recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-
fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from
the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of
provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-
IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress
breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355
creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and
favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both
Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to
incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area
requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it
consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-
IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the
enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of
viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that
Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average
annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as
certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four
times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the
creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents
has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the
results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait
accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats
existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that
Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.
11) MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 209185; October 25, 2013
Power of COMELEC to Postpone date of plebiscite (and of
elections)
FACTS: Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative
district of Davao del Sur, filed with Hon. Bautista, representative of the
2nd legislative district of the same province, House Bill No. 4451, a bill
creating the province of Davao Occidental. It was do signed into law as
Rep. Act No. 10360, the Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental.
Section 46 of said law, provides for the date of the holding of a
plebiscite. Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall
be created, as provided for in this Charter, upon approval by the
majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in
a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within sixty days from the date of the effectivity
of this Charter.
The House of Representatives passed R.A. No. 10360 on 28 November
2012, and by the Senate on 5 December 2012. President Benigno S.
Aquino III approved R.A. No. 10360 on 14 January 2013. R.A. No.
10360 was published in the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin only
on 21 January 2013. Considering that R.A. No. 10360 shall take effect
15 days after its publication in at least two newspapers of general and
local circulation, COMELEC, therefore, only had until 6 April 2013 to
conduct the plebiscite
As early as 27 November 1012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No.
10364, the COMELEC suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a
matter of policy and in view of the preparations for the May 2013
National and Local Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013,
the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao
Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 barangay
Elections to save on expenses.
Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is
without authority to amend or modify section 36 of R.A. 10360 by
mere resolution because it is only Congress who can do so thus,
COMELEC’s act of suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Did the COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the plebiscite for the creation of
the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October 2013, simultaneous
with the Barangay Elections?
RULING: NO. The COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes
the power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by
law.
The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province.
Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the Constitution provide that:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan
political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10
hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic
autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and
legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority
that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution emphasizes the
direct exercise by the people of their sovereignty. After the legislative
branch’s enactment of a law to create, divide, merge or alter the
boundaries of a local government unit or units, the people in the local
government unit or units directly affected vote in a plebiscite to
register their approval or disapproval of the change.
The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites
should be held. This is in contrast with its provisions for the election
of members of the legislature in Section 8, Article VI and of the
President and Vice-President in Section 4, Article VII. The Constitution
recognizes that the power to fix the date of elections is legislative in
nature, which is shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned
Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local government
officials.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 7160 furnishes the general rule as to
when a plebiscite may be held:
Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. – No creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from
the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action,
unless said law or ordinance fixed another date.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360, however, specifically provides
that the plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao
Occidental be held within 60 days from the effectivity of R.A. No.
10360, or until 6 April 2013. Cagas claims that R.A. No. 10360 "did
not confer express or implied power to COMELEC to exercise discretion
when the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao
Occidental will be held. On the contrary, said law provides a specific
period when the COMELEC should conduct a plebiscite. Cagas views
the period "60 days from the effectivity" in R.A. No. 10360 as
absolute and mandatory; thus, COMELEC has no legal basis to hold
a plebiscite on 28 October 2013.
Even if the statute fixes the date of the plebiscite (for the
creation of a LGU), the COMELEC has "exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly
and honest elections.” The text and intent of Section 2 (1) of
Article IX (C) is to give COMELEC "all the necessary and
31
incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.” (copied
from DBL Pre-Bar Notes)
Sections 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881) the
Omnibus Election Code, provide the COMELEC the power to set
elections to another date.
Sec. 5. Postponement of election.- When for any serious cause such as
violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio
or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due
notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date
which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of
election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall,
on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and
effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5 February 2013, coupled with the
subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13 May
2013 as mandated by the Constitution, rendered impossible the
holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao
Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360.
The logistic and financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite
so close to the National and Local Elections is unforeseen and
unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and
administrative mishaps covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881.
The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave abuse of
discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the creation
of the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to synchronize
it with the Barangay Elections.
More importantly, it bears stressing that the COMELEC was not given
a special budget to defray the cost of the plebiscite. In fact, the
COMELEC had to take P11 million from its savings and from the
Barangay Elections budget to finance the plebiscite to ratify R.A. No.
10360 on October 28, 2013.
The COMELEC’s questioned Resolution then directing the holding of
the plebiscite for the ratification of R.A. No. 10360 simultaneously with
the Barangay Elections was not an abuse of its discretion, as
alleged, but simply an exercise of prudence, because as the
COMELEC itself noted, doing so "will entail less expense than holding it
separately."
The determination of the feasibility of holding a plebiscite on a
given date is within the competence and discretion of the COMELEC.
Petitioner cannot therefore simply insist that the COMELEC should
have complied with the period specified in the law when doing so
would be virtually impossible under the circumstances.
12) MUN. OF SANTA FE VS. MUN. OF ARITAO
TOPIC: Substantial Alteration of Boundary Disputes
FACTS: On October 16, 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in the
Province of Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, for the Determination of Boundary Dispute involving the
barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. As the parties failed to amicably
settle during the pre-trial stage, trial on the merits ensued.
The court ordered the suspension of the proceedings and the referral
of the case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. In
turn, the Sanggunian passed on the matter to its Committee on Legal
Affairs, Ordinances and Resolutions, which recommended adopting
Resolution No. 64 its Provincial Board, previously resolved to
adjudicate the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan as parts of
Aritao's territorial jurisdiction and enjoin Santa Fe from exercising its
governmental functions within the same. Subsequently, as per
Resolution No. 357, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved the
Committees recommendation but endorsed the boundary dispute to
the RTC for further proceedings and preservation of the status quo
pending finality of the case.
Back in the RTC, Aritao moved to consider Resolution No. 64 as final
and executory. The trial court, however, resolved to deny the motion
ruling that since there was no amicable settlement reached at the time
the Provincial Board had exceeded its authority in issuing a decision
favoring a party.
Aritao filed a motion praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction on the ground that the prevailing law at the time of the
filing of the motion, the power to try and decide municipal boundary
disputes already belonged to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and no
longer with the trial court. The case was dismissed.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Does the RTC have jurisdiction to hear and decide a case
regarding boundary disputes?
RULING: No. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan has been the primary
tribunal responsible in the amicable settlement of boundary disputes
between or among two or more municipalities located in the same
province. In the event the Sanggunian fails to effect a settlement, it
shall not only issue a certification to that effect but must also formally
hear and decide the case within the reglementary period.
Sections 118 and 119 of the Local Government Code:
SEC. 118. Jurisdictional
Responsibility for Settlement of
Boundary Dispute. Boundary
disputes between and among
local government units shall, as much as
possible, be settled amicably. To
this end:
xxx
(b) Boundary disputes involving
two (2) or more municipalities within the
same province shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned.
xxx
(e) In the event the sanggunian
fails to effect an amicable settlement
within sixty (60) days from the date
the dispute was referred thereto, it shall
issue a certification to that effect.
Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally
tried by the sanggunian concerned
which shall decide the issue
within sixty (60) days from the date of
the certification referred to above.
SEC. 119. Appeal. Within the
time and manner prescribed by the
32
 Rules of Court, any party may
elevate the decision of the sanggunian
concerned to the proper Regional
Trial Court having jurisdiction
over the area in dispute. The Regional
Trial Court shall decide the appeal
within one (1) year from the filing
thereof. Pending final resolution of
the disputed area prior to the
dispute shall be maintained and
continued for all legal purposes.
Aside from having the function of bringing the contending parties
together and intervening or assisting in the amicable settlement of the
case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now specifically vested with
original jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the dispute in
accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its
implementing rules and regulations. Only in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal,
should any party aggrieved by the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan elevate the same.
13) PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE V. CALABOCAL
G.R. NO. 209146
JUNE 08, 2016
FACTS: Dolores Bago, then Mayor of the Municipality of Bulalacao,
Oriental Mindoro, agreed to lend the administration of Liwagao Island
to Oscar Lim, then Mayor of the Municipality of Caluya, Antique. The
agreement was made orally and without executing any formal
documents to this effect. The condition attached to the agreement was
that the island would be returned upon termination of either party's
terms in office. The terms of both mayors ended. Mayor Lim allegedly
returned Liwagao Island to the Municipality of Bulalacao. However, the
Municipality of Caluya continued to exercise administration over the
island.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution
No. 1454-2012 entitled Resolution Calling for the Conduct of a Joint
Session between the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Oriental Mindoro and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Antique for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Claim over the Island of
Liwagao. The Vice Governor of Antique wrote the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro of her willingness to conduct a joint
session to settle the boundary dispute. However, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Antique issued Resolution No. 142-2012 informing
Oriental Mindoro that it was not amenable to any form of settlement
over the jurisdiction of Liwagao Island and asserted that the same
rightfully belongs to their province. Thereafter, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro issued a resolution directing the
Provincial Legal Office to file the necessary legal action to claim
Liwagao Island.
In their Answer before the RTC, petitioners set up the defense of lack
of jurisdiction of the RTC. They argued that "under Section 118,
paragraph (c) of the Local Government Code, jurisdiction over
boundary disputes between municipalities of different provinces is
vested on the Sangguniang Panlalawigans of the provinces involved."
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the respondents'
petition for recovery of property and declaration of territorial and
political jurisdiction/dominion over Liwagao Island.
RULING: Yes. RTC has jurisdiction over the dispute. However, the
RTC's ruling that the case does not involve a boundary dispute is
incorrect.
A boundary dispute involving different local government units is
defined in the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Local
Government Code. Specifically, Rule III, Article 15 states that, there is
a boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area
of an LGU is claimed by two or more LGUs. Boundary disputes
between or among LGUs shall, as much as possible, be settled
amicably.
Having established that the case involves a boundary dispute, the
procedure to resolve the same is that established under the Local
Government Code. Under the said law, boundary disputes involving
municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly
referred for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
It is only upon the failure of these intermediary steps will resort to the
RTC follow, as specifically provided in Section 119 of the Local
Government Code.
Respondents' resort to filing a case before the RTC was warranted
under the circumstances of this case.
It must be emphasized that respondents followed the procedure laid
down in the Local Government Code. They took all the necessary steps
to settle the dispute within the procedure set out in the law. However,
petitioners failed to perform their concomitant responsibility under the
same law, leaving respondents with no other recourse but to bring the
matter to court. Petitioners cannot demand that respondents now
follow the procedure when they themselves have made it impossible
for any party to follow the same. The Province of Antique's Resolution
No. 142-2012, stating that the Province of Antique was not amenable
to any form of settlement, effectively blocked any way to continue
following the steps in the IRR.
As such, respondents' petition before the RTC must be upheld.
14) CITY OF PARANAQUE VS. KATIPUNAN NG MGA
MAMAMAYAN
SEPTEMBER 7 2016
(Case cannot be found yet over the net)
15) BRGY. MAYAMOT VS. ANTIPOLO CITY
FACTS: In 1984, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 787 to 794 were
passed creating eight (8) new barangays in the then Municipality of
Antipolo. Each law creating the new barangay contained provisions
regarding the sitios comprising it, its boundaries, and mechanism for
ratification of the law. Antipolo became composed of sixteen (16)
barangays.
In order to integrate the territorial jurisdiction of the sixteen (16)
barangays into the map of Antipolo, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Antipolo passed Resolution No. 97-80, commissioning the City Assessor
to plot and delineate the territorial boundaries of the sixteen (16)
barangays pursuant to the Bureau of Lands Cadastral Survey No. 29-
047 and the provisions of BP Blg. 787 to794.
On October 25, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed
Resolution No. 97-89, "Defining the Territorial Boundaries of the Eight
(8) Newly Created Barangays and the Eight (8) Former Existing
Barangays of the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal" stating that the
Bureau of Lands Cadastral Survey No. 29-047 has defined the
boundaries of the eight (8) formerly existing and has continued to
exist. Furthermore it states that it is just and proper to identify and
delineate barangay territorial boundaries in [accordance] with the
Cadastral Survey for Old Barangays and the laws creating the new
barangays as prepared and plotted by the Assessor's Office.
Barangay Mayamot filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity and/or
Annulment of Resolution No. 97-89 and Injunction before the RTC of
Antipolo City stating that while BP Blg. 787 to 794 did not require
Barangay Mayamot to part with any of its territory, the adoption of
Resolution No. 97-89 reduced its territory to one-half of its original
area and was apportioned to Barangays Sta. Cruz, Bagong Nayon,
Cupang, and Mambugan. It also claimed that the City Assessor's
preparation of the plan and the Sangguniang Panglungsod's adoption
of Resolution No. 97-89 were not preceded by any consultation nor
any public hearing. Moreover, Barangay Mayamot further alleged that
Resolution No. 97-89 violated Section 82 of BP Blg. 337 or the Local
Government Code of 1983, the law in force at the time, which
provided that alteration, modification and definition of barangay
boundaries shall be by ordinance and confirmed by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
33

ISSUE: Is Brgy. Mayamot entitled a portion of the territory of
Barangays Bagong Nayon, Sta. Cruz, Cupang and Mambugan?
RULING: The petition has no merit.
Resolution of a boundary dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
At the time Barangay Mayamot filed its petition before the RTC of
Antipolo City, RA No. 7160 was already in effect. Based on the
foregoing, it is clear that the RTC is without jurisdiction to settle a
boundary dispute involving barangays in the same city or municipality.
Said dispute shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panglungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned. If there is failure of
amicable settlement, the dispute shall be formally tried by
the sanggunian concerned and shall decide the same within sixty (60)
days from the date of the certification referred to. Further, the decision
of the sanggunian may be appealed to the RTC having jurisdiction over
the area in dispute, within the time and manner prescribed by the
Rules of Court. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense
may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final
judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is
conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to
themselves determine or conveniently set aside.
16) ABBAS V COMELEC
G.R. NO. 89651 NOVEMBER 10, 1989
FACTS: The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in 13
provinces and 9 cities in Mindanao and Palawan, in implementation of
RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the ARMM",
a law passed pursuant to a constitutional mandate enshrined in the
constitution, Article X section 15.
These petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from
conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and
Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose;
and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional.
The arguments against R.A. 6734 are:
a. That R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution,
primarily on the contention that it unconditionally creates an
autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the
aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the
autonomous region which make the creation of such region
dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite. In support of
his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A.
No. 6734 which declares that "[t]here is hereby created the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of
provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called
for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution." Petitioner contends that the tenor of the
above provision makes the creation of an autonomous
region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in
favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be
created composed of the two provinces where the favorable
votes were obtained.
b. That certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the
Tripoli Agreement, the tripoli agreement is the one between
Republic and MNLF and islamic conference.
ISSUE: W/N R.A 6734 violated the constitution and corollary whether
the Tripoli agreement is controlling.
RULING: On the matter of the Tripoli agreement, the court ruled that
it is not necessary to discuss the nature of such agreement and said
that assuming for the sake of argument that such agreement is
considered as a treaty and binding as part of the internal law of the
land, it is not superior to R.A 6734, but rather within the same class.
The enactment of R.A 6734, being a subsequent law should be treated
to have amended such agreement.
More Importantly, on the Constitutionality of R.A 6734, The
matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its
composition needs to be clarified.
First, the questioned provision in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessary
for the creation of the autonomous region. The reference to the
constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates
that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in
accord with the constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific
provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act,
which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied
in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus: SEC. 13. The
creation of the ARMM shall take effect when approved by a majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of
Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than 90 days or later than 120 days after the approval of this
Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the ARMM. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in
the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution AND R.A. No 6734, the creation of
the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite,
and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in
favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region.
The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall
not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an
autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces
and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No.
6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by
the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of
(1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao
and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A.
No. 6734, shall compromise it.
What does majority mean? Does it refer to a majority of the
total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or
a majority in each of the constituent units, or both? If the
framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority
of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated.
Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution
shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with
the provision on the creation of the autonomous region, which reads:
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities
and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].
It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is
made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but
on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and
the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast,
they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for
the ratification of the Constitution
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple
majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent
units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put
together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
What areas should be included in the ARMM? - Legislative
discretion, political question. Petitioner Mamao then adds and
argues that only those areas which share common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics should be properly included within the
coverage of the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because not all of the 13 provinces and 9 cities
included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and
cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics.
34

Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the
standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should
constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional
criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share
common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's
discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the
wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to
the separation of governmental powers.
IF other non-muslim areas are included, then ARMM should
include all the rest of the non-muslim areas in Mindanao -
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, Political question,
legislative prerogative and valid classification
Petitioner Mama-o argues that since the Organic Act covers several
non-Muslim areas, its scope should be further broadened to include
the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the other
non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, and
therefore is violative of the Constitution.
Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional
provision he had earlier invoked. Any determination by Congress of
what areas in Mindanao should compromise the autonomous region,
taking into account shared historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics, would
necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. Such
determination by Congress of which areas should be covered
constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom may
not be inquired into by this Court.
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable
classification the Court ruled that once class may be treated
differently from another where the groupings are based on reasonable
and real distinctions. The guarantee of equal protection is thus not
infringed in this case, the classification having been made by Congress
on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution
itself.
Petitioners contend that R.A 6734 violates the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression. FREEDOM OF RELIGION -
NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY,
The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which
mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code
[P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had,
and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created
under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain
that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes
it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made"
national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating
possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code
and national law, wherein an application of national law might be
offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
Untenable, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual
controversies are legally demandable and enforceable. No actual
controversy exist, the Court in this case may not be called upon to
resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the
provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
Petitioner contend that R.A 6734 is unconstitutional as it
grants the President the power to merge regions, a power
which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.
That the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to
the Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section
10 of the Constitution which provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected.
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the
merger of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National
Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes, which was made as part of the law of the
land. Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions
like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. While the power to
merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with
the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the
Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the President
to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision
requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because
the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies
only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to
administrative regions.
DELAY due to transfer by oversight committee? - NO DELAY, it
will take effect immediately upon approval by majority votes
cast by constitution units.
RA 6734 mandate that the transfer of certain national government
offices and their properties to the regional government shall be made
pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and
that such transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years from the
organization of the regional government.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional
because while the Constitution states that the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the
requirement of organizing an Oversight committee tasked with
supervising the transfer of powers and properties to the regional
government would in effect delay the creation of the autonomous
region.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges
only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by
majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled
plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes
effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges
only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by
majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled
plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes
effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an
oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a
different date of effectivity.
17) ORDILLO VS. COMELEC
TOPIC: AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
FACTS: The people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their
votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to a law providing for an Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Official COMELEC results of the plebiscite show that it was approved by
majority of the votes only in Ifugao province and overwhelmingly
rejected in the other provinces and cities involved. COMELEC
subsequently released a resolution that the organic act has been
approved. On the same day, the Sec. of Justice issued a memorandum
that only the provinces that voted favorably shall be included in such
Cordillera Autonomous Region. The province of Ifugao being the only
province which voted favorably — then, alone, legally and validly
constitutes the CAR.
Congress then enacted a law setting the elections in the Cordillera
Autonomous Region of Ifugao. The president then issued an order that
the regional legislative assembly and executive board of the CAR are
abolished.
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of
more than one constituent unit.
ISSUE: Should the province of Ifugao, being the only province which
voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region
can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region?
RULING: No, the sole province of Ifugao CANNOT validly constitute
the Cordillera Autonomous Region. This petition is meritorious.
Under Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution it states that there
shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
35
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines.
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means
two or more provinces.
Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join
other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins
other units because of their common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant
characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are NOT present in
this case.
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the petitioner's position that the
Region cannot be constituted from only one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera
government consisting of the Regional Government and local
government units. It further provides that the Regional Government
shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper
governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region.
It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province
may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced
with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of
provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their
executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera
Assembly shall then be elected only from the province of Ifugao
creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies —
the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan —
exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. And
since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines,
population-wise, it would have too many government officials for so
few people.
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The COMELEC resolution and
Memorandum order upholding the creation of an autonomous region is
declared null and void. SO ORDERED.
18) CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION VS COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
GR NO. 79956
JANUARY 29, 1990
Topic: Creation, Conversion, Division, Merger, Substantial
Change of Boundary of LGUs, and Abolition; Autonomous
Regions; Creation
FACTS: Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President Corazon
Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6
of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region
(CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-
Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2].
It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region
and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to
coordinate with the local government units as well as with the
executive departments of the National Government in the supervision
of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting
projects and activities in the region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the
implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects
in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional
Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive
Board as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the
Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the
autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec.
17].
Petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President,
in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the
first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted
Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and
created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
ISSUES:
1. Whether E.O. 220 creates an autonomous region
contemplated under the Constitution
2. Whether E.O. 220 creates a new territorial and political
subdivision
RULING:
1. No. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it
actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of
the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of
the National Government in the areas covered by the
administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of
autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the
autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It
merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for
autonomy.
2. No. After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No.
220, we find that it did not create a new territorial and
political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger
subdivision. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a
territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a
separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and
municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are
normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to
sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property,
the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As
stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate
the planning and implementation of programs and services
in the covered areas.
19) KIDA V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Topic: Autonomous Regions - Elections
FACTS: On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An
Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National
and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset
the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second
Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide
with the country’s regular national and local elections. The law as well
granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs)
for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor,
and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials
duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office.
Petitioners argued that RA 10153 violates the right of suffrage of the
people of ARMM.
ISSUE: W/N the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections?
RULING: YES. While the Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to
which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.
36
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all
elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms
of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to
synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local
to once every three years. This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions
of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent
indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national
and local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for
all the following elections.
OTHER ISSUE:
Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
Exception: elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for
in the Constitution;
The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
(unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant)
-The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in
nature.
The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs - valid, since it was
authorized by RA 10153.
Syncronization does not violate the autonomy of ARMM -Policy-
setting for the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. The autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to
defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of
elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is
subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be
used to exempt the region from having to act in accordance with a
national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution.
PART III. POWER RELATIONS WITH NAT’L GOV’T, SC,
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS; INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, & HIERARCHAL RELATIONS AMONG LGUS
20) MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP. (G.R. NO.
111097)
FACTS: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporations, Inc. and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the
Christmas season.
Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and enacted Ordinance No.
3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling
existing business permit to the establishment for the operation of the
casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the
casino and providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that
they both violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend
that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police
power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general
welfare.
ISSUE: Is the Ordinances are valid.
RULING: No. Under the Local Government Code, local government
units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously,
this provision excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has
the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by
a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter.
Additional; emphasized in the book
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable
21) DRILON VS. LIM
G.R. No. 112497
FACTS: A petition was filed before the Secretary of Justice (Drilon) to
declare Ordinance No. 7794 (the Manila Revenue Code) null and void
for non-compliance with with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances, specifically Sec. 187 of the Local
Government Code. Secretary Drilon issued a Resolution declaring it
void on the basis of that provision. The City of Manila filed a petition
for certiorari before the RTC, praying that the Resolution be set aside.
The RTC held that: (1) The Ordinance is valid since the procedural
requirements were in fact followed; and (2) Sec. 187 of the LGC is
unconstitutional since it allegedly vested the Secretary the power of
control over local governments, in violation of the policy of local
autonomy.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Secretary of Justice exercised the power
of control when he declared the Ordinance null and void;
2. Whether or not the lower court erred in voiding Sec. 187 of
the LGC on the ground that it gave the Secretary the power
of control
RULING:
1. No, he did not exercise the power of control. When he
alters, modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
permitted to substitute his own judgment over that of the
local government that enacted the measure. While Secretary
Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, he did not
replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.
2. Yes, the lower court was in error. Sec. 187 does not give the
Secretary the power of control, which is the power of an
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the latter. Under
Sec. 187, all he is permitted to do is ascertain the
constitutionality or legality of the tax measure,
without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is
unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has
no discretion on this matter.
22) GANZON VS CA (1991)
Topic: Exercise of General Supervision of the President over
LGUs
FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. Sometime
in 1988, a series of ten (10) administrative complaints were filed by
various city officials, against petitioner Ganzon, on various charges
such as abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct and others..
In the course of the hearing of the administrative cases, respondent
Secretary Santos issued against petitioner Ganzon three (3) separate
orders of preventive suspension based on the merits of the complaints
filed against dated 11 August 1988, 11 October 1988, and 3 May 1990,
each of the orders to last for a 60-day period.Ganzon appealed the
issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the
Secretary. It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987
Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal
over local officials. According to petitioners, the Constitution is meant,
first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by
deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided by law to strip the President
of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they
37
contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional
Commission.
ISSUE: Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be
provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to
investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials?
RULING: The deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to
stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local
autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed
by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. The
Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing
legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local
Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the
Constitution contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left
the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the
power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because
legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as
this Court has held, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa,
51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had
occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the
power of supervision by the President over local
government officials in contrast to the power of
control given to him over executive officials of our
government wherein it was emphasized that the
two terms, control and supervision, are two
different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court
has made the following digression: "In
administration law supervision means overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter." But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred
that the power of supervision of the President over
local government officials does not include the
power of investigation when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires, as
postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code. ... 35
23) NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY VS PAREDES
FACTS: In the synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in 1997,
Alex David was proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan. However,
Rayos filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO alleging that he was elected
President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on 14
June 1997 by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their
Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.
The DILG through respondent Secretary Barbers, filed an Urgent
Motion invoking the President’s power of general supervision over all
local government units and requested for appointment as interim
caretaker until such time that the regularly elected National Liga Board
of Directors shall have qualified and assumed office, to manage and
administer the affairs of the National Liga Board. Subsequently, the
DILG issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-176 citing reported
violations of the Liga ng mga Barangay Constitution and By-Laws by
David and gave directions not to recognize or honor any Liga
Presidents of the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters as ex-officio
members of the sanggunian concerned until further notice, as well as
to disregard any pronouncement issued by Mr. Alex David on any issue
or matter relating to the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay until
further notice from the Courts or the Department.
Respondent Judge Paredes appointed DILG as interim caretaker. With
his Department already appointed as interim caretaker of the Liga,
Secretary Barbers nullified the results of the Liga elections and
promulgated DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 laying down the
supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of the
provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the
national chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay; scheduled dates for the
new provincial, metropolitan and national chapter elections; and
appointed respondent Rayos as president of Liga-Caloocan Chapter.
ISSUES:
1. Is the Liga ng mga Barangay subject to DILG supervision?
2. Did DILG act within the scope of its supervisory power or did it
exercise control?
RULING:
1. Yes. The President’s power of the general supervision, as
exercised by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the
Liga ng mga Barangay, even if the Liga is not a local government
unit. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice
ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government
organization, being an association, federation, league or union
created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either
appointed or elected government officials. Under the LGC, the liga
ng mga barangay is an organization of all barangays for the
primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in
the sanggunians, Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which the
barangay participates in the enactment of ordinances and
formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher than
the sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the
mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development.
2. It acted beyond its supervisory power. The appointment of the
DILG as interim caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of
the Liga effectively removed the management from the National
Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the DILG, in
derogation of the Constitution. The acts of the DILG constituted
direct interference with the political affairs of the Liga and of the
barangay as an institution. The election of Liga officers is part of
the Liga’s internal organization, for which the latter has already
provided guidelines. Supervision means overseeing, or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to
compel his subordinates to perform their duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. DILG is an entity exercising only
supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay. Its authority is
limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay
down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify
or replace them. In this particular case, the most that the DILG
could do was review the acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga
in the conduct of the elections to determine if they committed
any violation of the Ligas Constitution and Bylaws and its
implementing rules. If there were violations, it could have ordered
another election in accordance with the Ligas own rules, but not
come up with DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither had the DILG the
authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and
replace them, even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers.
DILG Memorandum Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are
unconstitutional and ultra vires, as they all entailed the
conferment or exercise of control a power which is denied by the
Constitution even to the President.
24) ZALDY AMPATUAN, et al. vs. HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011
38
FACTS: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre
of 57 men and women, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She
directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be
allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. She issued
Administrative Order 273-A which delegated the supervision of the
ARMM to the DILG.
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 claiming that
the presidents issuances (Proclamation 1946 & AO 273-A) encroached
on the ARMMs local autonomy under RA 9054 (Expanded ARMM Act)
and Constitution, that it was an invalid exercise of the President’s
emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for
declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents
occurred.
The respondents, through the OSG insisted that the President issued
Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to
restore peace and order in subject places. She issued the proclamation
pursuant to her calling out power as Commander-in-Chief under the
first sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. Also, the
President merely delegated through AO 273-A her supervisory powers
over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego which
was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.
Further, the assailed proclamation and administrative order did not
provide for the exercise of emergency powers.
ISSUES:
1. Did President Arroyo validly exercise emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City?
2. Was there factual basis for such action on calling out the Armed
Forces?
RULING:
1. When President Arroyo ordered the deployment of the AFP and
PNP personnel in the places as mentioned in the proclamation,
such was not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as
understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state
of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a
power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She
did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
2. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the
Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s
exercise of the above power, unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, which
the petitioners in this case failed to do, the Court will accord
respect to the President’s judgment.
25) HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN
OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ vs. HON.
FRANCISCO DIZON PANO and TONY CALVENTO
GR No. 129093 August 30, 2001
FACTS: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was
appointed agent by the Phil. Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to
install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor
Cataquiz of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open the lotto
outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter because of an
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on September 18,
1995 which illegalized lotto in Laguna. Respondent Calvento then filed
a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order. He asked for the refraining of the
implementation and enforcement of said ordinance and for him to be
granted a business permit. Respondent judge Francisco Dizon Pano
promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing
or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. So
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently
denied in an Order dated April 21, 1997. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayors permit based
thereon are valid.
2. Whether prior consultations and approval by the
concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be
operated in a given local government unit.
RULING:
1. The refusal of Mayor Cataquiz was based on an existing
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of
Laguna. This ordinance, however, merely states the objection of
the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on
the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could
it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto
system in the province of Laguna. As a policy statement
expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such
resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s
autonomy to air its view which may be contrary to that of the
national government’s. But this freedom to exercise contrary
views does not mean that local governments may actually enact
ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given
this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and
should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting
the operation of lotto. The game of lotto is duly authorized by the
national government through an Act of Congress. RA 1169 as
amended by BP Blg. 42 is the law which grants a franchise to the
PCSO and allows it to operate lotteries. Hence, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna cannot issue a resolution or ordinance
that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the
national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a
provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
2. The petitioners also erred in declaring that Sec. 2(c) (Declaration
of Policy) and 27 (Prior Consultations Required) of RA 7160 apply
mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the country.
These provisions apply only to national programs and/or projects
which are to be implemented in a particular local community.
Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national
government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Section 27
of the LGC should also be read in conjunction with Section 26
thereof. None of the effects stated in Sec. 26 will be produced by
the introduction of lotto in Laguna. Moreover, this argument
regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is clearly just
an afterthought on their part. There is no indication in the letter
of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for his refusal
to issue a permit.
26) BANGUS-FRY-FISHERFOLK
FACTS: On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director (RED) of
Region IV, DENR, issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC)
in favor of respondent NAPOCOR. The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to
construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo,
Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a
mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist
zone. Petitioners, fisherfolks of Minolo, sought the reconsideration of
the ECC issuance but was denied so they filed a complaint with RTC of
Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and the issuance of a
writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility.
Respondents claimed that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies and sought for the dismissal of the case.
ISSUE: Should the case be dismissed for failing to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to the filing of such in court?
39
RULING: Yes. The case should be dismissed for failing to exhaust
administrative remedies under Article VI of DENR Administrative Order
96-37, which provides:
SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the
Secretary. Any party aggrieved by the final decision
of the RED may, within 15 days from receipt of such
decision, file an appeal with the Office of the
Secretary. The decision of the Secretary shall be
immediately executory.
SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. The grounds for
appeal shall be limited to grave abuse of discretion
and serious errors in the findings of fact which
would cause grave or irreparable injury to the
aggrieved party. Frivolous appeals shall not be
countenanced.
SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. The proponent or
any stakeholder, including but not limited to, the
LGUs concerned and affected communities, may file
an appeal.
Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the
DENR Secretary and immediately filed their complaint with the Manila
RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary the opportunity to review the
decision of his subordinate, RED Principe. Under the Procedural Manual
for DAO 96-37 and applicable jurisprudence, petitioners omission
renders their complaint dismissible for lack of cause of
action.Consequently, the Manila RTC did not err in dismissing
petitioners complaint for lack of cause of action.
27) PROVINCE OF RIZAL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO.
129546, DECEMBER 13, 2005
FACTS: At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and
its environs, parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set
aside by the President, through Proclamation No. 635 dated 28 August
1995, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal
applications.
This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San
Mateo, and various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the CA, denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality
and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.
Here, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early Resolution, calling
attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite by the MMDA
that caused the people of Antipolo to stage a rally and barricade the
Marcos Highway to stop the dump trucks from reaching the site for
five successive days. All the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal
openly declared their full support for the rally, and notified the MMDA
that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their
province.
As a result, it caused the MMDA to agree that it would abandon the
dumpsite after six months. In return, the municipal mayors allowed the
use of the dumpsite until 20 July 1999. However, on 20 July 1999, the
Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and Projects and the
MMDA entered into a MOA with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the
Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of Antipolo, whereby the latter
agreed to an extension for the use of the dumpsite until 31 December
2000, at which time it would be permanently closed. Despite this
agreement, President Estrada directed to reopen the San Mateo
dumpsite on 11 January 2001, in view of the emergency situation of
uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and
imminent health and sanitation epidemic.
Claiming the above events constituted a clear and present danger of
violence erupting in the affected areas, petitioners sought for a
restraining order which the Supreme Court had issued that prevented
the dumpsites reopening.
ISSUE: WON San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed.
RULING: We hold that the San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently
closed.
Were it not for the TRO, then President Estrada’s instructions would
have been lawfully carried out, for as we observed in Oposa v.
Factoran, the freedom of contract is not absolute. The constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare.
We thus feel there is also the added need to reassure the residents of
the Province of Rizal that this is indeed a final resolution of this
controversy, for a brief review of the records of this case indicates two
self-evident facts. First, the San Mateo site has adversely affected its
environs, and second, sources of water should always be protected.
The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was
passed violates R.A. No. 7160 /LGC.
The LGC gives to local government units all the necessary powers to
promote the general welfare of their inhabitants. Section 2(c) of the
said law declares that it is the policy of the state to require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate
local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations,
and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. Likewise,
Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be
implemented by government authorities and the prior approval of the
sanggunian is obtained.
During the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining
order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task
Force declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted
the required consultations. However, he added that this is the
problem, sir, the officials we may have been talking with at the time
this was established may no longer be incumbent and this is our
difficulty now. That is what we are trying to do now, a continuing
dialogue.
The ambivalent reply of Director Uranza was brought to the fore when,
at the height of the protest rally and barricade along Marcos Highway
to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of
the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and
notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to
dump garbage in their province.
The municipal mayors acted within the scope of their powers, and
were in fact fulfilling their mandate, when they did this. Section 16
allows every local government unit to exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare, which involve, among other things, promoting health
and safety, enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
and preserving the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and
functions of the municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power
to, among other things, enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code.
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites
must be met before a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities
can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory
requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.
Note: The SC cited some cases, ruling that Sections 2(c) and 27 of the
LGC do not apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around
the country. The projects and programs mentioned in Section 27
should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects
40
are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that:
(1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may
cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss
of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain
animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other
projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular
group of people residing in the locality where these will be
implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the
introduction of lotto outlets around the country. Sections 26 and 27
are inapplicable to projects which are not environmentally critical.
28) REPUBLIC VS. SPOUSES LAZO, G.R. NO. 195594,
SEPTEMBER 29, 2014
TOPIC: LGUs and National Agencies and Offices (with project
implementation functions): Prior Consultation Before Implementation
FACTS: Respondents spouses Rogelio Lazo and Dolores Lazo are the
owners and developers of Monte Vista Homes (Monte Vista), a
residential subdivision located in Barangay Paing, Municipality of
Bantay, Ilocos Sur. Sometime in 2006, they voluntarily sold to the
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) a portion of Monte Vista for
the construction of an open irrigation canal that is part of the
Banaoang Pump Irrigation Project (BPIP). Subsequently, respondents
engaged the services of Engr. Donno G. Custodio, retired Chief
Geologist of MGB-DENR, to conduct a geohazard study on the possible
effects of the BPIP on Monte Vista. Engr. Custodio later came up with
a Geohazard Assessment Report (GAR), finding that ground shaking
and channel bank erosion are the possible hazards that could affect
the NIA irrigation canal traversing Monte Vista. He then recommended
the construction of a double-slope retaining walls, high concrete dike,
adequate draining system and the planting of ornamental trees/plants
and shrubs along the buffer zone.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Bantay, Ilocos Sur approved Resolution No.
34, which adopted the recommendations contained in the GAR. Among
others, it resolved that the GAR recommendations should be observed
and implemented by the concerned implementing agency of the NIA
BPIP.
Respondent Rogelio Lazo brought to NIA’s attention Resolution No. 34
through his letters dated, specifically asking for the implementation of
the GAR recommendations and the payment of just compensation for
the entire buffer zone.
When respondents’ demands were not acted upon, they decided to file
a complaint for just compensation with damages against NIA. Prior to
the filing of an Answer, respondents filed an Amended Complaint with
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction. They further alleged that the BPIP contractor is undertaking
substandard works that increase the risk of a fatal accident.
RTC: Granted respondents’ application for preliminary injunction,
enjoining defendant from continuing further construction works on the
irrigation canal particularly those located inside the Monte Vista Homes
until the issue in the main case is resolved.
Also, the trial court found that petitioner violated R.A. No. 7160, or the
Local Government Code of 1991 saying that petitioner seemed to have
disregarded all deference due to the local government of the
Municipality of Bantay when, despite the issuance of Resolution, it
insisted that its design of the open irrigation canal is adequately safe
without consultation or asking a formal audience with the Sangguniang
Bayan and spell-out the design of the open irrigation canal which could
persuade the latter to reconsider its Resolution.
Without moving for a reconsideration of the two Orders, petitioner
directly filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
CA: Dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged Orders of the
trial court.
ISSUES
1. Does this case for just compensation with damages one of
extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue such that unless
a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction is issued
grave injustice and irreparable injury on the part of respondents
will arise?
2. Whether or not petitioner violated the Local Government Code of
1991, which requires all national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultations before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
RULING:
1. We hold not. Here, respondents failed to demonstrate that there
is a constitutional issue involved, much less a constitutional issue
that is of extreme urgency. The case aims to compel the
Government to acquire more portion of Monte Vista on the bases
of the GAR recommendations, which was espoused by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Bantay, Ilocos Sur, and of the alleged
substandard works on the BPIP. The findings in the GAR,
however, are vehemently opposed by petitioner. It asserted that
the 20-meter buffer zone is unnecessary because similar
precautionary measures are already sufficiently installed and that
further acquisition of respondents’ property would be grossly
disadvantageous to the Government as it would cost
additional P68,370,000.00, more or less. Petitioner also counters
that the claim of substandard works on the BPIP is speculative,
since the contractor has not yet handed over the BPIP as
completed and petitioner is yet to inspect and approve the BPIP
according to its design and specifications. Considering that these
issues are very much disputed by the parties, it cannot be said
that respondents’ constitutional right to just compensation was or
has already been breached at the time the complaint was filed or
even during the hearing on their application for preliminary
injunction.
As petitioner consistently argues, it has not taken any property of
respondents that is more than what was the subject matter of the
negotiated sale executed in 2006. Quite the contrary, it is
respondents who are obliging it to purchase more than what it
deems as necessary for the implementation of the BPIP. In
general, however, a property-owner like respondents has no right
to unilaterally determine the extent of his or her property that
should be acquired by the State or to compel it to acquire beyond
what is needed, the conformity of a higher authority like the
Sanggunian Bayan notwithstanding.
2. As regards petitioner’s alleged violation of the Local Government
Code, the same does not suffice to grant the prayer for injunctive
relief.
Section 2(c) of the Local Government Code declares the policy of
the State "to require all national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultations with appropriate local government units,
non-governmental and people's organizations, and other
concerned sectors of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions." This
provision applies to national government projects affecting the
environmental or ecological balance of the particular community
implementing the project. Exactly, Sections 26 and 27 of the
Local Government Code requires prior consultations with the
concerned sectors and the prior approval of the Sanggunian. It
was said that the Congress introduced these provisions to
emphasize the legislative concern "for the maintenance of a
sound ecology and clean environment."
The projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be
interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are
among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those
that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic
change; (3) may cause the depletion of non renewable resources;
(4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover;
(5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of
the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for
the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality
41
 where these will be implemented. Preliminarily, it appears that
the present case does not fall under any of these
instances; ergo, there is neither a need for prior
consultations of concerned sectors nor prior approval of
the Sanggunian.
Respondents failed to satisfy even the basic requirements of the
Rules for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Therefore, the
trial court gravely abused its discretion when it granted their
application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.
In so doing, it prematurely decided disputed facts and effectively
disposed of the merits of the case without the benefit of a full-
blown trial wherein testimonial and documentary evidence could
be fully and exhaustively presented, heard, and refuted by the
parties.
Nevertheless, this Court emphasizes that this Decision is limited
to the issue of propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction as an interim relief under
the peculiar factual milieu of this case. As the substantive issues
presented and disputed by the parties are not finally resolved, We
leave them to the trial court for resolution after trial on the
merits.
29) BRAGA VS ABAYA
30) ANDAYA V. RTC
FACTS: The position of City Director, Cebu City Police Command (chief
of police) became vacant. Petitioner Andaya submitted to the City
Mayor, Cebu City a list of five (5) eligibles for the mayor to choose one
to be appointed as the chief of police of Cebu City. The mayor did not
choose anyone from the list of five (5) recommendees because the
name of P/Chief Inspector Andres Sarmiento was not included therein.
However, petitioner Andaya refused to agree to Mayor Alvin B. Garcias
request to include the name of Major Andres Sarmiento in the list of
police officers for appointment by the mayor to the position of City
Director (chief of police), Cebu City Police Command. Petitioner
Andaya's refusal was based on his contention that Major Andres
Sarmiento was not qualified for the position of City Director (chief of
police).
The City of Cebu filed with the Regional Trial Court,a complaint for
declaratory relief with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
and temporary restraining order against petitioners. Trial court
rendered decision in favor of respondent City of Cebu.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor of Cebu City may require the
Regional Director, to include the Mayor’s protege in the list of five (5)
eligibles to be recommended by the Regional Police Director to the
mayor from which the mayor shall choose the City Director (chief of
police).
RULING: NO. The mayor has only the power to choose from the list.
It it’s the prerogative of the regional director of the police to choose
the eligible person who should be included in the
list without intervention from local executives – based on the National
Police Commission (NPC) memorandum, which provides the
qualifications of a chief of police. In case of disagreement, the issue
should be elevated to the regional director of the NPC who shall
resolve the issue within 5 working days.
The authority of the mayor is limited, he has no power to appoint but
basically has the power to choose from the list of five eligibles to be
named the chief of police. Actually, the power to appoint the chief of
police of Cebu City is vested in the Regional Director. Much less may
the mayor require the Regional Director, to include the name of any
officer, no matter how qualified, in the list of five to be submitted to
the mayor. The purpose is to enhance police professionalism and to
isolate the police service from political domination.
PART IV. GOVERNMENTAL POWERS OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
31) ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE,
SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR)
G.R. No. 91649; May 14, 1991
FACTS: PAGCOR was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A and was
granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B "to establish, operate and
maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines." Subsequently, PAGCOR was created
under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize
all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by
law.
The petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR Charter, PD 1869, because
it waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and
license fees as Sec. 13 (2) of PD 1869 exempts PAGCOR as the
franchise holder from paying “tax of any kind or form, income or
otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature,
whether National or local.” The law then has intruded into the local
government's right to impose local taxes and license fees in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local
autonomy.
ISSUE: Does PD 1869 violate the local autonomy clause of the
Constitution in exempting PAGCOR from paying local taxes?
RULING: NO. Section 5, Article 10 of the Constitution provides that
"each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and other charges subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy." The power then of
local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains
an operative law, its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to
the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and
fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the
principle of local autonomy.
Also, Congress has the power of control over local governments; it can
create and abolish them. If Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or
even take back the power. And a municipal corporation has no
inherent right to impose taxes. Its power to tax must always yield to a
legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state
itself which has the inherent power to tax.
Lastly, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the
National Government. PAGCOR is a GOCC with an original charter. All
of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Its
governmental role to regulate gambling casinos places it in the
category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. As such,
it should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. This is in
consonance with the "supremacy" of the National Government over
local governments.
32) MCIAA V MARCOS
GR. NO 120082, SEPTEMBER 11, 1996
FACTS: MCIAA was created by virtue of RA no. 6958 and under its
charter it provides that it enjoys the privilege of exemption from
payment of realty taxes. Eustaqio Cesa, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the
Treasurer of City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes. It paid
under protest and filed an action for declaratory relief contending that
(1 )the taxing power of local governments do not extend to the levy of
taxes or fees of any kind of instrumentality of the national
government; (2) while it is indeed a GOCC , it nonetheless stands on
the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national
government by the very nature of its power and functions. Respondent
argues that MCIAA is merely a GOCC performing proprietary functions
whose tax exemption has been withdrawn by virtue of sec. 193 and
234 of the LGC.
ISSUES: Is MCIAA bound to pay the real property tax?
42
RULING: Yes. There can be no question that under Section 14 of R.A.
No. 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes
imposed by the National Government or any of its political
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since
taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the
exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing
authority. As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently
enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, section 193
of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz, they are withdrawn upon
effectivity of the LGC except those granted to local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-
profit hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise
provided in the LGC,
Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon
the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real property
taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the said
section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned
corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax
granted it in Section 14 of its Charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been
withdrawn.
33) QUEZON CITY V. BAYAN TELECOM, INC.
G.R. NO. 162015
MARCH 6, 2006
FACTS: Pursuant to the taxing power vested on LGUs by
Sec. 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to Sec.
232 of the LGC, petitioner enacted a City Ordinance known
as the Quezon City Revenue Code (QCRC). The QCRC
imposes (Sec. 5) a real property tax on all real properties in
Quezon City, reiterates (Sec. 6) the withdrawal of exemption
from real property tax under Section 234(2) of the LGC, and
withdraws (Sec. 230) the tax exemption privileges in
general.
Petitioner sought to impose real property taxes on Bayantels properties
under its jurisdiction by virtue of QCRC.
ISSUE: May Bayantel’s properties located in Quezon City be
subjected to real property taxes pursuant to QCRC?
RULING: No. Bayantel is a legislative franchise holder under
RA 3259. Section 14 thereof, provides: “(a) The grantee
shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate,
buildings and personal property, exclusive of the
franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or
hereafter may be required by law to pay.”
The term “exclusive of this franchise” effectively exempts
from any property tax all of Bayantels realties which are
actually, directly and exclusively used in the operation of its
franchise. While this realty tax exemption was subsequently
withdrawn by force of Sec. 234 of the LGC, it was later on restored
by Sec. 11 of RA 7633 with the same defining phrase. This is
an express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again
remove from the LGCs delegated taxing power, all of Bayantel’s
properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit
of its franchise.
Further, Sec. 5, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution does not change the
doctrine that municipal corporations do not possess inherent powers of
taxation. It only confer municipal corporations a general power to
levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue subject to
the legislative authority to impose limitations consistent with the basic
policy of local autonomy.
34) MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (MIAA) VS CA
GR 155650; JULY 20, 2006
TOPIC: LGU Power of Taxation
FACTS: MIAA operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport in
Parañaque City. The MIAA Charter mandates MIAA to devote the
Airport Lands and Buildings for the benefit of the general public. Since
the Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use and public
service, the ownership of these properties remains with the State. The
City of Parañaque assessed MIAA of real estate tax from 1992 to
2001.The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public
auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the
real estate tax delinquency. The Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) supported MIAA’s argument that Section 21 of the
MIAA exempts them from the payment of real estate. The City of
Parañaque invoked Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which
expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of "government-
owned and-controlled corporations" upon the effectivity of the Local
Government Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not MIAA is liable for real estate tax to the City of
Parañaque?
RULING: MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real
estate tax imposed by local governments as they are owned by the
State. MIAA is not a GOCC but an instrumentality. Section 133 of the
Local Government Code states that "unless otherwise provided" in the
Code, local governments cannot tax national government
instrumentalities. The only exception is when the legislature clearly
intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of
essential public services for sound and compelling policy
considerations. When local governments invoke the power to tax on
national government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly
against local governments.
35) GSIS V. CITY TREASURER OF MANILA
GR NO. 186242, DECEMBER 23, 2009
FACTS: GSIS owns or used to own two (2) parcels of land, one
located at Katigbak and the other at Concepcion, both properties are in
Manila. Both the GSIS and the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila occupy the Concepcion-Arroceros property, while the Katigbak
property was under lease.
On September 13, 2002, the City Treasurer of Manila sent an
assessment letter to GSIS President and General Manager Winston F.
Garcia informing him of the unpaid real property taxes due for both
properties.
ISSUES:
1. Is GSIS exempt from paying real property taxes?
2. Is GSIS liable for real property taxes for its properties leased to a
taxable entity?
3. Are the properties of GSIS exempt from levy?
RULING:
1. GSIS is exempt from real property taxes. RA 8291 which took
effect on June 24, 1997 provides the full tax exemption privilege
of GSIS, the operative provision being Sec. 39 thereof.
1. SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial
solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and
maintained at all times and that contribution rates necessary to
sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible
in order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their
employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the
actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate
necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly,
notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets,
revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be
exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all
kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and
43
 specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of
the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.
Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances,
opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this
provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered
ineffective and without legal force and effect.
Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent
laws to the contrary unless this section is expressly, specifically
and categorically revoked or repealed by law and a provision is
enacted to substitute or replace the exemption referred to herein
as an essential factor to maintain or protect the solvency of the
fund, notwithstanding and independently of the guaranty of the
national government to secure such solvency or liability.
2. Leased property is liable for real property taxes for its properties
leased to a taxable entity pursuant to beneficial use principle.
Thus read together, the provisions allow the Republic to grant the
beneficial use of its property to an agency or instrumentality of
the national government. Such grant does not necessarily result
in the loss of the tax exemption. The tax exemption the
property of the Republic or its instrumentality carries
ceases only if, as stated in Sec. 234(a) of the LGC of 1991,
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for a
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. GSIS, as a
government instrumentality, is not a taxable juridical person
under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC.
3. GSIS properties cannot be levied. In light of the foregoing
disquisition, the issue of the propriety of the threatened levy of
subject properties by the City of Manila to answer for the
demanded realty tax deficiency is now moot and academic. A
valid tax levy presupposes a corresponding tax liability.
Nonetheless, it will not be remiss to note that it is without doubt
that the subject GSIS properties are exempt from any
attachment, garnishment, execution, levy, or other legal
processes. This is the clear import of the third paragraph of Sec.
39, RA 8291, which we quote anew for clarity:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. x x x. The
funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the
benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this
Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution,
levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial
agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit
(COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the
members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or
caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official
functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with
his position or work except when his monetary liability,
contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.
36) PIMENTEL VS AQUIRRE
FACTS: A petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul
Section 1 of Admin Order No. 372, insofar as it requires local
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their
authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services; and (2) to
enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which
withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
Contention: That the President was in effect exercising the power
of control where the Constitution vests only the power of
general supervision over LGUs, inconsistent with the principle of local
autonomy. That withholding of their IRA is in contravention of Sec 286
of the LGC and Sec 6 Art X of the Constitution, for the automatic
release of share in the national internal revenue.
ISSUE: WON AO 372 violates the local autonomy of LGUs.
RULING:
Control vs Supervision: Supervision means overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s]
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter.
Extent of Local Autonomy: Under the Philippine concept of local
autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all
its powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to
political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make
governance more directly responsive and effective at the local
levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the
smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a
whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated
and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting
for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. Municipal
governments are still agents of the national government.
AO 372
Sec 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal
autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, to ensure that local programs,
fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372
is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent
with his powers of supervision over local governments. A directory
order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of
control. The AO is intended only to advise all government
agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction
measures that will help maintain economic stability in the
country. It does not contain any sanction in case of
noncompliance.
The LGC also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters,
provided that certain requisites are met:
(1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government;
(2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and
the House of Representatives and the presidents of the
various local leagues;
(3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and
Budget and Management; and
(4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than
30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of
the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
[Failed to comply but Sec 1 allowed by SC as the directive was merely
advisory in character, not mandatory]
Sec 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal
autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the
national internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution and
the Local Government Code. Sec 4 which orders the withholding of
10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the
law.
37) SMART COMMUNICATIONS INC. VS. MUNICIPALITY OF
MALVAR, BATANGAS
GR NO. 204429, FEBRUARY 18, 2014
FACTS: In the course of its business, Smart Communications
constructed a telecommunications tower within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Malvar. The tower was built for the
purpose of receiving and transmitting cellular communications within
the covered area.
On 30 July 2003, the Municipality passed Ordinance No. 18, series of
2003, entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Establishment of Special
Projects." Consequently, on August 24, 2004, Smart received from the
Permit and Licensing Division of the Office of the Mayor of the
Municipality an assessment letter with a schedule of payment for the
total amount of P389,950.00 for Smart’s telecommunications tower.
44

Due to the alleged arrears in the payment of the assessment, the
Municipality also caused the posting of a closure notice on the
telecommunications tower.
On September 9, 2004, Smart filed a protest assailing the validity of
the ordinance. However, the Municipality denied its protest. Smart
later filed an action with the RTC, assailing the validity of the same
ordinance. On 2 December 2008, the trial court rendered a Decision
partly granting Smart’s Appeal/Petition. The trial court confined its
resolution of the case to the validity of the assessment, and did not
rule on the legality of Ordinance No. 18.
Smart filed a petition for review with the CTA but it was denied.
ISSUE: Should the municipal ordinance be held as valid?
RULING: The municipal ordinance is valid.
Firstly, Smart contended that the CTA should not have denied the
petition and should have declared the ordinance as illegal. However,
the Supreme Court ruled against their favor.
The Court found that the fees imposed under Ordinance No. 18 are
not taxes and is therefore not within the ambit of the CTA.
Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that "each local
government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local government."
Consistent with this constitutional mandate, the LGC grants the taxing
powers to each local government unit. Additionally, the LGC defines
the term "charges" as referring to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees
against persons or property, while the term "fee" means "a charge
fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business
or activity."
In this case, the ordinance was meant to address the foreseen
"environmental depredation" to be brought about by these
"special projects" to the Municipality. Its purpose is to to
regulate the enumerated activities particularly related to the
construction and maintenance of various structures. Thus, The
fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not impositions on the building or
structure itself; rather, they are impositions on the activity
subject of government regulation, such as the installation and
construction of the structures.
Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain
construction activities of the identified special projects, which included
"cell sites" or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed in
Ordinance No. 18 are primarily regulatory in nature, and not
primarily revenue-raising. While the fees may contribute to the
revenues of the Municipality, this effect is merely incidental.
Secondly, Smart argued that the act of imposition of fees in the
ordinance is an ultra vires act of the Municipality. The SC which ruled
in the affirmative added that even if the fees do not appear in Section
143 or any other provision in the LGC, the Municipality is empowered
to impose taxes, fees and charges, not specifically enumerated in the
LGC or taxed under the Tax Code or other applicable law. Section
186 of the LGC, granting local government units wide latitude
in imposing fees.
The High Tribunal has also emphasized that an ordinance carries with
it the presumption of validity. Courts will go slow in writing off an
ordinance as unreasonable unless the amount is so excessive as to be
prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory. A rule
which has gained acceptance is that factors relevant to such an inquiry
are the municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of the business
made subject to imposition.
Plaintiff, has however not sufficiently proven that, taking these factors
together, the license taxes are unreasonable. The presumption of
validity subsists. For, plaintiff has limited itself to insisting that the
amounts levied exceed the cost of regulation and the municipality has
adequate funds for the alleged purposes as evidenced by the
municipality’s cash surplus for the fiscal year ending 1956.
38) MACTAN CEBU INT’L AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. CITY OF
LAPU-LAPU AND PACALDO
G.R. NO. 181756, JUNE 15, 2015
FACTS: Petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) was created by Congress under Republic Act No. 6958. Upon
its creation, petitioner enjoyed exemption from realty taxes imposed
by the National Government or any of its political subdivision.
However, upon the effectivity of the LGC, the Supreme Court rendered
a decision that MCIAA is no longer exempt from realty estate taxes.
Respondent City issued to MCIAA a Statement of Real Estate Tax
assessing the lots comprising the Mactan International Airport which
included the airfield, runway, taxi way and the lots on which these are
built. MCIAA contends that these lots, and the lots on which they are
built, are utilized solely and exclusively for public purposes and are
exempt from real property tax, basing its claim for exemption on DOJ
Opinion No. 50.
Respondent issued notices of levy on 18 sets of real properties of
MCIAA. MCIAA filed a petition for Prohibition, TRO, and a writ of
preliminary injunction with RTC Lapu-lapu which sought to enjoin
respondent City from issuing the warrant of levy against its properties
from selling them at public auction for delinquency in realty tax
obligations.
MCIAA claimed before the RTC that it had discovered that respondent
City did not pass any ordinance authorizing the collection of real
property tax, a tax for the special education fund (SEF), and a penalty
interest for its nonpayment. MCIAA argued that without the
corresponding tax ordinances, respondent City could not impose and
collect real property tax, an additional tax for the SEF, and penalty
interest from petitioner. RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction
which was later on lifted upon motion by the respondents.
CA: The court held that MCIAA’s airport terminal building, airfield,
runway, taxiway, and the lots on which they are situated are not
exempt from real estate tax imposed by City of Lapu-lapu, reasoning
as follows: Under LGC, enacted pursuant to the constitutional mandate
of local autonomy, all natural and juridical persons, including
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs),
instrumentalities and agencies, are no longer exempt from local taxes
even if previously granted an exemption. The only exemptions from
local taxes are those specifically provided under the Code itself, or
those enacted through subsequent legislation.
ISSUES:
(1) Is MCIAA a government instrumentality such that it is
exempt from paying RPT?
(2) Can Lapu-lapu City impose realty tax, special education fund
and penalty interest?
(3) Are the airport terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway,
including the lots in which they are situated, exempt from
realty tax?
RULING: (1) Yes. MCIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code because it is not organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation. Neither is MCIAA a government-owned or
controlled corporation under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution because it is not required to meet the test of
economic viability. MCIAA is a government instrumentality
vested with corporate powers and performing essential public
services pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of
the Administrative Code. As a government instrumentality, therefore,
MCIAA is not subject to any kind of tax by local governments under
Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. The exception to the
45
exemption in Section 234(a) does not apply to MCIAA because MCIAA
is not a taxable entity under the Local Government Code. Such
exception applies only if the beneficial use of real property owned by
the Republic is given to a taxable entity.
(2) No. MCIAA’s properties that are actually, solely and
exclusively used for public purpose, consist of the airport
terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots, on
which they are situated, are EXEMPT from real property tax
imposed by the City of Lapu-Lapu. All the real property tax
assessments, including the additional tax for the special education
fund and the penalty interest, as well as the final notices of real
property tax delinquencies, issued by the City of Lapu-Lapu on
MCIAA’s properties, except the assessment covering the portions
that MCIAA has leased to private parties, are void. NULL and
VOID also was the sale in public auction of 27 of petitioner’s properties
and the eventual forfeiture and purchase of the said properties by
respondent City of Lapu-Lapu. Finally, the SC declared VOID the
corresponding Certificates of Sale of Delinquent Property issued to
respondent City of Lapu-Lapu.
(3) Yes. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MCIAA are
properties devoted to public use and thus are properties of
public dominion. Properties of public dominion are owned by the
State or the Republic. As properties of public dominion owned by the
Republic, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Airport Lands and
Buildings are expressly exempt from real estate tax under Section
234(a) of the Local Government Code. The SC has also repeatedly
ruled that properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or
foreclosure sale.
39) GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, ET AL. V. HON.
JESSE M. ROBREDO
G.R. NO. 195390, 10 DECEMBER 2014, EN BANC, (REYES, J.)
FACTS: In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an
examination and audit on the manner the local government units
utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the calendar years
1993-1994. The examination yielded an official report, showing that a
substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was
not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to
expenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of R.A.
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC). In 2010, Jesse Robredo, in his capacity as DILG Secretary,
issued the assailed Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83, entitled
“Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public
Offerings,” which aims to promote good governance through enhanced
transparency and accountability of LGUs. The MC requires the posting
within 30 days from the end of each fiscal year in at least three (3)
publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the local government unit
a summary of all revenues collected and funds received including the
appropriations and disbursements of such funds during the preceding
fiscal year. The foregoing circular also states that noncompliance will
be meted sanctions in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and
regulations. On December 2, 2010, the Robredo issued another MC,
reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be utilized for
desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes essential to
the attainment of the constitutional objective of a quality of life for all.
It also enumerated a list for which the fund must not be utilized.
Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by the Provincial
Government of Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition for certiorari,
seeking to nullify the assailed issuances of the respondent for being
unconstitutional for violating the principles of local and fiscal autonomy
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.
ISSUE: Did the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles
of local and fiscal autonomy?
RULING: No, a reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere
reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended
to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287
of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development
projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if
they have been complying with the law. It must be recalled that the
assailed circular was issued in response to the report of the COA that a
substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was
not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to
expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section
287 of the LGC.
Contrary to the Villafuerte, et al.’s posturing, however, the
enumeration was not meant to restrict the discretion of the
LGUs in the utilization of their funds. LGUs remain at liberty to
map out their respective development plans solely on the
basis of their own judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly,
with the only restriction that 20% thereof be expended for
development projects. They may even spend their IRAs for some of
the enumerated items should they partake of indirect costs of
undertaking development projects.
Villafuerte, et al. likewise misread the issuance by claiming that the
provision of sanctions therein is a clear indication of the President’s
interference in the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. Significantly, the
issuance itself did not provide for sanctions. It did not
particularly establish a new set of acts or omissions which are
deemed violations and provide the corresponding penalties
therefor. It simply stated a reminder to LGUs that there are existing
rules to consider in the disbursement of the 20% development fund
and that non-compliance therewith may render them liable to
sanctions which are provided in the LGC and other applicable laws.
Villafuerte, et al. claim that the requirement to post other documents
in the mentioned issuances went beyond the letter and spirit of Section
352 of the LGC and R.A. No. 9184, otherwise known as the
Government Procurement Reform Act, by requiring that budgets,
expenditures, contracts and loans, and procurement plans of LGUs be
publicly posted as well. Pertinently, Section 352 of the LGC reads that
Local treasurers, accountants, budget officers, and other accountable
officers shall, within thirty (30) days from the end of the fiscal year,
post in at least three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in
the local government unit. R.A. No. 9184, on the other hand, requires
the posting of the invitation to bid, notice of award, notice to proceed,
and approved contract in the procuring entity’s premises, in
newspapers of general circulation, and the website of the procuring
entity. In particular, the Constitution commands the strict adherence to
full disclosure of information on all matters relating to official
transactions and those involving public interest. Pertinently, Section
28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the Constitution.
40) CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
G.R. NO. 199439 APRIL 22, 2014
FACTS: Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was enacted by the city of
General Santos on August 13, 2009. It is entitled An Ordinance
Establishing the GenSan Scheme on Early Retirement for Valued
Employees Security (GenSan SERVES).
It was question by the city auditor and eventually the Office of General
Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021. The opinion explained
that Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, partakes of a
supplementary retirement benefit plan. In its view, Section 28,
paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, prohibits
government agencies from establishing supplementary retirement or
pension plans from the time the Government Service Insurance System
charter took effect while those plans already existing when the charter
was enacted were declared abolished. According to COA, since
Ordinance No. 08 is in the nature of an ERP [Early Retirement
Program] of the City Government of General Santos, a law
authorizing the same is a requisite for its validity. In the
absence, however, of such law, the nullity of Ordinance No. 08
becomes a necessary consequence.
According to petitioner city, GenSan SERVES does not provide for
supplementary retirement benefits. Petitioner city explains that
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was designed to entice employees
who are unproductive due to health reasons to avail of the incentives
46
by way of an early retirement package. In essence, the incentives are
severance pay. Those who have reached retirement age are
disqualified. Petitioner city adds that GenSan SERVES is a one-time
offer. It is available only to qualified employees who applied within two
months from the ordinance’s effectivity. In fact, out of its 1,361
regular employees, 50 employees applied. Out of all that applied, only
39 employees qualified to avail of the incentives provided by the
ordinance. These incentives are independent and distinct from the
Government Service Insurance System retirement package. Section 5
of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was amended by Ordinance No.
11, series of 2009, "to exclude those GSIS and PAG-IBIG benefits the
payment[s] of which are passed on [to] the employer." This was to
remove any doubt as to its coverage and applicability and to ensure
that no employee will be paid twice.
According to petitioner city, GenSan SERVES is an initial step pursuant
to its organization development masterplan, which began with the city
mayor’s issuance of Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating
change management teams. Petitioner city cites Sections 16 and 76 of
the Local Government Code as its authority to reorganize. It argues
that these provisions necessarily imply the authority of
petitioner city to provide retirement benefits, separation pay,
and other incentives to those affected by the reorganization.
Petitioner city also cites Republic Act No. 6656, otherwise known as An
Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and
Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization.
According to petitioner city, this not only requires good faith in the
implementation of reorganization but mandates the payment of
appropriate separation pay, retirement, and other benefits under
existing laws within 90 days from effectivity date of separation.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion
when it considered the ordinance in the nature of an early retirement
program requiring a law authorizing it for its validity.
RULING: We agree with respondent Commission on Audit but only
insofar as Section 5 of the ordinance is concerned. We declare Section
6 on post-retirement incentives as valid.
The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner
city’s issuance of Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating
change management teams as an initial step for its organization
development masterplan. Local autonomy also grants local
governments the power to streamline and reorganize. This power is
inferred from Section 76 of the Local Government Code on
organizational structure and staffing pattern, and Section 16
otherwise known as the general welfare clause. Designing and
implementing a local government unit’s own "organizational structure
and staffing pattern" also implies the power to revise and reorganize.
Without such power, local governments will lose the ability to adjust to
the needs of its constituents. Effective and efficient governmental
services especially at the local government level require rational and
deliberate changes planned and executed in good faith from time to
time.
Local autonomy allows an interpretation of Sections 76 and 16
as granting petitioner city the authority to create its
organization development program.
A reorganization involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of
one's position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a
reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy
more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith;
otherwise, it is void ab initio.
Republic Act No. 6656 invoked by petitioner city as authority for the
creation of GenSan SERVES, for example, enumerates situations
considered as bad faith when employees are removed as a result of
any reorganization:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of
positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or
agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing
substantially the same functions in created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in
terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department
or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices; and
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided
in Section 3 hereof.
None of these badges of bad faith exist in this case. Petitioner city
followed the order of priority under Section 4 of its ordinance. It
required applicants to undergo medical examination with the local
hospital and considered the hospital chief’s recommendations.
Unfortunately, these allegations showing good faith is not enough to
declare the program created by petitioner city as a reorganization that
justifies the creation of a retirement benefit plan.
COA’s justification for its decision was anchored on Section 28,
paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, otherwise known as the
Government Service Insurance Act, as amended by Republic Act No.
4968. This proscribes all supplementary retirement or pension plans for
government employees: “No insurance or retirement plan for officers
or employees shall be created by any employer. All supplementary
retirement or pension plans heretofore in force in any government
office, agency, or instrumentality or corporation owned and controlled
by the government, are hereby declared inoperative or abolished.“ The
purpose behind the proscription was to address the need to prevent
the proliferation of inequitous plans. According to Conte v. Commission
on Audit, to ignore such rule would be tantamount to permitting every
other government office or agency to put up its own supplementary
retirement benefit plan under the guise of such "financial assistance”.
Petitioner city invoked Republic Act No. 6656, which provides that
employees separated from the service as a result of any reorganization
shall be entitled to separation pay, retirement, and other benefits. The
text of the ordinance indicates its purpose of encouraging employees,
especially those who are unproductive due to health reasons, to avail
of the program even before they reach the compulsory retirement age.
Section 6 provides for a form of severance pay to those who availed of
GenSan SERVES, which was executed in good faith. The benefits
provided in Section 6 serve its purpose of inducing petitioner city’s
employees, who are unproductive due to health reasons, to retire
early. Furthermore, the benefits under GenSan SERVES were only
given to a select few—the sickly and unproductive due to health
reasons. Certainly, this negates the position that the benefits provide
for supplementary retirement benefits that augment existing
retirement laws.
In any case, petitioner city is authorized by the Local Government
Code to approve ordinances to provide for the care of the sick as
provided in SECTION 458 of the LGC. This is also consistent with the
constitutional mandate for a comprehensive approach to health
development, with priority for the needs of the sick in Article XIII,
Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, the cash gift for the sickly employees, lifetime free medical
consultation in petitioner city's hospital, and other similar benefits
under Section 6 of the ordinance are valid. The proscription under
Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended,
does not apply to Section 6 of the ordinance. Consequently, the
Commission on Audit acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
declared the entire ordinance void and of no effect.
41) TATEL V. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC
G.R. NO. 40243, MARCH 11, 1992
FACTS: Petitioner Tatel was engaged in the import and export of
abaca and other products. He filed a Petition for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction with the CFI against the Municipal Council of
Virac enjoining them from enforcing Resolution No. 29, declaring the
petitioner’s warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Art. 694
of the Civil and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said
47
warehouse to a more suitable place within 2 months from receipt of
the resolution.
The Municipal Council contended that the warehouse was constructed
in violation of Ordinance No. 13 which prohibited the construction of
warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios
without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said
block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.
Petitioner also contended that the assailed ordinance was
unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Was Ordinance 13, which prohibited the construction of
warehouses near a block of houses, a legitimate exercise of
the police power of the Municipal Council?
2. Was it proper for the ordinance to be given a meaning other
than and different from what it provided by declaring that
petitioner violated the same by using the warehouse for
storage of abaca and copra when what is prohibited and
penalized by the ordinance is the construction of
warehouses?
3. Was it proper on the part of the municipality to refuse to
take judicial notice of the fact that there are numerous
establishments similarly situated but which were not
prosecuted?
RULING: The Court found no merit in the Petition.
1. Yes. Ordinance 13 was passed in the exercise of the
Municipality of Virac’s police power. Municipal corporations
are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local self-government as such are endowed
with the police power in order to effectively accomplish and
carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority
emanates from the general welfare clause under the
Administrative Code.
Requisites for the validity of an ordinance
a. Must be within the corporate powers of the municipality
to enact
b. In accordance to the procedure prescribed by law
c. In consonance with certain well established and basic
principles of a substantive nature
Criteria for a valid ordinance
d. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
e. Must not be unfair or oppressive
f. Must not be partial or discriminatory
g. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade
h. Must be general and consistent with public policy
i. Must not be unreasonable
2. A different was not given to the ordinance in question. What
is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of
warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where
such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters
from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a
warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and
property in case of fire which is one of the primordial
obligation of the government. The trial court merely stated
the purpose of the ordinance and what it intends to prohibit
to accomplish its purpose.
3. The mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have
not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality
allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim
that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be
made between the law itself and the manner in
which said law is implemented by the agencies in
charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no
valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of
proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are
operating in violation of the ordinance and that the
complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned
without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.
42) ALFREDO TANO, ET. AL VS. HON. GOV. SALVADOR P.
SOCRATES, ET. AL,
G.R. NO. 110249, 21 AUGUST 1997
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinance No. 15-92 (An Ordinance Banning the Shipment of all live
fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to
January 1, 1998 and providing exemptions, penalties and other
purposes thereof). Subsequently, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan enacted Ordinance No. 2 prohibiting the catching, gathering,
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years in and coming from Palawan
waters.
It was alleged that the implementation of the ordinances deprived
petitioners of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted
them from the practice of trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII
and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners alleged that they have the preferential rights for the use of
the communal marine and fishing resources as they are subsistence or
marginal fishermen. Respondents Gov Socrates and members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, on one hand, argued that Ordinance No. 2
is a valid exercise of the Provincial Government’s power under the
general welfare clause and its specific power to protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger
the environment.
ISSUE: Are the challenged ordinances violative of the Constitution?
RULING: No. The challenged ordinances did not suffer from any
infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is absolutely no showing
that any of them qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow
any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the
duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth.
Moreover, the preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen
to the use of marine resources is not absolute. In accordance with the
Regalian doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant
to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
"exploration, development and utilization . . . shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State." Anent Section 7 of Article
XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing
resources, but of their protection, development and
conservation. As hereafter shown, the challenged ordinances are
meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources
to the end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only
for the present generation, but also for the generations to
come.
Furthermore, one of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of
the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal
waters which necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to
effectively carry out fishery laws within the municipal waters. The
principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC
eliminate doubts as to the validity of the questioned Ordinances.
43) LIM vs. PACQUING
September 1, 1994
FACTS: The City of Manila passed an Ordinance on 1971
allowing the operation of jai-alai. The city of Manila was then
ordered by judge Pacquing to issue permits to ADC in operating jai-
alai’s. After which, PD 771 was then issued which revoked the powers
of LGU's to grant permits or licenses and cancelling all existing
franchises to operate jai-alai. Less than two months after PD 771 was
issued, the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation was granted
48
a franchise to operate a jai-alai under PD 810. However, after EDSA
Revolution, PD 810 was repealed. When private respondent sought to
resume its franchise under the Ordinance, the trial court granted itand
ordered the Mayor to grant the necessary permit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Associated Development Corporation has a
valid and subsisting franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai?
RULING: NO. It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not
delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or
betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to
franchise". What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in
Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was the
power to "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore means
that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate
a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are
accepted, would not amount to something meaningful UNLESS
the holder of the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by
the national government to so operate. Moreover, even this
power to license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was
removed from local governments, including the City of Manila, and
transferred to the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No. 392.
The net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the
operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory
function is vested in the GAB.
In relation, therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no
franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate
even if its has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the
jai-alai in the City of Manila.
44) CRUZ VS. PARAS
G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
TOPIC: Local Police Power: General Welfare Clause; Scope and
Limitations
FACTS: Petitioners, as licensed club operators, assailed the validity of
Ordinance No. 84 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue,
Bulacan. They alleged that Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a
municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation
or calling; that Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to
due process and the equal protection of the law, as the license
previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial
hearing. They further alleged that the night clubs are well-lighted and
have no partitions, the tables being near each other; That the
petitioners do not allow the hospitality girls therein to engage in
immoral acts and to go out with customers; That these hospitality girls
are made to go through periodic medical check-ups and not one of
them is suffering from any venereal disease and that those who fail to
submit to a medical check-up or those who are found to be infected
with venereal disease are not allowed to work; That the crime rate
there is better than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of
Bulacan.
The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance
No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by
way of appeal. "Those who lust cannot last. This in essence is why the
Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, stigmatized as it has been
by innuendos of sexual titillation and fearful of what the awesome
future holds for it, had no alternative except to order thru its legislative
machinery, and even at the risk of partial economic dislocation, the
closure of its night clubs and/or cabarets.”
Issue: Can a municipal corporation prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses.
Ruling: No. Police power is granted to municipal corporations. “The
municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law
and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”
If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly
the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. It cannot be said
that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering
public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose
sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the Administrative Code
provision, is set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149 defining the
powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows: " (a)
Enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law,
and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health,
safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve
public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of
property therein xxx (rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses and lodging houses, except travel
agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe
restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards which shall
remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of
Tourism which shall exercise such authority without infringing on the
taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss) Regulate public
dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or massage
parlors; (tt) Regulate the establishment and operation of billiard pools,
theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment;
..." It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business. All that petitioners
would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate
night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such
businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial
correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the
operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate
regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their
establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount
to no more than a temporary termination of their business. During
such time, their employees would undergo a period of deprivation.
Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome can be avoided, it should be.
ORTIGAS VS FEATI
94 SCRA 533
Facts:
Plaintiff Ortigas & Co, vendor, entered into separate agreements with
Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles on a sale on
installments over two parcels of land known as Lots No. 5 and 6, Block
31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated in Mandaluyong, Rizal.
The Angeles transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid
lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. When the payment was given for
the purchased price over the lots, Ortigas & Co executed the
corresponding deed of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. The said
agreement of the sale on statements as well as the deeds of sale
contained restrictions:
1. The parcel of land subject of the sale shall be used exclusively for
residential purposes, and shall not be entitled to take or remove soil,
stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements except the fence which may
be constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials
and properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations
connected either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank,
and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its
boundary lines.
Eventually Feati Bank acquired the said lots. The said lots were later
49
on declared as commercial and industrial zone as per resolution NO. 27
of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal.
Feati bank constructed buildings devoted to banking purposes, but
which it also claimed that could also be devoted to, and used
exclusively for residential purposes. Ortigas and Co upon knowing of
such fact demanded Feati to stop the construction of the commercial
building. The latter refused stating that the said buidling was
constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations.
Hence a civil case was filed seeking for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
RTC dismissed the complaint. It went up to the SC.
Issues:
1. whether resolution no. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power;
2. whether the said resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.
Held:
i. whether resolution no. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police
power;
Without Merit.
The validity of the resolution was never questioned before the court.
And the validity of the resolution was admitted at least impliedly, in the
stipulation of facts of the case. But assuming arguendo that it is not
yet too late in the day for Ortigas & Co to raise said issue, it is still
unsustainable.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy
Act, "empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations"; for the municipality.
Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power
through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is
not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the
intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the
provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the
power exists "(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ...
" 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Municipal board
An examination of Section 12 of the same law which prescribes the
rules for its interpretation likewise reveals that the implied
power of a municipality should be "liberally construed in its
favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the
local government and it shall be presumed to exist." The same
section further mandates that the general welfare clause be liberally
interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to local
governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and
material progress of the people in the community. The only exceptions
under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract
between "a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third
party on the other," in which case the original terms and provisions of
the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in
the case at bar.
ii. whether the said resolution can nullify or supersede the
contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.
While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the
rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety
and general welfare of the people.
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of highway 54,
now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard
to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously
passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise
of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace,
good order and general welfare of the people in the locality, Judicial
notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially
where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front
the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished
about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through
several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an
endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution
are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in
its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of
Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if not
perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject
resolution.
It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building restrictions were
assumed by the defendant-appellee as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in
the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 101613 and 106092, the contractual obligations so assumed
cannot prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police power through the
said resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare
Lots Nos. 5 and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced.
BALACUIT V CFI
GR NO. L-38429
JUNE 30, 1988
Facts:
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April
21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½ of the ticket price given to
minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a
2-6 month imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to
prevent the law from being enforced. The respondent court entered
its decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.
640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of
police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within
the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section
can only fix license fees for theatres and not admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by
invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the
cited law.
Issue:
Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the
fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and
amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the
general welfare clause as invoked by the City?
Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional.
Petition granted.
1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted
to include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would
seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and
amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make
proper police regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be
exercised.
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of
theatres, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition
are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the
exercise of delegated police power by the local government.
People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run
cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was
upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power.
50
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to
enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied
in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it
under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said
ordinance
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that
the interest of the public generally requires an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual
and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words,
the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the courts.
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process
clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust,
confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right
of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theatre owners
are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission
prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.
Homeowners Association- the exercise of police power is necessarily
subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the
regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the
fundamental law
The court agrees with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified
by any necessity for the public interest. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes
and means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of
cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of
money for the admission of their children, as they would for
themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean
corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are
the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does
not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise
penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as
petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation
because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of
the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age
as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The
ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable
practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that
birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age
of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that
the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive
upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no
discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion
of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children
are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how the
children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission. They are
treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults.
Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and
theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome
movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to
avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for
themselves.
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license,
revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be
evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the
purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the
performance on condition that he behaves properly. Such ticket,
therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may
be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right
is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that
right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the
owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the
contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to
sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain.
In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The State has
not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the
admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however,
that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even
to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important
both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of
the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of
issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing
cultural traits are considerable.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally
true that such regulation must be within the bounds of
reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable,
and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an
arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of
regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of
regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of
police power.
A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and
operation of a business should not encroach upon the
legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property
rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property
shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and,
as such, within the protection of the due process clause.
Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless
be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the
face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence
LUCENA GRAND TERMINAL, INC V. JAC LINER, INC
GR NO. 148339
23 FEBRUARY 2005
Facts:
Respondent JAC Liner, a common carrier operating buses which ply
various routes to and from Lucena City assailed City Ordinances Nos.
1631 and 1778 of Lucena City as unconstitutional on the grounds that
the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power and an undue
taking of private property.
Ordinance 1631 grants the petitioner a franchise to construct, operate
and maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City.
Sec 4 (c) of said Ordinance provides that during the City of Lucena
“shall not grant any third party any privilege to operate a bus, mini-bus
and/or jeepney terminal.” Ordinance 1778, on the other hand,
regulates the entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses
and out-of-town passenger jeepneys. Under said ordinance, all
temporary terminals are hereby declared inoperable starting from the
efffectivity of this ordinance; and that no other terminals shall be
situated inside or within the City of Lucena.
Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one
of those affected by the ordinances. The RTC of Lucena rendered
judgment, declaring City Ordinance 1631 as valid, having been issued
in the exercise of police power, but declared its Sec. 4 (c) as illegal
and ultra vires. It also declared City Ordinance 1778 as null and void,
for being an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of police
power.
Issue: Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power
when it enacted the subject ordinances?
Held: NO. That traffic congestion is a public concern cannot be
gainsaid. The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the
51
objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they
involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The
first requisite for the proper exercise of police power, which is lawful
subject, is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of
whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod
to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to
a single location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation
of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those
already existing, and allow the operation of only one common
terminal, the franchise for which was granted to petitioner.
The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus
compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities
of petitioner. These ordinances assailed herein are
characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally,
since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would
subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is
unduly oppressive.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede
the flow of traffic. Neither are terminals public nuisances as
petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate business
which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of
property, health or comfort of the community. But even
assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged I ndirect
effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per
accidens, not per se. Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it
may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial
proceedings. In the subject ordinances, the scope of the proscription
against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities
which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised
terminal are barred from operating at all.
Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it
is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness,
which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law
were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be
justified whenever they happen to be effective. The weight of popular
opinion must be balanced with that of an individual’s rights.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL V CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA
GR NO. L-24693
JULY 31, 1967
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its
members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance
4670 to be applicable in the city of Manila.They claimed that the
ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate
due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They
also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class
motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a
form specifying their personal information.There was also a provision
that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They
claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.The law
also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in
each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners
also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary. It was
also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more
than twice every 24 hours.There was also a prohibition for persons
below 18 in the hotel.The challenged ordinance also caused the
automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the
ordinance.The lower court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional.Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of
the due process clause?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is
no violation of constitutional due process for being reasonable and the
ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any
irregularity on its face. Thus it would be unreasonable to stigmatize an
ordinance enacted precisely for the well-being of the people, especially
if there is no factual foundation being laid to prove its alleged violation
of due process and offset the ordinance’s presumed validity.
CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUIO
GR NO. 118127
APRIL 12, 2005
Facts:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with
the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance
enacted which prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment,
services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment
and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The
Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage
parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets,
motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments
are given three months to wind up business operations or transfer to
any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other
kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in
case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTDC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying
that the Ordinancebe declared invalid and unconstitutional for several
reasons.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is unconstitutional?
HELD: YES
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only
be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
A. The Ordinance contravenesthe Constitution
The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster
under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the
prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the
principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that
the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept
that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their
derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. The Ordinance was
passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power,
an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress.
This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC,
known as the general welfare clause. The enactment of the
Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
52

A.1 It infringes the due process clause
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on
government, usually called procedural due process and substantive
due process.Procedural due processrefers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property while substantive due processasks whether the government
has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or
property.It looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the
governments action.
The police power granted to local government units must always be
exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly
be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property
A.1.aRequisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not
met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it
appear that
(1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the
means employed must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive.
It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights
can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the police measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall
be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation
of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting
for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council’s police powers, the means
employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and
unduly oppressive.The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the
eradication of the community’s social ills can be achieved through
means less restrictive of private rights;. The closing down and
transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses
“allowed” under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to
the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the
prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se
protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the
community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills
of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
spread of sexual disease in Manila.
A.1.b Means employed are constitutionally infirm
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors,
massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs,
super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in
the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators
of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the
date of approval of the Ordinance within which to wind up business
operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area
or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within
the area. Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent
violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the premises of the
erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the
Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the
constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to
liberty and property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare. In accordance with this case,
the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced
in the concept of liberty
A.1.c Modality employed is unlawful taking
The Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially
divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The
Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated
businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its
owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside
the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An
ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes
beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property without just compensation. It is intrusive and
violative of the private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A
possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or
physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the
governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use
of the property. What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory
takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner
that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A
regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land will require compensation under the takings clause.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited
establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to
wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business
operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the
owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed
business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left
empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he
will likewise leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be
given to the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices
which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of
time. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businesses are
confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also
equivalent to a taking of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning
ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police
power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which cannot
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property
without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor
intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation.
Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity
and eminent domain. It needs restating that the property taken in
the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose while the property taken under the
power of eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and
is therefore wholesome. If it be of public benefit that a wholesome
property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then
53
certainly the public should bear the cost of reasonable compensation
for the condemnation of private property for public use
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the
petitioners actions. Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use
of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the
rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must
not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of
unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions
A.2. The Ordinance violates EqualProtection Clause
To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class
In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between
motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public.
No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a
just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. The Court
likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation
of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located
outside the area.
A.3. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra
vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter
merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit,
the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the
only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate
them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from
cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the
general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may
be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It cannot
be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or
comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for
that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs
counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC,
the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area
into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse
or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have
force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council
to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the
general law.
White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila
GR No. 122846
January 20, 2009
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed
into law the Ordinance.4
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An
Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission
and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted
terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the
City of Manila.
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void
since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is
an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and
oppressive interference in their business.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities, among other local government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Ruling:
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized
in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling
state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance
would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash
rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families
are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the
power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who
wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for
abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of
persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few
hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can
legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient
alternative.
However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments
as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as
restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and
renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality
without accommodating innocuous intentions.
Abraham Rimando Vs. Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc.
GR No. 198860
July 23, 2012
Facts:
The present controversy stemmed from a petition for mandamus and
damages filed before Branch 67 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bauang, La Union, by Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc.,
represented by its President, Rosemarie Llarenas (respondent) against
Abraham P. Rimando, mayor of the Municipality of Naguilian, La Union.
The petition prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel
the petitioner to issue a business permit in favor of the respondent.
In support of its plea, the respondent claimed that its business is being
conducted on a parcel of land which formerly belonged to the national
government but later on certified by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) as an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain. The petitioner refused to issue a business permit
unless and until the respondent executes a contract of lease with the
54
Municipality of Naguilian. The parties did not reach a common ground
hence, the petition for mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus to release the respondent’s business
permit?
Held:
A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit
since the exercise of the same is a delegated police power hence,
discretionary in nature.
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the
delegated police power to local governments. Local government units
exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the
municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and
suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance.
As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the
matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of
mandamus.
Fernando vs St. Scholastica’s College
GR No. 161107
March 12, 2013
FACTS:
Respondents St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) and St. Scholastica’s
Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are educational institutions
organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with
principal offices and business addresses at Malate, Manila, and at
Marikina Heights, Marikina City, respectively.Respondent SSC is the
owner of four (4) parcels of land located in Marikina Heights. Located
within the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of
the Benedictine Order, the formation house of the novices, and the
retirement house for the elderly sisters. The property is enclosed by a
tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting
the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other
improvements.
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No.
192, entitled "Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the
Municipality of Marikina." Subsequently, Ordinance Nos. 217 and
200were enacted to amend Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance
No. 192, as amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
ORDINANCE No. 192
Series of 1994
ORDINANCE REGULATING THE CONSTRUCTION OF FENCES AND
WALLS IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF MARIKINA
WHEREAS, under Section 447.2 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the
Sangguniang Bayan as the local legislative body of the municipality to
"x xx Prescribe reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property
within the jurisdiction of the municipality, x xx";
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the
National Building Code of the Philippines, does not adequately provide
technical guidelines for the construction of fences, in terms of design,
construction, and criteria;
WHEREAS, the adoption of such technical standards shall provide more
efficient and effective enforcement of laws on public safety and
security; XXX
Section 1. Coverage: This Ordinance regulates the construction of all
fences, walls and gates on lots classified or used for residential,
commercial, industrial, or special purposes.
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this
ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in
height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be of an open fence
type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru; XXX
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5)
meter parking area allowance located between the front monument
line and the building line of commercial and industrial establishments
and educational and religious institutions.
Section 7. Transitory Provision. Real property owners whose existing
fences and walls do not conform to the specifications herein are
allowed adequate period of time from the passage of this Ordinance
within which to conform, as follows:
(1) Residential houses – eight (8) years
(2) Commercial establishments – five (5) years
(3) Industrial establishments – three (3) years
(4) Educational institutions – five (5) years (public and privately
owned)
Section 8. Penalty. Walls found not conforming to the provisions of this
Ordinance shall be demolished by the municipal government at the
expense of the owner of the lot or structure.
APPROVED: September 30, 1994
The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina
property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move it
back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to
park.The respondents requested for an extension of time to comply
with the directive. In response, the petitioners, through then City
Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the enforcement of the subject
ordinance.
Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with
an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina.
The respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of
jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192, asserting that such
contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. That
demolishing their fence and constructing it six (6) meters back would
result in the loss of at least 1,808.34 square meters along West Drive,
and at least 1,954.02 square metersalong East Drive. It would also
result in the destruction of the garbage house, covered walk, electric
house, storage house, comfort rooms, guards’ room, guards’ post,
waiting area for visitors, waiting area for students, Blessed Virgin
Shrine, P.E. area, and the multi-purpose hall, resulting in the
permanent loss of their beneficial use. The respondents, thus, asserted
that the implementation of the ordinance on their property would be
tantamount to an appropriation of property without due process of
law; and that the petitioners could only appropriate a portion of their
property through eminent domain. They also pointed out that the goal
of the provisions to deter lawless elements and criminality did not exist
as the solid concrete walls of the school had served as sufficient
protection for many years.
The petitioners countered that the ordinance was a valid exercise of
police power, by virtue of which, they could restrain property rights for
the protection of public safety, health, morals, or the promotion of
public convenience and general prosperity.
On the merits, the RTC rendered a decisiongranting the petition and
ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition commanding the
petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing
Ordinance No. 192 on the respondents’ property. It ruled that the
assailed ordinance was neither remedial nor curative in nature,
considering that at the time the respondents’ perimeter wall was built,
the same was valid and legal, and the ordinance did not refer to any
previous legislation that it sought to correct.
The CA dismissed the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision.
In this case, the petitioners admit that Section 5 of the assailed
ordinance, pertaining to the five-meter setback requirement is, as held
by the lower courts, invalid. Nonetheless, the petitioners argue that
such invalidity was subsequently cured by Zoning Ordinance No. 303,
55
series of 2000. They also contend that Section 3, relating to the 80%
see-thru fence requirement, must be complied with, as it remains to
be valid.
ISSUE:
Whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises
of police power by the City Government of Marikina
RULING:
No. The CA was correct in affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing
the writ of prohibition. The petitioners must permanently desist from
enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance on the
respondents' property in Marikina City.
"Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make
statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people."The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise
of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State.
This delegation of police power is embodied in Section 16of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the General
Welfare Clause, which has two branches. "The first, known as the
general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to enact
ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second, known as
the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact
ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety,
prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of
the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their
property."
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,25 discusses the test of a valid
ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.26
Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the
apparent exercise of its police power. To successfully invoke the
exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court
– the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in
analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis
examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further
a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review,
governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of
less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the
focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest.
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance
No. 192, series of 1994 must be struck down for not being reasonably
necessary to accomplish the City’s purpose. More importantly, it is
oppressive of private rights.
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the
following requisites as discussed in Social Justice Society (SJS) v.
Atienza, Jr.:
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having
properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites are
met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there
must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
Otherwise, the police power measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process
clause.
Section 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance are pertinent to the issue
at hand, to wit:
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed under this
ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in
height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be an open fence type,
at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru;
x xx
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5)
meter parking area allowance located between the front monument
line and the building line of commercial and industrial establishments
and educational and religious institutions.
The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners from
requiring them to (1) demolish their existing concrete wall, (2) build a
fence (in excess of one meter) which must be 80% see-thru, and (3)
build the said fence six meters back in order to provide a parking area.
Setback Requirement
The petitioners initially argued that the ownership of the parking area
to be created would remain with the respondents as it would primarily
be for the use of its students and faculty, and that its use by the public
on non-school days would only be incidental.
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback
requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the public,
considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive use of the
respondents as it would also be available for use by the general public.
Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent
domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the
ownership of the property will continue to remain with the
respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of title nor
the total destruction of value is essential to taking. In fact, it is usually
in cases where the title remains with the private owner that inquiry
should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is
merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. The Court is
of the view that the implementation of the setback
requirement would be tantamount to a taking of a total of
3,762.36 square meters of the respondents’ private property
for public use without just compensation, in contravention to
the Constitution.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and
"un-neighborliness," it is obvious that providing for a parking area has
no logical connection to, and is not reasonably necessary for,
the accomplishment of these goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback
requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not, under
the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial
use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the community.The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be
unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the
respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
80% See-Thru Fence Requirement
The petitioners argue that while Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 may
be invalid, Section 3.1 limiting the height of fences to one meter and
requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru,
should remain valid and enforceable against the respondents.
The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner.
56
For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners
must show the reasonable relation between the purpose of the police
power measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for
even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or
prevent the concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts." The ultimate
goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime to ensure public
safety and security. The means employed by the petitioners, however,
is not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose
and is unduly oppressive to private rights. The petitioners have not
adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious to this
Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide better
protection and a higher level of security, or serve as a more
satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid concrete wall.
It may even be argued that such exposed premises could
entice and tempt would-be criminals to the property, and that
a see-thru fence would be easier to bypass and breach. It also
appears that the respondents’ concrete wall has served as more than
sufficient protection over the last 40 years. `
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with
the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to
property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to
protect their property.
The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue
interference with the respondents’ rights to property and privacy.
Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is, thus, also invalid and cannot be
enforced against the respondents.
Legaspi v City of Cebu
G.R. No. 159110
December 10, 2013
FACTS:
1. On Jan 27 1997 the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu passed
Ordinance 1664 which authorized the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to
immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and
prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City).
Pertinent provisions of the said ordinance are as follows:
Section 1. POLICY – It is the policy of the government of the City of
Cebu to immobilize any motor vehicle violating any provision of any
City Ordinance on Parking Prohibitions or Restrictions, more
particularly Ordinance No. 801, otherwise known as the Traffic Code of
Cebu City, as amended, in order to have a smooth flow of vehicular
traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times.
Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLES – Any vehicle found
violating any provision of any existing ordinance of the City of Cebu
which prohibits, regulates or restricts the parking of vehicles shall be
immobilized by clamping any tire of the said violating vehicle with the
use of a denver boot vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget
designed to immobilize motor vehicles. For this particular purpose, any
traffic enforcer of the City (regular PNP Personnel or Cebu City Traffic
Law Enforcement Personnel) is hereby authorized to immobilize any
violating vehicle as hereinabove provided.
Section 3. PENALTIES – Any motor vehicle, owner or driver violating
any ordinance on parking prohibitions, regulations and/or restrictions,
as may be provided under Ordinance No. 801, as amended, or any
other existing ordinance, shall be penalized in accordance with the
penalties imposed in the ordinance so violated, provided that the
vehicle immobilizer may not be removed or released without its owner
or driver paying first to the City Treasurer of Cebu City through the
Traffic Violations Bureau (TVB) all the accumulated penalties for all
prior traffic law violations that remain unpaid or unsettled, plus the
administrative penalty of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for the
immobilization of the said vehicle, and receipts of such payments
presented to the concerned personnel of the bureau responsible for
the release of the immobilized vehicle, unless otherwise ordered
released by any of the following officers:
a) Chairman, CITOM
b) Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology
c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belciña
3.1 Any person who tampers or tries to release an immobilized or
clamped motor vehicle by destroying the denver boot vehicle
immobilizer or other such special gadgets, shall be liable for its loss or
destruction and shall be prosecuted for such loss or destruction under
pain or penalty under the Revised Penal Code and any other existing
ordinance of the City of Cebu for the criminal act, in addition to his/her
civil liabilities under the Civil Code of the Philippines; Provided that any
such act may not be compromised nor settled amicably extrajudicially.
3.2 Any immobilized vehicle which is unattended and constitute an
obstruction to the free flow of traffic or a hazard thereof shall be
towed to the city government impounding area for safekeeping and
may be released only after the provision of Section 3 hereof shall have
been fully complied with.
3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance shall, upon
conviction, be penalized with imprisonment of not less than one (1)
month nor more than six (6) months or of a fine of not less than Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) nor more than Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of
the court.[2]
2. On July 29, 1997, – two lawyers filed a suit seeking the declaration
of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due
process and for being contrary to law, and damages. One of the
lawyers, Jaban Sr – parked his car in a paying parking area but his car
was immobilized after 10 mins; the car was impounded for 3 days and
he had to pay 4.2k fine without court hearing or due process of reason
why the car was immobilized. A similar thing happened to the author
lawyer – Jaban Jr – who parked his car in a secluded place where
there was no sign prohibiting parking, he had to pay pay 1.4k.
3. On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi – sued in RTC Cebu to
demand the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the
Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages. He left his car outside the
gate of his house, occupying part of the road and the sidewalk to
make way for the vehicle of the “anay” exterminator who had asked to
be allowed to unload his materials and equipment with the assurance
that the unloading would not take too long. While waiting for the anay
exterminator to finish unloading, the phone in his office inside the
house had rung, impelling him to go into the house to answer the call;
that after a short while, his son-in-law informed him that unknown
persons had clamped the front wheel of his car.
4. The City Attorney of Cebu, as a defense, said that the officers only
upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the plaintiffs. They added
that the said ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality
and validity.
5. On Jan 22 1999 – RTC declared Ordinance No. 1664 as null and
void – for violating due process - In both procedural and substantive
due process, a hearing is always a pre-requisite; depriving its owner of
the use thereof at the sole determination of any traffic enforcer or
regular PNP personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement
Personnel. It was indicated that the owner of the immobilized vehicle
shall have to undergo all these ordeals at the mercy of the Traffic Law
Enforcer who, as the Ordinance in question mandates, is the arresting
officer, prosecutor, Judge and collector.
57
6. CA – reversed RTC, declared Ord 1664 valid. The CA stated that and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of
Ordinance 1664 is a legitimate exercise of police power of the streets and public places;(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu. and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon
and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare,
ISSUES authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal
1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit constructions in public places.
of the legislative powers of the City of Cebu - YES
2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the
The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to leave to
requirements for validity and constitutionality, particularly
the cities themselves the task of confronting the problem of traffic
the limitations set by the Constitution and the relevant
congestions associated with development and progress because they
statutes - YES
were directly familiar with the situations in their respective
jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs would be in the best position to craft
HELD:
their traffic codes because of their familiarity with the conditions
The Supreme Court denied the petitions for their lack of merit. The
peculiar to their communities. With the broad latitude in this regard
decision of the CA was affirmed.
allowed to the LGUs of the cities ,their traffic regulations must be held
valid and effective unless they infringed the constitutional limitations
Citing City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. the court restated the tests for a
and statutory safeguards.
valid ordinance:
In compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the substantive
1. must be within the corporate powers of the local
requirements:
government unit to enact
The Court discussed the 2 aspects of the guaranty of due process:
2. must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
1. procedural due process - procedures that the government
law,
must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
3. must also conform to the following substantive requirements
property (i.e. notices and hearings)
a. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2. substantive due process - adequate reason for taking
b. must not be unfair or oppressive;
away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In other words,
c. must not be partial or discriminatory;
substantive due process looks to whether there is sufficient
d. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
justification for the government’s action.
e. must be general and consistent with public policy; and
f. must not be unreasonable
Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the
In compliance with the formal requirements:
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of
fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy. The terms
The enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 was within the corporate
encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC were
powers of the LGU of the City of Cebu. No issues were raised against
broad enough to include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else
the formalities of the enactment of the ordinance, so compliance is
obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks
presumed. Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the
delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely:
Petitioners say that they were not accorded the opportunity to protest
the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of
the clamping, towing, and impounding of the vehicles, or even to be
taxation, but with parameters and limitations. It bears stressing that
heard and to explain their side prior to the immobilization of their
police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot
vehicles; and that the ordinance was oppressive and arbitrary for that
be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
reason. Any vehicle owner may protest such action of a traffic enforcer
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this
or PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance. – the ordinance permits the
power to the President and administrative boards as well as the
release of a vehicle upon a protest directly made to the Chairman of
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.
CITOM; or to the Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and
Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers
Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belciña,
as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
even without payment of the fine. None of the petitioners resorted to
this. Such did not diminish the fairness and reasonableness of the
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of
escape clause written in the ordinance. The immobilization of a vehicle
Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations
by clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the driver
was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally
or vehicle owner was around at the time of the apprehension. In that
by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the
situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver to move
LGC.24Section 458of the LGC relevantly states: Section 458. Powers,
the vehicle or issue a traffic citation. The towing away of the
Duties, Functions and Composition. –(a) The sangguniang panlungsod,
immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but
as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic.
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the
As to the compliance with the procedural due process:
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for
under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due
process. Yet, there are many instances under our laws in which the
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective absence of one or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial
delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under or deprivation of due process. These are: cancellation of the passport
Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, of a person being sought for the commission of a crime, preventive
shall: suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges, the
distraint of properties to answer for tax delinquencies, the padlocking
of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks,
movies, and the abatement of nuisance per se, arrest of a person in
bridges, parks and other public places and approve the
flagrante delicto. The same applies to the clamping of the tires of the
construction, improvement repair and maintenance of the
vehicles of the petitioners.
same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or
regulate the use of the same by privately-owned vehicles
The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires
which serve the public; regulate garages and operation of
was necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time
conveyances for hire;designate stands to be occupied by
of apprehension. The lack of a hearing does not constitute a breach of
public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting up of
procedural due process, for giving the transgressors the chance to
signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets;
reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest. Such clamping of
58
the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce
the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors
would evade liability by simply driving away.
Legaspi refers to a different ruling in the Astillero case – but SC says
this is an irrelevant ruling - it should be the RTC that had improperly
acted for so deciding the Astillero case despite the appeals in these
cases being already pending in the CA.
- the same RTC should have exercised a “becoming modesty” on the
issue of the constitutionality of the same ordinance that the
Constitution required the majority vote of the Members of the Court
sitting en banc to determine.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS ATIENZA
GR NO. 156052
MARCH 7, 2007
FACTS:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent mayor approved the
ordinance on November 28, 2001. It became effective on December
28, 2001, after its publication.Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted
pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a
principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact
laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health,
morals and general welfare of the society.
This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:
SECTION1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and
ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of
[those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR
Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the
southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the
northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in
the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of
Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, MarcelinoObrero St.,
Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from
Industrial II to Commercial I.
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the
operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are
hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of
this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of
businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within six months
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called " Pandacan
Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron
Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
with the oil companies in which they agreed that " the scaling down of
the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option."
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In
the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was
effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.
Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunianadopted Resolution
No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003
and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the
oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a
reassessment of the ordinance. Meanwhile, petitioners filed this
original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor
Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
ISSUE:
WON the City Mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
the said ordinance.
RULING:
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition
for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel
the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already
imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner
should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
performance of the act and it must be the clear and
imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance
with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt
exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command
and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is
neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal
right but to implement that which is already established.
Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not
issue.
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the
enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political
party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in
Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of Manila.
The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents
of Manila. We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous
cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and
its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in
the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest
and they need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of
Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the
city's ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners
to institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon
respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by
the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is
his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., we stated the reason for this: These officers
cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is
obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if
these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them
and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers
of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the
law and are bound to obey it.
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with
the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the
Sanggunian have made the respondent's duty to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the
second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and
Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can
amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU
were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which
ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it
full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is
nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No.
8027. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines,
along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to
59
protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic
devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack
on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a
protective measure should be delayed.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. LIM
GR Nos. 187836 & 187916
November 25, 2014
FACTS:
This is a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza,
Jr. Petitioners challenge the validity of Ordinance No. 8187 entitled
"AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 8119, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS ‘THE MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN
AND ZONING ORDINANCE OF 2006,’ BY CREATING A MEDIUM
INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) AND HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-
3), AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT" enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila (Sangguniang Panlungsod) on 14
May 2009. Creating a medium industrial zone (1-2) and heavy
industrial zone (1-3) effectively lifted the prohibition against owners
and operators of businesses. Such ordinance contains provisions
contrary to those embodied in Ordinance No. 8027.
In G.R. 1878836, they contended the Ordinance not a valid exercise of
police power because the measures provided therein do not promote
the general welfare of the people within the contemplation of the
following provisions of law:
a) Article III, Section 18 (kk) of Republic Act No. 409 otherwise
known as the "Revised Charter of the City of Manila," which
provides that the Municipal Board shall have the legislative power
to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper;
b) Section 16 of Republic Act No. 7160 known as the Local
Government Code, which defines the scope of the general welfare
clause;
In G.R. No. 187916, alleges violation of the right to health of the
people and the right to a healthful and balanced environment under
Sections 15 and 16 of the Constitution.
Respondent contends that it is the function of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to enact zoning ordinances, for which reason, it may
proceed to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 without prior referral
to the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals (MZBAA) as
prescribed under Section 80 (Procedure for Re-Zoning) and the City
Planning and Development Office (CPDO) pursuant to Section 81
(Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance) of Ordinance No. 8119,
especially when the action actually originated from the Sangguniang
Panlungsod itself.
That the assailed ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; that it
is consistent with the general welfare clause and public policy, and is
not unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the Constitution,
municipal laws, and international conventions; and that the petitioners
failed to overcome the presumption of validity of the assailed
ordinance.
ISSUE:
Is the Ordinance a valid exercise of Police Power under the General
Welfare Clause?
RULING:
NO. The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the
SangguniangPanlungsod is vested with the power to "reclassify land
within the jurisdiction of the city "subject to the pertinent provisions of
the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or
repealed by another ordinance. These have been properly applied in
G.R. No. 156052, where the Court upheld the position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of the
Ordinance, and declared that the mayor has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027, provided that it has not been repealed by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise annulled by the courts.
In the same case, the Court also used the principle that the
SanguniangPanlungsod is in the best position to determine the needs
of its Constituents – that the removal of the oil depots from the
Pandacan area is necessary "to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals.
In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had already
changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was passed in favor of the retention of
the oil depots. In 2012, again when some of the previous members
were no longer re-elected, but with the Vice-Mayor still holding the
same seat.
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the conditions
with respect to the operations of the oil depots existing prior to the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ to this
day, as would later be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on
the new composition of the council and/or political affiliations.
The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the
"general welfare" of the city does not after all gear towards
the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning, but
is, one way or another, dependent on the personal preference
of the members who sit in the council as to which particular
sector among its constituents it wishes to favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors,
has changed its view on the matter, favoring the city’s economic
related benefits, through the continued stay of the oil terminals, over
the protection of the very lives and safety of its constituents, it is
imperative for this Court to make a final determination on the
basis of the facts on the table as to which specific right of the
inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present
controversy, history reveals that there is truly no such thing as
"the will of Manila" insofar as the general welfare of the
people is concerned.
In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.
8027 was declared as a guarantee for the protection of the
constitutional right to life of the residents of Manila. There, the Court
said that the enactment of the said ordinance was a valid
exercise of police power with the concurrence of the two
requisites: a lawful subject – "to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila;"and a
lawful method – the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027
reclassifying the land use from industrial to commercial,
which effectively ends the continued stay of the oil depots in
Pandacan.
In the present petitions, the respondents and the oil companies plead
that the Pandacan Terminal has never been one of the targets of
terrorist attacks; that the petitions were based on unfounded fears and
mere conjectures; and that the possibility that it would be picked by
the terrorists is unlikely given the security measures installed thereat.
The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely
target of terrorist attacks has already been passed upon in G. R. No.
156052. Based on the assessment of the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila and the
then position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the Court was
convinced that the threat of terrorism is imminent. It remains
so convinced.
Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the
very nature of the depots where millions of liters of highly
flammable and highly volatile products, regardless of whether
or not the composition may cause explosions, has no place in
a densely populated area. Surely, any untoward incident in the oil
depots, be it related to terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise,
would definitely cause not only destruction to properties within and
60
among the neighboring communities but certainly mass deaths and
injuries.
With regard to the scaling down of the operations in the Pandacan
Terminals, which the oil companies continue to insist to have been
validated and recognized by the MOU, the Court, in G.R. No. 156052,
has already put this issue to rest. It specifically declared that even
assuming that the terms of the MOU and Ordinance No. 8027 were
inconsistent, the resolutions ratifying the MOU gave it full force and
effect only until 30 April 2003.
The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore, remain insufficient to
convince the Court that the dangers posed by the presence of the
terminals in a thickly populated area have already been completely
removed.
For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one
point or another, no matter how remote it is as perceived by one or
some, we cannot allow the right to life to be dependent on the
unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of probability have
no place in situations where the very life of not just an individual but
of residents of big neighborhoods is at stake.
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no impediments to
its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the
inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have
categorically expressed their desire for the relocation of the
terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny
and preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by
the intervenors’ warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats
of economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
The same best interest of the public guides the present
decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target
even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any
convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life, security and
safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the
presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation
to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Ordinance No. 8187 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID with respect to
the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
DOCTRINE:As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of the
businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer
be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial,
commercial and residential uses is derived from the police
power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of
the residents of a locality… The depot is perceived, rightly or
wrongly, asa representation of western interests, which means that it
is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst,
the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to
remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. The people’s Right to
life prevails over petroleum companies Right to Property.(copied from
DBL Pre-bar Notes)
VALENTINO LEGASPI V. CITY OF CEBU; JABAN V. CA
GR NO. 159110; GR NO. 159692
DECEMBER 10, 2013
Facts:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu
enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu
City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions
and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu
City). Petitioners Jaban and Legaspi questioned the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 1644 for being in violation of due process and for being
contrary to law. Their separate complaint alleged that they had
properly parked their car and that upon return, had found their car
being immobilized by a steel clamp; that their car was impounded for
and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay a
fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car; that
the fine was imposed without any court hearing and without due
process of law
In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co–defendants, the
City Attorney of Cebu presented similar defenses, essentially stating
that the traffic enforcers had only upheld the law by clamping the
vehicles of the plaintiffs; and that Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the
presumption of constitutionality and validity. The cases were
consolidated before Branch 58 of the RTC, which, after trial, rendered
on January 22, 1999 its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null
and void. The City of Cebu and its co–defendants appealed to the CA
which overturned the RTC and declaring Ordinance No. 1664 valid.
Issues
1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted
within the ambit of the legislative powers of
the City of Cebu; and
2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with
the requirements for validity and
constitutionality, particularly the limitations
set by the Constitution and the relevant
statutes.
Ruling
A. Tests for a valid ordinance
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,18 the Court restates the tests of a valid
ordinance: It must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law (FORMAL), it must also conform to the
following SUBSTANTIVE requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable.
B. Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal
requirements
With no issues being hereby raised against the formalities attendant to
the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664, we presume its full compliance
with the test in that regard. Congress enacted the LGC as the
implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s
great powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain,
and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the
specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in
the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each
LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the State subject to the
constitutional and statutory limitations.
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel–Air Village
Association, Inc., the Court cogently observed: It bears stressing that
police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot
be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and administrative
boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are
conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of
Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations
was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally
by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the
.
LGC.
Section 458 of the LGC relevantly states:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Composition. – (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as
the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant
61
 to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise
of the corporate powers of the city as provided for
under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
xxx
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the
efficient and effective delivery of the basic
services and facilities as provided for under
Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said
services and facilities, shall:
xxx
(v) Regulate the use of streets,
avenues, alleys, sidewalks,
bridges, parks and other public
places and approve the
construction, improvement repair
and maintenance of the same;
establish bus and vehicle stops
and terminals or regulate the use
of the same by privately–owned
vehicles which serve the public;
regulate garages and operation of
conveyances for hire; designate
stands to be occupied by public
vehicles when not in use; regulate
the putting up of signs, signposts,
awnings and awning posts on the
streets; and provide for the
lighting, cleaning and sprinkling
of streets and public places;
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets
and bridges; prohibit
encroachments or obstacles
thereon and, when necessary in
the interest of public welfare,
authorize the removal of
encroachments and illegal
constructions in public places;
The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to leave to
the cities themselves the task of confronting the problem of traffic
congestions associated with development and progress because they
were directly familiar with the situations in their respective
jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs would be in the best position to craft
their traffic codes because of their familiarity with the conditions
peculiar to their communities. With the broad latitude in this regard
allowed to the LGUs of the cities, their traffic regulations must be held
valid and effective unless they infringed the constitutional limitations
and statutory safeguards.
C. Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664with the substantive
requirements
Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the
substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with
the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with
the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with
public policy.
Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth
and progress in the population and economic centers of the country,
the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public
interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its
adoption was, therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government
purpose of immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic congestions
caused by illegally parked vehicles obstructing the streets of the City of
Cebu.
The clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No.
1664 (and of the vehicles of others similarly situated) is of the same
character as the established exceptions dispensing with notice and
hearing. As already said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles
by clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors were
not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance,
notice and hearing would be superfluous.
Mosqueda vs Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
Association, Inc.
GR No. 189185
August 16, 2016
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various
stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted
Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within
Davao City.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. et al.,
filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the
ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the
unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection
clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process
of law; and lacked publication pursuant to Section 511 6 of Republic
Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
The residents living within and adjacent to the bananaplantations in
Davao City led by Wilfredo Mosqueda, joined by other residents of
Davao City, (Mosqueda, et al.) submitted their Motion for Leave to
Intervene and Opposition to the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction.
The RTC granted their motion.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional ondue
process and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and
oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a
ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under
Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition period to shift to other
modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the
maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all
agricultural lands in Davao City.
Ruling:
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
The SC said, Davao City "must not act arbitrarily, whimsically or
despotically regardless of the ordinance's salutary purpose."
 On Section 5, the SC said 3 months would be
inadequate time for the city to shift from aerial to
truck-mounted boom spraying, effectively
depriving the city an efficient meansto combat
disease.
 But the SC disagreed with PBGEA that the buffer
zone required by the ordinanceis in violation of
due process since the purpose is to minimize the
effects of aerialspraying.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The SC said equal protection wasviolated since the ordinance made no
substantial distinctions when it prohibited aerial spraying per se
regardless of the substance or the level of concentration of the
chemicals to be applied, and when it imposed the 30-meter buffer
zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the size of
landholdings.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is an ultra vires act
According to the SC, the City disregarded regulations implemented by
the Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority (FPA), including its identification
and classification of safe pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.
Regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals,
the SC said, is a function lodged with the FPA and not with local
government units.
62
Thus, when Davao City enacted the ordinance "without inherent and
explicit authority to do so" the SC said the local government performed
an ultra vires act.
Rodolfo Laygo and Willie Laygo vs. Municipal Mayor of Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya
GR No. 188448
January 11, 2017
Facts: In July 2005, Aniza Bandrang sent two letter-complaintsto then
Municipal Mayor Santiago O. Dickson and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, informing them of the illegal sublease she
entered into with petitioners Laygo over Public Market Stalls which
petitioners leased from the Municipal Government.
The Sangguniang Bayan endorsed the letter of Bandrang to Mayor
Dickson for appropriate action.
The Sangguniang informed Mayor Dickson that the matter falls under
the jurisdiction of his office since the Sangguniang has already passed
and approved Resolution No. 183-2004, which authorized Mayor
Dickson to enforce the provision against subleasing of stalls in the
public market.
Mayor Dickson informed the Sangguniang that the stalls were
constructed under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, which
meant that the petitioners had the right to keep their stalls until the
BOT agreement was satisfied. Thereafter, Bandrang wrote another
letter praying for the cancellation of the lease contract between the
Municipality and petitioners for violating the provision on subleasing.
Mayor Dickson, however, did not act on the letter. Thus, Bandrang
filed a Petition for Mandamus against him and alleged that despite
already being aware of the violations of the lease contracts of
petitioners, Mayor Dickson still refused to enforce the provisions of the
lease contracts against subleasing. Bandrang concluded that Mayor
Dickson's inaction can only be construed as an unlawful neglect in the
performance and enforcement of his public duty as the Chief Executive
of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
The RTC held petitioners clearly violated the terms and conditions of
the lease contract. Since Mayor Dickson failed in his duty to enforce
the resolution and delayed its implementation without valid
reason, mandamus is a proper remedy.The CA affirmed the finding of
the RTC.
* In the case at bar, the Sangguniang delegated to Mayor Dickson
and subsequently to incumbent Mayor Dacayo, the power to cancel
the lease contracts of those market stallholders who violated
their contracts with the Municipality. Inferred from this power is
the power of the Mayor to determine who among the market
stallholders violated their lease contracts with the Municipality. Such
power connotes an exercise of discretion.
Issue:
Should the petition for Mandamus prosper for the refusal of the mayor
to perform a discretionary act?
Ruling:
No. The Petition for Mandamus must fail because the acts sought to be
done are discretionary in nature. The petition sought an order to direct
Mayor Dickson to cancel the lease contract of petitioners with the
Municipal Government and to lease the vacated market stalls to
interested persons. In an earlier decided case, we held that the
privilege of operating a market stall under license is always subject to
the police power of the city government and may be refused or
granted for reasons of public policy and sound public administration.
Being a delegated police power falling under the general welfare
clause of Section 16 of the Local Government Code, the grant or
revocation of the privilege is, therefore, discretionary in nature.
While Mayor Dickson may be compelled to act on the directive, he may
not be compelled to do so in a certain way, as what was prayed for by
Bandrang in seeking the cancellation of the contract and to re-lease
the vacated market stalls to interested persons. It was enough that
Mayor Dickson be reminded of his authority to cancel the contract
under Item No. 11, but whether or not his decision would be for or
against Bandrang would be for Mayor Dickson alone to decide. Not
even the Court can substitute its own judgment over what he had
chosen.
As it was, Mayor Dickson did act on the matter before him. He
exercised his discretion by choosing not to cancel the contract on the
ground of pari delicto, explaining that Bandrang, as the sub-lessee
herself, was in violation of the same policy on subleasing. The
complaint does not allege that in deciding this way, Mayor Dickson
committed grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable
excess of authority. Neither did Bandrang present proof that Mayor
Dickson acted arbitrarily, wantonly, fraudulently, and against the
interest of the public when he chose not to cancel the lease contract of
petitioners.
Suguitan vs City of Mandaluyong,
GR No. 135087
March 14, 2000
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued Resolution
No. 396, S-1994authorizing then Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to institute
expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Sugui located at
Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City for the
expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center.
Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter offering to buy
his property, but Suguitan refused to sell. Consequently, the city of
Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based
on the following grounds -(1) the power of eminent domain is not
being exercised in accordance with law; (2) there is no public necessity
to warrant expropriation of subject property; (3) the City of
Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said property without payment
of just compensation; (4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget and
appropriation for the payment of the property being expropriated; and
(5) expropriation of Suguitan' s property is but a ploy of Mayor
Benjamin Abalos to acquire the same for his personal use. Respondent
filed its comment and opposition to the motion.
Acting upon a motion filed by the respondent, the trial court issued an
order allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession
of Suguitan's property upon the deposit of P621,000 representing 15%
of the fair market value of the subject property based upon the current
tax declaration of such property. Subsequently, Mandaluyong assumed
possession of the subject property by virtue of a writ of possession
issued by the trial court.
Petitioner assert that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its
delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as
required by section 19 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, and not by
means of a mere resolution. Respondent contends, however, that it
validly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain; that
pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160, a resolution is a sufficient antecedent
for the filing of expropriation proceedings with the Regional Trial
Court.
Petitioners refute respondent's contention that only a resolution is
necessary upon the initiation of expropriation proceedings and that an
ordinance is required only in order to appropriate the funds for the
payment of just compensation.
ISSUE:
Is an ordinance necessary for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain by an LGU?
RULING:
Yes. The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature.
It is firmly settled, however, that such power may be validly delegated
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to local government units, other public entities and public utilities,
although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily
narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be
exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law.
The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local
government units is section 19 of RA 7160 which provides that:
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the
benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of
eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and
such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of
the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least
fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That the
amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
value at the time of the taking of the property.
Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local
governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the
power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the
delegating law. In fact, the courts have adopted a more censorious
attitude in resolving questions involving the proper exercise of this
delegated power by local bodies, as compared to instances when it is
directly exercised by the national legislature.
The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following
requisites have been complied with by the local government unit
concerned:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property .calr
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said
offer was not accepted.
In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the
power of eminent domain over petitioners' property by means of a
resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is
clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an
ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain. We cannot uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance
is needed only to appropriate funds after the court has determined the
amount of just compensation. An examination of the applicable law will
show that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a
complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the
power of eminent domain is already being exercised.
It should be noted, however, that our ruling in this case will not
preclude the City of Mandaluyong from enacting the necessary
ordinance and thereafter reinstituting expropriation proceedings, for so
long as it has complied with all other legal requirements.
Municipality Of Paranaque vs V.M Realty Corporation
292 SCRA 676
FACTS:
The Municipality of Paranaque pursuant to a Sanguniang Resolution
filed a complaint for expropriation against V.M reality over two parcels
of land with a combined area of 10,000 sqm, said lots would serve the
purpose of alleviating the living conditions by providing socialized
housing for the homeless. The municipality previously made an offer
to enter into negotiated sale where V.M did not accept.
Finding the complaint sufficient in form and substance the RTC gave it
due course and authorized the municipality to take possession upon
deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value
based on its current tax declaration. VM answered, alleging that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action because under the LGC, an
ordinance is required and not just a resolution and that the cause of
action was barred prior judgment. RTC dismissed the case,
Municipality appealed. CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a resolution duly approved by the municipal council
has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an
expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. Whether or not res judicata is a valid ground for dismissal of case.
HELD:
1. An ordinance is required to validly exercise such power. The power
of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch which may be
delegated the exercise to LGU. An LGY may therefore exercise the
power to expropriate rivate property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restrains, imposed
through law, in this case LGC, specifically section 19 which requires
that such power must be exercised pursuant to an ordinance.
The term resolution and ordinance are not synonymous. An
ordinance is law but a resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of the lawmaking body. The former
possesses a general and permanent character, while the latter is
temporary in nature. The two are also enacted differently. One
requires third reading, while a resolution does not unless decided
otherwise by a majority of all the sanggunian members.
2. Eminent Domain not Barred by Res Judicata. While all the requisites
of res judicata are present in this case, the court holds that such
principle which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings
cannot bar the right of the state or its agent to expropriate private
property. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and like police
power, can reach every form of property which the state might need
for public use.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the
state to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues
decided in a previous case. For example a final judgment dismissing an
expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer
precludes another suit raising the same issue, it cannot however bar
the state from thereafter complying with this requirement and
subsequently exercising the power over the same property.
Moday vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 107916
February 20, 1997
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del
Sur passed a Resolution authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the
Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of a certain Lot
along the National Highway owned by Moday for the Site of Bunawan
Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities.The resolution
was approved by the Municipal Mayor of Bunawan and it was
transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said resolution and returned it
commenting that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there
are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the
upcoming government center." Despite the disapproval of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the Municipality of Bunawan subsequently
filed a Petition for Eminent Domain against the petitioner before the
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Regional Trial Court at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. The municipality
then filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject
Matter of This Case.
Despite petitioners' opposition, the Regional Trial Court granted
respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land. The
lower court held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare
the resolution invalid leaves it effective. MR was denied by the trial
court.Petitioners elevated the case but the same was dismissed by
respondent appellate court. The Court of Appeals upheld the RTC and
that the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution.
Respondent appellate court also denied petitioners' MR. Meanwhile,
the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject
property 2 wooden structures, and the Gymnasium, which is made of
concrete hence, the petition for Review.
ISSUE:
Can a municipality expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal
resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
but NOT invalidated?
HELD:
The municipality The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's
reason for disapproving the resolution is baseless because it failed to
point out which and where are those available lots. Respondent court
also concluded that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not
declare the municipal board's resolution as invalid, expropriation of
petitioners' property could proceed.
The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent
domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas
PambansaBlg. 337, the Local Government Code in force at the time
expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:
"Section 9. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through
its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian,
exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation
proceedings for public use or purpose."
Petitioners question the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise
this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved the
Municipal Resolution. Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
"Sec. 153. SangguniangPanlalawigan Review. —
(1) Within thirty days after receiving copies of
approved ordinances, resolutions and executive
orders promulgated by the municipal mayor, the
sangguniangpanlalawigan shall examine the
documents or transmit them to the provincial
attorney, or if there be none, to the .provincial
fiscal, who shall examine them promptly and
inform the sangguniangpanlalawigan in writing
of any defect or impropriety which he may
discover therein and make such comments or
recommendations as shall appear to him
proper.
(2) If the sangguniangpanlalawigan shall find
that any municipal ordinance, resolution or
executive order is beyond the power conferred
upon the sangguniangbayan or the mayor, it
shall declare such ordinance, resolution or
executive order invalid in whole or in part,
entering its actions upon the minutes and
advising the proper municipal authorities
thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to
annul the ordinance, resolution or executive
order in question in whole or in part. The action
of the sangguniangpanlalawigan shall be final.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of the Municipal
Resolution is an infirm action which does not render said resolution
null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337,
grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a
municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is
beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to
issue.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to
disapprove the municipal resolution for the Municipality of Bunawan
clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its
Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution,
pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce; it
follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be
used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners'
property.
In the questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly held
that the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any
of respondent municipality's "other available properties available for
the same purpose." The accusations of political reprisal are likewise
unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds
that petitioners' demand that the former municipal mayor be
personally liable for damages is without basis.
The instant petition is hereby DENIED.
Province of Camarines Sur vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 103125
May 17, 1993
Facts:
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province
of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988,
authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate
property contiguous to the Provincial Capitol site, in order to establish
a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government employees.
Complaint for expropriation was then filed against the private
respondents (San Joaquins). The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their
property. The Trial Court ruled in favour of the province. The San
Joaquins went to the Court of appeals and the latter ruled in their
favour. The Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur
shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the
private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Issue:
Is the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government
units subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian
Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural
use?
Ruling:
NO. Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that
local government, units must first secure the approval of the
Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the
necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision
in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly
subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could
cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in
expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government
units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the
construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first
applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of
Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve
a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of
65
Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public
purpose or public use.
City Of Cebu vs Spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo
GR No. 142971
May 7, 2002
FACTS:
On 17 September 1993, Petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for
eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa
Dedamo. The petitioner alleged that they needed the parcels of land
owned by the respondents for public purpose because they are
planning to construct a public road which will serve as an access or
relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilom
Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu
City.
The trial court appointed Palermo M. Lugo, Alfredo Cisneros and
Herbert E. Buot to be the commissioners to determine the just
compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated. The
commissioner’s report contained that the plaintiff is directed to pay a
just compensation costs P24,865.930.00 to the respondents.
The petitioner filed with a petition for review to the SC. They asserted
that just compensation should be determined on September 17, 1993,
as of the date of the filing of the complaint and not at the time the
property was actually taken in 1994.
ISSUE:
Whether just compensation should be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint
HELD:
No. Just compensation should not be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint.
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is the Governments right to appropriate, in the nature
of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose.[9] However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just
compensation as consideration therefor.
In this case, the applicable law as to the point of determining the just
compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly
provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the
time of actual taking. The SC justifies that although the general rule
in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of
the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule
admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the
property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
Moreover, both of the parties agreed to be bound by the report of the
commission so they need to comply on the agreement in good faith.
Also, the petitioner was too late to question the valuation without
violating the principle of equitable estoppel. And lastly, Section 4, Rule
67 of the Rules of Court cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a
substantive law.
Therefore, the petition was denied.
Jesus is Lord Christian School Inc. vs Municipality of Pasig
GR No. 152230
August 9, 2005
Facts:
The municipality of Pasig passed an ordinance for the expropriation of
a private property for the building of an access road from the public
market to a certain barangay in Pasig. The municipality notified the
owners by sending a letter manifesting its intention to construct an
access road. Petitioner’s contention is that there was no valid and
definite offer, as required by Sec. 19 of the LGC, before a municipality
can exercise the power of expropriation. Respondent argued that there
was substantial compliance to the prior valid and definite offer.
Issue:
Whether or not the there was a prior valid and definite offer
Held:
The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of
the owner and against the condemnor. The respondent was
burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite
offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the
rejection thereof by the latter.
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to
be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and
voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in
order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action. A
reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro
forma offer, to acquire the property for a reasonable price must be
made to the owner or his privy. A single bona fide offer that is
rejected by the owner will suffice.
The expropriating authority is burdened to make known its
definite and valid offer to all the owners of the property.
However, it has a right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title
covering the land to be expropriated. Hence, it is required to make
its offer only to the registered owners of the property. After all,
it is well-settled that persons dealing with property covered by a
Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears
on its face.
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed
its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the
property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced
by the respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local
Government Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing
the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners,
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the letter is
not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the
property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of
the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the
project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.
Masikip vs City of Pasig
GR No. 136349
January 23, 2006
FACTS:
Then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, notified Masikip of its
intention to expropriate a portion of her property to be used for the
sports and recreational activities of the residents of Barangay
Caniogan. A second letter was sent, stating that the property was
allegedly for the purpose of provide land opportunities to deserving
poor sectors of our community. Masikip refused. When Pasig filed an
action for expropriation, Masikip filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that
there was no genuine necessity for the taking. According to petitioner,
there is already an established sports development and recreational
activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and
being utilized by its residents.
ISSUES:
Was there a genuine necessity for the expropriation of Masikip’s
property?
RULING:
No. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a
public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must
precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land.
The records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan
Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of the Ordinance
66
authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is
the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private
organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the
members of the said Association are desirous of having their own
private playground and recreational facility. Masikip’s lot is the nearest
vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and
categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially
considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports
development and community recreation in the area, which is the
Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those
of Caniogan.
Francia vs Municipality of Meycauayan
GR No. 170432
March 24, 2008
Facts:
Respondent Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan filed a complaint for
expropriation against petitioners Francia because respondent needed
petitioners' property at the junction of the North Expressway,
Malhacan-Iba-Camalig main road artery and the MacArthur Highway to
establish a common public terminal for all types of public utility
vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks. petitioners denied that
the property sought to be expropriated was raw land. It was in fact
developed and there were plans for further development. For this
reason, respondents offer price of P2,333,500 (or P111.99 per square
meter) was too low.
After trial, the RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public
purpose. The construction of a common terminal for all public utility
conveyances (serving as a two-way loading and unloading point for
commuters and goods) would improve the flow of vehicular traffic
during rush hours. Moreover, the property was the best site for the
proposed terminal because of its accessibility. petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) claimed that the
trial court issued the orders without conducting a hearing to determine
the existence of a public purpose.
Issue:
If prior determination of the existence of a public purpose was not
necessary for the issuance of a writ of possession
Ruling:
Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of
the property sought to be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and
(2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair
market value based on its current tax declaration. The law does not
make the determination of a public purpose a condition
precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession.
Republic vs Vicente Lim
GR No. 161656
June 29, 2005
Facts:
Republic insituted a special civil action for expropriation with CFI of
Cebu, involving Banilad Friar land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the
purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army.
Lot 932 was registered in the name of GAERVASIA Denzon, while Lot
939 was in the name if Eulalia Denzon. After depositing P9,500 with
PNP, pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated 1938, the Republic took
posession of the lots. Thereafter, on May14, 1930, the CFI ordered the
republic to pay the Dezons the sum of P4,062.10 as just
compensation. For the time being, the lots were transferred to
Valdehueza and Penerio, which was subsequently owned by Vicente
Lim pursuant to loan agreement that resulted to being foreclosed. On
May 4, 2001, pursuant to a petition for quiting of title, RTC declared
Vicente Lim as the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot 932.
Issue:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its
failure to pay the just compension therefore pursuant to the
judgement of the CFI rendered as early as May14, 1940.
Ruling:
Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates:
"Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."
The length of time and the manner with which it evaded payment
demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude.
The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No.
781) was entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has
passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has
remained empty-handed.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic's delay is
contrary to the rules of fair play, as "just compensation embraces
not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to
the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered 'just.'" In
jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated
property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that
if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be
treated as a trespasser ab initio.
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This
limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights
against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment
of the individual's rights. Given this function, the provision should
therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the
government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.
The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall
pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled
principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. et al., vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,thus:
"Title to property which is the subject of condemnation
proceedings does not vestthe condemnor until the judgment
fixing just compensation is entered and paid,but the
condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the
petition under theEminent Domain Act, or the
commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is
filed.
. . . Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for
a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property
taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made.
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no
transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise
stated, the Republic's acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the
full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time.
The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not
entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment
of its fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that
"non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings)
does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the
expropriated lots." This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of
the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,and Reyes vs. National
Housing Authority. However, the facts of the present case do not
justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered
to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation
proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years
have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republic's failure
to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under
such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order.
MCIAA vs Lozada, Sr.
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 GR No. 176625
February 25, 2010
Facts:
Spouses Bernardo and Rosario Lozada were the registered owners of
Lot No. 88 which the Republic sought to acquire by expropriation
through then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) for the expansion
of the Lahug Airport. A decision was rendered by the CFI in favor of
the Government and Bernardo Lozada, Sr. as landowner appealed
therefrom. During the pendency of the appeal, the parties entered into
a compromise settlement to the effect that the subject property would
be resold to the original owner at the same price when it was
expropriated in the event that the Government abandons the Lahug
Airport. Title to Lot No. 88 was subsequently transferred to the
Republic of the Philippines. However, the projected expansion and
improvement of the Lahug Airport did not materialize. Since the public
purpose for the expropriation no longer exists, the Lozadas sought to
repurchase their property.
Issue:
Can the respondents recover the property?
Held:
Yes. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the
Government’s power of eminent domain is subject to mandatory
requirement that it is for a particular public purpose which partakes of
the nature of implied condition that should be complied with to
enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. The
expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to
the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed,
failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at
all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if
they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation received. Otherwise, the
judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property
will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be
denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the
property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.
The right of respondents to repurchase Lot No. 88 may be enforced
based on a constructive trust constituted on the property held
by the government in favor of the former. In constructive trusts,
the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustees sole
duty is to transfer the title and possession over the property to the
plaintiff-beneficiary.
To summarize, respondents must return to petitioners the just
compensation they received for the expropriation and to pay
petitioners the necessary expenses the latter incurred in maintaining
Lot No. 88, plus the monetary value of their services to the extent that
respondents were benefited thereby. Petitioners are entitled to keep
whatever fruits and income they may have obtained from Lot No. 88
and respondents are also entitled to keep whatever interests the
amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the
meantime, as well as the appreciation in value of Lot No. 88, which is
a natural consequence of nature and time.
Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano vs Republic; MCIAA vs Inocian
GR No. 168770; GR No. 168812
February 9, 2011
FACTS:
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAAs predecessor
agency, pursued a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.
As a sweetener, the government negotiating team assured the
landowners that they could repurchase their respective lands should
the Lahug Airport expansion project not push through or once the
Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu
Airport. Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed
deeds of sale with a right of repurchase while others refused to sell
because the price offered was way below market. The Republic,
represented by then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as
successor agency of the NAC, filed a complaint for expropriation for
the remaining lots. The CFI (Civil Case No. R-1881) rendered judgment
for the Republic allowing the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
In view of the buy-back assurance by the government, the owners of
the lots no longer appealed and the certificates of title for the covered
parcels of land were issued in the name of the Republic which,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6958, were subsequently transferred to
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA).
At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of the aforesaid lots to
MCIAA, Lahug Airport completely ceased operations as Mactan Airport
has opened to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial
flights. This prompted the former lot owners to formally demand from
the government that they be allowed to exercise their promised right
to repurchase on the ground that the expropriated lots were never
utilized for the purpose they were taken as no expansion of Lahug
Airport was undertaken. As their demand was unheeded, the civil suits
followed, hence these two consolidated cases.
G.R. No. 168812 (MCIAA Petition) is a complaint for reconveyance filed
by Ricardo L. Inocian and others wherein the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, directed MCIAA to reconvey the lands to the plaintiffs after they
have paid for the sums indicated in the previous expropriation case.
G.R No. 168770 (Ouano Petition) is also a complaint for reconveyance
filed by the Ouanos wherein the RTC initially ruled in their favor but
reversed its earlier decision upon motion for reconsideration by the
Republic. The Court of appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision denying the
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff lot owners (Ouanos, Inocians, and others)
are entitled to recover their property
RULING: Yes.
MCIAA argues that the judgment of condemnation in Civil Case No. R-
1881 was without qualification and was unconditional as there is
nothing in the fallo of the court’s decision indicating that that the
government undertook to reconvey the covered lands in case the
Lahug airport expansion project is aborted. MCIAA further argues that
the claim of the Ouanos and the Inocians regarding the alleged verbal
assurance of the NAC negotiating team that they can reacquire their
landholdings is barred by the Statute of Frauds. As ruled by the
Supreme Court, the statute applies only to executory and not to
completed, executed, or partially consummated contracts as in this
case. Furthermore, the objection on the admissibility of evidence on
the basis of the Statute of Frauds may be waived if not timely raised
(and MCIAA did not timely object).
On eminent domain:
The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation
proceedings, acquires unrestricted ownership over or a fee simple title
to the covered land, is no longer tenable. The Court in this case
reiterated the case of MCIAA vs. Lozada, Sr. which abandoned the
previous case of Fery vs. Municipality of Cabanatuan (the case
which MCIAA constantly invoked) which ruled that the former owner is
not entitled to reversion of the property even if the public purpose was
not pursued and was abandoned.
The Court ruled that Fery was not decided pursuant to our now
sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. It is well settled
that the taking of private property by the Governments power
of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements:
(1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner. These
requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should
be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.
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Take note: Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece
of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way of an
unconditional purchase and sale contract freely entered by two parties,
one without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In
that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really
no occasion to apply the fee simple concept if the transfer is
conditional. The taking of a private land in expropriation
proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion
to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is
terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he
so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course to the return, at
the very least, of the just compensation received.
Public use, expanded concept: Public use, as an eminent domain
concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use
that is of usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit of the public. If the genuine public necessity- the very
reason or condition as it were- allowing, at the first instance, the
expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no
more cogent point for the governments retention of the expropriated
land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes
the property to another public use very much different from the
original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another
private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its
power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to
another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizens own
private gain, is offensive to our laws
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the
expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then
incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise,
the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack
one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of
eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the
property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner
would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate
the property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity. The
government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any
manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of
expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play,
Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand the
reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the
Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also
dictate that the Ouanos and Inocians return to MCIAA what they
received as just compensation for the expropriation of their respective
properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in
this case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the
reconveyance obligation. They must likewise pay MCIAA the necessary
expenses it might have incurred in sustaining their respective lots and
the monetary value of its services in managing the lots in question to
the extent that they, as private owners, were benefited thereby.
Spouses Yusay vs Court Of Appeals
GR No. 156684
April 6, 2011
FACTS:
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square
meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez
Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they
used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other
families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of
income.
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution
No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S.
Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of
the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost
housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod abused its discretion in
adopting Resolution No. 552
HELD:
No. A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while
an ordinance is a law that is permanent in character. No rights can be
conferred by and be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing but
an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in the
light of attendant circumstances. A municipal ordinance is
different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two
are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance,
but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all
the Sanggunian members. In simply expressing its sentiment or
opinion through the resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of all
gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a
constitutionally protected right.
Henry Sy vs Quezon City
GR No. 202690
June 5, 2013
Facts:
November 7, 1996, the City, through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, filed
a complaint for expropriation with the RTC in order to acquire a 1,000
sqm parcel of land, owned and registered under the name of Henry
Sy, which was intended to be used as a site for several government
activities.
March 18, 1997, pursuant to Sec. 19 of the LGC, the City deposited the
amount of Php 241, 090 with the Office of the Clerk of Court,
representing the 15% fair market value of the subject property based
on its tax declaration. Sy did not question the right to expropriate the
property but only the amount of just compensation. The RTC tasked 3
commissioners to determine the proper amount of just compensation.
It was decided by 2 of them that it should be at Php 5,500 per sqm to
be computed from the date of the filing of the expropriation complaint.
On the other hand, 1 said that the amount should be Php 13,500 per
sqm.
The RTC ruled that just compensation should be Php 5,500 per sqm. It
also didn’t award damages and back rentals in favor of Sy. For equity
considerations, 6% legal interest was awarded and computed from the
date of the filing of the expropriation until full payment of just
compensation. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling with the modification
that the City should pay Sy the amount of Php 200,000 as exemplary
damages (because the City took the property without even initiating
expropriation proceedings) and attorney’s fees equivalent to 1% of the
total amount due. Sy was denied payment for back rentals and
damages for shelved plans of utilization.
Both Sy and the City’s motion for reconsiderations were denied. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Did the CA err in upholding the amount of just compensation, the
grant of 6% legal interest and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees?
Ruling:
The petition was partly granted.
The correct legal interest is 12% owing to the nature of the City’s
obligation as an effective forbearance. It was held in Republic v. CA
that “the debt incurred by the government on account of the taking of
the property subject of an expropriation constitutes an effective
forbearance which therefore, warrants the application of the 12% legal
interest.” Also, legal interest should accrued from the time of
the “taking” of the property in 1986 (when the property was already
used as a Brgy. Day Care and Office? And not from the filing of the
complaint for expropriation on November 7, 1996. The lack of
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proper authorization, i.e. resolution to effect the expropriation, did not
affect the character of the City’s taking of the subject property back in
1986. There is “taking” when the owner is actually deprived of
the use of his property thus, the legal character of the City’s
action as one of “taking” did not change.
Because of such irregularity in the actual “taking” and filing of the
expropriation proceedings, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
should be awarded to the landowner for equity purposes. MIAA v.
Rodriguez states that “these are wanton and irresponsible acts which
should be suppressed and corrected. Hence, the award of exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees is in order.”
With regard to the amount of just compensation, the Php 5,500 per
sqm cannot be sustained. This was derived from the documents that
were issued in 1996. Valuation should be based as of the time of
taking which was in 1986. Thus, the case should be remanded to the
RTC for proper assessment.
Mangune vs Ermita
GR No. 182604
September 27, 2016
Facts:
R.A. No. 7842 was enacted establishing the Taguig-Pateros District
Hospital (TPDH), under the administration and supervision of the DOH.
President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 567 devolving the administration and
supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig. E.O. No. 567
provided that it was issued pursuant to R.A. No. 7160 /Local
Government Code of 1991 and the President's continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under the executive department.
Thus, the City of Taguig, through its Mayor Tinga, issued E.O. No. 053
formalizing the plan for the City of Taguig's take-over of the operations
of TPDH. The City of Taguig and the DOH subsequently entered into a
MOA providing the details of the transition and turn-over of the
hospital's operations from the DOH to the City of Taguig.
Petitioners aver that E.O. No. 567 contradicts the constitutional
principle of separation of powers as: (1) it amends the Local
Government Code, particularly its Section 17(e), which limits
devolution of basic services and facilities to LGUs to only 6 months
after the effectivity of the law; and (2) it violates the DOH-issued IRR
of the LGC which provides that district health offices in the NCR,
including its district hospitals, are exempt from devolution. Petitioners
also argue that E.O. No. 567 violates R.A. No. 7305 because the
former did not include provisions for the expenses relative to
petitioners' transfer and reassignment.
Respondents counter that the issuance of E.O. No. 567 is within the
President's constitutional power of control over government entities in
the executive department, her continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President and her
constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Consequently, the MOA between the City of Taguig and DOH as well
as the subsequent executive orders of then Mayor Tinga are valid.
Issue:
WON E.O. No. 567 is constitutional.
Held: E.O. No. 567 is constitutional.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. Thus,
to be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order,
must comply with the following requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
E.O. No. 567 satisfies all of the above requisites.
First, E.O. No. 567 itself identifies its statutory and constitutional
basis.
E.O. No. 567 was issued pursuant to Section 17 of the LGC expressly
devolving to the local government units the delivery of basic services
and facilities, including health services.
It is the policy of the Local Government Code to provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure through a
system of decentralization. Thus, E.O. No. 567 merely implements and
puts into operation the policy and directive set forth in the Local
Government Code.
Similarly, E.O. No. 567 is within the constitutional power of the
President to issue. The President may, by executive or administrative
order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the
executive department. This is sanctioned under the Constitution, as
well as other statutes.
The transfer of the administration and supervision of TPDH from the
DOH to the City of Taguig is a result of the President's exercise of
her power of control over the executive department, including
the DOH. In issuing E.O. No. 567, the President was actually carrying
out the provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
She was performing her duty to ensure the faithful execution of the
laws.
As regards the second requisite, that the order must be issued or
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, petitioners
do not question the procedure by which E.O. No. 567 was issued. In
the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, acts of the other
branches of the government are presumed to be valid, and there being
no objection from the respondents as to the procedure in the
promulgation of E.O. No. 567, the presumption is that the executive
issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by
law.
The third requisite provides that an administrative issuance must not
be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must
not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other
existing laws, for such is the sole function of the legislature which the
other branches of the government cannot usurp.
In assailing E.O. No. 567, petitioners argue that it violates Section
17(e) of the Local Government Code. For petitioners, the provision
limits the devolution of services to a period of only six (6) months from
the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Any devolution after the
expiration of such period can only be done through a statutory act.
Thus, the issuance of E.O. No. 567, which was well-beyond such
period, is a clear usurpation of legislative functions.
There is no question that the law favors devolution. In fact, as
mentioned earlier, Section 5(a) of the Local Government Code
explicitly states that in case of doubt, any question on any
provision on a power of a local government shall be resolved
in favor of devolution of powers and of the LGU.
The more reasonable understanding of the six-month period is that the
framers of the law provided for the period to prompt the national
government to speedily devolve the existing services to the LGUs.
However, it was not intended as a prescriptive period, as to absolutely
prohibit the national government from devolving services beyond the
period. Most especially so in this case because the TPDH was created
long after the lapse of the six-month period, thus making its devolution
within such period impossible.
Petitioners also posit that E.O. No. 567 violates the IRR promulgated
by the DOH pursuant to Article 25 of the IRR of the Local Government
Code as it excludes district health offices and hospitals in the NCR,
including TPDLI, from devolution.
We emphasize that under the Local Government Code, it is the
Oversight Committee, composed of representatives from both
the executive and the legislative branches of government,
which was tasked to formulate the implementing rules and regulations
of the law. The Local Government Code did not delegate to any
70
other entity the formulation of its implementing rules and
regulations.
The Local Government Code and its IRR do not contain any provision
directing the DOH to promulgate implementing rules and regulations
on the devolution of health services. Article 25 of the IRR of the LGC
mandates that the health services to be provided by the LGUs must
comply with the standards and criteria given by the DOH. It does not
direct the DOH to create rules on how devolution of health services
must be implemented.
We emphasize that the DOH is subject to the power of control of the
President. Therefore, E.O. No. 567 issued by the President shall prevail
over any issuance made by the DOH and not the other way around.
The fourth requisite pertains to the reasonableness of an
administrative issuance. It is an axiom in administrative law that
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in
the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and
regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in
view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for
which they were authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be
invalid.65 Specific to a reorganization, it is regarded as valid provided
it is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried
out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient.
E.O. No. 567 meets the test of reasonableness. The transfer of the
administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of
Taguig aims to provide the City of Taguig the genuine and meaningful
autonomy which would make it an effective and efficient partner in the
attainment of national goals and providing basic health services and
facilities to the community. It implements and breathes life to the
provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code on
creating a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization.
The petition is DENIED.
Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 104786
January 27, 1994
(229 SCRA 554)
TOPIC: Reclassification of Lands
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No.
363, series of 1982 (Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City),
Section 8 of which required that funeral parlors “shall be established
not less than 50 meters from any residential structures, churches and
other institutional buildings.”
Upon prior approval and certification of zoning compliance,
Patalinghug was issued a building permit for the construction of a
funeral parlor in the name and style of Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at
Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City. Thereafter, Patalinghug
commenced the construction of his funeral parlor.
Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay Agdao, Davao
City that the construction of Patalinghug’s funeral parlor violated
Ordinance No. 363, since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter
radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel and several residential
structures, the Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted an investigation
and found that the nearest residential structure, owned by Wilfred
Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south. But, Patalinghug continued to
construct his funeral parlor.
Consequently, private respondents filed a case for the declaration of
nullity of a building permit with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction and/or restraining order with the trial court.
RTC: dismissed. After conducting its own ocular inspection, it found
that:
1. the residential building of Cribillo and Iglesia ni Kristo chapel
are 63.25 meters and 55.95 meters away, respectively, from
the funeral parlor.
2. although the residential building owned by Mr. Tepoot is
adjacent to the funeral parlor (separated only by a concrete
fence), said residential building is being rented by Mr.
Asiaten, who actually devotes it to his laundry business with
machinery thereon.
CA: reversed and annulled Patalinghug’s building permit on the ground
that the funeral parlor was within the 50-meter radius from Mr.
Tepoot's building. Although Mr. Teepot’s building was used by his
lessee for laundry business, it was a residential lot as reflected in the
tax declaration, thus paving Ordinance No. 363 applies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's operation of a funeral home constitutes
permissible use within a particular district or zone in Davao City.
RULING:
YES. Petitioner did not violate Section 8 of Ordinance No. 363. The
question on whether or not Mr. Teepot’s building is residential or not
was already resolved by the lower court and said resolution is
considered binding. The testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows
that Mr. Tepoot's building was used for a dual purpose both as a
dwelling and as a place where a laundry business was conducted. But
while its commercial aspect has been established by the presence of
machineries and laundry paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other
than being declared for taxation purposes as such, was not fully
substantiated.
A tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for
zoning purposes. A property may have been declared by its owner as
residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a
commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of
the nature of property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the
determination of a property for zoning purposes. A tax declaration only
enables the assessor to identify the same for assessment levels. In
fact, a tax declaration does not bind a provincial/city assessor, for
under Sec. 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code, appraisal and
assessment are based on the actual use irrespective of "any
previous assessment or taxpayer's valuation thereon," which is
based on a taxpayer's declaration. In fact, a piece of land declared by
a taxpayer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or city
assessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial.
The finding that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial is strengthened by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod’s declaration of the questioned area as
commercial or C-2 under the same ordinance. Consequently, even if
Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as
residential, once a local government has reclassified an area
as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must
prevail. While the commercial character of the questioned vicinity has
been declared thru the ordinance, private respondents failed to
substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral
parlor was constructed, was still a residential zone. Unquestionably,
the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a "commercial
purpose".
The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a
municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote
the good order and general welfare of the people in the
locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare
of the state and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of
the individual may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the
location of funeral homes has been adopted comprehensive zoning
plans for the orderly development of the area covered thereunder.
CA decision is reversed. RTC decision is reinstated.
Hon. Carlos O. Fortich vs Hon. Renato C. Corona
71
 GR No. 131457
April 24, 1998
FACTS:
The alleged farmer-beneficiaries strikers protested the March 29, 1996
decision of the Office of the President (OP), which approved the
conversion of a 144-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial
institutional area. This led the OP, through then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called "Win-Win"
Resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier
decision after it had already become final and executory. The said
Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion only to the
extent of 44 hectares, and ordered the remaining 100 hectares to be
distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
The petitioners now seek to annul and set aside the "Win Win"
Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Garilao of the
Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said
Resolution.
ISSUE:
Was the OP’s modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its
powers and prerogatives?
RULING:
The SC then struck down as void the OP’s act, it being in gross
disregard of the rules & basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the OP are embodied
in Administrative Order No. 18, which provides in Section 7, that:
"Decisions . . . become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of
a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration
thereof is filed within such period: . . .
When the OP declared the decision of March 29, 1996 final and
executory, as the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably
filed, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case or
modify the decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the OP has no more
authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of
the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution.
The respondent’s explanation that the DAR’s office procedure ‘made it
impossible…to file its Motion for Reconsideration on time’ since the
said decision had to be referred to its different departments cannot be
considered a valid justification. While there is nothing wrong with such
referral, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary period fixed by
law, rule or regulation.
The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made
subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative body.
Nicolas Laynesa vs Uy
GR No. 149553
February 29, 2008
Facts:
In 1938, Robert Morley was the owner of a 4-hectare parcel of land in
Barrio Tagbong, Pili, Camarines Sur. Petitioner Santos Laynesa was his
tenant over 2 1/5 hectares of the land. In 1947, Morley sold the 4 has.
toSixto Cuba, Sr. He maintained Santos as the tenant over the 2-
hectare portion while instituting petitioner Nicolas Laynesa, son of
Santos, as his tenant over the remainder of the property.
On January 13, 1993, Cuba, Jr. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land, transferring the property to respondent PacitaUy,
married to respondent PaquitoUy, in consideration of PhP 80,000.
Cuba, Jr. was named owner of the land. Notably, the Deed was not
registered with the Register of Deeds. Later, Cuba, Jr. executed a
Deed of Assignment or Transfer of Rights of the undelivered owners
share of the produce in favor of Pacita.
On July 13, 1993, Pacita demanded that the Laynesas vacate the land.
She claimed that she had purchased the land. The Laynesas asked for
proof of Pacitas acquisition, but she could not produce any.
Subsequently, Pacita returned and again demanded that the Laynesas
vacate the property, this time exhibiting the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistrered Land signed by Cuba, Jr. Consequently, the Laynesas
filed on October 13, 1993 a petition against Pacita with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), for Legal
Redemption entitled. The Laynesas primarily sought that they be
allowed to redeem the land from Pacita.Thereafter, on November 25,
1993, Pacita filed a complaint docketed for Collection of Rentals and
Ejectment against the Laynesas with the DARAB.
Meanwhile, Pacita obtained a certification from the Municipal
Agricultural Office (MAO) that the property was not prime agricultural
property, and from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) that
TCT No. 23276 was not covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) or
by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27. The certifications were sought so
the land could be reclassified as industrial land.
On May 29, 1995, the Municipal Council of Tagbong, Pili, Camarines
Sur approved Resolution No. 67, which embodied Ordinance No. 28
and reclassified the land from agricultural to industrial. Hence, the CA
ruled DARAB without jurisdiction. According to the CA, the evidence on
record shows that when the Laynesas filed their action with the
DARAB, the property was no longer agricultural but had been
reclassified.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the reclassification of a lot by a municipal
ordinance, without the Department of Agrarian Reforms
(DARs) approval, suffices to oust the jurisdiction of the
DARAB over a petition for legal redemption filed by the
tenants.
2. Whether or not there was a valid reclassification.
Ruling:
1. No, this position is incorrect.
Despite the reclassification of an agricultural land to non-agricultural
land by a local government unit under Sec. 20 of RA 7160, the DARAB
still retains jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a tenant of the land in
question for threatened ejectment and redemption for the following
reasons:
(1) Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Likewise settled is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of
the complaint. DARAB Case No.V-RC-028 was filed by the tenants of
an agricultural land for threatened ejectment and its redemption from
respondents. It cannot be questioned that the averments of the
DARAB case clearly pertain to an agrarian reform matter and involve
the implementation of the agrarian reform laws. Such being the case,
the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB under Sec. 50
of RA 6657 on the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR. It bears stressing
that the DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). Primary jurisdiction means in case of seeming
conflict between the jurisdictions of the DAR and regular courts,
preference is vested with the DAR because of its expertise and
experience in agrarian reform matters. Sec. 50 is also explicit that
except for the DA and DENR, all agrarian reform matters are within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the DAR.
(2) Sec. 20(e) of RA 7160 is unequivocal that nothing in said section
shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner
the provisions of [RA] 6657. As such, Sec. 50 of RA 6657 on quasi-
judicial powers of the DAR has not been repealed by RA 7160.
72
In view of the foregoing reasons, we rule that the DARAB retains
jurisdiction over disputes arising from agrarian reform matters even
though the landowner or respondent interposes the defense of
reclassification of the subject lot from agricultural to non-agricultural
use.
2. On the issue of whether there has been a valid reclassification of
the subject lot to industrial land, we rule that respondents failed to
adduce substantial evidence to buttress their assertion that all the
conditions and requirements set by RA 7160 and MC 54 have been
satisfied.
Respondent Pacita only procured a MAO certification that the property
was not prime agricultural property. The MARO certified that the land
was not covered by the OLT under PD 27. These two certifications will
not suffice for the following reasons:
(1) Sec. 20 of RA 7160 requires submission of the recommendation or
certification from the DA that the land ceases to be economically
feasible or sound for agricultural purposes. In this case, the MAO
certification attests only that the lot is no longer prime agricultural
property.
(2) Sec. 20 requires a certification from the DAR that the land has not
yet been distributed to beneficiaries under RA 6657 which took effect
on June 15, 1988 nor covered by a notice of coverage. In the case at
bar, the MARO certification which pertains only to PD 27 does not
suffice.
(3) Respondents have not shown any compliance with Sec. 2 of MC 54
on the additional requirements and procedures for reclassification such
as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Boards report and
recommendation, the requisite public hearings, and the DAs report and
recommendation.
Based on the foregoing reasons, respondents have failed to satisfy the
requirements prescribed in Sec. 20 of RA 7160 and MC 54 and, hence,
relief must be granted to petitioners.
Landowners must understand that while RA 7160, the Local
Government Code, granted local government units the power to
reclassify agricultural land, the stringent requirements set forth in Sec.
30 of said Code must be strictly complied with. Such adherence to the
legal prescriptions is found wanting in the case at bar.
Ayala Land, Inc. vs Castillo, et. al.
GR NO. 178110
June 15, 2011
Reclassification of Lands
FACTS:
CCFI owned 2 parcels of land mortgaged in favor of MBC. The DAR
issued a Notice of Coverage placing the property under compulsory
acquisition under the CARL of 1988. MBC foreclosed on the lien and
the land was awarded to it in an auction sale. Subsequently, the SC in
G.R. No. 85960 ordered MBC‘s partial liquidation and allowed the sale
of the bank‘s assets including the subject landholding. CCFI was
authorized to partially redeem the subject land and sell them to a third
party,Ayala Land Inc.
Prompted by the numerous proceedings for compulsory acquisition
initiated by the DAR against MBC, Governor Reyes requested DAR
Sec.to issue an order exempting the landholdings of MBC from CARL
and to declare a moratorium on the compulsory acquisition, but
thiswas denied. Upon petition, the OP remanded the case to the DAR.
DARSecretary then issued a Resolution granting MBC‘s "Request for
Clearance to Sell," with the sale to be undertaken by CCFI.He also
issued Conversion Order approving the conversion and/or exemption
based on the findings of the DAR‘s CLUPPI and of the MARO that the
land was beyond 18 degrees in slope. CCFI submitted the following:
(1)Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution approving the
conversion/ reclassification of the said parcels of land from
agricultural to residential, commercial, and industrial uses;
(2)Sangguniang Bayan Resolution recommending
conversion based on the favorable findings by the
Committee on Housing and Land Use;
(3) Statement of Justification; and
(4) proof of settlement of claims.
Almost 3 years after the Conversion Order had been in force and
effect, the farmers tilling the subject land filed a Petition for
Revocation of Conversion Order alleging: (1) that the sale by CCFI to
ALI was invalid as it was done prior to the land‘s conversion and was
concealed in the application;and (2) that CCFI and ALI were guilty of
misrepresentation in claiming that the property had been reclassified
through a mere Resolution when the law required an ordinance of the
Sanggunian.
The DAR Sec. denied the petition. This was affirmed by the Office of
the President which found the subject property to have been legally
converted into non-agricultural land, citing the findings of the local
agencies that it was beyond 18 degrees in slope, remained
undeveloped, was not irrigated, and was without any other source of
irrigation in the area.
The CA reversed the findings of the OP and the DAR. Even if the issue
was only raised for the first time on appeal, the CA ruled that the
subject land could no longer be subject to conversion because a Notice
of Coverage and a Notice of Acquisition had already been issued over
the properties.
ISSUES:
1. Does a notice of acquisition ban conversion of land?
2. Is the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution sufficient compliance with the
requirement of the Conversion Order?
3. Was the subject property legally converted into non-agricultural
land?
RULING:
1. NO. A notice of acquisition is not an absolute, perpetual ban on
conversion. AO 12-94par. E, disallows applications for conversion of
lands for which the DAR has issued a notice of acquisition. But this
falls under heading VI, "Policies and Guiding Principles."The law grants
the DAR Sec. the sole power to make this policy judgment, despite the
"guiding principle."Upon applicant‘s compliance with the application
requirements, the DAR is rightly authorized to determine the propriety
of conversion. Ithas the sole prerogative to make technical
determinations on changes in land use and to decide whether a parcel
of agricultural land has indeed been converted to non-agricultural use.
2. YES. While the LGC requires that an ordinance must be enacted for
a valid reclassification, Conversion and Reclassification are
separate procedures. The 2 Resolutions were submitted to the DAR
only as supporting documents in their application for Conversion. Par.
B (3) Part VI of DAR AO 12-94 allows conversion when the land will
have greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes "as certified by the LGU." The 2 Resolutions, while not strictly
for purposes of reclassification, are sufficient compliance with the
requirement of the Conversion Order.
Par. E and B (3) were thus set merely as guidelines in issues of
conversion. CARL is to be solely implemented by the DAR, taking into
account current land use as governed by the needs and political will of
the local government and its people.
3. YES. Land use conversion may be allowed when it is by reason of
changes in the predominant use brought about by urban development.
Par. B (3) Part VI of DAR AO 12-94 states that if at the time of the
application, the land still falls within the agricultural zone, conversion
shall be allowed only on the following instances: a) When the land has
ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes, as certified by the Reg. Dir. of DA or b) When the locality
has become highly urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial and industrial purposes, as
certified by the LGU. The thrust of this provision is that even if the
land has not yet been reclassified, if its use has changed towards the
modernization of the community, conversion is still allowed.
The Conversion Order has long attained finality and may no longer be
questioned.
73

Macasi ano vs Diokno
212 SCRA 464
Facts:
Municplaity of Parañaque passed Ordinance no. 86 which authorized
the closure of Gabriele, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and
theestablishment of a flea market thereon. This was pursuant to MCC
Ordinance No. 2, approved by the Municipal council, authorizing
andregulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads
and open spaceswithin Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market
and/or vending areas.
Upon authority given by the Municipal Council, it entered into an
agreement with Palanyag whereby the latter shall operate, maintain
andmanage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the
obligation to remit dues tothe treasury of the municipal government of
Parañaque. Market stalls werethen put up by Palanyag on the said
streets.
Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command,
ordered the destruction and confiscation of the stalls but were later
returned to Palanyag. Notice was given to remove it within 10
otherwise they will be dismantled.
Respondents petitioned the court and Macasiano was enjoined from
enforcing the order of destroying and confiscating the market stalls.
Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, contends that municipal roads
are used forpublic service and are therefore public properties; that as
such, they cannot be subject toprivate appropriation or private
contract by any person, even by the respondent Municipality of
Parañaque. Petitioner submits that a property already dedicated to
publicuse cannot be used for another public purpose and that absent a
clear showing that the Municipality of Parañaque has been granted by
the legislature a specific authority toconvert a property already in
public use to another public use, respondent municipality is,therefore,
bereft of any authority to close municipal roads for the establishment
of a fleamarket.
Issue:
Is the ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of
Parañaque authorizing the lease and use of the public streets or
thoroughfares as sites for flea market vaild?
Ruling:
NO. J. Gabrielle G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena
streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore
considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of
the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed
public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local
governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the
use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them
by Congress.
Authority to local government units to close roads and other similar
public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic
principles already established by law. These basic principles have the
effect of limiting such authority of the province, city or municipality to
close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays
down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general areoutside the
commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local
government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due
process which should be complied with before closing a road, street or
park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the
road or other public property from public use when circumstances
show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public
useor public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the
property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government
unit concerned. It is only then that the respondent municipality can
"use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or
conveyed" in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter
II of Blg. 333, known as Local Government Code.
The general public have a legal right to demandthe demolition of the
illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials
of respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from
public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific
public purpose.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has
the authority to passthe disputed ordinance, the same cannot be
validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the
Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by respondent
municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval
of the ordinance.
Cabrera vs Court of Appeals
195 SCRA 314
FACTS:
On September 19, 1969, the Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted
Resolution No. 158 resolving to close the old road leading to the new
Capitol Building of the province to traffic effective October 31, 1969,
and to give to the owners of the properties traversed by the new road
equal area as per survey by the Highway District Engineer's office from
the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their
properties.
Learning about Resolution 158, the petitioner filed on December 29,
1978, a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes for
"Restoration of Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance,
Annulment of Resolutions and Documents with Damages." He alleged
that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the
Province of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and therefore
beyond the commerce of man. He contended that Resolution No. 158
and the deeds of exchange were invalid, as so too was the
closure of the northern portion of the said road.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the board has authority to close the road.
2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to damages.
RULING:
The petition has no merit.
The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or
convey it for other purposes is derived from the following
provisions of Republic Act No. 5185 in relation to Section 2246 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides,
R.A. No. 5185, Section 11 (II) (a):
II. The following actions by municipal officials or municipal councils, as
provided for in the pertinent sections of the Revised Administrative
Code shall take effect without the need of approval or direction from
any official of the national government: Provided, That such actions
shall be subject to approval or direction by the Provincial Board:
(a) Authority to close thoroughfare under Section 2246;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2246. Authority to close thoroughfare. — With the prior
authorization of the Department Head, a municipal council may close
any municipal road, street, alley, park, or square; but no such way or
place aforesaid or any part thereof, shall be closed without
indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. L
Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to
the municipality might be lawfully used or conveyed.
Finally, the construction of the new road was undertaken under the
general welfare clause. Whatever inconvenience the petitioner has
suffered “pales in significance compared to the greater convenience
the new road, which is wide and concrete, straight to the veterans
74
fountain and down to the pier, has been giving to the public, plus the
fact that the new road adds beauty and color not only to the
town of Virac but also to the whole province of Catanduanes." For the
enjoyment of those benefits, every individual in the province, including
the petitioner, must be prepared to give his share.
Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs Hon. Pascual A. Bercilles
GR No. L-40474
August 29, 1975
Facts:
The terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City was
declared in a Resolution as an abandoned road, the same not being
included in the City Development Plan. Later it was also sold in a public
bidding by the Acting Cebu City Mayor as authorized by a Resolution to
petitioner, Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co.
When petitioner sought to register such lot, the Assistant Provincial
Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground
that the property being a public road intended for public use is
considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the
commerce of man.
Issue:
Is the local government empowered to close a public road or street?
Held:
Yes. Section 31, paragraph 34 of the City Charter of Cebu City
(Republic Act No. 3857) gives the City of Cebu the valid right to
declare a road as abandoned. Since that portion of the city street
subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was withdrawn
from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes
patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Favis vs City of Baguio
G.R. No. L-29910
April 25, 1969
(29 SCRA 456)
Facts:
Antonio Favis bought a parcel of land from the Assumption Convent,
Inc. Said lot is bounded on the southwest (proposed road), owned by
Assumption Convent, Inc. and part of subdivision plan.
Simultaneous with the sale, Assumption donated to the City — "for
road purposes" — the lot indicated in its subdivision plan as the
proposed road. This donated road is used by Favis as his means of
egress and ingress from his residence to a public street called Lapu-
Lapu Street.
Lapu-Lapu Street is actually a portion of a big tract of land registered
in the name of the City, known as Baguio Market Subdivision, for all of
which the City holds Transfer Certificate of Title. It branches out to
various parts of the market subdivision. Ocular inspection conducted
by the trial court disclosed that at the exact connecting point of Lapu-
Lapu Street and the donated road (which leads to appellant's land),
the road opening is only 2.5 meters wide.
Lot 25 of the Baguio Market Subdivision is northernmost in said
subdivision and contains an area of approximately 400 square meters.
As far back as June, 1947, the City, leased this Lot 25 to Shell for a
ten-year period renewable for another ten years. Shell constructed
thereon a service station of about 335 square meters.
In 1961, the City Council of Baguio passed a Resolution authorizing the
City thru its Mayor to lease to Shell two parcels of land.
Lot 25 (Lot A), it is to be noted, is the same lot leased to Shell way
back in June, 1947 and the lease of Lot B is merely an addition
thereto. This additional area taken from Lapu-Lapu Street is five (5)
meters wide and twenty (20) meters long and abuts Lot 25.
Antonio C. Favis lodged a letter- protest against the additional lease
made in favor of Shell. He claimed that it would diminish the width of
Lapu-Lapu Street to five meters only; that it would destroy the
symmetry of the said street thus making it look very ugly; and that the
City was bereft of authority to lease any portion of its public streets in
favor of anyone.
Issue:
Does the city council have the power to close city streets like Lapu-
LapuStreet? Favis asserts that since municipal bodies have no inherent
power to vacate or withdraw a street from public use, there must be a
specific grant by the legislative body to the city or municipality
concerned
Ruling:
Undoubtedly, the City is explicitly empowered to close a city street.
We may drive home the point by presenting here the converse of the
rule as set forth in Unson vs. Lacson, supra. There, as here, the
municipal board passed an ordinance (No. 3470) withdrawing the
northern portion of Callejondel Carmen from public use, declaring it
patrimonial property of the City of Manila and authorizing its lease to
Genato Commercial Corporation. Unson had a lot bordering Callejondel
Carmen on which several buildings stood. One of such buildings was
known as "Commerce Building." Prior to the construction of Genato's
building on the leased premises, Unson's lot had on its southern
boundary two exits on Callejondel Carmen which had to be closed
upon the construction of said building. Unson went to court alleging
that the ordinance and the contract of lease with Genato were illegal.
The trial court upheld the city's authority to withdraw such alley for
public use and to convert it into patrimonial property. But, on appeal,
we held:
"In this connection, respondents have been unable to cite any legal
provision specifically vesting in the City of Manila the power to close
Callejondel Carmen. Indeed, Section 18(x) of Republic Act No. 409 —
upon which appellees rely — authorizes the Municipal Board of Manila
'subject to the provisions of existing laws, to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement . . . of streets, avenues, alleys . . . and
other public places,' but it says nothing about the closing of any such
places. The significance of this silence becomes apparent when
contrasted with Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code,
explicitly vesting in municipal councils of regularly organized
municipalities the power to close any municipal road, street, alley, park
or square, provided that persons prejudiced thereby are duly
indemnified, and that the previous approval of the Department Head
shall have been secured. The express grant of such power to the
aforementioned municipalities and the absence of said grant to the
City of Manila lead to no other conclusion than that the power was
intended to be withheld from the latter."
The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority competent to
determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public
use.
Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the
discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the
courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness
to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private
interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation
ordinance.
Deemed as material factors which a municipality must consider in
deliberating upon the advisability of closing a street are: "the
topography of the property surrounding the street in the light of
ingress and egress to other streets; the relationship of the street in the
road system throughout the subdivision; the problem posed by the
'dead end' of the street; and width of the street; the cost of rebuilding
and maintaining the street as contrasted to its ultimate value to all of
the property in the vicinity; the inconvenience of those visiting the
subdivision; and whether the closing of the street would cut off any
property owners from access to a street."
Given the precept that the discretion of a municipal corporation is
broad in scope and should thus be accorded great deference in the
spirit of the Local Autonomy Law (R.A. 2264), and absent a clear
abuse of discretion, we hold that the withdrawal for lease of the
disputed portion of Lapu-Lapu Street and the conversion of the
75
remainder of the dead-end part thereof into an alley, does not call for,
and is beyond the reach of, judicial interference.
Sangalang vs Immediate Appellate Court
176 SCRA 719
FACTS:
The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to
opening of several streets to the general public. BAVA claim that the
demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets amounts to
deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation
without just compensation.
ISSUE:
Is the act of the Mayor valid?
HELD:
YES, the opening of the streets was warranted by the demands of the
common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public
convenience.
There is no merit in BAVA's claims as there is no taking of property
involved here. The act of the Mayor, now challenged, is in the concept
of Police power. Police power is the state’s authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare. It consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common
good.
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.The Bill of
Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual
rights and liberties. It is subject to the far more overriding demands
and requirements of the greater number. (Philippine Association of
Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon)
BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit Street was
unjustified, or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. The fact that it has
led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is no argument against the
Municipality's effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. Certainly, the
duty of a local executive is to take care of the needs of the greater
number, in many cases, at the expense of the minority.
Pilapil vs Court of Appeals
216 SCRA 33
[Closure and Opening of Roads, Article 43-45, IRR of LGC, Permanent,
grounds and conditions]
Facts:
The petitioners-spouses (hereinafter, Pilapils) own a parcel of land
situated in Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu, which formerly belonged to
Marcelo Pilapil’s grandfather. Meanwhile, private respondents
(hereinafter, Colomidas), who are residents of Mandaue City,
purchased on 4 June 1981 from Esteria vda. de Ceniza and the heirs of
Leoncio Ceniza a parcel of land, also located at Bahak, Poblacion,
Liloan, Cebu.
The Colomidas claim that they had acquired from Sesenando Longkit a
road right of way which leads towards the National Road; this road
right of way, however, ends at that portion of the property of the
Pilapils where a camino vecinal exists all the way to the said National
Road. However, the Pilapils specifically deny the existence of such
camino vecinal.
The Colomidas presented witnesses testifying that the camino vecinal
traverses the property of the Pilapils. On the other hand, the Pilapils
presented Engineer Epifanio Jordan, the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator of the Municipality of Liloan to testify that on
Liloan's Urban Land Use Plan or zoning map which he prepared upon
the instruction of then Municipal Mayor Cesar Butai and which was
approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan, the camino vecinal in
sitio Bahak does not traverse, but runs along the side of the Pilapil
property.
Both the trial court and Court of Appeals gave credence to the
testimonies of Colomidas’ witnesses and ruled in favor of them.
Issue:
Does the camino vecinal traverses Pilapil’s property?
Ruling: No.
The Supreme Court ruled that the issue of the witnesses’ credibility has
been rendered moot by the unrebutted evidence which shows that the
Municipality of Liloan, through its Sangguniang Bayan, had approved a
zoning plan, otherwise called an Urban Land Use Plan. This plan
indicates the relative location of the camino vecinal in sitio
Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu.
It is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment of
the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan.
No private party can interfere with such a right. Under the applicable
law in this case, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (The Local Government
Code), more specifically Section 10, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I
thereof provides:
“A local government unit may likewise, through its head
acting pursuant to a resolution of its Sangguniang and in
accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code,
close any barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street,
alley, park or square. No such way or place or any part thereof
shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced
thereby. A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used
or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or
conveyed.”
A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for public use.
Pursuant, therefore, to the above powers of a local government unit,
the Municipality of Liloan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare
and adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which
may consider, among other things, the municipal roads to be
constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close any
municipal road.
In the instant case, the Municipality of Liloan, through the
Sangguniang Bayan, approved the Urban Land Use Plan; this plan was
duly signed by the Municipal Mayor. By doing so, the said legislative
body determined, among others, the location of the camino vecinal in
sitio Bahak.
As further declared by Engineer Jordan, this camino vecinal in sitio
Bahak "passes the side of the land of Socrates Pilapil. This is the
proposed road leading to the national highway." The Colomidas
presented no rebuttal witness to show that by the approval of the
zoning map by the Sangguniang Bayan, they were effectively deprived
of access to the national highway from their property.
Alolino v. Flores
GR No. 198774,
April 4, 2016
FACTS:
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land
where he initially constructed a bungalow-type house. In 1980, he
added a second floor to the structure. He also extended his two-storey
house up to the edge of his property. There are terraces on both
floors. There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3)
on the ground floor and another three (3) on the second floor.
In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie)
Flores constructed their house/ sari-sari store on the vacant
municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of
Alolino's house. Since they were constructing on a municipal road, the
respondents could not secure a building permit. The structure is only
about two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino's
house, covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents'
construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had
76
previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to the
municipal road through the rear door of his house.
Alolino demanded that the spouses remove their structure but the
latter refused. Thus, he complained about the illegal construction to
the Building Official of the Municipality of Taguig. Sometime 2001 or
2002, respondents began constructing a second floor to their
structure, again without securing a building permit. This floor was to
serve as residence for their daughter, Maria Teresa Sison. The
construction prompted Alolino to file another complaint with the
Building Official of Taguig.
On May 17, 2002, the Office of the Barangay Council of Tuktukan
issued a certification that no settlement was reached between the
parties relative to Alolino's 1994 complaint. The respondents did not
comply with the directive from the building official, prompting Alolino
to send them a letter dated January 23, 2003, demanding the removal
of their illegally constructed structure.
Respondents refused to comply. Thus, on February 14, 2003, Alolino
filed a complaint against the respondents with the RTC.
RTC: Alolino had already previously acquired an easement of light and
view and that the respondents subsequently blocked this easement
with their construction. Respondents' illegal construction was a private
nuisance with respect to Alolino because it prevented him from using
the back portion of his property and obstructed his free passage to
the barrio/municipal road. Moreover, respondents' house was a public
nuisance, having been illegally constructed on a barrio road - a
government property - without a building permit.
CA: RTC decision is reversed and complaint is dismissed. (1) Alolino
had not acquired an easement of light and view because he never
gave a formal prohibition against the respondents; (2) Alolino was also
at fault, having built his house up to the edge of the property line in
violation of the National Building Code; (3) Alolino had not acquired an
easement of right of way to the barrio Road; and (4) that the
respondents' house was not a public nuisance because it did not
endanger the safety of its immediate surroundings. The Government
had already abandoned the barrio road pursuant to the 2004
Sanggunian resolution.
ISSUE:
Was respondent’s property, where the house/sari-sari store was built,
validly reclassified from a municipal/barrio road to a residential lot by
the Sanggunian?
HELD: No.
There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari sari store on
government property. Properties of LGUs are classified as either
property for public use or patrimonial property.
From the distinction provided in Article 424 NCC, the barrio road
adjacent to Alolino's house is property of public dominion devoted to
public use.
We find no merit in the respondents' contention that the Local
Government of Taguig had already withdrawn the subject barrio road
from public use and reclassified it as a residential lot. To convert
a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the
LGU to enact an ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds
(2/3) of the Sanggunian members, permanently closing the
road.
In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely
passed a resolution. The difference between an ordinance and a
resolution is settled in jurisprudence: an ordinance is a law but a
resolution is only a declaration of sentiment or opinion of the
legislative body.
Properties of the local government that are devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control
of Congress. Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate the use of these
properties unless specifically authorized by Congress, as is the case
with Section 21 of the LGC. In exercising this authority, the LGU
must comply with the conditions and observe the limitations
prescribed by Congress. The Sanggunian's failure to comply with
Section 21 renders ineffective its reclassification of the barrio road.
As a barrio road, the subject lot's purpose is to serve the benefit of the
collective citizenry. It is outside the commerce of man and as a
consequence: (1) it is not alienable or disposable; (2) it is not subject
to registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot be the
subject of a Torrens title; (3) it is not susceptible to prescription; (4) it
cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract; (5) it
is not subject to attachment and execution; and (6) it cannot be
burdened by any voluntary easements.
Agreeably, Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an
easement of right of way over the respondents' property or
the barrio road it stands on. This does not mean, however, that the
respondents are entitled to continue occupying the barrio road and
blocking the rear of Alolino's house. Every building is subject to the
easement which prohibits the proprietor or possessor from committing
nuisance.
Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, the respondents' house is evidently
a nuisance. A barrio road is designated for the use of the general
public who are entitled to free and unobstructed passage thereon.
Permanent obstructions on these roads, such as the respondents'
illegally constructed house, are injurious to public welfare and
convenience. The occupation and use of private individuals of public
places devoted to public use constitute public and private nuisances
and nuisance per se. Evidently, the respondents have no right to
maintain their occupation and permanent obstruction of
the barrio road. The interests of the few do not outweigh the greater
interest of public health, public safety, good order, and general
welfare.
PART V. CORPORATE POWERS OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
City Council of Cebu vs Cuizon
47 SCRA 325
FACTS:
Respondents Mayor Cuizon and Tropical Commercial Co. entered into a
contract involving the purchase of road construction equipment for
$520,912.00 cash from Tropical. The City Council of Cebu filed with
the CFI a complaint to nullify said contract as having been executed
without prior authority from it. Complaint was dismissed for lack of
legal capacity.
The lower court held that there is no provision of law authorizing the
city council to sue in behalf of the city and that the authorized
representative under the LGC is the city mayor for that purpose. Hence
the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the city councilors have the legal capacity to question
the validity of the contract entered into by the mayor.
RULING:
Yes. Plaintiffs' right and legal interest as city councilors to file the suit
below and to prevent what they believe to be unlawful disbursements
of city funds by virtue of the questioned contracts and commitments
entered into by the defendant city mayor notwithstanding the city
council's revocation of his authority with due notice thereof to
defendant bank must likewise be recognized.
The lower court's narrow construction of the city charter, Republic Act
No. 3857, that under section 20 (c) thereof, it is only the city mayor
who is empowered "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings to
recover properties and funds of the city wherever found and cause to
be defended all suits against the city," and that plaintiffs' suit must
therefore fail since "there is no provision in the said charter which
authorizes expressly or impliedly the city council or its members to
77
bring an action in behalf of the city" cannot receive the Court's
sanction.
The case at bar shows the manifest untenability of such a narrow
construction. Here where the defendant city mayor's acts and
contracts purportedly entered into on behalf of the city are precisely
questioned as unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of his
authority, and the city should therefore not be bound thereby nor incur
any liability on account thereof, the city mayor would be the last
person to file such a suit on behalf of the city, since he precisely
maintains the contrary position that his acts have been lawful and duly
bind the city.
To adhere to the lower court's narrow and unrealistic interpretation
would mean that no action against a city mayor's actuations and
contract in the name and on behalf of the city could ever be
questioned in court and subjected to judicial action for a declaration of
nullity and invalidity, since no city mayor would file such an action on
behalf of the city to question, much less nullify, contracts executed by
him on behalf of the city and which he naturally believes to be valid
and within his authority.
Ramos, et. al. vs Court of Appeals
GR. No. 99425
March 3, 1997
(269 SCRA 34)
FACTS:
Petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez, Norma C. Castillo,
and the Baliuag Market Vendors Association, Inc. filed a petition for
the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances No. 91 and No. 7
and the contract of lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed
in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan. The provincial Fiscal and the
Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed an Answer in behalf of
respondent municipality.At the pre-trial conference, Atty. Roberto B.
Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he was counsel for respondent
municipality. Provincial Attorney Oliviano D. Regalado appeared as
collaborating counsel of Atty. Romanillos. The Provincial Fiscal did not
appear. It was Atty. Romanillos who submitted the Reply to
petitioners' Opposition to respondents' motion to dissolve injunction. It
was also Atty. Romanillos who submitted a written formal offer of
evidence for respondent municipality.
During the hearing, petitioners questioned the personality of Atty.
Romanillos to appear as counsel of the respondent municipality, and
moved to disqualify Atty. Romanillos from appearing as counsel for
respondent municipality and to declare null and void the proceedings
participated in and undertaken by Atty. Romanillos. Meanwhile, Atty.
Romanillos and Atty. Regalado filed a joint motion stating, among
others, that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for
respondent municipality and that Atty. Regalado, as his collaborating
counsel for respondent municipality, is adopting the entire proceedings
participated in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos. Respondent Judge
issued an Order which denied petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty.
Romanillos as counsel for respondent municipality and to declare null
and void the proceeding participated in by Atty. Romanillos; and on
the other hand, granted Atty. Regalado's motion "to formally adopt the
entire proceedings including the formal offer of evidence". In support
of his foregoing action, respondent Judge reasoned:
 "Petitioners" motion for the disqualification of Atty.
Romanillos as respondent municipality's counsel is deemed
moot and academic in view of his withdrawal as counsel of
said municipality.
 The opposing counsel has never questioned his appearance
until after he made a formal offer of evidence for the
respondents. The acquiescence of petitioners' counsel of his
appearance is tantamount to a waiver and petitioners are,
therefore, estopped to question the same.
ISSUES
1. Who is authorized to represent a municipality in a civil suit
against it?
2. What is the effect on the proceedings when a private
counsel represents a municipality? Elsewise stated, may be
the proceedings be validated by a provincial attorney's
adoption of the actions made by a private counsel?
RULING:
As to the First Issue: Who is Authorized to Represent a
Municipality in its Lawsuits?
In the recent case of Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals,
this Court, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, set in clear-cut
terms the answer to the question of who may legally represent a
municipality in a suit for or against it, thus: . . . The matter of
representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled
in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and reiterated in Province of
Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., where we ruled that
private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in
lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Duty of
fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. —
The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality
or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof ( sic)
original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where
the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to
the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal
district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial
government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the
provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. When the provincial
fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province a special attorney may be employed by its
council.
Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, Republic Act
No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only provincial fiscal and the
municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their
lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to
employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where
the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.For the
aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal
was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on
record.In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that
the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality
of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel is
without authority of law.The provincial fiscal's functions as legal officer
and adviser for the civil cases of a province and corollarily, of the
municipalities thereof, were subsequently transferred to the provincial
attorney.
The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence show that only the
provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal attorney should
represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only in exceptional instances
may a private attorney be hired by a municipality to represent it in
lawsuits. These exceptions are enumerated in the case of Alinsug vs.
RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, to wit:
 When the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving
the provincial government or another municipality or city
within the province.
 Where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve
and represent it.
 When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court
a particular municipality such as:
o when original jurisdiction of case involving the
municipality is vested in the Supreme Court,
o when the municipality is a party adverse to the
provincial government or to some other
municipality in the same province, and
o when, in a case involving the municipality, he, or
his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir
legatee, creditor or otherwise.
None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. It may be said
that Atty. Romanillos appeared for respondent municipality inasmuch
as he was already counsel of Kristi Corporation which was sued with
respondent municipality in this same case. The order of the trial court
stated that Atty. Romanillos "entered his appearance as collaborating
78
counsel of the provincial prosecutor and the provincial attorney." This
collaboration is contrary to law and hence should not have been
recognized as legal. It has already been ruled in this wise:The fact that
the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to collaborate with
a private law firm does not legalize the latter's representation of the
municipality of Hagonoy. While a private prosecutor is allowed in
criminal cases, an analogous arrangement is not allowed in civil cases
wherein a municipality is the plaintiff.
As already stated, private lawyers may not represent municipalities on
their own. Neither may they do so even in collaboration with
authorized government lawyers. This is anchored on the principle that
only accountable public officers may act for and in behalf of public
entities and that public funds should not be expanded to hire private
lawyers.Petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning the
legality of the appearance of Atty. Romanillos, notwithstanding that
they questioned the witnesses of respondent municipality during the
hearing of its motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Municipality
of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals held that the legality of the
representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings.
As to the Second Issue: Effect on Proceedings by Adoptionof
Unauthorized Representation
We agree with public respondent that such adoption produces validity.
This Court believes that conferring legitimacy to the appearance of
Atty. Romanillos would not cause substantial prejudice on petitioners.
Requiring new trial on the mere legal technicality that the municipality
was not represented by a legally authorized counsel would not serve
the interest of justice. After all, this Court does not see any injustice
committed against petitioners by the adoptions of the work of private
counsel nor any interest of justice being served by requiring retrial of
the case by the duly authorized legal representative of the town.
In sum, although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to
represent it in litigations, in the interest of substantial justice however,
we hold that a municipality may adopt the work already performed in
good faith by such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it (1)
provided that no injustice it thereby heaped on the adverse party and
(2) provided further that no compensation in any guise is paid therefor
by said municipality to the private lawyer. Unless so expressly adopted,
the private lawyers work cannot bind the municipality.
People v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 162748-50
March 28, 2006
Facts:
Calamba Mayor Lajara and his fellow local publics officials, members of
the Sangguniang Bayan, and the President of the Australian
Professional Realty Inc. were charged before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Sections 3€, (g) and (j) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. It was alleged that said officials gave APRI
unwarranted privilege of constructing a shopping center in Calamba
despite knowledge that the said construction firm was not qualified by
the PCAB. There were other anomalies alleged such as the terms and
conditions of the MOA entered into was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Municipality such that the actual operation and
management of the said shopping center and the income derived
therefrom for a period of 25 years will be directly under the control
and supervision of the APRI. It was also alleged that no pre-
qualification, bidding and awarding of the project was conducted, thus,
causing undue injury to the Government and that the MOA was still
under the study of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. It was
argued that the Resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan, which
authorized the entering into the MOA, was not valid for the reason that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna disapproved or did not ratify
the same.
Issue:
Can a Municipal Ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan be
declared invalid for its lack of approval or ratification from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan?
Held:No.
Under Section 22 (d) of the Local Government Code, “Local
government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their
proprietary functions in the managements of their economic
enterprises…” As held in the case of Mendoza v. Leon, the
establishment, construction and maintenance of municipal markets are
undoubtedly pure proprietary function of any municipality.
It is the opinion of this Court that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan may
not restrict or frustrate the exercise of the proprietary function of the
municipality because the power to review of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is limited only to a finding that an ordinance or resolution
is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Pangbayan (Sec. 56 (c) Local Government Code).
OSG vs. Court of Appeals and the Municipal Government of
Saguiran, Lanao del Sur
GR No. 199027
June 9, 2014
Facts:
Municipality of Saguiran was named a respondent in a petition for
mandamus filed with the RTC of Lanao del Sur by the former members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Saguiran for the payment of their unpaid
terminal leave benefits.
RTC dismissed the petition. On appeal, the CA issued a notice requiring
the OSG to file a memorandum for the Municipality of Saguiran.
Instead of filing the required memorandum, OSG filed a Manifestation
and Motion requesting to be excused from filing the memorandum on
the ground that the Municipality of Saguiran had to be represented by
its legal officer, pursuant to Article XI (3)(i) of the LGC which bar local
government units from obtaining the services of a lawyer other than
their designated legal officers. OSG contended that it has no legal
authority to represent the Municipality of Saguiran as its mandate is
limited to the representation of “the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its official and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
a lawyer.”
Issue:
May the OSG be compelled to represent the Municipality of Saguiran in
its lawsuit?
Ruling: No.
LGC vested exclusive authority upon legal officers to be counsels of
local government units.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the OSG’s powers and
functions are as follows:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. – The Office of
the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services
of a lawyer. When authorized by the President
or head of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government-owned or controlled
corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It
shall have the following specific powers and
functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and
its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all
civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his
official capacity is a party;
79
However, on the matter of counsels’ representation for the
government, the Administrative Code is not the only law that delves on
the issue. The Local Government Code limits the lawyers who are
authorized to represent the local government units in court actions.
Under Book III, Title V, Article XI, Sec. 481 of LGC, it is provided that
“the legal officer shall represent the local government unit in all civil
actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or
any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party.” This provision of
the LGC restricts the lawyer who may represent the local government
unit as its counsel in court proceedings.
Being a special law on the issue of representation in court that is
exclusively made applicable to local government units, the LGC must
prevail over the provisions of the Administrative Code, which is
classified only as a general law on the subject matter.
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in
pari materia and should, accordingly, be read together and
harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is
that where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular
and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same
matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a
general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more
particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is
absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any
meaning at all.
Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs Zamboanga City
22 SCRA 1334
Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of
Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga
Province.
On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting
the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act
also provided that —Buildings and properties which the provinceshall
abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be
acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed
by the Auditor General.
The properties and buildings referred toconsisted of 50 lots and some
buildingsconstructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and
covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of
Zamboanga Province.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province
of Zamboanga into two (2):
Zamboanga del Norte andZamboanga del Sur.
Properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall
be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga
del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the
President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor
General. However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act
3039was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by
providing that—all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the
former province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in
favor of the said City of Zamboanga.
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961, ordered the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further
payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City
the sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue
allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since
the enactment of Republic Act 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has
already been returned to it.
This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file on
March 5, 1962, a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction"
Issue:
Whether or not Zamboanga del Norte is deprived of its private
properties without due process and just compensation
Ruling:
The matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the
properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The
principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality
(meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over
it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity,
then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment
of just compensation||.
Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it
affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds,
hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites —
a total of 24 lots — since these were held by the former Zamboanga
province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the
absolute control of Congress.
But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del
Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots
which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for
distinctly governmental purposes.|||
The fact that the 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition
that they are truly private in nature. On the other hand, that the 24
lots used for governmental purposes are also registered
is of no significance since
registration cannot convert public property to private. Applying, Art.
424 of NCC, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used
as High School playgrounds, could be considered as
patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province.
Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school
sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use.
They would fall under the phrase "public works for public service"
Rabuco vs Villegas
55 SCRA656
The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on
the strength of the established doctrine that the subdivision of
communal land of the State (although titled in the name of the
municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots
by sale on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional
authorization and disposition does not constitute infringements of the
due process clause or the eminent domain provisions of
the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of the
legislature's right of control and power to deal with State property.
Facts:
The City officials of the City of Manila questioned the constitutionality
of Republic Act 3120 whereby congress converted the lot in question
together with another lot in San Andres, Malate from "reserved as
communal property" and into "disposable and alienable lands of the
State" for sale in small lots to the bona fide occupants thereof.
It is argued invalid and unconstitutional for constituting deprivation the
City of Manila of the lots in question without due process of law and
without just compensation as contended by the city officials.
Issue:
Whether or not the the lots in dispute maybe disposed without paying
just compensation to the city of Manila.
Held:
Respondents city officials' contention that the Act must be stricken
down as unconstitutional for depriving the city of Manila of the lots in
question and providing for their sale in subdivided small lots to bona
fide occupants or tenants without payment of just compensation is
untenable and without basis, since the, lots in question are manifestly
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owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and are
therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as
distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in
its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived
without due process and without just compensation.
Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the properties were
"reserved as communal property" and ordered their conversion into
"disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale in small lots to
the bona fide occupants thereof. It is established doctrine that the act
of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary
legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts.|||
The Court holds that the Act in question (Republic Act 3120 in the case
at bar) were intended to implement the social justice policy of
the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless
and that they were not "intended to expropriate the property involved
but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and
to make it available for disposition by the National Government: . . .
The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision
lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate
as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just
compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of
the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right
and power to deal with state property."
Villanueva vs Castaneda
154 SCRA 142
Facts:
On 7 November 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando
(Pampanga) adopted Resolution 218 authorizing some 24 members of
the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association (FUMTA) to
construct permanent stalls and sell along Mercado street, on a strip of
land measuring 12 by 77 meters (talipapa). The action was protested
on 10 November 1961 by Felicidad Villanueva, et. al. (claiming that
they were granted previous authorization by the municipal government
to conduct business therein), in Civil Case 2040, where the Court of
First Instance (CFI) Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of preliminary
injunction that prevented the FUMTA members from constructing the
said stalls until final resolution of the controversy.
On 18 January 1964, while the case was pending, the municipal
council of San Fernando adopted Resolution 29, which declared the
subject area as “the parking place and as the public plaza of the
municipality,” thereby impliedly revoking Resolution 218 (series of
1961).
On 2 November 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid
case and held that the land occupied by Villanueva, et. al., being public
in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not
be the subject of private occupancy. The writ of preliminary injunction
was made permanent.
The decision was not enforced as the petitioners were not evicted from
the place. The number of vendors in the area (talipapa) ballooned to
200. The area deteriorated increasingly to the great prejudice of the
community in general, as the makeshift stalls render the area as virtual
fire trap.
On 12 January 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and
Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate
implementation of Resolution 29, to restore the property to its original
and customary use as a public plaza. Acting thereon after an
investigation conducted by the municipal attorney, OIC (Office of the
Mayor) Vicente Macalino issued on 14 June 1982 a resolution requiring
the municipal treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish the
stalls beginning 1 July 1982.
The Villanueva, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition with the CFI
Pampanga (Civil Case 6470) on 26 June 1982.
Issue:
Did the mayor act whimsically in exercising his authority only after the
municipal attorney had conducted an investigation to look into the
complaint filed by the Association of Concerned Citizens and
Consumers of San Fernando?
Held:
The Court observes that even without such investigation and
recommendation, the respondent mayor was justified in ordering the
area cleared on the strength alone of its status as a public plaza as
declared by the judicial and legislative authorities. In calling first for
the investigation (which the petitioner saw fit to boycott), he was just
scrupulously paying deference to the requirements of due process, to
remove an taint of arbitrariness in the action he was caged upon to
take.
Since the occupation of the place in question in 1961 by the original 24
stallholders (whose number later ballooned to almost 200), it has
deteriorated increasingly to the great prejudice of the community in
general. The proliferation of stags therein, most of them makeshift and
of flammable materials, has converted it into a veritable fire trap,
which, added to the fact that it obstructs access to and from the public
market itself, has seriously endangered public safety. The filthy
condition of the talipapa, where fish and other wet items are sold, has
aggravated health and sanitation problems, besides pervading the
place with a foul odor that has spread into the surrounding areas. The
entire place is unsightly, to the dismay and embarrassment of the
inhabitants, who want it converted into a showcase of the town of
which they can all be proud. The vendors in the talipapa have also
spilled into the street and obstruct the flow of traffic, thereby impairing
the convenience of motorists and pedestrians alike. The regular
stallholders in the public market, who pay substantial rentals to the
municipality, are deprived of a sizable volume of business from
prospective customers who are intercepted by the talipapa vendors
before they can reach the market proper. On top of all these, the
people are denied the proper use of the place as a public plaza, where
they may spend their leisure in a relaxed and even beautiful
environment and civic and other communal activities of the town can
be held.
The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners
are covered by the police power as delegated to the municipality under
the general welfare clause. This authorizes the municipal council “to
enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to
law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for
the protection of property therein.” This authority was validly exercised
in this case through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of 1964,
by the municipal council of San Fernando.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution
could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that
the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through
the medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public
interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal
order. This power can be activated at any time to change the
provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the
promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not
militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited
by the paramount police power.
Dacanay vs Asistio
GR No. 93654
May 6, 1992
Facts:
On January 1979, MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating certain city and municipal
streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets. Pursuant
thereto, the Caloocan City mayor opened up 7 flea markets in that city.
One of those streets was the “Heroes del ‘96 Street” where the
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petitioner lives. Upon application of vendors, respondents City Mayor
and City Engineer, issued them licenses to conduct vending activities
on said street.
In 1987, Antonio Martinez, as OIC City Mayor of Caloocan City, caused
the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes del ‘96, V. Gozon and
Gonzales streets.
As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del ‘96 Street, through
the tolerance of public respondents, and in clear violation of the
decision in Civil Case No. C-12921, Dacanay filed the present petition
for mandamus, praying that public respondents be ordered to enforce
the final decision in Civil Case No. C-12921 which upheld the City
Mayor’s authority to order the demolition of market stalls on V. Gozon,
Gonzales and Heroes del ‘96 streets and to enforce PD No. 772 and
other pertinent laws.
Issue:
Whether or not public streets or thoroughfares can be leased or
licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or
resolution of the Metro Manila Commission?
Held: NO
The petition for mandamus is meritorious. There is no doubt that the
disputed areas from which the private respondents’ market stalls are
sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in
Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street is property for public use,
hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424 NCC). Being
outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or
other contract.
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to
occupy portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to
law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or
licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the
public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through a
contract. The executive order issued by the Acting Mayor authorizing
the use of Heroes del ‘96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who
were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general
law that reserves city streets and roads for public use.
City of Angeles v Court of Appeals
261 SCRA 90
Facts:
In a Deed of Donation, respondent donated to the City of Angeles, 51
parcels of land situated in Barrio Pampanga, City of Angeles (50,676 sq
m). The amended deed provides that: “The properties donated shall
be devoted and utilized solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports
Center. Any change or modification in the basic design or concept of
said Sports Center must have the prior written consent of the DONOR.
The properties donated are devoted and described as ‘open spaces’ of
the DONOR’s subdivision, and to this effect, the DONEE, upon
acceptance of this donation, releases the DONOR and/or assumes any
and all obligations and liabilities appertaining to the properties
donated.
On 1988, petitioners started the construction of a drug rehabilitation
center on a portion of the donated land. Upon learning thereof, private
respondent protested such action for being violative of the terms and
conditions and also offered another site for the rehabilitation center.
Private respondent filed a complaint for breach of the conditions
imposed in the amended deed of donation and seeking the revocation
of the donation. Petitioners admitted the commencement of the
construction but alleged that the conditions imposed in the amended
deed were contrary to Municipal Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1962,
otherwise known as the Subdivision Ordinance of the Municipality of
Angeles.
Issue:
Whether a subdivision owner/developer is legally bound under
Presidential Decree No. 1216 to donate to the city or municipality the
“open space” allocated exclusively for parks, playground and
recreational use.
Ruling:
PD 1216 (amending PD 957) defines open space as an area reserved
exclusively for parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads,
places of worship, hospitals, health centers, barangay centers and
other similar facilities and amenities. These areas reserved for parks,
playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands,
and non-buildable. No portion of the parks and playgrounds donated
thereafter shall be converted to any other purpose or purposes.’ “Upon
their completion x xx, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds
shall be donated by the owner or developer to the city or municipality
and it shall be mandatory for the local government to accept;
provided, however, that the parks and playgrounds may be donated to
the Homeowners Association of the project with the consent of the city
or municipality concerned. x xx.” (amended sec. 31, PD 957)
It is clear from the aforequoted amendment that it is no longer
optional on the part of the subdivision owner/developer to donate the
open space for parks and playgrounds; rather there is now a legal
obligation to donate the same. Although there is a proviso that the
donation of the parks and playgrounds may be made to the
homeowners association of the project with the consent of the city of
municipality concerned, nonetheless, the owner/developer is still
obligated under the law to donate. Such option does not change the
mandatory character of the provision. The donation has to be made
regardless of which donee is picked by the owner/developer. We hold
that any condition may be imposed in the donation, so long as the
same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy. The contention of petitioners that the donation should be
unconditional because it is mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216
does not provide that the donation of the open space for parks and
playgrounds should be unconditional.
Chavez vs Public Estate Authority
GR No. 133250
November 11, 2003
FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were
being reclaimed. A law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority
which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in
this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a
private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between
AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila
Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI.
By 1973, the government signed a contract with CDCP to reclaim
certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay and to construct
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road.
By 1977, Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating PEA which tasked the
latter "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and
"to develop, improve, acquire, x xx lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands” and Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
By 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA
to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in
MCCRRP x xx shall be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed
under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP) .
By April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA"
for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250
hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete
the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA
through negotiation without public bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the
Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the
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JVA.5 On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda
delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as
the "grandmother of all scams." And as a result, the Senate Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
conducted a joint investigation.
By 1997, Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the
JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The Legal Task
Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.
ISSUE:
WHETHER or NOT AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own
under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and
submerged areas in Manila Bay?NO
HELD:
1. The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which holds that the
State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. The 1987
Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all
natural resources are owned by the State and except for
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural
resources cannot be alienated. The Amended JVA covers a
reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the
750 hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the
rest of the area are still submerged areas forming part of Manila
Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the
actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder
the other reclamation costs to be incurred. The foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public
domain, waters and other natural resources and consequently
owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas
shall not be alienable unless they are classified as agricultural
lands of the public domain. Clearly, the mere physical act of
reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not
make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the
mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public
domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are
alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a
declaration that these lands are not needed for public
service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands
of the public domain. Only such an official classification and
formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition under
the Constitution, Title I and Title II3 of CA No. 141 and other
applicable laws
2. There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No.
525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PEA's charter, however,
expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer,
deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands x xx owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the
government."87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore,
legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands,
whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties
in accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional
limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to
the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.PEA may also sell its
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer
any statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional
ban does not apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any
of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority
benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain
barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain, including government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the
reclaimed lands could be transferred by PEA to the "contractor or
his assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to private
corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional
ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
3. Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition, and further declared no
longer needed for public service, PEA would have to conduct a
public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must observe
the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring
public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from
holding a public auction. Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No.
1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the
government is required to sell valuable government property
through public bidding. It is only when the public auction fails
that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the Commission
on Audit must approve the selling price. The Commission on Audit
implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through
Circular No. 89-29691 dated January 27, 1989. This circular
emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only
through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to
only in case of "failure of public auction." At the public auction
sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the
auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving
only 407.84 hectares,95 is not a valid justification for a
negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly
auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on
December 10, 1991, more than three years before the signing of
the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the
country had greatly improved during the intervening period.
4. The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is absolute and clear: "Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, x xx." Even Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT
Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative authority
to sell reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the
constitutional ban. private corporation, even one that undertakes
the physical reclamation of a government BOT project, cannot
acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of
the constitutional ban. Although Section 302 of the Local
Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to that of the
BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership
automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the
Local Government Code.Thus, under either the BOT Law or the
Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a
corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of
the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual,
portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares96 of
non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in
view of the legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is
the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local
Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Philippine Fisheries Development Authorities vs CA
GR No. 169836
July 31, 2007
Facts:
The Ministry of Public Works and Highways reclaimed from the sea a
21-hectare parcel of land in Barangay Tanza, Iloilo City, and
constructed thereon the IFPC, consisting of breakwater, a landing
quay, a refrigeration building, a market hall, a municipal shed, an
83
administration building, a water and fuel oil supply system and other
port related facilities and machineries. Upon its completion, the
Ministry of Public Works and Highways turned over IFPC to the
Authority, pursuant to Section 11 of PD 977, which places fishing port
complexes and related facilities under the governance and operation of
the Authority. Notwithstanding said turn over, title to the land and
buildings of the IFPC remained with the Republic. The Authority
thereafter leased portions of IFPC to private firms and individuals
engaged in fishing related businesses.
Sometime in May 1988, the City of Iloilo assessed the entire IFPC for
real property taxes. The assessment remained unpaid until the alleged
total tax delinquency of the Authority for the fiscal years 1988 and
1989 amounted to P5,057,349.67, inclusive of penalties and
interests. To satisfy the tax delinquency, the City of Iloilos cheduled
on August 30, 1990, the sale at public auction of the IFPC.
Issue:
1) whether the Authority is a government owned or controlled
corporation (GOCC) or an instrumentality of the national government;
2) whether the IFPC is a property of public dominion.
Ruling:
For an entity to be considered as a GOCC, it must either be organized
as a stock or non-stock corporation. Two requisites must concur before
one may be classified as a stock corporation, namely: (1) that it has
capital stock divided into shares, and (2) that it is authorized to
distribute dividends and allotments of surplus and profits to its
stockholders. If only one requisite is present, it cannot be properly
classified as a stock corporation. As for non-stock corporations, they
must have members and must not distribute any part of their income
to said members.
The Authority is actually a national government instrumentality which
is defined as an agency of the national government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter.[13] When the law vests in a government
instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become
a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government
instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate
powers.
Thus, the Authority which is tasked with the special public function to
carry out the governments policy to promote the development of the
country’s fishing industry and improve the efficiency in handling,
preserving, marketing, and distribution of fish and other aquatic
products, exercises the governmental powers of eminent
domain,[14] and the power to levy fees and charges.[15] At the same
time, the Authority exercises the general corporate powers conferred
by laws upon private and government-owned or controlled
corporations.[16]
By express mandate of the Local Government Code, local
governments cannot impose any kind of tax on national
government instrumentalities like the MIAA. Local governments are
devoid of power to tax the national government, its agencies
and instrumentalities. The taxing powers of local governments do
not extend to the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, [u]nless otherwise provided in this Code as stated in
the saving clause of Section 133.
The Iloilo fishing port which was constructed by the State for public
use and/or public service falls within the term port in the aforecited
provision. Being a property of public dominion the same cannot be
subject to execution or foreclosure sale.[22] In like manner, the
reclaimed land on which the IFPC is built cannot be the object of a
private or public sale without Congressional authorization. Whether
there are improvements in the fishing port complex that should not
be construed to be embraced within the term port, involves evidentiary
matters that cannot be addressed in the present case. As for now,
considering that the Authority is a national government
instrumentality, any doubt on whether the entire IFPC may be levied
upon to satisfy the tax delinquency should be resolved against the City
of Iloilo.
In sum, the Court finds that the Authority is an instrumentality of the
national government, hence, it is liable to pay real property taxes
assessed by the City of Iloilo on the IFPC only with respect to those
portions which are leased to private entities. Notwithstanding said tax
delinquency on the leased portions of the IFPC, the latter or any part
thereof, being a property of public domain, cannot be sold at public
auction. This means that the City of Iloilo has to satisfy the tax
delinquency through means other than the sale at public auction of the
IFPC.
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority vs CA
GR No. 150301
October 2, 2007
Facts:
The controversy arose when
respondent Municipality of Navotas assessed the real estate taxes
allegedly due from petitioner Philippine Fisheries Development
Authority (PFDA) for the period 1981-1990 on properties under its
jurisdiction, management and operation located inside the Navotas
Fishing Port Complex (NFPC).
The assessed taxes had remained unpaid despite the demands made
by the municipality which prompted it, through Municipal Treasurer
Florante M. Barredo, to give notice to petitioner on October 29, 1990
that the NFPC will be sold at public auction on November 30, 1990 in
order that the municipality will be able to collect on petitioners
delinquent realty taxes which, as of June 30, 1990, amounted
to P23,128,304.51, inclusive of penalties.
Petitioner asked the RTC to enjoin the auction of the NFPC on the
ground that the properties comprising the NFPC are owned by the
Republic of the Philippines and are, thus, exempt from
taxation.According to petitioner, only a small portion of NFPC which
had been leased to private parties may be subjected to real property
tax which should be paid by the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not the PFDA should be liable for taxes
Held:
As a reclaimed land, the port complex should be considered a reserved
land. In NDC v. Cebu City, the Supreme Court held that a reserved
land is a public land that has been withheld or kept back from sale or
disposition. The land remains an absolute property of the government.
As its title remains with the State, the reserved land is tax exempt.
In Government v. Cabangis and Lampria v. Director of Lands, this
Court declared that the land reclaimed from the sea, as a result of the
construction by the government of a breakwater fronting the place
where it is situated, belongs to the State in accordance with Article 5
of the Law of Waters of 1866.
The NFPC property is intended for public use and public service. As
such, it is owned by the State, hence, exempt from real property
tax.Nonetheless, the above exemption does not apply when the
beneficial use of the government property has been granted to a
taxable person. Section 234 (a) of the Code states that real property
owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions is exempted from payment of the real property tax except
when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person.
As a rule, petitioner PFDA, being an instrumentality of the national
government, is exempt from real property tax but the exemption does
not extend to the portions of the NFPC that were leased to taxable or
private persons and entities for their beneficial use.
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Similarly, for the same reason, the NFPC cannot be sold at public
auction in satisfaction of the tax delinquency assessments made by
the Municipalityof Navotas on the entire complex. Petitioner is only
liable to pay the amount of P62,841,947.79 representing the total
taxes due as of December 31, 2001 from PFDA-owned properties that
were leased, as shown in the Summary of Realty Taxes Due Properties
Owned and/or Managed by PFDA as per Realty Tax Order of Payment
dated September 16, 2002.
Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan vs Hon. Dumdum
GR No. 168289
March 22, 2010
FACTS:
A Complaint was filed by herein private respondent Emily Rose Go Ko
Lim Chao against herein petitioners, the Municipality of Hagonoy,
Bulacan and its chief executive, Felix V. Ople (Ople) for collection of a
sum of money and damages. It was alleged that respondent, doing
business as KD Surplus and as such engaged in buying and selling
surplus trucks, heavy equipment, machinery, spare parts and related
supplies, was contacted by petitioner Ople. Respondent had entered
into an agreement with petitioner municipality through Ople for the
delivery of motor vehicles, which were needed to carry out certain
developmental undertakings in the municipality. That because of
Ople’s earnest representation that funds had already been allocated for
the project, she agreed to deliver from her principal place of business
in Cebu City twenty-one motor vehicles whose value
totaled P5,820,000.00. She attached to the complaint copies of the
bills of lading showing that the items were consigned, delivered to and
received by petitioner municipality on different dates.However, Ople
allegedly did not heed respondents claim for payment. That the total
obligation of petitioner had already totaled P10,026,060.13 exclusive of
penalties and damages. Thus, respondent prayed for full payment of
the said amount, with interest at not less than 2% per month, plus
damages for business losses, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
the costs of the suit.
The trial court issued an Ordergranting respondent’s prayer for a writ
of preliminary attachment conditioned upon the posting of a bond, the
trial court then issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment directing the
sheriff to attach the estate, real and personal properties of petitioners.
Instead of addressing private respondent’s allegations, petitioners filed
a Motion to Dismisson the ground that the claim on which the action
had been brought was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, that
there was no written contract or document that would evince the
supposed agreement they entered into with respondent. They averred
that contracts of this nature, before being undertaken by the
municipality, would ordinarily be subject to several preconditions such
as a public bidding and prior approval of the municipal council which,
in this case, did not obtain. Petitioners also filed a Motion to Dissolve
and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment Already
Issued, invoking immunity of the state from suit, unenforceability of
the contract, and failure to substantiate the allegation of fraud.
The trial court issued an Order denying the two motions. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration, but they were denied.
The Court of Appeals, finding no merit in the petition, upheld private
respondents claim and affirmed the trial courts order.
ISSUE:
I. Whether the contract is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds
as there was no written contract or document that would evince the
supposed agreement
II. Whether there is a valid reason to deny petitioners motion to
discharge the writ of preliminary attachment.
RULING:
I.
NO. the contract is enforceable. Statute of Frauds found in paragraph
(2), Article 1403 of the Civil Code, requires for enforceability certain
contracts enumerated therein to be evidenced by some note or
memorandum. The term Statute of Frauds is descriptive of statutes
that require certain classes of contracts to be in writing; and that
do not deprive the parties of the right to contract with respect to the
matters therein involved, but merely regulate the formalities of the
contract necessary to render it enforceable.
Thus, the Statute of Frauds only lays down the method by which the
enumerated contracts may be proved. But it does not declare them
invalid because they are not reduced to writing inasmuch as, by law,
contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered
into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are
present. The object is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement
of obligations depending, for evidence thereof, on the unassisted
memory of witnesses by requiring certain enumerated contracts and
transactions to be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be
charged. The effect of noncompliance with this requirement is simply
that no action can be enforced under the given contracts. If an action
is nevertheless filed in court, it shall warrant a dismissal under Section
1(i), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, unless there has been, among
others, total or partial performance of the obligation on the part of
either party.
Since there exists an indication by way of allegation that there has
been performance of the obligation on the part of respondent, the
case is excluded from the coverage of the rule on dismissals based on
unenforceability under the statute of frauds, and either party may then
enforce its claims against the other.
II.
NO. there is no valid reason to deny petitioners motion to discharge
the writ of preliminary attachment. The general rule spelled out in
Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its
political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise
put, they are open to suit but only when they consent to it. Consent is
implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it
then descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it may be
embodied in a general or special law such as that found in Book I, Title
I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
vests local government units with certain corporate powers one of
them is the power to sue and be sued.
Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As
held in City of Caloocan v. Allarde, where the suability of the state is
conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the state is at
liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or
not. Execution may not issue upon such judgment, because statutes
waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to satisfy
judgments recovered from the action. These statutes only convey an
implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final
and make provisions for its full satisfaction. Thus, where consent to be
sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is
limited only to the resultant verdict on the action before execution of
the judgment.
Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, citing Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, There,
the Court highlighted the reason for the rule, to wit:
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to
be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it
may limit claimants action only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by
the corresponding appropriations as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot
be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects. x xx
With this in mind, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary
attachment must be dissolved and, indeed, it must not have been
issued in the very first place. While there is merit in private
respondents position that she, by affidavit, was able to substantiate
85
the allegation of fraud in the same way that the fraud attributable to
petitioners was sufficiently alleged in the complaint and, hence, the
issuance of the writ would have been justified. Still, the writ of
attachment in this case would only prove to be useless and
unnecessary under the premises, since the property of the municipality
may not, in the event that respondents claim is validated, be subjected
to writs of execution and garnishment unless, of course, there has
been a corresponding appropriation provided by law.
Viuda de Tantoco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo
49 Phil 52
Facts:
Municipality of Iloilo appropriated 2 strips of land owned by petitioner
for widening of a street. - Petitioner files case in Court of First Instance
to recover the purchase price for the said lots. The CFI of Iloilo
sentenced the said municipality to pay the plaintiff the amount so
claimed, plus the interest.
On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay
the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue
against the property of the said municipality, by virtue of which the
sheriff attached two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police
patrol automobile, the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and
Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the corresponding lots,
used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and Mandurriao.
The Municipality files a motion to dissolve the attachment and declare
such as null and void for being illegal. This was granted by the CFI.
Issue:
Can the properties mentioned be attached by a judgment-debtor of a
municipality?
Ruling:
Citing Tufexis vs. Olaguera and Municipal Council of Guinobatan (32
Phil., 654), the SC ruled that the movable and immovable property of a
municipality, necessary for governmental purpose, may not be
attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against the
municipality. The supreme reason for this rule is the character of the
public use to which such kind of property is devoted.
The Court further added that even the municipal income, is exempt
from levy and execution. SC cited volume 1, page 467, Municipal
Corporations by Dillon stating the following:
“The revenue of the public corporation is the essential
means by which it is enabled to perform its appointed work.
Deprived of its regular and adequate supply of revenue,
such a corporation is practically destroyed and the ends of
its erection thwarted. Based upon considerations of this
character, it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only
the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of
such corporations cannot be seized under execution against
them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it.
Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such
judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not
subject to execution unless so declared by statute. The
doctrine of the inviolability of the public revenues by the
creditor is maintained, although the corporation is in debt,
and has no means of payment but the taxes which it is
authorized to collect.”
The following rules can therefore be culled from this case:
1. Properties held for public uses - and generally everything held for
governmental purposes - are not subject to levy and sale under
execution against such corporation. The same rule applies to funds in
the hands of a public officer and taxes due to a municipal corporation.
2. Where a municipal corporation owns in its proprietary capacity, as
distinguished from its public or governmental capacity, property not
used or used for a public purpose but for quasi-private purposes, it is
the general rule that such property may be seized and sold under
execution against the corporation.
3. Property held for public purposes is not subject to execution merely
because it is temporarily used for private purposes. If the public use is
wholly abandoned, such property becomes subject to execution.
Baldivia vs Lota
107 Phil 1099
FACTS:
The petitioners Jose Baldivia, Marcelo Capuno, Carlito Catapang, Eliseo
Dimaculangan and Ricardo Bathan were former members of the police
force of the municipality of Taal, province of Batangas. Shortly after
the last election held in November 1955, the petitioners resigned from
their positions. They have brought this instant action to compel the
respondent Flaviano Lota in his capacity as municipal mayor of Taal,
Batangas, to approve the vouchers submitted by the petitioners for the
payment of the leave pay which they had in their favor at the time of
their separation from the service.
The evidence of the petitioners show that the petitioners resigned
because they belong to a different political faction from that of
the Respondent. In connection with their claim for their leave pay,
they had gone to the Office of the President in Malacañang, and were
able to secure a note from Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique c.
Quema, addressed to the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, requesting
the latter to help the petitioners in securing the payment of their
accumulated vacation and sick leave. Acting on the said note of
Mr.Quema, the Provincial Treasurer wrote separate letters to the
respondent municipal mayor and to the municipal treasurer of Taal,
Batangas, interceding in behalf of the petitioners and suggesting a
manner by which their claim may be paid.
The petitioner Jose Baldivia was actually able to receive one month
leave pay on two separate occasions, on December 1, 1955, and
February 10, 1956, respectively. The other petitioners were likewise
able to receive one month leave pay each on February 10, 1956. The
petitioners claim, however, that there is a balance remaining in their
favor of unpaid vacation leave in the amount of three and one-half (3
1/2) months in the case of Jose Baldivia, and four months each in the
case of the rest of the petitioners, all at the rate of P35.00 a month.
The municipal treasurer prepared the corresponding vouchers for the
payment of another one month vacation leave to each of the petitioner
and submitted them to the respondent mayor for approval. The
respondent, however, refused to approve the same.
In justification for his act, respondent alleged that there is no
appropriation for the amount covered by said vouchers; that
petitioners held their positions illegally, they having served beyond the
time limit prescribed by law for the effectivity of their appointments as
temporary employees; and that said appointments were illegal, the
same having been made without the consent of the municipal council,
which is required in sections 2199 and 2200 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners may compel compel respondent,
FlavianoLota, as Mayor of Taal, Batangas, to approve certain vouchers
RULING:
Yes, the mayor may be compelled through mandamus. While the Court
feels itself powerless to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioners, it
could not help but express its sympathy with their situation, and its
displeasure with the manner by which they had been deprived of a
claim which appeared to be valid and meritorious. This case is another
manifestation of that unfortunate phenomenon in local politics in this
country wherein considerations of public interest have been set aside
for the satisfaction of petty factional jealousies and sacrificed on the
altar of political rivalries. The instant petitioners are claiming only what
is due them nothing more, nothing less. The payment of leave pay to
an employee who has been separated from the service and who
generally depends for his continued sustenance on such amounts as
may be collected by him by reason of his past services, is not only an
expression of simple justice on the part of the government, but is also
designed for the maintenance of the loftier ideal of morale in the
public service. The respondent in this case has shown unusual interest
86
not for the purpose of affording the petitioners the justice that is due
them, but in his attempt to find ways and means of defeating the
petitioners’ claim. The respondent has admitted that he had spent over
a thousand pesos in going to different government offices and in
making several trips to Manila to consult with ‘legal luminaries’ to
research and find reasons to justify his refusal to pay the petitioners. It
is ironic indeed that in so doing, he actually spent more than what the
petitioners are claiming to be the balance of their unpaid leave. It may
well be said that had the respondent instead spent his money, time
and effort to look for means by which he could pay the petitioners, he
would have dedicated himself to a worthier cause and with decidedly
lesser effort and expense.
Indeed, respondent could have, and should have, either included the
claim of petitioners herein in the general budget he is bound to
submit, pursuant to section 2295 of the Revised Administrative Code,
or prepared a special budget for said claim, and urged the municipal
council to appropriate the sum necessary therefor. In any event, if the
municipal mayor fails or refuses to make the necessary appropriation,
petitioners may bring an action against the municipality for the
recovery of what is due them and after securing a judgment therefor,
seek a writ of mandamus against the municipal council and the
municipal mayor to compel the enactment and approval of the
appropriation ordinance necessary therefor.
Yuviengco vs Gonzales
108 Phil 247
DOCTRINE: In an order brought against a province for the recovery
of an amount representing the unpaid balance of cost of construction
of school projects, the Provincial Treasurer and the Assistant Provincial
Treasurer are parties, because they are the legal custodians of the
public funds of the province and are in charge of the disbursement
thereof. Hence, if they willfully disobey and defy the court's order to
deposit the amount needed to settle the claim, which has been found
to be valid and demandable, the said officials may be ordered arrested
FACTS:
On November 13, 1956, Geronimo V. Maluto, filed against the Province
of Cavite and Vicente Francisco, as District Engineer of Cavite, a
complaint for the recovery representing the unpaid balance of costs of
the construction of two school projects, with legal interest.
Respondent court found that the evidence and the law supported the
validity of the said plaintiff's claim and thus ordered the payment of
the amounts prayed for. The said judgment became final and
executory.
On September 20, 1954, however, it adopted a resolution authorizing
payment of the said obligation subject to the condition of availability of
funds. On October 29, 1958, respondent court ordered the Provincial
Treasurer of Cavite to deposit the moneywith the court with the
warning that he shall be ordered arrested upon failure to comply with
said order.
Compliance with the aforecited order was not made hence the said
court on October 30, 1958 ordered the arrest of said Provincial
Treasurer.
On November 3, 1958, respondent court issued another order upon
the plaintiff's urgent motion for compliance showing that non-
compliance, with the first order was caused by the Provincial
Treasurer's alleged sickness and absence from office. The latter order
commanded the Assistant Provincial Treasurer of Cavite to act in place
of the Provincial Treasurer and deposit with the court.The said order
also contained a warning that said officer would be held in contempt
of court in case of non-compliance.
The petitioners assailed the orders contending that it is arbitrary and
capricious and that they (the Provincial Treasurer and the Assistant
Provincial Treasurer) are not parties to the case (the proper party
against whom execution should have been made being allegedly the
Province of Cavite.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners considered parties to the case?
RULING:
It is illogical for petitioners to contend that the Provincial Treasurer
and the Assistant Provincial Treasurer are not parties to the case. For,
in a very real sense, indeed they are, because they are the legitimate
custodians of the public funds of said province, the very officials in
charge of the disbursement of all provincial funds.
Petitioners' willful disobedience and defiance to respondent court's
order is irreverence of the court's dignity. In the maintenance of the
respect due to it, respondent court was correct in the imposition of the
orders of arrest.
Municipality of Paoay vs Manaois
GR No L-3485
June 30, 1950
Facts
Manaois obtained a judgment against the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos
Norte and Judge De Guzman of said province issued a writ of
execution against the defendant municipality. In compliance with said
writ the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Norte levied upon and attached the
amount of One thousand seven hundred twelve pesos and one
centavo (P1,712.01) in the Municipal Treasury of Paoay, Ilocos Norte,
representing the rental paid by Mr. Demetrio Tabije of a fishery lot
belonging to the defendant municipality and about forty fishery lots
leased to thirty-five different persons by the Municipality.
The Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte in representation of the
municipality of Paoay, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan asking for the dissolution of that attachment of levy of the
properties above-mentioned which was denied. Instead of appealing
from that order the municipality of Paoay has filed the present petition
for certiorari with the writ of preliminary injunction, asking that the
order of respondent Judge dated October 6, 1946, be reversed and
that the attachment of the properties of the municipality already
mentioned be dissolved.
Issue:
Whether the properties attached by the sheriff for purposes of
execution are subject to levy.
Ruling:
No. The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos
Norte, which had been parceled out or divided into lots and later let
out to private persons for fishing purposes at an annual rental are
clearly not subject to execution. In the first place, they do not belong
to the municipality. They may well be regarded as property of State.
What the municipality of Paoay hold is merely what may be
considered the usufruct or the right to use said municipal waters,
granted to it by section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code
which reads as follows:
1. SEC. 2321. Grant of fishery. — A municipal council shall
have authority, for purposes of profit, to grant the exclusive
privileges of fishery or right to conduct a fish-breeding
ground within any definite portion, or area, of the municipal
waters.
"Municipal waters", as herein used, include not only
streams, lakes, and tidal waters, include within the
municipality, not being the subject of private ownership, but
also marine waters include between two lines drawn
perpendicular to the general coast line from points where
the boundary lines of the municipality touch the sea at high
tide, and third line parallel with the general coast line and
distant from it three marine leagues.
Where two municipalities are so situated on opposite shores
that there is less than six marine leagues of marine waters
between them the third line shall be a line equally distant
from the opposite shores of the respective municipalities.
The municipality of Paoay is not holding this usufruct or right of
fishery in a permanent or absolute manner so as to enable it to
87
dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away from it as its property
through execution.
The fishery lots numbering about forty in the municipality of Paoay
are not subject to execution. However, the amount of P1,712.01 in the
municipal treasury of Paoay representing the rental paid by Demetrio
Tabije on fishery lots let out by the municipality of Paoay is a proper
subject of levy, and the attachment made thereon by the Sheriff is
valid. We may add that other amounts coming or due from lessees of
the forty odd fishery lots leased by the municipality to different
persons may also be attached or garnished to satisfy the judgment
against the municipality of Paoay.
Municipality of Makati v. CA
GR Nos. 89898-99
October 1, 1990
Facts:
An action for eminent domain was filed. Attached to petitioner's
complaint was a certification that a bank account (Account No. S/A
265-537154-3) had been opened with the PNB Buendia Branch
under petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510.00, made
pursuant to the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 42. After due hearing,
respondent RTC judge rendered a fixing the appraised value of the
property at P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount
minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier
released to private respondent.
Pending, petitioner filed a "Manifestation"informing the court that
private respondent was no longer the true and lawful owner of the
subject property because a new title over the property had been
registered in the name of Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. (PSB). PSB filed
a manifestation informing the court that it had consolidated its
ownership over the property as mortgagee/purchaser at an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. After several conferences, PSB and
private respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby
they agreed to divide between themselves the compensation due from
the expropriation proceedings.
Respondent trial judge subsequently issued an order whichordered
PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum of P4,
953,506.45 which corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of
the subject property from the garnished account of petitioner.
However, petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia
Branch could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do
so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation.
Respondent trial judge issued an order denying petitioner'smotion for
reconsideration on the ground that the doctrine did not apply to the
case because petitioner's PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was an
account specifically opened for the expropriation proceedings of the
subject property.
Petitioner in its petition before the Court of Appeals,alleges for the first
time that it has actually two accounts with the PNB Buendia Branch, to
wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 — exclusively
for the expropriation of thesubject property, with
an outstanding balance of P99,743.94.
(2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 — for statutory
obligations and other purposesof the municipal
government, with a balance of P170,098,421.72.
xxxxxxxxx
Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was specifically
opened for expropriation proceedings it had initiated over the subject
property, petitioner poses no objection to the garnishment or the levy
under execution of the funds deposited therein amounting to
P99,743.94. However, it is petitioner's main contention that inasmuch
as the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net
amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by respondent sheriff in
excess of P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for the
municipal government's other statutory obligations, are exempted from
execution without the proper appropriation required under the law.
Issue:
Are public funds earmarked for the municipal government's other
statutory obligations exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law?
Ruling:
Yes. Public funds earmarked for the municipal government's other
statutory obligations exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law.
In this jurisdiction, well-settledis the rule that public funds are not
subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by
statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether
real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be
attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment
against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes,
licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and
exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and
functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.
The foregoing rule finds application in thecase at bar. Absent a
showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed anordinance
appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the
balancedue under the RTC decision, less the sum of P99,743.94
deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution
may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in
Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are
left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses,
without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money
judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of
mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the
necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds therefor.
City of Quezon vs Lexber, Inc.
GR No. 141616
March 15, 2001
Facts:
On August 27, 1990, a Tri-Partite Memorandum of Agreementwas
drawn between petitioner City of Quezon, represented by its then
Mayor Brigido R. Simon, Jr., respondent Lexber, Inc. and the then
Municipality of Antipolo, whereby a 26,010 square meter parcel of land
located in Antipolowas to be used as a garbage dumping site by
petitioner and other Metro Manila cities or municipalities authorized by
the latter, for a 5-year period commencing in January 1991 to
December 1995. Part of the agreement was that the landowner,
represented by Lexber, shall be hired as the exclusive supplier of
manpower, heavy equipment and engineering services for the
dumpsite and shall also have the right of first refusal for contracting
such services.
This led to the drawing of first negotiated contractbetween petitioner,
represented by Mayor Simon, and Lexber whereby the latter was
engaged to construct the necessary infrastructure at the
dumpsite. Construction of said infrastructure was completed and the
contract price agreed upon was accordingly paid to it by
petitioner.Meanwhile, a second negotiated contractwas entered into by
Lexber with petitioner. Lexber alleged that petitioner immediately
commenced dumping garbage on the landfill site continuously from
December 1991 until May 1992. Thereafter, petitioner ceased to dump
garbage on the said site for reasons not made known to
Lexber. Consequently, even while the dumpsite remained unused,
Lexber claimed it was entitled to payment for its services as stipulated
in the second negotiated contract.Respondents counsel sent a demand
letter to petitioner demanding the payment of at least 50% of its
service fee under the said contract.
88
Petitioner, represented by Mayor Mathay,denied any liability under the
contract on the ground that the same was invalid and
unenforceable. According to Mayor Mathay, the subject contract was
signed only then Mayor Simon and had neither the approval nor
ratification of the City Council, and it lacked the required budget
appropriation.
Thus, a complaint for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance or
Rescission of Contract and Damages was filed by Lexber against
petitioner. Lexber averred that because petitioner stopped dumping
garbage on the dumpsite after May 1992, Lexbers equipment and
personnel were idle to its damage and prejudice. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of respondent ordering the defendant to
pay the plaintiff. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said Judgment
was affirmed in toto.
Issue:
Is a contract entered into by the city mayor involving the expenditure
of public funds by the local government without prior appropriation by
the city council valid and binding?
Ruling:
Petitioner insists that the answer is in the negative, arguing that there
is no escaping the stringent and mandatory requirement of a prior
appropriation, as well as a certification that funds are available
therefor.
There is no denying that Sections 85 and 86 of P.D. 1445 (Auditing
Code of the Philippines) provide that contracts involving expenditure of
public funds:
a. can be entered into only when there is an appropriation
therefor; an
b. must be certified by the proper accounting official/agency
that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose,
which certification shall be attached to and become an
integral part of the proposed contact.
However, the very same Presidential Decree No. 1445 does not
provide that the absence of an appropriation law ipso facto makes a
contract entered into by a local government unit null and
void.Consequently, public funds may be disbursed not only pursuant to
an appropriation law, but also in pursuance of other specific statutory
authority, i.e., Section 84 of PD 1445.
Furthermore, then Mayor Simon, Jr. did not enter into the subject
contract without legal authority. The Local Government Code of 1983,
or B.P. Blg. 337, which was then in force, specifically and
exclusively empowered the city mayor to represent the city in its
business transactions, and sign all warrants drawn on the city treasury
and all bonds, contracts and obligations of the city.Such power granted
to the city mayor by B.P. Blg. 337 was not qualified nor restricted by
any prior action or authority of the city council.
Under B.P. Blg. 337, while the city mayor has no power to appropriate
funds to support the contracts, neither does said law prohibit him from
entering into contracts unless and until funds are appropriated
therefor. In fact, it is his bounden duty to so represent the city in all its
business transactions. On the other hand, the city council must provide
for the depositing, leaving or throwing of garbage and to appropriate
funds for such expenses.It cannot refuse to so provide and appropriate
public funds for such services which are very vital to the maintenance
of cleanliness of the city and the good health of its inhabitants.
There is no provision in B.P. Blg. 337, however, that prohibits the city
mayor from entering into contracts for the public welfare, unless and
until there is prior authority from the city council. This requirement
was imposed much later by R.A. No. 7160, long after the contracts had
already been executed and implemented.
The trial court ruled that while there may not have been prior authority
or appropriation to enter into and implement the second negotiated
contract, the project denominated as Quezon City Landfill Disposal
System was duly supported by a Certificate of Availability of Funds.
It must be noted that the Negotiated Contract dated November 8,
1990 is not ipso facto absolutely null and void. The subject thereof is
perfectly within the authority of the city government. It is pursuant to
the Tripartite Agreement entered into between the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the Municipality of Antipolo. The plaintiff was given the
exclusive right to exercise acts stated in the two negotiated contracts,
which are entered into to further carry out and implement the
provisions of the Tripartite Agreement.
It is of no moment that the certificate referred to by the trial court did
not state that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for
the current fiscal year is available for expenditure on account
thereof.The Certificate of Availability of Fundsmerely showed that
funds for the Landfill Disposal System was available. The funds to
cover the 1992 fiscal year could have been made available and
appropriated therefor at the beginning of said year. That the Quezon
City government later refused to appropriate and approve payments to
Lexber under the contract despite its use of the facilities for several
months in 1992, is not respondent’s fault, and being the aggrieved
party, it cannot be made to suffer the damage wrought by the
petitioner’s failure or refusal to abide by the contract.
When appellant City government, after the construction by the
appellee of the dumpsite structure in accordance with the contract
plans and specifications, started to dump garbage collected in the City
and consequently paid the appellee for the services rendered, such
acts produce and constitute a ratification and approval of the
negotiated contract and necessarily should imply its waiver of the right
to assail the contracts enforceability.
Manantan vs Municipality of Luna
82 Phil 844
FACTS:
The municipal council of Luna, Province of La Union, passed its
Resolution No. 32, series of 1945, the purpose of offering at public
auction on a lease of the privilege to catch "bañgus" fry within certain
section of the municipal waters.
Acting on the authority granted in said resolution the municipal
treasurer issued the necessary notices for the auction wherein it was
stated, among other things that the fishing privilege in question would
be leased to the highest bidder ranging from P1,000 and up together
with a deposit of 10 per cent of the amount so offered for the period
of one year from January 1, 1946, to December 31, 1946. With the
further statement that bids for more than one year but not more than
four years can be offered.
In official confirmation, the municipal council passed Resolution No.
37, series of 1946, granting to Julian Segundo Manantan and his
associates the fishing privilege in question and authorizing the
municipal mayor to execute the corresponding contract of lease. The
lease was to be four years (from 1946 to 1949, inclusive) at the
agreed price of P1,000 for the first year payable immediately, and
P2,400 for the succeeding three years, payable in a lump sum at the
beginning of 1947 or in installments at the discretion of the municipal
council.
After paying the P1,000 corresponding to the first year of the lease,
the lessees began catching "bangus" fry within the fishery zone in
question. But the municipal council, now composed of a new set
councilors headed by a new mayor, passed, a two new resolution: one
annulling the fishing privilege granted to Julian Segundo Manantan and
his partners and another setting date for auction of the fishing
privilege. Subsequently, Manantan and his associates commenced the
present suit in the Court of First Instance of La Union to have said
resolution declared void and the municipal council enjoined from
carrying out the auction. The municipal council, however, went ahead
with the auction and awarded the lease for the fishing privileges in
question to Timoteo Santaromana, whose bid was declared to be the
better of the two that were submitted.
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Petitioners contends that the lower court erred in holding Resolution
No. 37 to be null and void, and in not declaring Resolution No. 23 null
and void as violative of the constitutional provision prohibiting the
passage of any law impairing the obligation of contracts. It is obvious
that the case hinges on the validity of Resolution No. 37 granting the
fishing privileges to the petitioners. The learned trial judge rightly held
that Resolution No. 32 (the one authorizing the first auction) was not
invalidated by the fact that it was disapproved by the provincial board,
since "they only ground upon which a provincial board may declare
any municipal resolution . . . invalid is when such resolution . . . is
beyond the powers conferred upon the council . . . making the same"
and there is no question that Resolution No. 32 is within the powers
granted to municipal councils by the Fishery Law. His Honor, however,
was in error in taking the view that Resolution No. 37 and the lease
contract granted under it were null and void on the ground that when
the municipal council by said resolution "accepted the four-year if
proposal of petitioners and declared them to be the best and highest
bidders for the 1946-1947-1948-1949 fishing privilege, the municipal
council in effect awarded to the petitioners the four fishing privilege
without the intended benefits of public auction, in violation of section
69 of Act No. 4003, the Fishery Law, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 471." The trial judge thus proceeds on the assumptions that
Resolution No. 32, which authorized the first auction, did not authorize
a lease for more than one year, so that the notice of public auction
calling for bids for a longer period was unauthorized and therefore
void.
ISSUE:
Is Resolution 37, granting petitioners the 4-year fishing privilege,
valid?
RULING: YES.
It is true that the resolution fixes the minimum price for the lease at
P1, 000 for one year "beginning January 1, 1946, up to and including
December 31, 1949." But nowhere does it say that the lease was to be
for one year only. On the contrary, it expressly provides that the lease
"can be extended for a period of from one to four years," thus
indicating an intention not to limit the duration of the lease to one
year. In accord with that intention, the municipal treasurer, in
announcing the public auction, inserted in the notice a provision that
"bids for more than one year but not more than four years can be
offered," and the same municipal council which passed the resolution
(No. 32) confirmed that intention by entertaining and accepting in its
Resolution No. 37 the petitioners' bid for four years. It is a rule
repeatedly followed by this Court that "the construction place upon a
law at the time by the official in charge of enforcing it should be
respected."
As that part of the notice issued by the municipal treasurer which calls
for bids for a longer period than one year but not more than four years
is in accord with the real intent of Resolution No. 32, as that intention
was subsequently confirmed in Resolution No. 37 of the same
municipal council, the said notice cannot be deemed to be
unauthorized and void, so that it is erro[neous] to hold that he grant
of the fishing privilege to the petitioners was null and void for lack of a
valid notice of the public auction.
It results that the contract of lease entered into under the authority of
Resolution No. 37 between the petitioners and the municipal
government of Luna is a valid and binding contract and as such it is
protected by the Constitution and cannot, therefore, be impaired by a
subsequent resolution which sets in it aside and grants the fishing
privilege to another party.
Sangalang vs IAC
176 SCRA 759
FACTS:
Jose Sangalang and wife, herein petitioners are residents of Jupiter
Street, Makati Metro Manila. Sangalang and the other petitioners who
are also residents of Jupiter Street initially filed a case against Ayala to
enforce by specific performance restrictive easement upon property
pursuant to stipulations embodied in the deeds of sale cornering the
subdivision, and for damages,they want their property to remain
residential as agreed. The other petitions were also for the
enforcement of the aforesaid restrictions stipulated in the deeds of sale
executed by the Ayala corporation.
The lots which were acquired by the petitioners, were all sold by
Makati Development Corporation MDC (which will later merged with
ayala, the company owned and operated Bell-Air village) and also the
owners of subject to certain conditions and easements contained in
the Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of sale. When
MDC sold the above-mentioned lots to appellees’ predecessor in
interest, the whole stretch of the commercial block between Buendia
Avenue and Jupiter street, from Reposo street in the west to Zodiac
Street in the east was still undeveloped. Although it was not part of
the original plan, MDC constructed a fence or wall on the commercial
block along jupiter.
In 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance no 81,
providing for the zonification of Makati. Under this ordinance, Bel-Air
Village was classified as a Class A residential zone, with its boundary in
the south extending the center line of jupiter street. Under the zoning
classification, Jupiter street, therfore is a common boundary of Bel-Air
Village and the commercial zone.
Gates have been installed by BAVA (Bell Air Village Association) with its
employ its security guards in strategic locations across Jupiter Street to
maintained, supervise and enforce traffic regulations in the roads and
streets of the village. Then, on January 17, 1977 the Mayor of Makati
directed that in the interest of Public welfare and for the purpose of
easing traffic congestion, the streets of in Bel-Air village should be
opened for public use. The other streets in Bel-Air were voluntarily
opened except Jupiter street. The Municipal engineer of Makati then
wrote a letter addressed to BAVA to open for vehicular and pedestrian
traffic the entire portion of Jupiter street from Makati Avenue to
Reposo Street. Finally, the municipal officials of makati allegedly
opened, destroyed and removed the gates constructed/located at the
corner of Reposo street and Jupiter Street as well as the gates/fences
at Jupiter street and Makati Avenue forcibly, and then opened the
entire length of Jupiter to public traffic.
Petitioners brought the present action for damages against the
defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation on the ground of breach of
contract and on tort or quasi-delict. The area ceased to be purely
residential. Action for damages was brought against Ayala Corporation
and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely
residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their
respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala
Corporation violated in opening the Jupiter street for public use and
Whether or not the exercise of police power is valid.
HELD:
No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was
violated. Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by
Ayala Corporation, to build a “[f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate
for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayala’s alleged continuing
obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial
sections. It is our ruling, we reiterate, that Jupiter Street lies as a mere
boundary, a fact acknowledged by the authorities of Makati and the
National Government and, as a scrutiny of the records themselves
reveals, by the petitioners themselves, as the articles of incorporation
of Bel-Air Village Association itself would confirm. As a consequence,
Jupiter Street was intended for the use by both -the commercial and
residential blocks. It was not originally constructed, therefore, for the
exclusive use of either block, least of all the residents of Bel-Air Village,
but, we repeat, in favor of both, as distinguished from the general
public.
Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still overtaken by the
passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate exercise of
police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold
otherwise other than for the supposed “non-impairment” guaranty of
90
the Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests
of general welfare. While non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, I.e” the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
Invariably described as “the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers” and “in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government” the exercise of such power maybe judicially inquired into
and corrected only if it is a capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having bee a denial of due process or a violation
of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. The Ordinance has
not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to
warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.
City of Manila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. 71159
November 15, 1989
FACTS:
This is an action for damages brought forth by the widow and children
of a certain Sto. Domingo, Sr. against the City of Manila and some of
its officers, among others.The husband of plaintiff and litigating minors
died and was buried in a lot of the North Cemetery which was
accordingly leased by the City to the widow for a period of 50 years. A
receipt was thereby issued and no other document subject to the
transaction was made thereafter.
The City Mayor of Manila followed in good faith an administrative order
which prescribed uniform guidelines in processing of documents
pertaining to the use of the lots in North Cemetery. It later resulted to
the documents stating that the lease to the Sto. Domingo family was
only for 5 years. A certification and authorization was made for the
exhumation and removal of the remains of the dead husband.
Subsequently, the same lot was rented out to another lessee. When it
was All Souls’ Day, the plaintiff’s found out that the resting place of
their father and husband was no longer there, but in a warehouse with
thousands of sacks filled with human bones.
She petitioned for relief in court. She was denied relief in the RTC but
was later on reversed in the CA. Hence, this instant petition by the City
of Manila.
ISSUE:
Is the operation and function of a public cemetery governmental, or a
corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila? What is the
liability for damages of the petitioner city?
HELD:
The City of Manila is incorrect.
Private respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into a
contract of lease which involved the exercise of proprietary functions
with private respondent Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers
therefore can be sued for any violation of the contract of lease.Private
respondents' contention is well-taken.
Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate
and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be
exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law,
and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and
contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-
public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate,
private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those
exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the
public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and
political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the
special benefit and advantage of the community and include those
which are ministerial, private and corporate.
The Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the
settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third
persons ex contractu or ex delicto.
The Court further stressed:
"Municipal corporations are subject to be sued
upon contracts and in tort. . . .
xxxxxxxxx
"The rule of law is a general one, that the
superior or employer must answer civilly for the
negligence or want of skill of its agent or
servant in the course or line of his employment,
by which another, who is free from contributory
fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under
the conditions herein stated, fall within the
operation of this rule of law, and are liable
accordingly, to civil actions for damages when
the requisite elements of liability coexist. . .
The Court added:
". . . while the following are corporate or
proprietary in character, viz: municipal
waterworks, slaughter houses, markets, stables,
bathing establishments, wharves, ferries and
fisheries. Maintenance of parks, golf courses,
cemeteries and airports among others, are also
recognized as municipal or city activities of a
proprietary character.
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special
law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila
which was created by resolution of the Municipal Board. The
administration and government of the cemetery are under the City
Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of
graves, inches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the
purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the
superintendent of the cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore
prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of
burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery through.
With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North
Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns
in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute
that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents.
Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the
lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a
breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages
even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.
As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot
there is nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the
conclusion of both the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court
to the effect that the receipt is in itself a contract of lease.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, petitioner City of Manila is
liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify
and check the duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the
petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5,
series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5)
years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said
administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified
on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for
fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect. The Decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
Quisumbing vs Gov. Garcia
GR No. 175527
December 8, 2008
Facts:
COA conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu. It found out
that several contracts in the total amount of P102, 092, 841.47 were
not supported with a Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution authorizing
the Provincial Governor to enter into a contract, as required under
Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160. In her defense, Governor Garcia argued
that there was already an authority from the Sanggunian by virtue of
appropriation ordinance. However, this appropriation ordinance was
only a re-enacted budget of the previous year (2003).
Issue:
91
Is the re-enacted appropriation ordinance the same as “prior
authorization by the Sanggunian” as stated in Sec 22(c) of the LGC?
Ruling:
No. The fact that the Province of Cebu operated under a reenacted
budget in 2004 lent a complexion to this case which the trial court did
not apprehend. Sec. 323 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that in case of a
reenacted budget, only the annual appropriations for salaries and
wages of existing positions, statutory and contractual obligations, and
essential operating expenses authorized in the annual and
supplemental budgets for the preceding year shall be deemed
reenacted and disbursement of funds shall be in accordance therewith.
It should be observed that, as indicated by the word only preceding
the above enumeration in Sec. 323, the items for which disbursements
may be made under a reenacted budget are exclusive. Clearly,
contractual obligations which were not included in the previous years
annual and supplemental budgets cannot be disbursed by the local
government unit. It follows, too, that new contracts entered into by
the local chief executive require the prior approval of the sanggunian.
The question of whether a sanggunian authorization separate from the
appropriation ordinance is required should be resolved depending on
the particular circumstances of the case. Resort to the appropriation
ordinance is necessary in order to determine if there is a provision
therein which specifically covers the expense to be incurred or the
contract to be entered into. Should the appropriation ordinance, for
instance, already contain in sufficient detail the project and cost of a
capital outlay such that all that the local chief executive needs to do
after undergoing the requisite public bidding is to execute the contract,
no further authorization is required, the appropriation ordinance
already being sufficient.
On the other hand, should the appropriation ordinance describe the
projects in generic terms such as infrastructure projects, inter-
municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control, and
irrigation systems projects, reclamation projects or roads and bridges,
there is an obvious need for a covering contract for every specific
project that in turn requires approval by
the sanggunian. Specific sanggunian approval may also be required for
the purchase of goods and services which are neither specified in the
appropriation ordinance nor encompassed within the regular personal
services and maintenance operating expenses.
Vergara vs The Hon. Ombudsman
GR No. 174567
March 12, 2009
FACTS:
1. The City Council of Calamba (City Council), where petitioner was a
member, issued Resolution No. 115, Series of 2001 which authorized
Mayor Lajara to negotiate with landowners within the vicinity of
Barangays Real, Halang, and Uno, for a new city hall site. During the
public hearing, the choice for the new city hall site was limited to
properties owned by Pamana and a lot in Barangay Saimsin, Calamba.
2. The City Council then passed Resolution No. 280, Series of 2001,
authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase several lots owned by Pamana
with a total area of 55,190 square meters for the price of
P129,017,600. Mayor Lajara was also authorized to execute, sign and
deliver the required documents.
3. The City Government of Calamba (Calamba City), through Mayor
Lajara, entered into the following agreements: MOA, Deed of Sale,
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Deed of Assignment of Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA).
4. The above documents were subsequently endorsed to the City
Council. Petitioner, however, alleged that all these documents were
not ratified by the City Council, a fact duly noted by the Commission
on Audit.
5. The respondents justified the absence of ratification by the City
Council of the MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of
Assignment. They cited Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160)
which spoke of prior authority and not ratification. Respondents
pointed out that petitioner did not deny the fact that Mayor Lajara was
given prior authority to negotiate and sign the subject contracts. In
fact, it was petitioner who made the motion to enact Resolution No.
280.
6. The Ombudsman explained that ratification by the City Council was
not a condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to enter into
contracts on behalf of the city. The law requires prior authorization
from the City Council and in this case, Resolution Nos. 115 and 280
were the City Council’s stamps of approval and authority for Mayor
Lajara to purchase the subject lots.
7. Aggrieved by the Ombudman’s findings, petitioner elevated the case
before this Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether all the documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots
should bear the ratification by the City Council of Calamba
RULING:
Petitioner contends that all the documents, like the Memorandum of
Agreement, Deed of Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment,
do not bear the ratification by the City Council.
In its Memorandum submitted before this Court, the Ombudsman,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the
ratification by the City Council is not a condition sine qua non for the
local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the city. The
law requires prior authorization from the City Council and in this case,
Resolution No. 280 is the City Councils stamp of approval and authority
for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.
Section 22(c), Title I of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, provides:
Section 22.Corporate Powers. - x xx
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no
contract may be entered into by the local chief
executive in behalf of the local government unit
without prior authorization by the sanggunian
concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted
at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city,
municipal or barangay hall. (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
Section 455, Title III of RA 7160 enumerates the powers, duties, and
compensation of the Chief Executive. Specifically, it states that :
Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and
Compensation. - x xx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city
mayor shall:
x xx
(vi) Represent the city in all its business transactions
and sign in its behalf all bonds, contracts, and
obligations, and such other documents upon
authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant
to law or ordinance; (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, ratification by the City
Council is not a condition sine qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter into
contracts. With the resolution issued by the SangguniangPanlungsod, it
cannot be said that there was evident bad faith in purchasing the
subject lots. The lack of ratification alone does not characterize the
purchase of the properties as one that gave unwarranted benefits to
Pamana or Prudential Bank or one that caused undue injury to
Calamba City.
Another principle not discussed: A Resolution is enough to authorize
the local chief executive.
92

Verceles vs COA
September 13, 2016
Facts:
The Provincial Government of Catanduanes through Governor
Verceles, engaged the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) to carry out the province's tree seedlings production
project (the project).The province and PENRO entered into several
Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) to implement the project.obleslaw
On June 11, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP), through
Resolution No. 067-2001, gave blanket authority to the governor to
enter into contracts on behalf of the province.
The cost of the project was allegedly paid out of the Economic
Development Fund (EDF) allocation in the provincial budget for
calendar years (CY) 2001 and 2002.The EDF is the 20% portion of the
province's internal revenue allotment (IRA) required by law to be spent
on development projects.
On October 12, 2001, the SP issued Resolution No. 104-A-
2001,12 which effectively revoked the blanket authority given to the
governor to enter into contracts on behalf of the Province.
On February 4, 2003, the COA Audit Team Leader issued an Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM), finding that Verceles should have
sought prior authority from the SP pursuant to Sections 22 (c)and 465
(b) (1) (vi) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code
(LGC) before executing any MOA after the issuance of Resolution No.
104-A-2001.
According to Verceles, while prior authorization to enter into a contract
is the general rule, the LGC identifies an exception, i.e., when the
contract entered into is pursuant to a law or ordinance. He points out
that the funding for the first and third MOAs were approved and
included in the budget of the province for CYs 2001 and
2002.chanrobleslaw
Verceles posits that even granting that Resolution No. 104-A-2001 had
revoked the governor's blanket authority to enter into contracts on
behalf of the province, the MOAs merely implemented the items
already identified in the appropriation ordinances for CYs 2001 and
2002. Thus, he could (as he did) enter into the MOAs to implement the
approved items in the budget.
Verceles claims that the first and third MOAs were covered by
appropriations under the EDF of the Province's CY 2001 and CY 2002
The second, fourth and fifth MOAs, on the other hand, were funded
from augmentation of funds from savings, which augmentations were
ratified in the CY 2003 appropriation ordinance. Augmentation is
allowed under Section 336 of the LGC and Article 454 (b) of the LGC
implementing rules and regulations.44 Verceles underscores that the
appropriation ordinance for CY 200345 ratified the second,
fourth, and fifth MOAs.
The COA refutes this claim on the grounds that: (1) the ordinances
did not specifically authorize Verceles to execute the MOAs with the
PENRO; and (2) the CY 2003 appropriation ordinance, which
supposedly ratified the augmentations made by Verceles in 2001 and
2002, could not have retroactive application.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the governor was authorized by the SP to enter into
contracts in behalf of the province
2. Whether or not the governor’s power to augment was validly
exercised
Held:
1. Partly Yes. Verceles claims that the first and third MOAs were
funded by the EDF allocation of the province in CYs 2001 and 2002.
We agree but only with respect to the third MOA.
The prior authorization for the local chief executive to enter into
contracts on behalf of the local government unit may be in the form of
an appropriation ordinance passed for the year which specifically
covers the project, cost, or contract to be entered into by the local
government unit.56
chanrobleslaw
the LGC requires the local chief executive to secure prior authorization
from the sanggunian before he can enter into contracts on behalf of
the LGU.63 A separate prior authorization is no longer required if the
specific projects are covered by appropriations64 in the annual
budget65 of the LGU. The appropriation ordinance passed by
the sanggunian is the local chief executive's authority to enter into a
contract implementing the project.
As required in Quisumbing v. Garcia, the local chief executive must
inquire if the provisions in the appropriation ordinance specifically
cover the expense to be incurred or the contract to be entered into.
If the project or program is identified in the appropriation ordinance in
sufficient detail, then there is no more need to obtain a separate or
additional authority from the sanggunian. In such case, the project
and the cost are already identified and approved by
the sanggunian through the appropriation ordinance.
On the other hand, the need for a covering contract arises when the
project is identified in generic terms. The covering contract must also
be approved by the sanggunian.
Verceles claims that the first and third MOAs were funded by the EDF
allocation of the province in CYs 2001 and 2002. We agree but only
with respect to the third MOA. ( <-- 3M was specifically allocated for
seedling production project)
2. No. Under Section 336, the general rule is that funds shall be
available exclusively for the specific purpose for which they have been
appropriated. The exception is when the local chief executive
is authorized by ordinance to augment any item in the approved
annual budget from savings in other items within the same expense
class.
Article 45477 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LGC78 states that augmentation implies the existence in the budget of
an item, project, activity, or purpose with an appropriation which upon
implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources is
determined to be deficient.
The question is whether the grant of authority to the local chief
executive to augment items in the annual budget can be belatedly
granted. To answer this, we review the case of Araullo v. Sec. Aquino
III.79
chanrobleslaw
Construing Section 25(5),80 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Court laid down the requisites for a valid transfer of appropriated
funds at the national level, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and cralawlawlibrary
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices.81chanrobleslaw
The crucial requisite as far as the fourth and fifth MOAs are concerned
is the first requisite, i.e., the existence of a law (in this case,
ordinance) authorizing the governor to augment items in approved
93
budget. As to the second MOA, the crucial requisite is the third
requisite, i.e., the existence of an actual item to be augmented.
Second MOA (2001 EDF)
There was no valid augmentation made in CY 2001 that could have
covered the cost of the second MOA.
As discussed above, the CY 2001 appropriation ordinance did not
identify the specific projects or items82 to be funded by the EDF. How
could Verceles transfer savings from nonexistent items (in the EDF) to
augment the tree seedlings propagation project? The project that was
supposed to be augmented was also not identified in the CY 2001
appropriation ordinance.
The augmentation was legally impossible as there were no items from
which savings could have been generated from and there was no item
to which such savings could have been transferred.83 The second MOA
was thus correctly disallowed.
Fourth and Fifth MOAs (2002 EDF)
Still in Araullo, we ruled that Section 25(5) Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution,
must have an implementing law for it to be operative. That law,
generally, is the general appropriation act (GAA) of a given fiscal year.
To comply with the first requisite, the GAA should expressly authorize
the transfer of funds.84chanrobleslaw
Araullo suggests that for augmentations to be valid, the GAA of a given
fiscal year must expressly authorize the transfer of funds in the same
year. At the very least, a law must first be passed authorizing the
transfer of savings in the year that realignments are to be made.
On the local level, Section 336 of the LGC requires an implementing
ordinance so that the local chief executive can augment items in the
annual budget of the LGU. Applying Araullo, the appropriation
ordinance of a given fiscal year must expressly authorize the local chief
executive before he can make augmentations in that particular year, or
at the very least, he must be authorized by ordinance before he can
make augmentations.
Exceptions are strictly construed and apply only so far as their
language fairly warrants, with all doubts being resolved in favor of the
general proviso rather than the exception. Consistent with the strict
construction approach, we rule that the requisite "authorized by
ordinance" does not necessarily and automatically include "ratified by
ordinance."
The exception clause of Section 336 states: "the local chief
executive . . . may, by ordinance, be authorized to augment any item
in the approved annual budget . . . ."88 The key phrase is "by
ordinance, be authorized to augment." We must therefore interpret
this phrase in a manner that does not easily erode the basic principle
that funds shall be available exclusively for the specific purpose for
which they have been appropriated.
To "authorize" means "to empower; to give a right or authority to act."
It means "to endow with authority or effective legal power, warrant or
right; to permit a thing to be done in the future."89
chanrobleslaw
Thus, strictly speaking, the governor must be duly authorized before
he can make augmentations. We highlight the words "to augment"
suggesting that what is being authorized is an act that has yet to
happen.
Sison vs. People
GR Nos. 170339,170398-403
March 9, 2010
FACTS:
A state auditor conducted a post-audit investigation which revealed
that during the incumbency of petitioner Rolando E. Sison, then
municipal mayor of a fourth-class municipality, no public bidding was
conducted for the purchase of certain equipment and supplies. During
trial before the Sandiganbayan, Sison himself testified that he made a
personal canvass, and indeed, no public bidding was conducted,
reasoning that since all suppliers were based in Manila, nobody would
bid anyway. The Sandiganbayan convicted him of seven counts of
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019. Sison appealed,
invoking reasonable doubt.
ISSUES:
Was there a failure to comply with the requirements of the law on
procurement of supplies?
Is Sison guilty of violating Sec. 3(e), RA 3019?
RULING:
RA 7160 explicitly provides that, as a rule, “acquisitions of supplies by
local government units shall be through competitive bidding.”By way of
exception, no bidding is required in the following instances:
(1) personal canvass of responsible merchants;
(2) emergency purchase;
(3) negotiated purchase;
(4) direct purchase from manufacturers or exclusive
distributors; and
(5) purchase from other government entities.
Sison availed of personal canvass which is an exception to the rule
requiring public bidding. However, the law provides limitations on such
exception, to wit:
Sec. 367. Upon approval by the Committee on Awards,
procurement of supplies may be affected after personal
canvass of at least three (3) responsible suppliers in the
locality by a committee of three (3) composed of the local
general services officer or the municipal or barangay
treasurer, as the case may be, the local accountant, and the
head of office or department for whose use the supplies are
being procured. The award shall be decided by the
Committee on Awards.
Purchases under this Section shall not exceed the amounts
specified hereunder for all items in any one (1) month for
each local government unit:
xxxxxx
Fourth Class and Below —Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00)
The use of the word “shall” indicates the mandatory nature of the
above provision which Sison violated. Moreover, seeing as the
equipment and supplies procured included one Toyota Land Cruiser
and 119 bags of cement, the maximum of P20,000 was clearly
exceeded.
Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid down by
RA 7160 on personal canvass, no matter how strict they may have
been. Dura lex sed lex. These requirements are not empty words but
were specifically crafted to ensure transparency in the acquisition of
government supplies, especially since no public bidding is involved in
personal canvass.
Ong vs People
GR No. 176546
September 25, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was accused of malversation of public funds and property in
connection with several alleged irregularities committed during her
term as Mayor of Angadanan, including the purchase of the dump
truck for being grossly overpriced. Upon finding of probable cause, she
was indicted or violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, as amended,
with respect to the acquisition of the dump truck. Sangguniang Bayan
members and complainants Ruben P. Lappay and Mirasol P. Lappay
both testified that the dump truck was bought without conducting a
public bidding or a resolution by the Sangguniang Bayan; that the
94
truck was merely reconditioned and not brand new as can be seen
from its deplorable condition, worn tires and old battery; and that a
subsequent canvass of other suppliers showed that better quality
dump trucks cost no more than P500,000.00.
In her defense, petitioner testified that in 1996, the municipality
appropriated the amount of P1,000,000.00 for the purchase of a dump
truck;that pursuant to said appropriation, the subject vehicle was
purchased on August 12, 1996 for P750,000.00 through a negotiated
purchase from Josephine Ching of J.C. Trucking; that the public
bidding and prior Sangguniang Bayan resolution were dispensed with
pursuant to Commission on Audit (COA) Resolution Nos. 95-244 and
95-244-A which do not require the conduct of a public bidding on any
negotiated purchase in amounts not exceeding P10,000,000.00; that
the truck was not in disrepair as the same was inspected by the
Regional Engineer from COA who declared it fit and in good running
condition; and that the purchase was allowed by COA because it did
not issue a notice of disallowance
The Sandiganbayan found her guilty hence she appealed denying
causing injury or giving anybody any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of her official or administrative
functions, or that she is guilty of any manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross negligence.
Issue:
If the acquisition is valid pursuant to a COA resolution stating that
there is no necessity of prescribing the limit of purchases not subject
to public bidding since Executive Order No. 301 authorizes the heads of
an agency with the approval of the Department Heads to enter into
a negotiated purchase as long as the same is advantageous to the
government.
Ruling:
The contention that the acquisition through a negotiated purchase was
valid the same being pursuant to COA Resolution Nos. 95-244 and 95-
244-A, is untenable. Petitioner’s reliance on said COA Resolutions is
misplaced. The resolutions are implementing guidelines which must be
read and applied in conjunction with Title VI,23 Book II, of Republic Act
No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 356 thereof states the general rule that the acquisition of
supplies by the local government units shall be through competitive
bidding. a local chief executive could only resort to a negotiated
purchase under Section 366 of RA No. 7160 and COA Resolution Nos.
95-244 and 95-244-A, if the following two requisites are present: (1)
public biddings have failed for at least two consecutive times and; (2)
no suppliers have qualified to participate or win in the biddings.
The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that by procuring the subject truck
through a negotiated purchase without public bidding, petitioner failed
to comply with the above stated procedure. Indeed, as the local chief
executive, petitioner is not only expected to know the proper
procedure in the procurement of supplies, she is also duty bound to
follow the same and her failure to discharge this duty constitutes gross
and inexcusable negligence.
Price quotations obtained from several suppliers24 as well as the
testimonies of Ramon de Guzman Sevilla, Ruben Lappay and Mirasol
Lappay proved that the dump truck purchased by petitioner was over-
priced. Hence, had petitioner observed the proper procurement
procedure, the municipality of Angadanan could have acquired a dump
truck similar to, if not better than the one originally bought, at a much
lower price of not more than P500,000.00. Without doubt, petitioner’s
negligence caused undue injury to the government while at the same
time gave unwarranted benefits to Josephine Ching.
PART VI. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES
City of Manila vs Genaro N. Teotico and CA
GR No. L-23052
January 29, 1968
Facts:
On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and
P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone,
waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board the
jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered
and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the
fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint
against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced
the City of Manila to pay damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the City of Manila have control or supervision over P.
Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico
Ruling:
Decision affirmed. In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that
"the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in
good condition…and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City
and the officers concerned…" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted
that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted.
What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have
either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance
would not necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."
Bernardino Jimenez vs City of Manila and Intermediate
Appellate Court
GR No. 71049
May 29, 1987
Facts:
Jimenez went to Sta. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at a time
when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. On his
way home, he stepped on an uncovered opening which could not be
seen because of the dirty rainwater, causing a rusty four- inch nail,
stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce his left leg. His left leg
swelled and he had to be confined for 20 days in the hospital.
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic
Integrated Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Ana Public
Market had been placed by virtue of a Management and Operating
Contract.
Respondent City maintains that it cannot be held liable for the injuries
because under the Management and Operating Contract, Asiatic
assumed all responsibility for damages which may be suffered by third
persons for any cause attributable to it. Also, that under Article 1,
Section 4 of RA No. 409 as amended (Revised Charter of Manila): the
City shall not be liable for damages or injuries to persons or property
arising from the negligence or failure of the Mayor, the Municipal
Board, or any other City Officer, to enforce the provisions of this
chapter.
Issue:
Is the City of Manila liable for damages?
Held: Yes
SC clarified that RA No. 409 establishes a general rule regulating the
liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or
property arising from the failure of city officers”. Upon the other hand,
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides specifically
that: “Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of
defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and
other public works under their control or supervision.” Therefore Art
2189 is decisive on this case.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
to attach, that the defective public works belong to the province, city
or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality has either "control or
supervision" over the public building in question.
95
The fact of supervision and control of the City over subject public
market was admitted by: Mayor Ramon Bagatsing in his letter to
Secretary of Finance; that the City of Manila employed a market
master for the Sta. Ana Public Market whose primary duty is to take
direct supervision and control of that particular market; and the
provision under the LGC that the treasurer shall exercise direct and
immediate supervision, administration and control over public markets.
Respondent City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation being
joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable
Florentina A. Guilatco vs City of Dagupan and The Honorable
Court of Appeals
171 SCRA 382
FACTS:
While petitioner Florentina A. Guilatco, a court Interpreter, was about
to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a
National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of
Dagupan), she accidentally fell into a manhole located on said
sidewalk. As a result, she had to be hospitalized for 16 days because
of her fractured right leg and severe pain on all parts of her body.
Despite her discharge, she had difficulty in locomotion which
prevented her from reporting for duty as a court interpreter thereby
losing her income. Furthermore, she has lost several pounds as a
result of the accident and is no longer her former jovial self, and has
been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities which
she used to do prior to the incident.
Petitioner filed a civil action for recovery of damages against
respondent City of Dagupan. The city contended that Perez Boulevard,
where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not
under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no
liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the
Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision through the
Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by
the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City
of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in
accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code
RULING: Yes.
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries
suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is
expressed in the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to
the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only
requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.
In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of
Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer whose duty
includes the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and
sewers, and all sources of water supply, and the control, maintenance
and regulation of the use of the same. The same charter of Dagupan
also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of
streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use
thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter
clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over
the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.
Petitioner is entitled to actual damages in the amount of P15,924;
P20,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as exemplary damages.
Municipality of San Juan vs CA
GR No. 121920
August 9, 2005
FACTS:
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) entered into
a contract for water service connections with KC Waterworks Service
Construction (KC).On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the
South Sector Office of MWSS to conduct and effect excavationsat the
corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a
national road, for the laying of water pipesand tapping of water to the
respective houses of water concessionaires.
Only ¾ of the job was finished in view of the fact that the workers
were still required to re-excavate that particular portion for the tapping
of pipes for the water connections to the concessionaires. Between
10:00 and 11:00 in the evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was
driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991 at a speed of
thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan Road
towards thedirection of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. She
was with prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The road wasflooded as it was
then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a
manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a
result, the humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa
wasfractured.Consequent to the foregoing incident, Biglang-awa filed
before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila acomplaint for
damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan and a number of
San Juan municipal officials.After due proceedings, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa adjudging MWSS and
theMunicipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to her. CA
affirmed RTC with modification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of San Juan can be held liable
HELD:
Yes. Jurisprudenceteaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189
of the Civil Code, ownership of the roads,streets, bridges, public
buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being
sufficient that a province,city or municipality has control or supervision
thereof.At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary for the liability therein established to attach thatthe
defective roads or streetsbelong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. Whatsaid article requires is that
the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision"
over said street or road.
We must emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section 149, of
the Local Government Code, the phrases“regulate the drilling and
excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other
pipes”, and “adoptmeasures to ensure public safety against open
canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life
andproperty”, are not modified by the term “municipal road”. And
neither can itbe fairly inferred from the same provisionof Section 149
that petitioner’s power of regulationvis-à-visthe activities therein
mentioned applies only in caseswhere such activities are to be
performed in municipalroads. To our mind, the municipality’s liability
for injuriescaused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation
of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes,
attaches regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made on a
national or municipal road, for as long asthe same is within its
territorial jurisdiction. Neither is the petitioner relieved of liability based
on its purported lack of knowledge of the excavation and thecondition
of the road during the period from May 20, 1988 up to May 30, 1988
when the accident occurred. It mustbe borne in mind that the
obligation of the petitioner to maintain the safe condition of the road
within its territory is acontinuing one which is not suspended while a
street is being repaired.
Nor can petitioner seek shelter on Section 8 of Ordinance 82-01 of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.Concededly, Section 8 of the
Ordinance makes the permittee/excavator liable for death, injury
and/or damages caused by the non-completion of works and/or failure
of the one undertaking the works to adopt the required precautionary
measures for the protection of the general public. Significantly,
96
however, nowhere can it be found in said Ordinance any provision
exempting municipalities in Metro Manila from liabilities caused by their
own negligent acts. Afortiori, nothing prevents this Court from applying
other relevant laws concerning petitioners liability for the injuries
sustained by Biglang-awa on that fateful rainy evening of 31 May
1988.
Municipality of Pasay vs Manaois
86 Phil 629
Facts:
Municipality of Paoay has been leasing fishery lots on municipal
waters. It entered into a contract with Duque for the lease of 3 fishery
lots. Later on, the municipal council confiscated the leased property for
non-payment. Manaois was the highest bidder for the lease of the
property and paid the rentals thereon. However, he was denied entry
into the area as Duque claims to be the rightful lessee. Manaois then
brought an action against the municipality to recover the sum paid and
damages.
Respondent obtained a judgment against the Municipality of Paoay of
a writ of execution against the defendant municipality. In compliance
with the said writ, the Sheriff levied upon and attached the following
properties:
"(1) The amount of One thousand seven hundred twelve
pesos and one centavo (P1,712.01) in the Municipal
Treasury of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, representing the rental
paid by Mr. Demetrio Tabije of a fishery lot belonging to
the defendant municipality;"(2) About forty fishery lots
leased to thirty-five different persons by the Municipality."
The Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte, representing the Municipality of
Paoay, filed a petition asking for the dissolution of the attachment or
levy. After it was denied, the petitioner now files a petition for
certiorari with writ of preliminary injunction to have the order of the
RTC Judge reversed. Allegedly, the properties attached are not subject
to levy because they are properties for public use.
Issue:
Are the properties exempt from attachment or levy? Are the funds
from the rent of these properties subject to levy or attachment?
Ruling:
The property itself may not be levied or attached but the funds coming
therefrom may be.
There is no question that properties for public use held by municipal
corporations are not subject to levy and execution. Even public
revenues of municipal corporations destined for the expenses of the
municipality are also exempt from execution. The reason is that they
are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the
accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are
created.
Property however, which is patrimonial and which is held by
a municipality in its proprietary capacity is treated by great
weight of authority as the private asset of the town and may be levied
upon and sold under an ordinary execution. The same rule applies to
municipal funds derived from patrimonial properties, for instance, it
has been held that shares of stock held by a municipal corporation are
subject to execution.
The municipality does not own the water it leases, what it only holds is
usufruct in the issuance of licences. Even so, the Municipality of Paoay
is not holding this usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or
absolute manner as it is merely granted to them by the Legislature
through Secc. 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code.
But we hold that the revenue or income coming from the
renting of these fishery lots is certainly subject to execution. In
other words, to many municipalities engaged in this
business of letting out municipal waters for fishing purposes, it is a
sort of sideline, so that even without it the municipality may still
continue functioning and perform its essential duties as such
municipal corporations.
We call this activity of municipalities in renting municipal waters for
fishing purposes as a business.
Merritt vs Government of the Philippines Islands
34 Phil 311
Facts:
The plaintiff, Merritt who was a constructor, riding on a motorcycle,
was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along
the west side thereof, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was
ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General
Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning
toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be
on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and
the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long
before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft
Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which
movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the
southwestern point or from the post placed there. Because of the
incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond
rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way
he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used
to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the
government which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by
virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E.
Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands
and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said
suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and
ordered the government to pay the same.
Issue:
WON the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the
ambulance.
Held:
No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from
suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any
cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of
the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its
agents.
The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a
special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one
who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor
was a government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can
be no liability from the government. “The Government does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or
agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its
operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which
would be subversive of the public interest.”
Municipality of San Fernando (La Union) vs Firme
GR No. L-52179
April 8, 1991
(195 SCRA 692)
97
FACTS:
At about 7am of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a
passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot (owned by the Estate
of Macario Nieveras), a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose
Manandeg (owned by Tanquilino Velasquez), and a dump truck of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig.
Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including
Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and
four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against
the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and
driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid
defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the
driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
Petitioner raised as one of its defenses the non-suability of the State.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando is immune from suit
RULING: YES.
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts
committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality
depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the
municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality
insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of
sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the
performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver
of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his
office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of
Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102
Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the
truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities."
We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable
for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death
of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may be ––
imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
Discussion on Non-suability of the State and the Dual Capacity
of LGUs:
Non-suability of the State
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in
Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be
sued without its consent. Consent takes the form of express or implied
consent. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a
special law. Consent is implied when the government enters into
business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other
contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim.
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are
agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental
functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit.
Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such
functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on
the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a
state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other
hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed
itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it
is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the
defendant is liable.
Dual Capacity of LGUs
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are
twofold. In one, they exercise the right springing from sovereignty,
and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their
acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such
capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public
functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are
officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity, the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising
from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their
officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf
of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not
for the state or sovereign power.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable
because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed
by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can
be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in a proprietary capacity.
Spouses Jayme vs Rodrigo Apostol
GR No. 163609
November 27, 2008
FACTS:
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was
on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee
of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered
under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession
of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from
Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to
catch his Manila flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was
then crossing the National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok,
SouthCotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some fifty
(50) meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that
Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident.
Marvin sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma and
diffused cerebral contusion. He was initially treated at the Howard
Hubbard Memorial Hospital. Due to the seriousness of his injuries, he
was airlifted to the Ricardo Limso Medical Center in Davao City for
more intensive treatment. Despite medical attention, Marvin expired
six (6) days after the accident.
ISSUES:
1.) May a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent
acts of the driver assigned to him?
2.) May an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government
employee?
RULING:
1.) No, the municipal mayor cannot be held liable for the negligent
acts of the driver assigned to him
It was the Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of
Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was
employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently
assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no
moment. The Supreme Court, on several occasions, held that an
employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee was
loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control
over the employee subsists. In the case under review, the Municipality
of Koronadal remains to be Lozano's employer notwithstanding
Lozano's assignment to Mayor Miguel.
98
 Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give
instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. In
Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere
giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger
has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer
of the driver. This Court, in Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, ruled in a similar
vein, to wit:
. . . The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions
to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the
client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and
liable for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those instructions or
directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in
the contract for services entered into with the security agency. .
(Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee
although the person may have the right to control the manner of the
vehicle's operation. In the absence of an employer-employee
relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver's negligence
should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be
an occupant of the vehicle.
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s
registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him
and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for
Marvin’s death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the
accident.
2.) No, the municipality cannot be held liable since it is an agency of
the State engaged in governmental functions, and hence, immune
from suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Supreme Court held:
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable
because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them
in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary
capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives
the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the
claimant cannot recover.
Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver
and his direct employer. The CA observation along this line are worth
restating:
Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and
severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and
third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the
operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the
vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the
vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly
and primarily responsible for the consequences incident (sic) to its
operation.
Mendoza vs De Leon
33 Phil 508
Facts:
An action for damages was filed against the individual members of the
municipal council of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the
revocation of the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to
the plaintiff under the provisions of Act No. 1643 of the Philippine
Commission. After use of a little more than one year, the plaintiff was
forcibly ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted by the
herein defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another
person.
Issue:
Are the members of the municipal council personally liable?
Ruling: Yes
Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the Municipal
Code have both governmental and corporate or business functions. Act
No. 1643 provides that the use of each fishery, fish-breeding ground,
ferry, stable, market, and slaughterhouse belonging to any
municipality or township shall be let to the highest bidder annually or
for such longer period not exceeding five years as may have been
previously approved by the provincial board of the province in which
the municipality or township is located. The leasing of a municipal ferry
to the highest bidder for a specified period of time is not a
governmental but a corporate function. Such a lease, when validly
entered into, constitutes a contract with the lessee which the
municipality is bound to respect.
A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent
performance of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In
the administration of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a
private corporation or individual so far as its liability to third persons
on contract or in tort is concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into,
may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts of
its officers or agents within the scope of their employment in precisely
the same manner and to the same extent as those of private
corporations or individuals. As to such matters the principles of
respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes that the
municipality is made liable to suits in the courts. Municipal corporations
are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort.
The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must
answer civilly of the negligence or want of skill of his agent or servant
in the course or line of his employment, by which another, who is free
from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations, under the
conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law,
and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the
requisite elements of liability coexist. To create such liability, it is
fundamentally necessary that the act done which is injurious to others
must be within the scope of the corporate powers as prescribed by
charter or positive enactment (the extent of which powers all persons
are bound, at their peril, know); in other words, it must not be ultra
vires in the sense that it is not within the power or authority of the
corporation to act in reference to it under any circumstances.
Under the provisions of Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, the plaintiff
had a vested right to the exclusive operation of the ferry in question
for the period of his lease. Were the municipality a party to this action,
it would be patent that a judgment for damages against it for the
rescission of the contract would be proper. This, be it said, is the usual
method of exacting damages, either ex contractu or ex delicto arising
from the exercise of corporate powers of municipalities. In
administering the patrimonial property of municipalities, the municipal
council occupies, for most purposes, the position of a board of
directors of a private corporation. In disposing of the local public
utilities, if the term may be used, such as the fishing and ferry rights,
etc., they must exercise considerable judgment. It required some
considerable amount of business acumen to compel performance on
the part of lessees of these privileges in accordance with the terms of
their leases and in a manner which will not cause the property to
deteriorate. Questions must continually arise which are not expressly
provided for in contracts and which must be settled, if possible, in a
manner that will preserve the just claims of the municipality.
The rule of personal liability should be with municipal councilors in
such matters as it is with the directors or managers of an ordinary
private corporation. The defendants are liable jointly and severally for
the damages sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his
contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question.
Judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Torio, et. al. vs Fontanilla
GR No. L-29993
October 23, 1978
FACTS:
99
The Municipal Council of Malasiqui passed 2 resolutions providing for
the management of the town fiesta celebration and the creation of the
town fiesta executive committee. The council appropriated funds for
the construction of 2 stages. The stage collapsed while the troupe was
performing the zarzuela and its member, was pinned underneath and
died the following day.
The heirs of Fontanilla filed a complaint to recover damages against
the Mun. ofMalasiqui, the Mun. Council and its members. The
municipality answered that no liability can arise as the holding of a
town fiesta is an exercise of governmental functions.
ISSUES:
1. Is the holding of the town fiesta an exercise of a governmental
function?
2. Is the municipality liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla?
RULING:
1. NO. Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in
administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare. The holding of the town fiesta by the municipality was an
exercise of a proprietary function. According to Article 2282 of the
Revised Administrative Code, municipalities are authorized to hold
fiesta, but it is not their duty to conduct such.It is in essence an act for
the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of
the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state.
The distinction of powers is important in determining the liability of the
municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third
persons.If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a
governmental function, no recovery can be had from the municipality
nor from its officers. On the other hand,with respect to proprietary
functions, a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons
ex contract or ex delicto.
2. YES. Since the holding of a town fiesta is an exercise of a
proprietary function, the Municipality is liable for any injury sustained
on the occasion thereof. Under the doctrine of respondent superior,
the municipality is to be held liable for the death of Fontanilla if that
was attributable to the negligence of the its officers, employees, or
agents. In this case, negligence was found in the failure of the
Municipality through the Committee on Entertainment and Stage to
build a stage strong enough to sustain the weight of the performance
and to take the necessary measure to insure the personal safety of the
participants.
However, the councilors are not liable as there was no showing of bad
faith or gross negligence on their part;they were not participants in the
wrongful act.
City of Manila vs IAC
179 SCRA 428
Facts:
Vivencio, husband of Irene Sto. Domingo,was buried in a certain lot of
the North Cemetery which was leased by the City to wife for the period
from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as evidenced only by a receipt. The
said term of duration was not even recorded in the burial record of the
Manila North Cemetery.
Believing in good faith, in accordance to an administrative order
prescribing uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of
documents pertaining to and for the use and disposition of burial lots
and plots within the North Cemetery, the lot was leased only for five
years and was ready for exhumation. The cemetery authorities then
exhumed and removed the remains of the late Vivencio from the burial
site and placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same
in the depository orbodega of the cemetery.
The same lot in question was rented out toanother so that when Irene
and her children went to visit on All Souls Dayin their shock,
consternation and dismayit was someone else’s tomb already. The
authorities explained to Irene and was informed that she can look for
the bones of her deceased husband in the warehouse of the cemetery
where the exhumed remainsfrom the different burial lots of the North
Cemetery are being kept until they areretrieved by interested parties.
To her, the advice given was simply unacceptable. She was too
aggrieved that she came to court for relief even before she could
formally present her claims and demands to the city government and
tothe other defendants named in the present complaint.
Petitioners contention: (1) North Cemetery is exclusively devoted
forpublic use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of
the Ordinances of theCity of Manila and since it is a political
subdivision in theperformance of its governmental function, it is
immune from tort liability which may becaused by its public officers
and subordinate employees; (2) Section 4, Article I of theRevised
Charter of Manila exempts the city from liability for damages or injuries
topersons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any othercity officer, to enforce the provision of its
charter or any other laws, or ordinance, or fromnegligence of said
Mayor, Municipal Board or any other officers while enforcing
orattempting to enforce said provisions. - Revised Charter of Manila
beinga special law cannot be defeated by the Human Relations
provisions of the Civil Codebeing a general law.
Respondents maintained that the City of Manila entered into acontract
of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with
privaterespondent Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers
therefore can be sued for anyviolation of the contract of lease
Issue:
Is the operations and functions of a public cemetery a proprietary
function of the City of Manila hence making it liable for damages?
Ruling:
YES. Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body
corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in
conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and
be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold
in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and
corporate, private and proprietary on the other.
In Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to
proprietaryfunctions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can
be held liable to third persons ex contractu.
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special
law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila
which was created by resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27,
1903 and January 7, 1904. The administration and government of the
cemetery are under the City Health Officer the order and police of the
cemetery, the opening of graves, inches, or tombs, the exhuming of
remains, and the purification of the same are under the charge and
responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. The City of Manila
furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and
dispositions of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery through
Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975.With the acts of dominion, there
is, therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of
property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private
character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was
leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising
from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties.
Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the
law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision
entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach
is prescribed in the contract.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, City of Manila is liable for
the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check
the duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-
city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of
1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only
beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said
administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified
on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for
fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.
100

Quezon City vs Lexber Inc.
GR No. 141616
March 15, 2001
FACTS:
LEXBER INC. owned a parcel of land in Antipolo which was contracted
to be used as a garbage dumping site by Quezon City and other Metro
Manila Cities or municipalities authorized by the latter for 5 years from
Jan.1991 to Dec. 1995.
On August 27, 1990, a Tri-Partite MOA was drawn among Quezon City,
represented by Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., Lexber Inc. and Mun. of
Antipolo. Part of the Agreement was that Lexber Inc. shall be hired as
the exclusive supplier of manpower, heavy equipment and engineering
services for the dumpsite and shall also have the right of first refusal
for contracting such services.
On September 10, 1990, comes the first negotiated contract between
Quezon City represented by Mayor Simon and Lexber Inc. for Lexber
to construct the necessary infrastructure at the dumpsite, designated
as the Q.C. Sanitary Landfill which was completed on November 25,
1991 and the contract price was paid by Q.C.
On November 8, 1990, second negotiated contract was entered into
between Lexber and Q.C. where it was agreed that Lexber shall
provided maintenance services in the form of manpower, equipment
and engineering operations for the dumpsite. It was also agreed that
Q.C. shall pay Lexter a reduced fee of 50% of the monthly contract
price if Q,C. fails to dump the agreed volume of garbage for any given
month.
On December 11, 1991, Lexber was notified to commence
maintenance and dumping operations at the site starting on Dec. 15,
1991 by Q.C. thru the City Engineer Alfredo Macapugay, Proj. Manager
Rene Lazaro, and Mayor Simon. Q.C. immediately commenced
dumping garbage on the landfill site continuously from December 1991
until May 1992. Thereafter, it ceased to dump garbage on the site
without notice to Lexber who then claimed that even if the dumpsite
remains unused, it was entitled to payment for its services as
stipulated in the second negotiated contract.
Q.C. who is now acting thru Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. who succeeded
Mayor Simon in the interim, denied any liability under the contract on
the ground that it was invalid and unenforceable. According to Mayor
Mathay, the contract was signed only by Mayor Simon and was not
approved nor ratified by the City Council and it lacked the required
budget appropriation.
ISSUES:
1. Was the second negotiated contract null and void ab initio
because its execution was done in violation of existing laws, more
particularly Sections 85, 86 and 87 of P.D. 1445 and Section
177(b) of B.P. 337?
2. Do subsequent acts of Q.C. petitioner constituted a ratification of
the subject negotiated contract notwithstanding the lack of
appropriation?
RULING:
1. No, the second negotiated contract was entered in to Mayor Brigido
Simon, Jr. pursuant to law or specific statutory authority as required by
P.D. No. 1445. It is also evident that even as early as April 4, 1991,
funds which were certified to as available had been allocated for use in
the first few months operation of the sanitary landfill.
P.D. 1445 does not provide that the absence of an appropriation law
ipso facto makes a contract entered into by a local government unit
null and void. Section 84 of the statute specifically provides: Revenue
funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository except
in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific statutory
authority. Consequently, public funds may be disbursed not only
pursuant to an appropriation law, but also in pursuance of other
specific authority, i.e., section 84 of PD 1445. Thus, when a contract is
entered into by a city mayor pursuant to specific statutory authority,
the law, i.e., PD 1445 allows the disbursement of funds from any
public treasury or depository therefor.
As such, an appropriation law is not the only authority upon which
public funds shall be disbursed. Furthermore, then Mayor Simon did
not enter into the subject contract without legal authority. He was so
authorized under BP 337, the Local Government Code of 1993. We
note that while the subsequent Local government Code of 1991, which
took effect after the execution of the subject contract, provides that
the mayor’s representation must be upon authority of the sangguniang
panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance, there was no such
qualification under the old code.
2. Yes, there was constructive ratification on the part of petitioner.
When appellant City government after the construction by the appellee
of the dumpsite structure in accordance with the contract plans and
specifications started to dump garbage collected in the City and
consequently paid the appellee for the services rendered, such acts
produce and constitute a ratification and approval of the negotiated
contract and necessarily should imply its waiver of the right to assail
the contract’s enforceability.
City of Manila vs IAC
GR No. 71159
November 15, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Irene Sto. Domingo leased a burial ground for the remains
of her late husband from the North Cemetery as operated by the City
Government of Manila for a period of 25 years from June 6, 1971 to
June 6, 2021. The full payment of Php50.00 is evidenced by a receipt.
No other document was executed as in fact, the burial record for the
lot does not reflect the duration of the lease.
Believing in good faith that the lease was only for 5 years in
accordance with an Administrative Order released in 1975 prescribing
the procedure for the use and disposition of burial lots, the subject lot
was certified as ready for exhumation.
When Irene Sto. Domingo went to visit her deceased loved one on All
Souls’ Day, she was shocked and dismayed to find another stone
marker on her husband’s burial lot. When she inquired from the office,
she was told that the remains of her late husband had been taken
from the burial lot in question which was given to another lessee.
And that she can look for the bones of her deceased husband in the
warehouse of the cemetery.
THUS, petitioner with her children, sued the City of Manila, its officers
from the City Health and North Cemetery for tort and damages from
breach of contract.
Issue:
Can the City of Manila be held liable for the violation of the lease
contract?
Ruling:
Yes. The City of Manila can be held liable to petitioners for the breach
of contractual obligations.
Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate
and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be
exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law,
and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and
contract and be contracted with.
The North Cemetery is within the class of property, which the City of
Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there
is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private
respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force
of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed
by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them.
Province of Cebu vs IAC
GR No. 72841
101
 January 29, 1987
(147 SCRA 447)
Facts:
On February 4, 1964, while then incumbent Governor Rene Espina was
on official business in Manila, the Vice-Governor, Priscillano Almendras
and three (3) members of the Provincial Board enacted Resolution No.
188, donating to the City of Cebu 210 province-owned lots all located
in the City of Cebuand authorizing the Vice-Governor to sign the deed
of donation on behalf of the province. The deed of donation was
immediately executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu by Vice-
Governor Almendras and accepted in behalf of the City of Cebu by
Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. The document of donation was prepared
and notarized by a private lawyer. The donation was later approved by
the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Juan Cancio.
According to the questioned deed of donation the lots donated were to
be sold by the City of Cebu to raise funds that would be used to
finance its public improvement projects. The City of Cebu was given a
period of one (1) year from August 15, 1964 within which to dispose of
the donated lots.
Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina denounced as illegal and
immoral the action of his colleagues in donating practically all the
patrimonial property of the province of Cebu, considering that the
latter's income was less than one-fourth (1/4) of that of the City of
Cebu.
Meanwhile, Cebu City Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. announced that he
would borrow funds from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and
would use the donated lots as collaterals. In July, 1965, the City of
Cebu advertised the sale of all the lots remaining unsold. Thereupon,
Governor Espina, apprehensive that the lots would be irretrievably lost
by the Province of Cebu, decided to go to court. He engaged the
services of respondent Garcia in filing and prosecuting the case in his
behalf and in behalf of the Province of Cebu.
The Provincial Board passed a resolution authorizing the Provincial
Attorney, Baguia, to enter his appearance for the Province of Cebu and
for the incumbent Governor, Vice-Governor and members of the
Provincial Board in this case.
A compromise agreement was reached between the province of Cebu
and the city of Cebu.
For services rendered Atty. Garcia filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien,
praying that his statement of claim of attorney's lien in said case be
entered upon the records. To said notice, petitioner Province of
Cebuopposed: the payment of attorney's fees are not allowed by law.
Issue:
Can the governor validly engage the services of a private lawyer and
can the province be held liable to pay the fees?
Ruling:
The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney
has been settled in Ramos v. Court of Appeals (108 SCRA 728).
Collaboration of a private law firm with the fiscal and the municipal
attorney is not allowed. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides:
"Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial
subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the
province and any municipality, or municipal district thereof in any
court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the
Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality, or municipal district
in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some
other municipality, or municipal district in the same province. When
the interests of a provincial government and of any political division
thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the
province. LLpr
"When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or
other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be
employed by its council."
The above provision, complemented by Section 3 of the Local
Autonomy Law, is clear in providing that only the provincial fiscal and
the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in its
lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to
employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where
the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it as when he
represents the province against a municipality.
The lawmaker, in requiring that the local government should be
represented in its court cases by a government lawyer, like its
municipal attorney and the provincial fiscal, intended that the local
government should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a
private lawyer. The lawmaker also assumed that the interests of the
municipal corporation would be best protected if a government lawyer
handles its litigations. It is to be expected that the municipal attorney
and the fiscal would be faithful and dedicated to the corporation's
interests, and that, as civil service employees, they could be held
accountable for any misconduct or dereliction of duty
However, every rule is not without an exception, Ibi quid
generaliterconceditur; inesthaecexceptio, si non aliquid sit contra jus
fasque (Where anything is granted generally, this exception is implied;
that nothing shall be contrary to law and right). Indeed, equity, as well
as the exceptional situation facing us in the case at bar, require a
departure from the established rule.
We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a
municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay
the reasonable value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as
to which it has the general power to contract. The doctrine of implied
municipal liability has been said to apply to all cases where money or
other property of a party is received under such circumstances that the
general law, independent of express contract implies an obligation
upon the municipality to do justice with respect to the same." (38 Am.
Jur. Sec. 515, p. 193):
"The obligation of a municipal corporation upon the doctrine of an
implied contract does not connote an enforceable obligation. Some
specific principle or situation of which equity takes cognizance must be
the foundation of the claim. The principle of liability rests upon the
theory that the obligation implied by law to pay does not originate in
the unlawful contract, but arises from considerations outside it. The
measure of recovery is the benefit received by the municipal
corporation. The amount of the loan, the value of the property or
services, or the compensation specified in the contract, is not the
measure. If the price named in the invalid contract is shown to be
entirely fair and reasonable not only in view of the labor done, but also
in reference to the benefits conferred, it may be taken as the true
measure of recovery."
The petitioner cannot set up the plea that the contract was ultra vires
and still retain benefits thereunder. Having regarded the contract as
valid for purposes of reaping some benefits, the petitioner is estopped
to question its validity for the purposes of denying answerability.
San Diego vs Municipality Of Naujan
107 Phil 118
FACTS:
Following a public bidding, a contract was entered into between
highest bidder San Diego and Municipality of Naujan for the exclusive
privilege of use the Butas River and the Naujan Lake. San Diego’s
petition for extension for another five years was approved and
confirmed by the municipal council of Naujan whose term was then
about to expire. Under a new set of municipal council members, the
resolution for the approval of San Diego’s petition, was revoked, for
the reason that the extension was illegal, it having been granted
without competitive public bidding.
ISSUE:
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Is the Resolution revoking the extension valid/ is the municipality
estopped from assailing the validity of the contract?
HELD: YES, the municipal council was correct in revoking the
resolution.
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as against a municipal
corporation to validate a contract which it has no power to make, or
which it is authorized to make only under prescribed conditions, within
prescribed limitations, or in a prescribed mode or manner, although
the corporation has accepted the benefits thereof and the other party
has fully performed his part of the agreement, or has expanded large
sums in preparation for performance. A reason frequently assigned for
this rule is that to apply the doctrine of estoppel against a municipality
in such case would be to enable it to do indirectly what it cannot do
directly. Also, where a contract is violative of public policy, the
municipality executing it cannot be estopped to essert the invalidity on
this ground; nor can it be estopped to assert the invalidity of a
contract which has ceded away, controlled, or embarrassed its
legislative or government powers.
There is no doubt that the original lease contract in this case was
awarded to the highest bidder, but the reduction of the rental and the
extension of the term of the lease appear to have been granted
without previous public bidding.
It has been ruled that statutes requiring public bidding apply to
amendments of any contract already executed in compliance with the
law where such amendments alter the original contract in some vital
and essential particular. Inasmuch as the period in a lease is a vital
and essential particular to the contract, we believe that the extension
of the lease period in this case, which was granted without the
essential requisite of public bidding, is not in accordance with law.
Municipality of Jasaan v. Gentallan
GR No. 154961
May 09, 2005
Facts:
On December 14, 1994, then Mayor Jose Salcedo appointed Jocelyn
Gentallan as local civil registrar of the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis
Oriental. This was later confirmed by the Civil Service Commission and
because of the incaction of the Sangguniang Bayan of Jasaan, such
appointment was deemed approved. However, Rosalina Asis, a
research aide of in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, filed a protest
but was later dismissed by the CSC.
Nonetheless, the CSC reviewed the appointment and found that
Gentallan was not qualified for the position. Pursuant to the CSC
resolution to this effect, Gentallan was ordered by the Mayor to vacate
her position and resume her former position as Assistant Registration
Officer.
Gentallan appealed the resolution and the Court of Appeals found that
she was qualified to the position. However, the mayor did not
implement the court’s decision to reinstate respondent. Respondent,
through her counsel, wrote the CSCRO-10 requesting for an order
directing the municipality to reinstate her and pay her backwages.
Despite the favourable orders granted to Gentallan, the municipality
did not reinstate her and paid her back salaries.
The municipality claimed that Gentallan was not entitled to back
salaries because she was not illegally dismissed from service and that
it was merely following the previous orders of the CSC when it ordered
respondent to vacate the position in issue.
This prompted respondent to appeal her case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Is Gentallan entitled to payment of back salaries, RATA and bonuses?
Ruling: Yes.
Firstly, the Supreme Court found that respondent was qualified and
eligible for the position of local civil registrar, and there was no factual
nor legal basis for her removal from said position. The CA order to
reinstate her had become final and executory. The CA decision ought
to be upheld.
As a permanent appointee to the position, respondent enjoys security
of tenure. She is likewise entitled to all benefits, rights and privileges
attached to the position. She cannot be removed or dismissed from the
service without just cause and without observing the requirements of
due process.
An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered
reinstated is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from
the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only
fair and just because an employee who is reinstated after having been
illegally dismissed is considered as not having left her office and should
be given the corresponding compensation at the time of her
reinstatement.
In the instant case, we note that there is no finding that malice or bad
faith attended the illegal dismissal and refusal to reinstate Gentallan by
her superior officers. Thus, they cannot be held personally accountable
for her back salaries. The municipal government, therefore, should
disburse funds to answer for her claims resulting from dismissal.
Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte vs Manaois
GR No. L-3485
June 30, 1950
FACTS:
The municipality of Paoay is and for many years have been leasing
fishery lots on municipal waters. These waters have been parceled out
in lots, either singly or in groups and let out or rented after public
bidding to the highest bidders, ordinarily, for a year, but sometimes,
for a longer period of time.
On April 4, 1937, the municipality of Paoay entered into a contract with
one Francisco V. Duque for the lease of fishery lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8
at a rental of P1,218.79 per annum, for a period of four years from
January 1, 1937 to December 31, 1940.
In 1938, the municipal council of Paoay approved a resolution
confiscating said six fishery lots on the ground that Duque had failed
to comply with the terms of the lease contract. Thereafter, the lease of
fishery lots were advertised for public bidding, including the lots above
mentioned. Teodoro Manaois, being the highest bidder for lots 3 to 8,
was awarded the lease as per resolution of the municipal council of
December 1, 1938.
On January 1, 1939, Manaois paid P2,025 as rental for the year 1939.
However, when Manaois and his men tried to enter the property in
order to exercise his right as lessee and to catch fish, he found Duque
and his men who claimed that he (Duque) was still the lessee, and
despite appeal of Manaois to the Municipality to put him in possession
and the efforts of the municipality to oust Duque, the latter succeeded
in continuing in his possession and keeping Manaois and his men out.
Manaois brought an action against the Municipality of Paoay to recover
not only the sum paid by him for the lease of the fishery lots but also
damages.
He obtained judgment in his favor in June, 1940, which decision has
long become final. Judge De Guzman of said province issued a writ of
execution against the defendant municipality where the Provincial
Sheriff levied upon and attached the following properties: (1)
P1,712.01 in the Municipal Treasury of Paoay, Ilocos Norte,
representing the rental paid by Mr. Demetrio Tabije of a fishery lot
belonging to the defendant municipality; and (2) About forty fishery
lots leased to thirty-five different persons by the Municipality."
Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte, representing Paoay, filed a petition for
the dissolution of that attachment or levy. Denied, the municipality
subsequently filed the present petition for certiorari with writ of
preliminary injunction, asking that the order be reversed and that the
attachment be dissolved contending that the properties attached by
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the sheriff for purposes of execution are not subject to levy because
they are properties for public use.
ISSUE:
Were the (1) fishery lots and (2) rental payments for its lease subject
to levy and attachment?
HELD: (1) No. There can be no question that properties for public use
held by municipal corporations are not subject to levy and execution.
This court has held that properties for public use like trucks used for
sprinkling the streets, police patrol wagons, police stations, public
markets, together with the land on which they stand are exempt from
execution. Even public revenues of municipal corporations destined for
the expenses of the municipality are also exempt from execution. The
reason behind this exemption extended to properties for public use,
and public municipal revenues is that they are held in trust for the
people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for
which municipal corporations are created, and that to subject said
properties and public funds to execution would materially impede,
even defeat and in some instances, destroy said purpose.
The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte are
clearly not subject to execution. In the first place, they do not belong
to the municipality. They may well be regarded as property of the
State. What the municipality of Paoay hold is merely what may be
considered the usufruct or the right to use said municipal waters,
granted to it by section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Now, is this particular usufruct of the municipality of Paoay over its
municipal waters, subject to execution to enforce a judgment against
the town? We are not prepared to answer this question in the
affirmative because there are powerful reasons against its propriety
and legality. In the first place, it is not a usufruct based on or derived
from an inherent right of the town. It is based merely on a grant, more
or less temporary, made by the Legislature. All this only goes to prove
that the municipality of Paoay is not holding this usufruct or right of
fishery in a permanent or absolute manner so as to enable it to
dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away from it as its property
through execution.
Second, if this were to be allowed and this right sold on execution, the
buyer would immediately step into the shoes of the judgment-debtor
municipality. Such buyer presumably buys only the rights of the
municipality. He does not buy the fishery itself nor the municipal
waters because that belongs to the State. All that the buyer might do
would be to let out or rent to private individuals the fishery rights over
the lots into which the municipal waters had been parceled out or
divided, and that is, after public bidding. Then, we shall have a
situation rather anomalous to be sure, of a private individual
conducting public bidding, renting to the highest bidders fishery lots
over municipal waters which are property of the State, and
appropriating the rentals to his own private use. The impropriety, if not
illegality, of such a contingency is readily apparent.
The situation imagined implies the deprivation of the municipal
corporation of a source of a substantial income, expressly provided by
law. Because of all this, we hold that the right or usufruct of the town
of Paoay over its municipal waters, particularly, the forty odd fishery
lots included in the attachment by the Sheriff, is not subject to
execution.
(2) Yes. The revenue or income coming from the renting of these
fishery lots is certainly subject to execution.
It may be profitable, if not necessary, to distinguish this kind of
revenue from that derived from taxes, municipal licenses and market
fees are provided for and imposed by the law, they are intended
primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of municipal corporations. These revenues are
fixed and definite, so much so that the annual appropriations for the
expenses of the municipalities are based on these revenues. Not so
with the income derived from fisheries. In the first place, the usufruct
over municipal waters was granted by the Legislature merely to help or
bolster up the economy of municipal government. Secondly, the
amount of this income is far from definite or fixed. It depends upon
the amounts which prospective bidders or lessees are willing to pay. In
other words, to many municipalities engaged in this business of letting
out municipal waters for fishing purposes, it is a sort of sideline, so
that even without it the municipality may still continue functioning and
perform its essential duties as such municipal corporations.
We call this activity of municipalities in renting municipal waters for
fishing purposes as a business for the reason that the law itself
allowed said municipalities to engage in it for profit. And it is but just
that a town so engaged should pay and liquidate obligations
contracted in connection with said fishing business, with the income
derived therefrom.
Therefore, the fishery lots in the municipality of Paoay are not subject
to execution. The levy and attachment made is void. However, the
amount of P1,712.01 in the municipal treasury of Paoay representing
the rental paid by Demetrio Tabije on fishery lots let out by the
municipality of Paoay is a proper subject of levy, and the attachment
made thereon by the Sheriff is valid. We may add that other amounts
coming or due from lessees of the forty odd fishery lots leased by the
municipality to different persons may also be attached or garnished to
satisfy the judgment against the municipality of Paoay.
Municipality of Makati vs CA
GR Nos. 89898-99
October 1, 1990
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned
by private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After
hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value of the property at
P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay this amount minus the
advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to
private respondent. It then issued the corresponding writ of execution
accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner
which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be
garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the
disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required
under the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence,
petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC.
Issue:
1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from
garnishment and levy upon execution?
2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents?
Held:
1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are
not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by
statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether
real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be
attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment
against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes,
licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and
exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and
functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a
showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance
appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the
balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under execution may be
validly effected on the public funds of petitioner.
2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are
left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses,
without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money
judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of
mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the
necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds therefor.
For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the
subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with
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its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited
from its possession of the property since the same has been the site of
Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court
will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation
arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. The
State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the
bounds of fair play and justice.
Laganapan vs Asedillo
GR No. L-28353
September 30, 1987
FACTS:
On 4 January 1960,The petitioner Solano Laganapan was appointed
chief of police of the municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna by the
respondent Mayor Asedillo. His salary was increased and he was
extended an appointment which was approved as provisional by the
Commissioner of Civil Service. The petitioner was given another
increase in salary and a corresponding appointment was made which
the Commissioner of Civil Service "approved under Sec. 24(c) of
Republic Act No. 2260, to continue until replaced by an eligible but not
beyond thirty (30) days from receipt of certification of eligibles by the
Provincial Treasurer of Laguna." For the third time, he was again given
salary increases, and new appointments were extended to him, which
appointments were also approved by the Commissioner of Civil
Service. However, on 16 February 1967, the petitioner was summarily
dismissed from his position by respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, on
the ground that his appointment was provisional and that he has no
civil service eligibility. The petitioner was told to surrender his firearm
and other office equipment to the Municipal Treasurer of Kalayaan,
Laguna who was also informed of petitioner's dismissal on the same
day. Respondent Epifanio Ragotero was appointed acting chief of
police of Kalayaan, Laguna on the same day, in place of the petitioner.
Subsequently, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan, Laguna abolished the
appropriation for the salary of the chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna.
In view thereof, the petitioner complained to the Police Commission
which advised him to file an injunction suit against Mayor Asedillo.
The petitioner filed a petition for mandamus, quo warranto with
preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents Mayor Elpidio
Asedillo, the Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, and Epifanio Ragotero,
seeking his reinstatement to the position of chief of police of Kalayaan,
Laguna, with back salaries and damages. In answer, respondents
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero claimed that the
appointment of the petitioner, being merely temporary in character,
and the petitioner having no civil service eligibility, his services could
be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure of the appoint
power; and that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies. The respondent Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, for its
part, alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against it; and
that, if the acts of the respondent mayor are patently irregular, the
said mayor should be held solely liable therefor.
The appellants contend that the appellee should have first exhausted
all administrative remedies before he reported to the courts. They
suggested that the appellee should have appealed the order of
dismissal to the Commissioner of Civil Service in view of the provisions
of Sec. 16(i) and Sec. 16 of Republic Act No. 2260 which grant the
Commissioner of Civil Service the final authority to pass upon the
removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and
employees in the competitive or classified service; and to hear and
determine appeals instituted by any person believing himself to be
aggrieved by an action or determination of any appointing authority
contrary to the provisions of the Civil Service Law and rules.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Laganapan violated the Doctrine of
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies – No.
2. Whether or not Solano Laganapan was illegally dismissed –
Yes.
3. Whether or not the Municipality may be held equally liable
with Mayor Asedillo – Yes.
RULING:
While there are precedents which hold that before a litigant can bring
a matter to court, it is necessary that he first exhaust all the remedies
in the administrative branch of the government, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It
has been repeatedly held that the principle requiring previous
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one; where the controverted act is
patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department secretary, whose
acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed
approval of the latter; where there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention; or where the respondent has acted in
utter disregard of due process. The rule does not also apply where
insistence on its observance would result in nullification of the claim
being asserted; and when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that, in terminating the services
of the appellee, the appellant Mayor Elpidio Asedillo acted summarily
without any semblance of compliance or even an attempt to comply
with the elementary rules of due process. No charges were filed; nor
was a hearing conducted in order to give the appellee an opportunity
to defend himself, despite the provisions of Sec. 14 of Republic Act No.
4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966, which took effect on
8 September 1966, that "Members of the local police agency shall not
be suspended or removed except upon written complaint filed under
oath with the Board of Investigators herein provided for misconduct or
incompetence, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Government, serious
irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law."
Following the rule, there was no need for exhaustion of administrative
remedies before appellee could come to court for the protection of his
rights.
Besides, it appears that the order was immediately executed and the
appellee was immediately removed from office and replaced by the
appellant Epifanio Ragotero on the same day, so that appeal to the
Commissioner of Civil Service, even if available to the appellee, was
not an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Furthermore,
appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service is not a pre-requisite to,
nor a bar to the institution of quo warranto proceedings, so that, as
pointed out by the trial court, to require the appellee to exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing this action, could easily result
in a grave injustice of barring him forever from bringing the matter to
the courts of justice for judicial determination. We also find no merit in
the appellants' contention that, since the appointments extended to
the appellee as chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna were all provisional
in nature, and not permanent, his services could be terminated with or
without cause, at the pleasure of the appointing officer. While it may
be true that the appellee was holding a provisional appointment at the
time of his dismissal, he was not a temporary official who could be
dismissed at any time. His provisional appointment could only be
terminated thirty (30) days after receipt by the appointing officer of a
list of eligibles from the Civil Service Commission. Here, no such
certification was received by Mayor Elpidio Asedillo thirty (30) days
prior to his dismissal of the appellee.
We, likewise, find no merit in the contention of the respondent
Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna that Mayor Elpidio Asedillo alone
should be held liable for the back salaries of the petitioner, because
the records show that the action was instituted against Mayor Asedillo,
not personally, but in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Kalayaan,
Laguna, and he appeared and defended the action in such capacity.
Furthermore, it is of record that, after the summary dismissal of the
petitioner by respondent Mayor Asedillo, the Municipal Council of
Kalayaan instead of opposing or at least protesting the petitioner's
summary dismissal from his position, even abolished the appropriation
for the salary of the Chief of Police of Kalayaan, Laguna, We consider
this act of the Municipal Council of Kalayaan as an approval or
confirmation of the act of respondent Mayor in summarily dismissing
the petitioner, as to make said municipality equally liable, as held by
the trial court, as respondent Mayor for the reinstatement of petitioner
and for the payment of his back salaries. The trial court, therefore,
did not commit error in finding that the summary dismissal of
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the petitioner was illegal and in ordering the respondent
Mayor and respondent Municipality to reinstate him with back
salaries from the time of his dismissal
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 91391
January 24, 1991
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, through the PCGG, with the assistance
of Solicitor General Chavez filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
against Cojuangco, Jr. and Enrile, among others, for reconveyance,
reversion and accounting, restitution and damages. After the denial of
Enrile’s motion to dismiss, he filed an answer with compulsory
counterclaim and cross-claim with damages. Enrile requested for leave
of court to implead Chavez and the PCGG officials as additional party
defendant therein for lodging an alleged “harassment suit.” The
motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan.
Chavez argued that since he was simply the lawyer in the case,
exercising his duty under the law to assist the Government in the filing
and prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1, EO No. 14, he
cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case.
Issue:
Is it proper to implead Solicitor General Chavez as additional party
defendant in the counterclaim filed by Enrile in the same civil case?
Held: No
The charges pressed by Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice
and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To
vindicate his rights, Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action
for damages against the Solicitor General.
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection
with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is
a showing of bad faith.
Chavez argued that he was covered by the immunity proviso provided
for under Section 4(a) or EO 1, however, such argument was not well
taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto
result in the charges being automatically dropped. Immunity from suit
cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant
a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.
Where Chavez exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad
faith, or, as contended by the Enrile, "maliciously conspires with the
PCGGcommissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against
him an evidentlybaseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional
rights and liberties,” there can be no question that a complaint for
damages may be filed against him.Highposition in government does
not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another.The
actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on
Human Relationsmay be taken against public officers or private citizens
alike. The issue is not the right of respondent Enrile to file an action
for damages. He has the right. The issue is whether ornot that action
must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against
him.
When a lawyer acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on
acounterclaim in the very same case he has filed only as counsel and
not as a party. Anyclaim for alleged damages or other causes of action
should be filed in an entirely separateand distinct civil action.
Rama vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. L-44484
March 16, 1987
Facts:
During the incumbency of Espina as Provincial Governor of Cebu,
Rama as Vice-Governor, and Garcia, Mendiola and Carillo as members
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Resolution No. 990 was adopted
where the Provincial Government of Cebu, under the aforementioned
officials, declared its policy “to mechanize the maintenance and repair
of all roads and bridges of the province, to economize in the
expenditure of its Road and Bridge Fund for the maintenance and
repair of provincial roads and bridges receiving national aid “JJ” and to
adopt a more comprehensive, systematic, efficient, progressive and
orderly operation and maintenance of the Office of the Provincial
Engineer." To implement said policy, the Provincial Board resolved to
abolish thirty positions (around 200 employees of the province were
eased out of their respective jobs). However, contrary to its declared
policy to economize the provincial administration, it later on hired
around one thousand new employees, renovated the Office of the
Provincial Engineer and provided the latter with a Mercedes-Benz car.
The displaced employees filed an action for the annulment of
Resolution No. 990, their reinstatement, and recovery of damages
against the aforementioned provincial officials who were sued both in
their official and personal capacities as a result of their alleged unjust,
oppressive, illegal, and malicious’ acts.
Issue:
May Espina, Rama, Garcia, Mendiola, and Carillo be held personally
liable for damages for adopting Resolution No. 990 which abolished
positions to the detriment of the occupants thereof?
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioners are personally liable for damages because of their
precipitate dismissal of provincial employees through an ostensibly
legal means.
In the case, it was found by the CA that the provincial employees
concerned were eased out because of their party affiliation. Such act
of the petitioners reflected their malicious intent to do away with the
followers of the rival political party so as to accommodate their own
protégés. Indeed, municipal officers are liable for damages if they act
maliciously or wantonly and if the work which they perform is done to
injure an individual rather than to discharge a public duty.
It was held in a case that a public officer who commits a tort or other
wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not
protected by his office and is personally liable therefor like any private
individual. A public officer is civilly liable for failure to observe honesty
and good faith in the performance of their duties as public officers, or
for wilfully or negligently causing damage to another, or for wilfully
causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs and/or public policy.
Rama’s protestations that when he eventually became the Governor of
Cebu he reinstated most of the dismissed employees cannot erase the
fact that he had a hand in the adoption of Resolution No. 990. His
subsequent benevolent act cannot sufficiently make up for the damage
suffered by the dismissed employees during their period of
unemployment.
Correa vs CFI Bulacan
GR No.L-46096
July 30, 1979
Facts:
On December 13, 1968, respondent Court rendered judgment in Civil
Case No. 3621-M in favor of therein plaintiffs (private respondents
herein) and adversely against therein defendants Eufemio T. Correa
(petitioner herein).
The pertinent portions of the decision read as follows:
"This Court finds that defendants Eufemio T. Correa and
Virgilio Sarmiento, municipal mayor and municipal treasurer
of Norzagaray, Bulacan respectively, should be ordered
personally to pay the salaries which the plaintiffs failed to
receive by reason of their illegal removal from office until
they are actually reinstated.”
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on March
22, 1976, and the motion for reconsideration of the Appellate Court's
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decision was denied on May 11, 1976. On August 24, 1976, the
decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory. It is in
connection with the efforts of the petitioner to quash the writ of
execution issued to enforce the aforestated final judgment that the
present proceedings arose.
Bulacan. Petitioner invoked the principle that when judgment is
rendered against an officer of the municipal corporation who is sued in
his official capacity for the payment of back salaries of officers illegally
removed, the judgment is binding upon the corporation, whether or
not the same is included as party to the action. Petitioner contends
that it is the municipality of Norzagaray that is liable.
Issue:
The issue is whether or not respondent Court in denying the Motion to
Quash the Writ of Execution acted with grave abuse of discretion or
with lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Held:
In the discharge of governmental functions, "municipal corporations
are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only
to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in
conformity with the requirements thereof." A public officer who
commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the
scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable
therefor like any private individual. This principle of personal liability
has been applied to cases where a public officer removes another
officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases
saying that by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of law
in respect to removal from office, the officials were acting outside their
official authority.
Respondent Court, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner's motion to quash writ of execution. The writ was
strictly in accordance with the terms of the judgment.
PART VII. ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
Pedro Gallego vs Vicente Verra
73 Phil 453
Synopsis: A case on petition for certiorari to review the decision of
the CA which declared illegal the Gallego’s election to the office of
Municipal Mayor of Abuyog Leyte, in the general elections of
December, 1940 on the ground that he did not have the residence
qualification.
Facts:
Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After studying in the Catarman
Agricultural School in the province of Samar, he was employed as a
school teacher in the Municipality of Catarman as well as in the
Municipalities of Brawn, Dulag, and Abuyog, province of Leyte.
He ran for Mayor of his home town, but was defeated. Finding himself
in debt and unemployed, he went to Mindanao to search for a job. He
went to Misaims Oriental, but he wasn’t able to find a job so he went
to the Sitio of Kaato-an, Malaybalay, Bukidnon where he arrived and
immediately found employment as nurseryman in the chitin plantation
of the Bureau of Forestry.
He returned to Abuyog on July 30 after arriving on June 20 to
SitioKaato-an. He was offered employment as teacher in the public
school of the array of Union, Municipality of Sogod Leyte. He did not
accept the offer however He went back to Kaato-an that August 23 to
resume his work. He stayed in the Chichona plantation until he
resigned in September 1940. During the period of his stay, his wife
and children stayed in Abuyog Leyte.
He registered himself as an elector in percent no. 14 of Lantapan,
municipality of MalaybalayBukidnon, and voted tehere in the election
for assemblymen held in December 1938. He did not fill the blank
space corresponding to the length of time he had resided in Bukidnon
in his voter’s affidavit, the trial court noted.
On January 20, 1940, he obtained and paid for his residence certificate
form the municipal treasurer of Malayalam, in which certificate it was
stated that he had resided in said municipality for one year and a half.
Based on the said facts, the CA held that Pedro Gallego acquired a
residence or domicile of origin in the municipality of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, and had lost his domicile of original in the municipality of
Abuyog, Leyte, at the he was elected mayor of the latter municipality,
and that therefore his election was void.
Issues:
Whether or not Pedro Gallego had been a resident of Abuyog for at
least one year prior to December 10, 1940
Held:
Question may be approached from either two angles: Did he lose his
domicile in Abuyog by the mere fact that he worked in Malaybalay as
government employee? registered himself as a voted and voted there
in the election for assemblymen in December 1938, and secured his
residence certificate there for the year 1940.
Had he reacquired his domicile of origin at least one year prior to his
election as mayor of Abuyog?
Petitioner did not lose his residence of domicile in abuyog. He did not
reside in Malaybalay with the intention of remaining there indefinitely
and of not returning to abuyog.
The court explained the term residence:
The term “residence” as used in the election law is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. In order to acquire a domicile by choice there must
concur:
1. residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
2. an intention to remain there,
3. intention to abandon the old domicile.
In other words there must be an animus non reverted and an animus
manendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must
be for an indefinite period of time. The acts of the person must
confirm with his purpose. The change of residence must be voluntary;
the residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be actual; and
to the fact of residence there must be added the animus manendi.
The court cites Larena vs. Teves (61 Phil., 36).
The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an
elective office to serve that community; and when the evidence on the
alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or conclusive and it
clearly appears, as in the entrant case, tat the purpose of the law
would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the ice, the will of the
electorate should be respected.
Pamil vs Teleron
86 SCRA 413
November 20, 1978
FACTS:
In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for
mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later proclaimed as mayor
therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo warranto case
against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that
as provided for in Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised Administrative
Code:
“in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a
municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service,
persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial
or national funds, or contractors for public works of the
municipality.”
107

In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Victorino
Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election
Code of 1971 which now allows ecclesiastics to run.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ecclesiastic is eligible to an elective municipal
position
RULING:
The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935
Constitution, “No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.” If the the doctrine of constitutional supremacy is to
be maintained, then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus, an
ecclesiastic may run for elective office. However, this issue proved to
have divided the Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the
majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order to declare Section
2175 of the Revised Administrative Code to be unconstitutional. For
this, the petition filed by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the
lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to
vacate the mayoralty position.
It was also pointed out that how can one who swore to serve the
Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at
times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the
separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code
still stands because there is no implied repeal.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and
persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national
funds “are obviously now allowed to run for a public elective office
because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 ‘every person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members
of the Armed Forces’ shall ipso facto cease in their office or position on
the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This implies that they
are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office.” The
Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining categories formerly
banned under the Revised Administrative Code, “ecclesiastics and
contractors for public works of the municipality are allowed to run for
municipal elective offices under the maxim, ‘Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius’, they being not included in the enumeration of persons
ineligible under the New Election Code. The rule is that all persons
possessing the necessary qualifications, except those expressly
disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.”
Faypon vs Quirino
96 Phil. 294
Facts:
Respondent was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers
elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur. He was born
in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur in 1895; came to Manila to pursue his studies;
went to the US for the same purpose; returned to the Philippines in
1923; lectured in UP; and engaged in newspaper work in Manila, Iloilo
and later on again in Manila. The crucial and pivotal point upon which
the eligibility of respondent to office is assailed, is his registration as a
voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947.
Held:
Mere absence from one’s residence of origin - domicile - to pursue
studies, engage in business, or practice his vocation, is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. The determination
of a person’s legal residence or domicile largely depends upon
intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities or utterances.
The party who claims that a person has abandoned or lost his
residence of origin must show and prove preponderantly such
abandonment or loss. A previous registration as voter in a municipality
other than that in which he is elected is not sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of his residence of origin.
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for “greener pastures”
to improve his lot, which includes study in other places, practice his
vocation or engage in business. When an election is to be held, the
citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to
his native town to cast his ballot, but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from the
place of his profession or business activities; so there he registers as
voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give
up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the
government especially in national elections.
Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his
domicile or residence of origin, has not forsaken him. This is the
reason why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return to the place of his
birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of ones’s birth
must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
Frivaldo vs COMELEC
GR No. 120295
June 28 1996
(257 SCRA 727)
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of
Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. Raul R. Lee,
another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that
Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or
position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and
that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled.
Frivaldo filed with the Comeleca petition, praying for the annulment of
the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation.
He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee
on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such,
when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was
released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in
the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation
(of Frivaldo) as governor.
Issue:
Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably
cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to
hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect?
If so, from when?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that his repatriation was valid and legal and
because of the curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his
repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run
for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing
the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of
the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only upon
taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended
the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application,
then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore
qualified to be proclaimed Governor of Sorsogon.
Torayno vs. Comelec
337 SCRA 574
Facts:
Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three
terms until 1995 election and his certificate of candidacy showed that
his residence was in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. On 14 June 1997,
while still governor he executed a voter registration record in Cagayan
de Oro City which is geographically located in Misamis Oriental,
claiming 20 years of residence. By 1998, he filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in the said city and stated that his residence for
the preceding two years and five months was in the same city.
Petitioners then filed a petition for disqualification of Emano for failing
108
to meet the one year- residency requirement. Prior to the resolution of
their petition, Emano won the mayoral post and was proclaimed
winner. Torayno filed for annulment of election of Emano. COMELEC
upheld its decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement?
HELD:
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of
residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the Constitution
or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or
newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective
office to serve that community” Emano was the overwhelming choice
of the people of Cagayan de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the
principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the
ballot be given the fullest effect. In case of doubt, political laws must
be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate.
Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was
governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the
seat of the provincial government was located. Based on our ruling in
Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was
a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to
qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover, the Comelec did
not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of residence.
Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro City is
a highly urbanized city whose voters cannot participate in the
provincial elections. Such political subdivisions and voting restrictions,
however, are simply for the purpose of parity in representation. The
classification of an area as a highly urbanized or independent
component city, for that matter, does not completely isolate its
residents, politics, commerce and other businesses from the entire
province -- and vice versa -- especially when the city is located at the
very heart of the province itself, as in this case.Undeniably, Cagayan
de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains
a geographical part of the province.
Coquilla vs Comelec
GR No. 151914
July 31, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in
Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when
he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as
a U.S. citizen.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a
residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the
United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted
until August 5, 2000.[4] Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation
under R.A. No. 8171[5] to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His
application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November
10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of
Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was approved by the
Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001.[6] On February 27,
2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had
been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two (2) years.[7]
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent
mayor of Oras and who was running for reelection, sought the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that
the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years
when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since
November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the
elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and
received the highest number of votes (6,131) against private
respondents 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001,
petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers.[8] He subsequently took his oath of office.
Issue:
Whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least
one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he
represented in his certificate of candidacy.
Ruling:
First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able
to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(Emphasis added)
The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation
as referring to dwelling or habitation,[21] but rather to domicile or legal
residence,[22] that is, the place where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found
at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi).[23] A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth.
It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues
until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile
of choice).[24]
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by
becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From
then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay
as a visitor or as a resident alien.
Mitra vs Comelec
GR No. 191938
July 2, 2010
Facts:
In the present case, the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) canceled the certificate of candidacy (COC) of petitioner
Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly misrepresenting that he is a
resident of the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where he
ran for the position of Governor. When his COC for the position of
Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent
Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then
included, among other territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City.
On March 26, 2007, Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a highly
urbanized city and thus ceased to be a component city of
the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new
status was the ineligibility of Puerto PrincesaCity residents from voting
for candidates for elective provincial officials.On March 20, 2009, with
the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for
the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720
of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy.
Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently
filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of
Aborlan.
Respondents filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel
Mitras COC. They essentially argued that Mitra remains a resident
of Puerto Princesa City who has not yet established residence in
Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.
Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioner is liable for material misrepresentation
under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code? Whether or not the
Petitioner was able to establish his residence in the Municipality of
Aborlan, enabling him to run for the position of Governor?
109
Held:
We find that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material
misrepresentation in his COC. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in its appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude
that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan. The COMELEC, too,
failed to critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him
ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan.
Mitras domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him
to qualify as Governor in light of the relatively recent change of status
of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized
city whose residents can no longer vote for provincial officials he had
to abandon his domicile of origin and acquire a new one within the
local government unit where he intended to run; this would be his
domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence,
which the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the following:
(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
(2) an intention to remain there; and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
We cannot but conclude that the COMELECs approach i.e., the
application of subjective non-legal standards and the gross
misappreciation of the evidence is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, as the COMELEC used wrong considerations and grossly
misread the evidence in arriving at its conclusion. In using subjective
standards, the COMELEC committed an act not otherwise within the
contemplation of law on an evidentiary point that served as a major
basis for its conclusion in the case.
The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC is an
aspect of the case that the COMELEC completely failed to consider as
it focused mainly on the character of Mitrasfeedmill residence. For this
reason, the COMELEC was led into error one that goes beyond an
ordinary error of judgment. By failing to take into account whether
there had been a deliberate misrepresentation in Mitras COC, the
COMELEC committed the grave abuse of simply assuming that an error
in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity in a material
representation. In this case, it doubly erred because there was no
falsity; as the carefully considered evidence shows, Mitra did indeed
transfer his residence within the period required by Section 74 of the
OEC.
Mitras feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and
separately from the circumstances of his transfer of residence,
specifically, his expressed intentto transfer to a residence outside of
Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial
position; his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; his initial
transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his
permanent home; and the construction of a house in this lot that,
parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the
completion of his house.
Thus, we have held that while provisions relating to certificates of
candidacy are in mandatory terms, it is an established rule of
interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions,
requiring certain steps before elections, will be construed as directory
after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
Handrieder vs De Rivera
AM Case No. P-05-2026
August 2, 2007
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint against Celia A. de Rivera,
Interpreter of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100, for
Serious Misconduct, Willful Refusal to Pay Just Debt, and Conviction for
an Offense Involving Moral Turpitude, relative to Criminal Cases Nos.
043676 to 043690 for fifteen (15) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Celia De Rivera."
In a Complaint-Affidavit dated 31 August 2004, complainant
Virginia Hanrieder alleged that in a decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 40 in the criminal cases,
respondent had been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
fourteen (14) counts of B.P. 22 violation and adjudged civilly liable for
the fifteen (15) checks subject of the charges.
A fine had also been imposed on respondent without any provision for
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Despite the finality of
the decision, according to complainant she had not been able to collect
any amount from respondent, except the cash bail bond in the amount
of P10,000.00. In addition, respondent did not pay the fine and even
opposed the release of the cash bond into complainant's custody as
partial satisfaction of the adjudged civil liability. Complainant further
alleged that the writ of execution issued by the trial court could not be
enforced as the sheriff could not levy upon any cash or property of
respondent. Consequently, the sheriff had made an arrangement with
respondent for the latter to pay the amount of P500.00 monthly.
Notwithstanding, this respondent failed to comply.
Complainant thus prayed that respondent be dismissed from service
and that all of her retirement, termination, and unused leave benefits
in the amount sufficient to repay her debts plus interest be released to
complainant.
Respondent asserted that her failure to pay her civil obligation was not
prompted by bad faith or willful intention to evade a responsibility. In
addition, she asserted that her conviction for violation of B.P.
22 cannot be characterized as misconduct so gross in character as to
render her morally unfit to hold her position since the same was not
committed in her professional capacity.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) evaluated the Complaint-
Affidavit and found it meritorious. Accordingly, the OCA recommended
that respondent be suspended for thirty (30) days for her willful failure
to pay her just debts. The OCA however did not consider respondent's
conviction for B.P. 22 as a conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the OCA’s recommendation, that respondent be suspended
for thirty days for her willful failure to pay her just debts, is in accord
with law and jurisprudence.
II. Whether the respondent’s conviction for B.P. 22, a crime involving
moral turpitude, warrants dismissal of the respondent.
RULING:
I.
The Court finds the OCA's recommendation not in accord with law and
jurisprudence.
It appears that the OCA failed to take into account respondent's having
been adjudged guilty of several counts of B.P. 22 violation when it
recommended that she be merely suspended. It might seem that the
issuance of the bouncing checks is but a component of respondent's
general failure to pay her just debts to complainant. But since issuing a
bouncing check for whatever purpose is in itself a criminal offense,
such act should be considered and appreciated separately from the
failure to pay just debts.
We first consider the charge of failure to pay just debts.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which is applicable since
respondent is an employee in the civil service, provides:
Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions. — (a) No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due
process.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxx xxx xxx
(22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay
taxes due to the government;
xxx xxx xxx
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines
"just debts" as those (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law, or (2)
claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the
110
debtor. Under the same Rule, willful failure to pay just debts is
classified as a light offense with the corresponding penalty of
reprimand for the first offense, suspension for one (1) to thirty (30)
days for the second offense, and dismissal for the third offense.
In the case at bar, respondent does not deny her indebtedness and
the same had been adjudicated by a court of law. Thus, her liability
under the law is undisputed. While the Court is sympathetic to
respondent's financial condition, she has a moral and legal duty to pay
her obligations when due despite her financial difficulties. Her failure to
do so warrants disciplinary action. Since she committed the offense for
the first time, the appropriate penalty is reprimand.
Apropos complainant's request for the Court's intercession to collect
the amount owed her, it should be stressed that the Court is not a
collection agency. Thus, the Court cannot grant her plea. The Court,
however, is duty bound to correct whatever it perceives as an
improper conduct among court employees by ordering them to do
what is proper in the premises. In the instant case, the Court directs
respondent to pay her indebtedness to complainant, within a
reasonable time from the receipt of this Resolution. A violation of this
order could be the basis of another administrative charge for a second
offense of "willful failure to pay just debts" punishable by suspension
of one (1) to thirty (30) days, among other serious charges arising
from a willful violation of a lawful order of this Court.
II.
YES. For having been found guilty with finality of a crime involving
moral turpitude, respondent Celia A. de Rivera should be dismissed
from service.
The Administrative Code of 1987 provides that conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disciplinary action. The
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service states that
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a grave offense and
upon the first offense, the penalty of dismissal must be meted out. In
the case of Re: Conviction of Imelda B. Fortus, Clerk III, RTC Br. 40,
Calapan City for the Crime of Violation of B.P. 22, the Court
characterized the violation of B.P. 22 as a crime involving moral
turpitude. It is clear therefore that respondent should be dismissed
from service for having been convicted by final judgment of B.P.
22 violations. As in the previously cited case, however, respondent
may reenter the government service if she can prove that she is fit to
serve once again.
Indeed, it is worthy of note that respondent violated B.P. 22 not once
or twice, but at least 14 times. The individual amount for each check
may have been relatively small, ranging from P833.00 to P4,400.00,
yet the sheer number of instances that respondent violated B.P.
22 cannot simply be ignored, especially considering the moral
turpitude dimension of her acts.
WHEREFORE, respondent Celia A. de Rivera, Interpreter, RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 100, is REPRIMANDED for her willful failure to pay
just debts, whi\ch amounts to conduct unbecoming a court
employee. Furthermore, for having been found guilty with finality of a
crime involving moral turpitude, respondent Celia A. de Rivera is
hereby DISMISSED from the service. Respondent, however, may be
allowed to reenter government service if she can prove that she is fit
to serve once again.
Edgar Y. Teves vs Comelec
GR No. 180363
April 28, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd
legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007
elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a
petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent
alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office
because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which
carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner
from running for the position of member of House of Representatives
and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. It appears,
however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional
elections for the position of member of the House of Representatives
of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant
Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.
.
The petitioner filed a petition which the court found to have merit.
Issue:
Did petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019
involve moral turpitude?
Ruling:
No. The crime for which petitioner was convicted in Sandiganbayan in
2005 did not involve moral turpitude. The Court discussed Sec. 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code regarding disqualifications of a candidate.
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless
within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary
to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general.
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows:
1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction;
3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such
interest by the Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct
or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is
when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity
in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited
from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
111

Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall
be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or
indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a
local government unit….
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited
interest.
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically
mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all
surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be
considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are
not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being
positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence,
authority or power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the
cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject
cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering
that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC
prohibiting possession of such interest.
Grego vs COMELEC
June 19, 1997
274 SCRA 481
FACTS:
Sec 40 (b) of Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government Code) which
took effect on January 1, 1992, disqualifies a person for any elective
position on the ground that “had been removed from office as a result
of an administrative case”.
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy
Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a finding of serious misconduct
in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena
Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in
the Second District of the City of Manila during the January 18, 1988,
local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office.
After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992
synchronized national elections. Again, he succeeded in his bid and he
was elected as one of the six (6) City Councilors. However, his victory
this time did not remain unchallenged. In the midst of his successful
re-election, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in
the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position.
One such case was a petition for quo warrantofiled before the
COMELEC by Cenon Ronquillo, another candidate for councilor in the
same district, who alleged Bascos ineligibility to be elected councilor on
the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. At about the same time, two more
cases were also commenced by Honorio Lopez II in the Office of the
Ombudsman and in the Department of Interior and Local
Government. All these challenges were, however, dismissed, thus,
paving the way for Bascos continued stay in office.
Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted
and ran again for councilor in the May 8, 1995, local elections seeking
a third and final term. Once again, he beat the odds by emerging sixth
in a battle for six councilor seats. As in the past, however, his right to
office was again contested.
On May 13, 1995, petitioner, seeks for the respondent’s
disqualification, pursuant to the above provision, contending that as
long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an
administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior
to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies.
. remove him.
Respondent contends that the petitioner is not entitled to said relief
because Section 40 par. b of the LGC may not be validly applied to
persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would
make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which
impairs vested rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies
retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on
January 1, 1992
RULING:
Sec. 40(b) of the LGC has no retroactive effect and therefore,
disqualifies only those administratively removed from office after Jan.
1, 1991 when the LGC took effect. It is a settled issue that Section 40
(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 does not have any retroactive effect.
Laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively.
In this regard, petitioner submits that although the Code took effect
only on January 1, 1992. Section 40(b) must nonetheless be given
retroactive effect and applied to Basco's dismissal from office which
took place in 1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as
worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from
office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to
attach. Hence, petitioner impresses upon the Court that as long as a
candidate was removed from office due to an administrative case,
regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of
the code, the disqualification applies. To him, this interpretation is
made more evident by the manner in which the provisions of Section
40 are couched. Since the past tense is used in enumerating the
grounds for disqualification, petitioner strongly contends that the
provision must have also referred to removal from office occurring
prior to the effectivity of the Code. We do not, however, subscribe to
petitioner's view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to the
provision of Section 40(b) is already a settled issue and there exists no
compelling reason for us to depart therefrom.
A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so
construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired
before its passage: “Lexprospicit, non respicit.” The law looks forward,
not backward.
Salalima vs Guigona
257 SCRA 55
FACTS:
Petitioner was held administratively liable and suspended in connection
with the negotiated contract entered into on 6 March 1992 with RYU
Construction for additional rehabilitation work at the Tabaco Public
Marketinstead through a bidding and for entering into a retainer
agreement with private lawyers in November 1989 despite of the
availability of a Provincial Legal Officer.
Petitioner argued that he cannot be held liable because public officials
cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term.
ISSUE:
Can the petitioner be held liable for acts committed during a prior
term?
RULING:
NO. Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are
generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially
true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings
for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and
disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer
was elected or appointed.
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms,
and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the
officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
112
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to
his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregard or forgave
his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the
will of the people.
However, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains
that Aguinaldo does not apply because the case against the official
therein was already pending when he filed his certificate of candidacy
for his reelection bid. It is of the view that an official's reelection
renders moot and academic an administrative complaint against him
for acts done during his previous term only if the complaint was filed
before his reelection. The fine distinction does not impress us.
The rule makes no distinction. As a matter of fact, in Pascual the
administrative complaint against Pascual for acts committed during his
first term as Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, was filed only a year
after he was reelected.
The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as criminal
cases are concerned, is still a good law. Such a rule is not only
founded on the theory that an official's reelection expresses the
sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or
omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was
committed during his previous term.
We may add that sound public policy dictates it. To rule otherwise
would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests
between the reelected official and his political enemies, who may not
stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative
cases for act, alleged to have been committed during his previous
term.
His second term may thus be devoted to defending himself in the said
cases to the detriment of public service. This doctrine of forgiveness or
condonation cannot, however, apply to criminal acts which the
reelected official may have committed during his previous term.
Osorio vs COMELEC
GR No. 162892 (RESOLUTION)
May 6, 2004
Facts
Petitioner and private respondents were both candidates for
the position of Barangay Chairman in the 2002 barangay
elections. Private respondent filed a disqualification case
against petitioner on the ground that the latter was found
guilty of dishonesty by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
while holding public office. Said CSC decision was final and
executory.
Petitioner won the barangay election by 21 votes. However, on
August 23, 2002, the COMELEC First Division released its
resolution declaring petitioner disqualified to run for any
public elective position since the penalty imposed upon herein
Respondent include[d] dismissal from service as a result of
that administrative Case, Petitioner insists that the word
"office" in Section 40(b) of the 1991 Local Government Code
refers exclusively to an elective office.
Issue:
Disqualification of petitioner
Ruling:
It is proper. Petitioner's cause for disqualification is provided
in Section 3(b) of COMELEC resolution 4801 promulgated on
May 23, 2002:
Section 3. Disqualifications. - The following are
disqualified from running for any elective barangay
and sangguniang kabataan positions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case.
xxx xxx xxx
in relation to Section 40(b) of the Local Government
Code:
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case.
xxx xxx xxx
The above-stated provisions state "removed from office"
without any qualification. It is a cardinal rule in statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, we must
not distinguish, in accordance with the maxim ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Marquez vs COMELEC
GR No. 112889
April 18, 1995
Facts:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position of
Governor filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the
resolution of the COMELEC which dismissed his petition for quo
warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent
Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of
insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending
before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of
Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court
for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent
on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation
ofrespondent's certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the
candidate's disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local
Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the COMELEC. The
COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect.
Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against
private respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993
resolution, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition. The
COMELEC En Banc, denied a reconsideration of the resolution.
Issue:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his
certificate ofcandidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal
charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest
comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section
40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from
being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to,
anelective local office.
Ruling:
Yes. Private respondent is a fugitive from justice and is disqualified
from being a candidate and is ineligible from holding an elective local
office.
The law needs no further interpretation and construction. Section
40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather clear and it disqualifies
"fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad"
from seeking any elective local office. The Solicitor General, expresses
a like opinion and concludes that the phrase "fugitive from justice"
includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
In the present case, at the time private respondent filed his certificate
of candidacy,a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of
insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending
before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of
Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court
113
for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent
on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.
Rodriguez vs Comelec
GR No. 120099
July 24, 1996
Facts:
Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez,
Jr. were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in
the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-
elected governor.
Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via petition for quo
warranto before the COMELEC. Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left
the United States where a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, is
pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for
fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of
personal property.Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice" which
is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility. The COMELEC dismissed
Marquez quo warranto petition. Marquez challenged the COMELEC
dismissal before this Court.
Issue:
Is Rodriguez a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section 40(e)
of the Local Government Code based on the alleged pendency of a
criminal charge against him?
Ruling:
The Court in "Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC" promulgated on April 18,
1995, hereinafter referred to as the MARQUEZ Decision, declared that:
xxx, fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support
from jurisprudence (x xx), and it may be so conceded as expressing
the general and ordinary connotation of the term."
Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under the
definition thus given was not passed upon by the Court. That task was
to devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the
directive to proceed therewith with dispatch conformably with
the MARQUEZ Decision.
The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Courta report
wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence, declared
that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice". Intent to evade is
absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that
Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the
criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12,
1985).
The objective facts sufficient to constitute flight from justice are: (a) a
person committed a 'crime' or has been charged for the commission
thereof; and (b) thereafter, leaves the jurisdiction of the court where
said crime was committed or his usual place of abode.
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling
factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And
obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or
punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an
already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction.
To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the
disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any
elective local position under Section 40(e) of the Local Government
Code, should be understood according to the definition given in
the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:"A 'fugitive from justice' includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise
those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution."
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be
established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at
least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a
"fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be
denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
Mercado vs Manzano
307 SCRA 630
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B.
Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent was then declared the winning
candidate; however its proclamation was suspended in view of a
pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril
who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation
of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that
he is a dual citizen and, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
provides that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective position.
Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the
Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-
31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in
1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the
United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and
is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding
his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship. From these facts, respondent is a dual citizen - both
a Filipino and a US citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective
office in the Philippines
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40
(d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws
of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the
Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore,
be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens
and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is
of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath
that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully
complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation
114
and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country
are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt
of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation
of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Cordora vs Comelec
GR No. 176947
February 10, 2009
Facts:
Cordora filed a complaint in the COMELEC accusing Tambunting of
making false assertions in his Certificate of Candidacy specifically on
the qualification of residency and being a natural born citizen.
Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration
which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an
American. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that
Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in
Honolulu. In short, Cordora argues that statements made by
Tambunting in the Bureau of immigration is contrary to what is stated
in his Certificate of Candidacy.
To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born
Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which
showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father.
Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American
citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government
after Tambunting’s father petitioned him through INS Form I-130
(Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which
he acquired at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an American passport
did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting
also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Issue:
Whether Tambunting knowingly made untruthful statements In his
COC
HELD: NO
Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances
of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the
naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process
involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American
citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from
the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two
trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the
same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed
that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior
to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections.
The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him
from running for public office.
Dual Citizenship is not a ground to disqualify from running in any
elective local position. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. What is referred to in R.A
7160 as dual citizenship must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance and it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who
seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the
oath of allegiance contained therein.
On residency, Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the
residency requirement because of Tambunting’s naturalization as an
American. Cordora’s reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a
naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election
laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place
and the intention to return there permanently,16 and is not dependent
upon citizenship.
Dela Torre vs COMELEC
GR No. 121592
July 5, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre via the instant petition for certiorari
seeks the nullification of two resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) allegedly with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a case for disqualification filed
against petitioner before the COMELEC. The first assailed resolution
declared the petitioner disqualified from running for the position of
Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last 1995 elections, citing as the
ground therefor, Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
It stated that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year
or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence is
a disqualification.In disqualifying the petitioner, the COMELEC held
thatDela Torre was convicted in a criminal action for violating the Anti-
Fencing Law (P.D 1612).
The second assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
The two (2) issues to be resolved are:
1. Does the crime of fencing involve moral turpitude?
2. Does the grant of probation affect Section 40 (a)'s applicability of
the LGC?
HELD:
COMELEC is in the right. Petitioner’s theory has no merit.
In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is
ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. The petitioner
has in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of fencing. At any
rate, the determination of whether or not fencing involves moral
turpitude can likewise be achieved by analyzing the elements alone.
From the foregoing definition may be gleaned the elements of the
crime of fencing which are:
xxxxx
"3. The accused knows or should have known
that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft; and
Xxxxx
Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge
by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the
same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that
115
which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature,
are crimes of moral turpitude.The same underlying reason holds
even if the "fence" did not have actual knowledge, but merely "should
have known" the origin of the property received. "When knowledge of
the existence of a particular fact is an element of the offense, such
knowledge is established if a person is aware of the high probability of
its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the
other hand, the words 'should know' denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in the
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon
assumption that such fact exists."
All told, the COMELEC did not err in disqualifying the petitioner on the
ground that the offense of fencing of which he had been previously
convicted by final judgment was certainly one involving moral
turpitude.
Anent the second issue where petitioner contends that his probation
had the effect of suspending the applicability of Section 40 (a) of the
Local Government Code, suffice it to say that the legal effect of
probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner's
conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a crime of
moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification
found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of
conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the
accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending
resolution of the application for probation. Clearly then, petitioner's
theory has no merit.
Moreno vs Comelec
GR No. 168550
August 10, 2006
Facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from
running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was
convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1)
Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of
action because he was already granted probation. The case went all up
to the Supreme Court. In SC, Moreno argues that the disqualification
under the Local Government Code applies only to those who have
served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do
not serve the adjudged sentence.
Issue:
Is Moreno disqualified to run for public office considering that he was
convicted by final judgment of a crime with a penalty of more than 1
year imprisonment but was later on granted pardon without him
having served the sentence?
Ruling:
No, he is not disqualified. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
appears innocuous enough at first glance. The phrase service of
sentence, understood in its general and commonsense, means the
confinement of a convicted person in a penal facility for the period
adjudged by the court.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing
defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a
suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of
probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal
penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be
equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation
Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the
execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court
but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in
the probation order.
Pamil vsTeleron
GR No. L-34854
November 20, 1978
Facts
Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of
municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly
proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner,
himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this
Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or
appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service,
persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national
funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The suit did
not prosper, respondent Judge sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga
to the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory
ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The
matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his
contention that there was no such implied repeal.
Issue
Whether or not the disqualification of the respondent based on
Administrative Code provision Constitutional
Ruling
There is no clear-cut answer from this Tribunal. After a lengthy and
protracted deliberation, the Court is divided on the issue. Seven
members of the Court are of the view that the judgment should be
affirmed as the challenged provision is no longer operative either
because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed.
The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court constitute
a minority, the vote of the remaining seven does not suffice to
render the challenged provision ineffective. Section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned,
must be accorded respect. The presumption of validity calls for its
application. Under the circumstances, certiorari lies. They have no
choice then but to vote for the reversal of the lower court decision and
declare ineligible respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga for the
office of municipal mayor.
Nonetheless, the above view failed to obtain the necessary eight votes
needed to give it binding force. The attack on the continuing effectivity
of Section 2175 having failed, it must be, as noted at the outset, given
full force and application.
In the 1935 Constitution, as it is now under the present Charter, it is
explicitly declared: "No religious test shall be required for the exercise
of civil or political rights." The challenged Administrative Code
provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any
elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the
religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them
is to impose a religious test. Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore
professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office.
There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code
provision relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional
mandate.
Talaga vs Comelec
GR No. 196804
October 9, 2012
Facts: Ramon Talaga already served 3 consecutive terms as mayor in
Lucena city. He filed his COC for mayor despite his service of 3
consecutive terms; a petition cancellation of COC was filed against
him. On April 19, 2010 , the COMELEC (division) DISQUALIFIED
Ramon. Ramon filed a motion for reconsideration. He withdrew his
motion for reconsideration on May 4, 2010; on the same day his wife
Barbara Ruby filed her own COC, as substitute of Ramon. On May 5,
2010 COMELEC en banc declared the Resolution of COMELEC division
as final and executory. On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of
116
Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor
were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate,
resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes
as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there was a valid substitution?
2. Who among the parties should assume the contested position?
Held:
1. No. Existence of a valid CoC is a conditionsine qua non for a valid
substitution.There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate
from running in an electoral race. One is through a petition for
disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court differentiated the two
remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,30 thuswise:
x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised
on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the
Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a
material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified
under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the
person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under
Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed
a CoC.31
Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code (i.e., prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact
of a candidate’s permanent residency in another country when that
fact affects the residency requirement of a candidate) are separate
and distinct from the grounds for the cancellation of or denying due
course to a COC (i.e., nuisance candidates under Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code; and material misrepresentation under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code), the Court has recognized in Miranda
v. Abaya32 that the following circumstances may result from the
granting of the petitions, to wit:
(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have
filed a valid CoC;
(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not
have filed a valid CoC; and
(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due
course or cancelled.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid
candidacy,33 there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that
a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly
substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a
CoC is not at all a candidate.34
The Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his CoC invalid;
hence, he was nota valid candidate to be properly substituted.
2. Elected Vice Mayor must succeedand assume the position
of Mayordue to a permanent vacancy in the office.
On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City,
Castillo submits that the doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer
espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections51 should not apply to
him because Ramon’s disqualification became final prior to the
elections.52 Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on
Elections,53 where the Court said:
x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the
elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was
applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment
declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other cases
had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the
other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer
have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the
candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential
condition does not exist in the present case.
Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May
1992, three days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day
itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was
disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004
elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for
mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was
legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for
him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section
6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations.
The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the
elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section
6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the
elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of
Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the
Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a
candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be
voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution
disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10
May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor
are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections.
Palileng’s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only
candidate, second to none.54
Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that he was
entitled to assume the position of Mayor of Lucena City for having
obtained the highest number of votes among the remaining qualified
candidates.
The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its
Resolution dated April 19, 2010, the copy of which Ramon received on
the same date.56 Ramon filed a motion for reconsideration on April 21,
201057 but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010,59ostensibly to allow
his substitution by Barbara Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any
motion for reconsideration. Such circumstances indicated that there
was no more pending matter that could have effectively suspended the
finality of the ruling in due course. Hence, the Resolution dated April
19, 2010 could be said to have attained finality upon the lapse of five
days from its promulgation and receipt of it by the parties. This
happened probably on April 24, 2010. Despite such finality, the
COMELEC En Banc continued to act on the withdrawal by Ramon of his
motion for reconsideration through the May 5, 2010 Resolution
declaring the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division
final and executory.
Yet, we cannot agree with Castillo’s assertion that with Ramon’s
disqualification becoming final prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the
ruling in Cayat was applicable in his favor. Barbara Ruby’s filing of her
CoC in substitution of Ramon significantly differentiated this case from
the factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat. Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat,
the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April 17, 2004, and his
disqualification became final before the May 10, 2004 elections.
Considering that no substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R.
Palileng, Sr., his rival, remained the only candidate for the mayoralty
post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted
Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded
117
by the electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the
electorate, she became a contender for the same position vied for by
Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing as Castillo. Such
standing as a candidate negated Castillo’s claim of being the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being consequently
entitled to assume the office of Mayor.
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a
disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely:
(a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law
of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such awareness within
the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.64Under this sole exception,
the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of
their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away
their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second
highest number of votes may be deemed elected.65 But the exception
did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second element
was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of
the fact of Barbara Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute.
Jalosjos vs. Comelec
GR No. 205033
June 18, 2013
FACTS:
The Comelec en banc issued a resolution which denied due course to
petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos’ Certificate of Candidacy for mayor, since
he was convicted by final judgment of two (2) counts of statutory rape
and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness, with the principal penalties
of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count and
carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
pursuant to Article 41, RPC. After serving his sentence, Jalosjos filed
his COC for mayor and meanwhile filed a petition for inclusion in the
list of voters which was denied.
Jalosjos imputed lack of jurisdiction to the Comelec en banc. He also
argued that Art. 41 of the RPC imposing the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification was already removed by Section
40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160. Hence, he argues that he is already
qualified to run for public office.
ISSUES:
Was Art. 41 of the RPC amended by Section 40(a) of RA 7160, such
that a person previously disqualified to run for public office may
already do so after the lapse of two (2) years after the service of his
sentence?
RULING:
There is no such amendment.
Section 40(a) of the LGC provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;
The above provision does not cover cases wherein the law imposes a
penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of
disqualifying the convict to run for elective office. An example of this
would be Article 41 of the RPC:
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their
accessory penalties. - The penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as
the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even
though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal
provision – such as Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically
prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite
the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his commuted
prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him
to run as mayor.
Chua vs Comelec
GR No. 216607
April 5, 2016
Facts:
Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua (Chua) filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila during the
May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. After the conduct of
elections, Chua garnered the sixth highest number of votes. She was
proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers on May 15, 2013.On the date
of Chua’s proclamation, however, Imelda E. Fragata (Fragata) filed a
Petition captioned as a "petition to declare [Chua] as a nuisance
candidate" and "to deny due course and/or cancel [Chua’s] Certificate
of Candidacy." Fragata was allegedly a registered voter in the Fourth
District who claimed that Chua was unqualified to run for Councilor on
two grounds: Chua was not a Filipino citizen, and she was a
permanent resident of the United States of America. The Comelec
treated the petition as one for disqualification. The Comelec found that
Chua was a dual citizen when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy.
Although she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in 2011 by taking an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, petitioner failed
to take a sworn and personal renunciation of her American citizenship
required under Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003.
Considering that Chua is a dual citizen, the Commission held that Chua
was disqualified to run for Councilor pursuant to Section 40 of the
Local Government Code. Consequently, Chua’s Certificate of Candidacy
was void ab initio, and all votes casted for her were stray. Chua’s
proclamation was likewise voided.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner disqualified to run for public office?
Ruling:
Petitioner claims that when she took the Oath of Allegiance to
reacquire her Filipino citizenship, it amounted to renounciation of her
American citizenship. Petitioner cannot claim that she has renounced
her American citizenship by taking the Oath of Allegiance. The oath of
allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign
citizenship are separate requirements, the latter being
an additional requirement for qualification to run for public
office. In Jacot v. Dal
[T]he oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy,
which is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn
renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It
bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general
requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine
elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional
requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public
posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one
citizenship.100
With petitioner’s failure to execute a personal and sworn renunciation
of her American citizenship, petitioner was a dual citizen at the time
she filed her Certificate of Candidacy on October 3, 2012. Under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, she was disqualified to run
for Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National
and Local Elections
118
 Leodegario A. Labao, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
GR No. 212615 / GR No. 212989
July 19, 2016
Facts:
In a Petition for Disqualification dated May 8, 2013 filed before the
COMELEC, Ludovico L. Martelino, Jr. (Ludovico) sought the
disqualification of Labao, Jr. as candidate3 for Mayor of the
Municipality of Mambusao, Capiz in the May 13, 2013 elections, on the
ground that Labao, Jr. was a fugitive from justice. Ludovico essentially
averred that there was an outstanding warrant for Labao, Jr.'s arrest in
connection with the filing of an Information for Murder against him
and four other persons; and that he had eluded arrest, thus, was at
large.
The Information for murder stemmed from the assassination of Vice-
Mayor Abel P. Martinez (Vice-Mayor Martinez) in front of his residence
on May 4, 2012. The assailants of Vice-Mayor Martinez were not
immediately known. But on December 20, 2012, one Roger D. Loredo
(Loredo) executed an extrajudicial confession admitting his
participation in the killing of Vice Mayor Martinez, and implicating
Labao, Jr. as the mastermind thereof. The Department of Justice
(DOJ) found probable cause to indict Labao, Jr.
Ludovico filed the said petition for disqualification against Labao, Jr. He
argued that Labao, Jr. qualified as a fugitive from justice as he went
into hiding after he was charged in court to avoid criminal prosecution.
6 It is for such reason that Labao, Jr. is considered a fugitive from
justice and, thus, disqualified from running as mayor. Labao, Jr. denied
the assertion that he was a fugitive from justice. He countered that
there was no charge against him when he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC); and that he was only implicated in the crime when
Loredo filed his extrajudicial confession on December 20, 2012.Finally,
Labao, Jr. puts emphasis on the fact that he had already been
proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Mambusao, Capiz
on May 14, 2013
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified as municipal mayor on the
premise that he is a fugitive from justice notwithstanding that there is
no more warrant of arrest against him and the criminal charge against
him had already been dismissed
Ruling: No
The petition against Labao, Jr. was for disqualification and not a pre ...
proclamation controversy. Labao, Jr. was not a fugitive from justice at
the time that he was a candidate for Mayor of Mamhusao, Capiz during
the May 13, 2013 Elections. The COMELEC anchored its finding that
Labao, Jr. was a fugitive from justice from the fact that he was missed
at the hospital when the warrant for his arrest was being served. No
other substantial evidence was presented to prove that Labao, Jr, tried
to hide from the authorities or that he left Mambusao, Capiz to avoid
being arrested and prosecuted.
The Court finds that the pieces of evidence on record do not
sufficiently establish Labao, Jr.' s intention to evade being prosecuted
for a criminal charge that will warrant a sweeping conclusion that
Labao, Jr., at the time, was evading prosecution so as to disqualify him
as a fugitive from justice from running for public office.
Abella vs Comelec
GR No. 100710
September 3, 1991
(201 SCRA 253)
Facts
Adelina Larrazabal obtained the highest number of votes in the local
elections of February 1, 1988 and was proclaimed as the duly elected
governor the province of Leyte but was later declared by the COMELEC
"... to lack both residence and registration qualifications for the
position of Governor of Leyte as provided by Art. X, Section 12,
Philippine Constitution in relation to Title II,
Chapter I, Sec. 42, B.P. Blg. 137 and Sec. 89, R.A. No. 179 and is
hereby disqualified as such Governor”. Benjamin Abella, the who
obtained the second highest number of votes for the position of
governor was not allowed by the COMELEC to be proclaimed as
governor after the disqualification of Larrazabal.
Issues:
a) Does the prohibition against the 'city's registered voters' electing the
provincial officials necessarily mean, a prohibition of the registered
voters to be elected as provincial officials?
b) Can Abella as the one who obtained the second highest number of
votes for the position of governor be proclaimed as governor?
Held
a) Yes. Sec. 89, R.A. No. 179 connotes two prohibitions — one, from
running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective
official.
b) No. While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to
deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was
filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the
local elections, Larrazabal was considered as a bonafide candidate.
The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she
was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were
counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect
is that Abella lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.
What matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position
who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is
disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time
of the election as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes for the same position cannot assume
the vacated position.
*During the pendency of the case, a TRO was issued ordering
incumbent Vice-Governor of Leyte Hon. Leopoldo E. Petilla to desist
from assuming the office of the Governor and from discharging the
duties and functions since he took his oath as Provincial
Governor of Leyte and assumed the governorship, but this TRO was
subsequently lifted.
CENIZA, et al. vs. COMELEC, COA, and NATIONAL TREASURER
95 SCRA 763
FACTS:
Pursuant to Batas Blg. 51 enacted by the Interim Batasang Pambasa
on Dec. 22, 1979, COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which
effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by
their charter), highly urbanized cities (those earning above P40M), and
component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in
provincial elections. The City of Cebu is classified as a highly urbanized
city since it has an income of P51, 603,147.64, thus its voters cannot
take part in the election of provincial elections of the province of Cebu.
On the other hand, the City of Mandaue is classified as a component
city but its registered voters cannot vote for the provincial elective
officials because it’s Charter expressly so provides. Since Cebu and
Mandaue City were added to a list by COMELEC in Resolution No. 1421
as two of the cities not entitled to participate in the election of
provincial officials, Ceniza et al., in behalf of the other members of D-
O-E-R-S (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed), a civic and
non-partisan group, filed a suit as taxpayers and registered voters of
such cities assailing BP. 51 which uses the annual income of a given
city as the basis for classification of whether or not a particular city is a
highly urbanized city whose voters may not participate in the election
of provincial officials of the province where the city is geographically
located; and Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 as well as Republic Act No.
5519 (Charter of Mandaue City) which went into effect without the
benefit of ratification by the residents of Mandaue in a plebiscite or
referendum.
The petitioners further contend that:
1. section 3 of Batas Blg. 885, insofar as it classifies cities
including Cebu city as highly urbanized as the only basis for
not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials
is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such
classification is not based on substantial distinctions
germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides
119
 for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and
therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a
denial of equal protection;
2. the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of
the law since the voters in other component cities are
allowed to vote for provincial officials;
3. political and gerrymandering motives were behind the
passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of
Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is
politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick
and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province,
234,582 are from Cebu City and 44,358 come from Mandaue
City, so that 278,940 electors, or close to one-third (1/3) of
the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for
the provincial officials of the province of Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause.
RULING: No.
The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of
local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, it is stated that "The state shall guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio, to ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities." Art. XI, Section
4(1) of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities outside the
supervisory power of the province where they are geographically
located. This is as it should be because of the complex and varied
problems in a highly urbanized city due to a bigger population and
greater economic activity which require greater autonomy. Corollary to
independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to
participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of
elective provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased
to exercise any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component
cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon
substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or
not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively
independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show
whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to
warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically
situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the
provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the
voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.
As to petitioners’ second contention, the Supreme Court found that the
practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial
officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another
component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates
neither the Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage.
As to petitioners’ third contention, the Court has ruled that such
charge has no factual and legal basis. "Gerrymandering" is a term
employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so
contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power.
As to the argument that the Charter of Mandaue went into effect
without the benefit of ratification by the residents of Mandaue in a
plebiscite or referendum, the Court held that the Constitutional
requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration
of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be
subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that
came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in
character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of
Mandaue which came into existence on June 21, 1969.
Datu Michael Abas Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
GR No. 196271
October 18, 2011
On June 30, 2011, RA 10153,(An Act Providing for the Synchronization
of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes)
was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August
2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years
thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local
elections. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint
officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the
Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153
already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146
and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this
Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the
organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the
ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140
further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No.
9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd
Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should
have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations
for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No.
10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May
2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court,
the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUE:
Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections
including the ARMM elections?
HELD:
Yes, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII)
of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The
Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators
of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local
elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the
following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections,
should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a
“local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution
mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM
elections.
SC dismissed the petitions and upheld the constitutionality of RA
10153 in toto.
Borja v. COMELEC
GR No. 133495
September 3, 1998
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Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18,
1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he
became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent,
Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for
two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate
for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco
would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June
30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The
Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but
the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible
to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as
mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to
have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term
limit
Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again
as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office
of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by
operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only
continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased
mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of
the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his
service in that office should not be counted in the application of any
term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not
only to prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to
enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the
historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned
with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with
preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term
limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that
the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider
Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to
run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but
also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they
wish to govern them.
Lonzanida vs COMELEC
GR No. 135150
July 28, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive
terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May
1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed
office and discharged the duties thereof. On February 27, 1998, or
about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated
the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it
issued. Juan Alvez, Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the
remainder of the term.
In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of
candidacy. His opponent filed a petition for disqualification on the
ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in
the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed
winner. The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution
maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive
terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as
service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for
local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor
of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections.
The private respondent maintained that the petitioner’s assumption of
office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because
he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March
1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s assumption of office from May 1995 to
March 1, 1998 is considered full term of office for the purpose of
three-term rule
Held:
This Court held that two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post
and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken
to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are
absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly
elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and
revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final
judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null
and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a
proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all[5]
and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength
of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome
of the election protest.[6] Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998
because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office
as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by
the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the
May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995
to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term. The respondents contention that the petitioner
should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998
because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis
to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of
the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under
scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the
framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-
term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term
does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length
of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a
few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
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severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and
thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did
not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from
May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of
computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC
finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral
elections should therefore be set aside.
Adormeo vs. COMELEC
GR No. 147927
February 4, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner (Raymundo Adormeo) and private respondent incumbent
Mayor (Ramon Talaga, Jr.) were the only candidates who filed their
certificate of candidacy (COC) for mayor of Lucena City in the May
2001 elections.
Private respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where he served
the full term. Again, he was re-elected in May 1995, where he again
served the full term. In the recall election of May 2000, he again won
and served only the unexpired term of Bernard Tagarao after having
lost to the latter in the 1998 election.
Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or disqualification of the
respondent on the ground that the latter was elected and had served
as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms contending that serving the
unexpired term of office is considered as one (1) term.
Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena
is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and
during Tagarao’s incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had
not been a mayor for 3 consecutive terms.
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that “the term of
office of elective officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for
more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.”
Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that “no
local elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent had already served three (3)
consecutive terms as mayor of Lucena City, thereby disqualifying him
to run in the May 14, 2001 elections
RULING: NO.
Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly
2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his term as mayor
was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a
violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as voluntary
renunciation for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said:
“The second sentence of the constitutional provision under
scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to
bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect
the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation
of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.”
Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3-consecutive
term limit.
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates vs Comelec
GR No. 154512, 154683, 155083-84
November 12, 2002
440 PHIL 106
FACTS:
Out of the 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of
Puerto Princesa, 312 convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall
Assembly (PRA) to initiate the recall of then Puerto Princesa Mayor
Victorino Dennis Socrates. The PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02,
which declared their loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his
recall. Thereafter, the COMELEC scheduled the campaign period and
the recall election. Mr. Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of
candidacy and eventually won the recall election
Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were
consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the
recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the
latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having
been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3)
consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the
instant recall election for the same post.
ISSUE:
Is Hagedorn qualified to run as mayor despite serving three
consecutive full terms immediately prior to recall election.
RULING:
Yes.Hagedorn is still qualified to run as mayor. The three-term limit
rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states:
“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.”
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which
provides:
“Section 43.Term of Office. – (a) x xx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.”
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only
consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The
second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length
of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek
immediate re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers
to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the
third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election,
is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-
122
election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the
Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does
not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the
re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive
term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-
election after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking
immediate re-election to run in any other subsequent election involving
the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a
consecutive fourth term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on
September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third
consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-
election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred
to the regular elections in 2001.
Latasa v. COMELEC
GR No. 154829
December 10, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos,
Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In February
2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001
elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise
disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time
for the position of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed
before the COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's candidacy since the
latter had already been elected and served for three consecutive
terms. Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a
certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will be the first
time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy.
However, his motion for reconsideration was not acted upon by the
Comelec en banc before election day and he was proclaimed winner.
Only after the proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution
that declared him disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City,
and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be counted.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a
municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality
separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should not be construed as
vying for the same local government post.
Issue:
Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of
mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served
for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
Ruling: No
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed
freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the
Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of
choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in
for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that
the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to
the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and
distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however,
that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision,
the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a
different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the
same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the
municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are
the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their
municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to
the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the
same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city
mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal
mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when
they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then
be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years.
This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if
not abhorred by it.
Ong vs. Alegre and COMELEC
GR No. 163295
January 23, 2006
FACTS:
Francis Ong was the mayor of the Municipality of San Vicente from
1995-1998. Francis was again proclaimed winner by COMELEC in the
1998 mayoralty election. Alegre filed an election protest but the
decision declaring Alegre as the duly elected mayor in the 1998
mayoralty contest came out only when Francis had fully served the
1998-2001 mayoralty term and has started to serve the 2001-2004
term as mayor.
In the 2004 elections, Francis and Alegre filed COC for mayor of the
same municipality. Upon Alegre’s Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due
Course and Cancel COC,COMELEC declaredFrancisdisqualified to run
for mayor and his name was ordered deleted from the official list of
candidates.This was predicated on the 3-consecutive term rule, Francis
having assumed as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for 3
consecutive full terms in 1995-2008, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004.
Rommel Ong filed his own COC for the position of mayor, as substitute
candidate for his brother Francis.However, COMELEC denied due
course to Rommel’s COC.
ISSUES:
1. Should Francis’s assumption of office as mayor for the term 1998-
2001 be considered as full service for the purpose of the 3-term limit
rule?
2. Was COMELEC’s action to deny due course to Rommel’s COC as
substitute for Francis proper?
RULING:
1. YES.
The 3-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in both the
Constitution and the LGC. For it to apply, the official should (1) be
elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same post and (2) and have
fully served 3 consecutive terms.These disqualifying requisites are
present, barring Francis from running for mayor in 2004.
While the RTC ruled that Alegre was the legally elected mayor in the
1998 mayoralty elections, this was without practical and legal use and
value having been promulgated after the term of the contested office
has expired. The contention that Francis was only a presumptive
123
winner in said election did not make him less than a duly elected
mayor. His proclamation by the MBC as the duly elected mayor in the
1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the
term is considered as service for a full term. There was no interruption
of the continuity of service as Francis was never unseated during the
term in question. A contrary view would be an outright injustice and
inequality as it rewards a legally disqualified and repudiated loser with
a crown of victory.
2. YES. An existing COMELEC policy provides for the non-inclusion of
the name of substitute candidates in the certified list of candidates
pending approval of the substitution. Moreover, a candidate whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course
cannot be substituted. A person with a cancelled certificate is no
candidate at all.
Atty. Rivera v COMELEC
GR No. 167591
May 9, 2007
Facts:
There are 2 cases involving same facts and issues. (1) A petition for
cancellation filed by Atty. Rivera and Normandick De Guzman; (2) a
petition for quo warranto by Antony dee, a Mayoralty candidate of
Pampanga. These were filed against Mario “Boking” Morales, running
also for mayor in Mabalacat, Pampanga, on the ground that he was
elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of
the place thus ineligible to run for another term or fourth term.
Morales admitted that he was electedmayor of Mabalacat for the term
commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (firstterm) and July 1, 2001
to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the secondterm from July
1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or asa "de
facto officer" because (1) he was not validly elected since his
proclamation as mayor was declared void by the RTC which decision
became final and executory on August 6, 2001, and (2) he was
preventively suspended by the suspended by the Ombudsman in an
anti-graft case from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999
COMELEC En Banc held that since the Decision in EPC No.98-131 of
the RTC, Branch 57, Angeles City declared respondent
Morales'proclamation void, his discharge of the duties in the Office of
the Mayor inMabalacat is that of a de facto officer or a de facto mayor.
Therefore, hiscontinuous service for three consecutive terms has been
severed.
Hence, filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Morales’ assumption, from July 1, 1995 to June
30, 2001 (2nd term), may be considered as one full term service in
the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.
(2) Whether the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who will serve the
remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term.
Ruling:
1. YES. For the three-term limit for elective local government
officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3)
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2)
that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998
to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor
until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest
case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor.
To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of
Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In
just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of
Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.
Morales maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001)
only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer."
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose
defeated when an official serves in the same position for three
consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer,
he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office
which enables him "to stay on indefinitely"
2. The vice-mayor shall server the remaining duration of term.
Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as mayorof
Mabalacat, the instant petition for quo warranto has become
moot.
In Labo v. Comelec, 8 this Court has ruled that a second place
candidate cannotbe proclaimed as a substitute winner. The rule,
therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majorityvotes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highestnumber of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidatecannot be deemed elected to the office.
As a consequence of petitioner's ineligibility, a permanent
vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be
filled by the vice mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local
Government Code
Dizon vs. Comelec and Morales
GR No. 182088
January 30, 2009
FACTS:
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga filed a case with
the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of
Mabalacat because under the LGC, no local elective official is allowed
to serve for more than 3 consecutive terms for the same position.
Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001
and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed
his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and
same municipality.
Morales asserts that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor
because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections.
He avers that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC
declaring Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998
elections. Morales also alleges that his term should be reckoned from
2001 or when he was proclaimed as Mayor of Mabalacat. Respondent
further asserts that his election in 2004 is only for his second term.
Hence, the three term rule provided under the LGC is not applicable to
him.
According to COMELEC, Respondent was elected mayor of Mabalacat
in 1995, 1998, and 2001. When he ran in 2004, the Supreme Court
ruled in May 2007 (3 years later) that respondent has violated the
three-term limit and thus was not considered a candidate in the 2004
elections. The vice-mayor assumed office as mayor from May 2007-
June 2007. Hence, his failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap
and allows him to run again for the same position in the 2007
elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Morales, in running for mayor in the 2007 elections,
has violated the three-term limit rule
HELD:
No. The petition has no merit.
Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office.
However, according to the SC, it unseated Morales in its May 2007
decision by canceling his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December
2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in
the May 2004 elections.
We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat
for the following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998; 1 July 1998 to
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30 June 2001; 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004; and 1 July 2004 to 16
May 2007.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the
LGC state that the term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of
the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly
elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term and did not hold the position of
mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to
have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Thus, the period
from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap. As a result, the
present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Bolos vs Comelec
GR No. 184082
March 17, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Nicasio Bolos, Jr. was elected for three terms as Punong
Barangay of Brgy. Biking, Dauis Bohol. Durigng his last term, he ran as
Sanguniang Bayan Member and subsequently left his post as Punong
Barangay to serve his full term asSanguninag Bayan until 2007.
In 2007, Bolos ran for Punong Barangay and Respondent Rey Angeles
Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay filed a petition in the
COMELEC for the disqualification alleging Bolos is
no longer allowed to run for the same position in accordance with
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No.
7160 as he has served three terms.
Bolos argued that he has not violated the three-term limit as his
election and assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member was
by operation of law hence, it must be considered as an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of his last term of service.
Issue:
Is Bolos disqualified to run on the ground of violation of the three-term
limit rule?
Ruling:
Yes. Bolos is disqualified as he violated the three-term limit rule.
Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides that barangay
officials are covered by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c) thereof
states that the term of office of barangay officials shall be five (5)
years.
The rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the
Local Government Code, has two parts:
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only
consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The
second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length
of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms.
The Court held that two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Petitioner clearly satisfies the first condition. As to the second
condition, there is a voluntary renunciation as he relinquished his office
as Punong Barangay and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan
member thus he is deemed to have fully served three consecutive
terms.
Aldovino v. Comelec
GR No. 184836
December 23, 2009
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an
interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit
rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?
Facts:
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of
Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-
2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or
during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then
faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan's
suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his
office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller,
and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due
course to Asilo's certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground
that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his
candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule
under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA
7160.
Issues:
1. Is the preventive suspension of an elected local official an
interruption of the three-term limit rule; and
2. Is the preventive suspension considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43 (b) of RA 7160?
Ruling:
Nature of Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension — whether under the Local Government Code,
17 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, or the Ombudsman Act —
is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official
who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the
evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for
eventual guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code
"when the evidence of guilt is strong and given the gravity of the
offense, there is a possibility that the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records and other evidence." Under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information (that
requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in court, while
under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of the
Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is
barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive
salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his
office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an
eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under
closely-controlled conditions and gives a premium to the protection of
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the service rather than to the interests of the individual office holder.
Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary
prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the official's office; the
official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the
preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in
the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public
official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to
Asilo.
1. Preventive Suspension and the Intent of the Three-Term
Limit Rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that
preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that
allows an elective official's stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because
the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred
from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official's
continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the
lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth
and prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a
constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary
inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of
term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many
reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary — some of them personal and
some of them by operation of law — that may temporarily prevent an
elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the
way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness,
inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as
a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office
holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time without
forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different because it
disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting
such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine
effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least
the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many
modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted in the
course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the
enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly
see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.
2. Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does
not involve a voluntary act on the part of the suspended official,
except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed
the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this
perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of
voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it
contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely
involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an
elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is — by
its very nature — the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is
involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of
service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that
they are, by nature, different and non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the
more important consideration of how they affect the three-term limit
rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total
incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an
effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode
of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective
interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid
the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall
disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term.
Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake
than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or
loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily
fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a
preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing
preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve
as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that
the Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.
Mendoza vs Familara
GR No. 191017
November 15, 2011
FACTS:
Mendoza, a candidate for Barangay Captain, questioned the retroactive
application of the three-consecutive term limit imposed
on barangay elective officials beginning from the
1994 barangay elections
ISSUE:
Is the retroactive application constitutional?
HELD:
The law is CONSTITUTIONAL.
It is settled in the case of COMELEC vs Cruz, no retroactive application
was made because the three-term limit has been there all along
as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the
1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the
[Local Government Code] and can still be found in the current
law.
Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials are provisions that are intended
to apply to all local elective officials, unless the contrary is clearly
provided. A contrary application is provided with respect to the length
of the term of office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local
elective officials, it does not apply to barangay officials whose length of
term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear
case of an exception to a general rule, the three-term limit under
Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all local
elective officials who must perforce include barangay officials.
This leads to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been there
all along and does not simply retroact the application of the three-term
limit to the barangay elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated
the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming up with
the challenged proviso.
Abundo, Sr. v. COMELEC
GR No. 201716
January 8, 2013
Facts:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004,
2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the
position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001
and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning
mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms
as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal
board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres
(Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of
mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo
was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9,
2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a
period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres
again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of
candidacy3 for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest,
Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run
predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010,
the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding for Abundo,
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who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes and was accordingly
proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.
The RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor and
the COMELEC has resolved the case in the same wise. By virtue of
such, It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was
dislodged from his post as incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
Issue:
Is Abundo eligible to run and be elected as the rightful mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes?
Ruling: Yes.
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s
three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during
the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was
veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after
due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful
choice of the electorate.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office
pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions,
the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate
the "monopolization of political power" and prevent elected officials
from breeding "proprietary interest in their position" but also to
"enhance the people’s freedom of choice." In the words of Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, "while people should be protected from the evils
that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be taken that
their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed."
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and
declares that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres,
was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which
effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term
limit rule.
It bears to stress that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term
starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor.
Otherwise how explain his victory in his election protest against Torres
and his consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly,
the first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based
on the three-term limit that the official has been elected is satisfied.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo
had served for "three consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically
understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately before the
2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course
the question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary
interruption during the three three-year periods, resulting in the
disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, means, in a legal
sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that
an officer may hold an office." It also means the "time during which
the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another." It is the period of time during which a duly elected official
has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or
from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim,
even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a
matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the
functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that
period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume
the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed
election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and
exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following
the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May
2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected
officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served
the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually
served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s
opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an
involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An
involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the
disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term threshold.
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the
concepts of interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of
service. The word interruption means temporary cessation,
intermission or suspension. To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or
prevent. When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of
interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of
the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short
the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the
elective office. On the other hand, the word "renunciation" connotes
the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to
give up, abandon, decline or resign. Voluntary renunciation of the
office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or
abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the term
the concerned elected official is entitled to.
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to
the office. On the contrary, he actively sought entitlement to the office
when he lodged the election protest case. And respondent-appellant’s
victory in the said case is a final confirmation that he was validly
elected for the mayoralty post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007.
Note:
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues
affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary
interruption, viz:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the
official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on
succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of
the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision
that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit
(Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior
to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said
position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary
severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and
who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth
term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the
continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim,
i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private
citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a
municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the
incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the
elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain
unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from
exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position
and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an
election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from
serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of
office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The
break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for
the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of
time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the
continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
127

6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision
becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office,
then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption
since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of
term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the
expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
Sambarani v. COMELEC and Maulay
GR No. 160427
September 15, 2004
FACTS:
In the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections, Sambarani, Miraato, Abubacar, Mascara and
Dayondong ran for re-election as punong barangay in their respective
barangays, all in Tamparan, Lanao del Sur.
Due to a failure of elections in eleven barangays in Lanao del Sur, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5479 setting special elections on 13
August 2002 in the affected barangays in Lanao del Sur including the
five barangays. On 14 August 2002, Acting Election Officer Esmael
Maulay issued a certification that there were no special elections held
on 13 August 2002.
Consequently, Sambarani, Miraato, Abubacar, Mascara and Dayondong
(joint-petitioners) filed a Joint Petition seeking to declare a failure of
elections in the five barangays and the holding of another special
election. The Joint Petition attributed the failure of the special
elections to EO Maulays non-compliance with COMELEC Commissioner
Sadains’ directive. Commissioner Sadain had directed EO Maulay to use
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 2001
computerized Voters List and the Voters Registration Records of the
Provincial Election Officer during the December 2001 registration of
new voters.
Since EO Maulay failed to file a written explanation, COMELEC moved
for the resolution of the case. It directed the DILG to appoint Brgy
Captains and Brgy Kagawads in the five barangays pursuant to LGC.
Petitioners filed the instant petition to hold another special election
which the COMELEC subsequently denied on the ground that the 30-
day period had already lapsed.
Petitioners argue that as the incumbent elective punong barangays,
they should remain in office in a hold-over-capacity until their
successors have been elected and qualified pursuant to LGC.
ISSUE:
May the DILG, in the interim, appoint the Brgy and SK officials?
HELD:
No, the DILG cannot appoint pending the election of new officials.
RA 9164 is now the law that fixes the date of barangay and SK
elections, prescribes the term of office of barangay and SK officials,
and provides for the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK
elections.
As the law now stands, the language of Section 5 of RA 9164 is clear.
Since there was a failure of elections in the 15 July 2002 regular
elections and in the 13 August 2002 special elections, petitioners can
legally remain in office as barangay chairmen of their respective
barangays in a hold-over capacity. They shall continue to discharge
their powers and duties as punong barangay, and enjoy the rights and
privileges pertaining to the office.
True, Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code limits the term of
elective barangay officials to three years. However, Section 5 of RA
9164 explicitly provides that incumbent barangay officials may
continue in office in a hold over capacity until their successors are
elected and qualified.
Section 5 of RA 9164 reiterates Section 4 of RA 6679 which provides
that: All incumbent barangay officials xxx shall remain in office unless
sooner removed or suspended for cause xxx until their successors shall
have been elected and qualified. Section 8 of the same RA 6679 also
states that incumbent elective barangay officials running for the same
office shall continue to hold office until their successors shall have
been elected and qualified.
The application of the hold-over principle preserves continuity in the
transaction of official business and prevents a hiatus in government
pending the assumption of a successor into office. As held in Topacio
Nueno v. Angeles, cases of extreme necessity justify the application of
the hold-over principle.
Victoria vs Comelec
229 SCRA 269
January 10, 1994
FACTS:
Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of
Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers
and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-
governor. The Comelec certified Jesus James Calisin of District 1 as
first ranking member with Juan Victoria of District 2 as second ranking
member based on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian
members in relation to the number of registered voters in the district.
Pursuant to the Comelec resolution, DILG Secretary
Alunan designated Calisin as acting Vice-Governor.
Victoria claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not
only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total
number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the
district who actually voted therein. He further argues that a district
may have a large number of registered voters but only a few actually
voted, in which case the winning candidate would register a low
percentage of the number of votes obtained. Conversely, a district may
have a smaller number of registered voters but may have a big voters'
turn-out, in which case the winning candidate would get a higher
percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, Victoria would come out
to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member.
ISSUE:
How shall the ranking in the Sanggunian be determined for purposes
of succession?
RULING:
Section 44 of the Local Government Code provides that if a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the vice-governor, the highest ranking
Sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking Sanggunian member, shall become vice-governor. "For
purposes of succession, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined
on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each
winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each
district in the immediately preceding local election."
The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by
each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in
each district. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely
apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent
of the legislature apart from the words.
Victoria's contention must very well be addressed to the legislative
branch and not to the Court which has no power to change the law.
Recabo vs Comelec
GR No. 134293
June 21, 1999
FACTS:
On March 27, 1998, petitioner Francisco R. Reyes, Jr., filed his
certificate of candidacy (as official candidate)for vice-mayor of the
municipality of Mainit, Surigao Del Norte of the political party LAKAS
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NUCD-UMDP. His nomination by said political party is evidence by the
certificate of nomination and acceptance dated March 27, 1998 signed
by Fidel V. Ramos and Jose de Venecia, National Chairman and
Secretary General, respectively, of said political party. However, on
April 2, 1998, another person, respondent Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr.,
claiming to be the official candidate of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP as vice-
mayor of the municipality of Mainit, Surigao del Norte also filed his
certificate of candidacy. Petitioner submitted to this Commission a
copy of the certificate of nomination and acceptance in favor of Kaiser
B. Recabo, Jr., dated March 30, 1998 signed only by one
representative of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP. Francisco T. Matugas. The
space of the other representative Robert Barbers is blank.
Petitioner’s Arguments: That the respondent KAISER B. RECABO,
JR., is a SUBSTITUTE candidate for the office of VICE-MAYOR of the
Municipality of Mainit, Surigao del Norte. He filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on April 02, 1998. He claims to be a substitute of MRS.
CANDELARIA B. RECABO who filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of VICE-MAYOR of Mainit, Surigao del Norte on March 25,
1998.Petitioner submits the theory that since the certificate of
nomination and acceptance in favor of Candelaria B. Recabo is not
signed by Robert Barbers, there is no valid nomination by LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP in favor of Candelaria Recabo. Therefore, Candelaria B.
Recabo not having been validly nominated, should be deemed an
independent candidate only. And since Candelaria B. Recabo is an
independent candidate, she cannot be validly substituted because
under Sec. 11 of Comelec Res. No. 2977 promulgated on January 15,
1998, "no substitution shall be allowed for an independent candidate."
Private Respondent’s Arguments: that the certificate of
nomination and acceptance signed only by representative Matugas
(and without the joint signature of representative Barbers)
substantially complied with the party requirements and are, therefore,
valid as far as the party is concerned. Respondent maintains that his
nomination is valid. Respondent further argues that the Commission
has no jurisdiction to rule on who between petitioner and respondent
has a valid certificate of candidacy.Respondent likewise claims that the
certificate of nomination in favor petitioner is falsified because it was
notarized in Mainit, Surigao del Norte at a time when the signatories
therein (Fidel Ramos and Jose de Venecia, Jr.,) were not in said place.
Respondent however has not presented any evidence to this effect.
Based on the foregoing, the respondent Commission cancelled the
certificate of candidacy of petitioner Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr. Petitioner
Recabo, Jr., filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplement
thereto. Francisco R. Reyes, Jr. filed his opposition. On July 1, 1998,
the Commission en banc issued a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s certificate of nomination by LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP is valid?
2. Whether or not a certificate of votes is sufficient to establish the
results of the election.
3. Should Reyes be proclaimed winner and assume the position of
vice-mayor being the second highest winning candidate?
4. How then the vacancy should be filled up?
RULING:
1. NO. COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 provides under Section 5
thereof: “The certificate of nomination by registered political
parties of their official candidates shall be filed with the
certificates of candidacy not later than the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy as specified in Section 4 hereof, duly
signed and attested under oath by the party president, chairman,
secretary-general or any other party officer duly authorized in
writing to do so.” Pursuant to said resolution, the political party of
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP issued an `Authorization’ designating two (2)
Party officers to nominate, sign, attest under oath and issue the
Official Certificates of Nomination, namely, Francisco T. Matugas
and Robert Ace S. Barbers. Consistent with the foregoing, the
certificate of nomination and acceptance, as pointed out by the
Comelec, requires the joint signing of the two party officers.
The certificate of nomination of the petitioner as well as his
mother did not comply with the requirements of being official
candidates of LAKAS Party. The certificate of nomination was
invalid because it was signed only by one authorized party officer
as compared to Reyes’ which was signed by the National
Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, of said political
party.
Moreover, the chronology of events would still call for the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy to curb the evil
that the Comelec sought to abate pursuant to its mandate to hold
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. As the
respondent Commission stated, “to allow respondent to run under
the circumstances adverted to herein would put the election
process in mockery and disrepute for we would in effect be
allowing an anomalous situation where a single political party
may field-in multiple candidates for a single election position.” It
will be recalled that the mother of herein petitioner filed her
certificate of candidacy on March 25, 1998 and later withdrew the
same on March 31, 1998. In the meantime, Reyes, Jr. filed his
certificate of candidacy on March 27, 1998. Thereafter, Recabo,
Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy on April 2, 1998, in
substitution of his mother who had withdrawn earlier.
Assuming all three candidates were fielded-in by the same
political party, at the time petitioner Recabo, Jr. filed his
certificate of candidacy there was no more void to fill in as
respondent Reyes, Jr. had already filed his certificate of candidacy
as official candidate of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP. Verily, there was no
more vacancy to be substituted for. Disunity and discord
amongst members of a political party should not be allowed to
create a mockery of our electoral process, which envisions one
candidate from a political party for each position.
2. To put matters in the proper perspective, we shall resolve the
second issue first that the “electorate has spoken loud and clear
in favor of petitioner by giving him a resounding majority of 1,102
votes or 12% of the votes cast for both of them”. Petitioner, in
effect, argues that the “popular will as clearly expressed in votes
cast and counted should prevail, such that the election of a
candidate cannot be annulled because of formal defects in his
certificate” Recabo submitted a ‘Certified List of Candidates with
their Votes Obtained’ and an undated `Certified List of Winning
Candidates’ both signed by the Acting Election Officer and
Election Officer-OIC, respectively.
In Garay vs. Commission on Elections, we had occasion to rule
that: “xxx. According to Section 17, a certificate of votes can
only be “evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or
any other anomaly committed in the election returns concerned,
when duly authenticated x xx.” A certificate of votes does not
constitute sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of
the election; only election returns are.”
In like manner, neither is the certified list of winning candidates
sufficient evidence of the real results of the election. Moreover,
the certificate of votes submitted does not conform with Section
16 of R.A. 6646. It does not state the number of votes obtained
in words; it does not state the number of the precinct, the total
number of voters who voted in the precinct and the time issued.
Most importantly, it was merely certified true and correct by a
certain Lydia P. Mahinay as acting election officer. As
aforequoted, Section 16 of R.A. 6646 requires that the certificate
of votes be signed and thumbmarked by each member of the
board of election inspectors. Thus, the doctrine that a mere
technicality cannot be used to frustrate the people’s will finds no
application in the case at bar considering that the results of the
election have not been duly established.
3. No. A certificate of votes is not sufficient to establish the true and
genuine results of the election. A certificate of canvass issued on
the basis of the election returns is required to proclaim the
elected candidate. It is settled that the disqualification or non-
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 qualification of the winner in a vice mayoralty race does not
justify the proclamation of the defeated candidate who obtained
the second highest number of votes. To simplistically assume
that the second placer would have received the other votes would
be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The
second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of
voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We
are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances.
4. The vacancy due to the ineligibility of herein petitioner should be
filled up in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 which provides that the highest ranking sanggunian
member shall become the vice-mayor.
Fariñas v. Barba
GR No. 116763
April 19, 1996
Facts:
Domingo, who did not belong to any political party, was a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, IlocosNorte. During his term,
he resigned after going without leave to the US. To fill the vacancy
created by his resignation, the mayor, Barba, recommended to the
Governor of IlocosNorte, Fariñas, the appointment of Palafox. A similar
recommendation, contained in a resolution, for the appointment of
Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas to Mayor
Barba. The resolution was submitted to the SangguniangPanlalawigan
of IlocosNorte. The latter disapproved the same for the reason that the
authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are
lodged in the Governor. The SangguniangPanlalawigan recommended
to Governor Fariñas the appointment of Nacino.
On June 8, 1994, Gov. Fariñas appointed Nacino and swore him to
office. On the same day, Mayor Barba appointed Palafox to the same
position. The latter took his oath the day thereafter. Palafox and
Nacino filed with the RTC a petition for quo warranto and prohibition.
Issue:
In case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan caused by
the cessation from office of a member who does not belong to any
political party, who can appoint the replacement and in accordance
with what procedure?
Held:
The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is
the Governor upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang
concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas where the
vacancy occurs.
Section 45(c) of the LGC states, “In case the permanent vacancy is
caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong to any political
party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the
sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.”
The appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyonerecommended
to him by the Sanggunian concerned. The power of appointment is
adiscretionary power. On the other hand, neither is the appointing
power vested with solarge a discretion that he can disregard the
recommendation of the Sanggunianconcerned. Since the
recommendation takes the place of nomination by political party,
therecommendation must likewise be considered a condition sine qua
non for the validity ofthe appointment, by analogy to the provision of
Sec. 45(b).
Since neither Nacino nor Palfox was appointed in the manner indicated
by law, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas, IlocosNorte, which was vacated by member Domingo. For
while Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not
recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other
hand, Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was
the mayor and not the provincial governor whoappointed him.
Purto Navarro and Tamayo vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 141307
March 28, 2001
Facts:
In May 11, 1997 local elections, Calimlim and Aquino, both from Lakas
NUCD-KAMPI, were elected as mayor and vice-mayor, respectively.
However, on March 25, 1999, Mayor Calimlim died so a vacancy was
thus created in the Office of the Mayor by operation of law. Pursuant
to the LGC, then Vice-Mayor Aquino succeeded him. Accordingly,
Tamayo who belonged to the REFORMA-LM political party,the highest-
ranking member (the one who garnered the highest number of votes)
of the Sangguniang Bayan was elevated to the position of the Vice-
Mayor.
Since a vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang Bayan by the elevation
of Tamayo to the office of the Vice-Mayor, Governor Agbayani
appointed Navarro as Member of the Sangguniang Bayan who
belonged to the same political party as that of Tamayo.
Private respondents filed a civil case to nullify the appointment of
Navarro, arguing that it was the former vice-mayor Aquino, succeeding
to the position of the mayor, who created the permanent vacancy in
the Sanggunian Bayan because under the law he was also a member
of the Sanggunian. Thus, the appointee must come from Lakas NUCD-
KAMPI. On the other hand, petitioners contended that it was the
elevation of Tamayo to the office of Vice-Mayor which resulted in a
permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan. Hence, the
appointment extended by Gov. Agbayani to Navarro, who was a
member of and recommended by the REFORMA-LM, is valid.
Issue:
Is the appointment of Navarro as Member of the Sangguniang Bayan
proper?
Ruling: Yes.
Under Section 44 of LGC, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. Sec.
45 of LGC provides among others that “xxx only the nominee of the
political party under which the Sanggunian member concerned has
been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank
created the last vacancy in the Sangunian shall be appointed in the
manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the
political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the
vacancy xxx.”
With the elevation of Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the
position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that
should be filled up with someone who should belong to the political
party of Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM’s representation in the
Sanggunian would be diminished. The reason behind the right given to
a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent
vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party
representation as willed by the people in the election.
The “last vacancy” in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the
elevation of the member formerly occupying the next higher in rank
which in turn also had become vacant.
Damasen vs Tumamao
GR No. 173165
February 17, 2010
Facts:
A permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the Vice Mayor of San
Isidro, Isabella when incumbent Vice-Mayor NeliaTumamao died..
Pursuant to Sec. 44 of RA 7160, Ligaya Alonzo, the highest ranking
member of the Sangguniang Bayan was elevated to the position.
To fill the ensuing vacancy in the Sangguinang Bayan, Mayor Lim
recommended to Governor Padaca the appointment of Oscar
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Tumamao, also a member of LDP. Tumamao was appointed, took his
oath and attended sessions.
On May 2005, Atty. Lucky Damasen, became a member of LDP and
got hold of a letter of nomination to the Sanggunian Bayan from
provincial chairman of LDP Balauag addressed to Governor Padaca. He
was appointed to SB and took his oath. Damasen attended sessions
but he was not recognized.
He filed a petition for quo warranto with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction against Tumamao with the RTC, seeking to be declared the
rightful member of the SB.
As part of his defense, Tumamao presentedAtty. Ernest Soberano who
identified a letter dated June 14, 2005, signed by LDP Provincial
Chairman Balauag, which states that the latter was revoking her
nomination of Damasen, and that she was confirming Tumamao’s
nomination made by Mayor Lim. Later, Tumamao presented Provincial
Chairman Balauag who affirmed the contents of her letter revoking the
nomination of Damasen.
RTC ruled in favor of Damasen.
Tumamao appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA
held that Damasen was not entitled to assume the vacant position in
the Sangguniang Bayan.
Issue:
Who, between Damasen and Tumamao, is entitled to the contested
position?
Held:
Tumamao is entitled to the contested position.
It is undisputed that the law applicable to herein petition is Sec. 45 (b)
of RA 7160, which provides for the rule on succession in cases of
permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian. As can be gleaned from Sec.
45, the law provides for conditions for the rule of succession to apply:
First, the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of
the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. Second, the
appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate of Membership
from the highest official of the political party concerned. The reason
behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement
where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain
the party representation as willed by the people in the election.
Since the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian occurred because of
the elevation of LDP member Alonzo to vice-mayor, it follows that the
person to succeed her should also belong to the LDP so as to preserve
party representation. Thus, this Court cannot countenance Damasen’s
insistence in clinging to an appointment when he is in fact not a bona
fide member of the LDP. While the revocation of the nomination given
to Damasen came after the fact of his appointment, this Court cannot
rule in his favor, because the very first requirement of Sec. 45 (b) is
that the appointee must come from the political party as that of the
Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. To stress, Damasen is
not a bona fide member of the LDP.
In addition, appointing Damasen would not serve the will of the
electorate. He himself admits that he was previously a member of the
Lakas-CMD, and that he ran for the position of Mayor under the said
party on the May 2004 Elections. Likewise, he did not resign from the
said party when he joined the LDP, and even admitted that his joining
the LDP was not because of party ideals, but because he just wanted
to. How can the will of the electorate be best served, given the
foregoing admissions of Damasen? If this Court were to grant herein
petition, it would effectively diminish the party representation of the
LDP in the Sanggunian, as Damasen would still be considered a
member of the Lakas-CMD, not having resigned therefrom, a scenario
that defeats the purpose of the law, and that ultimately runs contrary
the ratio of Navarro.
What is damning to the cause of Damasen, is the letter of Demaree
J.B. Raval, the Deputy Secretary Counsel of the LDP, addressed to
Governor Padaca wherein it is categorically stated that Damasen is not
a bona fide member of the LDP.
This Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of the letter coming
from the LDP leadership. Quite clearly, from the tenor of the letter, it
appears that the membership of Damasen still had to be approved by
the LDP National Council. Thus, notwithstanding Damasen’s
procurement of a Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial
Chairman Balauag, to this Court’s mind, the same merely started the
process of his membership in the LDP, and it did not mean automatic
membership thereto. While it may be argued that Damasen was
already a member upon receipt of a Certificate of Membership from
LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, this Court cannot impose such view
on the LDP. If the LDP leadership says that the membership of
Damasen still had to be endorsed to the National Council for approval,
then this Court cannot question such requirement in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. It is well settled that the discretion of
accepting members to a political party is a right and a privilege, a
purely internal matter, which this Court cannot meddle in.
Jalosjos vs Comelec
GR No. 205033
June 18, 2013
Facts:
On November 16, 2001, petitioner Jalosjos was convicted by final
judgment of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts
of lasciviousness in People of the Philippines v. Jalosjos in G.R. Nos.
132875-76. He was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively,
which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code. On April
30, 2007, his sentence was commuted by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo to 16 years, 3months and 3 days. After serving the same, he
was issued a Certificate of Discharge from Prison on March 18,
2009.On April 12, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in
Zamboanga City. Because of his previous conviction, hisapplication was
denied, prompting him to file a petition for inclusion in the permanent
list of voters. Pending the resolution of his petition, he filed a CoC on
October 5, 2012, seeking to run as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the
May 13, 2013 elections. In his CoC, petitioner stated that he is a
registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.On October 18,
2012, the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusionon account of his
perpetual absolute disqualification which ineffect deprived him of the
right to vote in any election. Such denial was affirmed by the RTC of
Zamboanga City, Branch 14 inits October 31, 2012 Order, which is final
and executory under the Omnibus Election Code. Five (5) petitions
were lodged before the COMELEC’s first and second divisions seeking
the denial and/or cancellation of petitioner’s CoC due to his perpetual
absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter
registration requirement. The COMELEC En Banc relied on the Court’s
pronouncement in the consolidated cases of Dominador Jalosjos Jr. v.
COMELEC and Agapito Cardino v. COMELEC and in its Resolution No.
9613 motu propio denied due course and/or cancelled petitioner’s CoC.
Petitioner then filed this petition against COMELEC Resolution No.
9613.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification?
RULING:
In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification has the effect of
depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run for elective office.
To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is
based on the presumptive rule that one who is rendered infamous by
conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of moral
turpitude, is unfit to hold public office,30 as the same partakes of a
privilege which the State grants only to such classes of persons which
are most likely to exercise it for the common good.
Pertinently, it is observed that the import of Article 41 in relation to
Article 30 of the RPC is more direct and specific in nature – insofar as
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it deprives the candidate to run for elective office due to his conviction
– as compared to Section 40(a) of the LGC which broadly speaks of
offenses involving moral turpitude and those punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment without any consideration of certain
disqualifying effects to one’s right to suffrage. Accordingly, Section
40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law of general application
and therefore, must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions in line
with the principle of lex specialis derogat generali – general legislation
must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally
is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special
provisions are not applicable. In other words, where two statutes are
of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially
designed therefor should prevail.
In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant
to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30
of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As discussed,
Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal
provision – such as Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically
prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite
the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his commuted
prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him
to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is
previously convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or
reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon. In this case, the same accessory
penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation
or by any subsequent pardon and as such, petitioner’s disqualification
to run for elective office is deemed to subsist.
Further, it is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the
aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in
this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison term which is
imposed as its principal penalty. Instructive on this point is the Court’s
ruling in Lacuna v. Abes, where the court explained the meaning of the
term "perpetual" as applied to the penalty of disqualification to run for
public office:
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification
disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such
disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27,
paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of
Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty
of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to
vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as
distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts
during the term of the sentence. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Likewise, adopting the Lacuna ruling, the Court, in the more recent
cases of Aratea, Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino,held:
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to
be elected to or hold public office perpetually."
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect
immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The
effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of
the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence
or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall
not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
[perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction
becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the
convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant
upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to
run for any elective public office perpetually.
Chua vs. COMELEC
GR No. 216607
April 5, 2016
Facts:
On October 3, 2012, Arlene LlenaEmpaynado Chua filed her certificate
of candidacy for councilor for the fourth district of Manila during the
May 13, 2013 National and Local elections. After the conduct of
elections, Chua garnered the sixth highest number of votes. She was
proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers on May 15, 2013 as the sixth
councilor for the fourth district of Manila (there are only 6 seats
available).
However, when she was proclaimed,Emelda Frigate filed a petition to
declare as a nuisance candidate and to deny due course and/or cancel
Chua’s certificate of candidacy. Frigate was allegedly a registered voter
in the fourth district who proclaimed that Chua was unqualified to run
for councilor on two grounds: Chua was not a Filipino citizen and she
was a permanent resident of the United States in America.
Chua contended that she was a natural born filipino, born to Filipino
parents in Cabanatuan city, Nueva ecija. With respect to her residency,
she said that she had been residing in Sampaloc Manila since 2008 and
had more than compiled with the one year period required to run for
councilor.
On June 19, 2013, Bacani filed a motion to intervene with
manifestation and motion to annul proclamation. She alleged that she
also ran for councilor in the fourth district of Manila, and that after the
canvassing of votes, she ranked seventh among all the candidates,
next to Chua. She said that if Chua be disqualified, she should be
proclaimed councilor the following this court’s ruling in Maquiling v
COMELEC.
Bacani argued that Chua, being a dual citizen was unqualified to run
for councilor. Based on an order of the Bureau of Immigration, Chua
was allegedly naturalized as an American citizen on December 7, 1977.
She was issued an American passport.
As a consequence, the COMELEC annulled proclamation of respondent
Chua as councilor for the 4th district of Manila, and to direct the board
of canvassers of the city of Manila to convene and proclaim
intervenorBacani as the duly councilor of the fourth district of the City
of Manila.
Chua then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether the rule on succession under section 45 of the local
government applies to this case
Held:
The rule on succession under section 45 applies in this case.
Permanent Vacancies referred to in Section 45 are those arising “when
an elective official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office,
fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitates to discharge the functions of his
office.
In these situations, the vacancies were caused by those whose
certificates of candidacy were valid at the time of the filing, but
subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that
took place, or a legal impediment that took effect after the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner Arlene Chua is a dual citizen correctly disqualified from
running for the position of Councilor in the fourth district of Manila
during the 2013 National and Local elections. With her dual citizenship
existing prior to the filing to the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
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her certificate of candidacy was void ab innate. She was correctly
considered a non-candidate. All votes caster for her were stray, and
the person legally entitled to the position is private respondent Bacani,
the candidate with the next highest number of votes among the
eligible candidates.
People vs Bustamante
105 Phil. 64
Facts:
Defendant-appellant Bustamante was married to one Maria Perez on
August 9, 1954 before the Justice of the Peace of Binalonan,
Pangasinan. A little over a year later, he contracted a second marriage
with DemetriaTibayan, solemnized before Vice-Mayor Francisco Nato of
Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting as mayor of the said
municipality, while the first marriage was still subsisting. Defendant
dwelt with Demetria and her parents for about a month, after which
time he returned to Calasiao, Pangasinan to live with the first wife,
Maria Perez. In the course of her search for him, Demetria discovered
from the Binalonan municipal authorities the previous marriage of
defendant Bustamante. Hence, this accusation.
It appears that Enrique Aquino and Francisco Nato were the duly
elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of the municipality of
Mapandan, Pangasinan in the elections of 1951. On September 16,
1955, Aquino went on leave of absence for one month. In view of this,
the vice-mayor was designated by the mayor to take over the rein of
municipal government during his absence; and Nato was acting in this
capacity when he performed the second marriage of Bustamante with
DemetriaTibayan.
Apellant, relying upon Article 56 of the Civil Code contends that thre
could not have been a second marriage to speak of, as Nato was
merely acting as mayor when he celebrated the same, hence, without
autnority of law to do so.
Issue:
Did the Vice-Mayor have the authority to solemnize the second
marriage?
Held:
The vice-mayor of a municipality acting as Acting Mayor has the
authority to solemnize marriages, because if the vice-mayor assumes
the powers and duties of the office of the mayor, when proper, it is
immaterial whether it is because the latter is the Acting Mayor or
merely acting as mayor, for in both instances, he discharges all the
duties and wields the powers appurtenant to said office.
PART VIII. DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
Garcia v Mojica
GR No. 139043
September 10, 1992
Facts:
On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed
a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The
contract covers the period 1998-2001, which was to commence on
September 1998 upon F.E. Zuellig’s first delivery. Sometime in March
1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous
purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by
petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to
conduct an inquiry into the matter.
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry,
docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After investigation, he recommended
that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases
against petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent
Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this
recommendation.
Issues:
Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable
Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the
Local Government Code
Held:
1. The Supreme Court said, No. As previously held, “…a re-elected
local official may not be held administratively accountable for
misconduct committed during his prior term of office.” The rationale is
that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it
did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past
misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still re-elects him, then
such is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract
entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just 4 days
before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the
election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for
petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and
character.
Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an act done
during his previous term. While petitioner can no longer be held
administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, this
should not prejudice the filing of any case, other than administrative,
against petitioner. The ruling does not mean the total exoneration of
petitioner’s wrongdoing, if any, that might have been committed in
signing the subject contract. The ruling is now limited to the question
of his administrative liability therefore, and it is our considered view
that he may not.
2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the
Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question
are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only
uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the
Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day
suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong. The power to
preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also
to the Deputy Ombudsman.
Alejandro vs Office of the Ombudsman
GR No. 173121
April 3, 2013
Facts:
During an anti-water pilferage operation, the PNP-CIDG discovered
that MICO’s car-wash boys had been illegally getting water from an
MWSI fire hydrant. The PNP-CIDG arrested the car-wash boys and
confiscated the containers used in getting water. At this point, the
petitioner, Alfredo’s father and the Barangay Chairman or punong
barangay of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, Manila, interfered with
the PNP-CIDG’s operation by ordering several men to unload the
confiscated containers. This intervention caused further commotion
and created an opportunity for the apprehended car-wash boys to
escape. The Ombudsman then after its initial investigation, filed with
the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman an administrative
complaint against the petitioner for his blatant refusal to recognize a
joint legitimate police activity, and for his unwarranted intervention,
where he was found guilty and was ordered to be dismissed from
service.
Issue and Ruling:
1. WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES REQUIRES A REQUEST FOR
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN TO THE OMBUDSMAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF A
RULE 43 REVIEW?
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 Administrative Order No. 07 did not provide for another appeal
from the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman to the Ombudsman.
It simply requires that a motion for reconsideration or a petition
for certiorari may be filed in all other cases where the penalty
imposed is not one involving public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent
to one (1) month salary. This post-judgment remedy is merely an
opportunity for the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, to correct itself in certain cases. To our
mind, the petitioner has fully exhausted all administrative
remedies when he filed his motion for reconsideration on the
decision of the Deputy Ombudsman. There is no further need
to review the case at the administrative level since the
Deputy Ombudsman has already acted on the case and he
was acting for and in behalf of the Office of the
Ombudsman
2. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS
JURISDICTION OVER ELECTIVE OFFICIALS?
While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act and the Local
Government Code both provide for the procedure to discipline
elective officials, the seeming conflicts between the two laws
have been resolved in cases decided by this Court where it held
that the two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so
inconsistent x x x as to compel us to only uphold one and strike
down the other." The two laws may be reconciled by
understanding the primary jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction
of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or
omission of a public officer or employee who is under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In administrative cases
involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining
authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which
opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.In
this case, the petitioner is a Barangay Chairman, occupying a
position corresponding to salary grade 14.2Since the complaint
against the petitioner was initially filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the
exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction
is concurrent.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE OMBUDSMAN HAS THE POWER TO
ORDER THEIR DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE?
Section 15 of RA 6770 reveals the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to give the Office of the Ombudsman
full administrative disciplinary authority. These powers
unmistakably grant the Office of the Ombudsman the power to
directly impose administrative sanctions; its power is not merely
recommendatory. We held in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Apolonio29 that:It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the
lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman with
sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its
mandate as protector of the people against inept and corrupt
government officers and employees. The Office was granted the
power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of
Court. It was given disciplinary authority over all elective
and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the
exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and
the Judiciary). Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under
its authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants.
4. Whether or not Alejandro is liable for misconduct in the
performance of his duties?
YES. At the outset, we point out that the maintenance of peace
and order is a function of both the police and the Barangay
Chairman, but crime prevention is largely a police matter. At the
time when the police officers were hauling the confiscated
equipment, they were creating a commotion. As Barangay
Chairman, the petitioner was clearly in the performance of his
official duty when he interfered. Under Section 389(b)(3) of RA
7160, the law provides that a punong barangay must "maintain
public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the
city or municipal mayor and the sanggunian members in the
performance of their duties and functions."Yet, instead of
assisting the PNP-CIDG, he actually ordered several bystanders to
defy the PNP-CIDG’s whole operation. The petitioner’s act stirred
further commotion that unfortunately led to the escape of the
apprehended car-wash boys
While the petitioner has general charge of the affairs in the
barangay, the maintenance of peace and order is largely a police
matter, with police authority being predominant especially when
the police has began to act on an enforcement matter.Police
authority is superior to the punong barangay’s authority in a
situation where the maintenance of peace and order has
metamorphosed into crime prevention and the arrest of criminal
offenders.In this case, a criminal act was actually taking place
and the situation was already beyond the general maintenance of
peace and order. The police was, at that point, under the
obligation to prevent the commission of a crime and to effect the
arrest, as it actually did, of criminal offenders.From another
perspective, the peace and order function of the punong
barangay must also be related to his function of assisting local
executive officials (i.e., the city mayor), under Section 389(b),
Chapter III of the Local Government Code. Local executive
officials have the power to employ and deploy police for the
maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes and
the arrest of criminal offenders. Accordingly, in the maintenance
of peace and order, the petitioner is bound, at the very least, to
respect the PNP-CIDG’s authority even if he is not in the direct
position to give aid. By interfering with a legitimate police
operation, he effectively interfered with this hierarchy of
authority.
5. Whether or not there is justification to impose a higher penalty
against the petitioner?
Yes. His open interference in a legitimate police activity. and
defiance of the police's authority only show his clear i1itent to
violate the law; in fact, he reneged on his first obligation as the
grassroot official tasked at the first level with the enforcement of
the law. The photographs, taken together with the investigation
report of the Police Superintendent and the testimonies of the
witnesses, even lead to conclusions beyond interference and
defiance; the petitioner himself could have been involved in
corrupt activities, although we cannot make this conclusive
finding at this point. We make this observation though as his son
owns MICO whose car-wash boys were engaged in water
pilferage. What we can conclusively confirm is that the petitioner
violated the law by directly interfering with a legitimate police
activity where his own son appeared to be involved. This act
qualifies the misconduct as grave. Section 52(A)(3), Rule IV of
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service provides that the penalty for grave misconduct is
dismissal from the service.
Pablico vs Villapando
GR. No. 147870
July 31, 2002
Facts:
An administrative complaint against respondent Alejandro A.
Villapando, then Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of authority
and culpable violation of the Constitution.[3] Complainants alleged that
respondent, on behalf of the municipality, entered into a consultancy
agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate in
the May 1998 elections. They argue that the consultancy agreement
amounted to an appointment to a government position within the
prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Section 6, of the 1987
Constitution.
134

Issue:
May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on
appeal, validly impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring
elective local officials?
Ruling:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official
may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the
following grounds:
xxx x xx x xx
An elective local official may be removed from office on the
grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the
penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official
may be decreed only by a court of law.
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code, however, adds that (b) An elective local
official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in
paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60,
Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or
the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction
to the exclusion of the other. The disciplining authority referred to
pertains to the SangguniangPanlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the
Office of the President.
This grant to the disciplining authority of the power to remove elective
local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight
Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or
regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as
the Local Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not
clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which
operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective
local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence,
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the
disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective local
officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section
60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or
removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and
applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or
removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is
involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the
people through the exercise of their constitutional right of
suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or
partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining
authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to
remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping
the power to remove.
Bunye vs Escareal
GR No. 110216
September 10, 1993
Facts:
The petition seeks to annul the resolution promulgated on May 11,
1993 by the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspending them from office pending their trial for violation of Section
3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Actunder an information
alleging that:
accused, while in the performance of their official functions,
in conspiracy with one another and taking advantage of their official
positions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enact
Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 on August 1, 1988, and on the basis thereof,
forcibly took possession of the new Public Market in Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and thereafter took over the operation and
management of the aforesaid public market starting August 19, 1988,
despite the fact that, there was a valid and subsisting lease contract
executed on September 2, 1985 for a term of 25 years, between the
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila and the Kilusang Bayan sa
Paglilingkod and mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihan ng Muntinlupa,
Inc.,” which forcible take-over had caused undue injury to the
aforesaid Cooperative members, and gave the Municipal Government,
and in effect, the herein accused themselves, unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of their official functions.
On the motion of the Public Prosecutor, and over the opposition of the
accused, the Sandiganbayan issued on May 11, 1993 a resolution
suspending them pendente lite from public office pursuant to Section
13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of preventive suspension on the
petitioners is valid?
Held:
There is no merit in the petitioners' argument that because they have
repeatedly admitted that they had committed the acts constituting the
offense charged against them, there is no cause for apprehension that
they might tamper with the records in the offices under their control,
or intimidate prospective witnesses against them. The Solicitor General
correctly replied that it is not for the petitioners to say that their
admissions are all the evidence that the prosecution will need to hold
up its case against them. "The prosecution must be given the
opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions
which would ensure nonintervention and noninterference for ninety
(90) straight days from petitioners' camp.”
The fear of the petitioners that the municipal government of
Muntinlupa will be paralyzed for ninety (90) days when they
(petitioners) are preventively suspended, is remote. There will still
remain eight (8) councilors who can meet as the Sangguniang Bayan.
The President or his alter ego, the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, will surely know how to deal with the problem of filling
up the temporarily vacant positions of mayor, vice-mayor and six
councilors in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government
Code, R.A. No. 7160
Garcia vs Mojica
314 SCRA 207
September 10, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with
F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers
the period 1998-2001, which period was to commence on September
1998 when the first delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig.
Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged
anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract
signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, After
his investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded
to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other
city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation.
Respondent Allan Francisco S. Garciano, the graft investigating officer
to whom the case was raffled for investigation, recommended the
preventive suspension of petitioner and the others. Two days later the
affidavit-complaint against petitioner was filed. The following day the
Office of the Ombudsman issued the questioned preventive suspension
order. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order which
motion was denied.
Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the validity of the said
order. He pleads for immediate relief through the present petition
135
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUES:
I. What is the extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to conduct
administrative investigation?
II. Given the purpose of preventive suspension and the circumstances
of this case, did respondent Deputy Ombudsman commit a grave
abuse of discretion when he set the period of preventive suspension at
six months?
III. Assuming that the Ombudsman properly took cognizance of the
case, what law should apply to the investigation being conducted by
him, the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) or the Ombudsman Law
(R.A. 6770)? Was the procedure in the law properly observed?
IV. What is the effect of the reelection of petitioner on the
investigation of acts done before his reelection?
RULING:
I.
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative
investigations is mandated by no less than the Constitution. Under
Article XI, Section 13[1], the Ombudsman has the power to:
investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Law, further grants the Office of the
Ombudsman the statutory power to conduct administrative
investigations. Thus, Section 19 of said law provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all
complaints relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions,
though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of
facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper
purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
Section 21 of R.A. 6770 names the officials subject to the
Ombudsmans disciplinary authority:
SEC. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over
all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.
Petitioner is an elective local official accused of grave misconduct and
dishonesty. That the Office of the Ombudsman may conduct an
administrative investigation into the acts complained of, appears clear
from the foregoing provisions of R.A. 6770.
However, the question of whether or not the Ombudsman may
conduct an investigation over a particular act or omission, is different
from the question of whether or not petitioner, after investigation, may
be held administratively liable. This distinction ought here to be kept in
mind, even as we must also take note that the power to investigate is
distinct from the power to suspend preventively an erring public
officer.
Likewise worthy of note, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to
preventively suspend an official subject to its administrative
investigation is provided by specific provision of law. Under Section 24
of R.A. 6770
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated
by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months,
without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by
the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition
of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
We have previously interpreted the phrase under his authority to mean
that the Ombudsman can preventively suspend all officials under
investigation by his office, regardless of the branch of government in
which they are employed, excepting of course those removable by
impeachment, members of Congress and the Judiciary.
The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the
Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman. This is the clear
import of Section 24 of R.A. 6770 above cited.
There can be no question in this case as to the power and authority of
respondent Deputy Ombudsman to issue an order of preventive
suspension against an official like the petitioner, to prevent that official
from using his office to intimidate or influence witnessesor to tamper
with records that might be vital to the prosecution of the case against
him.
II.
YES, respondent Deputy Ombudsman commit a grave abuse of
discretion when he set the period of preventive suspension at six
months.
Preventive suspension under Sec. 24, R.A. 6770, to repeat, may be
imposed when, among other factors, the evidence of guilt is
strong. The period for which an official may be preventively suspended
must not exceed six months. In this case, petitioner was preventively
suspended and ordered to cease and desist from holding office for the
entire period of six months, which is the maximum provided by law.
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension.
xxx
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated
by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months,
without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by
the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition
of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong as
to warrant preventive suspension rests with the Ombudsman. The
discretion as regards the period of such suspension also necessarily
belongs to the Ombudsman, except that he cannot extend the period
of suspension beyond that provided by law.But, in our view, both the
strength of the evidence to warrant said suspension and the propriety
of the length or period of suspension imposed on petitioner are
properly raised in This petition for certiorari and prohibition. It is
pertinent to note here that the inquiry that preceded the filing of an
administrative case against petitioner was prompted by newspaper
reports regarding the allegedly anomalous contract entered into by
petitioner, on behalf of Cebu City, with F.E. Zuellig. In the
memorandum to respondent Mojica,respondent Garciano
recommended that petitioner be preventively suspended, based on an
initial investigation purportedly showing: (1) the contract for supply of
asphalt to Cebu City was designed to favor F.E. Zuellig, (2) the amount
quoted in the contract was too expensive compared to the amount for
which asphalt may be bought from local suppliers such as Shell and
Petron, particularly considering that the amount was fixed in dollars
and was payable in pesos, thus exposing the city government to the
risks attendant to a fluctuating exchange rate, and (3) the interest of
the city under the contract is not protected by adequate
136
security. These findings were based on the contract itself and on
letters from Bitumex and Credit Lyonnais. There were also letters from
Shell and Petron that were replies to the Office of the Ombudsmans
(Visayas) inquiry on whether or not they could supply Cebu City with
asphalt and on what terms.
Given these findings, we cannot say now that there is no evidence
sufficiently strong to justify the imposition of preventive suspension
against petitioner. But considering its purpose and the circumstances
in the case brought before us, it does appear to us that the imposition
of the maximum period of six months is unwarranted.
On behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General stated during his oral
argument at the hearing that the documents mentioned in
respondents’ comment, documents that show petitioners guilt, were
obtained after petitioner had been suspended. Even if an afterthought,
he claimed they strengthen the evidence of respondents against
petitioner. If the purpose of the preventive suspension was to enable
the investigating authority to gather documents without intervention
from petitioner, then, from respondents’ submission, we can only
conclude that this purpose was already achieved, during the nearly
month-long suspension of petitioner from June 25 to July 19,
1999. Granting that now the evidence against petitioner is already
strong, even without conceding that initially it was weak, it is clear to
us that the maximum six-month period is excessive and definitely
longer than necessary for the Ombudsman to make its legitimate case
against petitioner. We must conclude that the period during which
petitioner was already preventively suspended, has been sufficient for
the lawful purpose of preventing petitioner from hiding and destroying
needed documents, or harassing and preventing witnesses who wish
to appear against him.
III.
The Ombudsman Law or RA 6770 should apply to the investigation
conducted by it and the procedures in the law were properly observed
since as previously held there could be preventive suspension even
before the charges against the official are heard, or before the official
is given an opportunity to prove his innocence.
True, under the Local Government Code, preventive suspension may
only be imposed after the issues are joined, and only for a maximum
period of sixty days. Here, petitioner was suspended without having
had the chance to refute first the charges against him, and for the
maximum period of six months provided by the Ombudsman Law. But
as respondents argue, administrative complaints commenced under
the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the Local
Government Code.
Respondents base their argument on the deliberations of the Senate
on Senate Bill No. 155, which became the Local Government
Code. Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., commenting on the preservation
in the proposed Code of the power of the Office of the President to
suspend local officials, said:
Senator Pimentel. Now, as far as we are concerned, the Senate
Committee is ready to adopt a more stringent rule regarding the power
of removal and suspension by the Office of the President over local
government officials, Mr. President. We would only wish to point out
that in a subsequent section, we have provided for the power of
suspension of local government officials to be limited only to 60 days
and not more than 90 days in any one year, regardless of the number
of administrative charges that may be filed against a local government
official. We, in fact, had in mind the case of Mayor Ganzon of Iloilo
where the Secretary of Local Government sort of serialized the filing of
charges against him so that he can be continuously suspended when
one case is filed right after the other, Mr. President.
Respondents may be correct in pointing out the reason for the shorter
period of preventive suspension imposable under the Local
Government Code. Political color could taint the exercise of the power
to suspend local officials by the mayor, governor, or Presidents
office. In contrast the Ombudsman, considering the constitutional
origin of his Office, always ought to be insulated from the vagaries of
politics, as respondents would have us believe.
In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole,on the matter of whether or not the
Ombudsman has been stripped of his power to investigate local
elective officials by virtue of the Local Government Code, we said:
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that
it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific
matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as
to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other.
It was also argued in Hagad, that the six-month preventive suspension
under the Ombudsman Law is much too repugnant to the 60-day
period that may be imposed under the Local Government Code.But per
J. Vitug, the two provisions govern differently.
We have held in other cases that there could be preventive suspension
even before the charges against the official are heard, or before the
official is given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive
suspension is merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation and is not in any way the final determination of the guilt
of the official concerned.
Petitioner also avers that the suspension order against him was issued
in violation of Section 26(2) of the Ombudsman Law, which provides:
SEC. 26. Inquiries. xxx
(2) The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any
source in whatever form concerning an official act or omission. It shall
act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the same entirely
baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such
dismissal citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to
investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent public officer or
employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit
a written answer within seventy-two hours from receipt thereof
Petitioner argues that before an inquiry may be converted into a full-
blown administrative investigation, the official concerned must be
given 72 hours to answer the charges against him. In his case,
petitioner says the inquiry was converted into an administrative
investigation without him being given the required number of hours to
answer.
Indeed, it does not appear that petitioner was given the requisite 72
hours to submit a written answer to the complaint against him. This,
however, does not make invalid the preventive suspension order
issued against him. As we have earlier stated, a preventive suspension
order may be issued even before the charges against the official
concerned is heard.
Moreover, respondents state that petitioner was given 10 days to
submit his counter-affidavit to the complaint filed by respondent
Tagaan. We find this 10-day period is in keeping with Section 5(a) of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,[23] which
provides:
Sec. 5. Administrative adjudication; How conducted.
(a) If the complaint is not dismissed for any of the causes enumerated
in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770, the respondent shall be
furnished with copy of the affidavits and other evidences submitted by
the complainant, and shall be ordered to file his counter-affidavits and
other evidences in support of his defense, within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, together with proof of service of the same on the
complainant who may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days from
receipt of the counter-affidavits of the respondent.
IV.
The ruling in Salalima applies to this case. Petitioner cannot anymore
be held administratively liable for an act done during his previous
term, that is, his signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig.
In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local
official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct
committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding
is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that
it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past
137
misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then
such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is
presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual
terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will
obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish
the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed,
reckoned from the date of the officials reelection, except that it must
be prior to said date.
As held in Salalima,
The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as criminal
cases are concerned, is still a good law. Such a rule is not only
founded on the theory that an officials reelection expresses the
sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or
omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was
committed during his previous term. We may add that sound policy
dictates it. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to
exacerbating endless partisan contests between the reelected official
and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former
during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have
been committed during his previous term. His second term may thus
be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the detriment of
public service...
However, respondents argue that the contract, although signed on
May 7, 1998, during petitioners prior term, is to be made effective only
during his present term.
We fail to see any difference to justify a valid distinction in the
result. The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and
F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during
petitioners prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to
the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be
prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may
have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the
contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the
contract are supposed to have been made months later.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for
signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, however, this should not
prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against
petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total
exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have
been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling now is
limited to the question of whether or not he may be
held administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that
he may not.
Hon. Tomas N. Joson III v. CA
G.R. 160652
February 13, 2006
Facts:
1. The Sangguniang bayan filed an administrative complaint against
incumbent Municipal Mayor of Aliaga, Elizabeth R. Vargas for
dishonesty, misconduct in office, and abuse of authority. It was alleged
that Mayor Vargas submitted to the Provincial Budget Officer two
falsified documents, namely, Appropriation Ordinance No. 1 and
Resolution No. 2, approving the enactment of Appropriation Ordinance
No. 1.
2. Mayor Vargas filed a complaint for annulment of falsified minutes of
session and appropriation ordinance with damages against the SB
members before the RTC of Cabanatuan City.
3. Mayor Vargas filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan a motion
to suspend proceedings and/or motion to dismiss due to the pendency
of a prejudicial question in the Civil Case she filed, specifically
questioning the genuineness of the documents she allegedly falsified.
Without resolving the said motion, the SP recommended to Gov. Joson
the preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas for sixty days.
4. Governor Joson issued an order of preventive suspension against
Mayor Vargas. Mayor Vargas filed before the Office of the President a
very urgent petition to set aside the suspension order. This was
granted but the preventive suspension was reinstated when Gov.
Joson filed a motion for reconsideration with the Office of the
President.
5. Mayor Vargas moved for reconsideration of the Resolution
reinstating the order of preventive suspension. She also filed before
the Court of Appeals a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus, with Urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78247.
6. The CA resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to further
enjoin and restrain Governor Joson from imposing the order of
preventive suspension and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from
conducting proceedings in the administrative case against Mayor
Vargas.
Issue:
1. Did the CA act with manifest partiality, arbitrarily and in grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the questioned order because:
a. Respondent Vargas availed the wrong remedy when she filed CA-
G.R. SP No. 78247;
b. Respondent Cargas clearly failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before seeking judicial relief;
c. The preventive suspension order was legally and validly issued.
2. Did the CA act arbitrarily and in grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing petitioners to cease and
desist from conducting proceedings in the administrative case?
Ruling:
1. No.
a. The assailed resolution having being issued by the Office of the
President, through the Executive Secretary, it would seem that the
proper remedy is an appeal via a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A perusal of the instant petition for
certiorari would, however, reveal that petitioner is alleging that the
challenged resolution was issued with grave abuse of discretion and
beyond respondents jurisdiction, hence, the appropriate remedy is
certiorari under Rule 65 as correctly availed by Mayor Vargas.
b. Citing Paat v. CA, the Court held that it recognizes some exceptions
to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies. They are the
following:
(1) when there is a violation of due process, (2)
when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there
is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego
of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter, (7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention.
The requirement of prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies may likewise be
dispensed with in the following instances: (1)
when the claim involved is small; (2) when strong
138
 public interest is involved; and (3) in quo warranto
proceedings.
c. Under Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive
suspension may be imposed (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when
the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense,
there is great probability that the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records and other evidence. Issues are considered
joined when the complaint has been answered and there are no longer
any substantial preliminary issues that remain to be threshed out.
In the administrative case, it appears that petitioner did not file, so far,
an answer to the complaint thus the issues could not have been
considered joined. What she did was to file a Motion To Suspend
Proceedings And/Or Motion To Dismiss which was treated by the
sanggunian as her answer. However, nothing in the records can be
inferred that the petitioner intended the said motion to be her answer.
Also, the assailed preventive suspension are general statements, mere
verbatim reproduction of the provision of law, unsupported by any
factual and substantial evidence. There is no showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong, with both parties charging each other with
falsification of documents.
2. No. Petitioner's contention that there is only one issue presented in
CA-G.R. SP No. 78247, that is, the validity of the reinstatement of the
preventive suspension order thus it was an abuse of discretion on the
part of CA when it directed the SP to cease and desist from conducting
the admin case, is of no merit.
Two of the issues raised by Mayor Vargas in her petition to the Court
of Appeals pertain to the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 02-S-
2003, to wit: (1) whether the civil case filed by Mayor Vargas before
the Cabanatuan RTC for annulment of falsified minutes of session and
appropriation ordinance with damages is a prejudicial question which
warrants the suspension of the proceedings in the administrative case,
and (2) whether the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has jurisdiction to hear
the administrative case filed against Mayor Vargas, when the relief
sought is her removal from office.
It is apparent that Mayor Vargas questioned the jurisdiction of SP in
the admin case since under Sec. 60 of the LGC, only the proper court
may order the dismissal from public office of an elective official. She
was therefore questioning the propriety of the proceedings in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan despite the alleged prejudicial question in
the civil case.
CA therefore did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
said resolution.
Mendoza vs Laxina Sr.
GR No. 146875
July 14, 2003
FACTS:
On May 27, 1997, respondent took his oath and thereafter assumed
office as the duly proclaimed and elected barangay captain of
Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, in the 1997 Barangay
Elections. Meanwhile, RoqueFermo, his rival candidate, filed an
election protest with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 40. On January 18, 1999, Fermo was declared as the winner in
the Barangay Elections. Respondent filed a notice of appeal with the
COMELEC while Fermo filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
On January 20, 1999, an order was issued by the trial court granting
the motion for execution pending appeal. Hence, respondent vacated
the position and relinquished the same to Fermo. Thereafter,
respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC questioning the January
20, 1999 order of the trial court. On September 16, 1999, the
COMELEC issued a resolutionannulling the order which granted the
execution of the decision pending appeal on the ground that there
existed no good reasons to justify execution.
On October 27, 1999, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution
directing Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Batasan Hills. On October 28, 1999, Fermo was served a copy of the
writ of execution but refused to acknowledge receipt thereof. He also
refused to vacate the premises of the barangay hall of Batasan Hills.
This did not, however, prevent respondent and his staff from
discharging their functions and from holding office at the SK-Hall of
Batasan Hills. On the same date, respondent appointed Godofredo L.
Ramos as Barangay Secretaryand on November 8, 1999, he appointed
Rodel G. Liquido as Barangay Treasurer.
On October 27, 1999, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution
directing Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Batasan Hills. On October 28, 1999, Fermo was served a copy of the
writ of execution but refused to acknowledge receipt thereof. He also
refused to vacate the premises of the barangay hall of Batasan
Hills. This did not, however, prevent respondent and his staff from
discharging their functions and from holding office at the SK-Hall of
Batasan Hills. On the same date, respondent appointed Godofredo L.
Ramos as Barangay Secretary and on November 8, 1999, he appointed
Rodel G. Liquido as Barangay Treasurer.
Petitioner Mendoza and other Kagawads questioned the validity of the
official acts discharged by respondent, which includes appropriation of
salaries, immediately after re-assumption but prior to re-taking of his
oath of office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the taking of an oath of office anew by a duly
proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective official a
condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office
where the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) orders the
relinquishment of the contested position.
RULING:
No, it is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-
assumption in office. To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying
requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full investiture
with the office. It is only when the public officer has satisfied the
prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position becomes
plenary and complete. However, once proclaimed and duly sworn in
office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise the
functions thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient
basis to enjoin him from assuming office or from discharging his
functions. Unless his election is annulled by a final and executory
decision, or a valid execution of an order unseating him pending
appeal is issued, he has the lawful right to assume and perform the
duties of the office to which he has been elected.
In the case at bar, respondent was proclaimed as the winner in the
1997 Barangay Elections in Batasan Hills, Quezon City; he took his
oath on May 27, 1997 and thereafter assumed office. He is therefore
vested with all the rights to discharge the functions of his office.
The re-taking of his oath of office on November 16, 1999 was a mere
formality considering that his oath taken on May 27, 1997 operated as
a full investiture on him of the rights of the office. Hence, the taking
anew of his oath of office as Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills,
Quezon City was not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-
assumption in office and to the exercise of the functions thereof.
Aguinaldo vs Santos
212 SCRA 768
NOTE: AGUINALDO DOCTRINE (already abandoned)
FACTS:
Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan.
After the December 1989 coup d’état was crushed, DILG Secretary
139
Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him
toshow cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office
for disloyalty to the Republic. A sworn complaint was also filed by
Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts
committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the
planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though
he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel
soldiers.
The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from
notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation. Later, the
Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and
ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was installed
as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.
Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the SC, assailing
the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government. Petitioner
argued that:
(1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local
government officialunder Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was
repealed by the 1987 Constitution;
(2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or
remove petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin
Vargas as Governor; and
(3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be
proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere
preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion
under the Revised Penal Code.
While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan. Three
petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that
he had been removed from office.
The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the
ground that the decision of the Secretary has not yet attained finality
and is still pending review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a
landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his
eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan
has rendered the administration case moot and academic
2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local
government officials as alter ego of the President
3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner
could be removed from office.
HELD:
1. YES. Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan
has rendered the administrative case pending moot and academic. It
appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the
most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan
province. The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed
coup.
2. YES. The power of the Secretary to remove local government
officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant
from the legislativebranch. The constitutional basis is provided
by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in
the President the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general
supervision over local governments. It is a constitutional doctrine
that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the
President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be
said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present
Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the
legislature the power and authority to enact a local government code,
which provides for the manner of removal of local government
officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court
had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite
the effectivity of the present Constitution, until such time as the
proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of
the DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is
found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.
3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally,
but administratively where the quantum of proof required is
only substantial evidence.
Garcia vs Mojica
GR No. 139043
September 10, 1999
Facts:
Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia and eight other city officials was
placed under preventive suspension without pay for the maximum
period of six months and told to cease and desist from holding office
immediately for an alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu
City, through the contract signed by petitioner.
Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the validity of the said
order. He pleads for immediate relief through the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Issues
What is the effect of the reelection of petitioner on the investigation of
acts done before his reelection? Did the Ombudsman for the
Visayas gravely abuse his discretion in conducting the
investigation of petitioner and ordering his preventive
suspension?
Ruling
The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as criminal
cases are concerned, is still a good law. Such a rule is not only
founded on the theory that an officials reelection expresses the
sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or
omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was
committed during his previous term. We may add that sound policy
dictates it. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to
exacerbating endless partisan contests between the reelected official
and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former
during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have
been committed during his previous term. His second term may thus
be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the detriment of
public service...
Petitioner cannot anymore be held administratively liable for an act
done during his previous term, that is, his signing of the contract with
F.E. Zuellig.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for
signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, however, this should not
prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against
petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total
exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have
been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling now is
limited to the question of whether or not he may be held
administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he
may not.
Valencia vs Sandiganbayan
GR No. 141336
140
 June 29, 2004
Facts:
Petitioners Rodolfo G. Valencia, et al were charged with Violation of
Section 3(e) in relation to Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information was filed with
the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 23624.A"Motion
to Quash" was filed by petitioner Valencia.
In the meantime, petitioners learned that in the administrative case
against them docketed as OMB-ADM-1-96-0316, which involved the
same subject matter as the criminal case, the Ombudsman dismissed
the complaint against them after finding that the contract of loan was
entered into in pursuance of the police power of the local chief
executive. Invoking this Resolution, petitioners filed with the
Sandiganbayan a Motion to Resolve Motion to Quash Information. The
Sandiganbayan denied the Motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction in not dismissing the
information or in not granting the Motion to Quash information despite
the fact that respondent Ombudsman had already dismissed the
administrativecase against the petitioners regarding the same subject
matter of the criminal case against the petitioners
Ruling:
No. There is no reason for the Sandiganbayan to quash the
Information againstpetitioners on the basis solely of the dismissal of
the administrative complaint against them.
Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the
administrative case againstthem based on the same subject matter
should operate to dismiss the criminal case because the quantum of
proof in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while that in
administrative cases is only substantial evidence. While that may be
true, it should likewise be stressed that the basis of administrative
liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative
proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-
honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other
hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of
crime.
Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative
case againstpetitioners is the fact that they were reelected to office.
Indeed, a reelected local official may not be held administratively
accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office.
The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back
into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life
and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such
knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a
condonation of his past misdeeds.
However, the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the
administrative, but not thecriminal, liability incurred by him during his
previous term of office.
There is, thus, no reason for the Sandiganbayan to quash the
Information againstpetitioners on the basis solely of the dismissal of
the administrative complaint against them.
People vs Hon. Rodolfo Toledano and Rolando Bunao
GR No. 110220
May 18, 2000
Facts:
On June 25, 1990, Rolando Bunao, while allegedly a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz, Zambales and its Committee on Bids
and Awards, entered into a lease contract with said municipality
covering 2 public market stalls. As a consequence, 2 administrative
charges were filed against him with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Luzon.Both cases were eventually dismissed by the Office of the
Ombudsman.
On December 7, 1992 an information for violation of Section 41(1) in
relation to Section 221 of BP 337 was filed against private respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales. Before arraignment,
private respondent moved to dismiss the information on the ground
that the charge had already become moot and academic and that any
criminal liability he may have incurred has been extinguished. The
respondent court dismissed the information.This petition
for certiorari and mandamus was filed questioning the Orders issued
by the respondent court dismissing the information.
Respondent judge dismissed the information on the ground that the
administrative case filed against private respondent Bunao with the
Office of the Ombudsman had been dismissed. In the memorandum
filed by the Solicitor General, said order of dismissal on the ground of
extinction of criminal liability is assailed for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part
of respondent judge, thus: "The respondent court anchored its
disposition in Criminal Case RTC No. 1274-I on dismissal of
administrative case against private respondent Rolando Bunao. But
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates the grounds for
extinction of criminal liability; and, dismissal of an administrative
charge against accused is not one of them.
Issue:
Was the dismissal of the criminal case proper by reason of the
dismissal of the administrative case?
Ruling: No.
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that
administrative cases are independent from criminal actions
for the same act or omission.The reliance made by respondent
judge on the re-election of private respondent as Kagawad in the May
1992 election so as to warrant the dismissal of the information filed
against him, citing Aguinaldo vs. Santosis misplaced. The ruling in
said case which forbids the removal from office of a public official for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, finds no
application to criminal cases, pending against said public officer.
Morales vs CA and Binay
GR Nos. 217126-27
November 10, 2015
Facts:
 A complaint was filed against Binay and other public officers of
the City Government of Makati charging them with administrative
cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and criminal cases
for violation of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and
Falsification of Public Documents. Binay, Jr. was alleged to be
involved in anomalous activities attending the procurement and
construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project,
committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of
Makati.
 The Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order, placing
Binay Jr., et al., under preventive suspension for not more than
six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB
Cases.
 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of the preventive suspension order.
 The CA granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding
Peña, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor. Citing Governor
Garcia, Jr. v.CA, it found that it was more prudent on its part to
issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and
seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were
established that the acts subject of the administrative cases
against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then,
applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant
that he can no longer be administratively charged.
Binay’s contention:
 Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of
Makati in 2010; and
 (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-
election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively
condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus
141
 rendering the administrative cases against him moot and
academic.
 In view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of
evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from
office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services
of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into
office.
The Ombudman’s contentions:
 The condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing
preventive suspension orders.
 Reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense,
which should have been raised by before it during the
administrative proceedings.
 There is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts
subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO
and the WPI enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine.
Ruling: No. However, the condonation doctrine is abandoned,
but the abandonment is prospective in effect.
A. The WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order
was correctly issued.
1. The CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the
condonation doctrine. By merely following settled precedents on
the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly
remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA
committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal
attribution above.
B. The Condonation Doctrine
1. Condonation is defined as "a victim's express or implied
forgiveness of an offense, especially by treating the offender as if
there had been no offense."
2. Under the Condonation Doctrine,
a. First, the penalty of removal may not be extended
beyond the term in which the public officer was elected
for each term is separate and distinct.
b. Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a
condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the
right to remove him therefor.
c. Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are
assumed to have known the life and character of
candidates, of their right to elect officers.
3. It is not based on statutory law but a jurisprudential creation.
a. It originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija. In which case, as there
was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the
Court, resorted to American authorities and found that
the weight of authorities seems to incline toward the rule
denying the right to remove one from office because of
misconduct during a prior term.
4. The condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. Also,
it would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there
is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
C. The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal
bases.
1. There is really no established weight of authority in theUS
favoring the doctrine of condonation.
2. The plain difference in setting, including the sheer impact of the
condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's
judicious re-examination.
a. Pascual was decided within the context of the 1935
Constitution which was silent with respect to public
accountability, or of the nature of public office being a
public trust.
3. The concept of public office, under the 1987 Constitution,
AS A PUBLIC TRUST and the corollary requirement of
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES is
PLAINLY INCONSISTENT with the idea that an elective
local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the
fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or
even another elective post.
4. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
offense.
5. There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support the notion.
In fact the Local Government Code and the RRACCS precludes
condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who
is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to
an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from
running for such post.
6. If condonation of an elective official's administrative
liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction,
then the same should have been provided by law under
our governing legal mechanisms.
7. The proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local
official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any, is infirm. No such
presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.
a. Most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in
secrecy, and concealed from the public. At a conceptual
level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has
actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus,
there could be no condonation of an act that is
unknown.
8. Liability arising from administrative offenses may only be
condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.
D. The Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application. It should be, as a general
rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment.
Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected.
Disclaimer: digest not mine. This is from Roloma for our admin
class during 2nd year.
Giron vs Ochoa (Condonation)
GR No. 218463
March 1,2017
Facts:
Giron filed a case in the ombudsman agains barangay Chairman for
illegally using electricity in his computer shop. The case was referred
then to the Special Investigation Committee on Administrative cases
agains elective barangay official in the city Council, the investigation
was however suspended due to the up and coming Barangay Elections,
Cando ran in this election as Kagawad and won. He assumed office on
December 1, 2013. The city council then adopted the resolution of the
committee recommending dismissal of the case for being moot and
academic. Citing the Pascual case, as reiterated in Aguinaldo where
the court stated that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor.
Giron argued that the doctrine of condonation was only applicable
when the re-election of the public official was to the same position.
Issue:
142
Whether or not the Pascual/Aguinaldo doctrine is still applicable
Whether the doctrine applies to re-election to a different position
Held:
The condonation doctrine has been abandoned by Carpio-Morales, as it
is unconstitutional but should only apply prospectively. On this matter,
cando is deemed condoned without prejudice to filing of criminal case
for theft of electricity.
On this issue of re-election to a different position, considering the ratio
decidendi behind the doctrine, the Court agrees with the interpretation
of the administrative tribunals below that the condonation doctrine
applies to a public official elected to another office. The underlying
theory is that each term is separate from other terms. Thus, in Carpio-
Morales, the basic considerations are the following: first, the penalty of
removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public
officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct; second, an
elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous
misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are
assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their
right to elect officers. In this case, it is a given fact that the body
politic, who elected him to another office, was the same.
Castillo vs Villarama
GR No. L-24649
September 18, 1965
FACTS:
Upon administrative complaint for oppression and mal-administration
filed by Provincial Governor Jose M. Villarama of Bulacan, with a
simultaneous order of suspension from office, Municipal Mayor
Bienvenido A. Castillo of Pulilan was investigated by the Provincial
Board, acquitted of the charge and ordered reinstated. The Governor
having refused to recognize the validity of this decision of the Board
and its order of reinstatement, and having instructed the Vice-Mayor,
ArsenioSulit, not to relinquish the office of Mayor which he assumed
upon Castillo's suspension, the latter initiated the instant proceeding
for prohibition under Rule 65 to prevent enforcement of the Governor's
instruction to the Vice-Mayor so that petitioner's reinstatement and re-
assumption of office may be carried out. Pursuant to the prayer for
preliminary injunction in the petition and after due notice and hearing
of the incident we issued the corresponding interlocutory writ on June
22, 1965. The case was heard and argued on the merits on September
6, 1965.
The charge against petitioner was filed with the Provincial Board and a
series of events ensued. Absences were incurred by the Governor and
the Vice-Governor in the Provincial Board sessions in the Capitol during
the meeting that set the hearing of the administrative case.
Investigation was reset to the next meeting and would continue daily
until such was completed.
During the day for investigation, petitioner appeared together with his
counsel and witnesses, but the session hall, where the hearing was to
be conducted, was found padlocked. The Governor and Vice-Governor,
who according to the verified allegations in the petition were in their
offices in the provincial capitol at the time, did not show up at the
meeting. The three Board Members decided to hold it in the office of
one of them, but later on, informed that the session hall had been
opened in the meantime, they repaired thereto and proceeded with
the business at hand. The administrative case was called, and after
ascertaining that the complaining witness was absent despite his
having been notified, the Board received petitioner's evidence. On the
same day, after the hearing was finished, the Board deliberated and
rendered its decision of acquittal, with an order for petitioner's
immediate reinstatement.
Informed of the decision, respondent Governor chose to ignore it by
instructing the Vice-Mayor in writing "not to relinquish your position to
anybody until the suspension of Mayor be legally lifted by the
undersigned."Thus the instant petition for prohibition was filed.
ISSUE:
Can the respondent Provincial Governor validly refuse to recognize the
decision of the Provincial Board, rendered unanimously by its three
members after an investigation conducted by them at a regular
meeting where the Governor was not present?
HELD:
The Governor’s contentions are misplaced. The writ prayed for by
petitioner is granted and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued is
made permanent.
The law provides that such charges shall be heard by the Provincial
Board within ten days from notice; that the preventive suspension shall
not be for more than thirty days; that at the expiration of said period
the suspended official shall be reinstated in office without prejudice to
the continuation of the proceeding against him, unless the delay in the
decision of the case is due to the fault, neglect or request of the
accused (Sec. 2189, Revised Administrative Code); and that the trial
shall be given preference over the current and routine business of the
Board. If the decision of the Board is one of exoneration and the
official concerned is still under suspension his reinstatement follows
immediately as a matter of course.
"SEC. 5. Composition of the
Provincial Board. — The provincial
board in first, second and third class
provinces shall be composed of the
provincial governor, who shall be the
presiding officer of the board, the vice-
governor, and three other members
who shall be elected at large by the
qualified electors of the province . . .
The presence of three members shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction
of business by the board. In case of a
tie on any matter deliberated upon by
the board, the side in favor of which the
governor has voted, shall prevail. In
the absence of the governor, the
vote of majority of the members
present shall constitute a binding
act of the board."
It may be noted that although the foregoing provision makes the
Provincial Governor the presiding officer of the Board, it does not
make his presence indispensable for the valid transaction of
business, for it not only considers the presence of three
members (out of the entire membership of five) sufficient to
constitute a quorum for the purpose, but also anticipates a
case when the Governor is absent, in which case "the vote of a
majority of the members present shall constitute a binding act
of the Board." The designation of the Governor as presiding officer is
obviously meant to apply to meetings where he is present, as the logic
of the situation dictates, he being the Executive and highest officer in
attendance.
The power of investigating and deciding an administrative case filed
against a municipal official is not executive in nature. It is lodged in
the Provincial Board as a body, which is enjoined by law to fix the day,
hour and place for the trial of the case and, as thus fixed, "to hear and
investigate the truth or falsity of the charges . . ." The performance of
this duty cannot be frustrated by the absence, fortuitous or deliberate,
of the Provincial Governor. In the very nature of things he may
consider it politically expedient to absent himself especially if he
happens to belong to a political party different from that of the official
against whom he himself has filed the administrative charges. The
adverse consequences of such recalcitrance, not only to the official
directly affected but to public interest as well, can easily be imagined.
It need only be added that in any event the thirty-day limit fixed by
law for the preventive suspension of a municipal official charged
administratively has already expired in the present instance, and hence
petitioner's reinstatement is in order.
Malinao vs Reyes
143
 GR No. 117618
March 29, 1996
255 SCRA 616
Facts:
Petitioner Virginia Malinao is Human Resource Manager III of Sta.
Cruz, Marinduque. Respondent Mayor filed a case against her in the
Office of the Ombudsman for gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and
incompetence. While the case was pending, he appointed a
replacement for petitioner.
On February 24, 1994 petitioner filed an administrative case, docketed
as Administrative Case No. 93-03, against respondent Mayor in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque, charging him with abuse of
authority and denial of due process.
On August 12, 1994, the case was taken up in executive session of the
Sanggunian. The transcript of stenographic notes of the
session[1] shows that the Sanggunian, by the vote of 5 to 3 of its
members, found respondent Mayor guilty of the charge and imposed
on him the penalty of one-month suspension,
The result of the voting was subsequently embodied in a Decision
dated September 5, 1994,[2] signed by only one member of the
Sanggunian, Rodrigo V. Sotto, who did so as Presiding Chairman, Blue
Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Copies of the Decision
were served on respondent Mayor Red as well as on respondent
Governor Luisito Reyes on September 12, 1994.
On October 21, 1994,[7] the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2, acquitted
respondent Mayor of the charges against him. The vote was embodied
in a Decision of the same date, which was signed by all members who
had thus voted.
Petitioner went to the SC by way of a Petition for Certiorari and
mandamus basically contending that inasmuch as the Decision
of September 5, 1994 had become final and executory, for failure of
respondent Mayor to appeal, it was beyond the power of the
Sanggunian to render another decision on October 21, 1994 which in
effect reversed the first decision.
Issue:
1. Did the Sanggunian render a decision on August 12, 1994?
2. Is the remedy of petition for certiorari and mandamus proper? Is
the decision of the Sanggunian appealable to the Office of the
President?
3. Is the case moot and academic considering that the Mayor was
reelected?
Ruling:
1. No. Contrary to petitioners claim, what the minutes only show is
that on August 12, 1994 the Sanggunian took a vote on the
administrative case of respondent Mayor and not that it then rendered
a decision as required by 66(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A.
No. 7160).
In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving elective
local officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must thus be in writing
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such
decision. What the Sanggunian, therefore, did on August 12, 1994 was
not to render a decision.
Neither may the so-called Decision prepared by Sanggunian Member
Rodrigo V. Sotto on September 5, 1994 be regarded as the decision of
the Sanggunian for lack of the signatures of the requisite majority. Like
the procedure in the Supreme Court, the voting following the
deliberation of the members of the Sanggunian did not
necessarily constitute their decision unless this was embodied in an
opinion prepared by one of them and concurred in by the others, in
the same way that the voting following the deliberation on a case in
the Supreme Court becomes its decision only after the opinion
prepared by a Justice is concurred in by others composing the
majority. Until they have signed the opinion and the decision is
promulgated, the Justices are free to change their votes.
Now, as already stated, the Sanggunian, at its session on October 21,
1994, took another vote and, 7 to 2, decided to dismiss the case
against respondent Mayor. This time its decision was made in writing,
stating the facts and the law on which it was based, and it was signed
by the members taking part in the decision. This, and not the so-called
decision of September 5, 1994, is the decision of the Sanggunian.
2. No, petition for certiorari is not proper; Yes, the decision of the
Sanggunian is appealable to the OP. Petitioner brought this case by
way of Petition for certiorari and mandamus. A prime specification of
the writ of certiorari, however, is that there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to
petitioner. But, in the case at bar, petitioner could have appealed the
decision of the Sanggunian to the Office of the President as provided
in 67(b) of the Local Government Code.
3. Yes. At all events, this case is now moot and academic as a result of
the expiration of respondents term during which the act complained of
was allegedly committed, and further proceedings against respondent
Mayor are barred by his reelection on May 8, 1995.
Pursuant to 66(b) of the Code, the penalty of suspension cannot
exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6)
months for every administrative offense. On the other hand, any
administrative disciplinary proceeding against respondent is abated if
in the meantime he is reelected, because his reelection results in a
condonation of whatever misconduct he might have committed during
his previous term.
Salalima v. Guingona
GR No. 117589-92
May 22 1996
FACTS:
NPC filed a case against the Province of Albay questioning the validity
of the auction sale, which the Province conducted because of NPC’s
failure to pay real property taxes assessed. The Albay Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, through a resolution, authorized respondent Governor
Salalima to engage the services of a Manila-based law firm (Cortes &
Reyna Law Firm) to handle the case against NPC. Later, the Province
also engaged the services of Atty. Cornago.
On June 4, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Province.
The latter then paid the lawyers amounting to around 7 million.
However, on May 31, 1993, the Provincial Auditor informed the
Province that COA had disallowed the payments for lack of prior
written conformity of the Solicitor General and a written concurrence
of COA. An administrative complaint was later on filed against the
petitioners with the Office of the President.
The Office of the President found that the petitioners incurred
administrative liability in hiring private lawyers to defend it in the NPC
case.
1. Section 481 of the LGC states that the legal officer of the
province has the duty to represent the LGU in all civil actions
and special proceedings wherein the LGU or any official
thereof, in his official capacity, is a party.
2. In the case Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, the Supreme
Court ruled that the LGU cannot be represented by private
lawyers and it is solely the Provincial legal officer or
provincial fiscal who can represent it. A private lawyer has
no standing in such a case.
Because of these findings, the OP imposed the penalty of suspension
for 6 months against Gov. Salalima and Vice governor Azana, while the
members of the SP were suspended for 4 months. The petitioners
appealed the case to the SC. In the meantime, the 1992 elections took
place wherein the petitioners were reelected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners may be held administratively liable,
despite re-election
144
HELD: NO.
Whether or not they incurred liabilities, they can no longer be held to
answer for these in view of the fact that they have already been
reelected. Their reelection operates as condonation of any misconduct
committed in their prior term.
In Pascual v. Pascual, the SC ruled that offenses committed or acts
done in a previous term are generally held not to furnish a cause for
removal in the current term of office. This is because each term is
separate from other terms and that the reelection operates as a
condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefore. Such a rule is founded
on the theory that an official’s reelection expresses the sovereign will
of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting
a ground for administrative discipline which was committed during the
previous term. Also, sound policy dictates such a rule. A contrary rule
would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests
between reelected officials and their political enemies who may not
stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative
cases for acts alleged to have been committed during his previous
term.
This Court reiterated this rule in Aguinaldo and explicitly stated
therein:
Clearly then, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal
cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed
during the failed coup.
Dagadag vs Tongnawa
GR Nos. 161166-67
February 3, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Dagadag was formerly the mayor of the municipality of
Tanudan, Province of Kalinga. Michael Tongnawa and Antonio
Gammod, respondents, are the municipal engineer and municipal
planning and development coordinator, respectively, of the said
municipality. Petitioner issued an order dropping them from the roll of
employees by reason of their unauthorized absences. Respondents
then appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC issued
Resolution No. 991136 affirming petitioners order dropping
respondents from the roll. Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals
which reversed and ordered their reinstatement and payment of
backwages. Petitioner appealed to the SC. Respondents aver that
petitioner has no legal personality to file the instant petition because
he had ceased to be the municipal mayor of Tanudan
Issue:
Who may appeal from the Decision of the CA?
Held: The current Mayor and the CSC
The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of
the suit.We hold that the CSC and the mayor of Tanudan are real
parties in interest in this case and, therefore, can contest the assailed
joint Decision of the Court of Appeals before us.
The CSC is the party adversely affected by the questioned Decision of
the Court of Appeals because it has been mandated by the
Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service
system.[7] Thus, any transgression by herein respondents of the CSC
rules and regulations will adversely affect its integrity. Significantly, it
has not challenged the assailed Decision.
As regards the mayor of Tanudan, there are two (2) reasons why he
may interpose such appeal. The first is rooted in his power to
appoint officials and employees of his municipality.Being chief
executive of the municipality, he possesses this disciplinary power over
appointive municipal officials and employees. To be sure, whenever his
order imposing administrative sanctions upon erring municipal
personnel is challenged, he should be allowed to defend his action
considering that he is the appointing authority.
The second reason why the municipal mayor of Tanudan has legal
personality to challengeddecision is because the salaries of the
respondents, being municipal officials, are drawn from the municipal
funds.
Admittedly, however, petitioner, at the time he filed with this Court the
instant petition assailing the Appellate Court Decision, was no longer
the mayor of Tanudan.
Where the petitioner (a public officer) ceases to be mayor, the appeal
and/or action he initiated may be continued and maintained by his
successor if there is substantial need to do so. If the successor failed
to pursue the appeal and/or action, the same should be dismissed.
Petition denied.
Flores vs. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga
GR No. 159022
February 23, 2005
FACTS:
Several municipal councilors filed an administrative complaint with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for dishonesty and gross misconduct
against then Mayor Edgardo G. Flores, alleging that he executed
Purchase Request No. 1 for communication equipment worth P293,000
without any resolution or ordinance from the Sangguniang Bayan, and
that such amount was overpriced by 100%.
Respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an Order recommending
to Governor Lapid of Pampangathat Flores be preventively suspended
from office for a period of sixty (60) days.
Without seeking reconsideration of the Order of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Flores sent a letter dated September 12, 2002 to
respondent Governor Lapid requesting him to veto the same.
Also, without waiting for respondent Governor Lapid’s action on his
letter, Flores filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
for issuing the Order. The Court of Appeals denied his petition for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Was there a failure to exhaust administrative remedies such that it
warrants dismissal of the certiorari petition?
HELD:
Yes. It is a well-settled rule that where, as here, the petitioner has
available remedies within the administrative machinery against the
action of an administrative board, body, or officer, the intervention of
the courts can be resorted to by him only after having exhausted all
such remedies. The rationale of this rule rests upon the presumption
that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake
or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it
properly.
A motion for reconsideration of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s Order
is a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. Section 1 of the same Rule requires that petitioner must not
only show that respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in issuing the
questioned Order, acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
but that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.We have held that the plain and
adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for
reconsideration.
Moreover, petitioner has not shown any valid and compelling reason
why, without waiting for the Governors action on the matter, he
immediately filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. By
doing so, petitioner effectively deprived the Governor of his duty to
take appropriate action on the controversy.
145

Buencamino vs CA
GR No. 175895
April 17,2007
Facts:
Private respondent filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, an
administrative complaint against petitioner for grave misconduct,
abuse of authority, acts unbecoming of a public officer, and violation
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act). In his complaint, private respondent alleged, among others, that
the act of petitioner in demanding payment (without official receipt) of
a pass way fee or a regulatory fee of P1,000.00 for every delivery
truck that passes the territorial jurisdiction of San Miguel, Bulacan is
illegal. The Office of the Ombudsman declared petitioner
administratively liable for abuse of authority and suspended him from
office for a period of six (6) months without pay. Petitioner filed with
the Court of Appeals, petition for review with application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioner prayed that the Office of the
Ombudsman be enjoined from implementing its Decision during the
pendency of his appeal, petitioners application for preliminary
injunction was denied. Petitioner filed for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, alleging that in
denying his application for a preliminary injunction, the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion; that pursuant to Section 7, Rule
III of Administrative Order No. 07, the Decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman suspending him from office is not immediately
executory; and that in enforcing its Decision suspending him from the
service during the pendency of his appeal, the Office of the
Ombudsman violated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) and the rulings of this Court in Lapid v. Court of Appeals; Lopez
v. Court of Appeals, and Ombudsman v. Laja stating “that only orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure,
reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not
equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence,
immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the
penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to
one month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In
these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and
executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is
perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order,
directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue
as a matter of right”. In its comment, the Office of the Ombudsman
countered that the Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its
discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions; and that the cases cited
by petitioner are not applicable to this case, the same having been
overturned by the ruling of this Court in In the Matter to Declare in
Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of
DPW and that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 has
been amended by Administrative Order No. 17, thus:
x x x this Honorable Court emphatically declared that
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman was already amended by Administrative
Order No. 17 wherein the pertinent provision on the
execution of the Ombudsmans decision pending appeal is
now similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service that is, decisions of
the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending
appeal.
ISSUE:
Are decisions of the Ombudsman immediately executory
even pending appeal?
RULING:
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 has been amended
by Administrative Order No. 17, thus:
Sec. 7. Finality and execution of decision. -
Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in
case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the
decision shall be final, executory and unappealabe. In all
other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review under the
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion
for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and
the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid
the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of
the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be
strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or
failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an
order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary
action against said officer.
Clearly, considering that an appeal under Administrative Order No. 17,
the amendatory rule, shall not stop the Decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman from being executory, we hold that the Court of Appeals
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners
application for injunctive relief.
Sangguniang Barangay of Don Marcos vs Punong Barangay
Martinez
GR No. 170626
March 3, 2008
Facts:
December 2004 – Severino Martinez, Punong Barangay of Barangay
Don Mariano Marcos (Bayombong, Nueva Vizacaya) was
administratively charged with Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Practices Act by petitioner (Sanggunian
Barangay) through the filing of a verified complaint before the
Sangguniang Bayan. Pursuant to Section 61 of the LGC, the SB is the
disciplining authority over elective barangay officials. Charges, among
others (6 in all) were for failure to submit and fully remit to the
Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste management
project particularly the sale of fertilizer and recyclable materials
derived from composting and garbage collection. There was also a
charge for failure to liquidate his travelling expenses for the 2003
Lakbay-aral.
July 2005 - the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which
imposed the penalty of removal from office. The Decision was
conveyed to the Municipal Mayor (Severino Bagasao) for its
implementation. Mayor issued a Memorandum, stating that SB is not
empowered to order Martinez’s removal from service. However, the
Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him.
ISSUE/HELD:
Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an
elective local official, from office
NO. SC affirmed RTC
During the deliberations of the Senate on the LGC, the legislative
intent to confine to the courts, i.e., RTCs, the Sandiganbayan and the
appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of
elective local officials was evident.
146
In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categorically ruled that
the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected
officials. Court invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (which
provides that “An elective local official may be removed from office …
by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first
acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.
As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides
for the procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an
erring elective barangay official before the SP or SB. However, the
Sangguniang cannot order the removal of an erring
elective barangay official from office, as the courts are
exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the
Local Government Code.
Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official
are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the
penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with
the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it
retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently
apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is
appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may
impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension;
if it deems that the removal of the official from service is
warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed
in court.
Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a
grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal
from office, the case should be filed with the regional trial court. The
most extreme penalty that the Sanggunian may impose is suspension.
Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr., and Glenda Araa vs Office of
The Ombudsman
GR No. 180917
April 23, 2010
Facts:
Salumbides and Glenda were appointed as Municipal Legal
Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of
Tagkawayan, Quezon. Towards the end of 2001, Mayor Vicente
Salumbides III (the mayor) saw the urgent need to construct a two-
classroom building with fence (the projects) for the Tagkawayan
Municipal High School (TMHS) since the public school in the poblacion
area would no longer admit high school freshmen starting school year
2002-2003. On how to solve the classroom shortage, the mayor
consulted Salumbides who suggested that the construction be charged
to the account of the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses/
Repair and Maintenance of Facilities (MOOE/RMF) but Glenda advised
Salumbides that there were no more available funds that could be
taken from the MOOE/RMF. The savings of the municipal government,
however, were adequate to fund the projects but the approval by the
Sangguniang Bayan of a proposed supplemental budget must be
secured.
The members of the Sangguniang Bayan have already gone on recess
for the Christmas holidays, so Glenda and Salumbides advised the
mayor to source the funds from the P1,000,000 MOOE/RMF allocation
in the approved Municipal Annual Budget for 2002. The mayor thus
ordered to proceed with the construction and only after were the
projects included in the list of local government projects scheduled for
bidding. Thus, the construction of the projects commenced without
any approved appropriation and ahead of the public bidding.
A complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman against
petitioners for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty.
Petitioners were found guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty, for which they
were meted the penalty of suspension from office for a maximum
period of six months with a stern warning against a similar repetition.
Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine of
condonation to cover coterminous appointive officials who were
administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing
authority with infractions allegedly committed during their preceding
term.
Issue:
Can the petitioners be absolved of the administrative charge?
Held: No
The Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija issued the
landmark ruling that prohibits the disciplining of an elective official for
a wrongful act committed during his immediately preceding term of
office because each term is separate from other terms, and the
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. But this does not apply to appointive officials and the non-
application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not
violate the right to equal protection of the laws. Substantial distinctions
clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation
thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure
while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
As to the charge:
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention
to a task expected from an employee resulting from either
carelessness or indifference. In the present case, petitioners fell short
of the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due
care and prudence in ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal
soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and giving
their advice to their superior.
As municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides failed to uphold the
law and provide a sound legal assistance and support to the mayor in
carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions of adequate
facilities when he advised the mayor to proceed with the construction
of the subject projects without prior competitive bidding.
As regards petitioner Glenda, the improper use of government funds
upon the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal legal
officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating rather
than registering her written objection as municipal budget officer.
Simple neglect of duty is classified as a less grave offense punishable
by suspension without pay for one month and one day to six months.
Finding no alleged or established circumstance to warrant the
imposition of the maximum penalty of six months, the Court finds the
imposition of suspension without pay for three months justified.
PART IX. RECALL
No case in the syllabus
PART X. LOCAL LEGISLATIONS
Municipality of Parañaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation
FACTS:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993,
the Municipality of Parañaque filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, on September 20, 1993 a complaint for expropriation against
V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land with a combined area
of about 10,000 sqm. located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque,
Metro Manila. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of
alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing
homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.
Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577,
Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated
sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not
accept.
147

In an Order dated February 4, 1994, the trial court authorized
petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with
its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market
value based on its current tax declaration. Private respondent filed its
answer alleging that (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action
because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance
as required by the Local Government Code; and (2) the cause of
action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. [The
second argument was raised because on Sept. 29, 2987, the
Municipality also filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same
parcels of land against Limpan Investment Corporation, the
predecessor-in-interest of V.M Realty Corporation. The case was
dismissed with prejudice by the RTC and was not appealed, hence the
same became final.]
The trial court then nullified its February 4, 1994 order and dismissed
the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
resolution.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Municpality of Parañaque can exercise its
power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making
body.
(2) Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to the
present case.
RULING:
(1) No. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal
council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case "substantially
complies with the requirements of the law" because the terms
"ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of
bestowing authority on the local government unit through its chief
executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain."
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government which may delegate the exercise
thereof to local government units, other public entities and public
utilities. A local government unit may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and
subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.
As provided for under Section 19 of RA 7160, the following essential
requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of
eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said
offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the
power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal
council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the
mayor be authorized through an ordinance. A municipal ordinance is
different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two
are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance,
but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all
the Sanggunian members. If Congress intended to allow LGUs to
exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have
simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code.
But Congress did not. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the
complaint for expropriation is equivalent to lack of cause of action.
(2) No. Although all the requisites for the application of res judicata
are present in this case, the Court holds that the principle of res
judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings,
cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private
property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of
the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and
unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. That petitioner
cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a
mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings,
once the said legal requirement and all others are properly complied
with.
Magtajas vs Pryce Properties
GR No. 111097
July 20, 1994
FACTS:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of
a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced
the project. The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous
success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to
Cagayan de Oro City. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it
enacted Ordinance No. 3353. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner
Ordinance No. 3375-93. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court
of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31,
1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued
the writ prayed to prohibit their enforcement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 are valid
HELD:
No. In the Local Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other
prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games
of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not
contravene a statute is obvious. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D.
1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended
or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance
No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino
and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all
their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869
and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires
and void.
Tatel vs Municipality of Virac
Facts:
Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta.
Elena,Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the
municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the
abaca bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse. A committee was
then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its
investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the
warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and
properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was
then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a
public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code.
According to respondent municipal officials, petitioner’s warehouse was
constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952,
prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses
either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary
distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives
and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner
contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional, contrary to the due
148
process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and
void for not having been passed in accordance with law.
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the respondent. Hence,
this petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance within the
meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the
Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.
Held:
The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner’s warehouse is anuisance
under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time,
Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the
exercise of its police power. Municipal Corporations are agencies of the
State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government an
as such are endowed with the police powers in order to accomplish
and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance:
1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be
unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent
with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable.
Basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of
warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored. The purpose of
the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of
fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower
court did not err in its decision.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Young vs. City of Manila,
73 Phil 537
(1941)
Facts:
The plaintiff is the owner of the Antipolo Subdivision situated near the
northern boundary of the city of Manila, of which the various lots
involved in this litigation form part. Five of said lots are known as
street areas, that is to say, they are named and indicated as streets on
the subdivision plan; and fifteen of said lots scattered in eight different
blocks are residential lots. All of said lots were declared a nuisance and
a menace to public health, by the Director of Health, because they
were so low or excavated as to admit and cause the formation of
stagnant and foul water and that they should be filled to at least
fifteen centimeters above street grade in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 3352. Accordingly, the City Engineer notified and
required the plaintiff to fill said lots within ninety days, with a warning
that should he fail to do so, the City Engineer would cause the said lots
to be filled, subject to the provisions of said Act.
The plaintiff did not dispute the decision of the Director of Health and
the requirement of the City Engineer for the filling of said lots, but he
declined to undertake the filling and notified, the City Engineer that, as
the cost of filling said lots would be more than the assessed valuation
of the property, he exercised the option granted him in section 3 of Act
No. 3352 to sell the land to the City for its market value.
The City Engineer thereafter undertook the work of filling portions of
the lots in question by contract which was awarded to the lowest and
best bidder. For that work the city of Manila paid the total sum of
P24,164.06 out of the special revolving fund created by section 5 of
Act No. 3352
The plaintiff refused to reimburse to the City the amount spent by the
latter for the filling of the lots in question and insisted on his option to
sell said lots to the City at the current market value, under section 3 of
Act No. 3352. Contending that it was not under obligation to buy said
lots, and invoking section 5 of Act No. 3352 in relation to section 2498
of the Revised Administrative Code, the City advertised said lots for
sale at public auction on September 29, 1937, in order to satisfy the
expenses of filling them; and, because of the absence of bidders at
such sale, the said lots were forfeited to the city of Manila under the
provisions 2501 of the Revised Administrative Code, subject to
plaintiff's right of redemption. The plaintiff having failed to redeem
said lots, the City Treasurer, on January 9, 1939, declared the
forfeiture absolute and conveyed said lots to the city of Manila.
The plaintiff commenced the present action against the city of Manila
to recover from the latter the payment for the lands plus legal interest
thereon and for refund of additional taxes paid under protest by the
plaintiff to the defendant city of Manila subsequent to the filing of the
original complaint herein.
The plaintiff assails the judgment of the lower court insofar as it fails
to determine the price that the defendant city of Manila should pay to
the plaintiff for the lots in question and dismisses his claim for the
refund of the taxes; and the defendant city of Manila on its part
contends that it is not obligated to buy said lots because the plaintiff is
solvent and not unable to pay the cost of filing.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant city of Manila is under obligation to
purchase the said lots from the plaintiff
Held:
The case hinges on the construction of section 3 of Act No. 3352,
which reads as follows:
Sec. 3. Owner may sell land to city. — Should the cost of
filing belonging to a private owner exceed one-half of the
assessed value thereof, the owner shall have the option to
either sell the property to the city at current market value or
reimburse the amount expended for filing in twenty equal
annual installments as provided in section five of its Act. In
the case the owner decides to sell his property for inability
to pay the cost of filing, the city shall purchase it and the
cost thereof shall be charged to the special fund herein
created: Provided, however, That the city shall dispose of
the land by public auction to the highest and best bidder,
but no award shall be made unless the amount of the offer
is at least equal to the cost of land, including the cost of
filling and incidental expenses. The proceeds of such sale be
resorted to said special fund.
In applying this statutory provision to the present case, it is important
to bear in mind that the land involved herein consists of street and
building lots. Street areas are marked and set apart for the use of the
public in general and the buyers of the building lots in particular. The
owner of a subdivision cannot sell the residential lots unless he
provides streets therefor. He adds the cost of the street areas to the
price he charges for the residential lots. The segregation of the street
from the building lots as shown on the subdivision plan and in the
technical description of each of said lots constitutes a representation
and promise by the owner of the subdivision to every buyer of the
building lots that he (the owner) has set aside and appropriated the
said areas for street purposes; or, in other words, that he has
withdrawn them from the commerce of men. That promise forms part
of the consideration of every contract of sale which he makes of the
residential lots. He cannot sell the streets nor use them for any other
purpose without violating his contract with the buyers of the building
lots. Indeed, after adding the cost of the streets to the price of the
building lots, the owner of the subdivision has no legal nor moral right
to sell those street areas.
Section 3 above quoted refers to land that is subject to the commerce
of men. Thus, it provides "that the city shall dispose of the land by
public auction to the highest and best bidder, but no award shall be
made unless the amount of the offer is at least equal to the cost of the
land, including the cost of filling and incidental expenses." Since the
City cannot sell the streets, it is obvious that it is not under any
obligation to purchase the street areas in question.
We are therefore of the opinion and so hold that the plaintiff cannot
compel the defendant city of Manila to purchase from him the street
areas described in his complaint. Neither can he compelled to donate
said land and transfer his title to the City so that the latter may build
and maintain the streets. But as long as the plaintiff retains the title
149
and ownership of said street areas, he is under obligation to pay to the
land taxes thereon as well as to reimburse to the City the expenses of
filing the same.
As to residential lots in question, we are of the opinion that the
defendant city of Manila is under obligation to purchase them from the
plaintiff at the market price in view of the option exercised by him
under section 3 of Act No. 3352. The contention of the City Fiscal that
in order to exercise such option the plaintiff must show himself to be
insolvent and unable to pay the cost of filling, is untenable. The law
expressly provides that, should the cost of filling any lot exceed one-
half of the assessed value thereof, the owner shall have the option to
either sell the property to the City at current market value or
reimburse the amount expended for filling it. It also provides that "in
case the owner decides to sell his property for inability to pay the cost
of filling, the city shall purchase it and the cost thereof shall be
charged to the special fund herein created." But the phrase "inability
to pay" cannot be interpreted to mean that the owner must be
insolvent in order to entitle him to exercise the option to sell. It is
presumed that the legislature to make the law operate equally on all
private owners regardless of their financial condition.
With reference to plaintiff's claim for the refund of the land taxes paid
under protest, we find that he is not entitled thereto for the reason
that his offer to sell the land in question did not relieve him of the
obligation to pay taxes thereon.
Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works,
GR No. L-10405,
December 29, 1960
(110 Phil. 331)
FACTS:
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated
P85,000.00 “for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then
governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the
appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the
terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision.
The said subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a
member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same law.
Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that
he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully
enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said law would be
upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose.
Zulueta, on the other hand, donated the said property to the City of
Pasig five (5) months after the effectivity of the tax law.
The trial court dismissed the on the ground that the appropriation was
validated by the donation of the property to the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent donation of the property to the
government rendered the tax law valid
RULING:
No, the court stressed that the validity of a statute depends upon the
powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon
events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the
latter consists of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with
retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said
statute.
Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder
roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said
roads were public or private property when the bill, which, latter on,
became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill
was approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum
became effective, or on June 20, 1953.
Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be
constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that
said appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was null and
void.
The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the
approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition,
for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the
appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect.
Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede
the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public
funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest,
as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals,
although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the
public.
Aniano A. Albon vs Bayani F. Fernando
GR No. 148357
June 30, 2006
FACTS:
In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to
widen, clear and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision. It was undertaken by the city government pursuant to
Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993 like other infrastructure projects relating to
roads, streets and sidewalks previously undertaken by the city.
On June 14, 1999, petitioner Aniano A. Albon filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 73, a taxpayer's suit for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with damages against certain officials of the
Marikina City Government.
Petitioner claimed that it was unconstitutional and unlawful for
respondents to use government equipment and property, and to
disburse public funds, of the City of Marikina for the grading, widening,
clearing, repair and maintenance of the existing sidewalks of Marikina
GreenheightsSubdivision which was a private property. Hence, the city
government could not use public resources on them. In undertaking
the project, therefore, respondents allegedly violated the constitutional
proscription against the use of public funds for private purposes 4 as
well as Sections 335 and 336 of RA 7160 5 and the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner further alleged that there was no
appropriation for the project.
The Trial Court denied Petitioner’s petition and upheld the validity of
Ordinance No. 59 and the Court of Appeals sustained the trial’s court
ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the validity of
Ordinance No. 59
RULING:
Yes, the Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the validity of the
Ordinance.
Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances
for the purposes set forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160). It
is expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the
general welfare clause of RA 7160. With this power, LGUs may
prescribe reasonable regulations to protect the lives, health, and
property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within
their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such powers
and discharge such functions and responsibilities as may be necessary,
appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the
basic services and facilities, including infrastructure facilities intended
primarily to service the needs of their residents and which are financed
by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities include municipal or
city roads and bridges and similar facilities.
There is no question about the public nature and use of the sidewalks
in the Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. One of the "whereas
clauses" of PD 1216 12 (which amended PD 957 13 ) declares that
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open spaces, 14 roads, alleys and sidewalks in a residential subdivision
are for public use and beyond the commerce of man. In conjunction
herewith, PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, mandates subdivision
owners to set aside open spaces which shall be devoted exclusively for
the use of the general public.
Thus, the trial and appellate courts were correct in upholding the
validity of Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993. It was enacted in the exercise of
the City of Marikina's police powers to regulate the use of sidewalks.
Atienza v. Villarosa
GR No. 161081
May 10, 2005
Facts:
Mindoro Occidental Governor Villarosa issued a memorandum requiring
that all purchase orders for supplies, equipment, etc. for the upkeep of
the SangguniangPanlalawigan be signed by him. Vice-Governor Atienza
replied that such authority was vested in him by the LGC. In response,
Villarosa ordered the dismissal of almost 60 of Atienza’s appointees in
the provincial government. Atienza asked Villarosa to reconsider both
of his actions but the latter refused. Thus, Atienza filed a prohibition
suit in the CA assailing as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion the respondent Governors Memoranda. The petitioner Vice-
Governor claimed that these memoranda excluded him from the use
and enjoyment of his office in violation of the pertinent provisions of
Republic Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991, and its
implementing rules and regulations. It was prayed that the respondent
Governor be enjoined from implementing the assailed memoranda.
CA dismissed the case and upheld Villarosa’s power to sign the
purchase orders. Citing Section 344 of Rep. Act No. 7160, the CA
upheld the authority of the respondent Governor to issue the
Memorandum dated June 25, 2002 as it recognized his authority to
approve the purchase orders. The said provision provides in part that
approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive
himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed.Atienza
appealed to the SC, which ruled in his favor. The CA ruled that the
issue on whether it could be enjoined had already been rendered moot
and academic. The CA pointed out that the subject of the said
memorandum could no longer be enjoined or restrained as the
termination of the employees had already been effected. It opined that
where the act sought to be enjoined in the prohibition proceedings had
already been performed and there is nothing more to restrain, the
case is already moot and academic.
Issues:
1. Who between the petitioner and the respondent is authorized to
approve purchase orders issued in connection with the procurement of
supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance
of the SangguniangPanlalawigan?
2. Does respondent Villarosa, as local chief executive, have the
authority to terminate or cancel the appointments of casual/job order
employees of the SangguniangPanlalawigan Members and the Office of
the Vice-Governor?
Ruling:
1. We hold that it is the Vice-Governor who has such authority.
Under Rep. Act No. 7160, local legislative power for the province is
exercised by the SangguniangPanlalawigan and the Vice-Governor is
its presiding officer. Being vested with legislative powers, the
SangguniangPanlalawigan enacts ordinances, resolutions and
appropriates funds for the general welfare of the province in
accordance with the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7160. The same statute
vests upon the Vice-Governor the power to:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the SangguniangPanlalawigan and sign
all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures
appropriated for the operation of the SangguniangPanlalawigan.
Further, Section 344 provides:
Sec. 344. Certification on, and Approval of, Vouchers. No money shall
be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the existence of
appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local
accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer
certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and
payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the head of the
department or office who has administrative control of the fund
concerned, as to validity, propriety and legality of the claim involved.
Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly recurring
administrative expenses such as payrolls for regular or permanent
employees, expenses for light, water, telephone and telegraph
services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as the
GSIS, SSS, LBP, DBP, National Printing Office, Procurement Service of
the DBM and others, approval of the disbursement voucher by the
local chief executive himself shall be required whenever local funds are
disbursed.
In cases of special or trust funds, disbursements shall be approved by
the administrator of the fund.
In case of temporary absence or incapacity of the department head or
chief of office, the officer next-in-rank shall automatically perform his
function and he shall be fully responsible therefor.
Reliance by the CA on the clause approval of the disbursement
voucher by the local chief executive himself shall be required
whenever local funds are disbursed of the above section (Section 344)
to rule that it is the Governor who has the authority to approve
purchase orders for the supplies, materials or equipment for the
operation of the SangguniangPanlalawigan is misplaced. This clause
cannot prevail over the more specific clause of the same provision
which provides that vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and
approved by the head of the department or office who has
administrative control of the fund concerned. The Vice-Governor, as
the presiding officer of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, has
administrative control of the funds of the said body. Accordingly, it is
the Vice-Governor who has the authority to approve disbursement
vouchers for expenditures appropriated for the operation of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan.
On this point, Section 39 of the Manual on the New Government
Accounting System for Local Government Units, prepared by the
Commission on Audit (COA), is instructive:
Sec. 39. Approval of Disbursements. Approval of disbursements by the
Local Chief Executive (LCE) himself shall be required whenever local
funds are disbursed, except for regularly recurring administrative
expenses such as: payrolls for regular or permanent employees,
expenses for light, water, telephone and telegraph services,
remittances to government creditor agencies such as GSIS, BIR,
PHILHEALTH, LBP, DBP, NPO, PS of the DBM and others, where the
authority to approve may be delegated. Disbursement vouchers for
expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sanggunian shall be
approved by the provincial Vice Governor, the city Vice-Mayor or the
municipal Vice-Mayor, as the case may be.
While Rep. Act No. 7160 is silent as to the matter, the authority
granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants drawn on the
provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation
of the SangguniangPanlalawigan as well as to approve disbursement
vouchers relating thereto necessarily includes the authority to approve
purchase orders covering the same applying the doctrine of necessary
implication. This doctrine is explained, thus:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in
its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a
particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be
an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the
unfolding of events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as
the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to
fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine
states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as
that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object
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and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege
is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so
because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo
plus sit, simper inest et minus.
Warrants are order[s] directing the treasurer of the municipality to pay
money out of funds in city treasury which are or may become available
for purpose specified to designated person[s]. Warrants of a municipal
corporation are generally orders payable when funds are found. They
are issued for the payment of general municipal debts and expenses
subject to the rule that they shall be paid in the order of presentation.
The ordinary meaning of voucher is a document which shows that
services have been performed or expenses incurred. It covers any
acquittance or receipt discharging the person or evidencing payment
by him. When used in connection with disbursement of money, it
implies some instrument that shows on what account or by what
authority a particular payment has been made, or that services have
been performed which entitle the party to whom it is issued to
payment.
Purchase order, on the other hand, is an authorization by the issuing
party for the recipient to provide materials or services for which issuing
party agrees to pay; it is an offer to buy which becomes binding when
those things ordered have been provided.
When an authorized person approves a disbursement voucher, he
certifies to the correctness of the entries therein, among others: that
the expenses incurred were necessary and lawful, the supporting
documents are complete and the availability of cash therefor. Further,
the person who performed the services or delivered the supplies,
materials or equipment is entitled to payment. On the other hand, the
terms and conditions for the procurement of supplies, materials or
equipment, in particular, are contained in a purchase order. The tenor
of a purchase order basically directs the supplier to deliver the articles
enumerated and subject to the terms and conditions specified therein.
Hence, the express authority to approve disbursement vouchers and,
in effect, authorize the payment of money claims for supplies,
materials or equipment, necessarily includes the authority to approve
purchase orders to cause the delivery of the said supplies, materials or
equipment.
Since it is the Vice-Governor who approves disbursement vouchers and
approves the payment for the procurement of the supplies, materials
and equipment needed for the operation of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan, then he also has the authority to approve
the purchase orders to cause the delivery of the said supplies,
materials or equipment.
Indeed, the authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants
drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for
the operation of the SangguniangPanlalawigan as well as to approve
disbursement vouchers relating thereto is greater and includes the
authority to approve purchase orders for the procurement of the
supplies, materials and equipment necessary for the operation of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan.
2. We hold that the Governor, with respect to the appointment of the
officials and employees of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, has no such
authority.
Among the powers granted to the Governor under Section 465 of Rep.
Act No. 7160 are:
Sec. 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. (a) The provincial governor, as the chief executive of
the provincial government, shall exercise such powers and perform
such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of
which is the general welfare of the province and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the provincial governor shall:
(v) Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are
wholly or mainly paid out of provincial funds and whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may
be authorized by law to appoint.
On the other hand, Section 466 vests on the Vice-Governor the power
to, among others:
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all
officials and employees of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, except those
whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in this Code.
Thus, while the Governor has the authority to appoint officials and
employees whose salaries are paid out of the provincial funds, this
does not extend to the officials and employees of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan because such authority is lodged with the
Vice-Governor. In the same manner, the authority to appoint casual
and job order employees of the SangguniangPanlalawigan belongs to
the Vice-Governor.
The authority of the Vice-Governor to appoint the officials and
employees of the SangguniangPanlalawigan is anchored on the fact
that the salaries of these employees are derived from the
appropriation specifically for the said local legislative body. Indeed, the
budget source of their salaries is what sets the employees and officials
of the SangguniangPanlalawigan apart from the other employees and
officials of the province. Accordingly, the appointing power of the Vice-
Governor is limited to those employees of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan, as well as those of the Office of the Vice-
Governor, whose salaries are paid out of the funds appropriated for
the SangguniangPanlalawigan. As a corollary, if the salary of an
employee or official is charged against the provincial funds, even if this
employee reports to the Vice-Governor or is assigned to his office, the
Governor retains the authority to appoint the said employee pursuant
to Section 465(b)(v) of Rep. Act No. 7160.
However, in this case, it does not appear whether the contractual/job
order employees, whose appointments were terminated or cancelled
by the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 issued by the respondent
Governor, were paid out of the provincial funds or the funds of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan. Nonetheless, the validity of the said
memorandum cannot be upheld because it absolutely prohibited the
respondent Vice-Governor from exercising his authority to appoint the
employees, whether regular or contractual/job order, of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan and restricted such authority to one of
recommendatory nature only. This clearly constituted an
encroachment on the appointment power of the respondent Vice-
Governor under Section 466(a)(2) of Rep. Act No. 7160.
Gamboa vs Aguirre and Araneta
GR No. 134213
July 20, 1999
FACTS:
The Governor of Negros Occ. designated Vice-Governor Gamboa as
Acting Governor for the duration of his official trip abroad until his
return. When the SangguniangPanlalawigan held its regular session,
the members thereof questioned the authority of Gamboa to preside
therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor. Herefused when
asked to vacate the Chair. A petition for declaratory relief and
prohibition was filed and the trial court declared Gamboa temporarily
legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the
period that he is the Acting Governor.
ISSUE:
May an incumbent Vice-Governor while concurrently the Acting
Governorcontinue to preside over the sessions of the SP?
RULING: NO
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The LGC provides that the Vice-Gov. shall be the presiding officer of
the SP. In addition, when there is temporary vacancy in the office of
the Governor, the Vice-Gov. shall automatically exercise the powers
and perform the duties of the Governor.
A Vice-Gov. who is concurrently an Acting Governor is a quasi-
Governor so that for purposes of exercising his legislative powers, he is
deemed a non-member of the SP for the time being. Being the Acting
Governor, the Vice-Gov. cannot continue to simultaneously exercise
the duties of the latter office which includes being the presiding officer
of the SP. First, the nature and duties of the Governor call for a full-
time occupant to discharge them. Second, under the LGC the Governor
was deprived of the power to preside over the SP and no longer a
member thereof.
The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor
creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-
Gov. whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary
vacancy. This constitutes an inability on the part of the regular
presiding officer to preside during the SP sessions. Under Sec. 49(b) of
the LGC, in the event of such inability, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary
presiding officer.
Malonzo vs Zamora
323 SCRA 875
January 28, 2000
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General questioning the decision of the Supreme Court dated July 27,
1999 wherein the Court annulled and set aside the Office of the
President's decision wherein Mayor Malonzo, Vice-Mayor Malapitan and
several Councilors were adjudged guilty of misconduct and each were
meted the penalty of suspension from office for a period of 3 months.
The OP found petitioners guilty of misconduct on the ground that . . .
". . . the P39,352,047.75 appropriated in
Ordinance 0254 to fund theexpropriation of
Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate was merely a
portion of theP50 million included and
appropriated in the 1998 Annual Budget
forexpropriation purpose and . . . the judicial
action for expropriation . . . is stillpending
with the court. This being so, the amount
allocated for theexpropriation cannot be
reverted to or be deemed as savings to
serve asfunds actually available for the
supplemental budget. . .
(a supplemental budget was passed by the councilors upon three
readings held on the same day of a proposed budget. Hence they were
charged of misconduct)
Solicitor General contended that the Office ofthe President did not err
in suspending herein petitioner Mayor for misconduct forrealigning the
P50 million appropriation and maintains that:
 Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was enacted
withoutsufficient compliance with the requirement of Section
50 of the Local Government Coderequiring that house rules
be adopted or updated.
 Assuming that the Sanggunian can legally take up matters
pertaining to the supplemental budget even before the
adoption or updating of its existing rules of procedure, the
circumstances that preceded the enactment of the
supplemental budget were irregular since there was undue
haste in conducting the three readings of Ordinance No.
0254, Series of 1998, in one session day.
Issues:
(1) Does the law require the completion of the updating or adoption
of the internal rules of procedure before the Sangguniang
Panlungsod could act any other matter like the enactment of an
ordinance?
(2) Can the three reading of a proposed ordinance be held on the
same day?
Ruling:
(1) NO. The records satisfactorily show, however, that the
Sanggunian took up the matter of adopting a set of house rules in
its general meeting entitled, "Katitikan ng Karaniwang Pulong ng
Sangguniang Panlungsod na ginanap noong ika-2 ng Hulyo 1998
sa Bagong Gusali ng Pamahalaang Lungsod ng Caloocan." During
said meeting, the Sanggunian created an Ad Hoc Committee
composed of seven (7) members to study the existing house
rules. Thereafter, it enacted Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998.
As we have held in our Decision dated July 27, 1999, such
succession of events is legally permissible. The law does not
require the completion of the updating or adoption of the internal
rules of procedure before the Sanggunian could act on any other
matter like the enactment of an ordinance. It simply requires that
the matter of adopting or updating the internal rules of procedure
be taken up during the firsst day of session. It would be
inequitable to read something more into the requirement of the
law and use it as a basis for finding petitioners guilty of
misconduct, especially when the charge is serious enough to
warrant a penalty of suspension from office for three (3) months
without pay.
(2) YES. There is nothing in the law, however, which prohibits that
the three readings of a proposed ordinance be held in just one
session day. Respondents themselves are aware of this. And it
certainly is not the function of this Court to speculate that the
councilors were not givenample time for reflection and
circumspection before the passage of the proposed ordinance by
conducting the three readings in just one day considering that it
was a certain Eduardo Tibor, by himself as taxpayer, and not the
councilors themselves, who raised such complaint. It might not be
amiss to point out that the salaries of the city employees were to
be funded by the said ordinance which embodied the
supplemental budget for 1998, hence, the urgency for its
passage. Even the five (5) councilors 11 who abstained from
voting for the passage of Ordinance 0254, Series of 1998 took
advantage of its bene􀀺ts by submitting to the office of petitioner
Malonzo the names of the employees assigned to their respective
offices for salary and accounting purposes
Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative Inc. vs Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dumaguete
155 SCRA 421
FACTS:
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to
conduct an investigation in connection with pending legislation related
to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the
heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) –
Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have
installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac
refused to appear before the SP and they alleged that the power to
investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power
lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National
Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City
of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred that inherent in
the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power
to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to
punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt
HELD:
No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in
the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to
subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for
contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of
these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a
subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious
behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the
statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt
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power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They
cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they
exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To
allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise
these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC
explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue
compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of
Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and
Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body
has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even
assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to
issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would
still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the
subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where
the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body.
Santiago vs Guingona
GR No. 134577
November 18, 1998
Facts:
During the election of the officers of the Senate, both Sen. Fernan and
Sen. Tatad were nominated as Senate President. By vote of 20-2, Sen.
Fernan was declared the Senate President. Sen. Tatad then manifested
that with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assumming the position of minority
leader. He explained that those who voted for Fernan belong to the
majority and those who voted for him as the losing nominee belongs
to the minority. However, those 7 members belonging to the LAKAS-
NUCD party, thus still a minority voted for Sen. Guingona, Jr. as the
minority leader. After three sessions, the issue was still unresolved.
Thereafter, Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as
the minority leader of the Senate. Thus, Sen. Santiago and Sen. Tatad
filed a quo warranto proceeding alleging a violation of the Constitution
by virtue of Guingona’s declaration and sought his ouster.
Issue:
Was there a violation of the Constitution by virtue of the declaration of
Sen. Guigona as the minority leader?
Ruling:
No, there is no violation of the Constitution with regards to the manner
of the election of Sen. Guigona as Minority Leader.
The term majority when referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, simply means the number greater than half or more than
half of any total.While the Constitution mandates that the President of
the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one
half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members
who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who
could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.
Majority sometimes referred to as plurality, may also refer to the
group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes, not
necessarily more than one half. In contrast, minority is a group, party,
or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority. Minority is a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of
votes or adherents than the majority. Between two unequal parts or
numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would
obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But
where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to
say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all
the minorities.
No constitutional or statutory provision prescribes which of the many
minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the
right to select the minority leader.Congress verily has the power and
prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is
certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the
parameters for the exercise of this prerogative.
Zamora v. Caballero
GR No. 147767
January 14, 2004
(464 Phil 471)
Facts:
Petitioner Manuel Zamora, a member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan
of Compostela Valley (the Sanggunian), seeks to invalidate all acts
executed and resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its sessions
held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum.
It appears that on February 6, 2001, Vice-Governor Reynaldo Navarro
sent a written notice of a special session on February 7, 2001. Upon
the request of Governor Jose R. Caballero, however, the scheduled
special session was reset to February 8, 2001 without the benefit of a
written notice.
On February 8, 2001, the Sanggunian thus held a special session to,
among other things, allow the Governor to deliver his State of the
Province Address. As only seven members of the fourteen-member
Sanggunian were present, no resolution was considered.
On February 26, 2001, the Sanggunian held its 4th regular session
during which it issued Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province
of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and Resolution No. 07
authorizing the Governor to, on behalf of the province, enter into a
construction contract (Contract) with Allado Construction Company,
Inc. (the Allado Company) for the completion of Phase II of the
construction of the capitol building. During the same session, the
Sanggunian accepted the letter of irrevocable resignation submitted by
Board Member Gemma Theresa M. Sotto.
While only eight members of the Sanggunian were present at the
commencement of the session on February 26, 2001, the Journal of
the Proceedings (Journal) and Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 showed that
a total of thirteen members attended it.
Petitioner thus filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
against the Governor, et al., challenging the validity of the acts of the
Sanggunian on February 26, 2001, alleging that while the Journal and
Resolutions indicated the presence of 13 members, the Sanggunian
nonetheless "conducted official business without a quorum" as only
seven of its fourteen members were actually present when the
irrevocable letter of resignation of Board Member Sotto was noted, and
the motions to declare the entire province of Compostela Valley under
a state of calamity and to authorize the Governor to enter into the
Contract with the Allado Company were approved.
Petitioner furthermore challenged the validity of the special session of
February 8, 2001 for lack of quorum, there being only seven members
of the Sanggunian in attendance, and for lack of written notice sent to
all members at least 24 hours before the holding of the special session
in accordance with Section 52 (d) 17 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (LGC).
Respondents, on the other hand, contended that since Board Member
Sotto was in the United States at the time the questioned acts were
executed and resolutions adopted, the actual number of Board
Members then in the country was thirteen which should be the basis of
the determination of a quorum.
Issue:
Was there a compliance by the Sanggunian with the requirements
prescribed under the LGC before it may grant the Governor authority
to enter into the Contract?
Ruling:
The present caseinvolves a local legislative body, the
SangguniangPanlalawigan of Compostela Valley Province, and the
applicable rule respecting quorum is found in Section 53(a) of the LGC
which provides:
Section 53. Quorum. —
154

(a) A majority of all members of the sanggunian who have been
elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official
business. Should a question of quorum be raised during a session, the
presiding officer shall immediately proceed to call the roll of the
members and thereafter announce the results.
"Quorum" is defined as that number of members of a body which,
when legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to
transact its proper business or that number which makes a lawful body
and gives it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act.
"Majority," when required to constitute a quorum, means the number
greater than half or more than half of any total. In fine, the entire
membership must be taken into account in computing the quorum of
the sangguniangpanlalawigan, for while the constitution merely states
that "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum," Section 53 of
the LGC is more exacting as it requires that the "majority of all
members of the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified" shall constitute
a quorum.
The difference in the wordings of the Constitution and the LGC is not
merely "a matter of style and writing" as respondents would argue, but
is actually a matter of "meaning and intention." The qualification in the
LGC that the majority be based on those "elected and qualified" was
meant to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members
thereof have been proclaimed. And, while the intent of the legislature
in qualifying the quorum requirement was to allow sanggunians to
function even when not all members thereof have been proclaimed
and have assumed office, the provision necessarily applies when, after
all the members of the sanggunian have assumed office, one or some
of its members file for leave. What should be important then is the
concurrence of election to and qualification for the office. And election
to, and qualification as member of, a local legislative body are not
altered by the simple expedient of filing a leave of absence.
A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the principal
function and duty of the sanggunian, requires the participation of all its
members so that they may not only represent the interests of their
respective constituents but also help in the making of decisions by
voting upon every question put upon the body. The acts of only a part
of the Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions
aforementioned are legally infirm, highly questionable and are, more
importantly, null and void. And all such acts cannot be given binding
force and effect for they are considered unofficial acts done during an
unauthorized session.
Board Member Sotto is then deemed not resigned because there was
no quorum when her letter of irrevocable resignation was noted by the
Sanggunian. For the same reason, Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 are of no
legal effect.
The motion to grant the Governor authority to enter into the
construction contract is also deemed not approved in accordance with
the law even if it received seven affirmative votes, which is already the
majority of thirteen, due to the defect in the seventh vote. For as
priorly stated, as the Journal confirms, after all six members voted in
the affirmative, Board Member Osorio, as acting presiding officer,
relinquished his seat to Board Member Arafol and thereafter cast his
vote as a member in favor of granting authority to the Governor.
This Court is faced with an act clearly intended to circumvent an
express prohibition under the law — a situation that will not be
condoned. The LGC clearly limits the power of presiding officers to
vote only in case of a tie, to wit:
Section 49. Presiding Officer. — (a) The vice-governor shall be the
presiding officer of the sangguniangpanlalawigan . . . . The presiding
officer shall vote only to break a tie.
(b) In the event of inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at
a sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum
shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer. . . .
While acting as presiding officer, Board Member Osorio may not, at the
same time, be allowed to exercise the rights of a regular board
member including that of voting even when there is no tie to break. A
temporary presiding officer who merely steps into the shoes of the
presiding officer could not have greater power than that possessed by
the latter who can vote only in case of a tie.
Lastly, for a resolution authorizing the governor to enter into a
construction contract to be valid, the vote of the majority of all
members of the Sanggunian, and not only of those present during the
session, is required in accordance with Section 468 54 of the LGC in
relation to Article 107 55 of its Implementing Rules.
Even including the vote of Board Member Osorio, who was then the
Acting Presiding Officer, Resolution No. 07 is still invalid. Applying
Section 468 of the LGC and Article 107 of its Implementing Rules,
there being fourteen members in the Sanggunian, the approval of
eight members is required to authorize the governor to enter into the
Contract with the Allado Company since it involves the creation of
liability for payment on the part of the local government unit.
La Carlota City, Negros Occidental vs Atty. Rex Rojo
GR No. 181367
April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Atty. Rojo tendered his resignation as Sangguniang Panlungsod
member preceding his appointment as Sangunniang Panlungsod
Secretary. Due to infirmities in his appointment, his resignation was
considered withdrawn.
ISSUE:
Is the resignation as Sangguniang Panlungsod member not deemed
acceptedwhen it was presented on during the scheduled regular
session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod for lack of quorum?
HELD: It was validly accepted.
RA 7160 clearly states that the Sangguniang Panlungsod shall be
composed of the city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the
regular sanggunian members, the president of the city chapter of
the liga ng mga barangay, the president of
thepanlungsodnapederasyonngmgasangguniangkabataan, and the
sectoral representatives, as members. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
composed of as formed of or consisting of. As the presiding officer,
the vice-mayor can vote only to break a tie. In effect, the presiding
officer votes when it matters the most, that is, to break a deadlock in
the votes. Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is mandated under
Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to break a tie. To construe otherwise
would create an anomalous and absurd situation where the presiding
officer who votes to break a tie during a Sanggunian session is not
considered a member of the Sanggunian.
Thusly, a quorum of the Sangguniang Panlungsod should be computed
based on the total composition of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In this
case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod is composed of the presiding
officer, ten (10) regular members, and two (2) ex-officio members, or
a total of thirteen (13) members. A majority of the 13 members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, or at least seven (7) members, is needed to
constitute a quorum to transact official business. Since seven (7)
members (including the presiding officer) were present on the regular
session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there was a quorum
such that the irrevocable resignation of respondent was validly
accepted.
De los Reyes vs Sandiganbayan
281 SCRA 631
Facts:
Petitioner, along with two others, was charged with the crime of
falsification of a public document, specifically Resolution No. 57-S-92
dated July 27, 1992 of the Municipal Council of Mariveles, Bataan. The
complaint alleged that the resolution, appropriating the amount
of P8,500.00 for the payment of the terminal leave of two municipal
155
employees, was anomalous for not having been approved by the said
Council, as the minutes of the proceedings therein made no reference
to the supposed approval thereof. It contended that its seeming
passage was carried out by petitioner in connivance with Sangguniang
Bayan (SB) Member Jesse Concepcion and SB Secretary Antonio
Zurita.
In an effort to exonerate himself from the charge, petitioner argues
that the deliberations undertaken and the consequent passage of
Resolution No. 57-S-92 are legislative in nature. He adds that as local
chief executive, he has neither the official custody of nor the duty to
prepare said resolution; hence, he could not have taken advantage of
his official position in committing the crime of falsification as defined
and punished under Article 171[6] of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the final step in
the approval of an ordinance or resolution, where the local chief
executive affixes his signature, is purely a ministerial act.
Issues:
(1) Is the affixing of signature or approval of an ordinance by the local
chief executive merely a ministerial act?
(2) Can the minutes taken during the session of a local legislative
assembly be sufficient evidence to prove that the same assembly made
no reference to the passage of the resolution in question?
Ruling:
(1) No.
Contrary to petitioners belief, the grant of the veto power confers
authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance or
resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability.Such power accords the
local chief executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance
in the first instance or to veto it and return it with his objections to the
Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The
Sanggunian concerned, however, may override the veto by a two-
thirds (2/3) vote of all its members thereby making the ordinance or
resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. It is clear,
therefore, that the concurrence of a local chief executive in the
enactment of an ordinance or resolution requires, not only a flourish of
the pen, but the application of judgment after meticulous analysis and
intelligence as well.
(2) Yes.
In the case at bar, the minutes of the session reveal that petitioner
attended the session of the Sangguniang Bayan on July 27, 1992. It is
evident, therefore, that petitioner approved the subject resolution
knowing fully well that the subject matter treated therein was neither
taken up and discussed nor passed upon by the Sangguniang Bayan
during the legislative session.
Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official
repository of what actually transpires in every proceeding. It has
happened that the minutes may be corrected to reflect the true
account of a proceeding, thus giving the Court more reason to accord
them great weight for such subsequent corrections, if any, are made
precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records. In light of the
conflicting claims of the parties in the case at bar, the Court, without
resorting to the minutes, will encounter difficulty in resolving the
dispute at hand.
Acaac vs Hon. Azcuna, Jr.
GR No. 187378
September 30, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.
(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization, founded by petitioner
Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the protection and
conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within
Misamis Occidental. In line with its objectives, PETAL built some
cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island in 1995 as
well as a seminar cottage in 2001 which it rented out to the public and
became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries, among whom are
petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
On April and May 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D.
Azcuna, Jr. and Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate
Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for
a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code of the
Philippines), and ordered PETAL to stop all illegal building activities on
Capayas Island.
On July 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena adopted
Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 2002 which prohibited, among
others: (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or
organization inside the sanctuaries; and (b) the construction of any
structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if
authorized by the local government.
Azcuna approved the subject ordinance, which was thereafter
submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental that
conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Notices were posted at the
designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as
government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.
Petitioners filed an action for the issuance of a TRO, injunction and
damages against respondents before the RTC alleging that they have
prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed
that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since
1961, with whom it entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the
operation of the said island as a camping, tourism, and recreational
resort; thus, the issuance of the subject ordinance was prejudicial to
their interest as they were deprived of their livelihood.
Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the
following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b)
it was not published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province as required by LGC; and (c) it was not approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against
them since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas
Island, which was classified as timberland and property belonging to
the public domain. Moreover, they have complied with all the
publication and hearing requirements for the passage of the ordinance,
which was deemed approved by operation of law for failure of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to take any positive action thereon as
provided under the LGC. As such, it is valid and enforceable.
ISSUE:
Is the subject ordinance valid and enforceable against petitioners?
HELD:
Yes. Section 56 (d), LGC provides that “if no action has been taken by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission
of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed
consistent with the law and therefore valid.”
In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be
deemed approved through the mere passage of time considering that
the same is still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It, however, bears to
note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the
said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the
Sangguniang Bayan; hence, it should be deemed approved and valid.
Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the
subject ordinance was not published nor posted in accordance with the
provisions of the LGC. Petitioners’ own evidence reveals that a public
hearing was conducted prior to the promulgation of the ordinance.
Other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any
evidence to show that no publication or posting of the subject
ordinance was made. In contrast, Azcuna had testified that they have
complied with the publication and posting requirements.
While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence
thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of
an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the
156
absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed
by law was not observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had
the burden of proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed
to do.
We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law
requires them to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary.
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation
essential to petitioner's cause of action in the present case. Hence, as
petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since
petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the
subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no
public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are
constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.
Robert Tayaban vs People
GR NO. 150194
March 6, 2007
FACTS:
In 1988, Roberto Tayaban was the mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao. He made a
project proposal with the Governor for a public market to be erected.
The same was approved and it was funded by the Cordillera Executive
Board (CEB). The project bidding was subsequently won by Lopez
Pugong. Pugong began erecting the market but in 1989, Tayaban and
Tinoc’s councilors enforced a resolution to demolish the structure
being built on the ground that the structure is not being erected in the
proper area as specified by Tayaban and that the structure is a public
nuisance and by virtue of police power to protect general welfare.
Tayaban and some councilors then went to the site and demolished
the structure. Pugong sued Tayaban et al for violation of Section 3 (e)
of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti Graft Act). Pugong also averred that the
resolution reviewing the said local public development project (market)
that the council passed in 1989 was not posted in a conspicuous place
as required by Sections 56 and 59(a) of the 1991 LGC (R.A. No. 7160).
Tayaban lost and he appealed contending that he demolished the
structure by virtue of PD 1096 (National Building Code) and LOI 19
(removal of illegal structures).
ISSUE:
Is the resolution a valid legislation?
RULING:
A careful reading of Resolution No. 20 reveals that petitioners’ only
basis in deciding to carry out the demolition was because the
supposed public market was being erected in a place other than that
identified by the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc. There was no mention
whatsoever in the said Resolution that the private contractor failed to
secure the requisite building permit. Neither was there any mention
that the demolition was being conducted pursuant to the power vested
upon the Mayor by the provisions of LOI No. 19. Even the letter sent
by petitioner Tayaban to the head laborer of Pugong dated July 31,
1989, the letter to the Station Commander of the INP, Tinoc of even
date, and the memorandum sent to the laborers of Pugong dated
August 3, 1989 uniformly state that the only reason why petitioners
wanted to stop the construction was because the supposed public
market was being erected in the wrong place. Hence, petitioners’
reliance on the provisions of P.D. No. 1096 and LOI No. 19 was merely
an afterthought and as a means of justification for their acts which, in
the first place, were done in bad faith.
Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners’ contention that the
subject demolition is a valid exercise of police power. The exercise of
police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is
against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of a common right. In the present
case, the acts of petitioner have been established as a violation of law,
particularly of the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Neither can petitioners seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings.
This principle applies to nuisances per se, or those which affect the
immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity. Petitioners claim that the
public market would pose danger to the safety and health of
schoolchildren if it were built on the place being contested. However,
petitioners never made known their supposed concerns either to the
Governor or to the CEB. Instead, they took the law into their own
hands and precipitately demolished the subject structures that were
built without the benefit of any hearing or consultation with the proper
authority, which in this case is the CEB.
Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. vs Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr
GR No. 156052
March 7, 2007
FACTS:
The SangguniangPanlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
8027.Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28,
2001. It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its
publication.Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police
power delegated to local government units. Ordinance No. 8027
reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial
and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under
Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within
six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals"
of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)6
with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of
the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option."
Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the following:
undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which
shall include, among others, the immediate removal/decommissioning
process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres
and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and
green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals; establish joint
operations and management, including the operation of common,
integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with international and
domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic considerations
and standards.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do
the following:endorse to the City Council this MOU for its appropriate
action; enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in
compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting
from the joint operations and the scale down program; monitor the
OIL COMPANIES’ compliance with the provisions of this MOU and
protect the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at
preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by
illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties. The
SangguniangPanlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the
same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective
only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on
January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13
extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and
authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil
companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment
of the ordinance.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus praying
that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it
can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12
RULING:
157
1.
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal
duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code
(RA 7160), to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal
of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has
allowed them to stay. Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No.
8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions.
However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU
are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not
amended the former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid
and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way
prevent him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains
that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full
implementation.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel
compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a
substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of
mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to
adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to
secure a legal right but to implement that which is already
established. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded,
mandamus will not issue.
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right
to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it
is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections
and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many members
who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and
Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.We need not belabor
this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a
mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to
compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the
execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest
and they need not show any specific interest.Besides, as residents
of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of
the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of
petitioners to institute this proceeding.On the other hand, the
Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as
city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As
the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.21 He has no other choice.
It is his ministerial duty to do so.
2. The question now is whether the MOU entered into by
respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent
resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the
respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful,
unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the second issue
raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and Resolution
Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8027
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the
MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions
which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.
Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent
from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with
the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001
attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York
City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of
Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case
of a terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why
such a protective measure should be delayed.
Ongsuco vs Malones
GR No. 182065
October 27, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market. After a
meeting with the stall holders, Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin
approvedMunicipal Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled "The Municipal
Revised Revenue Code."The Code contained a provision for increased
rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees in the amount
of P20,000.00 andP15,000.00 for stalls located on the first and second
floors of the municipal public market, respectively. The same Code
authorizedrespondent to enter into lease contracts over the said
market stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the
stall holders at themunicipal public market.Sangguniang Bayan of
Maasin approved Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, moving to have
the meeting declared inoperative as a publichearing, because majority
of the persons affected by the imposition of the goodwill fee failed to
agree to the said measure. However,Resolution No. 68, series of 1998,
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin was vetoed by respondent on 30
September 1998. Respondentwrote a letter to petitioners informing
them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal
public market without anylease contract, as a consequence of which,
the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested
applicants.Petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with
Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, against respondent. The RTC found that
petitioners could not avail themselves of the remedy of mandamus or
prohibition. Because they failed to show a clear legal right to the use
of the market stalls without paying the goodwill fees and also on
theground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. This decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
Is there was a need for the exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Is the imposition of the goodwill fees is valid? NO, it is defective due to
lack of public hearings
Held:
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to
preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve
acontroversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where
theissue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence;
and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative
agency,would clearly constitute an exception.There is no dispute
herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other stall holders at the
municipal public market were sent out,informing them of the supposed
"public hearing" to be held on 11 August 1998. Even assuming that
petitioners received their notice, the"public hearing" was already
scheduled, and actually conducted, only five days later.This
contravenes Article 277 (b) (3) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code which requires that the
public hearing be held no less than ten days from the time the notices
were sent out, posted, or published. When the Sangguniang Bayan of
Maasin sought to correct this procedural defect through Resolution No.
68, series of 1998 vetoed thesaid resolution. Although the
Sangguniang Bayan may have had the power to override respondent's
veto, it no longer did so.The defect in the enactment of Municipal
Ordinance No. 98 was not cured when another public hearing was held
on 22 January 1999,after the questioned ordinance was passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan and approved by respondent on 17 August 1998.
Section 186 of theLocal Government Code prescribes that the public
hearing be held prior to the enactment by a local government unit of
an ordinancelevying taxes, fees, and charges.Since no public hearing
had been duly conducted prior to the enactment of Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01, said ordinance is void andcannot be given any
effect. Consequently, a void and ineffective ordinance could not have
conferred upon respondent the jurisdiction toorder petitioners' stalls at
the municipal public market vacant.
PART XI. LOCAL INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
Garcia, et al. Comelec
GR No. 111230
September 30, 1994
Facts:
158

In its PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sanggunian
Bayan ngMorong agreed to the inclusion of the Municipality of Morong
as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone.
Petitioners filed a petition to annul the said PambayangKapasyahan.
However, the Municipality of Morong did not take any action on the
petition within 30 days after its submission. So, petitioners resorted to
their power of initiative under the LGC. They started to solicit the
required number of signatures to cause the repeal of said resolution.
COMELEC en banc denied the petition for local initiative on the ground
that its subject is “merely a resolution and not an ordinance.” Under
section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX, Book 1 of LGC, local initiative is
defined as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.
Petitioners argued that a Sangguniang Bayan resolution being an act
of the local legislative assembly is undoubtedly a proper subject of
initiative. It also contended that Comelec’s authority in the matter of
local initiative is merely ministerial; and it is duty-bound to supervise
the gathering of signatures in support of the petition and to set the
date of the initiative once the required number of signatures are
obtained.
Issue:
Is PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993 a proper subject of an
initiative?
Ruling:Yes.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative.
Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress
shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or
part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An
act includes a resolution. Moreover, Sec. 3(a0, RA No. 6735 (An Act
Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum) expressly
includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations.
LGC did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone.
Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX, Book I merely defines the concept of
local initiative. It does not deal with the subjects or matters that can
be taken up in a local initiative. It is section 124 which deals with such.
It states:
Sec. 124. Limitations on Local
Initiatives. (a) The power of local
initiative shall not be exercised
more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to
subjects or matters which are
within the legal powers of the
Sanggunians to enact.
Generally, resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it
may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful administration
of the business affairs of a city. However, in this case, it cannot be
argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the Municipality of
Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a
permanent rule of conduct or government.The inclusion of Morong as
part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching implications
in the governance of its people.Considering the lasting changes that
will be brought in the social, political, and economic existence of the
people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic
Special Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their voice on the
matter via an initiative. It is not material that the decision of the
municipality of Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a
resolution for what matters is its enduring effect on the
welfare of the people of Morong.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs Comelec
GR No. 125416
September 26, 1996
FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created the
Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to
implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic
military reservation into alternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic
military reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,
petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly
the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and
other installations left by the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan
passed PambayangKapasyahanBilang 10, Serye 1993,
expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said
Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and
submitted such to the Office of the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annulPambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify
PambayangKapasyangBlg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special
Economi Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are
met.

The Sangguniang BayanngMorong acted upon the petition by
promulgating PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 18, Serye 1993,
requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain
provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under
the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative
on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution
and not an ordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No.
532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein
the portion of the former naval base within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No.
2845 and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local
referendumand providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern
the conduct of the referendum

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari
contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public
respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that
proposes an amendment of a national law
ISSUE:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of
the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the
powers of the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such
initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."
HELD:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE
but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
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In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote
below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but
"initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as
a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a
"Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum
returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the
ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not
once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No.
2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and
laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the
legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right
reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which
has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would
without action on the part of electors become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and
supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of
elections. These law-making powers belong to the people,
hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change
the substance or the content of legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal
resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved
law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an
approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing
to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for
it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights
and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this
point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue
upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts
may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or
cases.
In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to
review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of
grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same
authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been
promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or
instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on
Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the
issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence,
there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality
or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire
jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
PART I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
[1] PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. v PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION
26 June 1940, G.R. No. 47065
Facts
PANTRANCO is in the transport business and operates in Pangasinan,
Tarlac, parts of Nueva Ecija and Zambales. It has existing certificated
of pubic convenience. It applied before the Public Service Commission
(PSC) to operate 10 additional trucks in order for it to comply with the
terms and conditions of its existing certificates, as well as the Eight
Hour Labor Law. PSC granted the application subject to new
conditions, over which PANTRANCO was not agreeable. It argued that
(1) CA 454, the statute granting PSC legislative powers effects a
complete and total abdication of legislative powers; and (2) even if CA
454 validly delegated legislative powers, PSC exceeded its authority
since the Act applies only to future certificates.
Issue:
May PSC impose additional terms and conditions over existing
certificates of public convenience?
Held:
Yes, it may.
It is Constitutionally mandated for the State to ensure the promotion
of public interest. Sec. 8, Art. XIII of the Constitution also provides
that no franchise, certificate or other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall exceed 50 years. CA 454 gives
authority to the PSC to prescribe as a condition for issuance of a
certificate the parameters already provided for in the Constitution,
hence what was delegated to PSC was merely an administrative
function, involving the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the
Legislature.
With the growing complexities of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward
the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the
approval of the practice by the courts.
Further, a review of the legislative proceedings for CA 454 reveals that
the Legislature intended PSC to have powers that apply to existing
certificates of public convenience. Statutes enacted for the regulation
of public utilities, being an exercise of police power, apply not only to
public utilities created after its passage, but likewise to those already
in operation.
Finally, PANTRANCO is a common carrier, and its business holds a
peculiar relation to the public interest that superinduced upon it is the
right of public regulation.
[2] EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. v PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL KASAR
AND KATHLEEN D. SACO
19 October 1998, G.R. No. 76633
Facts:
POEA awarded Php 192K to Kathleen Saco for the death of her
husband. She sued under EO No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2
of the POEA. Eastern Shipping argued that POEA had no jurisdiction
over the case since Saco was not an OFW, hence jurisdiction lay with
the SSS. Accordingly, it argued that (1) POEA’s Memorandum Circular
No. 2 was violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power, and (2) even if it was valid, the regulation amounted to an
exercise of legislative discretion which is not subject to delegation.
Issues:
(1) Did POEA have the authority to issue Memorandum Circular No.
2?
(2) Was POEA’s Circular an exercise of legislative discretion?
Held:
Yes, it had authority to issue the circular, and no, it was not an
exercise legislative discretion.
First, POEA had the authority to issue the Circular pursuant to Section
4(a) of EO 797.
Secondly, legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the
law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to
the delegate.
There is a need for administrative agencies because of the increasing
complexity of the government’s task and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. The solutions may be expected
from the delegates who are seen as experts in the particular fields.
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The power granted is on of “subordinate legislation”, and with it,
administrative agencies may implement the broad policies laid down in
a statute by “filling in” the details which Congress may not have the
opportunity nor the competence to provide.
[3] SOLID HOMES, INC. V TERESITA PAYAWAL
GR NO. 84811 AUG. 29,1989
Facts:
Teresita Payawal filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City against
Solid Homes, Inc. for the delivery of title to a subdivision lot.
Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National Housing
Authority under PD No. 957.
PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the
National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the
Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957."
Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
haveexclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.)
Issue:
Will Solid Homes,Inc. contention that claims for damages of the
subdivision/condominium buyer against the owner, developer, dealer
or salesmen is under the jurisdiction of the NHA prosper? Decide
Held:
Yes. PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344 leaves no room for
doubt that "exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner
and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial Court
but in the National Housing Authority.
Such claim for damages which the subdivision/condominium buyer
may have against the owner, developer, dealer or salesman, being a
necessary consequence of an adjudication of liability for non-
performance of contractual or statutory obligation, may be deemed
necessarily included in the phrase "claims involving refund and any
other claims" used in the aforequoted subparagraph C of Section 1 of
PD No. 1344. The phrase "any other claims" is sufficiently broad to
include any and all claims which are incidental to or a necessary
consequence of the claims/cases specifically included in the grant of
jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority under the subject
provisions.
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has
become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to
help in the regulation of its ramified activities. They can deal with the
problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice
[4] MECANO V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
GR NO. 103982 11,1992
Facts:
Antonio A. Mecano, Director II of the NBI, was hospitalized for
cholecystitis and incurred medical and hospitalization expenses. He
requested for reimbursement citing Sec. 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January
16, 1992, however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that
Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code
of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated
nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987.
He filed a petition for certiorari, and seek to nullify the decision of the
COA denying his claim for reimbursement.
Issue:
Did the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section
699 of the Revised Administrative Code?
Held:
NO. There are two types of repeal: express and implied.
Express repeal happens when there is a declaration in the new statute
that a specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed.
Implied repeal has two categories. First is that when the two acts
pertaining on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict
and the second is when the later act covers the whole subject matter
of the earlier one and is clearly intended to substitute the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not
cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code.
There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found
in the new Code, such as the provisions on claims for sickness benefits
under Section 699, and others. According to the Opinion of the Sec. of
Justice what appears clear in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the
intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to
administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of
the many changes that transpired in the government structure since
the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. Hence, every effort
must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable
construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a
repeal of the earlier.
Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed unless
it is manifest that the legislature so intended. The presumption is
against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed
to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
[5] PRIMITIVO LEVERIZA, FE LEVERIZA, PARUNGAO &
ANTONIO C. VASCO, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES & CIVIL AERONAUTICS
ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. L-66614 January 25, 1988
Facts:
Civil Aeronautics Administration as LESSOR, leased the same parcel of
land, for durations of time that overlapped to two lessees, to wit: (1)
Defendant Rosario C. Leveriza, and that plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines,
Inc., as LESSEE, leased the same parcel of land from two lessors, to
wit: (1) defendant Rosario C. Leveriza and (2) defendant Civil
Aeronautics Administration, Inc., for durations of time that also
overlapped. That because the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a
contract of sublease with Mobil Oil Philippines without the consent of
CAA (lessor), the contract was cancelled for violating the provision
against sublease.
Petitioners however contend that the administrator of CAA cannot
execute without approval of the Department Secretary, a valid contract
of lease over real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines,
citing Sections 567 and 568 of the Revised Administrative Code.
On the other hand, respondent CAA avers that the CAA Administrator
has the authority to lease real property belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines under its administration even without the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, which authority is
expressly vested in it by law, more particularly Section 32 (24) of
Republic Act 776
Issue:
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Who has the authority to execute contracts of lease covering
properties under the administration of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA)? Who should execute the contract of lease
involving CAA’s property?
Held:
Under Art. 567 of the Revised Admin Code (the 1987 Admin Code), a
contract of lease that the CAA will enter into must be executed by 1)
the President of the Philippines, or 2) an officer designated by him, or
3) an officer expressly vested by law. However, under RA 776 (the law
creating the CAA), it is the Administrator of the CAA who was given the
power to administer CAA’s property.
The law creating CAA (RA 776) is a special law, thus prevails over the
1987 Admin Code which is a general law.
Thus, the Administrator of the CAA shall have the power to lease a
government property of CAA despite a provision in the Admin Code
that it should be entered into by the President of the Republic,
because a special law (R.A. 776) creating CAA gives the Administrator
that power.
PART II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND
ORGANIZATION
[6] SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC) vs. ROBERTO MABALOT
February 27, 2002, G.R. No. 138200
Facts:
DOTC secretary Jesus Garcia issued Memorandum Order No. 96-735
which directed LTFRB Chairman Dante Lantin to effect the transfer of
regional functions of that office to the DOTC-CAR Regional Office
pending the creation of a regular Regional Franchising and Regulatory
Office pursuant to Section 1 of Executive Order No. 202
Respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition praying that MO be
declared illegal and without effect. The court issued a TRO enjoining
petitioner from implementing the MO. Later, Secretary Lagdemao
issued DO establishing DOTC-CAR as the regional office of the LTFRB
and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR
subject to the direct supervision and control of the LTFRB central
office. The court rendered MO and DO as null and void and without
any legal effect as being violative of the provision of the constitution.
Issue:
Were the MO and DO violative of the provision of the Constitution
against encroachment on the powers of the legislative department to
abolish offices and create new ones?
Held:
NO. The MO and DO were not violative of the Constitution.
Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, the President - through
his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary
in the present case - may legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the Department, particularly the
establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the
Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and
performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a
regional office of the LTFRB. At this point, it is apropos to reiterate the
elementary rule in administrative law and the law on public officers
that a public office may be CREATED through any of the following
modes, to wit, either (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by
law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by authority of law.
Congress can delegate the power to create positions. This has
been settled by decisions of the Court upholding the validity of
reorganization statutes authorizing the President to create,
abolish or merge offices in the executive department.
[7] EUGENIO vs. CSC
Facts:
Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research
Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility
and a CESO rank. She was given a CES eligibility and was
recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board (CESB).
Respondent Civil Service Commission passed Resolution No. 93-4359
abolishing the CESB. The resolution became an impediment to the
appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV. Petitioner
then filed the petition to annul Resolution No. 93-4359.
Issue:
Did Respondent CSC usurped the legislative functions of congress
when it abolished the CESB, an office created by law, through the
issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359?
Held:
Yes
The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative
function.
The Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1. As the CESB was created by law, it can only be
abolished by the legislature. In the case, the legislature has not
enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the
contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the
legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
[8] DE LA LLANA vs. ALBA
Facts:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes” was enacted.
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of BP 129. They filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition seeking to enjoin
respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking
any action implementing BP 129.
Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and
judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is unconstitutional for violating the the
security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges?
Held:
No
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Moreover, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the
authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish
existing ones.
[9] LARIN vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Larin questions the following memorandum and orders:
1. Memorandum No. 164 — It created a committee to investigate on
a complaint filed against Larin.
2. AO No. 101 — It found Larin guilty of grave misconduct, and
imposed the penalty of dismissal.
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3. EO No. 132: It ordered the streamlining/reorganization of BIR
(some positions and functions were abolished, decentralized and
transferred to other offices)
Larins position as Assistant Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service
was one of those that was abolished by EO 132.
Petitioner contentions: The President does not have the authority to
dismiss Larin from office, as the latter only exercises the power of
control over Career Executive Service Officers, and not the power of
removal. EO 132 was made in bad faith since Congress didn’t enact a
law that allowed the reorganization of the BIR.
Respondent contentions: Since Larin is a presidential appointee, he
falls under the disciplining authority of the President.
Issue:
Who has the power to discipline Larin/CESO?
Was Larin dismissed validly?
Is EO 132 a valid enacted law by the President?
Held:
Petition GRANTED; Larin is REINSTATED
The President Exercises Disciplinary Power Over CESO
Larin is a Career Executive Service Officer, and is therefore a
presidential appointee while enjoying the right to security of tenure.
The President exercises disciplining authority over Larin (conferred by
Section 16, Art. VII of the Consti) but can only remove him for any of
the causes enumerated by law (by virtue of Section 36 of PD 807).
The Administrative Case, Which Fully Relied On The Criminal
Conviction That Is Later Set Aside, Must Be Dismissed
Larin was not dismissed validly because the criminal case that was
relied on by the Administrative Order was later set aside by the
Supreme Court itself. Lifted from the full-text:
“where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner
is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set
aside by this Court upon a categorical and clear finding that the
acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful
and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case
necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action
against him, because in such a case, there is no more basis nor
justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit.”
EO 132 Is A Valid Law, But Must Conform To The CSC Law
Book III, EO 292 states:
"Sec. 20. Residual Powers. — Unless Congress provides
otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under
the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or
which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.”
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No.
1416, gives the President the power to reorganize. The decrees
expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices,
to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
EO 132 was made in bad faith because it violated Sec. 2 of RA 6656
(Protecting the CESO in Reorganization). There was a reorganization
and the new office was performing the very same functions.
Further Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656 states that officers holding
permanent appointments are given preference for appointment to the
new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their
former positions or in case there are not enough comparable positions
to positions next lower in rank. Larin is a career executive officer who
is holding a permanent position. Hence, he should have been given
preference for appointment in the position of Assistant Commissioner.
[10] CEBU UNITED ENTERPRISES (CUE) vs. JOSE GALLOFIN
Facts:
Cebu United Enterprises sought to compel, by a mandatory injunction,
Gallofin (Collector of Customs) to release their shipments of
newspapers purchased from the US, at the CFI-Cebu.
Issue:
Whether or not the Cebu United Enterprises had authority to import
the goods (ACTUALLY A SIDE-ISSUE BUT THE ONLY RELEVANT
TOPIC)
Held:
Yes, Cebu United Enterprises had authority.
The authority of the appellee to import was contained in the Import
Control Commission License No. 17225, validated on June 18, 1953,
and under Resolution 70 of the Commission (adopted March 27, 1952),
the same had a six-month period of validity counted from the said date
of June 18, 1953. This license states, among other conditions, that -
"Commodities covered by this license must be shipped from the
country of origin before the expiry date of the license, and are
subject to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 650."
Although Republic Act No. 650, creating the Import Control
Commission, expired on July 31, 1953, it is to be conceded that its
duly executed acts can have valid effects even beyond the life
span of said governmental agency.
[11] CRISOSTOMO V. CA
[G.R. No. 106296], July 5, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine
College of Commerce (PCC). During his incumbency as president of the
PCC, two administrative cases were filed against petitioner.
Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 992and R.A. No. 733
were likewise filed against him with the Office of Tanodbayan. On June
14, 1976, three (3) informations for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as amended) were
filed against him. On October 22, 1976, petitioner was preventively
suspended from office pursuant to R.A. No. 3019. In his place Dr.
Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge.
On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE
COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY,
DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS.
Subsequently, petitioner was acquitted of the charges against him and
was ordered reinstated to the position of President of the Philippine
College of Commerce, now known as the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines. The cases filed before the Tanodbayan (now the
Ombudsman) were likewise dismissed. On the other hand, the
administrative cases were dismissed for failure of the complainants to
prosecute them.
Petitioner then filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for
execution of the judgment, particularly the part ordering his
reinstatement to the position of president of the PUP and the
payment of his salaries and other benefits during the
period of suspension. The sheriff stated that he had executed the writ
by installing petitioner as President of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did
not vacate the office as he wanted to consult with the President of the
Philippines first. This led to a contempt citation against Dr. Gellor.
Petitioner assumed the office of president of the PUP.
On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining
order, enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from acting as
163
president of the PUP pursuant to the reinstatement orders of the
trial court.
Hence this petition.
Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which converted the PCC into the
PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He contends that if the law had intended
the PCC to lose its existence, it would have specified that the PCC was
being "abolished" rather than "converted" and that if the PUP was
intended to be a new institution, the law would have said it was being
"created." Petitioner claims that the PUP is merely a
continuation of the existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could be
reinstated to his former position as president.
Issue:
Was there an abolition of the Philippine College of Commerce?
Held:
No.
P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine
College of Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A.
No. 778 had converted what was then the Philippine
School of Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce. What
took place was a change in academic status of the educational
institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the
expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure
and organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish a
department or an office or an organization and to replace it with
another one, the lawmaking authority says so.
The appellate court ruled, however, that the PUP and the PCC are not
"one and the same institution" but "two different entities" and that
since petitioner Crisostomo's term was coterminous with the legal
existence of the PCC, petitioner's term expired upon the
abolition of the PCC. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court of Appeals took into account the following:
1. Being a university, PUP was conceived as a bigger institution
absorbing, merging and integrating the entire PCC and other
"national schools" as may be "transferred" to this new state
university;
2. The manner of selection and appointment of the university head
is substantially different from that provided by the PCC Charter;
3. The composition of the new university's Board of Regents is
likewise different from that of the PCC Board of Trustees;
4. The decree moreover transferred to the new university all the
properties including "equipment and facilities".
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing
institution and to create a new one. New course offerings can be
added to the curriculum of a school without affecting its legal
existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and organization
bring about its abolition and the creation of a new one. Only an
express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
[12] VIOLA V. ALUNAN III
[G.R. No. 115844], August 15, 1997
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art. III, §§1-
2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General
Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers so far as they provide
for the election of first, second and third vice presidents and for
auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.
Petitioner Cesar G. Viola brought this action as barangay chairman
against then Secretary of Interior and Local Government Rafael
M. Alunan III, et al., to restrain them from carrying out the elections
for the questioned positions on July 3, 1994.
Petitioner's contention is that the positions in question are in excess of
those provided in the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), §493 of
which mentions as elective positions only those of president, vice
president, and five members of the board of directors in each chapter
at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels. Petitioner argues that, in providing for the positions of
first, second and third vice presidents and auditor for each chapter,
§§1-2 of the Implementing Rules expand the number of positions
authorized in §493 of the Local Government Code in violation of the
principle that implementing rules and regulations cannot add or detract
from the provisions of the law they are designed to implement.
SC: Petitioner's contention that the additional positions in question
have been created without authority of law is untenable. To begin
with, the creation of these positions was actually made in the
Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga Barangay, which was
adopted by the First Barangay National Assembly on January 11, 1994.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the creation of the additional
positions is authorized by the LGC:
§493. Organization. — The liga at the municipal, city,
provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national
levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5)
members of the board of directors. The board shall appoint
its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions
as it may deem necessary for the management of the
chapter.
Issue: Can the Congress delegate the power to create positions and if
so, was there a sufficient standard in the exercise of such power?
Held: Yes.
That Congress can delegate the power to create positions such as
these has been settled by our decisions upholding the validity of
reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to
create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department. The
question is whether, in making a delegation of this power to the board
of directors of each chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay, Congress
provided a sufficient standard so that, in the phrase of Justice
Cardozo, administrative discretion may be "canalized within proper
banks that keep it from overflowing."
Statutory provisions authorizing the President of the Philippines to
make reforms and changes in government owned or controlled
corporations for the purpose of promoting "simplicity, economy and
efficiency" in their operations and empowering the Secretary of
Education to prescribe minimum standards of "adequate and efficient
instruction" in private schools and colleges have been found to be
sufficient for the purpose of valid delegation. Judged by these cases,
we hold that §493 of the Local Government Code, in directing the
board of directors of the liga to "create such other positions as may be
deemed necessary for the management of the chapter[s]," embodies a
fairly intelligible standard. There is no undue delegation of power by
Congress.
[13] NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs.CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION and VIOLETA L. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 84301. April 7, 1993
Facts:
"The records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws
graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy
Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later
reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to
which position, petitioner was also appointed under permanent status
up to September 1984. She was for two years, more or less,
designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9,
1981) which authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration
Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA) and regionalizing the Offices of the
Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as
164
Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary
status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar. Apparently EO
649 made being a member of the bar as a qualification for Deputy
Register of Deeds. She was involved in a bribery case and was later on
removed. She appealed the case to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB)
In its Order dated July 6, 1987, the MSPB dropped the appeal of
petitioner Garcia on the ground that since the termination of her
services was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment, her
separation is in order. Her motion for reconsideration was denied on
similar ground." 1
However, in its Resolution 2 dated June 30, 1988, the Civil Service
Commission directed that private respondent Garcia be restored to her
position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the
NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right theory the new
requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment
as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher as mandated under said
Executive Order, would not apply to her (private respondent Garcia)
but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer positions on or after
February 9, 1981, the date said Executive Order took effect." 3 A
fortiori, since private respondent Garcia had been holding the position
of Deputy Register of Deeds II from 1977 to September 1984, she
should not be affected by the operation on February 1, 1981 of
Executive Order No. 649.
Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of
the above Resolution of the Civil Service Commission
Issue:
Is the CSC correct in saying that Garcia is not affected by the change
in qualifications because the EO took effect after she had been holding
the position and she has a vested right on the position?
Held:
NO
EO 649 expressly abolished all positions in the LRC and restructured it
to become NALTDRA. Since there was a valid abolition, the position
that Garcia wishes to return to longer exists. It is already replaced by a
new position which requires that the holder must be a member of the
bar. Hence, Garcia is not qualified to hold it. This is different from a
removal, because it presupposes that a position subsists.
A final word, on the "vested right theory" advanced by respondent Civil
Service Commission. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an
estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an
office or its salary. None of the exceptions to this rule are obtaining in
this case.
To reiterate, the position which private respondent Garcia would like to
occupy anew was abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a
valid reorganization measure. There is no vested property right to be
re-employed in a reorganized office. Not being a member of the Bar,
the minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for
permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be
reinstated to her former position without violating the express
mandate of the law.
[14] DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, FELY MADRIAGA, SHIRLY
TAGABAN, RICARDO SARANDI, SUSAN IMPERIAL, BENJAMIN
DEMDEM, RODOLFO DAGA, EDGARDO BACLIG, GREGORIO
LABAYAN, HILARIO JEREZ, and MARIA CORAZON CUANANG,
vs. NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, represented by
ANTONIO DE GUZMAN and PERLITA BAULA
Facts:
The petitioners was terminated from their positions in the national
tobacco administration as a result of the executive order issued by
president Estrada which mandates for the streamlining of the National
Tobacco Administration (NTA), a government agency under the
Department of Agriculture.
The petitioners filed a letter-appeal to the civil service commission to
recall the Organization Structure and Staffing Pattern (OSSP) made by
the NTA which contains that changes made to the structure of the
positions. They then filed a petition for certiorari with prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and a
temporary restraining order with the regional trial court of Batak to
prevent the respondent from enforcing the notice of termination and
from ousting the petitioners in their respective offices.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Batac, Ilocos Norte. The regional trial court issued an order ordering
the national tobacco administration to appoint the petitioner to
position similar to the ones that they held before.
Issue:
Is the reorganization of the national tobacco administration valid
through issuance of a mere executive order by the president and not
by legislative action?
Held:
YES
The president has the power to reorganized an office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency as provided under Executive Order
292 sec. 31 and Section 48 of RA 7645 which provides that activities of
executive agencies may be scaled down if it is no longer essential for
the
delivery of public service.
Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10, of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987), above-referred to, reads thusly:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his
Office. The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office
and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may
take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential
Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the
Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies;
and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the
Office of the President from other departments and agencies
Sec. 48. of RA 7645 Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of
Agencies Within the Executive Branch. The heads of departments,
bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify
their respective activities which are no longer essential in the
delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased
out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. x x
x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities
shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution and
the Petition for an En Banc Resolution are DENIED for lack of merit.
Let entry of judgment be made in due course. No costs.
[15] KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI NG ENERGY REGULATORY
BOARD v. COMMISSIONER FE B. BARIN
June 29, 2007
Facts:
165
RA 9136, popularly known as EPIRA (for Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001), was enacted. Section 38 of such abolished the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and created the ERC. Petitioner
Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Board Regulatory Board (KERB)
wanted to declare said provision of the law as unconstitutional, on the
ground that it violated the security of tenure of its employees for
having been removed from their positions. (Out of the 212 ERB
employees, 138 were rehired and appointed to ERC plantilla positions
and sixty six 66 opted to retire or be separated from the service. 8)
ERB employees could not be appointed to new positions due to the
reduction of the ERC plantilla and the absence of positions appropriate
to their respective qualifications and skills). KERB claims that said
abolition was done in bad faith, thus invalid.
Issue:
WON the abolition of ERB was unconstitutional for having violated the
security of tenure of ERB’s employees?
Held:
No, abolition of ERB and creation of ERC was well within the
constitutional limits, and done with good faith; thus, there was no
violation of security of tenure.
If the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional
functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an
office different from the one abolished, even though it embraces all or
some of the duties of the old office, it will be considered as an
abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different one.
After comparing the functions of the ERB and the ERC, SC found that
the ERC indeed assumed the functions of the ERB. However, the
overlap in the functions of the ERB and of the ERC does not mean that
there is no valid abolition of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded
functions which are intended to meet the specific needs of a
deregulated power industry.
Legal Concepts about abolition mentioned in this case:
A valid order of abolition must not only come from a legitimate body, it
must also be made in good faith. An abolition is made in good faith
when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when it does
not circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service
employees.
The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in the order of abolition:
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in
the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially
the same functions is created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of
status of appointment, performance and merit;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or
agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same function as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in
Section 3 hereof.
[16] ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA V. ERMITA
April 20, 2010
Facts:
President Gloria Arroyo issued EO 378, whereby the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office) over the printing
services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities
was removed. In this law, government offices may now avail of
printing services from private companies. Executive Order No. 378 also
limited NPO’s appropriation in the GeneralAppropriations Act to its
income. Petitioners claim that EO 378 violates their security of tenure
as NPO employees, for it is a means to the gradual abolition of the
NPO.
Issue:
WON the said EO violates NPO employees’ security of tenure?
Held:
No, petition dismissed.
The president validly exercised its power to reorganized the
Executive Department. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence
that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and
agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents
constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by
virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize
executive offices under existing statutes
The reorganization by the president was done in good faith,
for failure of petitioners to present contrary proof. If the
reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which
results in loss of security of tenure of affected government employees,
would be valid.
A careful review of the records will show that petitioners utterly failed
to substantiate their claim. They failed to allege, much less prove,
sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the NPOs budget to its
own income would indeed lead to the abolition of the position, or
removal from office, of any employee. Neither did petitioners present
any shred of proof of their assertion that the changes in the functions
of the NPO were for political considerations that had nothing to do
with improving the efficiency of, or encouraging operational economy
in, the said agency.
[17] LOUIS BAROK BIRAOGO V. PTC, GR 192935 &
[18] LAGMAN V. OCHOA, GR 193036
Facts:
[17] G.R. No. 192935
Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer assails EO No. 1
for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section
1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority
of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds.
[18] G.R. No. 193036
Edcel C. Lagman, et.al filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition.
President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate
reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration thus, at the dawn of his administration, the
President signed EO No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
The Thrusts of the Petitions
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the
power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds
for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency
does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively
targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even
as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present,
who may be indictable.
Issues:
1. Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the
power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code?
2. Is there a valid delegation of power from Congress,
empowering the President to create a public office?
3. Does the President have the power to create the PTC?
4. Is EO No.1 constitutional?
166

Held:
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
Section 31 contemplates reorganization as limited by the following
functional and structural lines:
1. restructuring the internal organization of the Office of
the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from
one unit to another;
2. transferring any function under the Office of the
President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa;
3. transferring any agency under the Office of the
President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa.
The provision clearly refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is
already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be
effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is
in the negative. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the
Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No.
1.
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the
Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely
different from the power to create public offices. The former is
inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a
valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully
execute the laws.
Delegation of power from Congress
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission
pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416,
as amended by P.D. No. 1772. The said law granted the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including
the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services
and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and
materials. The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as
a justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is
already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a
delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the
power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of
the purposes of the decree.
President’s Power to create the PTC
The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
The allocation of power in the three principal branches of government
is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of
laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief
Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations
and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of
such authority.
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise
of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive
power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In
other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers
so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in
the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.
One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to
this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad
hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of
Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office,
suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an
allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.
Constitutionality of EO No.1
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the
investigative power of the President, but EO No. 1 should be struck
down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of
the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. To reiterate, in order for a
classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must
include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. In
Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the
previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional
as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three
times in the assailed executive order.
[19] BOYS SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
June 7, 2011
Facts:
COA issued Resolution No. 9901 “Defining the Commission’s policy
with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines” The
COA Resolution stated that BSP was created as a public corporation
under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the
Philippines v National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court
ruled that BSP as constituted under its charter, was a “government-
controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX (B) (20 (1) of
the Constitution”; and that “BSP is appropriately regarded as a
government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code.”
COA maintains that the functions of the BSP that include, among
others, the teaching to the youth of patriotism, courage, self-reliance,
and kindred virtues, are undeniably sovereign functions enshrined
under the Constitution and discussed by the Court in BSP v NLRC. COA
claims that the only reason why the BSP employees fell within the
scope of the Civil Service Commission even before the 1987
Constitution was the fact that it was a government-owned or
controlled corporation; that as an attached agency of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), the BSP is an agency of the
government; and that the BSP is a chartered institution under Section
1 (12) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, embraced under
the term government instrumentality. COA concludes that being a
government agency, the funds and property owned or held by the BSP
are subject to the audit authority of the COA pursuant to Section 2 (1),
Article IX (D) of the 1987 Constitution.
While the BSP concedes that its functions do relate to those that the
government might otherwise completely assume on its own, it avers
that this alone was not determinative of the COA's audit jurisdiction
over it. BSP further avers that the Court in BSP v NLRC "simply stated .
. . that in respect of functions, the BSP is akin to a public corporation"
but this was not synonymous to holding that the BSP is a government
corporation or entity subject to audit by the COA. BSP contends that
167
RA 7278 introduced crucial amendments to its charter; hence, the
findings of the Court in BSP v NLRC are no longer valid as the
government has ceased to play a controlling influence in it; that the
Court had categorically found that its assets were acquired from the
Boy Scouts of America and not from the Philippine government, and
that its operations are financed chiefly from membership dues of the
Boy Scouts themselves as well as from property rentals; and that "the
BSP may correctly be characterized as non-governmental, and hence,
beyond the audit jurisdiction of the COA." It further claims that the
designation by the Court of the BSP as a government agency or
instrumentality is mere obiter dictum.
Issue:
Is BSP a public corporation falling under COA’s audit jurisdiction?
Held:
Yes, BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA's
audit jurisdiction.
There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil
Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under Republic Act No.
7278, falls under the second classification. Article 44 reads:
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest or purpose created by law; their personality begins
as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality,
separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or
member. (Emphasis supplied.)
The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public interest or
purpose, is subject to the law creating it under Article 45 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of
the preceding article are governed by the laws creating or
recognizing them.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it
was created in order to implement a State policy declared in Article II,
Section 13 of the Constitution, which reads:
ARTICLE II — DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.
It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
The public, rather than private, character of the BSP is recognized by
the fact that, along with the Girl Scouts of the Philippines, it is
classified as an attached agency of the DECS under Executive Order
No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987.
Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled,
are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists
another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which
are otherwise known as "public corporations." These corporations are
treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government
which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and
economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public
purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their
administrative relationship to the government or any of its
Departments or Offices.
Regarding the COA's jurisdiction over the BSP, the Constitution clearly
provides:
Section 2. (1)The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle
all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or
held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters xxx.
Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public
corporation or a government instrumentality, it is subject to the
exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent
with the provisions of the BSP Charter.
[20] MARCOS et al., v Hon. MANGLAPUS et al.,
September 15, 1989
Facts:
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was forced out of office and
into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social
havoc in the country. After three years, he sought to return to the
Philippines but Corazon C. Aquino, considering the dire consequences
to the nation of his return at a time when stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning
to rise and move forward, stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
Petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so
"within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They
advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by
any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation
to that effect. They further assert that under international law, the
right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed.
Respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves
a political question which is non-justiciable. Respondents argue for the
primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual
rights. They also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and his
family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security
and public safety has international precedents.
Issue:
Does the President have the power under the Constitution, to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?
Held:
The Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested
in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does
not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Moreover,
the President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
The President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated
residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power
and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and
in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding
the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of
1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses
under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of
specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant
of executive power.
168
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the
Marcoses from returning has been recognized by members of the
Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House
of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the
President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine
unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable
proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for
human rights under the Constitution and our laws." The Resolution
does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense
of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel,
subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard
and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand
should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
[21] CARPIO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Congress Passed Republic Act No. 6975 Entitled "AN ACT
ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" As The Consolidated
Version Of House Bill No. 23614 And Senate Bill No. 463. Presently,
However, Petitioner As Citizen, Taxpayer And Member Of The
Philippine Bar Sworn To Defend The Constitution, Filed The Petition
Now At Bar On December 20, 1990, Seeking This Court's Declaration
Of Unconstitutionality Of RA 6975 With Prayer For Temporary
Restraining Order.
Petitioner Advances The View That RA 6975 Emasculated The National
Police Commission By Limiting Its Power "To Administrative Control"
Over The Philippine National Police (PNP), Thus, "Control" Remained
With The Department Secretary Under Whom Both The National Police
Commission And The PNP Were Placed.
Issue:
Whether said law shall be deemed unconstitutional?
Held:
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary
to the lowliest clerk 17 and has been held by us, in the landmark case
of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 18 to mean "the power of [the President] to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former with that of the latter." It is said to be at the very "heart
of the meaning of Chief Executive."
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the
President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the
same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to
his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly
exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and
by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department."
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are
placed under the reorganized Department of Interior and Local
Government is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster
a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public
safety agencies created under the assailed Act, 24 the funding of the
PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.
[22] SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION VS. CEMENT
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
Facts:
The case centers on the interpretation of provisions of Republic Act
No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA), which was one of the
laws enacted by Congress soon after the Philippines ratified the
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Philcemcor, an association of at least eighteen (18) domestic cement
manufacturers filed with the DTI a petition seeking the imposition of
safeguard measures on gray Portland cement, in accordance with the
SMA. After the DTI issued a provisional safeguard measure, the
application was referred to the Tariff Commission for a formal
investigation pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, in order to determine whether or not to impose
a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement.
The Tariff Commission held public hearings and conducted its own
investigation, then on 13 March 2002, issued its Formal Investigation
Report (Report). The Report determined as follows:
The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury
not having been established, it is hereby recommended that no
definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of
gray Portland cement.
The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could
still impose a definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the
negative finding of the Tariff Commission. After the Secretary of
Justice opined that the DTI could not do so under the SMA,[8] the DTI
Secretary then promulgated a Decision[9] wherein he expressed the
DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but
at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcors application for
safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in
light of the Tariff Commissions negative findings.
Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus[11] seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the
Tariff Commissions Report. It prayed that the Court of Appeals direct
the DTI Secretary to disregard the Report and to render judgment
independently of the Report. Philcemcor argued that the DTI
Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the power of review, is
not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission;
and, that the Report is void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework,
inconsistent inferences and erroneous methodology.
Issue:
Whether the DTI Secretary was barred from imposing a general
safeguard measure absent a positive final determination rendered by
the Tariff Commission.
Held:
The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve
duties on imported products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative
169
restrictions on the importation of a product into the country.
Concerning as they do the foreign importation of products into the
Philippines, these safeguard measures fall within the ambit of Section
28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.[49]
The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the
provision, and, hence, governing in this case. They are:
(1) It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts. Thus, the authority cannot come from the Finance
Department, the National Economic Development Authority, or the
World Trade Organization, no matter how insistent or persistent these
bodies may be.
(2) The authorization granted to the President must be embodied in a
law. Hence, the justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent
executive powers. It cannot arise from administrative or executive
orders promulgated by the executive branch or from the wisdom or
whim of the President.
(3) The authorization to the President can be exercised only within the
specified limits set in the law and is further subject to limitations and
restrictions which Congress may impose. Consequently, if Congress
specifies that the tariff rates should not exceed a given amount, the
President cannot impose a tariff rate that exceeds such amount. If
Congress stipulates that no duties may be imposed on the importation
of corn, the President cannot impose duties on corn, no matter how
actively the local corn producers lobby the President. Even the most
picayune of limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must be
observed by the President.
There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional
postulates. These impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within
the realm of the power of taxation, a power which is within the sole
province of the legislature under the Constitution.
Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no
authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the
importation of foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI
did not exist, the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided
on the ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of the
legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields such
delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as
an exceptional grant of legislative power to the President, rather than
the affirmation of an inherent executive power.
This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on
this presidential authority attain primordial consideration. First, there
must be a law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified
limits, a detail which would be filled in by the law. And further,
Congress is further empowered to impose limitations and restrictions
on this presidential authority. On this last power, the provision does
not provide for specified conditions, such as that the limitations and
restrictions must conform to prior statutes, internationally accepted
practices, accepted jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of
members of the executive branch.
The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President
under Section 28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with
legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the President, such as
department secretaries. Indeed, for purposes of the Presidents
exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is
generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter ego of the
President. The SMA provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the
DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their
capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such measures.
Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even as alter ego
of the President, to levy tariffs and imports.
Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA
should be likewise construed within the same context as part and
parcel of the legislative delegation of its inherent power to impose
tariffs and imposts to the executive branch, subject to limitations and
restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI
Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited
respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation of
the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary
legislative power of taxation. Indeed, even the President may be
considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing
safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which
possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without
legislative authorization through statute, the President has no power,
authority or right to impose such safeguard measures because taxation
is inherently legislative, not executive.
When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose
safeguard measures under the delineated conditions, the President or
the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to
perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the
legislature. It is basic agency law that the agent may not act beyond
the specifically delegated powers or disregard the restrictions imposed
by the principal. In short, Congress may establish the procedural
framework under which such safeguard measures may be imposed,
and assign the various offices in the government bureaucracy
respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of such measures, the task
assignment including the factual determination of whether the
necessary conditions exists to warrant such impositions. Under the
SMA, Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission
their respective functions[50] in the legislatures scheme of things.
There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the
limitations and restrictions imposed by Congress under Section 28(2)
Article VI, and that is such limitations and restrictions are themselves
violative of the Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful or
noxious these limitations and restrictions may seem, the Court has no
choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity
can be demonstrated.
What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the
present case? The entire SMA provides for a limited framework under
which the President, through the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may
impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffs and similar imposts.
The limitation most relevant to this case is contained in Section 5 of
the SMA, captioned Conditions for the Application of General
Safeguard Measures, and stating:
The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive
final determination of the [Tariff] Commission that a product is being
imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or
relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of
serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry; however, in
the case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary shall first establish
that the application of such safeguard measures will be in the public
interest.
[23] OSEA V. MALAYA
Facts:
Osea, (OIC, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent — Camarines
Sur), filed a protest with the CSC claiming that the appointment of
Malaya as Schools Division Superintendent — Camarines Sur was
invalid in the absence of prior consultation with the Provincial School
Board mandated by Section 99 of the Local Government Code. She
sought to declare the appointment be set aside for being null and void.
“Sec. 99. Functions of Local School Boards. — The provincial,
city or municipal school board shall:
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall consult
the local school boards on the appointment of division
170
 superintendents, district supervisors, school principals, and
other school officials.”
The CSC found that Malaya was merely reassigned, and not appointed
by the DECS Secretary. Thus, the CSC dismissed the protest and ruled
that the consultation with the local school board was unnecessary.
On review, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, hence the
petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Is the recommendation from the provincial school boards required
before the designation of Malaya?
Held:
Petition DENIED; NO; The designation of Malaya was only a
reassignment and not an appointment.
Section 99 of the Local Government Code requiring prior
consultation with the local school board in the appointment of division
superintendents, district supervisors, school principals and other school
officials, does not apply to reassignments.This is the plain
meaning of the law.
In Osea’s situation: the DECS appointed Osea as OIC, Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent — Camarines Sur, with the
recommendation from the Provincial School Board. (following Sec. 99)
In Malaya’s situation: the President appointed Malaya as the Schools
Division Superintendent but did not specify the station. It was the
DECS that later on assigned and designated Malaya to Camarines Sur.
The SC held this to be a ‘reassignment’. Malaya’s designation partook
of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City, where she previously
exercised her functions as OIC, Schools Division Superintendent —
Camarines Sur.
An appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions
of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless
he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
A reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which
does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not
require the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a
designation connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an
incumbent official.
[24] TECSON VS. SALAS
34 SCRA 275, 1970
Facts:
Tecson, Superintendent of Dredging, Bureau of Public Works, was
given a directive by the Executive Secretary Salas to be detailed to the
Office of the President, to assist in the San Fernando Project. Tecson
was reporting to Comodore Nuval, the Presidential Assistant on the
Ports and Harbors. Eventually, acting by presidential authority, Salas
ordered the nullification of Tecson’s detail to the Office of the
President.
Tecson filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. He argued that
Salas’ detail order, although issued by Authority of the President,
should be approved by the Budget Commissioner and the
Commissioner of Civil Service.
On the other hand, Salas argued that Tecson’s contention would
contravene to the generally accepted principle which recognizes
presidential power of control over the Executive Department. Also, the
temporary assignment of Tecson to the said office is not a demotion in
rank and salary, neither is it to be considered as a disciplinary action
against him and it does not involve removal from his present position
by transferring him to another position in a lower class. He should
have retained his position as Superintendent.
Issue:
Is the assignment of Tecson on temporary detail to the office of the
Comodore Nuval constitutes removal from office w/o cause
Held:
The question raised in this controversy is on the appraisal of the
validity of the acts of the President or Congress is one of power, it is
not for the Court to inquire on the motives that may have prompted
the exercise of a presidential authority, though at most, it can look into
the question of whether there is a legal justification for what was
done. This is a manifestation of the concept of the Principle of
Separation of Powers.
[25] DE LEON V. CARPIO
Facts:
The services of Francisco R. Estavillo as Agent III and of Cesar R. de
Leon as Head Agent in the National Bureau of Investigation were
terminated by then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales.
They were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil Service
Commission. They did. In substantially similar Orders, they were
sustained by the Merit Systems Protection Board of the said
Commission. It was held that their dismissals were invalid and
unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security of
tenure under the 1987 Constitution, which had already become
effective. Accordingly, the Board ordered their reinstatement with back
salaries but without prejudice to the filing of appropriate administrative
charges against them.
Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro referred the order
reinstating Estavillo to the respondent as Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation "for his information and appropriate
action." On March 14, 1988, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H.
Bello III referred the order reinstating De Leon to the respondent "for
appropriate action" and "immediate implementation." The reaction of
the respondent was to return the said orders to the Civil Service
Commission "without action," claiming that they were null and void for
having been rendered without jurisdiction.
Unable to return to their respective positions, Estavillo and De Leon
came to this Court in separate petitions for mandamus. The
respondent was required to comment. He again questioned the
jurisdiction of the Board, contending inter alia that it had no authority
to review dismissals made under the Freedom Constitution and that
the petitioners' dismissals were already final, not having been
seasonably appealed.
Issue:
whether or not the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation can
disobey an explicit and direct order issued to him by the Secretary of
Justice.
Held:
It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined
in the Constitution and honored not in the breach but in the
observance, that all executive departments, bureaus and offices are
under the control of the President of the Philippines. The President's
power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the
Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and
other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is
self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may
its be exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature.
Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his
Cabinet and may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at
pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, and replace them in his discretion. Once in place, they
are at all times under the disposition of the President as their
immediate superior. Justice Laurel put it aptly in Villena v. Secretary of
171
theInterior, when he said that "without minimizing the importance of
the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but
the projection of that of the President." Hence, "their acts, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive."
In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the
respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Secretary Ordoñez was acting
in the regular discharge his functions as an alter ego of the President.
His acts should therefore have been respected by the respondent
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, which is in the
Department of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a
subordinate in this department, the respondent was (and is) bound to
obey the Secretary's directives, which are presumptively the acts of
the President of the Philippines.
Our conclusion is that this regrettable controversy would not have
arisen at all if the respondent had had the humility to recognize the
limits of his authority and acted accordingly. Plainly put, Director
Carpio should have dutifully obeyed the orders of Secretary Ordoñez
as his immediate superior in the Department Justice. That is what we
must now order the respondent to do.
[26] LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. V. PANO
Facts:
Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-
hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan,
Province of Davao. Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a
portion (392,7569 hectares) of the above public land to plaintiff. On
April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially
released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural
land.
Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of
ninety hectares of the released area. Plaintiff corporation in turn filed
its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was
protested by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the
averment that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by
their own sales application.
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict,
rendered a decision on July 31, 1956 giving due course to the
application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose
Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed. On July 5,
1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on appeal
by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held that the appeal
was without merit and dismissed the same. The case was elevated to
the President of the Philippines.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of
the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the
Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public
interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend
on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they
have made improvements;" and (2) directed that the controverted land
(northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan,
Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided
into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without
prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of
surveying this portion." It may be well to state, at this point, that the
decision just mentioned, signed by the Executive Secretary, was
planted upon the facts as found in said decision.
Issue:
whether or not the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the
President, can reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had
been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
Held:
YES.
The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So,
too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that
department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to
appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure.
Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his
authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his
department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the
President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department
secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as
affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to the Office
of the President.This Court has recognized this practice in several
cases. In one, the decision of the Lands Director as approved by the
Secretary was considered superseded by that of the President's
appeal. In other cases, failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of
appeal was considered a fatal defect, warranting dismissal of the case,
for non-exhaustion of all administrative remedies.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the
President reposes upon the President's power of control over the
executive departments. And control simply means "the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."
[27] MONTES vs. CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF APPEALS
TOPIC: Principle of Exhaustion of Admin Remedies
Facts:
In Administrative Case No. R-8182 instituted against Montes for
negligence in the performance of duty as a watchman of the Floating
Equipment Section, Ports and Harbours Division of Bureau of Public
Works, the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him on the basis
of findings made by a committee. On appeal, the Civil Service Board
of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of
contributory negligence in not pumping the water from the bilge which
sunk the dredge under his watch, and ordered that he be considered
resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to
reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer.
Petitioner files an action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to
review the decision. On a Motion to Dismiss, the said court dismissed
the action on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his
administrative remedies before he instituted the action as provided in
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 598. Montes argued that there is no
duty imposed upon him to appeal to the President. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Montes erred in filing the action immediately before
the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of filing an appeal before
the President of the Philippines?
Held:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires where
an administrative remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief
must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will
act. The doctrine is a device based on considerations of comity and
convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the
courts, not only to give the administrative agency opportunity to
decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary
and premature resort to the courts.
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 598 provides that:
The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the power and authority
to hear and decide all administrative cases brought before it on
appeal, and its decisions in such cases shall be final, unless revised or
modified by the President of the Philippines.
172
The above-mentioned provision is a clear expression of the policy or
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the President,
under whom the Civil Service directly falls in our administrative system
as head of the executive department, may be able to grant the remedy
that petitioner pursues, reasons of comity and orderly procedure
demand that resort be made to him before recourse can be had to the
courts.
[28] MEDALLA VS. SAYO
Facts:
Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr., is the Chief of Clinics of the
Caloocan City General Hospital, Caloocan City. Private respondent,, Dr.
Honorato G. Mackay was the Resident Physician thereat.
When the position of Assistant, hospital Administrator of the Caloocan
City General Hospital became vacant upon the resignation of the
incumbent, former Caloocan City Mayor Alejandro A. Fider designated
and subsequently appointed, as Assistant Hospital Administrator
private respondent Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital.
Petitioner, Dr. Medalla, Jr., protested Dr. Mackay's designation and
subsequent appointment alleging among others that, as Chief of
Clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank. The then Acting City Mayor
Virgilio P. Robles, who succeeded former Mayor, now Assemblyman
Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4th Indorsement dated September 20, 1978,
sustained Mackay's appointment.
Dissatisfied, Medalla elevated his case to the Civil Service Commission
on appeal. On December 29, 1978, the Civil Service Merit Systems
Board issued Resolution No. 49 sustaining Medalla's appeal and
revoking Mackay's appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator.
Upon automatic review by the Office of the President, it declared that
the appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as Assistant Hospital
Administrator in the Caloocan City General Hospital is hereby revoked
and the position awarded in favor of appellant Dr. Eustaquio M.
Medalla.
The Acting City Mayor, on behalf of Mackay, moved for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Who has the right to be the Hospital Administrator of Caloocan City.
Held:
To start with, under the Revised Charter of the City of Caloocan RA
No. 5502), it is clear that the power of appointment by the City Mayor
of heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds is subject to Civil
Service law, rules and regulations (ibid., section 19).
The Caloocan City General Hospital is one of the city departments
provided for in the said law (ibid., sec. 17). The Hospital Administrator
is appointed by the City Mayor (ibid., section 66-B). The Hospital
Administrator is the head of the City General Hospital empowered to
administer, direct, and coordinate all activities of the hospital to carry
out its objectives as to the care of the sick and the injured (ibid.).
Under section 19 (3) of the Civil Service Decree (PD No. 807, effective
on October 6, 1975), the recruitment or selection of employees for
promotions is drawn from the next-in-rank.
SEC. 19. Recruitment and Selection of Employees. —
xxx xxx xxx
(3) When a vacancy occurs in a position in the second level of the
Career Service as defined in Section 7, the employees in the
government service who occupy the next lower positions i the
occupational group under which the vacant position is classified and in
other functionally related occupational groups and who are competent,
qualified and with the appropriate civil service eligibility shall be
considered for promotion.
Section 19 (6) of the same Decree provides for the administrative
procedure by an aggrieved employee in case of non-observance by the
appointing authority of the next-in-rank rule, thus:
Sec. 19(6) A qualified next-in-rank employee shall have the right to
appeal initially, to the department head and finally to the Office of the
President an appointment made ... (2. in favor of one who is not next-
in-rank, ... if the employee making the appeal is not satisfied with the
written special reason or reasons given by the appointing authority for
such appointment: ... Before deciding a contested appointment the
Office of the President shall consult the Civil Service Commission.
For purposes of this Section, .qualified next-in-rank' refers to an
employee appointed on a permanent basis to a position previously
determined to be next-in- rank to the vacancy proposed to be filled
and who meets the requisites for appointment thereto as previously
determined by the appointing authority and approved by the
Commission.
The prescribed procedure has been followed by petitioner Medalla He
had appealed to the department head and from thence, in view of the
latter's unfavorable action, to the Civil Service Commission and
thereafter to the Office of the President.
Resolution No. 49 of the Civil Service Merit Systems Board its Decision
of June 27, 1979, and the Decision of the presidential Executive
Assistant dated April 24, 1979, were all rendered in Medalla's favor.
The special reason given by the Acting City Mayor for Mackay's
appointment, which is, that lie had completed all academic
requirements for the Certificate of Hospital Administration, is not
tenable, since Medalla himself was found to be in possession of the
same qualification.
But while the qualifications of both petitioner Medalla and private
respondent Mackay are at par, yet, it is clear that the position of Chief
of Clinics is the next lower position to I hospital Administrator under
the organizational line-up of the hospital. Consequently, at the time of
Mackays appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator and
subsequently hospital Administrator, Medalla outranked Mackay who
was only a Resident Physician and, therefore, as the next-in rank,
Medalla is entitled to appointment as Hospital Administrator.
Respondent Mackay's urging that he was denied due process deserves
scant consideration considering that subsequent developsments in the
case establish that he was heardon his Motions for Reconsideration by
both the Civil Service Commission and the office of the President.
It is true that, as the respondent City Mayor alleges, a local executive
should be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they
are qualified and elligible, who in his best estimation are possesses of
the requisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and
judgement. 9
However, as reproduced heretofore, the Decision of the Civil Service
Merit Systems Board, upheld by the Office of the President, contains a
judicious assessment of the qualifications of both petitioner Medalla
and private respondent Mackay for the contested position, revealing a
careful study of the controversy between the parties, which cannot be
ignored. The revocation of Mackay's appointment reveals no
arbitrariness nor grave abuse of discretion.
Hence,
1) the appointment extended to private respondent, Dr. Honorato C.
Mackay, as Hospital Administrator is hereby declared null and
void;
2) respondent City Mayor of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to
extend an appointment to petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, as
Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital
immediately upon notice of this Decision;
3) petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, shall receive all
compensation and emoluments appertaining to said position
thenceforth, but without entitlement to salary differentials; and
4) respondent Judge is hereby permanently enjoined from further
proceeding with Civil Case No. 7770.
[29] THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., vs.
COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS
[G.R. No. 135945. March 7, 2001.]
173
Facts:
The property being fought over by the parties is a 10.36-hectare
property in Baguio City called Dominican Hills donated to the Republic
of the Philippines by UCPB through its President, Eduardo Cojuangco,
to be utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in human
settlements and economic development and governmental purposes"
of the Ministry of Human Settlements.
The Presidential Management Staff (PMS) received an application from
petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC. (UNITED,
for brevity), a community housing association composed of non-real
property owning residents of Baguio City, to acquire a portion of the
Dominican Hills property. PMS Secretary Elfren Cruz referred the
application to the HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATION
(HIGC). HIGC consented to act as originator for UNITED. A
Memorandum of Agreement was signed by and among the PMS, the
HIGC, and UNITED for the PMS to sell the Dominican Hills property to
HIGC which would, in turn, sell the same to UNITED. After UNITED
made its final payment, HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
July 1, 1992.
Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered
the Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed
houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from
the city mayor.
Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under
the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS
ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed an action for
injunction, in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4.
While Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, the ASSOCIATION, this time
represented by the Land Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc.
(BENEFICIARIES, for brevity), filed Civil Case before Branch 61 of the
same court. The complaint prayed for damages, injunction and
annulment of the said Memorandum of Agreement between UNITED
and HIGC.
Petitioner avers that private respondents returned and reconstructed
the demolished structures. To forestall the re-implementation of the
demolition order, private respondents filed a petition for annulment of
contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order, docketed as
COSLAP Case No. 98-253, in the Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City
Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of
Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent COSLAP issued
the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo.
Petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the
COSLAP.
Issue:
Is COSLAP under EO No. 561 empowered to try and hear a petition for
annulment of contracts with prayer for a TRO and thus, arrogate unto
itself the power to issue status quo order and conduct a hearing
thereof?
Held
No, COSLAP does not have the power to issue the status quo order.
Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 speaks of any resolution, order or
decision of the COSLAP as having the "force and effect of a regular
administrative resolution, order or decision." The qualification places
an unmistakable emphasis on the administrative character of the
COSLAP's determination, amplified by the statement that such
resolutions, orders or decisions "shall be binding upon the parties
therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same."\
An agency is defined by statute as "any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality,
or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government
or a distinct unit therein." A department, on the other hand, "refers to
an executive department created by law." Whereas, a bureau is
understood to refer "to any principal subdivision of any
department." In turn, an office "refers, within the framework of
governmental organization, to any major functional unit of a
department or bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to
any position held or occupied by individual persons, whose functions
are defined by law or regulation." An instrumentality is deemed to
refer "to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction
by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions
and government-owned or controlled corporations."
Applying the principle in statutory construction of ejusdem generis,
i.e., "where general words follow an enumeration or persons or things,
by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are
not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned," section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 patently
indicates that the COSLAP's dispositions are binding
on administrative or executive agencies. The history of the COSLAP
itself bolsters this view. Prior enactments enumerated its member
agencies among which it was to exercise a coordinating function.
However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative
agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still,
administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither
part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The
doctrine of separation of powers observed in our system of
government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3)
branches — the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary — each
department being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own
sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own
fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the
judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, it is empowered "to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
[30] BEJA vs. CA
G.R. No. 97149. March 31, 1992
Facts:
Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. was first employed by the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA) as arrastre supervisor in 1975. He became
Assistant Port Operations Officer in 1976 and Port Operations Officer in
1977. In February 1988, as a result of the reorganization of the PPA,
he was appointed Terminal Supervisor.
The PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed Administrative Case
against petitioner Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty,
grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Beja and Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees resulting
in the loss of P38,150.77 on the part of the PPA. Consequently, they
were preventively suspended for the charges. After a preliminary
investigation conducted by the district attorney for Region X,
Administrative Case was "considered closed for lack of merit."
Another Administrative Case was filed against Beja by the PPA general
manager also for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and for being notoriously undesirable. The charge
consisted of six (6) different specifications of administrative offenses
including fraud against the PPA in the total amount of P218,000.00.
Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to Sec. 41
of P.D. No. 807.
The PPA general manager indorsed the Administrative Case to the AAB
for "appropriate action." At the scheduled hearing, Beja asked for
continuance on the ground that he needed time to study the charges
against him. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an
opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja
filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later, he filed with
174
the AAB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of
Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the
pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the
motion and continued with the hearing of the administrative case.
Issue:
(1) Is the preventive suspension issued by the PPA General Manager,
valid?
(2) Does the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB have jurisdiction to
initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel, an
agency attached to the said Department, below the rank of
Assistant General Manager?
Held:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it upholds
the power of the PPA General Manager to subject petitioner to
preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the
jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on Administrative Case
and rules that due process has been accorded the petitioner.
(1) Yes. The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who
may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of
Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are sanctioned,
not only by Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 857 aforequoted, but also by Sec.
37 of P.D. No. 807granting heads of agencies the "jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions
against officers and employees" in the PPA.
(2) SC qualifiedly ruled in favor of petitioner.
The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July 11, 1974. Under
that law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing
Board of Directors known as the Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec.
5(i) of the same decree gave the Council the power "to appoint,
discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical
staff of the Authority and other personnel."
P.D. No. 505 was substituted by P.D. No. 857. Sec. 4(a) thereof
created the Philippine Ports Authority which would be "attached" to the
then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication.
When Executive Order No. 125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing
the Ministry of Transportation and Communications was issued, the
PPA retained its "attached" status.
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the
Department to which it is attached than one which is under
departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision.
This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the Department
and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and
program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the
independence of an attached agency from Departmental control and
supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even an agency under
a Department's administrative supervision is free from Departmental
interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions
"in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under
the Administrative Code of 1987. Moreover, the Administrative
Codeexplicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and
control shall not apply to chartered institutions attached to a
Department.
Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the
management of personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain extent,
free from Departmental interference and control. This is more explicitly
shown by Section 8, of P.D. No. 857. Although the foregoing section
does not expressly provide for a mechanism for an administrative
investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to remove erring
employees on the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA
Board of Directors, the law impliedly grants said officials the power to
investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may
be charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation,
the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may subject the employee
concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be
conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D.
No. 807. Only after gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General
Manager impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the
latter action which requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors.
From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board
of Directors, the employee concerned may elevate the matter to the
Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal directly to
the Civil Service Commission.
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA
General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General
Manager should have first conducted an investigation, made the
proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and sought its
approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the
part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC
Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.
[31] CESA VS COMELEC
Facts:
Government auditors conducted a surprise audit at the Cash Division
of Cebu City Hall. Getting wind of the surprise audit, paymaster
Rosalina G. Badana hurriedly left her office and, since then, never
returned. For a long time, Badana had cash advances of more
than P216 million fraudulently incurred by presenting cash items such
as payrolls and vouchers already previously credited to her account to
cover the balance or shortage during cash counts. Her unliquidated
cash advances were more than P18 million. The government auditors
discovered that Badana had an average monthly cash advance of P7.6
million in excess of her monthly payroll of P5.7 million, and was
granted more advances without liquidating previous advances.
City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia administratively charged Badana before the
Office of the Ombudsman. Cesa argued before the Ombudsman that he
could not grant cash advances as the authority belongs to a higher officer
and that he signed the cash advance vouchers not as approving officer but
because his signature was required therein. He also emphasized that since
he had under him five department heads, he was not expected to review
the work of some 370 workers under them, by virtue of division of labor
and delegation of functions.
Ombudsman found Cesa and the other city officials guilty of neglect of
duty and meted to them the penalty of six months suspension without
pay. The Court of Appeals upheld the findings and conclusions of the
Ombudsman, but declared that the imposable penalties therein were
merely recommendatory and should be directed to the proper officer
or authority concerned for enforcement.
Invoking Arias, Cesa insists he could rely on his subordinate,
the head of the cash division, who performed her functions
well, and that no inference of negligence can be drawn from
the act of relying on subordinates as government operates by
division of labor and delegation of functions.
Issue:
Whether Cesa could rely on his subordinate, the head of the cash
division to warrant the notion that there was no negligence on his part.
Held:
NO. In Alfonso v. Office of the President, where this Court held
that Arias was not applicable, we ruled that a public officials
foreknowledge of facts and circumstances that suggested an
irregularity constitutes an added reason to exercise a greater degree of
circumspection before signing and issuing public documents. By failing
to prevent the irregularity that Cesa had reason to suspect all along or
to take immediate steps to rectify, Cesa had tolerated the same and
allowed it to wreak havoc on the coffers of the city.
[32] LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. ASSOCIATION OF
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES
(G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995)
Facts:
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their
respective Position Papers to a Voluntary Arbitrator. The arbitrator
175
received ALDBE's Position Paper but LDB failed to submit its Position
Paper. Even without LDB’s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator
ruled that the Bank did not adhere to the CBA provision nor the MoA
on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside
the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from
enforcing the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining
Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April
1994, on promotion.
Held:
In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to
an impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence
and arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves
to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.
Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it
is based, as either compulsory or voluntary.
Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute
are compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are
compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration
by a third party who is normally appointed by the government.
Voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by
the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their
collective agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and
binding resolution.
The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of
such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides
that "(t)he award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be
final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the
copy of the award or decision by the parties," 5 while the "(d)ecision,
awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders."
Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a
labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal
from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary
arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the Supreme Court itself
on a petition for certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator
with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is
illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.
In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court ruled
that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a
quasi-judicial capacity." It follows that the voluntary arbitrator,
whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-
judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his
decisions are not appealable to the latter.
Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of
voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial
agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel are
comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial instrumentality."
An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. Thus,
the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are
synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a
government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is
performed. The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state,
contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental
power for the performance of a state function. An individual person,
like an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the
settling of an estate, in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed
by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, and a trustee
in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the
state.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to
a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor
in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of
the term "instrumentality" in Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his
functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not
place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-
judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein.
The decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators
should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the
procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like
those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions
enumerated therein.
Under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the
Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which
the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be
specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one
of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is
held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any
time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court
having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court
must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or
corrected.
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator
with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for
certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be
deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a
matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of
Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of
Appeals.
[33] IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 102976, October 25, 1995
Facts:
The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by PD No. 272, in
order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in
the Philippines. Initially, it was created for a term of 5 years but when
its original term expired, its term was extended for another 10 years
by EO No. 555. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly
owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is an
entity wholly owned by the National Government embarked on an
expansion program which includes the construction of a steel mill in
Iligan City. Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President
withdrawing from sale or settlement a tract of land in Iligan City to be
used by the NSC. However, certain portions of the public land under
Proclamation 2239 were occupied by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Co.
(MCFC).
LOI No. 1277 was issued directing NSC to negotiate with the owners of
MCFC for and on behalf of the Government for the compensation of
MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject land. The LOI directed
that ISA may exercise the power of eminent domain should the
negotiations fail. The negotiations failed and ISA commenced
expropriation proceedings against MCFC. While trial was on-going the
statutory existence of ISA had expired prompting MCFC to file the
dismissal of the case since ISA has ceased to be a juridical person. The
trial court granted MCFC’s motion to dismiss anchoring on the Rules of
Court that “only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by
law may be parties to a civil case.” ISA moved for a reconsideration
contending that despite the expiration of its term, its juridicial
existence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be
completed. In the alternative ISA urged that the Rep. of the Philippines
176
should be allowed to be substituted in its place. The RTC denied its
motion for reconsideration. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be
substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s term.
Held:
There is no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing
general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct
from that of the Government. ISA in fact appears to be a non-
incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other
agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are
case in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or
instrumentalities, sometimes with and other times without capital
stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from
the personality of the Republic. The term “Authority” has been used to
designate both incorporated and non-incorporated agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government.
The Court considers that ISA is properly regarded as an agent or
delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a
body corporate and juridical person vested with full panoply of powers
and attributes which are compendiously described as “legal
personality.”
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the
powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that
agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the
Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some
other disposition thereof such as e.g. devolution or transmission of
such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor
agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the
expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such
expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that
agency and, by way of supplementation in the provisions of the
Corporation Code. Since ISA is a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets
and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the
Government of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the
Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have
mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the
Republic.
It follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be
substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of
ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. The expiration of ISA’s
statutory did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent
domain proceedings. Further, no new legislative act is necessary
should the Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to
continue to prosecute the expropriation proceedings.
For the legislative authority, a long time ago, enacted a continuing or
standing delegation of authority to the President of the Philippines to
exercise, or cause the exercise of, the power of eminent domain on
behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
The issue on whether the constitutional requirement for public use or
public purpose is still premature. The issue is appropriately addressed
in the proceedings before the trial court. Those proceedings have yet
to produce a decision on the merits, since trial was still on going at the
time the Regional Trial Court precipitously dismissed the expropriation
proceedings.
[34] REPUBLIC, ACTING THROUGH THE SRA VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
200 SCRA 226 (1991)
Facts:
Republic Planters Bank (hereafter referred to as RPB), Zosimo
Maravilla, Rosendo de la Rama, Bibiano Sabino, Roberto Mascufiana
and Ernesto Kramer, "for themselves and in representation of other
sugar producers" filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court for
Sum of Money and/or Delivery of Personal Property with Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction against the Philippine Sugar
Commission (PHILSUCOM) and the National Sugar Trading Corporation
(NASUTRA).
They also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to
enjoining PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA from transferring, releasing or in
any manner disposing of all U.S. dollar deposits/accounts held in the
name of defendants, its subsidiaries, conduits agents and/or
representatives in the different banks, domestic and foreign, including
the physical sugar corresponding to crop year 1984-85 presently
remaining in the warehouses of the different sugar mills all over the
country.
Before PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA could answer, a Compromise
Agreement was submitted by the parties which the lower court
approved and based on it. The RTC did not grant their petition. The
Court of Appeals Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition for lack
of merit principally because of the following reasons:
(a) Under the compromise agreement petitioner (RPB) accepted the
designation/appointment as Trustee whose obligation is to pay; it
received benefits by way of trustee's fees; it may not question the
right of private respondents to attorney's fees;
(b) Petitioner (SRA) may not lawfully bring an action on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines since under
Section 13 of Executive Order No. 18 dated 28 May 1986,
which created it, it simply was to take over the functions
of the defunct PHILSUCOM; however, the latter was to
remain a judicial entity for three more years for the
purpose of prosecuting and defending suits against it;
hence it is PHILSUCOM, being a party to the compromise
agreement, which may properly contest the right of
private respondents to attomey's fees;
(c) The petition should have been filed through the Office of the
Solicitor General OSG and not through the (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel or OGCC); neither the latter nor
the (SRA) may lawfully represent the Government of the
Philippines in any suit or proceeding such as the present petition
for administrative agencies may only perform such powers and
functions as may be authorized by the laws which created or gave
them existence; and
(d) The respondent judge did not commit any error of jurisdiction in
issuing the questioned orders; hence, the remedy should be
appeal.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in holding that neither the OGCC nor the SRA
can represent the Government of the Philippines in the action before it
Held:
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner Sugar
Regulatory Administration may not lawfully bring an action on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and that the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel does not have the
authority to represent said petitioner in this case.
Executive Order No. 18, enacted on 28 May 1986 and which took
effect immediately, abolished the Philippine Sugar Commission
(PHILSUCOM) and created the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA)
which shall be under the Office of the President. However, under the
third paragraph of Section 13 thereof, the PHILSUCOM was allowed to
continue as a juridical entity for three (3) years for the purpose of
prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to
settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to
distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the
functions for which it was established, under the supervision of the
SRA.
Section 3 of said Executive Order enumerates the powers and
functions of the SRA; but it does not specifically include the power to
represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against it,
nor the power to sue and be sued although it has the power to "enter,
make and execute routinary contracts as may be necessary for or
incidental to the attainment of its purposes between any persons,
177
firms, public or private, and the Government of the Philippines" and
"[t]o do all such other things, transact such other businesses and
perform such functions directly or indirectly incidental or conducive to
the attainment of the purposes of the Sugar Regulatory
Administration." 18
Section 4 thereof provides for the governing board of the
Administration, known as the Sugar Board, which shall exercise "[a]ll
the corporate powers" of the SRA. Its specific functions are
enumerated in Section 6; however, the enumeration does not include
the power to represent the Republic of the Philippines, although
among such functions is "[t]o enter into contracts, transactions, or
undertakings of whatever nature which are necessary or incidental to
its functions and objectives with any natural or juridical persons and
with any foreign government institutions, private corporations,
partnership or private individuals. 19
It is apparent that its charter does not grant the SRA the power to
represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against the
latter.
It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has
only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and
those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
(Guerzon vs Court of Appeals, et al., 77707, August 8, 1988, 164 SCRA
182,189, citing Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. vs. SEC, 14 SCRA 620,
and Sy vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570.) 20
The SRA no doubt, is an administrative agency or body. An
administrative agency is defined as "[a] government body charged
with administering and implementing particular legislation. Examples
are workers' compensation commissions ... and the like. ... The term
'agency' includes any department, independent establishment,
commission, administration, authority board or bureau ... 21
The power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in any
suit by or against it having been withheld from SRA, it
following that the latter cannot institute the instant petition
and the petition in C.A.-G.R. No. 17188 on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines.
This conclusion does not, however, mean that the SRA cannot sued
and be sued. This power can be implied from its powers to make and
execute routinary contracts as may be necessary for or incidental to
the attainment of its purposes between any persons, firms public or
private, and the Government of the Philippines and to do all such other
things, transact such other businesses and perform such other
functions directly or indirectly incidental or conducive to the attainment
of the purposes of the SRA and the powers of its governing board to
enter into contracts, transactions, or undertaking of whatever nature
which are necessary or incidental to its functions and objectives with
any natural or juridical persons and with any foreign government
institutions, private corporations, partnership or private individuals.
The Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that the OGCC (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel) can represent neither the SRA nor
the Republic of the Philippines. We do not, however, share the view
that only the Office of the Solicitor General can represent the SRA.
The entry of appearance by the OGCC for the SRA was precipitated by
the sudden turn-about of the Office of the Solicitor General. Records
show that the OSG eventually represented the PHILSUCOM, NASUTRA
and SRA in the trial court. However, on 29 January 1988 it filed a
Manifestation dated January 27, 1988 informing the court that its
appearance in the case "is limited to the issues relating only to the
contempt proceedings against the public respondents and is not
concerned with the other issues raised by various parties in their
petitions for relief". 22 By reason thereof, the Chairman/Administrator
of SRA, Mr. Arsenio Yulo, Jr., sent a letter 23 dated 6 April 1988 to the
Solicitor General, informing him that since the appearance of the OSG
is limited and that it has taken a different position, SRA's only
alternative is to seek another representative and that much to its
regret, it is constrained to terminate OSG's services. He further
informed the Solicitor General that the case is being indorsed to the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for appropriate legal
action pursuant to P.D. No. 478. There is, however, no showing that
the OSG withdrew its appearance for PHILSUCOM, NASUTRA or the
SRA in the trial court. On the contrary, per its Manifestation dated 8
February 1990, and filed with this Court on 12 February 1990, 24 it
"has retained its appearance" "on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines to recover whatever amount may be owing to the National
Treasury by virtue of legal subrogation."
Also on April 6,1988, SRA sent a letter 25 to OGCC to engage its legal
services to represent SRA as successor agency of the PHILSUCOM in
the case pending before the trial court.
The OGCC, availing of P.D. No. 1415, the law creating it, particularly
Section 1 which, as quoted by it on page 16 of the Petition, 26 reads:
SECTION 1. The Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel shall be the principal law office of all government-
owned and controlled corporations, including their
subsidiaries except as may otherwise be provided by their
respective charters or authorized by the President (Emphasis
supplied).
sent a letter to the Office of the President, "in essence, requesting for
authority for OGCC to represent SRA in the case before the trial court,"
This was favorably acted by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr.
Indeed, under Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) the Solicitor
General is the lawyer of the government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. Said Section reads as
follows:
SECTION 35. Functions and Organization. — The Office of
the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by
the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government-owned and controlled corporations.
The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law
office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of lawyers. ... .
This is similar to subsection (1) of Section 1 of P.D. No. 478.
In Republic, et al. vs. Partisala et al. (G.R. No. 61997, 15 November
1982, 118 SCRA 370, 373), We ruled that only the Solicitor General
can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
and that, henceforth, actions filed in the name of the Republic if not
initiated by the Solicitor General will be summarily dismissed.
However, in Secretary Oscar Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, et al.,
G.R. No. 92561, 12 September 1990, 28 We stated:
In the discharge of this task, the Solicitor General must see
to it that the best interest of the government is upheld
within the limits set by law. When confronted with a
situation where one government office takes an adverse
position against another government agency, as in this case,
the Solicitor General should not refrain from performing his
duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon
him to present to the court what he considers should legally
uphold the best interest of the government although it may
run counter to a client's position. In such an instance the
government office adversely affected by the position taken
by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the merit of its
case, may appear in its own behalf through its legal
personnel or representative.
Consequently, the SRA need not be represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General. It may appear in its own behalf
through its legal personnel or representative.
178
The question that logically crops up then is: May it be represented by
the OGCC? Respondents hold the negative view. Petitioners maintain
otherwise, for the reason that pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of
the OGCC (P.D. No. 1415), as they quoted, the Office of the President,
through the Executive Secretary, has authorized it to represent the
SRA. The specific basis for such authority is the alleged portion of the
exceptionary clause therein, reading "... or authorized by the
President."
The words or authorized by the President are not found in the law. We
are not aware of any law, decree or executive order which amended
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1415 by inserting therein said words. Besides,
even granting for the sake of argument that such words are written
into the law, such exception cannot confer upon the OGCC authority to
represent the SRA. The exception simply means that although the
OGCC is the principal law office of all government-owned and
controlled corporations including their subsidiaries, the President may
not allow it to act as lawyer for a specified government-owned or
controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof. It will be noted that
under Section 1 of P.D. No. 478 the President may authorize the OSG
to represent government-owned or controlled corporations. In short,
the exception limits, rather than expands, the authority of the OGCC.
Thus, the so-called approval by the Executive Secretary of the request
of OGCC to represent the SRA is based on an erroneous interpretation
of the law.
In any case, even if we grant that there was such an exception, as
well construed in the manner urged by petitioners, it must be deemed,
nevertheless, to have been repealed by the Administrative Code of
1987. Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV thereof on the Office of
the Government Corporate counsel does not contain the purported
exception. It reads:
SECTION 10. Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. —The
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) shall act as the
principal law office of all government-owned or controlled
corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings and
government acquired asset corporations and shall exercise control and
supervision over all legal departments or divisions maintained
separately and such powers and functions as are now or may hereafter
be provided by law. In the exercise of such control or suspension, the
Government Corporate Counsel shall promulgate rules and regulations
to effectively implement the objectives of the Office. ...
Since the SRA is neither a government-owned or controlled
corporation nor a subsidiary thereof, OGCC does not have the
authority to represent it. The case of the RPB is, however,
different. It is admitted to be a government-owned corporation. The
OGCC can, therefore, legally represent RPB in actions filed by or
against it. Unfortunately, this issue was not categorically and expressly
addressed by the Court of Appeals and has not been raised in the
petition. Anyway, even if We have to rule that OGCC's appearance for
the RPB in the petition before the Court of Appeals in CAGR No. 17188
was proper, the result would be the same dismissal of the petition. As
also correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, having received
benefits by way of trustee's fees, the RPB may not question the right
of private respondents to attorney's fees; its only obligation under the
judgment based on compromise was to pay the attorney's fees from
out of the funds it held in trust.
[35] MANUEL M. LEYSON JR. vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
TIRSO ANTIPORDA, Chairman, UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and
OSCAR A. TORRALBA, President, CIIF Oil Mills
[G.R. No. 134990. April 27, 2000]
Facts:
International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), engaged in
the lighterage or shipping business, entered into a one (1)-year
contract with LEGASPI OIL, GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT,
comprising the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) companies,
for the transport of coconut oil in bulk through MT Transasia. The
majority shareholdings of these CIIF companies are owned by the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as administrator of the CIIF.
Under the terms of the contract, either party could terminate the
agreement provided a three (3)-month advance notice was given to
the other party. However, in August 1996, or prior to the expiration of
the contract, the CIIF companies with their new President, respondent
Oscar A. Torralba, terminated the contract without the requisite
advance notice. The CIIF companies engaged the services of another
vessel, MT Marilag, operated by Southwest Maritime Corporation.
Following such breach of contract, Petitioner Leyson Jr., Executive Vice
President of ITTC, charged respondent Tirso Antiporda, Chairman of
UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and respondent Oscar A. Torralba with
violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act also before the
Ombudsman anchored on the alleged irregularities and corrupt
practices. The latter dismissed the complaint based on its finding that
the case is a simple case of breach of contract with damages which
should have been filed in the regular court. It ruled that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of
the termination of the contract entered into by CIIF and ITTC. Besides
the entities involved are private corporations over which it has no
jurisdiction.
In this action, petitioner now imputes grave abuse of discretion on
public respondent in dismissing his complaint. He submits that
inasmuch as Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED)
v. PCGG[4] and Republic v. Sandiganbayan[5]have declared that the
coconut levy funds are public funds then, conformably with Quimpo v.
Tanodbayan,[6] corporations formed and organized from those funds or
whose controlling stocks are from those funds should be regarded as
government owned and/or controlled corporations. Since the funding
or controlling interest of the companies being headed by private
respondents was given or owned by the CIIF as shown in the
certification of their Corporate Secretary,[7] it follows that they are
government owned and/or controlled corporations. Corollarily,
petitioner asserts that respondents Antiporda and Torralba are public
officers subject to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Issue:
Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the case?
Held:
No. Par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code of 1987 defines "government owned or controlled corporation" as
any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary
in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of
stock corporations, to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock.
The definition has 3 requisites: 1) any agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation; 2) vested with functions relating to public
needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and, 3) owned
by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least 51% of its capital stock.
In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF
companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns
44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of
GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED
COCONUT.[15] Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI
OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or
controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to
GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second
requisite. Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to
substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT
and/ or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions relating to public
needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature. The Court thus
concludes that the CIIF companies are, as found by public respondent,
private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over these corporations, not being
GOCC.
179

[36] OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DENNIS M. VILLA-
IGNACIO, in his capacity as Special Prosecutor, Office of the
Ombudsman vs ATTY. GIL A. VALERA and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 164250. September 30, 2005
Facts:
Valera was the Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
Criminal and administrative charges were filed against him with the
Office of the Ombudsman alleging several violations of laws. But
Ombudsman Marcelo issued a Memorandum inhibiting himself from
said cases and directing the Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to act in
his stead and place. Pursuant to said memorandum, Special Prosecutor
Villa-Ignacio, in the administrative case, issued the Order placing
respondent Valera under preventive suspension for six months without
pay after his findings of strong evidence of guilt of respondent Deputy
Commissioner Valera and the fact that the charges against him consist
of Grave Misconduct and/or Dishonesty which may warrant his removal
from the service. The order of Preventive Suspension was questioned
before the CA and the CA nullifies such order holding that the Special
Prosecutor has no such authority to order such considering the limited
nature of its powers. The Memorandum made by the Ombudsman was
likewise nullified for the reasons that (1) it effectively stretched (or
over-stretched) the limited powers of the special prosecutor under R.A.
No. 6770 and the Constitution; (2) it has effectively placed the special
prosecutor over and above all of the five (5) deputies of the
Ombudsman in terms of hierarchy with respect to administrative
adjudication; (3) the Ombudsman has, wittingly or unwittingly,
permitted the Office of the Special Prosecutor to perform the
administrative adjudicative powers of the Ombudsman not only to
issue preventive suspension but to perform, without qualification, any
and all other administrative adjudicative powers, duties functions and
responsibilities pertaining to the former as provided under R.A. No.
6770 and the Constitution.
Issue:
Did the Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio have the authority to place
Valera under preventive suspension in connection with the
administrative case pending before the Office of the Ombudsman?
Held:
No, the Special Prosecutor has no such authority.
The Ombudsman, pursuant to his power of supervision and control
over the Special Prosecutor, may authorize the latter to conduct
administrative investigation. Under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770,
the Ombudsman has been granted investigatory and prosecutory
powers which were characterized as plenary and unqualified. It
pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. On the other hand, the authority of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor has been characterized as limited as it is merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may act only under
the supervision and control and upon the authority of the
Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Pursuant to its power of supervision and control, the
Office of the Ombudsman is empowered under R.A. No. 6770 to
delegate to the deputies, or its investigators or representatives such
authority or duty and complementary, the law requires the latter to
perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
However, R.A. No 6770 grants the power to preventively suspend only
to the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen as the law makes no
mention of Special Prosecutor. The obvious import of this exclusion is
to withhold from the Special Prosecutor the power to preventively
suspend. The express mention of one person, thing, act or
consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The Ombudsman and the
Deputy Ombudsmen have been granted the power to preventively
suspend as the same inheres in their mandate under the Constitution
even if R.A. No. 6770 accords the Special Prosecutor the same rank as
that of the Deputy Ombudsmen. Under civil service laws, rank
classification determines the salary and status of government officials
and employees. Although there is substantial equality in the level of
their respective functions, those occupying the same rank do not
necessarily have the same powers nor perform the same functions.
However, if the Ombudsman delegates his authority to conduct
administrative investigation to the Special Prosecutor and the latter
finds that the preventive suspension of the public official or employee
subject thereof is warranted, the Special Prosecutor may only
recommend to the Ombudsman to place the said public officer or
employee under preventive suspension.
[37] COMMUNITY RURAL BANK OF GUIMBA (N. E.), INC. vs.
Judge TOMAS B. TALAVERA
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1909 April 6, 2005
Facts:
The Bank lodged a complaint with the City Prosecutor's Office of
Cabanatuan charging several persons with Estafa. After a preliminary
investigation, the Investigating Fiscal recommended the filing — of six
(6) Informations for Estafa against the accused. The accused appealed
the findings of the Investigating Fiscal to the Department of Justice.
The DOJ denied the petition of the accused. Then, the accused filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied by the DOJ. Hence,
respondent Judge issued a Warrant of Arrest fixing no bail against the
accused.
After that, the accused filed a Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. However, neither the Bank nor its
counsel was furnished a copy of said Motion. There was also no
hearing on the said motion to afford the Bank an opportunity to
oppose the same. Respondent Judge granted the Motion for
Reinvestigation without any hearing thereon. Thus, a reinvestigation
proceeding was conducted by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
Again, the Bank was not notified of said proceedings.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor reversed the earlier findings of the
previous Investigating Fiscal. Thus, on the same day, a Motion to
Dismiss was filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. Neither the
bank nor its counsel was notified about the said Motion and no hearing
thereon was held to afford the Bank an opportunity to oppose the
same. Respondent Judge granted the Motion to Dismiss and ordered
the release of the accused.
Issue:
Whether the Judge erred in dismissing the case on the strength of the
reversal by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the earlier findings of
the previous Investigating Fiscal which was already affirmed by the
Secretary of Justice.
Held:
Yes, respondent showed his lack of understanding of the basic and
established superior-subordinate relationship between the secretary of
justice and the provincial prosecutors.
Inasmuch as the Resolution of the Investigating Fiscal has been
affirmed by the Secretary of Justice, the existence of probable cause to
hold the accused for trial may be deemed to be the finding of the
Secretary himself, not merely of the prosecutor who had first
investigated the case. Therefore, what the assistant provincial
prosecutor reviewed and overruled in the reinvestigation was not the
actuation and resolution of his predecessor, but of the secretary of
justice no less.
The justice secretary's superior authority in the prosecution of offenses
was elucidated upon by this Court in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 16
which we quote:
"Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Sections 5, 8, and 9,
Chapter 2, Title III of the [Revised Administrative] Code gives the
secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief
Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope
of his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38,
paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
180
 '(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall
include authority to act directly whenever a specific function
is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; . . .'
"'Supervision' and 'control' of a department head over his subordinates
have been defined in administrative law as follows:
'In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform such duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.'
"Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary
over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes,
abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative
activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher
administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. . . ."
The actions of prosecutors are not unlimited; they are subject to
review by the secretary of justice who may affirm, nullify, reverse or
modify their actions or opinions. Consequently the secretary may direct
them to file either a motion to dismiss the case or an information
against the accused.
In short, the secretary of justice, who has the power of supervision
and control over prosecuting officers, is the ultimate authority who
decides which of the conflicting theories of the complainants and the
respondents should be believed. The provincial or city prosecutor has
neither the personality nor the legal authority to review or overrule the
decision of the secretary.
Considering that a prima facie case had been found to exist against
the accused during the preliminary investigation — a fact affirmed by
the justice secretary — respondent judge should have exercised great
restraint in granting a reinvestigation.
[38] ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, ET AL V. ERMITA
G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010
Facts:
The National Printing Office was formed during the term of former
President Corazon C. Aquino, by virtue of Executive Order No. 285
which provided, among others, the creation of the NPO from the
merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing
units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA). Section 6 thereof
provides that the NPO shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction over the
following:
a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable
forms of national, provincial, city and municipal governments,
including government corporations;
b. Printing of officials ballots;
c. Printing of public documents such as the OfBcial Gazette, General
Appropriations Act, Philippine Reports, and development
information materials of the Philippine Information Agency
On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed
Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of Executive Order No.
285 by removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing
services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and
instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the
private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition
that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality
and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO.
Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO's appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act to its income.
Issues:
1. Whether it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to
amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former
President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers;
and
2. Whether Executive Order No. 378 will lead to the gradual
abolition of the NPO and effect the loss of security of tenure of its
present employees.
Held:
1. No.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the
power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive
department in line with the President's constitutionally granted power
of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of
the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing
statutes.
The Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing
authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the
President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code,
is explicit:
Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his
Office. — The President, subject to the policy in the Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency,
shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may
take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of
the President Proper, including the immediate Offices,
the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and
the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President
to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President
to any other department or agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the President from other
Departments or agencies.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of
the Press Secretary is part of the Office of the President. Concomitant
to such power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the Office of
the President Proper and to transfer functions/offices not only among
the offices in the Office of President Proper but also the rest of the
Office of the President and the Executive Branch, the President
implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less substantive
changes to the functional and internal structure of the Office of the
President, including the modification of functions of such executive
agencies as the exigencies of the service may require. To be very
clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to
the Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies
of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the
Legislature or the constitutionally created or mandated bodies.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a
removal of any of its functions to be transferred to another agency.
Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the
main printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms
and publications but in the interest of greater economy and
encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the
private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception
of election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of
the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the
Commission on Elections may determine. At most, there was a mere
alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity of
its printing responsibility to election forms.
2. No.
181
The basic evidentiary rule is that he who asserts a fact or the
affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it. A careful review of
the records will show that petitioners utterly failed to substantiate their
claim. They failed to allege, much less prove, sufficient facts to show
that the limitation of the NPO's budget to its own income would indeed
lead to the abolition of the position, or removal from office, of any
employee. Neither did petitioners present any shred of proof of their
assertion that the changes in the functions of the NPO were for
political considerations that had nothing to do with improving the
efficiency of, or encouraging operational economy in, the said agency.
In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show any
constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo's issuance of Executive
Order No. 378.
[39] PLR – BIRAOGO vs. TRUTH COMMISSION
2010 EN BANC
[40] LAGMAN vs. OCHOA
Facts:
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of
which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010.
President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate
reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the
President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed
under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Though it has been described as an independent collegial body, it is
essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and
subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad
hoc body is one.
It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to
state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or
sanctions.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions.
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause.
Held:
1. No. Executive Order No. 1 DOES NOT VIOLATE the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions.
However, the power to create PTC does not fall under the power of
reorganization of the President but under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.
The question before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall
within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31
of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates
reorganization as limited by the following functional and structural
lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof
or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any
function under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency
under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or
vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an
office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to
be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is
in the NEGATIVE.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the
President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the
plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of
an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure
of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive
Order No. 1.
In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that
reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing
structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of
control, authority and responsibility between them.
Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to
create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the
latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his
inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from
Congress, empowering the President to create a public office?
The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: "Section 17.
The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed."
As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus, the SC held
the view that the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in
the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws
are faithfully executed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of
Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office,
suffice it to say that there will be NO appropriation but only an
allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the
power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to
specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever
funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission. Moreover, since the
amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing
auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
2. No. Executive Order No. 1 DOES NOT supplant the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
182
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as
such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions
in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the
Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the
two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task
of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual
prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the
merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to
the commission. The phrase, when in the course of its investigation,
under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a
contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints
before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
3. Yes. Executive Order No. 1 VIOLATES the equal protection clause.
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the
investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in
upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Applying the equal protection precepts to this case, Executive Order
No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the "previous administration"only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the
questioned executive order.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration
is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations.
It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
PART III. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN
GENERAL
[41] MATIENZON V. ABELLERA
G.R. No. L-45839. June 1, 1988.
Facts:
Petitioners & private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators
in Metro Manila. The respondents, however, admittedly operate
"colorum" or "kabit" taxicab units, yet, on February 1977, they filed
their petitions with the Board of Transportation for the legalization of
their unauthorized "excess" taxicab units citing Presidential Decree No.
101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, "to eradicate the harmful and
unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them
to become legitimate and responsible operators." Within a matter of
days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the
applications for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority to
operate their "excess taxicab units" for which legalization was sought.
Petitioners opposed this, alleging that the BOT acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization and
awarding special permits to the private respondents.
Petitioners argue that neither the Board of Transportation chairman
nor any member thereof had the power, at the time the petitions were
filed (i.e. in 1977), the power to legitimize clandestine operations
under PD 101 had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and
after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973. They state
that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus officio.
Issue:
Did the BOT have the power to legitimize clandestine and unlawful
taxicab operations under Section 1 of PD101?
Held:
Yes.
A reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the
respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step towards the
legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time
limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to
suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after
promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the
withdrawal of the State's waiver of its right to punish said colorum
operators for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section
declares when the period of moratorium suspending the relentless
drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no
impediment to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction under its broad
powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public
convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a,
Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).
It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or
commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally
construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and
that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the
legislative intent should be upheld as being germane to the law.
Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the appropriate means are
deemed given (Martin, Administrative Law, 1979, p. 46).
[42] AZARCON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 116033. February 26, 1997
Facts:
Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated a hauling business. Occasionally,
he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose
trucks were left at the former’s premises. A Warrant of Distraint of
Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the BIR addressed
to the Regional Director or his authorized representative of Revenue
Region 10, Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the goods,
chattels or effects and other personal property of Ancla, a sub-
contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The
Warrant of Garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to
transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his
possession owned by taxpayer Ancla.
Azarcon, in signing the “Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized
Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue,” assumed the
undertakings specified in the receipt. Subsequently, Ancla took out the
distrained truck from Azarcon’s custody. For this reason, Azarcon was
charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Can Azarcon be considered a public officer by reason of his being
designated by the BIR as a depositary of distrained property?
Held:
No.
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as “any
person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any
183
rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer." Thus, to be a
public officer, one must have been granted authority by direct
provision of the law, popular election, or by appointment by competent
authority.
Although Sec. 206 of the NIRC authorizes the BIR to effect a
constructive distraint by requiring "any person to preserve a distrained
property, no provision in the NIRC constitutes such person a public
officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR's power authorizing a
private individual to act as a DEPOSITARY cannot be stretched to
include the power to appoint him as a public officer.
[43] REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATION vs
SENDINO
233 SCRA 665
Facts:
Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservation
agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square
meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Paranaque for
P307,800.00 as its purchase price. She paid P1,000.00 as partial
reservation fee on January 15, 1989 and completed payment of this
fee on January 20, 1989 by paying P4,000.00. On July 18, 1989,
private respondent paid REVI P16,600.00 as full downpayment on the
purchase price. However, she was advised by REVI to change her co-
maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do
so. For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of
the appropriate documents under the terms of the original agreement,
REVI, through its Vice-President for Marketing, informed respondent of
the cancellation of the contract on the 31st of July 1989.
On April 20, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for Specific
Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and
Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) asking that respondent be ordered to comply and continue
with the sale of the house and lot, and to pay damages.
On April 3, 1991 the HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide the
complaint was challenged by REVI in its answer, rendered its judgment
in favor of private respondent and ordered petitioners to continue with
the sale of the house and lot and to pay private respondent damages
and costs of the suit. An appeal from this decision was taken to the
HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The
decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the
President, herein public respondent.
On January 7, 1993, the public respondent rendered its decision
dismissing the petitioners' appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the
decision was denied by the public respondent on January 26, 1993.
Consequently petitioners come before this Court, in this petition, which
the Court resolves to treat as a petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the public respondent committed serious error in
declaring that the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions notwithstanding
absence of express grant by E.O. No. 90 which created it
Held:
No. It is settled that rules of procedure are as a matter of course
construed liberally in proceedings before administrative bodies. In the
instant case, the original suit for specific performance and damages
was filed by the private respondent with the HLURB-OAALA, an
administrative body not hamstrung by the strict procedural
technicalities of the Rules of Court. Under the circumstances, it was
certainly appropriate for the HLURB-OAALA to have acted on the
substantive questions relating to the validity of petitioners' unilateral
rescission of the contract without unduly concerning itself with a mere
procedural slip, the non-joinder of private petitioner's husband in the
original complaint before the HLURB.
Moreover, since petitioners participated in the administrative
proceedings without objecting to or raising the procedural infirmity,
they were certainly estopped from raising it on appeal before the
Office of the President and before this Court.
Proceeding to the principal issues raised by the petitioner, while E.O.
85 dated 12 December 1986 abolished the Ministry of Human
Settlements (MHS), it is patently clear from a reading of its provisions
that the said executive order did not abolish the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) which continued to exercise its powers
and functions even after the Ministry of Human Settlements ceased to
exist.
In spite of the Aquino Government's stated intention of eradicating
what
it considered the vestiges of the previous regime, it was not its
intention to create a vacuum by abolishing those juridical entities,
agencies, corporations, etc., attached to or supervised by the MHS,
which performed vital administrative functions.
Pursuant to this provision therefore, the President subsequently issued
Executive Order No. 90, series of 1986, recognizing the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (renamed the HLURB) as one of
the
principal housing agencies of the government. Prior to this, Executive
Order No. 648 in 1981 transferred all the functions of the National
Housing Authority (pursuant to Presidential Decrees Nos. 957, 1216
and
1344) to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC)
consolidating all regulatory functions relating to land use and housing
development in a single entity. Being the sole regulatory body for
housing and land development, the renamed body, the HLURB,
11would have been reduced to a functionally sterile entity if, as the
petitioner contends, it lacked the powers exercised by its predecessor
which included the power to settle disputes concerning land use and
housing development and acquisition.
As explicitly provided by law, jurisdiction over actions for specific
performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner or developer, is
vested exclusively in the HSRC. There is no question that a statute
may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency
over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's
special expertise.
The National Housing Authority (now HLURB) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in
accordance with the terms of PD No. 957 which defines the quantum
of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of said agency.
Clearly, therefore, the HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over
the case filed by the petitioners with its adjudicative body, the OAALA,
in ordering petitioners to comply with their obligations arising from the
Reservation Agreement. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-
judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined
in the agency's enabling act. The Court recognizes the HLURB as the
successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions, it therefore
follows that the transfer of such functions from the NHA to the HRSC
effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981, thereby resulted in
the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory powers which included
the power to "hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business
practices and cases of specific performance." Obviously, in the exercise
of its powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret and apply
contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts,
and award damages whenever appropriate.
We fail to see how the HSRC - which possessed jurisdiction over the
actions for specific performance for contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against developers - had
suddenly lots its adjudicatory powers by the mere fiat of a change in
name through E.O. 90. In fine, the HLURB-OAALA acted within the
scope of its authority in ordering petitioners to comply and continue
with the sale of the house and lot subject of the contract between the
original parties. It cannot be gainsaid that the quasi-judicial functions
exercised by the body are necessary incidents to the proper exercise of
its powers and functions under E.O. 90 and the laws enacted
184
delineating the scope of authority of its Board of Commissioners.
Denying the body those functions so necessary in carrying out its
power to regulate housing and land use results in its effective
emasculation as an important regulatory body in an area vital to the
national economy.
One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the
interpretation of such contracts and agreements and the determination
of private rights under these agreements is no longer a uniquely
judicial function. The absence of any provision, express or implied, in
E.O. 90, repealing those quasi-judicial powers inherited by the HSRC
from the National Housing Authority, furthermore militates
against petitioners' position on the question.
[44] LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. CA
Facts:
Because of the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991, The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of
this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within
their municipal waters. Rendering the law creating the Laguna Lake
Authority, Republic Act 4850 as amended by Presidential Decree 813
and Executive Order 927 series of 1983, somewhat repealed by R.A
7160.
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue
fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took
advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the
consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as
of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water
surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares
in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to
construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the
policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna
Lake carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of
separate independent policies in the operation of fishpens and
fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake
and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already
saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current
environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to
the general public that those permits not filed with them are declared
invalid and if they continue with their operation, that they will be
facing criminal charges.
Issue:
Whether or not the law creating the Laguna Lake Development
Authority is repealed by R.A. 7160.
Held:
No.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not
necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake
Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority
over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above,
specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region,
including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act
No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges
to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus
fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express
provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the
Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part
of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments.
The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No.
7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic
in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which
is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law.
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority,
which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and
sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative
intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the
purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the
Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for
lake quality control and management. It does partake of the nature of
police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the
most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation.
Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid
exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government
Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages
and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3
of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees
collected.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will
render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the
Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power
would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if
not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local
Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.
[45] SMART COMMUNICATIONS VS. NTC
(G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003)
Facts:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) promulgated rules and
regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. Petitioners-
communications companies filed an action for declaration of nullity of
the billing circulars, alleging, among others: that NTC contravened the
Civil Code provisions on sales in regulating the sale of prepaid call
cards; and that the billing circular violated the constitutional prohibition
against the deprivation of property without due process of law.
The NTC moved to dismiss the case for failure of petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss
and enjoined the NTC from implementing the questioned circulars. The
CA, however, dismissed the case on appeal without prejudice to the
referral of the petitioners' grievances and disputes on the assailed
issuances with the NTC.
Issue:
Is dismissal of the petition valid since NTC violated the principle of
exhaustion of Administrative Remedies?
Held:
No. The dismissal is not valid.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the trial court has jurisdiction
to hear and decide the civil case. Judicial power includes the authority
of the courts to determine the validity of the acts of administrative
agencies. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not
exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle
applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. In
185
like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises its quasi judicial or adjudicatory
function.
[46] PROVIDENT TREE FARMS V. HON. BATARIO
Facts:
A.J. International (AJIC) imported several containers of matches from
Indonesia and Singapore. Provident Tree Farms (PTFI), engaged in
industrial tree planting, filed a complaint for injunction and damages
against AJIC and the Commissioner of Customs to stop the
importation, claiming that based on Sec. 36, Par. (I) of the Revised
Forestry Code which confers on entities like PTFI to encourage
qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, there is a
qualified ban against the importation of wood and “wood-derivated”
products.
AJIC moved to have the complaint dismissed alleging that only the
Commissioner of Customs under Section 1207 of the Tariff and
Customs Code and not the regular court, has “exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the legality of an importation or ascertain whether the
conditions prescribed by law for an importation have been complied
with and over cases of seizure, detention or release of property.
The motion to dismiss was denied but upon reconsideration, it was
granted which subsequently dismissed the complaint of PTFI.
Therefore, PTFI brought the present recourse to the SC. PTFI also
claims that since there are no procedures made for the importation
ban under the law, recourse to the courts in the form of a complaint
for injunction is justified.
Issue:
Can the regular courts hear a case to determine the legality of an
importation, considering that there are no procedures made applicable
to the instant case?
Held:
No, the regular courts cannot rule on the legality of an importation
since the statutory privilege (Sec. 36, par. I) which PTFI bases its
claim is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs which has the
exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases.
Under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, the courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory
statute administered.
Just because there are no procedures outlined for the importation does
not mean that the Bureau of Customs has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter because the enforcement of a statutory right is not
foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner
of Customs may in fact create such procedures and where the statute
does not require any particular method of procedure to be followed,
the agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its
functions.
In the case at bar, the correspondence with the Bureau of Customs
contesting the legality of match importations may already take the
nature of an administrative proceeding.
[47] GSIS vs. CSC
Facts:
Respondents were employees in GSIS who were dismissed for being
notoriously undesirable considering anomalies in the canvass of
supplies and materials.
The employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board and later to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) who ruled that their dismissal was
illegal for failure to observe dues process and ordered their
reinstatement. The payment of backwages were withheld until GSIS
resolves their administrative case. The SC also decided the same.
The CSC then granted the employees motion for execution and
ordered GSIS to reinstate the employees and since some employees
already died, ordered payment of their backwages instead contrary to
the words in the decision to be executed.
ISSUES:
1. WON CSC has the power to execute its judgment.
2. WON CSC can deviate from the decision in executing it.
HELD:
Yes to both.
The CSC has quasi-judicial powers and it would appear absurd to deny
to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority to enforce or
order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should
be stressed, it has been exercising through the years. It would seem
quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is initial unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is
carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory
power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally
and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or
execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise
provides.
In this case, the deviation from the decision is allowed not merely
upon compassionate grounds, but simply because there is no fair and
feasible alternative in the circumstances.
If the deceased employees were still alive, the issue of payment of
their back salaries should properly await the outcome of the
disciplinary proceedings as decided in the Second Division's Resolution.
Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the
initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation
of any then pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may
be said of the binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as,
to all intents and purposes, it makes exoneration in the administrative
proceedings a condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it
cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a useless exercise
The questioned orders of the Civil Service Commission merely
recognized the impossibility of complying with the Resolution of July 4,
1988 and the legal futility of attempting a post-mortem investigation of
the character contemplated.
PART IV. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
[48] PEOPLE VS EXCONDE
Facts:
Exconde was a passenger en route to Japan. Upon inspection he was
found to be in possession of around P5,000.00. That time, the BSP had
previously issued Central Bank Circular No. 37 which penalized among
others, travellers leaving the Philippines with Philippine coins and notes
in an amount exceeding P100 or when the coins exceed P5.
Exconde argues that sec. 14 of the Central Bank Law does not grant
authority to the Monetary Board to prohibit the exportation of
Philippine currency, and that if any such authority was in fact granted,
the same is void as an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Issue:
Whether or not the delegation of legislative power is invalid
Held:
No. It is valid.
It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws
is a nondelegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
186
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the
law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be
not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law
prescribes.
We experience no difficulty in concluding that Circular No. 37 here in
question was a valid exercise of the regulatory power delegated by the
Central Bank Act, and that said Circular is in harmony with the
objectives sought to be achieved by that law, particularly the control of
any prejudicial "expansion and contraction of the money supply" (sec.
64) and "the preservation of the international value of the peso"
[49] LEO ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
GR No. 132601, October 12, 1998
RE: Doctrine of “Subordinate Legislation”; Limitations
Facts:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Petitioner Leo Echegaray
for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law
spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first
time the issue of the constitutionality of RA 7659 or the Death Penalty
Law, which was denied.
In the meantime, Congress changed the mode of execution of the
death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection and passed RA
8177 for the purpose. Pursuant to said law, the Secretary of Justice
promulgated the Implementation Rules and Regulations (IRR) and
directed the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection
Manual.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and TRO to
enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of
Prisons from carrying out the execution of the lethal injection under RA
8177 and its IRR as these are unconstitutional and void for being,
among others:
(a) An undue delegation of legislative power by Congress
(b) An unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to
legislate, and
(c) An unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of
Justice to respondent Director.
Issues:
1. Is there undue delegation of legislative power in RA 8117 to the
Secretary of Justice and the Director of Bureau of Corrections?
2. Did the Secretary of Justice unlawfully delegate the legislative
powers delegated to him under RA 8177 to the Director of
Bureau of Corrections?
3. Is the IRR of RA 8117 valid?
Held:
1. No.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in the framing of our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of
non-delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated or as expressed in Latin maxim: Potestas
Delegata Non Delegari Potest." The recognized exceptions to the rule
are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2)
of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section
23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation of administrative bodies.
Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary
of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate
rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of
delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed
the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the
law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it and
what is the scope of his authority.
RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative
policy, marks its limits, map out its boundaries and specify the public
agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which
the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically
requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the
authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so
far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the
sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings
prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be
administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the
convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in
the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the
performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful
purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question
raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but
the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts.
In this sense, RA 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of
discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, to use the words
of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of
discretion by the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where
standards are formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited
discretion, which though general, are capable of reasonable
application.
2. No.
A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue
delegation of legislative power from the Secretary of Justice to the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under
the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere
constituent unit of the Department of Justice. Further, the Department
of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the
"administration of correctional system." Hence, the import of the
phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal
Injection Manual, in consultation with the Department of Health.
2. No, insofar as Sections 19 and 17 are concerned.
Section 19 of the IRR provides:
“Sec.19. Execution Procedure — Details of the procedure
prior to, during and after administering the lethal injection
shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared by the Director.
187
 The manual shall contain details of, among others, the
sequence of events before and after execution; procedures
in setting up the intravenous line; the administration of the
lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and the removal
of the intravenous system.
Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be
limited to authorized prison personnel."
The IRR of RA 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked.
The first paragraph of Section 19 of the is a veritable vacuum. The
Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate
the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval
thereof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice,
the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would
not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary
of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such
apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said
paragraph invalid.
As to the second paragraph of Section 19, the Court finds the
requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with
respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment
for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain, a copy of the manual.
The contents of the manual are matters of public concern, "which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their
lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of
an ordinary citizen.
Even more seriously flawed than Section 19 is Section 17 of the IRR
provides:
"Sec. 17. Suspension of The Execution of the Death
Sentence. — Execution by lethal injection shall not be
inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following
the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon
any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter
case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in
Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death
penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after
delivery. Section 17 of the IRR omits the one (1) year period following
delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and
adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-
year reprieve after a woman is sentenced.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not
override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it
seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are
intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law." An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. In case of
discrepancy between a provision of statute and a rule or regulation
issued to implement said statute, the statutory provision prevails.
Since the cited clause in Section 17 which suspends the execution of a
woman within the three (3) years next following the date of sentence
finds no support in Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended,
perforce Section 17 must be declared invalid.
[50] LAND BANK OF THE PHILS V. LEONILA CELADA
GR No. 164876, January 23, 2006
RE: Doctrine of “Subordinate Legislation”; Limitations
Facts:
Celada owns an agricultural land, 60% of which was suitable for
compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Upon indorsement to it for field investigation and
valuation, Land Bank valued the said land at P299,569.61. DAR offered
the same amount to Celada as just compensation. Celada, however,
rejected the offer.
The matter was then referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)
for summary administrative hearing on the determination of just
compensation. During the pendency of the DARAB case, Celada filed a
petition for judicial determination of just compensation before the RTC
sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
Thereafter, SAC rendered judgment fixing the value of the land at
P354,847.50, finding that Celada’s evidence showed that the
neighboring lands of similar classification were paid higher than what
was quoted by Land Bank.
Land Bank contends that the SAC erred in fixing the just compensation
of the land based on the valuation of neighboring lands instead of its
actual land use.
Issue:
Did SAC correctly fix the just compensation?
Held:
No.
SAC erred in fixing the just compensation of the land based on the
valuation of neighboring lands instead of actual land use.
While SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments
made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it
is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic
formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section
49 of RA No. 6657.
As the government agency principally tasked to implement the
agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue rules and
regulations to carry out the object of the law. DAR A.O. No. 5, s. of
1998 precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, RA 6657 by
providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may
be taken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the
formula which was devised to implement the said provision.
It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative
bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have
the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative
issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a
presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative
issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in
issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have
no option but to apply the same.
[51] EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA
G.R. No. 76633
October 18, 1988
Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of a ship owned by petitioner Eastern
Shipping Lines. He died in an accident in Tokyo which prompted his
wife to sue for damages before the respondent Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. The wife was awarded with P180,000.00
as death benefits and P12,000 for burial expenses. These awards were
made by the POEA pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 2 of POEA.
The circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by shipping
companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
The contract provides for claims for the death and burial expenses.
Notably, the circular was issued pursuant to the authority of the POEA
provided in Executive Order No. 797. In creating the POEA, the
executive order mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino
workers to “fair and equitable employment practices.”
The petitioner questioned the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2
as, purportedly, it violates the principle of non-delegation of legislative
188
powers. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to
promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under
the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Issue:
Is Memorandum Circular No. 2 of POEA made pursuant to a valid
delegation of powers?
Held:
Yes. The two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power are the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines of limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegate from running riot.
While the occasions are rare when the executive power has to be
delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain, the principle
of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all three major powers of
the government. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the three major powers to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.
Specialization has become necessary. Administrative agencies have
been entrusted with the authority to issue rules to carry out the
general provisions of statutes; in this case, an executive order. This is
called the “power of subordinate legislation.” With this power,
administrative bodies may issue administrative regulations, which have
the force and effect of law, to fill in the details which the three major
powers may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
In this case, Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative
regulation. The power of the POEA in requiring the model contract is
not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in
the exercise of said authority. The standard is discoverable in the
executive order itself which, in creating the POEA, mandated it to
protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to “fair and equitable
employment practices.”
[52] TATAD V. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
G.R. No. 124360
November 5, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 or the
Downstream Oil Industry Regulation Act of 1996, which intends to
deregulate the downstream oil industry. Among other things, the
petitioner argues the Section 15 thereof constitutes undue delegation
of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy.
Section 15 of RA No. 8180 provides:
“Section 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. – Pursuant
to Section 5€ of RA No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval
of the President, implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far
as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Xxx
Petitioners argue that the provision does not provide a determinate
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining
when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry. They further contend that the law does not define when it is
practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when the
President may consider it practicable to declare full deregulation. Also,
the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the
prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining
nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered
stable.
Issue:
Is Section 15 of RA No. 8180 a valid delegation of legislative power?
Held:
Yes. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete
in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in RA No. 8180 that
full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the
occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is
mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the
final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is
to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997.
Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the
President – he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of
crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and
when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable.
The dictionary meanings of the words are well settled and cannot
confuse men of reasonable intelligence.
[53]KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER V. GARCIA
GR No. 115381, December 23, 1994.
Facts:
The petition is to review the circulars and orders of DOTC and LTFRB.
Among these are the (1) allowing provincial bus and jeepney operators
to increase fares without application in LTFRB (2) placing the burden
to prove that there is no “public need” in application for Certificates of
Public Convenience to those opposing it. Petitioner contends that this
is unconstitutional and illegal.
Issue:
Are these circulars and orders unconstitutional?
Held:
Yes. The Legislature delegated the power to fix rates of public services
to LTFRB. Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative
agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of
modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does
the difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. Given the task of determining
sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the
transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the
power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative
body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies laid
down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Legislature may
neither have time or competence to provide. However, nowhere under
the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and
LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a
transport operator, or other public service.
The establishment of public need in favor of an applicant reverses
well-settled and institutionalized judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative procedures. It allows the party who initiates the
proceedings to prove, by mere application, his affirmative allegations.
Moreover, the offending provisions of the LTFRB memorandum circular
in question would in effect amend the Rules of Court by adding
another disputable presumption in the enumeration of 37
presumptions under Rule 131, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Such
189
usurpation of this Court's authority cannot be countenanced as only
this Court is mandated by law to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure.
[54] AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. V. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS
GR No. L-26803, October 14, 1975
Facts:
This case is challenging the validity of Rule 168 of the “Revised Rules
of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases.”
The rule authorizes the Director of Patents to designate any ranking
official to hear “inter partes” proceedings. It likewise provides that "all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and
directly prepared by the Director and signed by him." These
proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a
mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose
of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-
mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a
trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.
Issue:
WON the Rule is invalid.
Held:
It is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the
administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a
delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the
decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that
requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and
discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and
report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his
decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally
exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due
process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the
actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make
the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and
the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no
question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully
met. In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make
preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of
these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and
questions involved is left to the Director of Patents. Apart from the
circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not
jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in what manner they have
been prejudiced by the proceedings.
[55] ESLAO V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
Pangasinan State University (PSU) entered into a MOA with DENR for
the evaluation of 11 government reforestation operations in
Pangasinan.
After the approval of the MOA by PSU’s Board of Regents, PSU issued
a Voucher representing the amount of P70, 375 for payment of
honoraria to PSU personnel engaged in the project. However, the
approved honoraria rates were found to be somewhat higher than the
rates provided for in the guidelines of National Compensation Circular
("NCC") No. 53. Accordingly, the amounts were adjusted downwards
to conform to NCC No. 53.
In 1989 however, COA resident auditor issued a "Notice of
Disallowance" alleging that there were excess payments of honoraria.
Such notice disallowed P64,925 from the amount of P70,37 stated in
the Voucher mentioned earlier. The COA auditor based his action on
the premise that Compensation Policy Guidelines No. 80-4, dated
August 1980, issued by the Department of Budget and Management
which provided for lower rates than NCC No. 53 dated June 1988, also
issued by the Department of Budget and Management, was the
schedule for honoraria and per diems applicable to work done under
the MOA of December 1988 between the PSU and the DENR.
According to Petitioner PSU, through Eslao its President, DBM's
position on the matter should be respected since the DBM is vested
with authority to (i) classify positions and determine appropriate
salaries for specific position classes, (ii) review the compensation
benefits programs of agencies and (iii) design job evaluation
programs. The Solicitor General agreed with the position of PSU,
stating that per certification of the DENR and Clarificatory
Letter/Opinion of the DBM that the project undertaken by PSU is
foreign-assisted, NCC No. 53 should apply.
Issue:
Which of the two circulars is applicable in respect of the honoraria to
be paid to PSU personnel who took part in the evaluation project?
Held:
NCC No. 53 applies in respect of the honoraria.
SC does not consider that the COA is, under its constitutional mandate,
authorized to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law or
administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which it does
not agree, at least not before such law or regulation is set aside by the
authorized agency of government — i.e., the courts — as
unconstitutional or illegal and void. The COA, like all other government
agencies, must respect the presumption of legality and constitutionality
to which statutes and administrative regulations are entitled until such
statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or until set aside in an
appropriate case by a competent court and ultimately this Court.
In the present case, COA cannot substitute DBM’s judgment on the
matter merely because COA apparently does not agree with the policy
basis of NCC No. 53 in relation to CPG No. 80-4.
[56] COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. CA
G.R. No. 119761 August 29, 1996
Facts:
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, engaged in the manufacture of different
brands of cigarettes, registered "Champion," "Hope," and "More"
cigarettes. BIR classified them as foreign brands since they were listed
in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies.
However, Fortune Corporation changed the names of 'Hope' to
'Hope Luxury 'and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said
brands from the foreign brand category.
Subsequently, BIR issued Revenue Memorandum Circular 37- 93
stating that: "HOPE," "MORE" and "CHAMPION" being manufactured
by Fortune Tobacco Corporation are hereby considered locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the
55% ad valorem tax on cigarettes.
The RMC was telefaxed to Fortune Tobacco Corporation and merely
days after, CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax
deficiency.
Petitioner opines that RMC 37-93 is merely an interpretative ruling of
the BIR which can thus become effective without any prior need for
notice and hearing, nor publication, and that its issuance is not
discriminatory since it would apply under similar circumstances to all
locally manufactured cigarettes.
Issue:
Are publication, filing of copies with the UP Law center and prior
hearing necessary for the validity, effectivity and enforceability of RMC
37-93?
190
Held:
Yes, the above procedures are necessary for the validity of the RMC.
According to SC, it should be understandable that when an
administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability
needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to
or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of law.
A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances
under which it has been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot
be viewed simply as a corrective measure (revoking in the process the
previous holdings of past Commissioners) or merely as construing
Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most
importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium
More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered
by RA 7654.
Prior to the issuance of the questioned circular, "Hope Luxury,"
"Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes were in the category of
locally manufactured cigarettes not bearing foreign brand subject to
45% ad valorem tax. Hence, without RMC 37-93, the enactment of RA
7654, would have had no new tax rate consequence on private
respondent's products. Evidently, in order to place "Hope Luxury,"
"Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes within the scope of the
amendatory law and subject them to an increased tax rate, the now
disputed RMC 37-93 had to be issued. In so doing, the BIR not simply
intrepreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-
legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of
notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then
ignored.
[57] PERALTA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 95832 August 10, 1992
Facts:
Respondent Commission interpreted provisions of Republic Act No.
2625 amending the Revised Administrative Code and promulgated a
policy that when an employee who was on leave of absence without
pay on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a
Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, he is also considered on leave of absence
without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday.
Petitioner Maynard Peralta was appointed Trade-Specialist II in the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). His appointment was
classified as "Reinstatement/Permanent". Since petitioner had no
accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted from his salary the amount
corresponding to his absences during the covered period, September
29, 1989 and October 20, 1989, inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays.
Petitioner challenged the policy, contending that he cannot be
deprived of his pay or salary corresponding to the intervening
Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays (in the factual situation posed), and
that the withholding (or deduction) of the same is tantamount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Respondent, on the other hand, averred that an employee who has no
more leave credit in his favor is not entitled to the payment of salary
on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays unless such non-working days occur
within the period of service actually rendered.
Issue:
Is the respondent Commission's policy mandating salary deductions
corresponding to the intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays
where an employee without leave credits was absent on the
immediately preceding working day valid?
Held:
No.
As administrative construction is not necessarily binding upon the
courts, action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set
aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of
power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
In the case at bar, construction by the respondent Commission of R.A.
2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent which is to exclude
from the computation of the leave during those days, Saturdays and
Sundays, as well as holidays, because actually the employee is entitled
not to go to office during those days. And it is unfair and unjust to him
that those days should be counted in the computation of leaves.
Moreover, the law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does
not provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated
leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in
order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus. The fact remains that government employees, whether or
not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to
work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they cannot be
declared absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are not
considered absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not
be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just
because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior
to, or after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a
deprivation of property without due process.
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner shall be paid the amounts
previously but unlawfully deducted from his monthly salary.
[58] MELENDRES VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 129958, November 25, 1999
Facts:
Melendres, who lost the Brgy. Chairman position to Concepcion in the
May 12, 1997 elections, filed an election protest against the latter with
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig. After preliminary hearing of the
election case, it was shown that no filing of docket fee was paid by the
protestant therein, which payment is required in the Rules of
Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6. So, Concepcion moved to dismiss the case
on ground of failure to comply with the requirement. Trial Court denied
the motion to dismiss and said that the case should be continued on
the ground that the filing of docket fee is merely an administrative
procedural matter and not jurisdictional. Concepcion elevated the case
for COMELEC to decide on. Melendres also filed with the Commission a
Manifestation wherein he claimed that the contested issue of non-
payment of filing fee was now moot and academic as the same had
been paid on June 6, 1997, ten days before this petition was filed.
COMELEC then ruled that the Trial Court should cease and desist from
further acting on the Election case.
Issues:
1. Is the payment of the filing fee in an election protest a
jurisdictional requirement and can non-compliance therewith be a
valid basis for the dismissal of the protest?
2. Did the subsequent full payment of the filing fee after the lapse of
the reglementary period cure the jurisdictional defect?
3. Did public respondent observe due process (issuance and service
of summons and conducting hearings for the purpose of receiving
evidence under Rule 14 of the COMELEC Rules) prior to the
promulgation of the questioned resolution?
Held:
1. Yes. Generally, the interpretation of an administrative
government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute, is
accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of
the courts. However, when an administrative agency renders an
opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best
advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means. Thus, an action by an administrative agency may be set
191
 aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse
of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
However, there is no cogent reason to depart from the general
rule because the findings of the COMELEC conforms to rather
than conflicts with the governing statute and controlling case law
on the matter. It is the payment of the filing fee that vests
jurisdiction of the court over the election protest, not the
payment of the docket fees for the claim of damages and
attorney’s fees. For failure to pay the filing fee prescribed under
Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, no
protest shall be given due course without the payment of a filing
fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) for each
interest.
2. No. The subsequent payment of the filing fee did not cure the
jurisdictional defect because the said date which is deemed the
actual date of filing the election protest is 25 days after the
proclamation of the election results and is way beyond the ten-
day reglementary period to file the same. The rule prescribing the
“ten-day period following the date of proclamation of the results
of the election” is mandatory and jurisdictional and the filing of an
election protest beyond the period deprives the court of
jurisdiction over the protest. The rule is not a mere technicality
but an essential requirement, the non-compliance of which would
oust the court of jurisdiction over the case. Relatedly, if the
docket fees are not fully paid on time, even if the election protest
is timely filed, the court is deprived of jurisdiction over the case.
3. Yes. Section 1, Rule 14 does NOT require the issuance and
service of summons in cases involving appeals from the decisions
of the courts in election protests, special actions, special cases,
special reliefs and special proceedings. Petitioner has no right to
require the COMELEC to first hear and receive evidence before
deciding the merits of the petition for certiorari. A formal trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to
due process. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy and to present evidence on which a fair decision can
be based.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
[59] LBP vs. CELADA
Facts:
Leonila P. Celada owns 22.3167 hectares of agricultural land of which
14.1939 hectares was identified as suitable for compulsory acquisition
under CARP. It was indorsed to LBP for valuation. It valued the land
at P2.1105517 per square meter for an aggregate value of
P299,569.61. The DAR offered the same amount to respondent as just
compensation, but it was rejected. The case was referred to DARAB
for summary administrative hearing on determination of just
compensation.
While the DARAB case was pending, respondent filed a petition for
judicial determination of just compensation against LBP alleging that
the value of her land is at least 150,000 per hectare. The case was
heard by an RTC, designated as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). The
SAC rendered judgment fixing the compensation of the land of
petitioner at P2.50 per square meter or a total of P354,847.50 for the
portion of 14.1939 hectares subject of compulsory acquisition under
the CARP.
The SAC based its valuation solely on the observation that there was a
patent disparity between the price given to respondent and the other
landowners. It did not apply the DAR valuation formula since according
to them, it is Section 17 of RA No. 6657 that should be the principal
basis of computation as it is the law governing the matter. The SAC
further held that said Section 17 cannot be superseded by any
administrative order of a government agency, thereby implying that
the valuation formula under DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of
1998 (DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998), is invalid and of no effect.
The LBP elevated the case to the CA but the latter dismissed the
appeal outright hence, this recourse to the SC alleging that the SAC
erred in not using the valuation formula under the DAR Administrative
Order.
Issue:
Should the valuation formula under the DAR Administrative Order be
followed?
Held:
Yes. It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect.
Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in
their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore
administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity
was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid,
courts have no option but to apply the same.
Thus, Section 17 of RA No. 6657 states:
SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation
by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.
Petition is granted.
[60] EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC.
and TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,vs.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION CORPORATION
TN: This is an amended decision
Facts:
The Court promulgated its Decision in the above-captioned case
ordering respondent to deposit in escrow in a reputable bank 20% of
the investment required for the first two years of the implementation
of the proposed project; and post a performance bond equivalent to
10% of the investment required for the first two years of the approved
project but not to exceed P500 Million within such period to be
determined by the National Telecommunications Commission, in
accordance with Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93.
Respondent now seeks a partial reconsideration of the portion of the
Court’s decision. Respondent claims that Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-
9-93, which required the foregoing amounts, does not apply to
applications voluntarily filed.
The NTC, through the OSG, explicitly clarified, that the escrow deposit
and performance bond are not required in subsequent authorizations
for additional/new areas outside its original roll-out obligation under
E.O. No. 109. The OSG agreed with respondent’s stance that since the
provisional authority in this case involves a voluntary application not
covered by the original service areas created by the NTC under E.O.
No. 109, then it is not subject to the posting of an escrow deposit and
performance bond as required by E.O. No. 109, but only to the
conditions provided in the provisional authority.
Issue:
Should the NTC’s interpretation of their own rules be accorded with
respect?
192
Held:
Yes.
The NTC, being the government agency entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under its special and technical forte, and
possessing the necessary rule-making power to implement its
objectives,6 is in the best position to interpret its own rules, regulations
and guidelines. The Court has consistently yielded and accorded great
respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own
rules unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the
letter and spirit of the law.
Thus, the Court holds that the interpretation of the NTC that Section
27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93 regarding the escrow deposit and
performance bond shall pertain only to a local exchange operator’s
original roll-out obligation under E.O. No. 109, and not to roll-out
obligations made under subsequent or voluntary applications outside
E.O. No. 109, should be sustained.
Motion for partial reconsideration is granted.
[61] WILLIMAN DAGAN V. PHILIPPINE RACING COMMISSION
G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009
Facts:
On Aug. 11, 2004 Philracom issued a directive to the Manila Jockey
Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) to
immediately come up with Club House Rules to address Equine
Infectious Anemia (EIA) and to get rid of their facilities with horses
infected with EIA virus.
The directive was issued purusant to A.O. No. 5 dated Mar. 28, 1994
by the Department of Agriculture.
In compliance with the directive, MJCI and PRCI ordered the owners of
racehorses stable in their establishments to submit the horses for
blood sampling to determine whether they are afflicted with the EIA
virus.
Upon receiving the copies of guidelines for the monitoring and
eradication of EIA, petitioner refused to comply with the same. Despite
resistance, the blood sampling was proceeded. The horses, whose
owners refused to comply were banned from the races, removed from
the actual day of race, prohibited from renewing their licenses or
evicted from their stables.
Racehorse owners complied before the Office of the President.
Issue:
Whether or not there was valid delegation of power exercised by
Philracom
Held:
Yes.
The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed
guidelines, hinges on compliance with the following requisites:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure;
3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
4. It must be reasonable.
As to the first requisite, all the prescribed requisites are met as regards
the questioned issuances. Philracom’s authority is drawn from P.D. No.
420 and hurdles the tests of completeness and standards sufficiency.
Philracom was created for the purpose of carrying out the declared
policy in Section 1 which is “to promote and direct the accelerated
development and continued growth of horse racing not only in
pursuance of the sports development program but also in order to
insure the full exploitation of the sport as a source of revenue and
employment.”
Philracom was granted exclusive jurisdiction and control over every
aspect of the conduct of horse racing, including the framing and
scheduling of races, the construction and safety of race tracks, and the
security of racing. P.D. No. 420 is already complete in itself.
Accordingly, there is no delegation by Philracom of its rule-making
powers to MJCI and PRCI.
The Philracom directive is merely instructive in character. Philracom
had instructed PRCI and MJCI to “immediately come up with Club’s
House Rule to address the problem and rid their facilities of horses
infected with EIA.” PRCI and MJCI followed-up when they ordered the
racehorse owners to submit blood samples and subject their race
horses to blood testing. Compliance with the Philracom’s directive is
part of the mandate of PRCI and MJCI under Sections 11 of R.A. No.
7953 and Sections 1 and 2 of 8407.
As to the second requisite, petitioners raise some infirmities relating to
Philracom’s guidelines. While it is conceded that the guidelines were
issued a month after Philracom’s directive, this circumstance does not
render the directive nor the guidelines void. The directive’s validity
and effectivity are not dependent on any supplemental guidelines.
Philracom has every right to issue directives to MJCI and PRCI with
respect to the conduct of horse racing, with or without implementing
guidelines.
On publication, Petitioners also argue that Philracom’s guidelines have
no force and effect for lack of publication and failure to file copies with
the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center as required by law.
As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an
administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require
notice and hearing, In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, this
Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise of
quasi-legislative powers since there is no determination of past events
or facts that have to be established or ascertained.
As to the third requisite, it must be within the limits of the powers
granted to it.
The assailed guidelines prescribe the procedure for monitoring and
eradicating EIA. These guidelines are in accord with Philracom’s
mandate under the law to regulate the conduct of horse racing in the
country.
Anent the fourth requisite, the assailed guidelines do not appear to be
unreasonable or discriminatory. In fact, all horses stabled at the MJCI
and PRCI’s premises underwent the same procedure.
[62] TAYUG RURAL BANK VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILS
G.R. No. L-46158, Nov. 28, 1986
Facts:
Tayug Rural bank is a bank in Pangasinan which took out 13 loans
from Central Bank (CB) in 1962 and 1963. All loans were covered with
promissory notes amounting to 813,000. In 1964, CB released a
circular through the Director of Loans and Credit which informall all
rural banks that an additional 10% per annum penalty interest would
be assessed on all past due loans beginning 1965.
In 1969, the outstanding balnce of Tayug was 444,000. Petitioner bank
then filed a case in CFI manila to recover the 10% penalty it paid up to
1968, amounting to 16,000 and to restrain CB from further imposing
penalty.
CB argued that it was legally imposed under Rules and Regulations
Governing Rural Banks promulgated by the Monetary Board on 1958,
under RA 720.
CFI Manila decided in favor of CB ordering petitioner to pay the 10%
penalty.
193
The case went to the SC. Petitioner argues that the CB circular's
retroactive effect impairs the obligations of contracts and deprives
them of property without due process of law. Respondent reasons
that, despite the loans, petitioner should have known that rules and
regulations authorizing CB to impose additional reasonable penalties.
Issue:
Whether or not the CB can validly impose 10% penalty through a
circular.
Held:
No.
The circular and its pertinent provisions including RA 720 shows that
nowhere therein is the authority given to the Monetary Board to mete
out additional penalties to Rural Banks on past due accounts with the
CB.
The Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless,
the retroactive imposition of administrative penalties cannot be taken
as a measure supervisory in character.
Administrative rules have the force and effect of law. The same has to
implement the given legislation by not contradicting it and conform to
the standard prescribed by law. It cannot go beyond the basic law.
It cannot implement a penalty not provided in the law authorizing it,
much less one that is applied retroactively.
[63] ARANETA V. GATMAITAN
G.R. Nos. L-8895 & L-9191, April 30, 1957
Facts:
The President issued Executive Order No. 80 prohibiting the use of
trawls in San Miguel Bay pursuant to the Fisheries Law. This was
challenged by a group of otter trawl operators in court arguing that the
exercise of such authority by the President is an undue delegation of
legislative powers. They also argued that, under the Fisheries Law, the
restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come
within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and not in the President. Are the arguments of the otter
trawl operators tenable?
Held:
On the Issue of Undue Delegation of Legislative Powers
No, the argument of the otter trawl operators that the issuance by the
President of E.O. 22 is an undue delegation of legislative powers is not
tenable.
For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small and immature fishes,
Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to prohibit
the use of any fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could
endanger and deplete the supply of sea food.
Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the
people and authorities issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely
prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within
the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the
welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of
issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict
conformity with the law.
On the Issue of the Powers of the President vis-à-vis the Sec. of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
No, the argument of the otter trawl operators that the Fisheries Law
vests such power to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and not in the President is not tenable.
As the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its
functions subject to the general supervision and control of the
President of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same
power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees
and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned.
Hence, the executive order, restricting and banning of trawl fishing
from San Miguel Bay is valid and issued by authority of law.
[64] HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. SOUTHWING
INDUSTRIES
G.R. Nos. 164171, 164172 & 168741
February 20, 2006
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary
Alberto G. Romulo, issued E.O. 156, entitled "PROVIDING FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE
MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
GUIDELINES." Such proscribes the importation into the country,
inclusive of the Freeport, of all types of used motor vehicles except for
particularly enumerated vehicles.
A group of Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises then filed a case challenging
the constitutionality of E.O. 156 for it constitutes an unlawful
usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with
Congress for being contrary to the mandate of Republic Act No. 7227
(RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport.
Decide the case.
Held:
E.O. 156 is void in so far as it applies to the Freeport.
Indeed, when the application of an administrative issuance modifies
existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as in the instant case, the
issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for
being unreasonable.
To apply the proscription to the Freeport would not serve the purpose
of the EO. Instead of improving the general economy of the country,
the application of the importation ban in the Freeport would subvert
the avowed purpose of RA 7227 which is to create a market that would
draw investors and ultimately boost the national economy.
If the aim of the EO is to prevent the entry of used motor vehicles
from the Freeport to the customs territory, the solution is not to forbid
entry of these vehicles into the Freeport, but to intensify governmental
campaign and measures to thwart illegal ingress of used motor
vehicles into the customs territory.
[65] BOIE-TAKEDA CHEMICALS, INC., vs. HON. DIONISIO DE
LA SERNA
G.R. No. 92174 December 10, 1993
Facts:
Presidential Decree No. 851, The 13th month Pay Law, defines "Basic
Salary" as which shall include all remunerations or earnings paid by an
employer to an employee for services rendered but may not include
cost of living allowances profit sharing payments, and all allowances
and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part
of the regular or basic salary of The employee. While on The Revised
Guidelines on The Implementation of the 13th month pay law
promulgated by then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon included these
salary-related benefits as part of the basic salary in the computation of
the 13th month pay. Petitioners in this case were ordered to pay their
employees due to underpayment of 13th month pay pursuant to The
Revised Guidelines. Petitioners contended however under P.D. 851, the
13th month pay is based solely on basic salary. As defined by the law
itself and clarified by the implementing and supplementary Rules as
well as by The Supreme Court in a long line of decisions,
remunerations which do not form part of the basic or regular salary of
an employee, such as commissions, should not be considered in the
computation of the13th month pay. This being the case, The Revised
Guidelines on The Implementation of the 13th month pay law issued by
then secretaty providing for the inclusion of commissions in the 13th
month pay, were issued in excess of the statutory authority conferred
by P.D. 851.
194

Issue:
Whether or not the revised guidelines on the implementation of the
13th month pay law issued by then secretary Drilon providing for the
inclusion of commissions in the 13ThmonTh pay, were issued in excess
of the statutory authority conferred by law.
Held:
In including commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay,
the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of The Revised Guidelines on
The Implementation of the 13th month pay Law unduly expanded the
concept of "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental
rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the
provisions of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they
are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
[66] MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., vs.
HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995
Facts:
Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos. 211 and
279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes
the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications
for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant
to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279
authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-
venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the
exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of
Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining
leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution… shall be converted into production-sharing
agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these
guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a
failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing
Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department
Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the
mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective
effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines,
Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim
owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their
validity and constitutionality before this Court.
Issue:
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?
Held:
Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and
approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications
for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources through "license,
concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said
constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No.
279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing
on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining
laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the
governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and
management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern.
Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation
clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as
those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this
petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the
police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this
regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-
impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power,
being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands
of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of
Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211
provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the
mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No.
9207, authorized the creation and development of what is now known
as the National Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former
President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a
parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over
440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC.
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the
reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and
authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct
sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in
population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137
from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel
Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing
the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the
number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the
government’s socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners
association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its
president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own
personal capacity and on behalf of the association. The instant petition
for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207,
otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing
and Land Utilization Act of 2003." Issue : Whether or not in issuing the
questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared
null and void for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical. Held:
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of
the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its
quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued
pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory
that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground
that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks
to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial
course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
195
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.
[67] PEOPLE V. MACEREN
Facts:
The old fisheries law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing, but
the sec. of agriculture and natural resources issued an admin order
penalizing such act. On March 7, 1969 5 men were charged for
violating the admin order. The 5 accused filed a motion to quash the
complaint & the MTC granted the motion. The plaintiff-appellant
appealed the case to CFI where the Hon. Judge Maceren preside.
Judge Maceren upheld the decision of MTC saying that, since the law
does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial
departments cannot consider it unlawful.
Issue:
Is the issuance of admin order within the scope of authority of the sec.
of agriculture & natural resources?
Held:
No, the sec. exceeded its authority when it ordered the criminalization
of an act which is not penalized by the old fisheries law. Yes, public
officials like the sec. can order rules and regulations to effect the
intent of the law, but such power should only be exercised within the
authority conferred upon by the law itself. The old fisheries law does
not expressly penalize electro fishing & the sec. cannot take the job of
criminalizing such act because that will be an unlawful delegation of
power. It has been held that, to declare what shall constitute a crime
and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the
legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency
[68] PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS and COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Section 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1977
(now Sec. 229, NIRC of 1997) provides for the prescriptive period of 2
years for filing a court proceeding for the recovery of tax erroneously
or illegally collected. Notwithstanding this statutory provision, the
acting commissioner issued RMC 7-85 which stretched the two-year
prescriptive period to 10 years. Petitioner asked CIR for tax credit of
P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and
second quarters of 1985. Pending the investigation of the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for
Review on November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
based on its claim for tax credit. CTA denied the petition on the ground
that it is filed beyond the 2 year prescriptive period. Petitioner argues
that it relied on RMC 7-85 when it filed its case with the court, and the
state is in estoppel for issuing such revenue memorandum.
Issue:
Is the revenue memorandum valid?
Held:
No, and the state is never estopped from the acts of its agents like the
acting commissioner in the instant case. The Final Adjusted Income
Tax Return of the petitioner for the taxable year 1985 was supposed to
be filed on April 15, 1986, the latter had only until April 15, 1988 to
seek relief from the court. Further, when the petitioner filed the case
before the CTA on November 18, 1988, the same was filed beyond the
time fixed by law, and such failure is fatal to petitioners cause of
action.
The act of commissioner in issuing RMC 7-85 created a clear
inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing,
the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines
contrary to the statute passed by Congress. A regulation or rule issued
to implement a law cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
latter.
[69] ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS
ANGELES VS. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND
G.R. No. 131082. June 19, 2000
Facts:
On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011,
Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII
provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of
Fund coverage, 3 it must have a plan providing for both
provident/retirement AND housing benefits superior to those
provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund.
Petitioners (RMBSD Law Firm) assail the validity of the 1995 and the
1996 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 7742 issued by Respondent HDMF, for being contrary
to law. In support thereof, PETITIONER contends that the subject
1995 Amendments issued by HDMF are inconsistent with the enabling
law, P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, which merely
requires as a pre-condition for exemption from coverage the
existence of either a superior provident/retirement plan OR a
superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans.
On the other hand, the HDMF contends that in promulgating the
amendments to the rules and regulations which require the existence
of a plan providing for both provident and housing benefits for
exemption from the Fund Coverage, the respondent Board was merely
exercising its rule-making power under Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. It
had the option to use "and" only instead of "or" in the rules on waiver
in order to effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing
"and," the Board has clarified the confusion brought about by the use
of "and/or" in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended.
Issue:
Is Section 1 of Rule VII of Board Resolution 1011, Series of 1995 valid
in that it is issued within the scope of authority of HDMF?
Held:
No. Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-
B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing
Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. No.
1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, are null and void insofar as they
require that an employer should have both a provident/retirement plan
and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in
order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund coverage.
Xxx The law obviously contemplates that the existence of
either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an
exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more
than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically
impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly
envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word "or" in
the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its
authority.
It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as
provided in Section 5 17 of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13 18 of P.D.
No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules and regulations, which
are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to,
but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
[70] PHILIPPINE INTERISLAND SHIPPING ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 1997
Facts:
On February 3, 1986, President Marcos issued EO 1088 which
increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously
196
fixed by the PPA. PPA, pursuant to its power to regulate pilotage
service in Philippine ports, refused to enforce EO 1088 and instead
issued Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, fixing pilotage fees at rates
lower than those provided in E.O. No. 1088. Subsequently, PPA issued
Administrative Order No. 02-88 effectively leaving the fixing of rates
for pilotage services in the hands of the contracting parties, thus
abandoning the rates fixed by it (PPA) under Memorandum Circular
No. 43-86, as well as those provided in E.O. No. 1088.
PPA contends that E.O. No. 1088 was merely an administrative
issuance of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and, as such, it could
be superseded by an order of the PPA. They argue that to consider
E.O. No. 1088 a statute would be to deprive the PPA of its power
under its charter to fix pilotage rates.
Issue:
Is EO 1088 a mere administrative issuance which can be superseded
by an order of the PPA?
Held:
No.
EO 1088 is law as it was issued by President Marcos pursuant to his
legislative powers as authorized under Amendment No 6 of the 1973
Constitution. Thus it cannot be superseded by an order of the PPA.
Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the
PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it
through the imposition of uniform rates. That is what the President did
in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegate the
ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific
instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No.
857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or
decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the services rendered by
the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District.
The orders previously issued by the PPA were in the nature of
subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of
delegated power. As such these could only be amended or revised
by law, as the President did by E.O. No. 1088.
E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to
comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may
not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088. Finally,
the PPA cannot refuse to implement E.O. No. 1088 or alter it as it did
in promulgating Memorandum Circular No. 43-86. Much less could the
PPA abrogate the rates fixed and leave the fixing of rates for pilotage
service to the contracting parties as it did through A.O. No. 02-88,
Section 3.
[71] DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. SUTTON
G.R. No. 162070, [October 19, 2005]
Facts:
The case at bar involves a land inherited by respondents which has
been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding.||| Pursuant to the
then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents
made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS). CARL of 1988, took effect. It
included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and
swine. Later, SC declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the
CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of
agrarian reform.||| In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents
filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as
their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, 5 which provided that only
portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the
coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded,
the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio
(i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the
landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure
for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the
operations of the CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the
DAR A.O. No. 9, respondents land was partially exempted from the
coverage of CARL. Respondents moved for reconsideration. They
contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is
devoted exclusively to cattle-raising.
Issue:
Is DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum
retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising, a valid
exercise of the rule-making power of DAR?
Held:
NO. It is not a valid exercise of the rule-making power of DAR.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid,
administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority
of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the
Constitution. 13 The rule-making power of an administrative agency
may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by
the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the
administrative agency beyond the scope intended.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to
what rules and regulations may be promulgated by
administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock
farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However,
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show
a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively
devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court
clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-
raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
"agriculture" or "agricultural activity."
[72] HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and
NESTOR F. APOLINARIO v. SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR,
ATTY. EDGARDO PAMINTUAN, MR. PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, MAYOR
FELICIANO BELMONTE, SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, and
SECRETARY FLORENTE SORIQUEZ
3 August 2006, G.R. No. 163980
Facts:
Holy Spirit sought to restrain and enjoin the government agencies from
enforcing the IRR of RA 9207.
In 1972, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826 reserving a
parcel of land in Quezon (440 hectares) as a national government site
to be known as the National Government Centre (NGC).
In 1987, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137. Excluding 150
of the 440 hectares to be disposed for the direct sale to bona fide
residents therein.
Because of its rapid sale, President Marcos, through Proclamation No.
248, authorized the vertical development of the area to maximize the
number of beneficiaries.
In 2003, President Arroyo singed RA. 9207 into law, which, among
others, amended Proclamation No. 1826 (Marcos) by excluding
another 184 hectares on the west, and 283 hectares on the east, and
declaring the same open for sale.
Administrative agencies created the IRR where sections thereof
disqualified Holy Spirit members from buying the excluded lands. The
IRR imposes a particular land area that beneficiaries can acquire,
whereas RA 9207 grants the right for residents to buy the area actually
occupied, without any limitations.
Issue:
May the IRR impose a limitation over the area residents may acquire?
Held:
197
Yes, it may. RA 9207 dichotomizes between two beneficiaries of lot
allocations. Sec. 4 provides for government institutions to have the
right over the land they actually occupy, whereas Sec. 3 which
provides for the right to buy of bona fide residents, does not grant the
beneficiaries such rights. There is no proviso under the law which
grants residents any entitlement over the lot area actually occupied by
them.
[73] ATTY. REYNANTE ORECO V COMELEC
GR NO. 190779 MAR 26,2010
Facts:
Resolution No. 8714 contains the IRR on the bearing,
carrying/transporting firearms or other deadly weapons and the
employment of services of the Security Personnel during the Election
Period for the May 10,2020 national and local elections.
Under Section 2 (b) of Resolution No. 8714, the term firearm includes
airgun, airsoft guns, and their replica/imitation in whatever form that
can cause an ordinary person to believe that they are real. However,
under RA 7166 the term firearm connotes to real firearm and does not
mention airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in including airsoft guns and
their replicas/imitations in the definition of firearm in Resolution No.
8714, since there is nothing in R.A. No. 7166 that mentions them.
Issue:
Is the inclusion of air soft guns and their replicas/imitations for the
term firearm under Resolution No. 8714 considered an ultra vires act
of the COMELEC?
Held:
PARTLY NO. The Supreme Court held in Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Defensor that where a rule or regulation has a
provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being
implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the
statute. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with,
the standards prescribed by the law.
Thus, the COMELEC had the authority to promulgate Resolution No.
8714 pursuant to RA 7166. The COMELEC was mandated to provide
the details of who may bear, carry or transport firearms or other
deadly weapons, as well as the definition of firearms, among others.
These details are left to the discretion of the COMELEC, which is a
constitutional body that possesses special knowledge and expertise on
election matters, with the objective of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. COMELEC’s intent
in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the term firearm and their
resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the
possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation
or terror during the election period. However, the Court
excludes the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns
and airguns from the term firearm under Resolution No. 8714,
because they are not subject to any regulation,
unlike airsoft guns.
[74] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. HON. ENRIQUE
MEDINA, HON. GREGORIO PANGANIBAN, HON. JOSUE L.
CADIAO, HON. FILOMENO KINTANAR, HON. PAZ VETO
PLANAS, as Associate Commissioners of the Public Service
Commission and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
G.R. No. L-32068, October 4, 1971
RE: Observance of Prescribed Procedure; Notice and Hearing,
Publication
Facts:
MERALCO filed an application with the Public Service Commission
seeking approval of revised rate schedules due to increased expenses.
The application was granted by the Commission despite the opposition
of the Republic and other oppositors.
The oppositors then filed an opposition to MERALCO's main application
for increase in rate charges on the ground that the floating rate of
exchange notwithstanding, the applicant's sound financial condition is
still capable of maintaining efficient service.
The Commission through Commissioner Enrique Medina, issued an
order directing the Auditor General to conduct an examination of
MERALCO's books of accounts. After hearing on the merits of the
petition, the Commission approved the proposed rate schedules of for
the increased rate adding that provisional rates should apply if the
decision if appealed.
It is contended, however, that the provisional rate proceedings were
void for want of jurisdiction, because the notice of hearing was first
published in two newspapers of general circulation beginning 9 May
1970, and continued for 10 consecutive days until 19 May 1970; that
the hearings on the provisional rates actually started 14 May, and said
rates were approved on 20 May 1970.
Issue:
Is there failure to observe the prescribed procedure for the propriety
of the authorization of provisional rates?
Held:
No. The authorization of provisional rates was proper.
The court found the contention unmeritorious, considering that when
the hearings were begun the notice had already been published six
days in succession. Moreover, Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 146), in its first proviso, expressly prescribes
—“That the Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed
by public services provisionally and without necessity of any hearing;
but it shall call a hearing thereon within 30 days thereafter, upon
publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory
affected...”
If the Commission is empowered to approve provisional rates even
without a hearing, a fortiori it may act on such rates upon a six-day
notice to persons concerned. In fact, when the provisional rates were
approved on 20 May, the full 10 days notice had been published. To be
sure petitioner Gonzalez argues that the proviso quoted applies only
to initial, not revised, rates. The Public Service Act however, makes no
distinction; it speaks of rates proposed by public services; and whether
initial or revised, these rates are necessarily proposed merely, until the
Commission approves them. The Public Service Commission practice,
moreover, is to hear and approve revised rates without published
notices or hearing. The reason is easily discerned: The provisional
rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in
conformity with the definitive rates approved, and in the case at bar,
the Public Service Commission order so provided.
[75] MACEDA vs. ERB
Facts:
Caltex Philippines, Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and
Petron Corporation proferred separate applications with the Energy
Regulation Board (Board) for permission to increase the wholesale
posted prices of petroleum products and meanwhile, for provisional
authority to increase temporarily such wholesale posted prices pending
further proceedings. The Board in a joint (on three applications)
Order granted provisional relief.
The petitioners pray for injunctive relief, to stop the Board from
implementing its Order, mandating a provisional increase in the prices
of petroleum and petroleum products. They submit that the Order had
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction, and correctible by certiorari. Further, petitioners
Senator Ernesto Maceda and Oliver Lozano argues that the
Order was issued without proper notice and hearing in
violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), of Executive Order No.
172.
198
Issue:
Was the Order validly issued considering it was without notice and
hearing, and hence, without due process of law?
Held:
Yes, the order was valid and was not in violation of due process
clause.
The authority for provisional increase falls within the Section 8 of
Executive Order No. 172 which provides that:
"SECTION 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief . — The Board may,
upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage
thereafter and without prior hearing, on the basis of supporting papers
duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief on motion of a
party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final
decision after hearing, should the Board find that the pleadings,
together with such affidavits, documents and other evidence which
may be submitted in support of the motion, substantially support the
provisional order: Provided, That the Board shall immediately schedule
and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days thereafter, upon
publication and notice to all affected parties.
While under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it
does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional
increase, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make
it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the
application.
Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or
otherwise, operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board may
resort to one but not to both at the same. Section 3(e) outlines the
jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a
price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing.
Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8, an
authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing,
subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. The Board, of
course, is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of
provisional authority, however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed
to conduct one.
[76] RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(RCPI) V. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
(NTC) & JUAN ALEGRE
Facts:
Alegre sent a telegram from Manila to Bohol, through RCPI’s services.
The telegram never made it, thus Alegre filed a complaint against RCPI
at the NTC. NTC ruled in favor of Alegre and cited Sec. 19(a), CA 146
as basis, hence the present petition by RCPI.
RCPI contentions: CA 146 limits the power of the PSC to only fixing
rates by citing the cases of RCPI v. Santiago (PSC only had power to
fix rates) & RCPI v. Board of Communications.
NTC, through the OSG contentions: the cases cited by RCPI is
inapplicable and that the power and authority of NTC to impose fines
is incidental to its power to regulate public service utilities and to
supervise telecommunications facilities. EO 546, which broadened the
NTC’s power, superseded the Santiago case.
Issue:
Can NTC impose fines on a telegraph company which fails to render
adequate service to a customer?
Held:
Appeal GRANTED; NTC decision is REVERSED; NTC has no jurisdiction
NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. (Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. PSC,
G.R. No. L-27520, 21 January 1987, 147 SCRA 269).
The EO 546 is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative
fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which
have failed to render adequate service to customers. Neither has it
expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the
agency.
Jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent
Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily
implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and
any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective
[77] PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC
v. THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS
[G.R. No. 78385], August 31, 1987
Facts:
Herein petitioner Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock,
nonprofit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines. The herein respondent heads the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the
Philippines.
On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education
submitted a report which favorably recommended to the DECS the
following with respect to the Government's policy on increases in
school fees for the schoolyear 1987 to 1988 —
(1) Private schools may be allowed to increase its total school
fees by not more than 15 per cent to 20 per cent, without
the need for the prior approval of the DECS. Schools that
wish to increase school fees beyond the ceiling would be
subject to the discretion of the DECS;
The DECS took note of the report and through the respondent, issued
an Order authorizing, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees however
reduced it later to lower ceiling of 10% to 15% pursuant to Dept.
Order No. 37. Despite this reduction, the petitioner still opposed the
increases. Thus, the petitioner went to this Court and filed the instant
Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring
the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The petitioner also
maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution inasmuch as the
petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said
Department Order was issued.
The petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested
parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before
school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the
questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural
due process of law.
Issue:
Is notice and hearing required for the validity of the Department Order
No. 37?
Held:
No.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be
either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative
function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is
not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an
administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior
notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the
rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they
may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates
imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of
fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.
199
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its
legislative function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order
prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all
private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being
so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its
issuance.
[78] PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP.
(PHILCOMSAT) vs. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NTC
180 SCRA 218 (1989)
Facts:
By virtue of RA 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted a franchise to
establish, construct, maintain and operate station/s and associated
equipment and facilities for international satellite communications. It
was likewise granted the authority to construct and operate such
ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services.
Under RA 5514, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from jurisdiction of Public
Service Commission, now NTC. However, pursuant to EO 196,
PHILCOMSAT was placed under jurisdiction of NTC. Implementing EO
196, NTC required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite certificate of
public convenience and necessity.
Consequently, PHILCOMSAT filed an application for authority to
continue operating and maintaining the facilities and provision of
services, as well as charging current rates. Pending hearing, it also
applied for provisional authority.
NTC granted provisional authority, valid for 6 months. When it expired,
it was extended for another 6 months. Now in controversy is the NTC
order which further extends the provisional authority for another 6
months but directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified reduced rates
through 15% reduction on present authorized rates, with the
reservation to make further reductions later. Such order of reduction
was based on its initial evaluation of the financial statements of
PHILCOMSAT.
PHILCOMSAT now seeks to annul such order for being violative of the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power
and denial of procedural and substantive due process of law. On
procedural due process (where case was assigned), it argued that
there was no prior notice and hearing, therefore, the reduction of rates
is ultra vires.
NTC admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions. However, it insists that notice and hearing are not
necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature.
Issue:
Is the requirement of notice and hearing in the exercise of quasi-
judicial functions necessary when the order issued by an administrative
body is merely interlocutory or incidental to an ongoing proceeding?
Held:
Yes. While respondent may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order,
temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as requirement
of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may
not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner.
Categorizing such order as temporary in nature does not perforce
entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than
would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter
unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar,
the applicable statutory provision is Sec. 16(c) of Public Service Act
which provides that the Commission shall have the power, upon proper
notice and hearing, to fix and determine individual or joint rates.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, NTC has no authority to
make such order without first giving PHILCOMSAT a hearing, whether
the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the
same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission’s own motion as in the present case.
While it may be true that NTC may have other sources of information
or data, still, since a hearing is essential, NTC should act solely on the
basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information
otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if
so adduced, PHILCOMSAT was given no opportunity to controvert.
[79] COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
261 SCRA 236
See Case No. 56
[80] RUBLE RUBENECIA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 115942 May 31, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Ruble Rubenecia assails Civil Service Commission ("CSC" or
"Commission") Resolution No. 94-0533, dated 25 January 1994,
acquitting him of a charge of insubordination but finding him guilty of
several other administrative charges and imposing upon him the
penalty of dismissal from the service. He also questions the validity of
CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 dated 29 June 1993, which allegedly
abolished the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) and authorized
the elevation of cases pending before that body to the Commission.
Teachers of Catarman National HS filed before the Merit System
Protection Board (MSPB) an administrative complaint against petitioner
Rubenecia, the School Principal for dishonesty, nepotism, oppression
and violation of Civil Service Rules
Rubenecia did not file answer despite multiple requests. He insists that
he be given the copies of the complaints that was filed against him
including all supporting documents. Regional Director of the CSC
investigated then submitted to MSPB the investigation report. In the
interim, Rubenencia sent a letter to the CSC chairman that he is not
guilty. Before MSPB could render a decision, CSC issued RESOLUTION
93-2387 which provided, among other things, that cases then pending
before the MSPB were to be elevated to the Commission for decision.
In accordance with the Resolution, Rubenecia’s case was elevated to
CSC. CSC determined that Rubenecia was GUILTY and dismissed him
from service.
Pertinent Issue (excluding due process):
(1) WON the CSC had authority to issue its Resolution No. 93-2387
and assume jurisdiction over the administrative case against petitioner
Held:
(1)YES it has authority to issue the said resolution and YES it has
jurisdiction over the administrative case
Rubenencia contends that since MSPB was a creation of law, it could
only be abolished by law and not by CSC.
The questioned resolution in sum does the following:
1. decisions in administrative cases appealable to the Commission
pursuant to Section 47 of the present Civil Service Law may now
be appealed directly to the Commission itself and not to the
MSPB.
2. Administrative cases already pending on appeal before the MSPB
or previously brought directly to the MSPB, at the time of the
issuance of Resolution No. 93-2387, were required to be elevated
to the Commission for final resolution.
The functions of the MSPB relating to the determination of
administrative disciplinary cases were, in other words, re-allocated to
the Commission itself
to "streamline the operation of the CSC" which in turn required the
"simplification of systems, cutting of red tape and elimination of
unnecessary bureaucratic layer." The previous procedure made it
difficult for cases to be finally resolved within a reasonable period of
time.
200

The change, theretofore, was moved by the quite legitimate objective
of simplifying the course that administrative disciplinary cases, like
those involving petitioner Rubenecia, must take.
However the questioned resolution did not abolish the Merit System
Protection Board, and if it did, he is not an employee of MSPB to be a
real-party-in interest to question the validity of supposed abolition.
Petition is dismissed
[81] ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA V. ERMITA
April 20, 2010
Facts:
Qualified Officers of PITC enjoy a Car Plan Program which entitles an
eligible officer to purchase a vehicle , where 50% of the value shall be
shouldered by PITC while the remaining 50% will be shouldered by the
officer through salary deduction over a period of 5 years. However, RA
6758 was subsequently passed, where there was consolidation of
allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates
save for certain additional compensation such as representation and
transportation allowances which were exempted from consolidation
into the standardized rate.
To implement RA 6758, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) issued DBM-CCC No. 1, which discontinued all allowances and
fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary, not enumerated within
said law. Unfortunately, the car benefits were not one of those
enumerated. Thus, COA disallowed payment/ reimbursement for said
benefits.
Issue
WON the act of COA was valid despite absence of publication of said
Administrative Regulation?
Held
Petition granted, disallowance of COA was proper.
Absent any publication thereof in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, DBM-CCC No. 10 shall be of no
effect. Publication is required as a condition precedent to the
effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or
rules and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by
the same. From the time the COA disallowed the expenses in audit up
to the filing of herein petition the subject circular remained in legal
limbo due to its non-publication. As was stated in Tañadavs. Tuvera,
"prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot
be dispensed with, for the reason that such omission would
offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it."
Also, despite the fact that DBM-CCC No. 10 has been re-issued in its
entirety and submitted for publication in the Official Gazette, said
subsequent publication cannot cure the earlier defect.
Publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a
law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and
regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same.
[82] Hon. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al., v SOUTHWING
HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.,
February 20, 2006
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary
Alberto G. Romulo, issued EO 156, entitled “RPOVIDING FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE
MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AN ITS IMPLEMENTING
GUIDELINES”. Article 2, Section 3.1 of said executive issuance
prohibits the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special
Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (Freeport), of
used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions. The issuance of EO
156 spawned three separate actions for declaratory relief before
Branch 72 of the RTC of Olongapo City, all seeking the declaration of
the unconstitutionality of Article 2, Section 3.1 of said executive order.
The cases were filed by herein respondent entities, who or whose
members, are classified as Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises and
engaged in the business of, among others, importing and/or trading
used motor vehicles.
A summary judgment was rendered declaring that Article 2, Section3.1
of EO 156 constitutes unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested
by the Constitution with Congress. The trial court held further that the
proviso is contrary to the mandate of RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and
capital within the Freeport.
Petitioners contend that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is valid and
applicable to the entire country, including the Freeport. In support
thereof, they raise that EO 156 was issued pursuant to EO 226, the
Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines and that its application
should be extended to the Freeport because the guarantee of RA 7227
on the free flow of goods into the said zone is merely an exemption
from customs duties and taxes on items brought into the Freeport and
not an open floodgate for all kinds of goods and materials without
restriction.
The Court of Appeals invalidated Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, on
the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President to issue the
same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of used motor
vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and
absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President though
an executive issuance, is void.
Issues:
(1) Is EO 156 invalid for lack of statutory basis?
(2) If it is with statutory basis, is the application of Art. 2, Sec.3. 1 of
EO 156 reasonable and within the scope provided by law?
Held:
NO. Contrary to the Conclusion of the CA, EO 156 has both
constitutional and statutory bases. Thus, it satisfied the first
requisite of a valid administrative order that the promulgation must
be authorized by the legislature.
Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section
28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. It provides:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
The relevant statutes to execute this provision are:
1) The Tariff and Customs Code which authorizes the President,
in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or
national security, to, inter alia, prohibit the importation of any
commodity.
2) Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of
the Philippines which was issued on July 16, 1987, by then
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of legislative power
under the Provisional Freedom Constitution, empowers the
President to approve or reject the prohibition on the importation
of any equipment or raw materials or finished products.
3) Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise known as the "Safeguard
Measures Act" (SSMA MA), and entitled "An Act Protecting Local
Industries By Providing Safeguard Measures To Be Undertaken In
Response To Increased Imports And Providing Penalties For
Violation Thereof," designated the Secretaries of the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department of Agriculture,
in their capacity as alter egos of the President, as the
implementing authorities of the safeguard measures, which
include, inter alia, modification or imposition of any quantitative
restriction on the importation of a product into the Philippines.
201
There are thus explicit constitutional and statutory permission
authorizing the President to ban or regulate importation of articles and
commodities into the country.
HOWEVER, the importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a
valid administrative order. To be valid, an administrative issuance must
not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It
must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and
other existing laws, for such is the sole function of the legislature
which the other branches of the government cannot usurp.
In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the
President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is
the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its
application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used
cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a
foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to
protect is actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the
Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227, as follows:
"the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport
where the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and
other national tariff and customs laws are in force and
effect.”
The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be
operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone
within the ambit of the prohibition is an invalid modification of RA
7227. Indeed, when the application of an administrative issuance
modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as in the instant
case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but
also for being unreasonable. If the aim of the EO is to prevent the
entry of used motor vehicles from the Freeport to the customs
territory, the solution is not to forbid entry of these vehicles into the
Freeport, but to intensify governmental campaign and measures to
thwart illegal ingress of used motor vehicles into the customs territory.
As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory,
the injury or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise.
To apply the proscription to the Freeport would not serve the purpose
of the EO. Instead of improving the general economy of the country,
the application of the importation ban in the Freeport would subvert
the avowed purpose of RA 7227 which is to create a market that would
draw investors and ultimately boost the national economy.
Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void insofar as it is made applicable
to the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as
stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A.
[83] GMA vs. MTRCB
Facts:
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF
television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent
MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing
"Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it as
provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.3
The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17
dated December 15, 19984 which provided for the penalties for
exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at
the same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with
the suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11,
2000. It also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted" by the
MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration
and letter-protest.
Issues:
(1) Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the
show "Muro Ami: The Making" prior to its broadcast by television
and
(2) Whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and
binding on petitioner.
Held:
First, Section 3 of PD 19865 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review
and examine all motion pictures, television programs including publicity
materials. This power of prior review is highlighted in its Rules and
Regulations, particularly Section 7 thereof, which reads:
SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. -- No motion picture,
television program or related publicity material shall be imported,
exported, produced, copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or
broadcasted by television without prior permit issued by the BOARD
after review of the motion picture, television program or publicity
material.
The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those
expressly mentioned in Section 7,6 such as (1) television programs
imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or
departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.
According to the CA, the subject program was a publicity for the
movie, "Muro Ami." In adopting this finding, we hold that "Muro Ami:
The Making," did not fall under any of the exemptions and was
therefore within the power of review of MTRCB.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that "Muro Ami: The Making" was
a public affairs program. Even if that were so, our resolution of this
issue would not change. This Court has already ruled that a public
affairs program -- described as a variety of news treatment; a cross
between pure television news and news-related commentaries,
analysis and/or exchange of opinions -- is within the MTRCB’s power of
review. Clearly, "Muro Ami: The Making" (which petitioner claims to be
a public affairs program) was well within the purview of MTRCB’s
power of prior review.1awphi1.net
However, while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program,
Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension
order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987,
particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file
with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the
University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or
filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for
the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without
valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of
January 27, 2000.10 Hence, the same is yet to be effective.11 It is
thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in the ONAR.12
Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not
have been meted the sanction provided thereunder.
[84] GMA v. COMELEC
Facts:
COMELEC Resolution 961 changed the airtime limitations for
political campaign from “per station” basis as adopted during the 2007
and 2010 elections, to a total aggregate basis for the 2013 elections.
Various broadcast networks (e.g. ABS-CBN, GMA, MBC, NBN, RMN,
and KBP) questioned the COMELEC interpretation on the ground that
the provisions are oppressive and violative of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of the press.
They question the constitutionality of Sec. 9 (a) which
provides for an aggregate total airtime instead of the previous per
station airtime for political campaigns and advertisements, and also
required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio
guestings and appearances. They claimed that such section limits the
computation of aggregate total airtime and imposes unreasonable
burden on broadcast media of monitoring a candidate’s or political
party’s aggregate airtime.
On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that these networks
do not have locus standi as the limitations are imposed on candidates.
It alleged that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit is
202
in accordance with the Fair Election Act as this would truly give life to
the constitutional objective to equalize access to media during
elections. It deems this rule to be a more effective way of levelling the
playing field between candidates/political parties with enormous
resources and those w/o much.
Issues:
1. Is Sec. 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution 9615 violates freedom of
expression, of speech, and of press?
2. Is COMELEC Resolution 9615 imposes unreasonable burden on
the broadcast industry?
Held:
1. Yes. The adoption of aggregate based airtime limits
unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech,
expression, and of press.
The aforementioned freedoms are the core civil liberties and have to
be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy. Political speech is
one of the most important expressions protected by the Constitution.
According to GMA, the reduction of a candidate’s airtime minutes in
the New Rules up to an estimation of 120 minutes per national
candidate in television during the whole campaign period of 88 days or
only 81.81 seconds per day TV exposure allotment. If he chooses to
place his political advertisements in the 3 major TV networks in equal
allocation, the candidate will only have 27.27 seconds of airtime per
network per day. This is only 1 advertisement on a 30-second spot
basis in television.
SC agrees that this is unreasonable and arbitrary as it restricts the
ability of candidates to reach out with the people. The reason of
COMELEC of levelling the playing field is not a compelling state interest
that would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of the
candidates to communicate their platforms.
2. No. COMELEC Resolution 9615 does not impose an
unreasonable burden on the broadcast industry.
SC cannot agree with GMA. SC agrees more with COMELEC when it
explained that the legal duty of monitoring lies with the COMELEC.
Broadcast stations are merely required to submit certain documents to
aid the COMELEC in ensuring that candidates are not sold airtime in
excess of the allowed limits. There is no duty on the broadcast stations
to do monitoring, much less monitoring in real time.
[85] PESIGAN V. ANGELES
Facts:
Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2,
1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with
Batangas as their destination.
They were provided with three certificates:
1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian,
2) permit to transfer/transport from the provincial commander; and
3) three certificates of inspections.
In spite of the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the provincial
veterinarian and the town’s police station commander while passing
through Camarines Norte. The confiscation was
based on EO No. 626-A which prohibits the transportation of carabaos
and carabeef from one province to another.
Issue:
Whether or not EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation and
forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one
province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable before
publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982
Held:
No. The said order is not enforceable against the Pesigans on April 2.
1982 because it is a penal regulation published more than two months
later in the OG. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as
provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code and Sec-11 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The word “laws” in article 2 includes circulars and regulations which
prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of
the contents of the regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive
orders having general applicability should be published in the Official
Gazette. It provides that “every order or
document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have
general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a violation of EO
No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture
provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that they have
cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary
confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the
carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot
transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by
the said executive order. Neither can they
recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenerosa acted in good faith in
ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
Judgment: Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal of the
carabaos, reversed and set aside. Respondents to restore carabaos,
with the requisite documents, to petitioners for their
own disposal in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
Important point: Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected hereby. Justice and fairness
dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of
the publication on the Gazette.
[86] PERALTA V. CSC
Facts:
Petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II in the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). His appointment was
classified as "Reinstatement/Permanent". Before said appointment, he
was working at the Philippine Cotton Corporation, a government-
owned and controlled corporation under the Department of
Agriculture.
Petitioner received his initial salary, covering the period from
25 September to 31 October 1989. Since he had no accumulated leave
credits, DTI deducted from his salary the amount corresponding to his
absences during the covered period, namely, 29 September 1989 and
20 October 1989, inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays.
Petitioner sent a memorandum to Amando T. Alvis (Chief,
General Administrative Service) inquiring as to the law on salary
deductions, if the employee has no leave credits. Amando T. Alvis
answered petitioner's query in a memorandum citing Chapter 5.49 of
the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil Service which
states that "when an employee is on leave without pay on a day
before or on a day immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or
Holiday, such Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday shall also be without pay
(CSC, 2nd Ind., February 12, 1965)."
Petitioner then sent a letter dated 20 February 1990
addressed to Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas raising the following question:
"Is an employee who was on leave of absence without
pay on a day before or on a day immediately preceding a
Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, also considered on leave of
absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or
Holiday?"
Petitioner in his said letter to the CSC Chairman argued that a reading
of the General Leave Law as contained in the Revised Administrative
Code, as well as the old Civil Service Law (Republic Act No. 2260),
the Civil Service Decree (Presidential Decree No. 807), and the Civil
Service Rules and Regulations fails to disclose a specific provision
which supports the CSC rule at issue. That being the case, the
203
petitioner contended that he cannot be deprived of his pay or salary
corresponding to the intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays (in
the factual situation posed), and that the withholding (or deduction) of
the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
Respondent Commission promulgated Resolution No. 90-
497, ruling that the action of the DTI in deducting from the salary of
petitioner, a part thereof corresponding to six (6) days (September 29,
30, October 1, 20, 21, 22, 1989) is in order.
Issue:
Is the respondent Commission's policy mandating salary deductions
corresponding to the intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays
where an employee without leave credits was absent on the
immediately preceding working day, valid?
Held:
During the pendency of this petition, the respondent Commission
promulgated Resolution No. 91-540 dated 23 April 1991 amending the
questioned policy, considering that employees paid on a monthly basis
are not required to work on Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays. In said
amendatory Resolution, the respondent Commission resolved "to adopt
the policy that when an employee, regardless of whether he has leave
credits or not, is absent without pay on day immediately preceding or
succeeding Saturday, Sunday or holiday, he shall not be considered
absent on those days." Memorandum Circular No. 16 Series of
1991 dated 26 April 1991, was also issued by CSC Chairman Sto.
Tomas adopting and promulgating the new policy and directing the
Heads of Departments, Bureaus and Agencies in the national and local
governments, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, to oversee the strict implementation of the
circular.
Because of these developments, it would seem at first blush that this
petition has become moot and academic since the very CSC policy
being questioned has already been amended and, in effect,
Resolutions No. 90-497 and 90-797, subject of this petition for
certiorari, have already been set aside and superseded. But the issue
of whether or not the policy that had been adopted and in force since
1965 is valid or not, remains unresolved. Thus, for reasons of public
interest and public policy, it is the duty of the Court to make a formal
ruling on the validity or invalidity of such questioned policy.
The petition is GRANTED, CSC Resolutions No. 90-497 and 90-797 are
declared NULL and VOID.
When an administrative or executive agency renders an
opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means. It has also been held that interpretative regulations need not
be published.
In promulgating as early as 12 February 1965 the
questioned policy, the Civil Service Commission interpreted the
provisions of Republic Act No. 2625 (which took effect on 17 June
1960) amending the Revised Administrative Code. The Civil Service
Commission in its here questioned Resolution No. 90-797
construed R.A. 2625 as referring only to government employees who
have earned leave credits against which their absences may be
charged with pay, as its letters speak only of leaves of absence with
full pay. The respondent Commission ruled that a reading of R.A.
2625 does not show that a government employee who is on leave of
absence without pay on a day before or immediately preceding a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary
for said days.
With this in mind, the construction by the respondent
Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative
intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government employees
are entitled to fifteen (15) days vacation leave of absence with full pay
and fifteen (15) days sick leave with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays and Holidays in both cases. Thus, the law speaks of the
granting of a right and the law does not provide for a distinction
between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who
have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The fact remains that
government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave
credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and
Holidays and thus they cannot be declared absent on such non-
working days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-
working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary
corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent
without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working
days. A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property
without due process.
[87] Nestle Philippines v. CA
Facts
Sometime in February 1983, the authorized capital stock of Nestle was
increased from P300 million divided into 3 million shares with a par
value of P100.00 per share, to P600 million divided into 6 million
shares with a par value of P100.00 per share. Nestle underwent the
necessary procedures and effected the necessary filings to secure the
approval of SEC, which approval was in fact granted. Nestle also paid
to the SEC the amount of P50,000.00 as filing fee in accordance with
the Schedule of Fees and Charges being implemented by the SEC
under the Corporation Code.
The BoD and stockholders of Nestle approved resolutions authorizing
the issuance of 344,500 shares out of the previously authorized but
unissued capital stock of Nestle, exclusively to San Miguel Corporation
and to Nestle S.A. San Miguel Corporation subscribed to and
completely paid up 168,800 shares, while Nestle S.A. subscribed to
and paid up the balance of 175,700 shares of stock.
Nestle sought exemption from the registration requirement and from
payment of fees based on Section 6(a) (4) of the Revised Securities
Act which provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Exempt transactions. — a) The requirement of
registration under subsection (a) of Section four of this Act
shall not apply to the sale of any security in any of the
following transactions:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) The distribution by a corporation, actively engaged
in the business authorized by its articles of incorporation, of
securities to its stockholders or other security holders as a
stock dividend or other distribution out of surplus; or the
issuance of securities to the security holder or other
creditors of a corporation in the process of a bona fide
reorganization of such corporation made in good faith and
not for the purpose of avoiding the provisions of this Act,
either in exchange for the securities of such security holders
or claims of such creditors or partly for cash and partly in
exchange for the securities or claims of such security holders
or creditors; or the issuance of additional capital stock of a
corporation sold or distributed by it among its own
stockholders exclusively, where no commission or other
remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly in
connection with the sale or distribution of such increased
capital stock. (Emphasis supplied)
embraces "not only an increase in the authorized capital stock but also
the issuance of additional shares to existing stockholders of the
unissued portion of the unissued capital stock". Nestle urged that
interpretation.
Issue:
Whether or not Nestle’s proposed issuance of additional shares to its
existing principal shareholders is exempted from the registration
requirement of Section 4 of the Revised Securities Act and from
payment of the fee referred to in Section 6(c) of the same Act.
Held:
The statutory phrase "issuance of additional capital stock" may refer
either to:
204
a) the issuance of capital stock as part of and in the course of
increasing the authorized capital stock of a corporation; or
(b) issuance of already authorized but still unissued capital stock.
By the same token, the phrase "increased capital stock" found at the
end of Section 6 (a) (4), may refer either:
1) to newly or contemporaneously authorized capital stock issued in
the course of increasing the authorized capital stock of a corporation;
or
2) to previously authorized but unissued capital stock.
Both the SEC and the Court of Appeals resolved the ambiguity by
construing Section 6 (a) (4) as referring only to the issuance of shares
of stock as part of and in the course of increasing the authorized
capital stock of Nestle. In the case at bar, since the 344,500 shares of
Nestle capital stock are proposed to be issued from already authorized
but still unissued capital stock and since the present authorized capital
stock of 6,000,000 shares with a par value of P100.00 per share is not
proposed to be further increased, the SEC and the Court of Appeals
rejected Nestle's petition.
We believe and so hold that the construction thus given by the SEC
and the Court of Appeals to Section 6 (a) (4) of the Revised Securities
Act must be upheld.
First, it is a principle too well established to require extensive
documentation that the construction given to a statute by an
administrative agency charged with the interpretation and application
of that statute is entitled to great respect and should be accorded
great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown
to be in sharp conflict with the governing statute or the Constitution
and other laws. As long ago as 1903, this Court said in In re Allen that:
[t]he principle that the contemporaneous construction of a
statute by the executive officers of the government, whose
duty is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should
ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the
courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction that no
authorities need be cited to support it.
The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the
multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the
establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and
satisfying those needs; it also relates to accumulation of experience
and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency
charged with implementing a particular statute.
Second, consideration of the underlying statutory purpose of Section
6(a) (4) compels us to sustain the view taken by the SEC and the
Court of Appeals. The reading by the SEC of the scope of application of
Section 6(a) (4) permits greater opportunity for the SEC to implement
the statutory objective of protecting the investing public by requiring
proposed issuers of capital stock to inform such public of the true
financial conditions and prospects of the corporation. By limiting the
class of exempt transactions contemplated by the last clause of Section
6(a) (4) to issuances of stock done in the course of and as part of the
process of increasing the authorized capital stock of a corporation, the
SEC is enabled to examine issuances by a corporation of previously
authorized but theretofore unissued capital stock, on a case-to-case
basis, under Section 6(b); and thereunder, to grant or withhold
exemption from the normal registration requirements depending upon
the perceived level of need for protection by the investing public in
particular cases.
[88] PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS V. RELOVA
Facts:
PGC applied before the Bureau of Communications (BOC) for authority
to establish a branch station in Cebu for international communication
services. The application was opposed by Capitol Wireless, et al. While
the application was pending, BOC issued Memorandum Circular No.
77-13 which designated Metro Manila as the sole “gateway” for
communications in the country, and defined what constitutes
“domestic record operations.”
After construing the legislative franchise of PGC, BOC granted the
application, to the opposition of Capitol Wireless, et al. Pending the
resolution for their MR, they filed for declaratory judgment regarding
the proper construction of PGC’s franchise.
Issues:
(1) Is PGC, under its franchise, authorized to have a station outside of
Metro Manila?
(2) Does the station constitute a domestic service within the franchise?
Held:
A reading of the law reveals that PGC is authorized to construct,
maintain and operate, apart from its principal station in Makati, other
stations within the Philippines for the purpose of its international
communications operations. With respect to the principle of
contemporaneous construction of a statute by executive officers of the
government whose duty is to execute it, it is entitled to great respect
and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the
courts. Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous
construction by executive officers, unless such interpretation in clearly
erroneous.
[89] ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL V. COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS
Facts:
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. was engaged in the production and milling
of centrifugal sugar for export, the produced sugar was being placed in
container known as jute bag which were not locally made. IN 1957, it
made two importations of jute bags. There were 44,800jute bags in
the first importation, and 75,200 in the second importation. These
importations were made free of customs duties and special import tax
upon the petitioner’s filing of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax
Bond conditioned upon the exportation of jute bags within one year
from date of importation.
The first transaction only exported 33,647 out of 120,000 jute bags
that it imported. The remaining 86,353 jute bags were exported after
the expiration of the one-year period but within three years from their
importation contrary to the Administrative Order 66 and 389 issued by
the Bureau of Customs. Due to the petitioner’s failure to show proof
of the exportation of the balance of 86,353jute bags within one year
from their importation, the collector of Customs of Iloilo required it to
pay the amount of 28,629.42 representing the customs duties and
special import tax due thereon, which amount paid under protest.
The petitioner demanded the refund of the amount it had paid, on the
ground that its request for extension of the period of one year was
filed on time, and that its failure to export the jute bags within the
required one-year period was due to delay in the arrival of the vessel
on which they were to be loaded and to the picketing of the Central
railroad line. Alternatively, it asked for refund of the same amount in
the form of a draw back under section 106(b) in relation to section
105(x) of the Tariff and Custom Code. On June 21,1960, the collector
of Customs of Iloilo, after hearing, rendered judgment denying the
claim for refund. Because of this judgment the petitioner appealed to
the Commissioner of Customs who upheld the decision of the
Collector. Eventually, a petition for review was filed with the CTA which
affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs.
Issue:
1. Is the Commissioner of Customs vested with discretion to extend
the period of one year provided for in section 23 of the Philippine
Tariff Act of 1909?
2. Is the Bureau of Customs, as an administrative body, allowed to
resolve questions of law in the exercise of it quasi-judicial
function as an incident to its power of regulation?
Held:
1. In the case at bar, the Bureau of Customs held that Section 23 of
the Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x)
205
 of the Tariff and Customs Code, are silent as to whether the one
year period within which the containers therein mentioned must
be exported, may be extended. By reason of this silence, the
Bureau of Customs Issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66
to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall
apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially known
its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in
the law as non-extendible.
2. Considering that the statutory provisions in question (Section 23
of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and Sec. 105(x) of the Tariff
and Customs Code) have not been the subject of previous judicial
interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial
respect for administrative construction would, be in
order.
Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted
the statute is the rule applicable that courts will give
consideration to construction by administrative or executive
departments of the state.
The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of
an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the executive
department or other agency charged with its administration or
enforcement is entitled to consideration and the highest respect
from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in
determining the meaning of the law, especially when the
construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is
contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or when
the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency.
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office
charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions
of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed
by it thereon should be given controlling weight. In
applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or
practical construction, the courts often refer to several factors
which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as factors
leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in
particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These
factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged
with administration, their competence, expertness, experience,
and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the
drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on
which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical
working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute
presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for
discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the
statute.
[90] PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION V.
CHINESE GENERAL HOSPITAL
Facts:
On February 14, 1995, Republic Act No. 7875, an Act Instituting a
National Health Insurance Program for all Filipinos and Establishing the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation For the Purpose, was
approved and signed into law. Before the enactment of RA 7875
Chinese General Hospital and Medical Center (CGH) had been an
accredited health care provider under the Philippine Medical Care
Commission (PMCC), more popularly known as Medicare. CGH filed
claims for reimbursement with SSS, however, this was overtaken by
the passage of RA 7875.
Under Sec 51 - Within sixty (60) days from the promulgation of the
IRR, all functions and assets of the Philippine Medical Care Commission
shall be merged with those of the Corporation (PHILHEALTH) without
need of conveyance, transfer or assignment. The PMCC shall
thereafter cease to exist. The liabilities of the PMCC shall be treated in
accordance with existing laws and pertinent rules and regulations. xxx
and Sec 52 - The Health Insurance Funds being administered by the
SSS and GSIS shall be transferred to the Corporation within sixty (60)
days from the promulgation of the implementing rules and regulations.
The SSS and GSIS shall, however, continue to perform Medicare
functions under contract with the Corporation until such time that such
functions are assumed by the Corporation xxx
CGH’s claims were denied by the Claims Review Unit of Philhealth for
being allegedly filed beyond the sixty (60) day period allowed by the
implementing rules and regulations under Section 52. CGH filed
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. CA ordered
PHILHEALTH to pay the claims, principally on the ground of liberal
application of the 60-day rule under Section 52 of RA 7875’s
Implementing Rules and Regulations. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
Should the 60-day rule under Section 52 of RA 7875’s Implementing
Rules and Regulations be liberally construed?
Held:
YES. The Supreme Court held that “A careful reading of RA 7875
shows that the law itself does not provide for any specific period within
which to file claims. We can safely presume therefore that the period
for filing was not per se the principal concern of the legislature. More
important than mere technicalities is the realization of the state policy
to provide Philhealth members with the requisite medical care at the
least possible cost. “
While it is doctrinal in administrative law that the rules and regulations
of administrative bodies interpreting the law they are entrusted to
enforce have the force of law, these issuances are by no means iron-
clad norms. Administrative bodies themselves can and have in fact
“bent the rules” for reasons of public interest.
For instance, PHILHELATH issued in its CIrualr no. 31-A: The
unreasonably strict implementation of the 60-day rule, without regard
to the causes of delay beyond respondent’s control, will be counter-
productive to the long-term effectiveness of the NHIP. Instead of
placing a premium on participation in the Program, Philhealth punishes
an accredited health provider like CGH by refusing to pay its claims for
services already rendered. Under these circumstances, no accredited
provider will gamble on honoring claims with delayed supporting
papers ― no matter how meritorious ― knowing that reimbursement
from Philhealth will not be forthcoming.
PART V. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
[91] SANADO V. CA
Facts:
The Philippine Fisheries Commission issued in favor of petitioner
Sanado an Ordinary Fishpond permit. Sanado and private respondent
Nepomuceno executed a contract of “Fishpond Development and
Financing”. Based on the modified agreement, Nepomuceno proceeded
with the development of the fishpond area, excluding the area of 10
hectares already developed by Sanado.
The Director of Fisheries and Aquatic resources recommended to then
Ministry of Natural Resources the conversion of Ordinary Fishpond
permit into a 25-year loan agreement. Pursuant to said
recommendation, Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued to Sanado.
Later, Nepomuceno waived his rights, interest, and participation over
the fishpond area in favor of one Edgar Chu. A complaint was later
filed in RTC by Sanado for recovery of possession and damages
against Nepomuceno and Edgar Chu.
While this case was pending, the Minister of Agriculture issued an
order cancelling the Fishpond Lease Agreement but giving
Nepomuceno the priority to apply for the area, his improvements were
not considered forfeited in favor of the government. Sanado however
elevated the matter to the Office of the President but his appeal was
dismissed. The trial court then decided in favor of Sanado, ordering
him to be restored to the possession and control of the fishpond area
and ordering respondents to pay to Sanado the rentals of the fishpond.
This was appealed to CA.
On July 31,1989, a few days after RTC rendered its decision pending
206
appeal, the Office of the President resolved the appeal filed by Sanado
affirming the cancellation of the Lease Agreement.
Issue:
What is the nature of the July 31, 1989 Malacanang decision and what
is its effect on the resolution of the Civil Case?
Held:
The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying,
or in suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or
certificate of public convenience and necessity is
administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely
administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent
upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon
which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined.
As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is
explicitly an official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by
the Executive Department headed by the highest officer of the land. It
thus squarely falls under matters relative to the executive
department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take
judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court.
The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacañang decision is
premised on the essential function of the executive department -
which is to enforce the law. The only exception is when there is a clear
showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave
abuse of discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar. It is thus
plain in the case at bar that the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of
the President is a substantial supervening event which drastically
changed the circumstances of the parties to the subject fishpond lease
agreement.
[92] PCGG V. PENA
Facts:
Between 1986 and 1987, PCGG, created through Executive Order No.
1, ordered the freezing of the assets, effects, documents and records
of two garment manufacturing corporations. PCGG assigned Ms.
Saludo as OIC of both corporation and was designated as authorized
signatories along with Mr Chun Ho, to effect deposits and withdrawals
of funds in the bank to pay the debts of the corporation. A certain Yim
Kam Shing was designated as co-signatory to transact with the bank in
the absence of the Mr Chun Ho. However, the authority of Yim Kam
Shing was revoked by OIC Saludo upon finding that Yim Kam Shing
was a Hongkong Chinese national staying in the country on a mere
tourist visa.
The revocation of the authorization made by the OIC was questioned
in an action for damages with preliminary injunction filed in the RTC to
which the latter issued a TRO enjoining the bank and its agents from
releasing any funds. A petition was filed questioning the jurisdiction of
the RTC over PCGG or over the subject matter of the case.
Issue:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over PCGG and properties it
sequestered and placed in its custodia legis in the exercise of its
powers under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as amended?
Can the RTC interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and
actions of PCGG?
Held:
NO. RTC and the CA for that matter have no jurisdiction over the
PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive
Orders and Art. XVIII, sec. 26 of the Constitution and therefore may
not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of
the Commission
To eliminate all doubts, the Court upheld the primacy of administrative
jurisdiction as vested in the Commission and held that jurisdiction over
all sequestration cases of ill-gotten wealth, assets and properties under
the past discredited regime fall within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by the SC.
Based on the duties and functions and the power and authority of the
Commission, it exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of
quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with
regional trial courts and "co-equal bodies have no power to control the
other." Further, EO 14 which lays down jurisdiction over ill-gotten
wealth cases lodged appellate jurisdiction over Sandiganbayan of
PCGG orders, decisions, etc. The memorandum revoking the authority
of the co-signatory should have been contested before Sandiganbayan,
not before the RTC as a co-equal body of PCGG.
Under section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on
May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding "the Funds,
Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated
by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates,
Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" whether civil or criminal, are lodged
within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan"
and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases
necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and
original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the
Supreme Court.
[93] UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL V.
COMMISSION ON SETTLEMENT
Facts:
The property is a 10.36 hectare property in Baguio City called
Dominican Hills. It was mortgaged to the UCPB which foreclosed the
mortgage, acquired the same as highest bidder, and was donated to
the Republic of the Philippines by UCPB. The deed of donation
stipulated that the property would be utilized for the "priority
programs, projects, activities in human settlements and economic
development and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human
Settlements
However, the Ministry of Human Settlements was abolished when
President Corazon Aquino issued EO No. 85. All the agencies as well as
all the assets, programs and projects of the Ministry were transferred
to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS)
PMS received an application from petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF
DOMINICAN HILL, INC. (UNITED) to acquire a portion of the
Dominican Hills property. PMS Secretary referred the application to the
HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC). A MOA was
signed by and among the PMS, the HIGC, and UNITED where PMS
would sell the property to HIGC which would, in turn, sell the same to
UNITED. Eventually, HIGC sold the property to UNITED
Sometime in 1993, private respondents, DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO
RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION), entered the
Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses.
Petitioner secured a demolition order.
Private respondents filed an action for injunction docketed as Civil
Case No. 3316-R but their prayer for writ of preliminary injunction was
later denied. While Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, private
respondents filed Civil Case No. 3382-R represented by the Land
Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (BENEFICIARIES). They prayed
for the damages, injunction and annulment of the said Memorandum
of Agreement between UNITED and HIGC which was dismissed by the
trial court.
Another demolition order was subsequently implemented. To forestall
the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents
filed petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a
temporary restraining order in the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner HIGC,
PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as the Register
of Deeds of Baguio City. Public respondent COSLAP issued the
contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status
quo.
207

Petitioner then filed the instant petition
Issue:
Is COSLAP empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of
contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order and to issue a
status quo order and conduct a hearing?
Held:
No. The COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the
controversy
Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 states that:
…The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the
foregoing cases shall have the force and effect of a regular
administrative resolution, order or decision and shall be binding upon
the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the
same
The COSLAP may not assume jurisdiction over cases which are already
pending in the regular courts. Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561
speaks of any resolution, order or decision of the COSLAP as having
the "force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or
decision." The qualification places an unmistakable emphasis on the
administrative character of the COSLAP's determination, amplified by
the statement that such resolutions, orders or decisions "shall be
binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having
jurisdiction over the same."
The COSLAP discharges quasi-judicial functions:
"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative
agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still,
administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither
part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals.
Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat,
impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary.
Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is
empowered "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
[94] CARINO V. CHR
Facts
800 public school teachers undertook "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure
of the public authorities to act upon grievances.
The teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an
order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or
face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not
comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the
eight (8) private respondents. For failure to heed the return-to-work
order, private respondents were charged on the basis of the principal's
report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days and temporarily replaced
In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082,
respondents filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation,
and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings
pending resolution by the Supreme Court of their application for
issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order.” When their
motion for suspension was denied, respondents led by their counsel
staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings. The case eventually resulted in a Decision of petitioner
Secretary Cariño decreeing dismissal from the service of respondent
Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of
respondents Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.
In the meantime, the "Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Manila against
petitioner, which was dismissed. Later, the MPSTA went to the
Supreme Court on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal,
grounded on the alleged violation of the striking teachers' right to due
process and peaceable assembly. The Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT) also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court.
In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn
statements to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while
they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly
learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. In connection
therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue” and sent a subpoena
to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance
On the day of the "dialogue," the Commission proceeded to hear the
case.
Secretary Cariño sought and was granted leave to file a motion to
dismiss the case. Pending determination by the Commission of the
motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were
promulgated in two (2) cases (decreeing dismissal from the service of
respondent Esber and
the suspension for nine (9) months of respondents Babaran, Budoy
and del Castillo; and that it was prima facie lawful for
petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative
charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue
decision on those charges.)
In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission
denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him and
Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counteraffidavits within ten
(10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and
resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter
affidavit."
The Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cariño, has commenced
the present action of certiorari and prohibition to invalidate and set
aside this Order of December 28, 1990
Issue:
Does the CHR have the power to try and decide, or hear and
determine alleged human rights violations involving civil or political
rights?
Held:
No.
Section 18, Article 13 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for
the powers and functions of the Commission:
Section 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have
the following powers and functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the
power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies
do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered such,
the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
208
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject
to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Hence, the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters.
Definition of Investigation and Adjudication in the case:
Investigation - investigation" being in turn described as an
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. … An inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery
and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters
Adjudication - pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact,
and the entry of a judgment
[95] MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY V. ATILANO
Facts:
MERALCO filed a case of estafa against Atilano et al because of an
investment allegedly gone wrong. The prosecutor dismissed
MERALCOs complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating that there
was no clear proof that Atilano et al misappropriated or converted
MERALCOs funds. The transaction partook of a loan agreement.
MERALCO petitioned to have the DOJ review the denial. The DOJ,
through a resolution, affirmed the denial, stating that there was no
error on the part of the handling prosecutor that would warrant a
reversal of the challenged resolution. Hence the present petition.
MERALCO now alleges that the DOJ did not follow the requirements
under Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution (“No decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.”)
Issue: Does the DOJ need to comply with the constitutional
requirement?
Held: No. The DOJ need not comply because the constitutional
provision applies only to quasi-judicial bodies and the DOJ reviewing
the prosecutors decision is not pursuant to quasi-judicial powers.
The resolution was issued in accordance with Section 12 (c), in relation
to Section 7, of Department Circular No. 70, dated July 3, 2000, which
authorizes the Secretary of Justice to dismiss a petition outright if he
finds it to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay,
or when the issues raised therein are too insubstantial to require
consideration.
In Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan Tiong Bio, the SC ruled that “Section
4, Article VIII of the Constitution does not . . . extend to resolutions
issued by the DOJ Secretary." In explaining the inapplicability of
Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution to DOJ resolutions, the Court
said that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and the action of the
Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor's order or resolution via
appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial
proceeding.
[96] ENCINAS V. AGUSTIN
Facts:
Agustin filed a letter-complaint to the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP)
for illegal transfer, against Encinas. (Encinas allegedly reassigned
Agustin to a far-flung area because the latter failed to give him 5,000
pesos)
On the same basis, Agustin also filed another complaint with the
CSCRO (Second complaint); this time accusing Encinas of violating the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713)
The IAS of the BFP through a resolution recommended the complaint
to be dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence, and stated that it was
within the ambit of authority of the head of office.
The CSCRO complaint, however, was given due course, and held that
the testimony was able to establish the fact that Encinas demanded
5,000 from him, in exchange for his non-reassignment.
Encinas now argues that (1) The CSCRO decision should be dismissed
due to the prior dismissal of the BFP complaint, under the principle of
res judicata; (2) Agustin was guilty of forum-shopping by filing two
separate complaints;
Issue:
Does the principle of res judicata apply in the exercise of
administrative functions?
Held:
Petition DENIED; NO, RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY IN THE
EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS
RES JUDICATA only applies to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
functions.
The BFP complaint (first complaint) resulted in a fact-finding
investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for
an administrative charge should be filed. No rights and liabilities were
determined with finality. This was pursuant to its administrative
functions.
“The Court has laid down the test for determining whether
an administrative body is exercising judicial or merely
investigatory functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of
the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an
investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an
agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to
it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
absence of judicial discretion and judgment.”
[97] PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION V. SEC OF
EDUCATION
Facts:
Herein petitioner Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock,
nonprofit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines. The herein respondent heads the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the
Philippines.
On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education
submitted a report which favorably recommended to the DECS the
following with respect to the Government's policy on increases in
school fees for the schoolyear 1987 to 1988 —
(1) Private schools may be allowed to increase its total school
fees by not more than 15 per cent to 20 per cent, without
the need for the prior approval of the DECS. Schools that
wish to increase school fees beyond the ceiling would be
subject to the discretion of the DECS;
The DECS took note of the report and through the respondent, issued
an Order authorizing, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees however
reduced it later to lower ceiling of 10% to 15% pursuant to Dept.
Order No. 37. Despite this reduction, the petitioner still opposed the
increases. Thus, the petitioner went to this Court and filed the instant
Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring
the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The petitioner also
maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution inasmuch as the
209
petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said
Department Order was issued.
The petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested
parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before
school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the
questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural
due process of law.
Issue: Is notice and hearing required for the validity of the
Department Order No. 37?
Held: No.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be
either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative
function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is
not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an
administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior
notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the
rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they
may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates
imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of
fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its
legislative function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order
prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all
private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being
so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its
issuance.
[98] SANADO V. CA
Legal effect of a decision rendered by an administrative body in a case
filed in the regular courts
Facts:
Sañado was issued by the now defunct Philippine Fisheries Commission
an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering an area of 50 hectares.
On July 16, 1973, Sañado executed a contract with Nepomuceno
wherein the latter agreed to develop 30 hectares of the 50 hectares
covered by Sañado’s fishpond permit. Two days later, the parties
modified this earlier agreement by excluding the area of 10 hectares
already cultivated and fully developed and providing that the contract
is renewable on terms acceptable to both of them.
Sept. 28, 1979 – Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
recommended to the then Ministry of Natural Resources the conversion
of Sañado’s fishpond permit into a 25-year fishpond loan agreement
which covered a reduced area of 26.745 hectares. Accordingly, a
Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued.
July 17, 1981 – Sañado filed a complaint against Nepomuceno with the
RTC for recovery of possession and damages, alleging that
Nepomuceno failed to deliver Sañado’s share of the net harvest among
other things. While this case was pending, the then Minister of
Agriculture and Food canceled the Fishpond Lease Agreement,
forfeiting the improvements thereon in favor of government. Later,
said order was reconsidered to the extent that Nepomuceno was given
priority to apply for the area and that his improvements thereon were
not considered forfeited in favor of the government.
Sañado elevated the matter to the Office of the President but appeal
was dismissed. Meanwhile, the trial court rendered a decision over
Sañado’s complaint for recovery of possession in his favor.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President has any
legal effect on the civil case for recovery of possession
Whether or not the judgment of the trial court has attained finality
Held:
What is the nature of the July 31, 1989 Malacañang decision and what
is its effect on the resolution of Civil Case No. 2085?
The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in
suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of
public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial.
The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the
administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights
and liabilities determined. As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the
Office of the President is explicitly an official act of and an exercise of
quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department headed by the
highest officer of the land. It thus squarely falls under matters relative
to the executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to
take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of the Executive
Department, its principal officers, elected or appointed, such as the
President, his powers and duties.
The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacañang decision is
premised on the essential function of the executive department —
which is to enforce the law. In this instance, what is being enforced is
Presidential Decree No. 704 which consolidated and revised all laws
and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries. Such enforcement must be
true to the policy behind such laws which is "to accelerate and
promote the integrated development of the fishery industry and to
keep the fishery resources of the country in optimum productive
condition through proper conservation and protection" (Section 2, P.D.
No. 704).
[99] GLOBE WIRELESS V. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts:
Antonio Arnaiz in the Philippines sent a telegraph to Maria Diaz in
Spain. The Bureau of Telecommunications in Bulacan received the
telegraph, transmitted it to its Manila Office, then the latter sent it to
Globe Wireless Ltd. for its transmission to Spain. The message did not
reach its intended recipient. Arnaiz filed a letter complaint to the Public
Service Commission against Globe Wireless. Globe contended that PSC
has no jurisdiction but despite that, the PSC rendered a decision
against Globe and ordered the latter to pay a fine of P200.00 and
refund P19.00 to the remitter of the undelivered message. Globe filed
an MR, it was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Does the PSC have jurisdiction over this particular dispute between
Arnaiz and Globe Wireless
Held:
No. Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended otherwise
known as the Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service
Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all Public services
and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative franchise under
which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission's
jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge
the Public. Thus,
Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given
jurisdiction over the grantee only with respect to the rates
which the grantee may charge the public subject to
international commitments made or adhered to by the
Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to
deliver the telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee
in Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed negligence had nothing
whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very limited
jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.
Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the
Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases
of violation of or failure by a Public service to comply with the terms
210
and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations
of the Commission. petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so
there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the
Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or
regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter
had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the
rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like
respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or
necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such
body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and
ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category.
Petition Granted, PSC decision set aside for being null
[100] PCGG V. PENA
Facts:
This is a case about the Presidential Commission on Good Government,
created through E.O. 1, charging it with the task of assisting the
President in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated
by the Marcoses, including the power to issue freeze orders or
sequestration of all business enterprises owned by them upon showing
of a prima facie case.
March 25, 1986 – PCGG issued an order freezing the assets,
effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing
firms: American Inter-fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel
Manufacturing Corporation. June 27, 1986 – PCGG designated the OIC,
Saludo, and Yeung Chun Ho as authorized signatories to effect
deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations. Sept. 4,
1986 – PCGG designated Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the
absence of Yeung Chun Ho and Marcelo de Guzman, in the absence of
Saludo. Feb. 3, 1987 – Saludo, in a memorandum, revoked the
authorizations previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam Shing
was a Hong Kong Chinese national staying in the country on a mere
tourist visa. The PCGG Commissioner approved the memorandum.
Shortly, thereafter, Saludo withdrew funds from Metrobank against the
accounts of the two corporations for payment of the salaries of the
stuff.
Yeung Chung Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan instituted through
Yim Kam Shing an action for damages with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the said bank, PCGG, the Commissioner
and OIC Saludo with the RTC, questiong the aforesaid revocation of
the authorization as signatory previously granted to Yim Kam Shing.
RTC issued TRO.
PCGG filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to Yim’s prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the case. RTC
judge denied PCGG’s motion to dismiss and granted Yim’s prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the PCGG?
Held:
NO. The RTC and the CA for that matter have no jurisdiction over the
PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive
Orders and Art. XVIII, sec. 26 of the Constitution and therefore may
not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of
the Commission. Under section 2 of the President's Executive Order
No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding
"the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or
Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business
Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" whether civil or criminal,
are lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan" and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related
to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's
exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by the Supreme Court”
Powers of the PCGG
E.O. 1 – created PCGG, charging it to assist the President in the
recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses,
including sequestration and provisional takeover of all
business enterprises owned by them as well as conduct investigations,
require submission of evidence by subpoena, administer oaths, punish
for contempt. Freedom Constitution (Proc. No. 3) – mandated the
President to “…recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the
leaders and supporters of the previous regime….”
Quasi-Judicial Function
As can be readily seen, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the
exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a co-equal body
with regional trial courts and “co-equal bodies have no power to
control the other.” However, although under B.P. 129, the CA has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgment…of regional trial
courts and quasi-judicial bodies, E.O. 14 specifically provides in section
2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all
such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which
shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily,
those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or
orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the
Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction.
The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to
review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.
Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
The Court recently had occasion to stress once more, in G.R. No.
82218, Reyes vs. Caneba March 17, 1988, that "(T)he thrust of the
related doctrines of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion
of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities
within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts of an
administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a court, and
a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency acting within the perimeters of its own
competence." Applying these fundamental doctrines to the case at bar,
the questions and disputes raised by respondents seeking to
controvert the Commission's finding of prima facie basis for the
issuance of its sequestration orders as well as the interjection of the
claims of the predecessor of American Inter-fashion and De Solei
lCorporations, viz. Glorious Sun Phil., headed by Nemesis Co are all
questions that are within the primary administrative jurisdiction of
the Commission that cannot be prematurely brought up to clog the
court dockets without first resorting to the exhaustion of the
prescribed administrative remedies. The administrative procedure
and remedies for contesting orders of sequestration issued by
the Commission are provided for in its rules and regulations. Thus, the
person against whom a writ of sequestration is directed may request
the lifting thereof, in writing; after due hearing or motu proprio for
good cause shown, the Commission may lift the writ unconditionally or
subject to such conditions as it may deem necessary, taking into
consideration the evidence and the circumstances of the case. The
resolution of the Commission is appealable to the President of
the Philippines. The Commission conducts a hearing, after due notice
to the parties concerned to ascertain whether any particular asset,
property or enterprise constitutes ill-gotten wealth. TheCommission's
order of sequestration is not final, at the proper time, the question of
ownership of the sequestered properties shall be exclusively
determined in the Sandiganbayan, whose own decisions in turn are
subject to review exclusively by the Supreme Court.
It should be emphasized here, as again stressed by the Court in the
recent case of Republic, et al. vs. De los Angeles, et al., G.R. No. L-
30240, March 25, 1988, that "it is well-recognized principle that purely
administrative and discretionary function may not be interfered with by
the courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the
proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of
government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the
211
exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. There should
be no thought of disregarding the traditional line separating judicial
and administrative competence, the former being entrusted with the
determination of legal questions and the latter being limited as a result
of its expertise to the ascertainment of the decisive facts." This is
specially true in sequestration cases affected by the Commission for
the recovery of the nation' s plundered wealth that may affect the
nation's very survival, in the light of the constitutional mandate that
such sequestration or freeze orders "shall be issued only upon showing
of a prima facie case" 17 and the settled principle that findings by
administrative or quasi-judicial agencies like the Commission are
entitled to the greatest respect and are practically binding and
conclusive, like the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts,
save where they are patently arbitrary or capricious or are not
supported by substantial evidence.
[101] MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY V. CA
Facts:
CCM Gas Corporation is a customer of MERALCO. At one point, it was
billed a total of Php 272,684.41, which CCM questioned. CCM refused
to pay the whole amount until given an explanation for the huge
amount, and the inclusion of some charges it claimed was improper.
This prompted MERALCO to send a notice of disconnection, which
resulted to CCM filing an injunction with the lower court. The trial court
granted the TRO and injunction.
MERALCO questioned the jurisdiction exercised by the lower court,
citing P.D. 1573 which vests upon the BOE supervision, control and
jurisdiction to "regulate and fix power rates to be charged
by electric companies."
Issue:
Who has jurisdiction over this case - Board of Energy or the Regular
Courts?
Held:
The Regular Courts have jurisdiction.
The trial court had jurisdiction to hear the case because what CCM Gas
was seeking was for MERALCO to show how it arrived at the
purchased power adjustment. This does not involve an
exercise of the Board of Energy's power to "regulate and fix power
rates imposed by electric companies."
It is almost trite to say that what
determines the nature of the action, as well
as the court which has jurisdiction over the case,
are the allegations in the complaint. Although in paragraph
6 of its complaint CCM Gas complains of the unilateral and arbitrary
imposition of the purchased power adjustment as having been made
"without the benefit of any public hearing," it is clear that what CCM
Gas is questioning is not the power of MERALCO to collect the amount
but the manner in which the amount was arrived at — in
short, the manner the power was exercised. Clearly, CCM Gas is not
invoking the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to "regulate and
fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies,"
but the regular court's power to adjudicate cases involving
violations of rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
[102] SYQUIA V. BOARD OF POWER AND WATER WORKS
Facts:
Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses (respondents) filed three separate
complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging De Syquia
as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments, with the
offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise issued by
respondent board, that he billed respondentsvarious specified amounts
for their electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco rates
authorized by respondent board.
De Syquia contends that the Board does not have jurisdiction to rule
on this issue, for it is well within the jurisdiction of the normal courts -
for that they involved contractual obligations of respondents as
apartment tenants and were beyond respondent board's jurisdiction.
Issue:
Who between the Board and the Regular Courts has jurisdiction?
Held:
The regular Courts have jurisdiction for such issue is civil in nature.
The question of the proportionate amount that each tenant should
bear for the additional electricity cost for common facilities of the
apartment building used by the tenants in common is purely civil in
character, (involving the conditions of lease between landlord and
tenant), to be adjudged under the applicable civil laws exclusively by
the regular courts of general jurisdiction and is beyond the
jurisdiction of Board of Power and Water Works.
[103] MARINO V, GAMILLA
Facts:
The UST Faculty Union (USTFU) entered into an initial CBA with the
University of Santo Tomas (UST) wherein UST undertook to provide
USTFU with a free office space at Room 302 of its Health Center
Building.
The officers and directors of USTFU scheduled a general membership
meeting for the election of the union officers. However, respondent
Gamilla and some faculty members filed a Petition with the Med-
Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
seeking to stop the holding of
the USTFU election. A faculty convocation was then held and in such
meeting, Gamilla and some faculty members proceeded with the
election of officers. Meanwhile, the Med-Arbiter issued a TRO enjoining
the holding of the election of the USTFU officers and directors. The
TRO they themselves sought was denied by Gamilla and some of the
faculty members who already elected the USTFU officers during the
faculty convocation.
In the succeeding week, petitioners (Marino and others) filed with the
DOLE a petition for prohibition, injunction, with prayer for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order, seeking to invalidate the
election held during the faculty convocation. Two months later, UST
and USTFU, represented by Gamilla and his co-officers, entered into a
CBA for a period 5 years. In another front, the Med-Arbiter issued a
TRO enjoining Gamilla and his fellow officers to "cease and desist from
performing any and all acts pertaining to the duties and functions of
the officers and directors" of USTFU.
Respondent Gamilla, with some other persons, served a letter of even
date on petitioners Mariño and Alamis, demanding that the latter
vacate the premises located at Room 302, Health Center Building, UST
— the Office of USTFU. However, only the office messenger was in the
office at the time. After coercing the office messenger to step out of
the office, Gamilla and company padlocked the door leading to the
union's office.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction and damages
with a prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order over the use of the USTFU office. They alleged that respondents'
act of padlocking the office was without lawful basis, and had
prevented them from entering the office premises, thereby denying
them access to personal effects, documents and records needed in the
on-going cases both in the DOLE and in the complaint a quo, and
ultimately precluding the union from serving its members. The RTC
issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, claiming
that the orders were void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction and on the
ground that they were issued in violation of due process of law.
Issue:
Does the RTC of Manila have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case?
212
Held:
In their complaint in the civil case, petitioners do not seek any relief
under the Labor Code but the payment of a sum of money as damages
on account of respondents' alleged tortuous conduct. The action is
within the realm of civil law and, hence, jurisdiction over the case
belongs to the regular courts.
Unlike the NLRC which is explicitly vested with the jurisdiction over
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, the
BLR is not specifically empowered to adjudicate claims of such nature
arising from intra-union or inter-union disputes. In fact, Art. 241 of the
Labor Code ordains the separate institution before the regular courts
of criminal and civil liabilities arising from violations of the rights and
conditions of union membership.
Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as
such, can exercise only those powers which are specifically granted to
them by their enabling statutes. Consequently, matters over which
they are not granted authority are beyond their competence. While the
trend is towards vesting administrative bodies with the power to
adjudicate matters coming under their particular specialization, to
ensure a more knowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to
them, this should not deprive the courts of justice their power to
decide ordinary cases in accordance with the general laws that do not
require any particular expertise or training to interpret and apply.
[104] Utto v. Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner Utto and Angas were candidates for the position of the
mayor of the municipality of Sultan sa Barongis, Maguindanao in
the May 2001 election. Before the start of the canvass, chairperson
Mamalinta distributed to the parties present a report on the status of
canvassing and there were 5 election returns which were excluded. At
this point, respondent orally manifested his intention to appeal the
ruling and simultaneously filed a verified notice of appeal, which Bai
Haidy D. Mamalinta (chairperson of the municipal board of canvassers)
refused to accept. Meanwhile, despite respondent’s manifestation, the
municipal board of canvassers proceeded with the proclamation of the
candidates for municipal offices. The board proclaimed petitioner as
the duly elected mayor of the municipality.
Later, Corazon Reniedo, sent a letter to Atty. Wynne Asdala, acting
provincial election supervisor of Maguindanao irrevocably resigning as
member of the municipal board of canvassers of Sultan sa Barongis,
Maguindanao in connection with the canvass of the election returns
because she was being pressured to proclaim mayoralty candidate Utto
in gross violation of Sec. 20, RA7166 and Section 38 (9), Comelec
Resolution No. 3848. Based on the canvass of 93 election returns,
petitioner obtained a margin of 149 votes over respondent. The total
number of registered voters from the five excluded election returns is
944. Clearly, the results of the municipal election would be adversely
affected by the uncanvassed returns.
Respondent filed a verified appeal with Comelec raising the issue of (1)
whether the exclusion of four (4) returns in some precincts was
justified or not; and (2) whether the returns of Precinct No. 126A/127A
would be included in the canvass since there was a ruling directing its
exclusion from the canvass.
Respondent also filed with Comelec a motion to
annul pendente lite petitioners proclamation, contending that such
proclamation violated Sec.20(i), RA7166. Inspite of the laws mandate
to suspend the canvassing and await the decision of the Comelec on
the appeal, the municipal board of canvassers proceeded with the
proclamation. The questioned election returns rejected by the
municipal board of canvassers would materially affect the results of the
municipal election.
Comelec (First Division) promulgated a resolution ordering the
inclusion of the uncanvassed election returns, and setting aside
petitioners proclamation and so petitioner filed with Comelec, First
Division, a motion to reconsider the resolution assailing it as contrary
to law and the evidence and issued without affording him notice and
opportunity to be heard as he was not impleaded as a party to the
petition. Citing Velayo v. Comelec, petitioner averred that his right to
due process was violated due to his non-inclusion as respondent and
lack of notice of the proceedings in the Comelec which resulted in the
cancellation of his proclamation. Without the required notice and
hearing, petitioner contended that his proclamation cannot be
annulled.
The COMELEC en banc denied the MR and affirmed the decision of the
First Division.
Issue:
Was petitioner denied of due process?
Held:
There was substantial evidence that petitioner was duly notified of the
appeal and annulment proceedings. The clerk of the Comelec sent
petitioner via telegram, summons with notice of hearing attaching
thereto a copy of respondents verified appeal. Respondent furnished
him, by registered mail, a copy of the appeal and position paper in
support of the appeal and motion to annul the proclamation, received
by petitioner’s daughter as certified by Saabudin P. Daud, acting
postmaster of Sultan sa Barongis, Maguindanao. Likewise, petitioner
received copy of the motion to annul proclamation sent through
registered mail.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side or
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. At the hearing before the Comelec en banc of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, petitioner was given full
opportunity to present his case. He did not present controverting
evidence to justify the exclusion of the five (5) election returns.
Considering that at the time respondent filed the motion to annul
proclamation no responsive pleading had been served, amendment of
the appeal was still a matter of right. Hence, petitioner’s contention
that the amendment was illegal in the absence of prior leave of court
is erroneous.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner was not given notice or an
opportunity to be heard, the petition would still be denied. The twin-
requirement of notice and hearing in annulment of proclamation is not
applicable because of the illegality of petitioner’s proclamation.
[105] GARCIA V. PAJARO
Facts:
Garcia is employed as Revenue Collector at the City Treasurer’s Office
of Dagupan City since 1974. He has been rating Unsatisfactory in his
performance for several semesters and for such reason, a Formal
Charge was filed against him. As a matter of procedure, he was
ordered suspended by City Treasurer Pajaro from June 1, 1990 to
March 15, 1992 and the withholding of his salary was directed. He did
not honor the suspension order nor submitted himself for investigation
despite his receipt of a duly issued subpoena. Respondent Pajaro then
proceeded with an ex-parte investigation and submitted the findings to
the Department of Finance. A Decision was promulgated by the DoF
penalizing Garcia with six (6) months suspension without pay while the
matter of his preventive suspension was favorably approved by the
Regional Director of the Bureau of Local Government Finance.
Petitioner argues that his right to due process was violated, because
he was not heard during the administrative proceedings.
Issue:
Is there a violation of Garcia’s right to due process in an administrative
proceeding?
Held:
NO. In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to explain one's side. Such process requires
notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral
argument, but also — and perhaps even many times more creditably
and practicably — through pleadings. So long as the parties are given
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the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process
are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this constitutional mandate
is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of an action or a ruling.
In this case, the administrative proceedings were conducted in
accordance with the procedure set out in the 1987 Administrative Code
and other pertinent laws. Parties who choose not to avail themselves
of the opportunity to answer charges against them cannot complain of
a denial of due process. Petitioner's refusal to attend the scheduled
hearings, despite due notice, was at his own peril. He therefore cannot
validly claim that his right to due process was violated.
[106] ANG TIBAY V. CIR
Facts:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company
which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather
materials, Toribio caused the layoff of 89 of its employees. The
National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said act as
it averred that the laid off employees were members of NLU while no
members of the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood)
were terminated. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union
and Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice. The CIR, decided the
case in favor of Toribio and NWB. NLU went to the Supreme Court
invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.
Issue:
What are the guiding principles that should be observed in the trial of
cases before an administrative body?
HELD:
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but
this does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must
be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act
on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable
from the authority conferred upon it.
[107] DOMINGO V. RAYALA
Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Sunday), then the stenographic reporter III
and disability compensation, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment
against Rayala before Bienvenido Laguesma Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the
complaint to the OP, Rayala being a presidential appointee. The OP,
through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Secretary
Laguesma ordered to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and
create a committee for such purpose. On December 4, 1998, Secretary
Laguesma issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 280, Series of 1998,
[5] constituting a Committee on Decorum and Investigation
(Committee) in accordance with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 . [6]
The Committee heard the parties and received their respective
evidence. On March 2, 2000, the Committee submitted its report and
recommendations to Secretary Laguesma. It Rayala found guilty of the
offense charged and recommended the pagpapataw of the minimum
penalty provided under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as a
suspension for six (6) months.
However, the executive secretary ordered the dismissal of Rayala and
because of this, the latter filed a certiorari case against the former.
The CA modified the decision and ordered respondent’s suspension
instead of his dismissal. Conversely, petitioner filed an MR saying that
the CA cannot overrule the decision of the president as Rayala was a
presidential appointee and therefore it is the president who had the
power to discipline him.
Issue:
Whether it was valid for the president to dismiss Rayala?
Held:
The Republic argues Rayalas acts that constitute sexual harassment
under AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of
affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are
generally annoying or offensive to the victim.
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CAs reduction of
the penalty imposed by the Office of the President. Rayala’s dismissal
is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove
the Chairman disability compensation rests solely upon the President,
limited only by the requirements under the law and the due process
clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one
(1) year suspension, it will not prevent the OP from validly imposing
the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though Rayala
is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law.
Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct, the acts
imputed to Rayala, constitute misconduct punishable by dismissal from
the service. The Republic adds that Rayalas position is invested with
public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, he should be
dismissed from the service.
The basic law of public officers is three-fold liability rule , which states
that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to
civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can
proceed independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to
sexual harassment.
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to
disgraceful and immoral conduct. Thus, any finding of liability for
sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful
and immoral conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala
committed sexual harassment, we now determine the proper penalty
to be imposed.
Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under
the pertinent Civil Service Rules, disgraceful and immoral conduct is
punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1)
214
month to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is charged
administratively, aggravating or mitigating circumstances can not be
appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) month to one (1) year, while the penalty for the
second offense is dismissal. On the other hand, Section 22 (o), Rule
XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 [53] and Section 52 A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service both provide that the first
offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) month to one (1) year. A
second offense is punishable by dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the disability compensation
shall hold office during good behavior until he or she reaches the age
of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or
becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.
In this case, it is the President of the philippines, As the proper
disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a valid
cause for the removal of Rayala disability compensation as Chairman.
This power, however, is qualified by the phrase for cause as provided
by law. Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty
of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have
unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty
provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the imposable
penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of
sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) month to one (1) year.
Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon
Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can
only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage
of his high government position, it still could not validly dismissed him
from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service , [56] taking undue advantage of a
subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance and
where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present,
the maximum penalty will be imposed. [58] Hence, the maximum
penalty that can be imposed on Rayala suspension is for one (1) year.
[108] RIVERA V. CSC
Facts:
Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land
Bank of the Philippines. Petitioner was charged of the following
offenses:
(1) Dishonesty;
(2) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in
the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such
fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by any person in the
hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than
that accorded other persons;
(3) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws;
(4) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the
permission required by Civil Service Rules and regulations;
(5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which
had a pending loan application with LBP, that he could facilitate the
processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a ten
percent (10%) commission. Rivera was said to have subsequently
received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan
proceeds from the LBP. From Lao, who had substantial investments in
Wynner, Rivera supposedly likewise received the amount of
approximately P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to the United
States, as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel
accommodations and pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong.
LBP held that Rivera was guilty of the charges filed and ordered his
forced resignation without any compensation. The Merit System
Protection board modified the decision on appeal and ordered Rivera’s
suspension instead of dismissal.
The case was brought to the CSC where the latter ordered the
petitioner’s dismissal. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the CSC committed Grave abuse of discretion in ordering
petitioner’s dismissal?
Held:
This Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to
sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its questioned resolution. Rivera filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the petition, now strongly
asserting that he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P.
Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board
Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on
LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a
CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration with the CSC.
In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set
aside by this Court after it had been established that the case
concerned an appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he
handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines.
Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of administrative justice,"
the Court said:
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might
not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be
other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there
could be no different view or there would be no real review of the
case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;
inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not
admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
The Court similarly struck down a decision of Presidential Executive
Assistant Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil Service
Commission, in which he, then concurrently its chairman, had earlier
"concurred."
Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved
Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation
in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and
consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument
that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of
29 August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did
participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March
1994, denying the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29
August 1990.
[109] CORONA V. CA
Facts:
Doromal, the President of Combat Security & Executive Protection
Agency (CSEPA), a security agency that participated in the bidding for
security services for the PPA, filed a complaint against Bungubung
before PPA Resident Ombudsman Manolo Mabini, alleging thar
Bungubung and other PPA officials asked for certain amounts from his
wife as balato for winning the award where and the latter obliged
herself to give. These were recorded in their books as representation
expense. When Doromal was now the one who managed the business,
Bungubung asked for an even higher amount and a van before the
bidding. When Doromal was not able to deliver, Bungubung awarded
the project to another agency.
Thus, the Ombudsman filed cases against Bungubung:
215
 a. an administrative complaint for Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service b. criminal complaint for
violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act
Upon further investigation, Bungubung was found guilty and
ordered dismissed from his servive.
Issues:
WHETHER THE RELIANCE BY THE OMBUDSMAN ON THE AFFIDAVITS
OF ROBERTO DOROMAL AND HIS WITNESS IN DETERMINING
[BUNGUBUNG]S ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY WAS PROPER. IT DID
NOT DEPRIVE [BUNGUBUNG] OF DUE PROCESS;
Held:
The present Petition must fail.
Before proceeding to the merits of the instant Petition, this Court
deems it necessary to first address the allegation of Bungubung that
he was denied due process by the Ombudsman. The fact that no
formal hearing took place is not sufficient ground to say that due
process was not afforded Bungubung. It is well-settled that in
administrative proceedings, including those before the Ombudsman,
cases may be submitted for resolution on the basis of affidavits and
pleadings. The standard of due process that must be met in
administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as
fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for
being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a
case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary
evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take
the place of their direct testimonies. Undoubtedly, due process in
administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of, which requirement was afforded Bungubung.
In Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[23] this Court held that:
[A]ctual adversarial proceeding becomes necessary only for
clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions
to unclear witnesses. This is a procedural right which the employee
must, however, ask for it is not an inherent right, and summary
proceedings may be conducted. This is to correct the common but
mistaken perception that procedural due process entails lengthy oral
arguments.Hearings in administrative proceedings and before quasi-
judicial agencies are neither oratorical contests nor debating
skirmishes where cross examination skills are displayed. Non-verbal
devices such as written explanations, affidavits, positions papers or
other pleadings can establish just as clearly and concisely aggrieved
parties predicament or defense. What is essential is ample opportunity
to be heard, meaning, every kind of assistance that management must
accord the employee to prepare adequately for his defense.
After the filing of the Complaint, Bungubung was allowed by the
Ombudsman to submit the following: (a) a counter-affidavit refuting
the charges against him; (b) a rejoinder-affidavit; and (c) a Motion for
Reconsideration of the 11 January 2005Order of the
Ombudsman. Moreover, Bungubung had the option to subject the
case to a formal investigation, but his Manifestation dated 21 February
2002 before the Ombudsman was evidence that he did not choose to
do so and, instead, agreed to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the affidavits on record. These facts establish that Bungubung
was not deprived of his right to due process, having ample opportunity
to present his side before the Ombudsman. In fact, it was only later on
in a Manifestation filed on 25 February 2002 that Doromal changed his
mind and informed the Ombudsman that he was opting instead for the
conduct of a formal investigation.
[110] OMB. MARCELO V. BUNGUBUNG AND CA
Facts:
President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 25 creating a
Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability, Sec. 1 of
which declares as a policy that the Department Secretary shall be
directly responsible to the President in eradicating graft and corruption
in his Department and the offices, agencies, government-owned or
controlled corporations attached to or under his Department. Pursuant
to it, DOTC Secretary Reyes issued Office Order No. 88-318 creating
the Administrative Action Board (AAB) to act, decide and recommend
to the Secretary appropriate measures on cases of administrative
irregularities.alaw virtua1aw library
Later on, two PPA police officers filed in the AAB a complaint
for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service against Bungubung, District Manager of the Port of Manila.
Bungubung filed his answer but later, he filed a motion to dismiss
assailing the jurisdictional competence of the AAB on the ground that it
was the General Manager of the PPA who had jurisdiction over the
case. AAB denied the motion to dismiss.
Subsequently, the PPA General Manager, Dayan, filed
another "formal charge" against Bungubung and Tan for dishonesty,
inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties,
willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and/or
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The case was
indorsed to the AAB for appropriate action. Questioning the jurisdiction
of the AAB over the administrative cases against him, Bungubung filed
a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order with SC. The Court required the respondents to file
their comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the AAB from further acting on the administrative
cases.chanrobles
Secretary Reyes also filed a complaint with the AAB against
Dinopol, then Manager of the Port of Davao, for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. PPA General Manager Dayan then
issued a preventive suspension order against Dinopol. PPA General
Manager also filed an administrative case against Dinopol for
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
At the hearings conducted by AAB, Dinopol actively
participated. He presented his evidence therein although he asserted
that the PPA General Manager, not the AAB, had jurisdiction to initiate
and conduct an administrative investigation under Sec. 8 of P.D. No.
857, the PPA Charter. The AAB rendered a decision finding Dinopol
guilty as charged and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from
the service with cause plus the accessory penalties of cancellation of
eligibilities, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification for re-employment in the government service. AAB also
rendered another decision in the second administrative case of the
same penalties.
Dinopol filed with the RTC, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order challenging the jurisdiction of the
AAB over the administrative cases against him. The following day, said
court issued an order directing the to desist from continuing the
proceedings of the Administrative Action Board. The court later on
issued a resolution ordering the reinstatement of Dinopol and the
payment to him of back salaries and other emoluments during his
preventive suspension. The court also issued the writ of preliminary
injunction.
This prompted the said respondents to file with this Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with an issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Issues:
1. Did the courts deprive the DOTC Secretary, acting as the alter
ego of the President, of the authority to control and/or supervise
personnel actions involving employees of the PPA?
2. Did the courts nullify the proceedings of the AAB for want of
jurisdiction, notwithstanding that respondent Dinopol submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the body?
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3. Was the court correct in granting writs of certiorari in favor of
respondents who failed to exhaust available and adequate
remedies?
Held:
1. Yes.
With respect to the management of personnel, an attached agency is,
to a certain extent, free from Departmental interference and control.
This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857. Although it does not
expressly provide for a mechanism for an administrative investigation
of personnel, by vesting the power to remove erring employees on the
General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the
law impliedly grants said officials the power to investigate its personnel
below the rank of Assistant General Manager who may be charged
with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA
General Manager may subject the employee concerned to preventive
suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance with
the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. Only after gathering
sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose the proper
penalty in accordance with law. It is the latter action which requires
the approval of the PPA Board of Directors.
From an adverse decision of the PPA General
Manager and the Board of Directors, the employee
concerned may elevate the matter to the Department Head
or Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal directly to the Civil
Service Commission. The permissive recourse to the
Department Secretary is sanctioned by the Civil Service Law.
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by
the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The
PPA General Manager should have first conducted an
investigation, made the proper recommendation for the
imposable penalty and sought its approval by the PPA Board
of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the herein
petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC Secretary
Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.
What is prescribed by the law is that all complaints
against a PPA official or employee below the rank of
Assistant General Manager shall be filed before the PPA
General Manager by the proper officials, such as the PPA
police or any aggrieved party. The aggrieved party should
not, however, be one and the same official upon whose lap
the complaint he has filed may eventually fall on appeal. No
man can be at once a litigant and judge unless such official
inhibits himself or expresses his willingness at the outset to
waive his right to review the case on appeal. Moreover, the
fact that the PPA is a government agency "attached" to the
DOTC extensively affects the extent of whatever control and
supervision the said Department’s Secretary may exercise.
An attached agency has a larger measure of
independence from the Department to which it is attached
than one which is under departmental supervision and
control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by
the ‘lateral relationship’ between the Department and the
attached agency. The attachment is merely for ‘policy and
program coordination.’ with respect to administrative
matters, the independence of an attached agency from
Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by
the fact that even an agency under a Department’s
administrative supervision is free from Departmental
interference with respect to appointments and other
personnel actions ‘in accordance with the decentralization of
personnel functions’ under the Administrative Code of 1987.
Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly provides that
Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not
apply to chartered institutions attached to a Department.
Thus, while PPA personnel are, as mandated by
P.D. 868, "embraced in the Civil Service," the DOTC may not
"act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law
or regulation to a subordinate." It should be noted that the
complaint against Bungubung was erroneously filed directly
with the AAB and it was no less than DOTC Secretary Reyes
who, upon the recommendation of the AAB, denied
Bungubung’s motion to dismiss. The PPA General Manager
also erroneously indorsed to the AAB Adm. Case No. 11-01-
88, the complaint he himself filed against Bungubung,
without having conducted an investigation and
recommending the appropriate penalty as required by the
facts found at said investigation. With regard to Adm. Case
No. AAB-006-88 against Dinopol, it was filed with the AAB by
Secretary Reyes himself while the other case against
Dinopol, Adm. Case No. 016-88, was filed by the PPA
General Manager directly with the AAB without said PPA
official’s appropriate investigation and corresponding
recommendation. Under these circumstances, the absurd
situation mentioned above could ensue: the DOTC Secretary
deciding on appeal his own complaint. On the other hand, in
Adm. Case No. 016-88, the PPA General Manager abdicated
his duty of conducting an investigation and submitting his
recommendation, as demanded by his factual findings.
2. No.
While it is true that a party may be estopped from raising
the question of jurisdiction on appeal, such estoppel may be invoked
successfully only if the party failed to raise such question in the early
stages of the proceedings. The records show that Bungubung did not
wait for the rendition of an AAB decision before he questioned its
jurisdiction. After filing his answer, he filed a motion to dismiss on the
issue of jurisdiction and even went to the extent of elevating the issue
to this Court. For his part, Dinopol also filed a motion to dismiss the
case against him and, upon its denial, filed a motion for
reconsideration.
3. Yes.
Neither is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies applicable. Besides the fact that the AAB was patently
without jurisdiction to act on the administrative complaints filed
against respondents Dinopol and Bungubung, the instant petition
raises only questions of law, one of the exceptions to the general rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
[111] PEREZ V. PEOPLE
Facts:
An audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin, Provincial
Auditor’s Office, Bohol, conducted a cash examination on the account
of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon,
Bohol.
In the course of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the
safe of petitioner. The audit team embodied their findings in the
Report of Cash Examination, which also contained an inventory of cash
items. Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on
hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79,
incurring a shortage of P72,784.57.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer of Bohol the amounts of P10,000.00 and P15,000.00,
respectively. On February 14, 1989, petitioner again remitted to the
Provincial Treasurer an additional amount of P35,000.00, followed by
remittances made on February 16, 1989 in the amounts of P2,000.00
and P2,784.00.
An administrative case was filed against petitioner on February 13,
1989. On April 17, 1989, petitioner again remitted the amount
of P8,000.00 to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol. Petitioner had then
fully restituted his shortage in the amount of P72,784.57.
217
Later, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with
malversation of public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code.
On September 24, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment of
conviction.
Issue:
whether or not assistance of counsel is indispensable in administrative
proceedings.
Held:
NO.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in
writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or
accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and
may be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more
reason, in an administrative inquiry. While investigations conducted by
an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding,
the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the
nature of the charges and of respondent’s capacity to represent
himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel.
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures
against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-
litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that,
without such representation, he shall not be bound by such
proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due
process clause such that without the participation of its members, the
safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not
that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer
at his side.
[112] ATIENZA JR. V. COMELEC
Facts:
Respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile
president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his partys withdrawal of
support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
Petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of
party members denounced Drilons move. Petitioner Atienza hosted a
party conference and subsequently proceeded to declare all positions
in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers. with Atienza as
LP president. Drilon opposed with a petition to the Comelec to nullify
the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the partys
electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and the
National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. On
the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LPs
NECO and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly.
Comelec then ordered the holding of a new election under
COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza
and the others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not
convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution. Both sides of the
dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April
17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution, granting respondent
Drilons petition and denying that of petitioner Atienza. Subsequently,
the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilons term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the
87 who were supposedly qualified to vote attended. Before the
election, however, several persons associated with petitioner Atienza
sought to clarify their membership status and raised issues regarding
the composition of the NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed
respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.
Petitioners Atienza among others, sought to enjoin Roxas
from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO
assembly which elected him was invalidly convened. They questioned
the existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition
ought to have been based on a list appearing in the partys 60th
Anniversary Souvenir Program. Petitioners Atienza, et al. also
complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not
invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner
Defensor, were given the status of guests during the meeting.
The COMELEC then issued the assailed resolution denying
petitioners Atienza, et al.s petition. It noted that the May 2007
elections necessarily changed the composition of the NECO since the
amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators,
members of the House of Representatives, governors and mayors
members of that body. That some lost or won these positions in the
May 2007 elections affected the NECO membership. Petitioners failed
to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president was not
properly convened.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners
Atienza, et al.s constitutional right to due process by the latters
expulsion from the party.
Held:
Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the
party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it
involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due
process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should
have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling
them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party
discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings and are,
therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.
But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the
internal affairs of political parties.
The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only
administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain
governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative
agency or instrumentality contemplates an authority to which the state
delegates governmental power for the performance of a state
function. The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the
exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.
Although political parties play a key role in our democratic set-up as an
intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private
organization, not a state instrument.
The discipline of members by a political party does not
involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the
due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the
state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The
only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other
party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed
upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract
among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter
may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the
enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the
government or any of its agencies.
But even when recourse to courts of law may be made,
courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary
matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its
internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free
association. In Sinaca v. Mula, the Court said that judicial restraint in
internal party matters serves the public interest by allowing the
political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also
consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party
system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people
[113] CATACUTAN V. PEOPLE
218
 Take note: DEL CASTILLO, the 2018 BAR Exam Chairman,
penned this case.
Facts:
Private complainant Georgito Posesano was an Instructor II with Salary Grade
13 while private complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an Education
Program Specialist II with Salary Grade 16, both at the Surigao del Norte School
of Arts and Trades (SNSAT).[3]
On June 2, 1997, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Caraga
Administrative Region, appointed and promoted private complainants as
Vocational Instruction Supervisor III with Salary Grade 18 at SNSAT.[4] These
promotional appointments were duly approved and attested as permanent by
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on June 3, 1997.[5]
Being then the Officer-In-Charge of SNSAT, the approved appointments were
formally transmitted to the petitioner on June 6, 1997,[6] copy furnished the
concerned appointees. Despite receipt of the appointment letter, the private
complainants were not able to assume their new position since petitioner made
known that he strongly opposed their appointments and that he would not
implement them despite written orders from CHED[7] and the CSC, Caraga
Regional Office.[8] Thus, on August 2, 1997, private complainants lodged a
formal complaint against petitioner for grave abuse of authority and
disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the Ombudsman
for Mindanao.[9]
In an Information dated February 27, 1998, petitioner was charged before the
RTC of Surigao City with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended.
The RTC found the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN guilty beyond reasonable
doubt [of] VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Argument of the Petitioner to the Supreme Court
Petitioner argues that the Decision rendered by the trial court is flawed and is
grossly violative of his right to be heard and to present evidence. He contends
that he was not able to controvert the findings of the trial court since he was
not able to present the Court of Appeals (CAs) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
51795 which denied the administrative case filed against him and declared that
his intention in refusing to implement the promotions of the private
complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent.
Issue:
W/N there is a violation of due process of law.
Held:
Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.
Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard.[24] Due process is
satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy.[25] Where an opportunity to be
heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is
no denial of procedural due process.[26]
Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can
hardly claim denial of his fundamental right to due process. Records show that
petitioner was able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him,
argue his case vigorously, and explain the merits of his defense. To reiterate, as
long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course,
he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law for the opportunity
to be heard is the better accepted norm of procedural due process.
There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow
petitioner to introduce as evidence the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It
is well within the courts discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it
judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. This
is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal
proceeding as in this case, concerns an administrative matter.
This action undertaken by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court
was not without legal precedent. In Paredes v. Court of Appeals,[28] this Court
ruled:
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law
that administrative cases are independent from
criminal actions for the same act or omission.
Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar
to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing
is administrative liability; quite another thing is the
criminal liability for the same act.
xxxx
Thus, considering the difference in the
quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed
and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative
proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should
not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the
evidence presented in the administrative case may not
necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the
criminal cases. x x x
In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,[29] the Court reiterated:
This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the
dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing
of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts
subject of the administrative complaint and that the
disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the
resolution of the other case/s and vice versa. x x x
On the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents, the Court has no
option but to declare that the courts below correctly disallowed the introduction
in evidence of the CA Decision.
Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an incompetent
witness. It is not an error to refuse evidence which although admissible for
certain purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the
ground for offering it.
[114] MELENDRES V. PCGG
[115] QUISUMBING V. ROSALES
Facts:
In a meeting of the CHR, several complaints of former
employees of the petitioner, namely: Eugenio, Buizon, Fernandez,
and Ayuste were taken up by the CHR. Only respondents
Chairperson Rosales, Commissioner Cardona and Commissioner dela
Cruz were present during the meeting; the petitioner was on sick
leave while Commissioner Mamauag was away on official business.
In their affidavits, Eugenio, Buizon, Fernandez and Ayuste
accused the petitioner of: (1) seriously maltreating and inflicting
upon them mental abuse through her unreasonable behavior and
demands on how they should work in or out of the office; (2) taking
a cut from some of her employees' salaries to form an office fund
under her sole control; (3) repeatedly misplacing and taking no
action on official documents requiring her action; (4) forging
another commissioner's signature; (5) hiring employees who do not
come to work; and (6) contracting consultancy work for another
government agency.
On the bases of these affidavits, the CHR issued on the
same day Resolution (CHR Resolution), through Chairperson
Rosales, a Show Cause Order, requesting the petitioner to submit
within five (5) days from receipt, a written explanation as to why
she should not be held liable for any administrative disciplinary
actions, and to transmit the written explanation together with her
supporting documents to the Office of the Ombudsman.
219
 Chairperson Rosales sent letters to the President of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Office of the Ombudsman
regarding the complaints and allegations against the petitioner.
Attached to the letters were copies of the Show Cause Order and
the CHR Resolution. Chairperson Rosales brought attention to the
serious allegations against the petitioner and prayed for the Offices'
appropriate action. Chairperson Rosales also requested the Office of
the Ombudsman to act on the complaint in accordance with the
established investigation and prosecutorial procedures.
On October 4, 2013, the petitioner filed with the CHR
Secretariat a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the Show Cause
Order. The petitioner assailed the validity of the Show Cause Order,
claiming that its issuance is null and void because it denied her due
process.
Issue:
Was the petitioner denied due process when the respondents issued
the Show Cause Order and the CHR Resolution during the meeting
held, knowing fully well that the petitioner would not be able to attend
the same. thereby depriving her of the opportunity to refute the
allegations and to participate as a member of the CHR?
Held:
The petition also fails with respect to the petitioner's claim
of denial of due process. There can be no denial of due process
where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his case. In
the present case, the petitioner was given ample opportunity to air
her side on the allegations against her after being sufficiently
apprised of the allegations against her; she was afforded the chance
to submit her written explanation. Unfortunately, the petitioner
failed to avail of that right, and chose to directly seek the
intervention of this Court. These circumstances, by themselves,
point the prematurity of the petition.
Jurisprudence tells us that the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the chance to explain one's side, or
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long
as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before any
definitive action is taken, the demands of due process are
sufficiently met.
[116] PROVIDENT TREE FARM V. BATARIO
Facts:
PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a
Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It
grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it
supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of
matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified
persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (l), of the
Revised Forestry Code confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives
among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and
"wood-derivated" products.
Private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC)
imported four (4) containers of matches from Indonesia, which the
Bureau of Customs released and two (2) more containers of matches
from Singapore.
Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment issued a
certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in the
Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price."
PTFI filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for
injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order
against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the
latter from importing matches and "wood-derivated" products, and the
Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations.
AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint alleging among others
that the Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and
Customs Code and not the regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the legality of an importation or ascertain whether the
conditions prescribed by law for an importation have been complied
with . . . (and over cases of) seizure, detention or release of property
affected . . .;". The Court reconsidered its 28 July 1989 order and
dismissed the case on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to
determine what are legal or illegal importations."
Issue:
Does the Bureau of Customs have exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the legality of an importation or ascertain whether the conditions
prescribed by law for an importation have been complied with and
over cases of seizure, detention or release of property affected?
Held:
The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par.
(l), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the
Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional
Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban
is devoid of any legal basis. To allow the regular court to direct the
Commissioner to impound the imported matches, as petitioner would,
is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to
impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination
and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an
usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed against
the Bureau of Customs as well as the prayer for injunction against
importation of matches by private respondent AJIC may not be
granted without the court arrogating upon itself the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
But over and above the foregoing, PTFI's correspondence
with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match
importations may already take the nature of an administrative
proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from
interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, we held
that —
. . . under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of
primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where
the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered
(Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co.,
Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for
specialized administrative boards or commissions with the
special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in
case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable . . .
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded,
the ultimate relief sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs
to seize and forfeit the match importations of AJIC. Since the
determination to seize or not to seize is discretionary upon the Bureau
of Customs, the same cannot be subject of mandamus. But this does
not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the extraordinary relief
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the Bureau of
Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Otherwise stated, the court cannot compel an agency to do a
particular act or to enjoin such act which is within its prerogative,
except when in the exercise of its authority it gravely abuses or
exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we have no occasion to
rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction
as it is not before us.
[117] AGUSMIN V. PROMOTIONAL ENTERPRISES
Facts:
Respondents Guiang and Liceralde and six others, all of whom were
holders of ordinary timber licenses consolidated their timber
220
concession to form AGUSMIN which was correspondingly issued a
consolidated license.
Because of some differences, respondents Guiang and Liceralde
requested the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to allow
withdrawal of their respective forest areas from AGUSMIN and to
consolidate the same with the timber license of Pedro B. de Jesus and
Sulpicio Lagnada.
The Director of Forestry, to whom the case was referred declared that
the request is beyond his jurisdiction and that the issuance of a new
timber licensc in their favor will be in violation of forestry rules and
regulations. On appeal to the Secretary, the decision was reversed and
authorized Guiang and Liceralde to withdraw their forest areas from
the timber license of AGUSMIN. The decision was immediately
implemented after respondents put up a bond.
Meanwhile, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President which
reverted and declared of no force and effect the decision of the
Secretary. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which,
however, had remained unacted.
Subsequently, petitioner requested and was granted by the Director of
Forestry a renewal of its timber license which included the forest areas
covered by the timber licenses of respondents. The same was later
reduced at the instance of respondent corporation formed by
respondents Guiang, Liceralde and DeJesus eliminating the forest
areas covered by the timber licenses of respondents.
AGUSMIN appealed the reduction order to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources but this was denied for lack of merit. On further
appeal to the Office of the President, the latter Office rendered a
decision declaring its decision final and executory.
Hence, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance
which thereafter rendered judgment in favor of respondents. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in toto. Pending resolution of
respondents' petition with the lower court, however, the President by
Letter of Instruction No. 172 cancelled the timber license of petitioner.
Issue:
Did the CA err in holding that the decisions of the Office of the
President were not validly issued?
Held:
While there may be some merit in the arguments of the petitioner
since the rule is that "in deciding administrative questions, technical
rules of procedure are not strictly enforced and due process of law in
the strict judicial sense is not indispensable", little, if any, useful
purpose could be gained in further discussing these issues because
Letter of Instruction No. 172, which ordered the cancellation of the
timber license issued to AGUSMIN, in effect, reversed and set aside the
said decisions of the Executive Secretary before the same became final
and enforceable. In the words of the Court of Appeals, the said
decisions "did not acquire any finality".
Incidentally Civil Case No. 75201 was dismissed, without considering
the merits of the petition, but only on the ground that the basic issue
in the petition in Civil Case No. 75201 was then still pending before the
Office of the President under petitioner's motion for reconsideration
dated Sept, 25, 1968. (Order, Civil Case No. 75201, January 22, 1969,
Annex DD-1, to the Stipulation of Facts). Significantly, this same order
of January 22, 1969 in Civil Case No. 75201 indicates that
implementation of the letter decision dated May 7, 1962, may well be
restrained, but such should be sought first from the Office of the
President. Considering however that up to May 30, 1972 no resolution
on petitioners' motion for reconsideration was made by the Office of
the President, petitioners herein understandably filed anew or
reiterated its suit against respondent AGUS-MIN under Civil Case No.
87209 on May 30,1972.
The background details recited therefore disclose that no finality was
ever achieved by the letter decision of the Executive Secretary in favor
of respondent AGUS- MIN dated May 7, 1962 in view of the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners herein in said DANR 3093-A. Under
such situation the aforesaid Surety Bond, earlier posted by petitioners
herein under DANR Case Nos. 3093 and 3093-A duly approved by
Director of Forestry, subsists as a restraining factor that would enjoin
respondent AGUS-MIN from immediately conducting logging
operations in the area conceded to the petitioners herein, P.B. de
Jesus, by the DANR. As now stands, the letter decision of the Office of
the Executive Secretary dated May 7, 1962 never gained finality and
has in fact now been overturned in the judgment rendered in Civil
Case No. 87209 of the Court below, dated November 27, 1975. Not
only this, the timber license rights of respondent AGUS-MIN, was even
then earlier cancelled on February 28, 1974 by the Office of the
President under Letter of Instruction No. 172.
[118] CARMELO V. RAMOS
Facts:
The Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee
"to investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other
personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City
Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of this Office (of the
Mayor)." Jesus L. Carmelo was chairman of said committee.
The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen
working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear
before it on several dates in connection with an administrative case
against Crisanta Estanislao but that Ramos, on whom the subpoenas
were duly served, refused to appear.
Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administrative proceedings," petitioner filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt.
The trial court dismissed the petition ruling that there is no law
empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue
subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under oath. It also held
that to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right against
self-incrimination.
Issue:
Does the committee have the power to subpoena witnesses to appear
before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal to comply?
Held:
No, petitioner's committee has no power to cite witnesses to appear
before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal.
Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and
superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against
administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said
contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of
court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code
Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides:
Section 580. Powers incidental to taking of testimony. —
When authority to take testimony or evidence is conferred
upon an administrative officer or upon any non-judicial person,
committee, or other body, such authority shall be understood
to comprehend the right to administer oaths and summon
witnesses and shall include authority to require the production
of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise,
subject in all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar
character.
Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this
Act, any one who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon
summons issued under the authority of the preceding
paragraph or who, appearing before any individual or body
exercising the power therein defined, refuses to make oath,
221
 give testimony, or produce documents for inspection, when
thereunto lawfully required, shall be subject to discipline as in
case of contempt of court and upon application of the
individual or body exercising the power in question shall be
dealt with by the judge of first instance having jurisdiction of
the case in the manner provided by law.
One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has
"authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the
courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses.
However, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor
about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the
power to investigate anomalies involving certain city employees. We
do not agree that a delegation of such power to investigation implies
also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of
witnesses whose appearance may be require by the compulsory
process of subpoena.
It is also doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the
Administrative Code are applicable to the City of Manila as these
pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government.
Also, whatever power may be claimed by petitioner's committee may
only be traced to the power of the Mayor to investigate as implied
from his power to suspend or remove certain city employees. There is
no statutory grant of power to investigate to petitioner's committee.
Even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the
appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is that
the Mayor cannot delegate this power to a body like the committee of
the petitioner.
Lastly, 50 Am. Jur. Sec. 428, p. 450 itself admits an exception to the
rule invoked by the petitioner. Thus, it is stated that "where the liberty
and property of persons are sought to be brought within the operation
of a power claimed to be impliedly granted by an act because
necessary to its due execution, the case must be clearly seen to be
within those intended to be reached." Here, no less than the liberty of
Armando Ramos is involved in the claim of the committee to the right
to cite witnesses.
[119] LASTIMOSA V. VASQUEZ
Facts:
On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of
Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an
administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and
grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio
Ilustrisimo. Intially, the deputy ombudsman found no prima facie
evidence. After review, Omb. Vasquez reversed and directed that the
mayor be charged with a criminal case in the RTC.
The case was referred to provincial prosecutor Lastimosa. She
conducted her own preliminary investigation and found that only acts
of lasciviousness had been committed. She filed a case for acts of
lasciviousness with the MCTC.
As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's
Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey
the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner
contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the
case against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not
committed in relation to a public office. For this reason it is argued
that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for
refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for
such refusal.
Issues:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the
Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for
attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to suspend the
prosecutor
Held:
The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate
and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has been held to
include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a
public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained
of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of
his official duty.
It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had
already conducted the preliminary investigation and all that remained
to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the
corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had
been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his
determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be
subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is
because under Section 31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor
is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the
Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his
(prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and
refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the
Ombudsman.
Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the
Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in
accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein."
There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their
refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding
before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in
another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the
filing of an information is a part, is quasi-judicial in character. Whether
petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a
defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful process, order or
command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for indirect
contempt under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court is for
respondents to determine after appropriate hearing.
[120] LAMEYRA V. PANGILINAN
Facts:
Petitioner received a letter from the mayor informing him that he is
dropped from the roll of employees of the local government unit
because of insubordination and absence without leave (AWOL).
Petitioner claims that he was terminated without prior written notice of
the charges and without investigation and hearing, which violated his
security of tenure and right to due process. Petitioner alleged that he
was dismissed as a janitor messenger and such was an act of political
harassment by the mayor as it was publicly known that he voted for
his political rival in the preceding election.
The mayor said that he issued a memorandum that all employees must
fill in a time log book but the petitioner refused to comply with the
memorandum. Such constitute insubordination and his continued
absence without official leave was deemed and considered as
abandonment of employment. He was found to have committed
falsification of public document in accomplishing his daily time record.
The Civil Service Commission in a resolution dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the action of the Municipal Mayor in dropping him from the
roll of employees for absence without leave.
222
On motion for reconsideration, Lameyra claimed that upon advice of
the Regional office of the Civil Service Commission in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, he reported for work at the office of the Vice Mayor
Constancio Fernandez, as he was not allowed by the Personnel Officer,
Benito Vicencio, to sign his name in the log book. The motion was still
denied by the CSC.
Issue:
Whether the CSC erred in refusing to consider the new evidence
submitted with petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
Held:
The Supreme Court found merit in the petition.
It is clear from a reading of the above provision that the no prior
notice is required to drop from the rolls an employee who has been
continuously absent without approved leave (AWOL) for at least thirty
(30) calendar days. It appears that solely on the basis of the
certification of the Personnel Officer/Human Resources Management
Assistant Benito Vicencio to the effect that petitioner did not report for
work for the period from July 6, 1995 to August 6, 1995, and the
undisputed fact that he has not submitted any proof that he actually
filed an application for leave nor presented any approved leave
application for the said period, petitioners termination from the service
was upheld by the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals.
Although it is clear from the Civil Service Memorandum Circular that no
prior notice is required to drop from the rolls an employee who has
been continuously absent without leave for at least thirty days,
petitioner contests the finding that he was absent at all. He claims
that he reported for work but was prevented from signing the log
book. In view of the circumstances prevailing in this case, the Civil
Service Commission should have considered the new evidence
annexed by petitioner to his motion for reconsideration.
While it is settled doctrine that findings of fact of an
administrative agency must be respected and this Court
should not be tasked to weigh once more the evidence
submitted before the administrative body, it is axiomatic that
such findings of fact should be supported by substantial
evidence. We are not convinced that the certification of the personnel
officer that petitioner did not report for work from July 6, 1995 to
August 6, 1995 constitutes such substantial evidence in light of the
petitioners submission that said personnel officer precisely prevented
him from signing the log book, that he has been replaced by one
Leynes in July, 1995, and that he has been asked to submit his
resignation which he refused to do. Under these circumstances, it is
believed that, in equity, and in proper compliance with the
requirements of due process, petitioner should be given a last full
opportunity to prove his contention that the termination of his services
was illegal.
Case was remanded to the CSC for further proceeding.
[121] RUBBERWROLD V. NLRC
Facts:
Malabanan was employed by Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. as a clerk and
was later promoted to production scheduler with salary increase. He
was again transferred to the Inventory Control Section as stock clerk.
But the Financial Audit Report from the Internal Audit Department of
the company shows a significant material variance between the year-
end actual inventory and that of the Cards (SC)/EDP Control Records.
Upon investigation, Malabanan was found guilty and was subsequently
terminated. Hence, this complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal
dismissal alleging that the ground for dismissal was due to his refusal
to resign or disaffiliate from the union whom he was a member.
Petitioner company denied complainants' allegations and averred that
respondent Malabanan's dismissal was due to gross and habitual
neglect of his duty and not due to his union affiliation.
Issue: Is the dismissal of respondent Malabanan tainted with unfair
labor practice?
Held:
No. The question of whether an employee was dismissed because of
his union activities is essentially a question of fact as to which the
findings of the administrative agency concerned are conclusive and
binding if supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence has
been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It means such evidence
which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be
reasonably inferred.
It was not proven that the company actually performed positive acts to
restrain the union participation of private respondent. For one, it is
doubtful whether Malabanan was really engaged in the organization of
a labor union affiliated with the federation TUPAS. The only evidence
presented by him to prove this contention is his affidavit and that of
his father. It is therefore, not in accordance with ordinary experience
and common practice that the private respondent pursued his battle
alone, without the aid and support of his co-members in the union and
his federation especially in a case of serious nature as this one
involving company intervention with union activity.
As a rule, it is the prerogative of the company to promote, transfer or
even demote its employees to other positions when the interests of the
company reasonably demand it. Unless there are instances which
directly point to interference by the company with the employees' right
to self-organization, the transfer of private respondent should be
considered as within the bounds allowed by law. Furthermore,
although Malabanan was transferred to a lower position, his original
rank and salary remained undiminished, which fact was not refuted or
questioned by Malabanan.
[122] ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V. CA
Facts:
Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) an
application for authority to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo,
Paraaque, Metro Manila, to Imelda Marcos Avenue of the same
municipality. The application was initially rejected but later BEU has
given due course to the application.
PDSC filed an opposition to the application on the grounds that: 1.]
there are adequate service stations attending to the motorists
requirements in the trading area covered by the application; 2.]
ruinous competition will result from the establishment of the proposed
new service station; and 3.] there is a decline not an increase in the
volume of sales in the area. Two other companies, namely Petrophil
and Caltex, also opposed the application on the ground that Shell
failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements.
In 1986, the BEU rendered a decision denying Shells application on a
finding that there was no necessity for an additional petroleum
products retail outlet in Imelda Marcos Avenue, Paraaque. Shell
appealed to Office of Energy Affairs (OEA). Meanwhile, EO No. 172
was issued creating the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and
transferring to it the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the BEU.
OEA, upon motion with the submission the updated survey, remanded
the case to the ERB for further evaluation and consideration, noting
therein that the updated survey conducted by Shell cited new
developments such as the accessibility of Imelda Marcos Avenue, now
Benigno Aquino, Jr. Avenue, to Paraaque residents along Sucat Road
and the population growth in the trading area.
In 1991, the ERB rendered a Decision allowing Shell to establish the
service station in Benigno Aquino, Jr. Avenue.
On appeal by PDSC of said decision, the CA reversed and set aside the
Decision and Order of Energy Regulatory Board. Correspondingly, the
application of respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation to
construct and operate the petroleum retail outlet in question is
DENIED.
223
However, even as the above case proceedings were pending in the
appellate court, Caltex filed on January 24, 1992 a similar application
for the construction of a service station in the same area with the
ERB. This application was likewise opposed by respondent PDSC, citing
the same grounds it raised in opposing Shells application.In the
aforesaid case, petitioner ERB rendered a Decision approving the
application of Caltex. This ERB Decision was challenged by PDSC,
again on the same grounds it raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 27661, in a
petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals, where the same was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29099. Subsequently, the appellate courts
Sixteenth Division dismissed PDSCs petition.
Issue: Is there substantial evidence to support ERBs finding of public
necessity to warrant approval of Shells application to build gasoline
service stations along Benigno Aquino, Jr. Avenue in Paranaque, Metro
Manila?
Held: Yes. The construction and operation of the Shell Station will not
lead to ruinous competition since [the] additional retail outlet is
necessary.
In reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein
must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant; that it is not for
the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment
for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence;
that the administrative decision in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion,
fraud or error of law.[26] Petitioner ERB is in a better position to resolve
petitioner Shells application, being primarily the agency possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine whether
the building of a gasoline retail outlet in a trading area would benefit
public interest and the oil industry lies with the ERB not the appellate
courts.
In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt
is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence,
preponderance of evidence and substantial evidence, in that
order.[27] A litany of cases has consistently held that substantial
evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of
fact.[28] It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion.
The record discloses that the ERB Decision approving Shells was based
on hard economic data on developmental projects, residential
subdivision listings, population count, public conveyances, commercial
establishments, traffic count, fuel demand, growth of private cars,
public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles, etc.,[25] rather than
empirical evidence to support its conclusions. In approving Shells
application, the ERB made the following factual findings and, on the
basis thereof, justified its ruling thus:
In evaluating the merits of the application, the first question that
comes to mind is whether there is indeed an increase in market
potential from the time this very same application was disapproved by
the then Bureau of Energy Utilization up to the present time that
would warrant a reversal of the former decision. The history of this
case serves to justify applicant Shells position on the matter. After a
little over a year from vigorously opposing the original application,
Caltex and Petron filed their respective applications to construct their
own service station within the same vicinity.
The figures in the applicants feasibility study projects a scenario of
growth well up to the year 1994. Where the applicant listed only thirty-
five commercial establishments, oppositor is servicing sixty-five. The
development of subdivisions along the area provides for a buffer of
market potential that could readily be tapped by the applicant service.
Although the applicants witness could have done better in
accentuating this fact, the oppositor did not do well either in
downplaying the potentials of the area. The main gist of PDSCs
contention is premised on the rising overhead cost of (increase in
salaries and rent) in relation to the establishment of new
competition. The proposed station expects to target a total volume of
460,151 liters per month with a projected increase of 2.6% per annum
and presumably expects to make a corresponding profit
thereof.Oppositor PDSC, on the other hand, with its lone Caltex Service
Station, expects to suffer income loss even with a projected volume of
600,000 to 800,000 liters per month (Exhibit 5).
In its first application, the applicants projection was to realize only
255,000 liters per month or some 20 percent of the total potential
demand. With its amended application, the 460,151 liters it hopes to
realize is almost twice the former volume representing a smaller
percentage of the present overall potential demand.
With further growth and development of the businesses in the area,
the fuel potential will tremendously increase and the presence of
strategically located service stations will greatly benefit the local
community as well as the transient motoring public.
[123] PLDT V. TIAMSON
Facts:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. (PLDT)
employed Antonio Q. Tiamson as a Radio Technician. He was assigned
at the company's North Luzon Toll Network Division in Pampanga. In a
Letter, the President of the Angeles City Telephone System and
Datelcom Corporation, informed PLDT of his complaint against its
employees, stating therein that he suspected them to be in cohorts
with the local subscribers in effecting illegal overseas calls. Acting on
the letter-complaint, PLDT immediately dispatched a team of
inspectors and investigators from its Quality Control and Inspection
Department (QCID) and Security Division to conduct surveillance
operations in the area.
Vidal Busa, a radio technician, was caught in flagrante
delicto while monitoring an illegally connected overseas call using the
radio facilities of the company's Clark-TMC Radio Room. In his sworn
statement, he specifically named Arnel Cayanan, his Shift Supervisor,
Antonio Tiamson and Paul Cruzada, both radio technicians, as the
other employees actively engaged in the illegal practice. He stated that
he knew about this because whenever he would relieve them from
their tour of duty, he would see that the circuit was engaged.
PLDT issued an Inter-Office Memo terminating Tiamson's
employment on the ground of serious misconduct and/or fraud.
Tiamson filed a complaint against PLDT for illegal suspension, illegal
dismissal, damages and other monetary claims before the NLRC. To
bolster PLDT’s contention that they have substantial evidence to prove
that the dismissal of Tiamzon was based on just grounds, the
petitioner adduces the following documentary evidences:
(1) the sworn statements of Vidal Busa specifically
implicating the respondent;
(2) the sworn statement of Arnel Cayanan; and
(3) the printout of the CAMA tape, recording the
unauthorized overseas calls originating from Clark-TMC
during the respondent's tour of duty.
Issue:
Whether petitioner PLDT has satisfied the quantum of proof
in illegal dismissal cases.
Held:
No.
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
employer to show that the dismissal is for just and valid cause; failure
to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. The
employer's case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and
not on the weakness of the employee's defense. Moreover, the
quantum of proof required in determining the legality of an employee's
dismissal is only substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.
The petitioner indeed failed to adduce substantial evidence
to prove that the dismissal of the respondent was for a just cause. In
his first sworn statement, Busa implicated the respondent in the illegal
connections of overseas calls. During the confrontation between Busa
224
and the respondent, the former reiterated his earlier statement that
the latter was involved in the illegal act of connecting overseas calls.
On the other hand, during the confrontation among all four employees
implicated in the matter, Cayanan testified that he was aware that his
"subordinates" were engaged in illegal activities. However, he failed to
specifically mention who these subordinates were.
Although admissible in evidence, affidavits being self-serving
must be received with caution. This is because the adverse party is not
afforded any opportunity to test their veracity. By themselves,
generalized and pro forma affidavits cannot constitute relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind may accept as adequate. There
must be some other relevant evidence to corroborate such affidavits.
On this point, the petitioner submits that the printout of the
CAMA tapes corroborated Busa's sworn statement. A perusal of the
printout, however, shows that it is not authenticated by the proper
officer of the company. Moreover, the name of the respondent and the
other annotations in the said printout are handwritten and unsigned.
In Asuncion v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled
that handwritten listing and unsigned computer printouts that are
unauthenticated are unreliable. Mere self-serving evidence (of which
the listing and printouts are of that nature) should be rejected as
evidence without any rational probative value even in administrative
proceedings.
The decisions of this Court, while adhering to a liberal view
in the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have
nonetheless consistently required some proof of authenticity or
reliability as a condition for the admission of documents. Absent any
such proof of authenticity, the printout of the CAMA tape should be
considered inadmissible, hence, without any probative weight.
To conclude, the petitioner has not established by
substantial evidence that there was just cause for the respondent's
termination from his employment. The sworn statements of Busa and
Cayanan alone are not sufficient to establish that the respondent was
guilty of serious misconduct. In light of such finding, there is no need
to delve into whether or not the respondent was afforded due process
when he was dismissed by the petitioner.
[124] ESTER DELOSO V. SPS. MARAPAO
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) against respondents praying that the
latter be enjoined from interfering with her tenurial rights, and that an
order be issued fixing the sharing of the net produce of the
landholding between the parties. Petitioner claimed that her first
husband, the late Primitivo Temple (Primitivo), entered into an
agreement with Lino Palomo, father of respondent Herminia P.
Marapao, stipulating that they would equally share the produce of the
landholding. After the death of Primitivo and her subsequent
remarriage to Vicente Deloso in 1986, petitioner averred that she
continued to be in possession of the subject landholding and to
transact with the copra dealer on behalf of respondents.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintained that Primitivo
was not a tenant of the landholding but merely an overseer paid for
the work he rendered. After Primitivo's death, his son, Alberto, was
installed as overseer also as a paid farmworker. Moreover,
respondents alleged that when petitioner remarried, she relocated to
Gingoog City with her husband making her allegation of personal
cultivation of the landholding an impossibility.
On the basis of the report of its legal officer tasked to
conduct an ocular inspection on the landholding and to investigate the
matter, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer found Alberto Temple to
be the tenant of the landholding. The PARAD, however, reversed the
finding of the MARO and declared that petitioner is a tenant of the
landholding. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the findings of the PARAD
and ruled that the requisites of agricultural tenancy are present.
Specifically, the DARAB held that pesadas and vales presented by
petitioner indicate that petitioner shared in the produce of the
landholding and personally cultivated the same even after she
remarried. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the
DARAB.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the DARAB is supported by
substantial evidence — the requisite quantum of evidence in agrarian
cases — and should, for that reason, have been upheld by the
appellate court.
Held:
No, the CA committed no error. Intertwined with this issue is
the question of whether petitioner is a tenant of the landholding.
In order to establish a tenancy relationship, the following
essential requisites must concur:
(1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee;
(2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production;
(5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and
(6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee.
Petitioner's evidence fails to establish the existence of all the
requisites of a tenancy relationship. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals focused on the absence of three (3) requisites, namely: (1)
consent on the part of respondents for petitioner to become a tenant
of the landholding; (2) personal cultivation; and (3) sharing in the
produce of the farm.
The pesadas and vales, which the DARAB heavily relied on
to support its decision, contain mere recitals of amounts representing
"gross, less fare, net, price, 1/3 share" without any indication whether
these amounts actually pertain to the landholding in question. They do
not show with reasonable certainty that petitioner shared in the
harvest of the landholding or even whether the shares mentioned
therein pertain to harvest shares.
The other pesadas dated October 9, 1987, January 17,
1988, July 7, 1988, December 31, 1988, April 26, 1989 and December
3, 1989 are similarly inconclusive and unenlightening, for which reason
they were correctly rejected by the Court of Appeals.
As regards the other documents submitted by petitioner to
prove that she is a tenant of the landholding, such as: (a) the Affidavit
of Benigno Haganas, Purok President of Purok 8, Bandiangon,
Ampayon, Butuan City; (b) Joint Affidavit of Pantaleon L. Navarra,
former Councilor of Ampayon, Emeliano Opeña, former Barangay
Captain of Cabcabon, Butuan City, and Felix Mijares; and (c)
Certifications issued by ARBA and former Barangay Captain Gaudioso
Cajutol, these affidavits and certifications fail to convince us of the
existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent.
It has been held that even certifications issued by
administrative agencies and/or officials concerning the presence or the
absence of a tenancy relationship are merely preliminary or provisional
and are not binding on the courts. The question of agricultural
leasehold relationship cannot be made to depend on mere
certifications issued by the president or officers of associations and
organizations.
We, therefore, concur with the Court of Appeals that the
DARAB relied far too much on the pesadas and vales and overlooked
compelling evidence indicating the absence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In particular, the DARAB ignored the findings of
the legal officer who investigated the case and concluded that Alberto
Temple, petitioner's son, is the tenant of the landholding and the
following documents: (a) the Affidavit of Alberto Temple executed
before the case was filed with the DARAB stating that he was installed
as a caretaker of the landholding; (b) the Agreement between
respondents and Alberto Temple showing that the latter has been
acting as caretaker of the landholding since 1986; (c) the Affidavit of
Gina Sarusad, petitioner's neighbor, stating that petitioner was living in
Gingoog City with her second husband from 1986-1994; and (d) the
Certification from the Commission on Elections and the Voter's Affidavit
of petitioner both showing that she is a registered voter of Gingoog
City. These documents confirm that petitioner was not personally
cultivating the landholding.
The DARAB also disregarded the time book and payroll
presented by respondents showing that petitioner was a paid
farmhand and did not share in the produce as a tenant.
225
 In fine, the wealth of evidence in this case sustains the
conclusion that petitioner is not a tenant of the landholding.
[125] SOLID HOMES V. LASERNA
Facts:
On 1 April 1977, respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe,
represented by their attorney-in-fact, Proceso F. Cruz, as buyers,
entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc. (SHI),
a corporation engaged in the development and sale of subdivision lots,
as seller. The total contract price agreed upon by the parties for the
said parcel of land was P172,260.00, to be paid in the following
manner: (1) the P33,060.00 down payment should be paid upon the
signing of the contract; and (2) the remaining balance of P166,421.88
was payable for a period of three years at a monthly installment of
P4,622.83 beginning 1 April 1977. The respondents made the down
payment and several monthly installments. When the respondents had
allegedly paid 90% of the purchase price, they demanded the
execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the final payment of the
balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the demands of the
respondents.
The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a Complaint
for Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed of Sale with Damages,
dated 28 June 1990, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB). In their Complaint, respondents alleged that as their
outstanding balance was only P5,928.18, they were already
demanding the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the TCT
of the subject property upon final payment of the said amount.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer, together with its Answer
dated 17 September 1990, asserting that the respondents have no
cause of action against it because the respondents failed to show that
they had complied with their obligations under the Contract to Sell,
since the respondents had not yet paid in full the total purchase price
of the subject property. In view of the said non-payment, the
petitioner considered the Contract to Sell abandoned by the
respondents and rescinded in accordance with the provisions of the
same contract.
On 7 October 1992, HLURB Arbiter Gerardo L. Dean rendered a
Decision denying respondents prayer for the issuance of the Deed of
Sale and the delivery of the TCT. He, however, directed the petitioner
to execute and deliver the aforesaid Deed of Sale and TCT the
moment that the purchase price is fully settled by the respondents.
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the aforesaid Decision to
the HLURB Board of Commissioners. On 10 August 1994, the HLURB
Board of Commissioners rendered a Decision, modifying the 7 October
1992 Decision of HLURB Arbiter Dean.
Petitioner remained unsatisfied with the Decision of the HLURB Board
of Commissioners, thus, it appealed the same before the Office of the
President. After evaluating the established facts and pieces of evidence
on record, the Office of the President rendered a Decision dated 10
June 2003, affirming in toto the 10 August 1994 Decision of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners. In rendering its Decision, the Office of the
President merely adopted by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the Decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners.
The petitioner thereafter elevated its case to the Court of Appeals by
way of Petition for Review under Rule 43. On 21 July 2004, the
appellate court rendered a Decision denying due course and dismissing
the petitioners Petition for Review for lack of merit, thus affirming the
Decision of the Office of the President dated 10 June 2003.
Petitioner avers that a full exposition of the facts and the law upon
which a decision was based goes to the very essence of due process
as it is intended to inform the parties of the factual and legal
considerations employed to support a decision. The same was not
complied with by the Office of the President when it rendered its one-
page Decision dated 10 June 2003. Without a complete statement in
the judgment of the facts proven, it is not possible to pass upon and
determine the issues in the case, inasmuch as when the facts are not
supported by evidence, it is impossible to administer justice to apply
the law to the points argued, or to uphold the rights of the litigant who
has the law on his side.
Issue:
W/N the Office of the President can merely adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the Decision of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners.
Held:
Yes. The Office of the President can merely adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the Decision of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners.
The constitutional mandate that, no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based, does not preclude the validity of
memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference the findings of fact
and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
In fact, in Yao v. Court of Appeals, this Court has sanctioned the use
of memorandum decisions, a specie of succinctly written decisions by
appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency, practicality,
convenience and docket status of our courts. This Court likewise
declared that memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional
mandate.
Hence, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the
cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or
portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court.
It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
need not apply to decisions rendered in "administrative proceedings",
as in the case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in
judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled Judiciary, and all of its
provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial
branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or even
imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative
agencies are oblige to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article
VIII.
However, it bears observation that while decisions of the Office of the
President need not comply with the constitutional requirement
imposed on courts under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution,
the Rules of Court may still find application, although suppletory only
in character and apply only whenever practicable and convenient.
There is no mandate that requires the application of the Rules of Court
in administrative proceedings.
The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as
long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been
satisfied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby
DENIED.
[126] LAPID V. CA
Facts:
On the basis of an unsigned letter dated July 20, 1998, allegedly
originating from the Mga Mamamayan ng Lalawigan ng Pampanga,
addressed to the National Bureau of Investigation, the latter initiated
an open probe on the alleged illegal quarrying in Pampanga & exaction
of exorbitant fees purportedly perpetrated by unscrupulous individuals
with the connivance of high-ranking government officials. The NBI
Report was endorsed to the respondent Ombudsman and was
docketed as OMB-1-98-2067.
On Oct. 26, 1998, a complaint was filed charging petitioner Gov.
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Manuel M. Lapid, Vice-Governor Clayton Olalia, Provincial Administrator
Enrico Quiambao, Provincial Treasurer Jovito Sabado, Mabalacat
Municipal Mayor Marino Morales and Senior Police Officer 4 Nestor
Tadeo with alleged Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for allegedly having
conspired between and among themselves in demanding and
collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee,
control slip, or monitoring fee of P120.00 per truckload of sand, gravel,
or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance
authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for its
collection. They were also accused of giving unwarranted benefits to
Nestor Tadeo, Rodrigo Rudy Fernandez & Conrado Pangilinan who are
neither officials/employees of the Provincial Government of Pampanga
nor quarry operators by allowing them to collect the said amount
which was over and above the P40.00 prescribed under the present
provincial ordinance and in allowing Tadeo, Fernandez and Pangilinan
to sell and deliver to various quarry operators booklets of official
receipts which were pre-stamped with SAND FEE P40.00.
The Ombudsman issued an Order dated January 13, 1999 preventively
suspending petitioner Lapid, Olalia, Quiambao, Sabado, Morales and
Tadeo for a period of six (6) months without pay pursuant to Sec. 24
of RA 6770. On Jan. 19, 1999, the Department of the Interior and
Local Government implemented the suspension of petitioner Lapid.
On November 22, 1999 the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the
administrative case finding the petitioner administratively liable for
misconduct, thus:
"Wherefore, premises considered, respondent Manuel M. Lapid,
Clayton A. Olalia, Jovito S. Sabado and Nestor C. Tadeo are hereby
found guilty of misconduct for which they are meted out the penalty of
one (1) year suspension without pay pursuant to section 25 (2) of R.A.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Respondent Marino P. Morales is
hereby exonerated from the same administrative charge for
insufficiency of evidence. The complaint against respondent Enrico P.
Quiambao, who resigned effective June 30, 1998 was dismissed on
March 12, 1999, without prejudice to the outcome of the criminal
case."
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on
January 18, 2000 praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin the Ombudsman from enforcing the questioned
decision. The temporary restraining order was issued by the appellate
court on January 19, 2000. When the 60-day lifetime of the temporary
restraining order lapsed on March 19, 2000 without the Court of
Appeals resolving the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed
with this Court on March 20, 2000.
On March 22, 2000 the Third Division of this Court issued a Resolution
requiring the respondents to comment on the petition. That same day,
the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying the petitioners prayer
for injunctive relief. The following day, or on March 23, 2000, the DILG
implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman and the highest
ranking Provincial Board Member of Pampanga, Edna David, took her
oath of office as O.I.C.- Governor of the Province of Pampanga.
The petitioner raised in issue the apparent pre-judgment of the case
on the merits by the Court of Appeals in its resolution denying the
prayer for preliminary injunction. In so doing, petitioner argued that
the respondent court exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction.
Proceeding from the premise that the decision of the Ombudsman had
not yet become final, the petitioner argued that the writs of prohibition
and mandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG for
prematurely implementing the assailed decision. Finally, the petitioner
prayed for the setting aside of the resolution issued by the Court of
Appeals dated March 22, 2000 and for the issuance of a new one
enjoining the respondents from enforcing the said decision or, if it has
already been implemented, to withdraw any action already taken until
the issue of whether or not the said decision of the Ombudsman is
immediately executory has been settled.
After due deliberation, the Court finds that the respondents failed to
establish the existence of a law mandating the immediate execution of
a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case where the
penalty imposed is suspension for one year. The immediate
implementation of the decision of the Ombudsman against petitioner is
thus premature.
Issue:
W/N the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding herein
petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon
him a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay is immediately
executory pending appeal.
Held:
No. The decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding herein
petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon
him a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay is NOT
immediately executory pending appeal.
Petitioner was administratively charged for misconduct under the
provisions of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Section 27 of
the said Act provides as follows:
"Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. All provisionary orders
of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after
receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on the following
grounds:
X X X
Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision
imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one months salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court
by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court."
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise
contain a similar provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said Rules
provides as follows:
"Sec. 7. Finality of Decision where the respondent is absolved of the
charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after
the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent,
unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have
been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770."
It is clear from the above provisions that the punishment imposed
upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one year, is not among
those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory.
Section 27 states that all provisionary orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory; and that any
order, directive or decision of the said Office imposing the penalty of
censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one months
salary is final and unappealable. As such the legal maxim inclusion
unius est exclusio alterus finds application. The express mention of the
things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import
of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not
enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and
immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in
the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the
decision. This finds support in the Rules of Procedure issued by the
Ombudsman itself which states that (I)n all other cases, the decision
shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt
thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or
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petition for certiorari (should now be petition for review under Rule 43)
shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.
WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
[127] EDMUNDO BUENCAMINO V. CA
Facts:
Edmundo Buencamino was a mayor in San Miguel Bulacan, who was
then held administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman for
grave misconduct, abuse of authority, acts unbecoming of a public
officer, and violation of RA 3019. Private respondent, who was the
president of Rosemoor Mining & Development Corporation, alleged
that Buencamino’s act of demanding a "pass way" fee or a regulatory
fee of P1,000.00 for every delivery truck that passes the territorial
jurisdiction of San Miguel, Bulacan is illegal. Although petitioner claims
that this was enacted pursuant to a municipal ordinance, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan disapproved it for being ultra
vires since the Local Government Code does not empower the
municipality to impose tax on delivery trucks of mining companies
passing through its territorial jurisdiction.
After the Ombudsman declared the petitioner administratively liable
and suspended him from office for 6 months, he filed a petition for
review with the CA with application for the issuance of TRO and a writ
of preliminary injunction. The appellate court issued a TRO, but the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction was denied.
Buencamino then filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
alleging that in denying his application for a preliminary injunction, the
Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, the Decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman suspending him from office is not
immediately executory, and that in enforcing its Decision suspending
him from the service during the pendency of his appeal, the Office of
the Ombudsman violated Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989
and the rulings of this Court in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, Lopez v.
Court of Appeals, and Ombudsman v. Laja.
Issue:
Was the order of suspension executory even pending appeal?
Held:
Yes.
The ruling of the SC in "In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court
Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPW overturned the cases
cited by the petitioner:
“. . . this Honorable Court emphatically declared that Section 7, Rule
III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was
already amended by Administrative Order No. 17 wherein the pertinent
provision on the execution of the Ombudsman's decision pending
appeal is now similar to Section 47 of the "Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service" — that is, decisions of the
Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal.”
Also, Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 has been
amended by Administrative Order No. 17, such that it specifically
provides that an appeal shall not stop the decision of the Ombudsman
from being executory.
Section 13(8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the
Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules. Hence, it has the power to
modify or amend its rules as the interest of justice may require. The
reliance on Admin. Order 17 was therefore in order.
[128] San Luis v. CA
Facts:
Mariano Berroya had been the quarry superintendent in the Province
of Laguna, who denounced graft and corrupt practices by employees
of the provincial government of Laguna. Thereafter, he was
transferred to the office of the Provincial Engineer pursuant to an
order by the Provincial Governor. Berroya challenged this transfer
before the Civil Service Commission, which ruled that it was violative of
Section 32, RA 2260. The CSC ordered that Berroya be reverted to his
regular position of quarry superintendent, but the provincial governor
suspended Berroya for alleged gross discourtesy, inefficiency and
insubordination. Despite CSC’s directive, the provincial governor
appealed to the Office of the President from the CSC rulings alluded to,
which reversed the CSC Rulings.
In the interim, the provincial governor issued an order dismissing
Berroya for alleged neglect of duty, frequent unauthorized absences,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of duty and abandonment of
office, which order of dismissal was appealed by Berroya to the Civil
Service Commission.
The Civil Service Commission resolved said appeal by declaring the
dismissal unjustified, exonerating Berroya of charges, and directing his
reinstatement as quarry superintendent, which the provincial governor
once again challenged through an MR. The governor’s motion was,
however, denied.
After Berroya’s formal demand for reinstatement to the position of
quarry superintendent was disdained despite the factual antecedents,
he filed a Civil Case No. SC-1834 for mandamus to compel his
reversion to the position of quarry superintendent at the Oogong
Quarry. During the pendency of this suit, the governor once again filed
a petition for relief with the Office of the President. The RTC upheld
Berroya’s dismissal. The Court of Appeals reversed this, and instead,
ruled in favor of Berroya.
Issue:
Was a writ of mandamus proper to compel the reinstatement of
Berroya?
Held:
Yes.
The principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not
confined in its operation to the judgments of what are
ordinarily known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon
whom judicial powers had been conferred. Hence, whenever
any board, tribunal or person is by law vested with authority
to judicially determine a question, like the Merit Systems
Board of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the
President, for instance, such determination, when it has
become final, is as conclusive between the same parties
litigating for the same cause as though the adjudication had
been made by a court of general jurisdiction.
Also, a writ of mandamus lies to enforce a ministerial duty or
"the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from office, trust or station." (Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court).
In this case, the appropriate administrative agencies having
determined with finality that Berroya's suspension and
dismissal were without just cause, his reinstatement
becomes a plain ministerial duty of the petitioner Provincial
Governor, a duty whose performance may be controlled and
enjoined by mandamus.
However, because Berroya already reached the compulsory
age of retirement of 65 years, he can no longer be
reinstated. He should instead be paid the back salaries and
also all retirement and leave privileges that are due him as a
retiring employee in accordance with law.
[129] OCHO V. CALOS
Facts: Spouses Epifanio and Valentina Calos (now both deceased),
together with their children, Bernardino, Ernesto, Teosita, Perfecta,
Manuel, Epifanio, Jr., and Delfin, all surnamed Calos (respondents),
filed a complaint before the DAR Provincial Adjudicator in Cagayan de
Oro City entitled “Annulment of Deeds of Assignment,
Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificate of Titles,
Retention and Recovery of Possession and Ownership.”
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In their amended complaint, the Caloses averred that their parents,
Epifanio and Valentina, were the original owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 23.7109 hectares located in Valencia, Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, and covered by an OCT issued by virtue of Homestead
Patent in 1955. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, the said land
was placed under the Operation Land Transfer and subsequently
distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries. The original farmer-
beneficiaries, however, allegedly unlawfully conveyed their respective
rights over the lands granted to them to third persons. The amended
complaint thus sought the nullification of the Emancipation Patents and
Transfer Certificates of Title issued to these third persons, including
Ramon D. Ocho (he sounds like a Mexican gunslinger).
PARO DECISION: The Caloses also posited in their amended complaint
that the subject land was beyond the coverage of the agrarian reform
law as the same was covered by a homestead patent. Accordingly,
they maintained that they have the right to recover the homestead
land of their deceased parents Epifanio and Valentina. After all the
parties had been heard, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered his
decision in 1993 in favor of the Caloses, ordering all persons,
respondents, beneficiaries or otherwise, in occupation, possession,
cultivation or otherwise of subject land are hereby ordered to turn over
the same land to the Complainants, and vacate subject land.
DARAB DECISION: Ramon D. Ocho, the other 3rd person buyers, and
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), elevated the case to
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The
DARAB reversed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator, upholding
the validity of the Emancipation Patents and their corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title, including that Ramon D. Ocho. The
Caloses then appealed the decision of the DARAB to the CA.
CA DECISION: The CA substantially affirmed the decision of the
DARAB as it upheld the titles over the subject lands. However,
petitioner Ramon D. Ocho’s title was annulled as he already owned
other agricultural land was not qualified to be a farmer-beneficiary.
Both the Caloses and petitioner filed their respective motions for
reconsideration but these were denied by the CA for lack of merit.
(Basically the Caloses are now claiming that since Ramon D. Ocho’s
title was invalidated by the CA, the land should now reverted to their
ownership.)
Ramon contends that the DAR cases filed by the Caloses constitute res
judicata as the said resolution already became final and executory and
the issue of his ownership of other agricultural lands may no longer be
relitigated, and that the CA allegedly erred when it made a finding that
he is the owner of other agricultural lands and directed him to return
to the government his subject lands as he is not qualified to be a
farmer-beneficiary under R.A. No. 6657.
Issue: Has res judicata set in?
Held: Yes. There is res judicata and Ramon D. Ocho’s ownership may
no longer be question.
There is no question that the issue of whether petitioner is the owner
of other agricultural lands had already been passed upon by the proper
quasi-judicial authority (the hearing officer of the DAR). Said decision
became final and executory when the Caloses failed to file an appeal
thereof after their motion for reconsideration was denied. Applying the
rule on conclusiveness of judgment, the issue of whether petitioner is
the owner of other agricultural lands may no longer be relitigated. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED insofar as it directs
petitioner Ramon D. Ocho to restore and return to the government his
subject land. Petitioner’s TCT is hereby declared VALID.
[130] ENCINAS V. AGUSTIN JR.
Facts:
I in Nueva Ecija. They claim that petitioner Encinas – who was then
Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija – informed them that unless
they gave him five thousand pesos (P5,000), they would be relieved
from their station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung
areas. Fearing the reassignment, they decided to pay petitioner.
Respondents came up short and managed to give only two thousand
pesos (P2,000), prompting petitioner to direct them to come up with
the balance within a week. When they failed to deliver the balance,
petitioner issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents.
Respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-
complaint (BFP Complaint) for illegal transfer of personnel under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Act of 1990.
On the basis of similar facts, respondents likewise filed with the CSC
Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga (CSCRO), as well as with
the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan City, their Complaint (CSCRO
Complaint). This time, they accused petitioner of violation of Section
4(c) of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.
After a fact-finding investigation was conducted in connection with his
alleged extortion activities, petitioner was formally charged with
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service.
The CSCRO found petitioner administratively liable for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and
ordered his dismissal from service.
Petitioner appealed with the CSC main office. In his Appeal, he argued
that respondents were guilty of forum-shopping for having filed two
(2) separate administrative Complaints before the CSCRO on the one
hand, and before the BFP/DILG on the other.
Petitioner further argued that the CSCRO only had appellate
jurisdiction or authority to decide cases brought before it by the head
of agency or, in this case, the BFP. He explained that the
administrative Complaint was investigated and heard by the BFP/DILG.
The BFP department head or fire director, Asignado, by virtue of the
Resolution, dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
There being no appeal or petition filed on the dismissal, the CSCRO
Complaint should have been dismissed as well. Petitioner further
argued that the CSCRO erred in concluding that the resolution of the
fact-finding committee was not a judgment on the merits. The BFP
being an agency of the government, any decision or resolution it
arrives at is also a judgment on the merits. Petitioner’s appeal was
subsequently denied by CSC.
Petitioner then filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA which denied
petitioner’s appeal. The CA ruled that it was not the letter-complaint
filed by respondents that commenced the administrative proceedings
against petitioner; instead, it was the formal charge filed by Atty.
Marasigan-De Lima. The letter-complaint merely triggered the CSCRO’s
fact-finding investigation. Considering that the Complaint was initiated
by the proper disciplining authority, it need not contain a certification
of non-forum-shopping.
The CA similarly ruled that respondents’ act of simultaneously filing
Complaints against petitioner both at the CSC and the BFP did not
constitute forum-shopping since they were nonetheless based on
different causes of action—more specifically, the BFP Complaint was
for alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019, while the CSC Complaint was for
violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 6713. Furthermore, the doctrine
of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not
to the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner filed an MR but the
CA denied. Petitioner filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari
before the SC.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is administratively liable?
Held:
Yes. Petitioner is administratively liable for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service under the
229
Administrative Code of 1987; thus, the Court affirmed his dismissal
from service.
The dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not constitute res
judicata in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no
forum-shopping on the part of respondents.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the
disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections;"
or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which
party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some
preliminary or formal or merely technical point."
In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of
the definition above. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the
Resolution was the result of a fact-finding investigation for
purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an
administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and
liabilities of parties were determined therein with finality.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata
applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not
to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers
here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to
administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking
and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the
evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported
by the facts proved.
The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with
respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal
rights and obligations of the contending parties are; and based
thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective
rights and obligations of the parties.
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand
is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of
persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law.
The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.
In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers
or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them
as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial
nature.
The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory
functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and
authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties.
Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the
evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to
make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the
conclusion that they were purely administrative in nature and
constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of
determining whether a formal charge for an administrative
offense should be filed against petitioner.
It can be gleaned from the Resolution itself that the purpose of the
BFP proceedings was to determine whether there was sufficient
ground to warrant the filing of an appropriate administrative offense
against petitioner.
The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative,
aimed at determining the existence of facts for the purpose of
deciding whether to proceed with an administrative action.
This process can be likened to a public prosecutor’s preliminary
investigation, which entails a determination of whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, and whether a
crime has been committed.
The preliminary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor was
merely inquisitorial and was definitely not a quasi-judicial proceeding.
[131] LIGTAS V. PEOPLE
Facts:
The uncontested declaration, of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board that Monico Ligtas was a tenant negates a finding
of theft beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants having rights to the harvest
cannot be deemed to have taken their own produce. Ligtas was
charged with the crime of theft. He allegedly entered into the abaca
plantation of Anecita Pacate, and unlawfully harvested 1,000 kilos of
abaca fibers. However, according to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of
Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since
1993. Andres Pacate installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares
of land involved in the criminal case.
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for Maintenance of Peaceful
Possession on November 21, 2000. On January 22, 2002, the DARAB
rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the
land. While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was
formally offered as evidence before the trial court, records are clear
that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court and
Court of Appeals and without any objection on the part of
the People of the Philippines.
Issue:
whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as
tenant of the land owned by private complainant Pacate is conclusive
or can be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft?
Held:
Yes.
We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy
relationship is conclusive and binding on courts if supported by
substantial evidence.
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal
proceedings. However, this case does not involve an administrative
charge stemming from the same set of facts involved in a criminal
proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both criminal
and administrative liability. DARAB Case involves a determination of
whether there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and
private complainant, while Criminal Case involves determination of
whether petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy relationship
is a factor in determining whether all the elements of theft were
proven by the prosecution.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial powers are entitled to respect if supported by substantial
evidence. This court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence
submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own
judgment as to the sufficiency of evidence." The DARAB is the quasi-
judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether
there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties. This court
has held that judicial determinations of the DARAB have the same
binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body.
PART VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW
230

[132] HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION VS
DEFENSOR
Facts:
A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No.
9207, authorized the creation and development of what is now known
as the National Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of
land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440
hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. On
August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from
the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the
disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide
residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in population density in
the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical
development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of
families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s
socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners
association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its
president, Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal
capacity and on behalf of the association. The instant petition for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No.
9207,otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC)
Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003.
Issue:
Is the filing of the petition under Rules 65 to the Supreme Court
proper?
Held:
No.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of
the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its
quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued
pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory
that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground
that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks
to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial
course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.
[133] TENG VS. PAHAGAC
Facts:
Albert Teng (Petitioner) is engaged in the business of deep sea fishing,
and he employs master fishermen to facilitate his fishing venture.
These master fishermen hire the Respondent workers as checkers of
the volume of the fish caught in every voyage.
Teng doubted the amounts the respondents were telling him regarding
how much fish were caught. By December, Teng told them their
services were terminated hence they filed for illegal dismissal.
The VA dismissed the complaint because there was no employer-
employee relationship. Respondents received the decision on June 12,
2003; They filed an MR which was denied and they received the order
on July 8, 2003. The Voluntary Arbitrator reasoned that the Procedural
Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings (1989
Procedural Guidelines) does not provide the remedy of a motion for
reconsideration to the party adversely affected by the VAs order or
decision.
Respondents appealed to the CA, which ordered Petitioner to pay
backwages and other monetary benefits. After denial of the MR,Teng
files the case before the Supreme Court
Teng argues that the VA Decision is not subject to motion for
reconsideration as it is not provided for under the labor code. Hence,
when respondents filed the petition for review in the CA after the
denial of the motion for reconsideration, it was already beyond the 10
day period to appeal from the date of the original decision, hence late
and should be denied.
Issue:
Is the VA's decision not subject to a motion for reconsideration?
Held:
Yes. Even though the Labor code does not expressly provide for a
motion for reconsideration, such must be allowed following the intent
of the law.
Article 262-A of the Labor Code deleted the word "unappealable" from
Article 263. The deliberate selection of the language in the amendatory
act differing from that of the original act indicates that the legislature
intended a change in the law, and the court should endeavor to give
effect to such intent. Presumably, the decision may still be
reconsidered by the Voluntary Arbitrator on the basis of a motion for
reconsideration duly filed during that period. The seasonable filing of a
motion for reconsideration is a mandatory requirement to forestall the
finality of such decision.
The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is based
on the doctrine that in providing for a remedy before an administrative
agency, every opportunity must be given to the agency to resolve the
matter and to exhaust all opportunities for a resolution under the given
remedy before bringing an action in, or resorting to, the courts of
justice
By disallowing reconsideration of the VA's decision, Section 7, Rule XIX
of DO 4003 and Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went
directly against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A of the Labor
Code. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct himself and
compel the courts of justice to prematurely intervene with the action
of an administrative agency entrusted with the adjudication of
controversies coming under its special knowledge, training and specific
field of expertise. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for
specialized administrative agencies with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial
review, is indispensable. In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though
the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
[134] INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES VS SINSUAT
231
Facts:
Two bids for the acquisition of trucks for the Bureau of
Telecommunications were accepted by the Bureau of Supply
Coordination. One from Industrial Power Sales, Inc (IPSI) and another
from Delta. IPSI was initially declared the winner after determination
that is offered the cheapeast rucks that met the requirements.
However, DELTA appealed to the Secretary of General Services,
Sinsuat who decided to award the bid to DELTA on technical grounds.
IPSI appealed the decision to the Office of the President and to the
Office of the Auditor General. The pending appeal notwithstanding, the
letter-order in favour of DELTA was released by sinsuat. IPSI then filed
with the Quezon City Court of First Instance on September 21, 1965, a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.
Issue:
WON the action filed by IPSI should be dismissed for not exhausting
administrative remedies before filing a case in court.
Held:
No.
Certain universally accepted axioms govern judicial review through the
extraordinary actions of certiorari or prohibition of determinations of
administrative officers or agencies:
First, that before said actions may be entertained in the
courts of justice, it must be shown that all the administrative
remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been
exhausted; and
Second, that the administrative decision may properly be
annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that the
administrative official or tribunal has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
There are however exceptions to the principle known as exhaustion of
administrative remedies, these being:
(1) where the issue is purely a legal one,
(2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was done
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction;
(3) where the respondent is a secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bear the latter's implied or assumed
approval, unless actually disapproved; or
(4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention
Hence, the argument that IPSI had gone to Court without first
exhausting all administrative remedies cannot be sustained as the
secretary acted with grave abuse in excess of his jurisdiction..
There is merit in IPSI's appeal, therefore. The respondent Secretary
had indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. His acts must be nullified, and the Trial Court's
judgment upholding those acts must be set aside.
[135] CHUNG FU INDUSTRIES VS CA
RE: Methods of Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions;
Special Civil Actions (Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus)
Facts:
Chung Fu Industries (Philippines) and private respondent Roblecor
Philippines, Inc. forged a construction agreement whereby respondent
contractor committed to construct and finish petitioner corporation’s
industrial/factory complex. In the event of disputes arising from the
performance of subject contract, it was stipulated therein that the
issue(s) shall be submitted for resolution before a single arbitrator
chosen by both parties.
Roblecor filed a petition for Compulsory Arbitration with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order before respondent RTC to claim the
unsatisfied account and unpaid progress billings. Chung Fu moved to
dismiss the petition and further prayed for the quashing of the
restraining order.
Subsequent negotiations between the parties eventually led to the
formulation of an arbitration agreement which, among others,
provides: “The parties mutually agree that the decision of the
arbitrator shall be final and unappealable. Therefore, there shall be no
further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or any
part of the arbitrator’s award.”
Respondent RTC approved the arbitration agreement and thereafter,
Engr. Willardo Asuncion was appointed as the sole arbitrator.
Arbitrator Asuncion ordered petitioner to immediately pay respondent
contractor and further declared the award as final and unappealable.
Chung Fu moved to remand the case for further hearing and asked for
a reconsideration of the judgment award claiming that Arbitrator
Asuncion committed twelve (12) instances of grave error by
disregarding the provisions of the parties’ contract. Chung Fu’s Motion
was denied. Chung Fu elevated the case via a petition for certiorari to
respondent CA. The respondent appellate court concurred with the
findings and conclusions of respondent trial court. A motion for
reconsideration of said resolution was filed by petitioner, but was
similarly denied.
Issue:
Is petitioner Chung Fu Industries estopped from questioning the
arbitration award allegedly in view of the stipulations in the parties’
arbitration agreement that “the decision of the arbitrator shall be final
and unappealable” and that “there shall be no further judicial recourse
if either party disagrees with the whole or any part of the arbitrator’s
award.”
Held:
No.
Article 2044 of the Civil Code provides that “any stipulation that the
arbitrators' award or decision shall be final is valid, without prejudice
to Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040."
It is thus clear under Art. 2044 of the Civil Code that the finality of the
arbitrators’ award is not absolute and without exceptions. Where the
conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040 applicable to both
compromises and arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators’ award may
be annulled or rescinded. Additionally, under Sections 24 and 25 of the
Arbitration Law, there are grounds for vacating, modifying or
rescinding an arbitrator’s award. Thus, if and when the factual
circumstances referred to in the above-cited provisions are present,
judicial review of the award is properly warranted.
Should courts refuse or neglect to inquire into the factual milieu of an
arbitrator's award to determine whether it is in accordance with law or
within the scope of his authority, the proper remedy is certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is to be borne in mind,
however, that this action will lie only where a grave abuse of discretion
or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
voluntary arbitrator is clearly shown. It should be stressed, too, that
voluntary arbitrators, by the nature of their functions, act in a quasi-
judicial capacity. It stands to reason, therefore, that their decisions
should not be beyond the scope of the power of judicial review of this
Court.
In fact, even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared
"final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted.
In spite of statutory provisions making 'final' the decisions of certain
administrative agencies, the courts have taken cognizance of petitions
questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of
232
discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantial justice or
erroneous interpretation of the law were brought to their attention.
It should be stressed too, that voluntary arbitrators, by the nature of
their functions, act in a quasi-judicial capacity. 24 It stands to reason,
therefore, that their decisions should not be beyond the scope of the
power of judicial review of this Court.
[136] OMB. MARCELO VS BUNGBUNG AND CA
RE: Methods of Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions;
Special Civil Actions (Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus)
Facts:
Complainant Doromal accused Bungubung of soliciting and receiving
P100,000.00 from him and a Mitsubishi Pajero van from another bidder
in exchange for the award of the security services contract of the PPA.
Doromal also accused Bungubung and other PPA employees of
demanding and receiving balato in consideration of the award of the
PPA Security Service Contract.
The Ombudsman found respondent Leopoldo Bungubung
administratively liable for grave misconduct, dismissing him from the
service and imposing the accessory penalties of cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and his perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service.
Bungubung filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. He then
sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Bungubung and absolved him from
liability for the charge of grave misconduct, finding no substantial
evidence that Bungubung committed the same. This was after
complainants filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint and Affidavit of
Desistance after admitting that all the allegations and evidence against
Bungubung were fabricated.
The Ombudsman filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied.
Consequently, the Ombudsman filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 45.
Issue:
What are the guidelines for the judicial review of decisions rendered by
administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial power?
Held:
The following are the guidelines for the judicial review of decisions
rendered by administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial power:
1. First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial
evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable
might conceivably opine otherwise.
2. Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive
branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are
to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the
conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or
otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.
3. Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the
power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the
evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted
therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional
evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency
concerned.
As stated above, the fundamental rule in administrative proceedings is
that the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in his complaint. Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act is unequivocal: Findings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.
Conversely, therefore, when the findings of fact by the Ombudsman
are not adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not
be binding upon the courts. Such is the case in the present Petition.
Being guided accordingly by the aforementioned evidentiary rules and
jurisprudence, the Court finds that the evidence on record in the
present case does not constitute substantial evidence of Bungubung's
administrative culpability for grave misconduct.
[137] OFFICE OF THE OMB VS CAPULONG
Facts:
A complaint was filed against respondent Capulong, Customs
Operation Officer V of the Bureau of Customs, for failing to file the
required SALN for several years and for failing to disclose in his SALNs,
in the years that he filed one, his wife’s business interests in two
corporations. Respondent denied all the allegations based, firstly, on
the presumption that he had faithfully complied with the annual filing
of SALN and, second, that he was not informed by his wife that she
was made an incorporator of two corporations; hence, there was no
willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on his part.
The Ombudsman preventively suspended the respondent
without pay which shall continue until the case is terminated but shall
not exceed 6 months effective from the receipt of the Order.
Meanwhile, respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with
urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary
injunction. The CA prohibited the Ombudsman from implementing the
preventive suspension order until further orders from the court.
Subsequently, CA rendered the decision granting
respondent’s petition and held that the simple allegation of non-
disclosure of the respondent spouse’s business interest does not
constitute gross misconduct and serious dishonesty since the
complaint-affidavit failed to alleged that the said non-disclosure were
deliberately done. Hence, there was absolutely no basis to warrant
respondent’s preventive suspension as it is evident on the face of the
complaint that there was nothing to support the same.
Issue:
May the CA be bound by findings of fact of the
Ombudsman?
Held:
No. While it is an established rule in administrative law that
the courts of justice should respect the finding of fact of said
administrative agencies, the courts may not be bound by such findings
of fact when there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such
evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial; and when
there is a clear showing that the administrative agency acted arbitrarily
or with grave abuse of discretion in a capricious and whimsical
manner, such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
These exceptions exist in this case and compel the appellate
court to review the findings of fact of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman may issue a preventive suspension order
when the evidence of guilt is strong and such determination is left to
the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. The
Court, however, can substitute its own judgment for that of the
Ombudsman on this matter, with a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. Undoubtedly, in this case,
233
the CA aptly ruled that the Ombudsman abused its discretion because
it failed to sufficiently establish any basis to issue the order of
preventive suspension. Respondent’s non-disclosure of his wife’s
business interest does not constitute serious dishonesty or grave
misconduct as nothing in the records reveals that he deliberately
placed “N/A” in his SALN despite knowledge about his wife’s business
interests.
[138] ABEJO VS DEL CRUZ
Facts:
Telectronic Systems, Inc. purchased the 133,000 minority
shareholdings of petitioner-spouses Abejo in the Pocket bell
Philippines, Inc. Thereafter, Telectronic requested the corporate
secretary of the corporation, Braga, to register and transfer to its
name, and those of its nominees the purchased shares in the
corporation’s transfer book, cancel the surrendered certificates of stock
and issue the corresponding new certificates of stock in its name and
those of its nominees.
Braga, the corporate secretary and son of the majority
stockholders of the corporations, refused to register the transfer of
shares asserting that they claim pre-emptive rights over the shares of
the petitioner-spouses Abejo. This triggered the series of intertwined
actions between the parties, all centered on the question of jurisdiction
over the dispute.
The Bragas assert that the regular court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction as against the SEC, while the Abejos claim the
contrary.
Issue:
Which body has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
issue in this case?
Held:
SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute in
the case at bar. P.D. No. 902-A which reorganized the SEC, provides
that SEC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over an
intracorporate dispute, one which arises between a stockholder and
the corporation.
The issue in this case is not the ownership of shares but
rather the non-performance by the Corporate Secretary of the
ministerial duty of recording transfers of shares of stock of the
Corporation of which he is secretary. Rightly so, this is an
intracorporate dispute.
Under the “sense-making and expeditious doctrine of
primary jurisdiction”, the courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered.
[139] PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTA VS CA
Facts:
When respondent Zamboanga Del Norte Electric Cooperative charged
increased power rates against the petitioner for the month of May,
1991, the petitioner filed a Complaint for Illegal Collection of Power
Bills against respondent before the trial court. Petitioner contended
that jurisdiction is vested with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) or
the regular trial court, while respondent's position was that jurisdiction
lies with the National Electrification Administration (NEA). Petitioner
also claimed that because of the unconstitutionality and arbitrariness
of the imposition of the charges, the case is an exception to the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Issue:
Can the Petitioner go directly to the trial court without exhausting
administrative remedies?
Held
No. The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that
he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if
a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be
exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be
sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case
may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and
legal reasons.
Also, NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control over
electric cooperatives and other borrowers, supervised or controlled
entities, is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations. It may
also, motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, conduct
investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters,
affecting electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or
controlled entities.
Thus, a party questioning the rates imposed by an electric cooperative
may file a complaint with the NEA as it is empowered to conduct
hearings and investigations and issue such orders on the rates that
may be charged. Consequently, the case does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the ERB. In case a party feels aggrieved by any order,
ruling or decision of the NEA, he may file a petition for review before
the Court of Appeals.
[140] ANTIPOLO REALTY VS NHA
Facts:
The dispute arouse from a non-fulfillment of payment in a Contract to
Sell of a real estate trade and business. The dispute was brought in
NHA but Antipolo Realty asserted that the jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case must be lodged in regular courts and not in NHA since
it involved the interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell.
Issue:
Can NHA interpret and apply the stipulations in the Contract to Sell
using its regulatory powers for real estate trade and business?
Held:
Yes. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative
agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions,
though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-
judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is
well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for
special competence and experience has been recognized as essential
in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and
because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular
courts have remained crowded and clogged. In the exercise of such
powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply
contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such
contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is
that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private
rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable
only by our regular courts.
[141] VILLAFLOR VS CA
234
Facts:
Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing 140 hectares from 4
different owners in 1940. The land was part of the public domain, but
the petitioner’s predecessor- in- interest over which he acquired the
property, have been in open, exclusive and notorious possession of the
same for some time.
After acquisition, petitioner asserts exclusive rights thereof for more
than fifty (50) years. In 1946, petitioner entered into a
lease agreement with respondent Nasipit Lumber Co.Inc. However, an
“Agreement for the Relinquishment of Rights” was entered into by
both parties in 1950. The respondent having complied all the
requirements agreed upon, assumed ownership and possession of the
property since then. Respondent corporation likewise filed a sales
application in 1950 over the property to bolster his claim which the
Bureau of Land otherwise granted on the same year, as proof an
“Order of Award” issued. In 1974 or after 24 years, petitioner
questioned and made several collateral and extraneous claims against
the respondent. However, the Bureau of Lands dismissed the claims,
arguing that petitioner no longer has any substantial
rights to question the validity of acquisition of the respondent and the
subsequent issuance of free patent by the Bureau of Lands.
Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration at the
Ministry of Natural Resources and the case went up to the CA but the
courts consistently ruled against the petitioner Villaflor. Petitioner then
filed a Petition for Review with the SC basically questioning the
sufficiency of the evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals,
alleging that public respondents’ factual findings were based on
speculations, surmises and conjectures. Petitioner insists that a review
of those findings is in order because they were allegedly (1) rooted,
not on specific evidence, but on conclusions and inferences of the
Director of Lands which were, in turn, based on misapprehension of
the applicable law on simulated contracts; (2) arrived at whimsically --
totally ignoring the substantial and admitted fact that petitioner was
not notified of the award in favor of private respondent; and (3)
grounded on errors and misapprehensions, particularly those relating
to the identity of the disputed area.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals err in adopting or relying on the factual
findings of the Bureau of Lands, especially those affirmed by the
Minister (now Secretary) of Natural Resources and the trial court?
Held:
No, CA did not err in relying on the factual findings of the Bureau of
Lands.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that the Director of Lands is a
quasi-judicial officer who passes on issues of mixed facts and
law. Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law thus mean that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the final arbiter
on questions of fact in public land conflicts.
Reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on the factual findings of
the Director of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources is not
misplaced. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction,
they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their
findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if
not finality, by the courts. The findings of fact of an administrative
agency must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court to weigh once
more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in
respect of sufficiency of evidence.
However, the rule that factual findings of an administrative agency are
accorded respect and even finality by courts admits of exceptions. This
is true also in assessing factual findings of lower courts. It is
incumbent on the petitioner to show that the resolution of the factual
issues by the administrative agency and/or by the trial court falls under
any of the exceptions. Otherwise, this Court will not disturb such
findings.
In this instance, both the principle of primary jurisdiction of
administrative agencies and the doctrine of finality of factual findings
of the trial courts, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals
as in this case, militate against petitioner’s cause. Indeed, petitioner
has not given us sufficient reason to deviate from them.
[142] PALOMA VS MORA
Facts:
Petitioner Paloma was appointed as General Manager of the Palompon,
Leyte Water District in 1993 but his services were terminated by a
resolution passed in 1995 by its Board of Directors.
Paloma then filed a petition for Mandamus in the RTC claiming that his
dismissal was a “capricious and arbitrary act on the part of the Board,
constituting a travesty of justice and a fatal denial of his constitutional
right to due process for the grounds relied upon to terminate him were
never made a subject of a complaint nor was he notified and made to
explain the acts he was said to be guilty of.” According to him,
“fundamental is the rule and also provided for in the Civil Rules and
Regulations that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended, separated, or dismissed except for cause and after due
process.”
The case for Mandamus was dismissed by the RTC for being
premature case of action and such ruling was affirmed by the CA for
lack of merit.
Meanwhile, Paloma also filed a Complaint with the CSC against the
respondents for alleged Violation of Civil Service Law and Rules of
Illegal Dismissal. CSC dismissed the complaint for lack of prima facie
case.
Issue:
(1) Will Mandamus lie to compel the Board of Directors to
reinstate former General Manager Paloma?
(2) Does CSC have primary jurisdiction over the case for Illegal
Dismissal of petitioner?
Held:
(1) No, Mandamus cannot lie to compel the Board to reinstate
Paloma.
According to the SC, Mandamus lies to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to
compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus
will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion
of a public officer where the law imposes upon the said
public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in
reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is
his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court.
In the present case, the Board under Section 23 of P.D. No.
198, as amended by P.D. No. 768, was vested with the
discretionary power to remove the General Manager. Such
provision provides that “said officer shall serve at the
pleasure of the Board.”
The Board may abridge the term of the General Manager
thereof the moment the latter’s services cease to be
convivial to the former. He is at the mercy of the appointing
power since his appointment can be terminated at any time
for any cause and following Orcullo, there is no need to of
prior notice or due hearing before the incumbent can be
separated from office.
(2) Yes, CSC has primary jurisdiction over the case.
SC rules that in a surfeit of cases, this Court has held that
quasi- judicial bodies like the CSC are better- equipped in
handling cases involving the employment status of
employees as those in the Civil Service since it is within the
field of their expertise. This is consistent with the powers
and functions of the CSC, being the central personnel
agency of the Government, to carry into effect the provisions
235
 of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws, including,
in this case, P.D. 198.
N.B. Arroyo inked into law R.A. No. 9286 which now provides that
“General Manager of Water Districts shall not be removed from the
office, except for cause and after due process.” But the law is silent as
to retroactivity of the law to pending cases, and must be taken to be
prospective in application. SC also said that to apply the law
retroactively will rob the respondents, as members of the Board, of the
right vested to them by PD 198 to terminate petitioner at their
pleasure.
[143] EURO-MED LABORATORIES VS PROVINCE OF
BATANGAS
Facts:
Petitioner Euro-Med Laboratories filed a complaint for sum of money
against Respondent Province of Batangas for the latter had, thru its
various authorized representatives of its government hospitals,
purchased various Intravenous Fluids (IVF) products from the
Petitioner, with an unpaid balance of P487,662.80. In its answer,
Respondent denied having an unpaid balance and alleged that some
payments it had already made were not reflected in the computation
set forth in the complaint and that it was continuously exerting
genuine and earnest efforts to find out the true and actual amount
owed.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the primary jurisdiction over Petitioner’s money claim was lodged with
the Commission on Audit (COA). Respondent pointed out that
Petitioner’s claim, arising as it did from a series of procurement
transactions with the province, was governed by the Local Government
Code provisions and COA rules and regulations on supply and property
management in local governments. RTC dismissed Petitioner’s
complaint without prejudice to the filing of the proper money claim
with the COA.
Issue:
As between the COA and the RTC, which has primary jurisdiction to
pass upon Petitioner’s money claim against the Province of Batangas?
Held:
It is the COA.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and
knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in
an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if
the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.
First, the enforcement of the Petitioner’s claim for a certain amount of
money against a local government unit is within the COA’s domain
under Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Second, Petitioner’s money claim was founded on a series of purchases
for the medical supplies of Respondent’s public hospitals. Both parties
agreed that these transactions were governed by the Local
Government Code provisions on supply and property management and
their implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the COA.
Petitioner’s claim therefore involved compliance with applicable
auditing laws and rules on procurement. Such matters are not within
the usual area of knowledge, experience and expertise of most judges
but within the special competence of COA auditors and
accountants. Thus, it was but proper, out of fidelity to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, for the RTC to dismiss Petitioner’s complaint.
Petitioner argues, however, that Respondent could no longer question
the RTC’s jurisdiction over the matter after it had filed its answer and
participated in the subsequent proceedings. To this, SC needs only
state that the court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua
sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties
to argue it as the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power
between judicial and administrative bodies and not for the convenience
of the parties.
Petition is hereby DENIED.
[144] HEIRS OF LORENZO AND CARMEN VIDAD VS LBP
Facts:
Petitioners are the owners of a land which was voluntarily offered for
sale to the government under RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988. By virtue of EO 405, vesting LBP with primary
responsibility to determine the valuation and compensation for all
lands covered by RA 6657, LBP computed the initial value of the land
P2,961,333.03 but the Petitioners rejected the valuation.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which the DARAB dismissed.
Petitioners filed a second petition for review asking for a re-evaluation
of the land with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).
The latter directed LBP to re-compute the value of the land. However,
Petitioners similarly rejected this offer. Petitioners then instituted a
case before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Tuguegarao
(RARAD). RARAD fixed the just compensation for the land
at P32,965,408.46 which the Petitioners accepted.
LBP moved for reconsideration but the RARAD denied the motion for
lack of merit. LBP then filed a petition for determination of just
compensation with the RTC, sitting as a SAC. SAC rendered a decision,
based on LBPs evidence alone, fixing the just compensation
at P5,626,724.47.
Petitioners filed an appeal, questioning the authority of the SAC to give
due course to the petition of LBP, claiming that the RARAD has
concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC over just compensation cases
involving lands covered by RA 6657. Furthermore, petitioners insisted
that LBP has no legal personality to institute a case for determination
of just compensation against landowners with the SAC.
CA rendered the assailed decision, dismissing the appeal for lack of
merit, and affirming the valuation of the SAC in the amount
of P5,626,724.47. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Is SAC precluded from assuming jurisdiction on the issue since it
was the DARAB, through the RARAD, which first assumed
jurisdiction on the issue of just compensation for Petitioners’
land?
2. Is LBP vested with the legal personality to institute the petition
with the SAC?
3. What is the value of just compensation to be paid to petitioners?
Held:
1. No.
The procedure for the determination of just compensation under
RA 6657, as in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Banal,
commences with LBP determining the value of the lands under
the Land Reform Program. Using LBPs valuation, the DAR makes
an offer to the landowner through a notice sent to the landowner.
In case the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR adjudicator
conducts a summary administrative proceeding to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP
and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with the
decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC
designated as a Special Agrarian Court for final determination of
just compensation.
Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB do
not exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just
compensation cases. The determination of just compensation is
judicial in nature. Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional
Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two
categories of cases, to wit:
(1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners and
(2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657].
236

2. Yes. Section 18 of RA 6657 states that LBP is not merely a
nominal party in the determination of just compensation. It is an
indispensable party, a real party-in-interest, in expropriation
proceedings under RA 6657, and thus, has the legal personality to
question the determination of just compensation, independent of
the DAR. RA 6657 directs LBP to pay the DAR’s land
valuation only if the landowner, the DAR and LBP agree on the
amount of just compensation. The DAR proceedings are but
preliminary, and become final only when the parties have all
agreed to the amount of just compensation fixed by the DAR.
However, should a party disagree with the amount fixed by DAR,
then the jurisdiction of the SAC may be invoked for the purpose.
3. The value of just compensation should take into consideration the
factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657 and the applicable
DAR regulations. Section 17 of RA 6657 provides: In determining
just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current
value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessments made by government assessors shall be considered.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well
as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
Petition is hereby GRANTED.
[145] GAW GUY VS. IGNACIO
Facts:
The father of petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu
became a naturalized Filipino citizen sometime in 1959. The said
petitioners, being minors at that time, were also recognized as Filipino
citizens. Respondent filed a Complaint for blacklisting and deportation
against petitioners Geraldine and Grace before the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) on the basis that the latter two are Canadian citizens
who are illegally working in the Philippines, petitioners having been
issued Canadian passports. The Special Prosecutor charged them for
working without permit, for fraudulently representing themselves as
Philippine citizens in order to evade immigration laws.
As a remedy, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with Damages
and a Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction which was granted by RTC but was set aside CA
ruling that resort must first be had to BI. Hence, the petitioner went to
the SC arguing that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, relied upon by
the CA in its decision, does not apply in the present case because it
falls under an exception. Petitioners assert that immediate judicial
intervention in deportation proceedings is allowed where the claim of
citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the claim is correct.
Issue: Does the doctrine of primary jurisdiction apply in this case?
Held:
No.
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the
exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an
alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship. And
a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of
Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings However,
the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least
insofar as deportation proceedings are concerned.
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized
and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.
The present case falls within the above-cited exception considering
that proof of their Philippine citizenship had been adduced, such as,
the identification numbers issued by the Bureau of Immigration
confirming their Philippine citizenship, they have duly exercised and
enjoyed all the rights and privileges exclusively accorded to Filipino
citizens, i.e., their Philippine passports issued by the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
Petition is granted.
[146] SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE VS SELUDO
Facts:
As members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of the petitioner,
individual petitioners passed Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005 on
January 22, 2005. The said resolution disallowed the private
respondent to attend succeeding meetings of the BOD effective
February 2005 until the end of his term as director. The same
resolution also disqualified him for one term to run as a candidate for
director in the upcoming district elections.
Convinced that his rights as a director of petitioner SAMELCO II had
been curtailed by the said resolution, private respondent filed an
Urgent Petition for Prohibition against petitioner, impleading individual
petitioners as directors in RTC, Samar, praying for the nullification of
the resolution. He likewise prayed that a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the
individual petitioners from enforcing the assailed board resolution.
Individual petitioners raised the affirmative defense of lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case arguing that
since the matter involved an electric cooperative, SAMELCO II, primary
jurisdiction is vested on the National Electrification Administration
(NEA).
The RTC sustained the jurisdiction of the court over the petition for
prohibition and barred the petitioners and/or their representatives from
enforcing the resolution. Petitioners then elevated the case to the
CA but the said action was dismissed by CA. Hence, the instant
petition imputing error on CA in limiting the doctrine to certain matters
involving specialized disputes and in upholding the jurisdiction of the
trial court on the ground that the issues raised therein do not require
the technical expertise of the NEA.
Issue: Who between the RTC and NEA has primary jurisdiction over
the question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by
SAMELCO II?
Held:
NEA has jurisdiction.
It is true that the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition
filed by respondent. However, the basic issue in the present case is
not whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition
filed by respondent; rather, the issue is who between the RTC and the
NEA has primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the
Board Resolution issued by SAMELCO II. A careful reading of the
above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1645 clearly show that, pursuant
to its power of supervision and control, the NEA is granted the
authority to conduct investigations and other similar actions as well as
to issue orders, rules and regulations with respect to all matters
affecting electric cooperatives. Certainly, the matter as to the validity
of the resolution issued by the Board of Directors of SAMELCO II,
which practically removed respondent from his position as a member
of the Board of Directors and further disqualified him to run as such in
the ensuing election, is a matter which affects the said electric
cooperative and, thus, comes within the ambit of the powers of the
NEA as expressed in Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645.
To sustain the petition for prohibition filed by respondent with the RTC
would constitute an unnecessary intrusion into the NEA's power of
supervision and control over electric cooperatives.
237
To sum, while the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition
filed by respondent, the NEA, in the exercise of its power of
supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction to determine the issue
of the validity of the subject resolution.
It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
has been placed within the special competence of an administrative
agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be
enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would
not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
Petition is granted.
[147] GARCIA VS CA
Facts:
On 18 October 1988, the PCA Governing Board (the "Board" for
brevity) passed Resolution No. 109-88, creating an "Investigation
Committee" which would look into the complaint made by one Antonio
Pua against petitioner, then administrator of the Philippine Coconut
Authority, for supposed irregularities committed by him.
An Investigating Committee was formed and thus, recommended:
1. That formal charges be filed against Administrator Leandro Garcia
for dishonesty, falsification of official document, grave misconduct and
violation of RA 3019 and 2. That respondent Garcia be placed under
preventive suspension.
A period of delay in the disposition of the case resulting from the
petitions/requests for extension of time, postponement/cancellation of
the scheduled hearings and related requests filed by the counsel of
respondent Administrator Leandro P. Garcia, has not been counted in
computing the period of preventive suspension, as approved by the
Board Investigation Committee.
The Court issued a TRO, `restraining the respondent Josefel P.
Grajeda and his Investigating Committee from further conducting an
investigation of herein petitioner within 20 days from receipt hereof'.
There was also no more time for the Court to resolve and worse, the
TRO already expired on September 18, 1989. It was within these
interregnum periods when the above incident was pending before this
Court that respondent Grajeda and his Investigating Committee issued
on August 21, 1989. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
(A) Whether or not the investigating Committee committed grave
abuse of discretion in finalizing and submitting its resolution to the PCA
Board while the court's resolution on the prayer for preliminary
injunction against the said Committee was pending.
(B) Whether or not the PCA violated administrative due process of the
proceedings
Held:
The petition for review is DENIED.
On the first issue, the Court seconds the appellate court in its
observation that the trial court, indeed, gravely abused its discretion in
issuing its assailed orders.
The Court finds no cogent reason for deviating from the rule on the
primacy of administrative jurisdiction. The records would show that
petitioner filed the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
with the trial court even while the administrative investigation was yet
ongoing. Petitioner's immediate recourse to the trial court was
premature and precipitate. From the decision of the PCA Board, once
rendered, an administrative remedy of appeal to the Civil Service
Commission would still be available to him.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse
through court action, cannot prosper until after all such administrative
remedies would have first been exhausted. The doctrine does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve, or
interfere in, a controversy the jurisdiction over which is lodged initially
with an administrative body, like the PCA Board and its Investigation
Committee, of special competence. The rule is an element of
petitioner's right of action, and it is too significant a mandate to be just
waylaid by the courts.
On the second issue, the factual scenario of the case would indicate
that petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to submit his case at
the administrative level. Petitioner cannot deny that he has been able
to effectively, if not deliberately, delayed the resolution of the
administrative case against him due to his repeated requests for
extension of time to file answer and his inexcusable refusal to attend
the scheduled hearings thereon despite due notice. Hence,
administrative due process was present.
[148] GONZALES VS CA
Facts:
Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales received two Orders from the Regional
Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued pursuant to
the operation land transfer program of the government under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27.
Petitioner was directed to surrender the titles to her land and to submit
the other requirements of the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines,
while the said bank was ordered to pay the petitioner compensation
for the two parcels of land.
The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to restrain the
enforcement and to annul the said two Orders of the DAR Regional
Director on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction, alleging that
the petitioner never filed a land transfer claim and was not notified of
nor heard in the execution of the final survey plans and the valuation
of her land.
The CA rendered a decision denying due course to, and dismissing the
petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Hence the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the
Court of Appeals comes within the exceptions to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies
Held:
No.
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that
the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized
areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an
administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a
matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and
convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for
determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to
the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the
petitioner.
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies to be applicable in this case.
238

The assailed orders involving parcels of land situated in Naga, Pototan,
Iloilo were issued by the Regional Director of DAR Region VI Office in
Iloilo City. A Regional Director is the head of a DAR Regional Office
which, under the Administrative Code of 1987, is responsible for
“supporting the field units and supervising program implementation of
the Department within the region”. The function of the DAR Regional
Office includes “[implementing] laws, policies, plans, rules and
regulations of the Department in the regional area”. A similar function
is delegated to the DAR Regional Offices under Executive Order No.
129-A. With such a broad function and responsibility, it may be
reasonably concluded that the issuance of the assailed orders pursuant
to the operation land transfer and tenant emancipation program of the
government is within the authority and jurisdiction of the DAR Regional
Director.
However, questions as to the propriety of the issuance could have still
been raised before the proper administrative forum. Instead of going
directly to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, the petitioner should
have sought redress in the DARAB, and the latter’s officials should
have been given an opportunity to review the matter and resolve the
controversy.
[149] REGINO VS. PANGASINAN
Facts:
PCST held a fundraising campaign wherein each student was
required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. Those who
refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final
examinations. Regino was not able to pay due to poverty and was not
allowed to take the exams. Regino then filed a complaint for damages.
PCST raised that defense that there was no prior exhaustion
of administrative remedies. The case should have been initiated before
the proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education
(CHED). Is this defense tenable?
Held:
No, the defense is not tenable.
First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
has no bearing on the present case. Petitioner is not asking for the
reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow
her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another
educational institution.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable
when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to
act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not
courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they
deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the
power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have
commenced her case before the Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of
which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner's action for damages inevitably
calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a
function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.
[150] BAUTELEC VS PANGASINAN ENERGY INDUSTRY
ADMINSTRATION BUREAU
Facts:
Batelec and Puyat Steel Corporation (PSC) entered into an agreement
wherein the former will construct 69 kv transmission lines for the
latter. However, Batelec failed to fulfill its obligation. PSC then filed an
application before the Energy Industry Administration Bureau (EIAB)
for direct connection with the National Power Corporation (NPC).
The EIAB ruled in favor of PSC. Batelec then filed a petition
for certiorari in the CA. The CA, however, denied the petition for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies as Batelec did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the EIAB’s resolution. Did the CA acted correctly?
Held:
Yes, the CA acted correctly.
In the present case, there is nothing in the records to show that
petitioner availed of administrative relief before filing a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It did not appeal the Bureau's
resolution dated 16 March 1998 to the Secretary of Energy, which
under Section 8 in relation to Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 7638 has the
power over the bureaus under the Department. It has not, as well,
suggested any plausible reason for direct recourse to the Court of
Appeals against the Resolution in question. Neither has petitioner
shown that the instant case falls among the recognized exceptions to
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Moreover, in light of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the
special civil action for certiorari may be availed of.
[151] HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION VS
DEFENSOR
Facts:
A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No.
9207, authorized the creation and development of what is now known
as the National Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former
President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a
parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over
440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC.
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the
reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and
authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct
sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in
population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137
from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel
Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing
the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the
number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the
government’s socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners
association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its
president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own
personal capacity and on behalf of the association. The instant petition
for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207,
otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing
and Land Utilization Act of 2003."
Issue:
Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the
Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
function and should be declared null and void for being arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical.
Held:
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of
the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its
quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its
239
rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued
pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory
that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground
that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks
to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial
course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.
[152] DIMSON VS LOCAL WARER UTILITIES
ADMINSTRATION
Facts:
Petitioners Dimson (Manila), Inc. and PHESCO, Inc. are duly organized
domestic corporations that had entered into a joint venture agreement
for the specific purpose of placing their bid to execute the Urdaneta
Water Supply Improvement Project (the Urdaneta Project) of
respondent LWUA.
On December 10 and 18, 2004, LWUA had caused the publication of
an invitation to bid on the Urdaneta Project a P113,385,979.00
contract.
Sixteen contractors, including petitioners joint venture, responded to
the invitation. Following the pre-bid conference, petitioners submitted
to LWUAs Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) their proposal in two (2)
sealed envelopes each containing their compliance with eligibility
requirements as a joint venture and their financial proposal as such to
undertake the project. Petitioners passed the eligibility requirements
and were found to have placed the lowest calculated bid at
P107,666,358.17.
However, on April 19, 2005, petitioners were informed by LWUA
Administrator Lorenzo Jamora that following the post-qualification
stage of the evaluation process, the joint venture would have to be
disqualified by the BAC on the finding that Dimson (Manila), Inc. joint
venture with another contractor was, as of March 17, 2005, suffering
from a 30.4% slippage in the Santiago Water Supply and Treatment
Project an ongoing project likewise under LWUAs administration.
Aggrieved, petitioners, through counsel, sent a letter to Administrator
Jamora on April 21, 2005 asserting that their post-disqualification had
no factual and legal basis. They claimed that their joint venture in
relation to the Urdaneta Project was distinct from the Dimsons joint
venture in the Santiago Project where Dimson was only a minority
partner that merely supplied the construction equipment. The alleged
slippage, according to them, would not be sufficient to justify their
post-disqualification, especially because it could be attributed to
several other factors. Significantly, they asserted that it was in fact
LWUA which ordered the suspension of the Santiago Project on
December 6, 2004 on account of certain variation orders that up to the
present remained unresolved. They then asked that their post-
disqualification be reconsidered and the contract for the Urdaneta
Project be awarded to them.
Pending action on this request, the BAC, on May 31, 2005, issued
Resolution No. 12, s. 2005 recommending the award of the Urdaneta
Project to the second lowest calculated bidder, R-II Builders.
Consequently, on June 7, 2005, the LWUA Board of Trustees issued
Resolution No. 102,[12] s. 2005 and awarded the contract to it.
Expectedly, petitioners request for reconsideration was declined. To
prevent the execution of the project by R-II Builders, petitioners filed
the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of LWUA when it post-
disqualified their joint venture from taking part in the project.
Issue:
Whether or not the action taken by the petitioner is correct.
Held: No, it was an error for the petitioner to directly course
the matter to the Supreme Court.
The proper recourse to a court action from decisions of the BAC, such
as this one, is to file a certiorari not before the Supreme Court but
before the regional trial court which is vested by R.A. No. 9184 with
jurisdiction to entertain the same.
In the recent case of First United Constructors Corporation v. Poro
Point Management Corporation,[16] we held that while indeed the
certiorari jurisdiction of the regional trial court is concurrent with this
Courts, that fact alone does not allow an unrestricted freedom of
choice of the court forum. But since this is not an iron-clad rule and
the full discretionary power to take cognizance of and assume
jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari directly filed with the
Court may actually be exercised by it, it is nevertheless imperative that
the Courts intervention be called for by exceptionally compelling
reasons or be warranted by the nature of the issues involved. In other
words, a direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to
issue the writ will be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
In the present case, at no given time have petitioners adduced any
special and important reasons to justify their direct resort to this Court
on certiorari. Neither have they established that the issues for
resolution could not properly be addressed by the proper court, nor
that the remedy they were seeking could not possibly be availed of
before that same court. Thus, we can only reaffirm the judicial policy
that this Court must dismiss a direct invocation of its jurisdiction in the
absence of any compelling and exceptional circumstances calling for a
resort to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari and in the
absence of any showing that the redress desired may never be
obtained through proper recourse in the appropriate courts.
Moreover, it appears that compliance with the mandatory protest
mechanisms of the law is jurisdictional in character. Section 58 of R.A.
No. 9184 requires that there be exhaustion of the statutorily available
remedies at the administrative level as a precondition to the filing of a
certiorari petition. This requirement points to the mechanisms for
protest against decisions of the BAC in all stages of the procurement
process that are outlined in both the provisions of Section 55 as well in
Section 55 of the implementing rules.
[153] SAMAR I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. VS
SELUDO
Facts:
The Board of Directors of petitioner with the exclusion of defendant,
issued a resolution prohibiting defendant to continue joining the Board
activities, and disqualifying him to run for the next BoD election.
Defendant filed a case for prohibition with RTC against petitioner.
Petitioner argued that the case should go first with the National
Electrification Administration (NEA) given the fact that Samar II
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II) was organized under the
provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 269, otherwise known as
the National Electrification Administration Decree, as amended by P.D.
No. 1645. NEA exercises control and supervision over petitioner and
because of that the case of defendant should be dealt with the agency
pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. RTC rejected
petitioner’s argument and this is affirmed by CA.
Issue:
should the controversy go first with the NEA?
Held:
Yes, pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction NEA has primary
jurisdiction over the case of defendant. Given that NEA has the power
240
to supervise and control the likes of petitioner, it is just proper for the
defendant to bring his case before it before going to regular courts.
Certainly, the matter as to the validity of the resolution issued by the
Board of Directors of SAMELCO II, which practically removed
respondent from his position as a member of the Board of Directors
and further disqualified him to run as such in the ensuing election, is a
matter which affects the said electric cooperative and, thus, comes
within the ambit of the powers of the NEA.
[154] PAAT VS CA
Facts: Respondent owns a truck that carried undocumented forest
products. The truck was confiscated by petitioner, and respondent filed
a letter of reconsideration before the executive regional director.
Respondent stated in that letter that in case their letter for
reconsideration would be denied then the letter should be considered
as an appeal to the Secretary. Pending resolution however of the
appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by
the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive
Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. RTC denied the motion and the CA sustained
the lower court’s decision.
Issue: is there a failure to exhaust administrative remedies in the case
at hand?
Held: Yes, In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy
was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to
him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents. In their letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,private respondents clearly
recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek
to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter,
reads, thus:
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action,
then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to
the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing
to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain
remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the
law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek courts intervention by
filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceedings.
[155] INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION VS
COMELEC
Facts:
This case involves the bidding for procurement by sale or lease of
supplies, equipment, materials or services for the implementation of
the Automated Election System for the May 10, 2004 elections.
A petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was filed by Petitioners seeking
to declare null and void Resolution No. 6074 of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), which awarded "Phase II of the Modernization
Project of the Commission to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC), among
others. Petitioners allege irregularities with the bidding process and
non-compliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural
requirements by Comelec.
Respondents claim that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, thus it acted prematurely by filing this instant petition.
According to respondents, the Report should have been appealed to
the Comelec en banc, pursuant to Section 55 and 58 of RA 9184. In
the absence of such appeal, the determination and recommendation of
the BAC had become final.
Issue:
Is petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies justifiable?
Held:
Yes.
Respondent Comelec came out with its en banc Resolution No. 6074
dated April 15, 2003, awarding the project to Respondent MPC even
before the BAC managed to issue its written report and
recommendation on April 21, 2003. Thus, how could petitioners have
appealed the BAC's recommendation or report to the head of the
procuring entity (the chairman of Comelec), when the Comelec en
banc had already approved the award of the contract to MPC even
before petitioners learned of the BAC recommendation?
In Paat v. Court of Appeals, SC enumerated the instances when the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded, as
follows:
"(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention."
The present controversy precisely falls within the exceptions listed as
Nos. 7, 10 and 11: "(7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (10) when
the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention." As already stated, Comelec itself
made the exhaustion of administrative remedies legally impossible or,
at the very least, "unreasonable."
In any event, the peculiar circumstances surrounding the
unconventional rendition of the BAC Report and the precipitate
awarding of the Contract by the Comelec en banc — plus the fact that
it was racing to have its Contract with MPC implemented in time for
the elections in May 2004 (barely four months away) — have
combined to bring about the urgent need for judicial intervention, thus
prompting this Court to dispense with the procedural exhaustion of
administrative remedies in this case.
[156] PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE VS CHINESE
GENERAL HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER
Facts:
Republic Act No. 7875||| or the PhilHealth Law was signed in to law in
February 1995. Prior to the enactment of R.A. 7875. CGH 4 had been
an accredited health care provider under the Philippine Medical Care
Commission (PMCC), more popularly known as Medicare.||| As such,
CGH filed its Medicare claims. Its application for the payment of its
claim with the SSS was overtaken by the passage of R.A. 7875. Being
the successor of the PMCC, PHILHEALTH, in compliance with the
mandate of R.A. 7875, 7 promulgated the rules and regulations
implementing said act, Section 52 of which provides:
SECTION 52. Fee for Service
Guidelines on Claims Payment. — . . .
b. All claims for payment of services
rendered shall be filed within sixty
(60) calendar days from the date of
discharge of the patient. Xxx
The claims of CGH for period 1989-1992 was partially granted (only
1.3m out of 8.1m was paid). CGH’s claims (7.5m) representing
241
services rendered to its patients from 1998 to 1999||| was denied for LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
being allegedly filed beyond the sixty (60) day period allowed by the
implementing rules and regulations. CA ordered PhilHealth to pay the A. PUBLIC OFFICE AND PUBLIC OFFICERS:
remaining balance of the 1989-1992 claims and the entire claims for DE FACTO AND DE JURE OFFICERS; SALARY
1998-1999 or a total of 14.1m.
[1] SECRETARY OF DOTC V. MABALOT
Issue:
G.R. No. 138200. February 27, 2002
Should the 60-day rule be strictly implemented?
Facts:
Held:
In 1996 DOTC Secretary Garcia, Jr., issued a Memorandum Order
No. A careful reading of RA 7875 shows that the law itself does not
effecting the transfer of regional functions of LTFRB to the DOTC-CAR
provide for any specific period within which to file claims. We can
Regional Office. Subsequently in 1997, Secretary Lagdameo issued a
safely presume therefore that the period for filing was not per se the
Department Order establishing DOTC-CAR Regional Office as the
principal concern of the legislature. More important than mere
Regional Office of the LTFRB and for such to exercise the regional
technicalities is the realization of the state policy to provide
functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct supervision and
Philhealth members with the requisite medical care at the
control of LTFRB Central Office.
least possible cost. Truly, nothing can be more disheartening
One argument in assailing such issuances is that these issuances
than to see the Act's noble objective frustrated by the overly
violate the Constitution, specifically Sections 7 and 8, Article IX- B on
stringent application of technical rules. I|||
prohibitions on appointment in any capacity to public office/position
The unreasonably strict implementation of the 60-day rule, without
during his tenure and on additional, double, or indirect compensation.
regard to the causes of delay beyond respondent's control, will be
counter-productive to the long-term effectiveness of the NHIP. Instead
Issue:
of placing a premium on participation in the Program, Philhealth
Whether or not the administrative issuances violates Sections 7 and 8,
punishes an accredited health provider like CGH by refusing to pay its
Article IX- B of the Constitution.
claims for services already rendered.
Held:
No, the assailed Orders of the DOTC Secretary do not violate the
[157] SUNVILLE TIMBER VS ABAD
aforementioned constitutional provisions.
Facts:
ON THE MEMORANDUM:
Sunvilee was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing
The organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR were, in effect,
it to cut, remove and utilize timber. Private respondents filed a petition
merely designated to perform the additional duties and functions of an
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the
LTFRB Regional Office subject to the direct supervision and control of
cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its
LTFRB Central Office, pending the creation of a regular LTFRB
conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.||| The
Regional Office.
petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, among others,
As held in Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees,
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Trial court and CA ruled
To designate a public officer to another position may mean to vest him
against Sunville saying that doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
with additional duties while he performs the functions of his
remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several
permanent office. Or in some cases, a public officer may be designated
instances, one of which is the urgent need for judicial intervention
to a position in an acting capacity as when an undersecretary is
because of the adverse effects of the logging operations of the
designated to discharge the functions of a Secretary pending the
defendant have already covered a wider area than that feared to be
appointment of a permanent Secretary.
adversely affected.
ON THE DEPARTMENT ORDER:
Issue: Was there a correct deviation from the rule that administrative
Assuming arguendo that the appointive officials and employees
remedies should first be exhausted before resorting to judicial
of DOTC-CAR shall be holding more than one office or employment at
intervention?
the same time as a result of the establishment of such agency as the
LTFRB-CAR pursuant to the Department Order, SC said that such fact
Held:
still does not constitute a breach or violation of Section 7, Article IX-B
No. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation
of the Constitution. On this matter, it must be stressed that under the
of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-
aforementioned constitutional provision, an office or employment held
interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively)
in the exercise of the primary functions of one’s principal office is an
within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that
exception to, or not within the contemplation, of the prohibition
the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve
embodied in Section 7, Article IX-B.
questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors
Equally significant is that no evidence was adduced and
committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their
presented to clearly establish that the appointive officials and
superiors if given a chance to do so.|||
employees of DOTC-CAR shall receive any additional, double or
indirect compensation, in violation of Section 8, Article IX-B of the
Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require
Constitution. In the absence of any clear and convincing evidence to
prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine
show any breach or violation of said constitutional prohibitions, SC
above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its
finds no cogent reason to declare the invalidity of the challenged
observance.|||
orders.
In this case, the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the
[2] NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION
claimed adverse impact of the case on the national interest, the record
ADMINISTRATION V. CSC
does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these
G.R. No. 84301. April 7, 1993
extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the
Facts:
courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flat
In 1977 petitioner Garcia, was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII
against the petitioner's uncontested contention that it has since 1988
under permanent status, then to RD III then as Acting Branch RD of
stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with an
Bulacan. In 1984 by virtue of E.O No. 649 (reorganizing Land
order of the DENR.|||
Registration Commission to NALTDRA), Garcia was issued an
appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II. But such was under
temporary status for not being a member of the Philippine Bar, which

242
is a qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the
position of Deputy Register of Deeds under the said E.O.
Years after, the then Minister Justice notified Garcia of the termination
of her services II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money".
This was in turn referred the appeal to the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB) which dropped Garcia’s appeal on the ground that since
the termination of her services was due to the expiration of her
temporary appointment, her separation is in order.
CSC then directed that Garcia be restored to her position or its
equivalent arguing that "under the vested right theory the new
requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment
as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher as mandated under said
Executive Order, would not apply to her Garcia but only to the filling
up of vacant lawyer positions on or after February 9, 1981, the date
said Executive Order took effect. Since Garcia had been holding a
position from 1977 to 1984, she should not be affected by the
operation of the Executive Order.
Issue: Whether or not membership in the bar should apply only to
new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the
LRC at the time of the issuance and implementation of the Executive
Order such as Garcia.
Held:
No, the qualification applies to Garcia.
SC said that there is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in
an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its
salary. None of the exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case.
In the present case, the requirement of Bar membership to qualify for
key positions was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and
new development of the times. Garcia who formerly held the position
of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It is
thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA. The
additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office.
Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid
reorganization measure.
[3] LAUREL V. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the Chair of
the National Centennial Commission (NCC), a body constituted for the
preparation of the National Centennial celebration in 1998.
Subsequently, he was appointed as the Chief Executive Officer of the
Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) and was one of
the nine incorporators. Petitioner was later implicated in alleged
anomalies concerning the construction and operation of the projects.
By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019).
The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and
contended that he is not a public officer since ExpoCorp is a private
corporation and that the National Centennial Commission was not a
public office.
Issue:
Is the petitioner a public officer over which the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction?
Held:
Yes.
Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989, provides that the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or
employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs.
In the instant case, NCC performs executive functions as it was
created to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of
the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government
and non-government or private organizations. Moreover, NCC performs
sovereign functions. It was a vehicle for fostering nationhood and a
strong sense of Filipino identity, an opportunity to showcase Filipino
heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values. It is, therefore, a
public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer over which
the Ombudsman has jurisdiction.
The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc
body' does not make it less of a public office.
Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation
during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an
incidence and forms no part of the office.
SC need not delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a
private or a public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a
private corporation, petitioner’s position as Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC.
Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be
viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.
Petition is DISMISSED.
[4] KHAN V. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006
Facts:
Private respondents Rosauro Torralba and Celestino Bandala charged
petitioners before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) for violation of RA
3019. In their complaint, private respondents accused petitioners of
using their positions in PAL to secure a contract for Synergy Services
Corporation, a corporation engaged in hauling and janitorial services in
which they were shareholders.
Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on the
following grounds: (1) the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them
since PAL was a private entity and (2) they were not public officers,
hence, outside the application of RA 3019.
In a resolution, the Deputy Ombudsman denied petitioners’ omnibus
motion to dismiss.
Petitioners appealed the order to the Ombudsman who affirmed the
Deputy Ombudsman’s ruling. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Did the Ombudsman have the authority to prosecute petitioners for
violation of RA 3019?
Held:
No.
The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over GOCCs is confined only to
those with original charters. Although the government later on
acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter
did not have an original charter and its officers/employees could not
be investigated and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman. PAL, being
originally a private corporation seeded by private capital and created
under the general corporation law, does not fall within the
jurisdictional powers of the Ombudsman under Article XI, Section
13(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the latter is devoid of
authority to investigate or prosecute petitioners.
Petition is hereby GRANTED.
[5] CARANDANG VS. OMBUDSMAN
Facts:
Roberto S. Benedicto (Benedicto) was a stockholder of RPN, a private
corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
243
Commission (SEC). The Government ordered the sequestration of
RPNs properties, assets, and business. The Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) entered into a compromise agreement with
Benedicto, whereby he ceded to the Government, through the PCGG,
all his shares of stock in RPN. Consequently, upon motion of the PCGG,
the Sandiganbayan directed the president and corporate secretary of
RPN to transfer to the PCGG Benedictos shares representing 72.4% of
the total issued and outstanding capital stock of RPN. Benedicto
however, filed a motion for reconsideration of this decision which
remained unresolved until today.
On July 28, 1998, Carandang assumed office as general manager and
chief operating officer of RPN. Carandang was charged by the
Ombudsman in the Sandigbanbayan with a violation of Section 3 (g) of
RA 9139 and grave misconduct alleging that Carandang, in his capacity
as the general manager of RPN, had entered into a contract with AF
Broadcasting Incorporated despite his being an incorporator, director,
and stockholder of that corporation; that he had thus held financial
and material interest in a contract that had required the approval of
his office. Carandang moved to quash the information arguing that
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction because he was not a public official
due to RPN not being a government-owned or -controlled corporation.
Issue
Is RPN a GOCC such that Carandang can be considered as a public
officer and therefore, his case is cognizable by the Ombudsman and
the Sandiganbayan?
Held
A government-owned or controlled corporation is a stock or a non-
stock corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary
functions, which is directly chartered by a special law or if organized
under the general corporation law is owned or controlled by the
government directly, or indirectly through a parent corporation or
subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its
outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding voting capital
stock.
A corporation is considered a government-owned or -controlled
corporation only when the Government directly or indirectly owns or
controls at least a majority or 51% share of the capital stock.
Consequently, RPN was neither a government-owned nor a controlled
corporation because of the Governments total share in RPNs capital
stock being only 32.4%.Even the PCGG and the Office of the President
(OP) have recognized RPNs status as being neither a government-
owned nor -controlled corporation.
Although it is true that the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer to the
PCGG of Benedictos shares that represented 72.4% of the total issued
and outstanding capital stock of RPN, such quantification of Benedictos
shareholding cannot be controlling in view of Benedictos timely filing of
a motion for reconsideration whereby he clarified and insisted that the
shares ceded to the PCGG had accounted for only 32.4%, not 72.4%,
of RPNs outstanding capital stock. With the extent of Benedictos
holdings in RPN remaining unresolved with finality, concluding that the
Government held the majority of RPNs capital stock as to make RPN a
government-owned or -controlled corporation would be bereft of any
factual and legal basis.
The conclusion that Carandang was a public official by virtue of his
having been appointed as general manager and chief operating officer
of RPN by President Estrada deserves no consideration. President
Estradas intervention was merely to recommend Carandangs
designation as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN to
the PCGG, which then cast the vote in his favor vis--vis said
positions. Under the circumstances, it was RPNs Board of Directors
that appointed Carandang to his positions pursuant to RPNs By-Laws.
Petition is granted.
[6] ABEJA VS. JUDGE TANADA
Facts:
Petitioner Evelyn Abeja and private respondent Rosauro Radovan
(deceased) were contenders for the office of municipal mayor. After
the proclamation of private respondent, petitioner filed an election
contest covering 22 precincts. Respondent filed an Answer with a
Counter-Protest of the results in 36 precincts.
Meanwhile, the private respondent died and was substituted by Vice-
Mayor Conrado de Rama and, surprisingly, by his surviving spouse,
Ediltrudes Radovan as the latter was claiming a counterclaim for
damages.
Issue:
Does the wife have the standing to substitute her husband in an
election protest case?
Held:
No. Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property
which passes to his heirs. The heirs may no longer prosecute the
deceased protestee's counter-claim for damages against the protestant
for that was extinguished when death terminated his right to occupy
the contested office.
[7] MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et al. G.R.
No. 103903. September 11, 1992
Facts:
On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for
prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent RaulDaza, then incumbent
congressman, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office,
on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful
permanent resident of the United States since October 16,
1974.Petitioners allege that Mr.Daza has not renounced his status as
permanent resident.Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they
filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza
from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and that the instant petition
is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by respondent
Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member
of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code?
Held:
No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is
already moot and academic for the reason that petitioners seek to
unseat respondent from his position forthe duration of his term of
office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992.
Moreover the jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House
Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued
against respondent since his term has already expired. Furthermore
as a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse
funds disbursed during his term of office becaus e his acts are as valid
as those of a dejure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.
[8] DE LA VICTORIA VS. COMELEC
Facts:
The contenders for the Mayorship were De La Victoria, Mesina, and
Fian. Mesina was proclaimed Mayor and her running-mate, Cantiga, as
vice-mayor.
De la victoria filed a pre-proclamation case in the COMELEC. In the
meantime, Mesina died and was substituted by vice-mayor Cantiga
who assumed mayorship by operation of law.
On July 17, 1990, the trial court in the decision of the election protest
declared de la victoria as the duly elected mayor against the deceased
protestee.
244
The heirs of Mesina appealed to the COMELEC to restrain the trial
court from rendering the decision. However, the court denied the same
as it was the vice-mayor who assumed mayorship as the "real party in
interest"
De la victoria then filed a motion for execution of the decision. He
assumed office on August 8, 1990. COMELEC on appeal ruled in favor
of Mesina declared the writ of execution null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased protestee may be considered
a real party-in-interest even if the vice mayor has been allowed to
intervene and the protestant had waived his claim for damages.
Held:
No.
Mesina's claim to the contested office was not in any sense a
transmissible right that devolved upon her surviving heirs after death.
"Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which
passes to his heirs"
Private respondents' only interest in the outcome of the case is limited
to no more than their interest in defending her against the protestant's
claim for damages and costs.
[9] LIBANAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 112386, June 14, 1994
Facts:
Vice-Governor Libanan was charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of R.A. 3019. He was then suspended by the Sandiganbayan
for 90 days. Libanan then contends that the order of suspension, being
predicated on his acts supposedly committed while still a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is
the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor. The implementation of
the suspension order, he further claims, would amount to a deprivation
of property without due process of law. Is the contention tenable?
Held:
No, the contention is not tenable.
The term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the
officer charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the
particular office under which he was charged. Obviously, the
suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without
due process of law. Public office is "a public agency or trust," and it is
not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision which
petitioner invokes.
[10] THE GENERAL MANAGER OF PPA V. MONSERATE
G.R. No. 129616
April 17, 2002
Facts:
Monserate was appointed as Manager II of the Phil. Ports Authority
(PPA). However, her appointment was protested and was overturned
by the PPA Appeals Board on grounds which were not explained or
discussed in the Resolution. Monserate was then demoted to the
position of Administrative Officer and instead appointed Anino as
Manager II.
Issues:
a) Was the Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board proper?
b) If not, can Monserate recover backpay differentials?
Held:
On the Issue of the Propriety of the Resolution of the PPA Appeals
Board
No, the Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board is not
proper. The grounds are incomprehensible for lack of discussion
or explanation by the Board to enable Monserate to know the
reason for her demotion. The Resolution is void for lack of
evidence and proper notice to Monserate. Indeed, her demotion,
tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as Manager II, is
a patent violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure
and due process.
On the Issue of Backwages
Yes, Monserate can recover backpay differentials.
In fine, the rule is that where there is a de jure officer, a de
facto officer, during his wrongful incumbency, is not entitled to the
emoluments attached to the office, even if he occupied the office in
good faith.
In this respect, while Anino's appointment to the contested
position is void, he is nonetheless considered a de facto officer during
the period of his incumbency. Monserate is entitled only to backpay
differentials for the period starting from her assumption as
Administrative Officer up to the time of her actual reinstatement to her
rightful position as Manager II. Such backpay differentials pertain to
the difference between the salary rates for the positions of Manager II
and Administrative Officer. The same must be paid by Anino
corresponding from the time he wrongfully assumed the contested
position up to the time of his retirement.
[11] NAZARENO V. CITY OF DUMAGUETE
527 SCRA 509
Facts:
On October 25, 1999, pursuant to the Commission’s Accreditation
Program, the CSC issued Resolution No. 992411, which granted the
City Government of Dumaguete the authority to take final action on all
its appointments, subject to some conditions.
Acting on such resolution, outgoing Mayor Remollo, made fifteen (15)
promotional appointments, and seventy-four (74) original
appointments for various positions in the city government. However
upon assumption of the newly elect Mayor Perdices he dishonored the
appointments made by Remollo. He instructed the City Administrator,
to direct respondent City Assistant Treasurer to refrain from making
any cash disbursements for payments of petitioners' salary differentials
based on their new positions.
Leah M. Nazareno, et al, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a
Petition for Mandamus, Injunction and Damages against the City of
Dumaguete. On Aug. 1, 2001, Director Abucejo of the Civil Service
Commission Field Office (CSCFO) invalidated and revoked the
questioned appointments as they were issued in violation of the
guidelines set forth by the CSC Resolution No. 992411.
Petitioner now sought for nullification of CSC Resolution No. 010988
because the Commission is without authority to issue regulations
prohibiting mass appointments at the local government level.
Petitioners cite De Rama v. Court of Appeals which held that Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution is only applicable to the President or
Acting President. They claim that outgoing or defeated local appointing
authorities are authorized to make appointments of qualified
individuals until their last day in office, and that not all mass
appointments are invalid. Finally, petitioners claim that because
Dumaguete City had been granted authority to take "final action" on all
appointments, the Commission did not have any authority to
disapprove the appointments made by outgoing mayor Remollo.
In their Comment dated May 15, 2008, respondents argue that
petitioners’ appointments violated civil service rules and regulations
other than CSC Resolution No. 010988. Respondents also assert that
the Commission is authorized to invalidate the petitioners’
appointments, because the CSC accreditation program carried with it
the caveat that "said exercise of authority shall be subject to Civil
Service law, rules and regulations." Finally, respondents claim that
petitioners were guilty of forum shopping because the issues in this
case and in G.R. No. 177795 are the same.
Issue:
245
Is issuance of Resolution No. 992411 beyond the powers of the CSC?
Held:
No, it is still within the powers of CSC.
The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government,
has statutory authority to establish rules and regulations to promote
efficiency and professionalism in the civil service. Presidential Decree
No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the
powers of the Commission, including the power to issue rules and
regulations and to review appointments.
The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise
of such delegated authority are set out in the statutes, to wit: to
promote "economical, efficient, and effective personnel
administration."
It is true that there is no constitutional prohibition against the issuance
of "mass appointments" by defeated local government officials prior to
the expiration of their terms. Clearly, this is not the same as a
"midnight appointment," proscribed by the Constitution, which refers
to those appointments made within two months immediately prior to
the next presidential election.
Midnight appointment which is prohibited under the constitution only
applied in to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no
law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments
during the last days of his or her tenure. It cannot be applied to those
made by chief executives of local government units, as here. Indeed,
the prohibition is precisely designed to discourage, nay, even preclude,
losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan
purposes thereby depriving the incoming administration of the
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments in line with its
new policies.
It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the prohibition on
appointments before and after the elections. Appointments are banned
prior to the elections to ensure that partisan loyalties will not be a
factor in the appointment process, and to prevent incumbents from
gaining any undue advantage during the elections. To this end,
appointments within a certain period of time are proscribed by the
Omnibus Election Code and related issuances. After the elections,
appointments by defeated candidates are prohibited, except under the
circumstances mentioned in CSC Resolution No. 010988, to avoid
animosities between outgoing and incoming officials, to allow the
incoming administration a free hand in implementing its policies, and
to ensure that appointments and promotions are not used as a tool for
political patronage or as a reward for services rendered to the
outgoing local officials.
The Accreditation of Dumaguete City did not remove the CSC’s
authority to review appointments
We find that the authority granted by CSC Resolution No. 992411 to
the City Government of Dumaguete to "take final action" on all its
appointments did not deprive the Commission of its authority and duty
to review appointments. Indeed, Resolution No. 992411 states that
such exercise of authority shall be "subject to civil service law, rules
and regulations" and that appointments in violation of pertinent rules
"shall immediately be invalidated."
Moreover, Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides that notwithstanding the
initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled for
"violation of other existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations."
The CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments
and other personnel actions and that such power "includes the
authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of
applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations."
C. QUALIFICATIONS
[12] SJS V. PDEA
GR No. 157870, November 3, 2008
Facts:
These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36
of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for
public office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3)
officers and employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons
charged before the prosecutor’s office of a crime with an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.
The challenged section reads:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be
done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard
the quality of the test results. The drug testing shall employ, among
others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x
The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary
and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations
as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the
parents, undergo a random drug testing..
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas,
shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for
use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall
be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of
Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than
six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both
in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug
test.
Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.
Issue:
Are the said provisions of the law constitutional?
Held:
Section 36, par. c and d are constitutional while par. f and g are
unconstitutional.
The High Court held that sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 requiring
mandatory drug testing of students and officials and employees of
public and private offices are constitutional.
The Court, taking note of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the
country which threaten “the well-being of the people, particularly the
youth and school children who usually end up as victims,” stated that
until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a
random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools “is
not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and
interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of
the government, are to be promoted and protected.”
The Court, taking into account the reduced expectation of privacy on
the part of employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by
the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of random drug testing, held that the
challenged drug test requirement for those employed in public and
private offices is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and
constitutional.
246

On the other hand, In declaring sec. 36(g) unconstitutional the Court
said that the same “unmistakably requires a candidate for
senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-
condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for
senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be
voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed senator-elect,” adding
that the assailed provision of the law and the COMELEC Resolution
“add another layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.”
The Court also found no valid justification for mandatory drug testing
for persons accused of crimes, as required by sec. 36(f) of the law, as
a mandatory drug testing in the case of persons charged with a crime
before the prosecutor’s office “can never be random or suspicionless.”
“When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will,” said the Court. “To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to
the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would
violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced
to incriminate themselves.”
[13] MAQUERA VS BORRA
Facts:
Congress passed RA 4421 which requires "all candidates for national,
provincial, city and municipal offices" to "post a surety bond equivalent
to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a
candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national,
provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate,
except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes
cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate of candidacy,
there being not more than four (4) candidates for the same office.
Issue:
Is the law valid?
Held:
NO, for the following reasons:
a. The law invalidly prevents or disqualifies from running for
President, Vice-President, Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives those persons who, although having the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution therefor, can
not file the surety bond aforementioned, owing to failure to
pay the premium charged by the bonding company and/or
lack of the property necessary for said counterbond.
b. That said Republic Act No. 4421 has, likewise, the effect of
disqualifying for provincial, city or municipal elective offices,
persons who, although possessing the qualifications
prescribed by law therefor, cannot pay said premium and/or
do not have the property essential for the aforementioned
counter-bond
c. The law has the effect of imposing property qualifications in
order that a person could run for a public office and that the
people could validly vote for him
d. That said property qualifications are inconsistent with the
nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in
our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying
the same, for said political system is premised upon the
tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them, and this, in
turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be
voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the
individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes
equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that,
accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied
the chance to be elected to public office; and
e. That the bond required in Republic Act No. 4421 and the
confiscation of said bond are not predicated upon the
necessity of defraying certain expenses or of compensating
services given in connection with elections, and is, therefore,
arbitrary and oppressive.
[14] FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Frivaldo run as a governor in Sorsogon. Mr. Lee another candidate in
the place questioned the qualification of Frivaldo. Mr. Lee argues that
as a candidate, Frivaldo should already be a Filipino citizen because if
he is not then he cannot comply with the requirement that a candidate
must be a registered voter in the place he wishes to be elected. And to
be a registered voter one has to be first a Filipino citizen. In this case
Frivaldo was a stateless guy before and after he filed his COC, but he
reacquired his being a natural born on August 17, 1994. It is that date
when he filed his repatriation with the special committee on
naturalization and the same was favorably acted upon.
Issue:
Is the argument of Lee tenable?
Held:
No, The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of
the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be
possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a
registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to
reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct
from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen
first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included
as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the
need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a
voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law
states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be
emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective
official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote
actually. Hence, registration not the actual voting is the core of this
"qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this second
requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.
C. EFFECTS OF PARDON
[15] MONSANTO vs. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 78239. February 9, 1989
Facts:
Monsanto, an assistant treasurer of a City, was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents. While his case was on appeal, he was granted
absolute pardon by then President Marcos. By reason of said pardon,
petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same
was still vacant.
Issue:
Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the
Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment?
Held:
No. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no
amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by
the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation
to make reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required."
This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be
entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
Xxx we are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion
that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to
public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of
247
the conviction, although such pardon undoubtedly restores his
eligibility for appointment to that office.
Xxx Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it
cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required
for a new appointment.
D. APPOINTMENT; APPOINTMENT VS DESIGNATION VS
REASSIGNMENT; PERMANENT VS TEMPORARY
APPOINTMENTS; CAREER VS NON-CAREER SERVICE;
ROLE OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC); CAREER
EXECUTIVE SERVICE (CES)
[16] LUEGO VS. CSC
G.R. No. L-69137. August 5, 1986
Facts:
The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the
City Mayor, Cebu City. The appointment was described as "permanent"
but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary," subject
to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent
and another employee.
After protracted hearings the legality of which does not have to be
decided here, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified
than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly,
directed "that respondent Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position
of Administrative Officer II in the Administrative Division, Cebu City, in
place of petitioner Felimon Luego whose appointment as
Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked." The private respondent
was then subsequently appointed.
Issue:
Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than
the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, ordering his
replacement by the latter?
Held:
No. It is well settled that the determination of the kind of appointment
to be extended lies in the official vested by law with the appointing
power and not the Civil Service Commission. The CSC is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment
extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified
and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has
no choice but to attest to the appointment.
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide.
[17] Santiago v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 92284, [July 12, 1991]
Facts:
Santiago was employed as State Auditor of COA with a salary of 7.2k,
he was detailed to the MIAA. Later the BOD of MIAA designated him
as Assistant General Manager of Finance and Administration of the
MIAA, said position has a monthly salary of 13k. Santiago was given
the differential salary of 5k, which is the difference between the salary
of an Assistant General Manager and that of the State Auditor of COA.
When he retired, GSIS used as basis the amount of 13k in computing
his retirement benefits considering that this is the highest basic salary
received by Santiago. COA disagreed and paid his retirement benefits
on the basis of only his monthly salary of P7k as State Auditor IV. OSG
argued that petitioner cannot invoke Section 9 because he was not
appointed to the second position in the MIAA but only designated
thereto. It is stressed that under the said provision, "the compensation
of salary or pay which may be used in computing the retirement
benefits shall be received by an official employee as fixed by law and
or indicated in his duly approved appointment." |||
Issue:
Is the designation of Santiago to MIAA as Assitant General Manager
included in the term “appointment” so that 13k salary may be made as
basis for the payment of his retirement benefits?
Held:
Yes.
The term "appointment" was used in a general sense to include the
term "designation." In other words, no distinction was intended
between the two terms in Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966. We
think this to be the more reasonable interpretation, especially
considering that the provision includes in the highest salary rate
"compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity."
This need not always be conferred by a permanent appointment. A
contrary reading would, in our view, militate against the letter of the
law, not to mention its spirit as we perceive it. That spin it seeks to
extend the maximum benefits to the retiree as an additional if belated
recognition of his many years of loyal and efficient service in the
government.
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree
because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully
even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning
his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public
service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best
concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate
with the value and length of his services.
[18] PANGILINAN V. MAGLAYA,
G.R. No. 104216, August 20, 1993
Facts:
Petitioner joined the government service in 1966 as an agent of the
National Bureau of Investigation. He served the NBI for about twenty
(20) years and slowly rose to the position of Supervising Agent. After
the EDSA revolution, he was appointed as Executive Director of the
Land Transportation Office. In addition, he was designated as its
Resident Ombudsman.||| It was when petitioner seriously took his job
as Resident Ombudsman that he got into problems. He unearthed
corruptions in his office, including the notorious purchase of motor
vehicle non-reflective license plates. Feeling he will get the attentive
ear of his superiors, he called their attention to the stinking mess but
he was ignored. he called a press conference and blew the whistle on
what the press denounced as the license plate mess. He threatened to
file graft charges against his own superiors. The day after his expose,
he was unceremoniously relieved.
In this petition, Pangilinan prays for reinstatement on the ground that
no charge has been filed or proved against him to justify his
removal.||| OSG argues that his separation was valid since the position
of the Executive Director of the LTO is a career executive position and
the petitioner is not a career executive service official.
Issue:
Was Pangilinan removed from office without due process and just
cause in disregard of his constitutional security of tenure?
Held:
No. The separation of Pangilinan from office is valid.
Pangilinan was only an acting appointee because he did not have the
requisite qualifications; as such, he could not claim security of tenure.
This Court has repeatedly held that this guaranty is available only to
permanent appointees. Where a person holds his position at the
pleasure of a superior or subject to some supervening event, his
248
separation from office is not a removal. It is effected by the will of the
superior or by the happening of the contingency, resulting in another
and different mode of terminating officials relations known as
expiration of the term.|||
[19] PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR v THE COURT OF APEALS,
ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN
17 May 1993, G.R. No. 103125
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines passed Resolution No.
129, authorizing the Governor to purchase or expropriate property
contiguous to the provincial capitol site, for the purpose of establishing
a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops, and a
housing project for provincial government employees. Pursuant
thereto, Gov. Villfuerte filed expropriation cases against the San
Joaquins. The San Joaquins sought the dismissal of the case on the
ground of insufficiency of the offer and the nullification of the
resolution. The dismissal was denied. Upon appeal, however, the CA
mandated the province to first secure the approval of DAR to convert
the property from agricultural land to non-agricultural land, before it
can proceed with the expropriation.
Issue:
Must the LGU first seek the approval of DAR before it can expropriate
lands?
Held:
No, there is no need to seek prior approval.
LGUs do not have an inherent power of eminent domain and can only
exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. In
delegating power, the legislature retains certain control or impose
restraints on the exercise. Statutes conferring the power of eminent
domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by
implication.
B.P. Blg. 337 (Local Government Code at the time) does not provide
the need for LGUs to first secure the approval of the Department of
Land Reform, nor does the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
require for LGUs to submit expropriation cases under the review and
control of DAR.
[20] GEMILIANO LOPEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR V
CSC, HON DANILO LACUNA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS V-MAYOR
AND CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA
GR NO 87119, April 16, 1991
Facts:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Charter of City of Manila (RA 409),
the Vice Mayor (Presiding Officer of City of Manila), Danilo Lacuna,
submitted to the CSC the appointments of 19 officers and employees
in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer. The City
Budget Officer of Manila later seek for a recommendation on whether
the payroll of the newly appointed employees of the City Council may
be paid. Since, under RA 5185, the officers that are entirely paid out of
city funds and their respective assistants or deputies shall, subject to
civil service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the City Mayor
xxx and BP 337 the City Mayor shall: xxx h)appoint, in accordance
with civil service law, rules and regulations, all officers and employees
of the city, whose appointments are not otherwise provided in this
Code.
Issue:
In terms of appointment of the officers, which of the two laws will
prevail? The general law (RA 5185 and BP 337) or special law (RA
409)?
Held:
The special law, City Charter of Manila, RA 409 will prevail. There is no
doubt that Republic Act No. 409, which provides specifically for the
organization of the Government of the City of Manila, is a special law,
and whereas Republic Act No. 5185 and Batas Blg. 337, which apply to
municipal governments in general, are general laws. It is a canon of
statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law —
regardless of their dates of passage — and the special is to be
considered as remaining an exception to the general.
Every effort must be exerted to avoid conflict between statutes. If
reasonable construction is possible the laws must be reconciled.
Repeal by implication are not favored.
Also, as the CSC stated the provisions of Republic Act No. 5185, giving
mayors the power to appoint all officials "entirely paid out by city
funds14 and those of Batas Blg. 337, empowering local executives with
the authority to appoint "all officers and employees of the city,"15 were
meant not to vest the city mayors per se with comprehensive powers
but rather, to underscore the transfer of the power of appointment
over local officials and employees from the President to the local
governments and to highlight the autonomy of local governments.
They were not meant, however, to deprive the City Council of Manila
for instance, its appointing power granted by existing statute, and
after all, that arrangement is sufficient to accomplish the objectives of
both the Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that is,
to provide teeth to local autonomy.
[21] GENEROSO R. SEVILLA vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and NERITO L. SANTOS
G.R. No. 88498 June 9, 1992
RE: No security of tenure (holding of office is merely temporary)
Facts:
Petitioner Sevilla was appointed as Assistant City Engineer of Palayan
City which he discharged until he was designated Acting City
Engineer of Cabanatuan City by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. He
unhesitatingly assumed the latter position and discharged its functions
and responsibilities. During the People Power, the OIC Mayor of
Cabanatuan City appointed Santos as the new city engineer to which
the latter assumed the position of city engineer. On that very same
day, a memorandum informing Sevilla of the appointment of Santos
was sent by then OIC Mayor. As Sevilla was on leave at the time, the
memorandum was received on his behalf by Anita de Guzman, the
administrative officer of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) Office of Cabanatuan City, where petitioner-appellee Sevilla
also holds office.
A few months later, Sevilla was designated by then Minister Rogociano
Mercado of the MPWH as acting district engineer of Pasay City. Sevilla
served in that capacity until he was removed from that office of the
new Secretary of the DPWH by the new DPWH Secretary, forcing him
to return to the Cabanatuan City Engineer's Office which, however,
was already occupied by Nerito Santos.
Sevilla filed a petition for quo warranto against Santos.
Issue:
Does Sevilla has right to the disputed position as City Engineer and
therefore challenge the same in an action for quo warranto?
Held:
No. A mere designation does not confer security of tenure, as the
person designated occupies the position only in an acting capacity.
An "acting" appointment is merely temporary, one which is good only
until another appointment is made to take its place. Hence, petitioner's
right to hold office as "Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City" was
merely temporary. It lapsed upon the appointment of Nerito Santos as
the permanent city engineer of Cabanatuan City.
Sevilla was the incumbent city engineer of Palayan City when he was
designated as Acting City Engineering of Cabanatuan City. There is a
difference between an appointment and a designation. Appointment
is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of an office. Designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition of additional duties, upon a person
already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment or
election. A mere "designation" does not confer upon the designee
249
security of tenure in the position or office which he occupies in an
"acting" capacity only.
Consequently, the designation of Sevilla as Acting City Engineering of
Cabanatuan City merely imposed upon him the additional function of
the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City on top of his regular duties as
City Engineer of Palayan City. He may claim security of tenure as City
Engineer of Palayan City but he may not lay such a claim to the
position of City Engineering of Cabanatuan City for he holds no
appointment to the latter office.
The power of appointment is essentially discretionary. Its exercise may
not be controlled by the courts. The appointment of Santos by OIC
City Mayor was valid and binding for it was confirmed by the Minister
of Public Works and Highways, and approved by the Civil Service
Commission.
An action for quo warranto may be commenced by "a person claiming
to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held
or exercised by another". Sevilla does not aver that he is entitled to
the office of City Engineer of Cabanatuan City and that Nerito L.
Santos is a mere usurper of said office. Sevilla’s ouster upon, and by
virtue of, Santos' appointment as City Engineer of Cabanatuan City,
was not illegal for the former’s right to discharge the functions of
Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City was extinguished when a
permanent appointment to the same office was made in favor of
Engineer Nerito L. Santos.
[22] NAZARENO V. CITY OF DUMAGUETE
Facts:
Petitioners were all bona fide employees of the City Government of
Dumaguete. They were appointed to various positions by City Mayor
Felipe Antonio B. Remollo, Jr. (Remollo), shortly before the end of his
term.
The newly elected City Mayor Agustin Perdices (Perdices) announced
during the flag ceremony held at the City Hall that he was not
recognizing the appointments made by former Mayor Remollo.
Thereafter, City Administrator Dominador Dumalag, Jr. (Dumalag)
issued a Memorandum directing Assistant City Treasurer Erlinda
Tumongha (Tumongha) to "refrain from making any disbursements,
particularly payments for salary differentials" to those given
promotional appointments by former Mayor Remollo, which included
several of the petitioners.
Thus, petitioners were constrained to file with the RTC a Petition for
Mandamus with Injunction and Damages with Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against respondents
representing the City of Dumaguete. The Petition was docketed as
Civil Case No. 13013.
On the same day, Director II Fabio Abucejo (Abucejo) of the Civil
Service Commission Field Office (CSC-FO) invalidated and revoked the
appointments made by former Mayor Remollo
Petitioners then filed with the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII,
Cebu City, a Motion for Reconsideration of the same. The CSC-RO
promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners' Motion on the grounds
that it should have been filed with the CSC-FO. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the CSC-RO requesting
that petitioners' earlier Motion for Reconsideration be treated as an
appeal of CSC-FO Director Abucejo's letter. The CSC-RO dismissed
petitioners' appeal and affirmed the invalidation of petitioners'
appointments.
Petitioners elevated their case to the CSC Proper. The CSC issued
Resolution No. 040932 dismissing petitioners' appeal. The CSC
considered petitioners' appointments as "mass appointments"
unnecessarily made by an outgoing chief executive, which should be
disapproved or invalidated, under Item No. 3 of CSC Resolution No.
010988. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of CSC
Resolution No. 040932, but the same was denied by the CSC in
Resolution No. 050473.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Review. The Court of Appeals affirmed CSC Resolutions No. 040932
and No. 050473 being in accordance with CSC Resolution No. 010988,
which provided rules and guidelines geared to prevent the nefarious
practices of outgoing chief executives in making appointments before,
during, and/or after the regular local elections for ulterior partisan
motives
Petitioners next filed an appeal before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
181559, raising the issue of whether petitioners' appointments were
valid (This is not the case at hand; it was still pending).
Meanwhile, in their Petition in Civil Case No. 13013, petitioners applied
for the issuance by the RTC of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
respondents from further doing acts or issuing orders nullifying
petitioners' appointments. The RTC issued an Order dated 3 August
2001 granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondents. Respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order dated 3 August 2001 but was denied.
Subsequently, Respondents filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. 13013.
The RTC issued an Order dated 26 September 2001 permanently lifting
the writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of such RTC Order was denied by the said trial court.
Petitioners then assailed the RTC Order before the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70254.
In the meantime, on 18 January 2002, the RTC ordered a contingent
suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 13013 until after the
Court of Appeals has resolved CA-G.R. SP No. 70254
Subsequently, on 2 October 2002, petitioners filed with the RTC a
Manifestation and Motion ad Cautelam seeking the resumption of the
trial on their main Petition and the declaration that respondents were
already in default for failure to file an Answer. Respondents, on 5
November 2002, then finally filed their Answer to the Petition in Civil
Case No. 13013. The RTC denied petitioners' motion to declare
respondents in default and admitted respondents' Answer but the
appellate court reversed the RTC Orders and declared respondents in
default
Given that the Court of Appeals found respondents to be in default in
Civil Case No. 13013, the RTC allowed petitioners, in the proceedings a
quo, to present their evidence ex-parte on the issues of mandamus
and damages.
In a Decision dated 27 March 2007 in Civil Case No. 13013, the RTC
dismissed petitioners' Petition, insofar as it concerns their prayers for
the issuance of a writ of mandamus and for the award of damages. On
the prayer for the writ of mandamus, it would not lie against
respondents when petitioners' rights to the positions and the
corresponding benefits thereof remained unclear. The Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision was denied by RTC in an Order dated
26 April 2007.
Unsatisfied with the judgment of the RTC, petitioners filed this present
Petition for Certiorari before the SC assailing the Decision 1 dated 27
March 2007 and Order dated 26 April 2007.
Issue:
Are the petitioners entitled to the issuance of writ of mandamus
ordering respondents to pay petitioners' salaries, salary adjustments,
and other emoluments, from 28 September 2001 until SC finally
resolves the issue of the validity of petitioners' appointments?
Held:
No
The remedy of mandamus is available only to compel the performance
of a ministerial duty
250
While it is true that it is the ministerial duty of the government to pay
for the appointees' salaries while the latter's appeal of the disapproval
of their appointments by CSC-FO and/or CSC-RO is still pending before
the CSC Proper, this applies only when the said appointments have
been disapproved on grounds which do not constitute a violation of
civil service law. Such is clearly not the case in the instant Petition
The factual circumstances that would have made it the
ministerial duty of the City Government of Dumaguete to pay
petitioners' salaries have not yet been established. Until this
Court resolves the Petition in G.R. No. 181559, reversing the
disapproval of petitioners' appointments or at the very least declaring
that the disapproval of the same was not on grounds that constitute
violation of civil service law, this Court cannot rule in the instant
Petition that it was the ministerial duty of the City Government of
Dumaguete to pay petitioners' salaries during the pendency — before
the CSC-RO, then the CSC Proper — of petitioners' appeal of the
disapproval of their appointments by CSC-FO Director Abucejo. Thus,
there is yet no ministerial duty compellable by a writ of mandamus.
Rule:
If the appointment was disapproved on grounds which do not
constitute a violation of civil service law, Section 3, Rule VI of the
Revised Omnibus Rules categorically recognizes the right of the
appointee to payment of salaries from the government, during
the pendency of his motion for reconsideration or appeal of
the disapproval of his appointment by the CSC-FO and/or
CSC-RO before the CSC Proper
But if the appointment was disapproved for violation of civil
service law, Section 4, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Action states that it is the
appointing authority who will be personally liable for the salary of the
appointee
Since petitioners' right to the payment of their salaries by the City
Government of Dumaguete is still unsettled at this point, the Court
cannot issue a writ of mandamus against respondents to make such
payment. Mandamus applies only when the petitioner's right is
founded clearly on law and not when it is doubtful. The writ will not
issue to compel an official to give to the applicant anything to which he
is not entitled by law. Mandamus will not issue to establish a right, but
only to enforce one that is already established.
[23] OSEA V. MALAYA
Facts:
Osea, (OIC, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent — Camarines
Sur), filed a protest with the CSC claiming that the appointment of
Malaya as Schools Division Superintendent — Camarines Sur was
invalid in the absence of prior consultation with the Provincial School
Board mandated by Section 99 of the Local Government Code. She
sought to declare the appointment be set aside for being null and void.
“Sec. 99. Functions of Local School Boards. — The provincial,
city or municipal school board shall:
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall consult
the local school boards on the appointment of division
superintendents, district supervisors, school principals, and
other school officials.”
The CSC found that Malaya was merely reassigned, and not appointed
by the DECS Secretary. Thus, the CSC dismissed the protest and ruled
that the consultation with the local school board was unnecessary.
On review, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, hence the
petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Is the recommendation from the provincial school boards required
before the designation of Malaya?
Held:
Petition DENIED; NO; The designation of Malaya was only a
reassignment and not an appointment.
Section 99 of the Local Government Code requiring prior
consultation with the local school board in the appointment of division
superintendents, district supervisors, school principals and other school
officials, does not apply to reassignments.This is the plain
meaning of the law.
In Osea’s situation: the DECS appointed Osea as OIC, Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent — Camarines Sur, with the
recommendation from the Provincial School Board. (following Sec. 99)
In Malaya’s situation: the President appointed Malaya as the Schools
Division Superintendent but did not specify the station. It was the
DECS that later on assigned and designated Malaya to Camarines Sur.
The SC held this to be a ‘reassignment’. Malaya’s designation partook
of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City, where she previously
exercised her functions as OIC, Schools Division Superintendent —
Camarines Sur.
An appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions
of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless
he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
A reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which
does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not
require the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a
designation connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an
incumbent official.
E. NEXT IN RANK RULE
[24] SANTIAGO VS. CSC
G.R. No. 81467, October 27, 1989
Facts:
Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada appointed Santiago from
Collector of Customs I to Collector of Customs III. Respondent Jose, a
Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems Promotion
Board against Santiago's promotional appointment mainly on the
ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of
Customs III. The Board decided to revoke Santiago's appointment and
directed that Jose be appointed in his stead. The Civil Service
Commission affirmed the Board Resolution. The Commission ruled
that respondent Jose has far better qualifications in terms of
educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars and
training courses taken. It added that the Commission is empowered to
administer and enforce the merit system as mandated by the
Constitution and to approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service. Thus, Santiago appealed.
Issue:
Should Santiago's promotional appointment be upheld?
Held: Yes.
There is "no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the Civil
Service Law that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in
appointment. What it does provide is that they would be among the
first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is
not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other
modes of appointment."
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for
promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that
he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested
right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing
authority to promote such person to the next higher position.
251

The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power
has a wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the
position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a
rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law
that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is
granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit
for appointment.
True, the Commission is empowered to approve all appointments,
whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate
eligibility or required qualification. However, "all the commission is
actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses
the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If
he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No
other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission
when it acts on, or as the decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an
appointment made by the proper authorities. ...To be sure, it has no
authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed
that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have
constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the
appointing authority."
There is no reason to disturb Santiago's promotional appointment. The
minimum qualifications and the standard of merit and fitness have
been adequately satisfied as found by the appointing authority. The
latter has not been convincingly shown to have committed any grave
abuse of discretion.
F. DISCRETION OF APPOINTING AUTHORITY
[25] LAPINID vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE
PORTS AUTHORITY and JUANITO JUNSAY
G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991
Facts:
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports
Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila
International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This
appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private
respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations
with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the
decision of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He
contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any
other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission finds
the appeal meritorious. It is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay
(79.5) and Villegas (79) have an edge over that of protestees Lapinid
(75) and Dulfo (78).
Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito
Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG
18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who
may be considered for appointment to any position commensurate and
suitable to their qualifications, and that the Commission be notified
within ten (10) days of the implementation hereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has the authority to
remove Lapinid and replace him with other persons which it deems
qualified.
Held:
Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals, this Court said:
The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of
this nature, according to Luego, is to review the appointment
in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law, and
when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal
requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice
but to attest to the appointment. Luego finally points out that
the recognition by the Commission that both the appointee
and the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy
renders it functus officio in the case and prevents it from
acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the
former's appointment; it has no authority to revoke the
appointment simply because it considers another employee to
be better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment
on the discretion vested in the appointing authority.
The determination of who among several candidates for a
vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the
sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing
authority and not in the Civil Service Commission. Every
particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal
qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of
academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc.,
may be valuable but so are such intangibles as
resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty,
ambition, prospects for the future, and best interests of the
service. Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it
best should be left to the Head of the Office concerned
provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied.
The Civil Service Commission cannot substitute its judgment
for that of the Head of Office in this regard.
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot
compel. While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the
subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee - taking into
account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract
qualities that define his personality - is the prerogative of the
appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion
of the appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil
Service Commission has no power to review under the Constitution
and the applicable laws.
Commenting on the limits of the powers of the public respondent,
Luego declared:
It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by the language of
Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil Service Decree because it says the
Commission has the power to "approve" and "disapprove"
appointments. Thus, it is provided therein that the Commission shall
have inter alia the power to:
9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those
presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess
appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. (Emphasis
supplied)
However, a full reading of the provision, especially of the underscored
parts, will make it clear that all the Commission is actually allowed to
do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate
civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his
appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is
permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on—
or as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves'—an appointment
made by the proper authorities.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
respondent Civil Service Commission dated February 14, 1990, May 25,
1990, August 17, 1990, and October 19, 1990, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated December 13, 1990, is
made PERMANENT. No costs.
G. DOCTRINE OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
[26] FAROLAN V. SOLMAC MARKETING
March 13, 1991
Facts
252
Ramon Farolan was the Acting Commissioner of Customs.
Solmac Marketing Corporation is the assignee, transferee, and owner
of polypropylene film, which it wanted to be imported. However, upon
arrival of said imported goods, Farolan withheld the release of the
subject importation because the shipment was different from what had
been authorized by the BOI and by law. Farolan seeked advice from
BOI as to whether said imported products may be released.
Unfortunately, BOI took years before it gave an advice to release said
products. Farolan was sued for damages because the delay caused
business losses on the part of Solmac Marketing.
Issue
Can Farolan be sued as an official performing his functions?
Held
No, Farolan can still shield under the Doctrine of Official Immunity; He
still enjoys the presumption of Good Faith in the performance of his
functions as an officer.
Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable
absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith. After all, "even under the law of
public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the
presumption of good faith.
Farolan is not personally liable because he acted in good faith (he
merely relied on the findings of DOST regarding the nature of the
imported goods; and it was BOI who delayed and not Farolan).
Prudence dictated that petitioners first obtain from the BOI the latter's
definite guidelines regarding the disposition of the various importations
of oriented polypropylene (OPP) and polypropylene (PP) then being
withheld at the Bureau of Customs. These cellophane/film products
were competing with locally manufactured polypropylene and oriented
polypropylene as raw materials which were then already sufficient to
meet local demands, hence, their importation was restricted, if not
prohibited under LOI 658-B. Consequently, the petitioners can not be
said to have acted in bad faith in not immediately releasing the import
goods without first obtaining the necessary clarificatory guidelines
from the BOI. As public officers, the petitioners had the duty to see to
it that the law they were tasked to implement, i.e., LOI 658-B, was
faithfully complied with.
[27] Lansang v. CA
Facts:
Private respondents were allegedly awarded a "verbal
contract of lease" by the National Parks Development Committee
(NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the
development of national parks, including Rizal Park, but actually
administered by high profile civic leaders and journalists. Whoever in
NPDC gave such "verbal" accommodation to private respondents was
unclear, for indeed no document or instrument appears on record to
show the grantor of the verbal license to private respondents to
occupy a portion of the government park dedicated to the national
hero's memory.
Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as
well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. With the
change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new
Chairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal
Park. In a written notice, petitioner terminated the so-called verbal
agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the
premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park.
The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI
president, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents. However,
Iglesias, who is totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing
the notice. He was allegedly told the chief warden of Rizal Park, that
he was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind,
Iglesias as president was knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well
as its business. On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an
action for damages and injunction in the RTC against petitioner,
Villanueva, and "all persons acting on their behalf."
Issue:
1. Should the complaint filed be dismissed on the ground of
immunity of the state from suit?
2. Was there abuse of authority on the part of petitioner?
Held:
Doctrine of state immunity
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed
against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties.
The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state
where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official
concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as
appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to
the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is
charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious
to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their
personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad
faith.
Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not
in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public
position.
The court is convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity
as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. The complaint filed by
private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as
chairman of the NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being
sued in that capacity. Also, it is evident from said complaint that
petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering
the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
Was there abuse of authority on the part of petitioner?
There is no evidence of abuse of authority on record. Rizal Park is
beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of a
lease contract. Admittedly, there was no written contract. That private
respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the
park was only a matter of accommodation by the previous
administrator. This being so, also admittedly, petitioner may validly
discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who
may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents
cannot and does not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal
Park.
H. THREE-FOLD LIABILITY RULE
[28] GOVERNOR SAN LUIS et al., v COURT OF APPEALS and
BERROYA, JR.
June 26, 1989
Facts:
Berroya had been the quarry superintendent in the Province of Laguna
since 1959. In 1973, he denounced graft and corrupt practices by
employees of the provincial government of Laguna which led to the
filing of criminal and administrative cases against some officials.
Thereafter, Gov. San Luis issued Office Order No. 72 transferring
Berroya to the office of the Provincial Engineer. Berroya challenged
said transfer and the Civil Service Commission ruled the same invalid
and ordered that Berroya be reverted to his regular position of quarry
superintendent. Instead of complying with the CSC directive, San Luis
suspended Berroya for alleged gross discourtesy, inefficiency and
insubordination. The CSC reiterated its directive and the governor
appealed to the Office of the President. In the interim, San Luis issued
an Order dismissing Berroya for alleged neglect of duty, frequent
unauthorized absences, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of duty
and abandonment of office. CSC declared the dismissal unjustified. The
trial court upheld the validity of the dismissal. However, it ordered
Berroya’s reinstatement to an equivalent position as a matter of equity.
An appeal to the CA was resolved in Berroya’s favor.
Issue:
Can the governor be held personally liable for the payment of
Berroya’s back salaries and damages?
253

Held:
Yes. It is well-settled that when a public officer goes beyond the scope
of his duty, particularly when acting tortuously, he is not entitled to
protection on account of his office, but is liable for his acts like any
private individual.
Thus, in Mendoza v. De Leon, it was held: Nor are officers or agents of
the Government charged with the performance of governmental duties
which are in their nature legislative or quasi-judicial liable for the
consequences of their official acts, unless it be shown that they act
willfully and maliciously and with the express purpose of inflicting
injury upon the plaintiff.
In this case, the provincial governor obstinately refused to reinstate
the petitioner, in defiance of the orders of the Office of the President
and the Ministry of Local Government and in palpable disregard of the
opinion of the Civil Service Commission, the appellate court's finding of
bad faith cannot be faulted.
I. LIABILITY OF SUPERIOR OFFICERS FOR ACTS OF
SUBORDINATES
[29] ARIAS VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Accused Amado C. Arias was the Auditor of Rizal Engineering District,
Pasig, Metro Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit the
acquisition as well as the payment of lands needed for the Mangahan
Floodway Project. Arias was accused of overpricing the said land to be
purchased by the government by falsifying documents stating that the
and costs P80 / sqm. And that it is a residential land, where in truth
and in fact, the land was merely a rice field with a value of P5.00 /
sqm. It was alleged that the government spent P1,520,320.00 when
the actual price was P92,020.00 only
Issue:
Whether petitioner is liable for graft and corruption?
Held:
NO. The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square
meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would be a fair evaluation. The value
must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a competent
court. We are certain, however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square
meter. Hence, the decision, insofar as it says that the "correct"
valuation is P5.00 per square meter and on that basis convicted that
petitioners of causing undue injury, damage, and prejudice to the
Government because of gross overpricing, is grounded on shaky
foundations.
There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction
where no proof adduced during orderly proceedings has been
presented and accepted.
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all
too common problems-dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork,
multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is suddenly
swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not
personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step
from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in
a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final approving
authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that documents
used in the negotiated sale were falsified. A key tax declaration had a
typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The
registration stampmark was antedated and the land reclassified as
residential instead of ricefield. But were the petitioners guilty of
conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing
undue in injury and damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records,
inspected documents, received procedures, and questioned persons. It
is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all
these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court
would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to
a reasonable extent 'on their subordinates and on the good faith of
those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a
department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not
ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill,
question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire
whether the correct amount of food was served and otherwise
personally look into the reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety,
and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should
examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small
government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of
papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters
and supporting paper that routinely pass through his hands. The
number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.
As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on
record shows that as the then District Engineer of the Pasig
Engineering District he created a committee, headed by Engr. Priscillo
Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz,
Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district office, as
members, specifically to handle the Mangahan Floodway Project,
gather and verify documents, conduct surveys, negotiate with the
owners for the sale of their lots, process claims and prepare the
necessary documents; he did not take any direct and active part in the
acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway; it was the committee
which determined the authenticity of the documents presented to
them for processing and on the basis thereof prepared the
corresponding deed of sale; thereafter, the committee submitted the
deed of sale together with the supporting documents to petitioner
Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified documents
which appeared regular and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as
head of the office and the signing authority at that level, merely signed
but did not approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G) as the approval
thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works; he
thereafter transmitted the signed deed of sale with its supporting
documents to Director Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who in
turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public Works;
the deed of sale was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works
after a review and re-examination thereof at that level; after the
approval of the deed of sale by the higher authorities the covering
voucher for payment thereof was prepared which petitioner Data
signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had never met her
during the processing and payment of her claims.
[30] ALFONSO V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
GR NO. 150091
APRIL 2, 2007
Facts:
Alfonso, then the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, was
held administratively liable for acquiescing to the change of an Original
Certificate of Title. The date of OCT no. 994 was changed from May 3,
1917 to April 19, 1917. She also made it appear that there was two
OCT Nos. 994. Thus, she was dismissed from government service on
the grounds of grave misconduct and dishonesty.
Alfonso was investigated by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) upon the request of Phil-Ville Development Corporation (Phil-
Ville) who purchased some parts of the land. Phil-Ville’s letter-
complaint led to the conduct of an inquiry of the Senate Committees
on Justice and Human Rights, and on Urban Planning, Housing and
Resettlement which finds that Alfonso acted maliciously, fraudulently
and in bad faith recommending the filing of the administrative cases
against her and her conspirators.
The Office of the President subsequently dismissed Alfonso.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Alfonso. This eventually resulted to
the petition contending that her right to due process was violated.
Issues:
1. Is she liable for the acts of her subordinate?
2. Was Alfonso’s right to due process violated?
254

Held:
1. Yes.
In the case at bar, Alfonso was charged not for changing the dates of
registration but rather on the fact that she acquiesced to the following:
1. Issuing conflicting certifications on the date of the
issuance of OCT 994
2. For making it appear that there were two OCT 994.
Thus, her protestations that she had no hand in the alteration are
unavailing. The fact that it was only her subordinates who prepared
the records do not negate the fact that she has the opportunity to
check the correctness of the entries before approving the titles.
2. No.
In Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, SC laid down the cardinal
and primary requirements of due process in administrative
proceedings:
a. Right to a hearing
b. Right to represent one’s case
c. Right to submit evidence in support.
The essence of the right to due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or to
seek a reconsideration of the action or the ruling
complained of.
As observed by the CA, Alfonso was given every opportunity to explain
her side and to present evidence in her defense during the
administrative investigation conducted by the LRA. Records sufficiently
show that in compliance with the show-cause letter of the LRA
Administrator, she submitted her written explanation, and that during
the pre-trial conferences, she presented documentary evidence.
Likewise, the quantum of proof required in an administrative
proceeding is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when
there is a reasonable ground to believe that the person indicted was
responsible for the alleged wrongdoing or misconduct.
[31] CESA VS COMELEC
Facts:
Government auditors conducted a surprise audit at the Cash
Division of Cebu City Hall. Getting wind of the surprise audit,
paymaster Rosalina G. Badana hurriedly left her office and, since then,
never returned. For a long time, Badana had cash advances of more
than P216 million fraudulently incurred by presenting cash items such
as payrolls and vouchers already previously credited to her account to
cover the balance or shortage during cash counts. Her unliquidated
cash advances were more than P18 million. The government auditors
discovered that Badana had an average monthly cash advance of P7.6
million in excess of her monthly payroll of P5.7 million, and was
granted more advances without liquidating previous advances.
City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia administratively charged Badana
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Cesa argued before the
Ombudsman that he could not grant cash advances as the authority
belongs to a higher officer and that he signed the cash advance vouchers
not as approving officer but because his signature was required therein. He
also emphasized that since he had under him five department heads, he
was not expected to review the work of some 370 workers under them, by
virtue of division of labor and delegation of functions.
Ombudsman found Cesa and the other city officials guilty of
neglect of duty and meted to them the penalty of six months
suspension without pay. The Court of Appeals upheld the findings and
conclusions of the Ombudsman, but declared that the imposable
penalties therein were merely recommendatory and should be directed
to the proper officer or authority concerned for enforcement.
Invoking Arias, Cesa insists he could rely on his
subordinate, the head of the cash division, who performed her
functions well, and that no inference of negligence can be
drawn from the act of relying on subordinates as government
operates by division of labor and delegation of functions.
Issue: Whether Cesa could rely on his subordinate, the head of the
cash division to warrant the notion that there was no negligence on his
part.
Held:
NO. In Alfonso v. Office of the President, where this Court held
that Arias was not applicable, we ruled that a public officials
foreknowledge of facts and circumstances that suggested an
irregularity constitutes an added reason to exercise a greater degree of
circumspection before signing and issuing public documents. By failing
to prevent the irregularity that Cesa had reason to suspect all along or
to take immediate steps to rectify, Cesa had tolerated the same and
allowed it to wreak havoc on the coffers of the city.
[32] SANTILLANO vs PEOPLE
Facts:
Santillano was charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Sandiganbayan finds the accused Santillano GUILTY as charged.
However, Santillo questioned the decision of the Sandiganbayan
contending that it erred in convicting him he is a private person and
not a public officer.
Issue:
W/N Santillo can be convicted of the crime charged.
Held:
(1) Santillano claims that the Sandiganbayan added an element to the
crime charged. The Sandiganbayan allegedly added the phrase or
a private person charged in conspiracy with the public officer to
the law in order to have a legal basis in holding him liable. The
assertion completely lacks merit.
The relevant provision of RA 3019 states:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply
to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions. x x x
While the afore-quoted provision does not contain a reference to
private individuals, it must be read in conjunction with the following
sections also of RA 3019:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals.
xxxx
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
to induce or cause any public official to commit
any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
Section 9. Penalties for violations.(a) Any public
officer or private person committing any of the
unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections
3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than one year nor more
255
 than ten years, perpetual disqualification from
public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor
of the Government of any prohibited interest and
unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to
his salary and other lawful income. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly, the law punishes not only public officers who commit
prohibited acts enumerated under Sec. 3, but also those who
induce or cause the public official to commit those offenses.
This is supported by Sec. 9, which includes private persons as liable for
violations under Secs. 3, 4, 5, and 6.
(2) Santillano argues too that there was no evidence that he
conspired with his co-accused. He cites as basis the Sandiganbayans
statement that there was no proof of actual agreement among the
accused to commit violations of RA 3019.
Proof of conspiracy need not be direct or actual. Indeed,
prosecutors would be hard-pressed to secure a conviction for those
charged under RA 3019 if direct evidence were required to be
established. Rule 133 of the Rules of Court on circumstantial evidence
applies to this case. It states:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when
sufficient.Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain
that leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, that is, the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.[21]
In petitioners case, the finding of conspiracy is not unfounded.
In all three criminal cases, the prosecution was able to establish that
Ecleo, Jr. and Navarra approved of overpayments made to Santillano.
The Sandiganbayan did not give much weight to their weak defense of
alibi.
In relation to Arias Doctrine
What is more, it correctly ruled that the doctrine in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan[22] could not be used by Ecleo, Jr. to escape liability, as
the documents he had to approve were not so voluminous so as to
preclude him from studying each one carefully.
On the contrary, if he had the best interest of his constituents in mind,
he should have examined all the project documents, as a good deal of
taxpayers money was involved. Navarras alibi was also not enough to
acquit her. She was not precluded from signing the documents relating
to the subject projects while she was on leave. She also did not
establish any proof that her signatures were forged. Worse, both
Ecleo, Jr. and Navarra were parties to an agreement that approved
disbursement of funds for a bogus municipal guest house and they
could not come up with a plausible justification for such a gaffe.
Santillano, on the other hand, was indisputably on the receiving end of
the overpayments and even issued receipts for them. He was unable
to justify the excessive payments by showing a written agreement with
the municipality pursuant to the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of PD 1594. All these undeniable circumstances lead to the logical
conclusion that all three accused acted in a concerted effort to, as the
Sandiganbayan put it, deprive the government of its much-needed
funds.
Also worthy to note is the futile attempt of Ecleo, Jr. to
evade liability by initiating a suit against Santillano in 1995. The case
was allegedly settled through a compromise agreement covering PhP
2,856,396.87, but Santillano denied being a party to it. It appears that
Ecleo, Jr. sought to cover up his role in the irregular disbursement of
government funds by trying to belatedly have Santillano prosecuted.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that this only proved that the audit
team correctly made a finding of overpayment, a finding Ecleo, Jr.
could not dispute.
[33] BACASMAS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 189343. July 10, 2013
Facts:
All the petitioners work for the City Government of
Cebu. Benilda B. Bacasmas (Bacasmas), the Cash Division Chief, Alan
C. Gaviola (Gaviola), the City Administrator, and Eustaquio B. Cesa
(Cesa), the City Treasurer.
By virtue of their positions, they are involved in the process
of approving and releasing cash advances for the City. The procedure
is as follows:
A written request for a cash advance is made by paymaster Luz
Gonzales (Gonzales), who then submits it to Cash Division Chief
Bacasmas for approval. Once the latter approves the request, she
affixes her initials to the voucher, which she forwards to City Treasurer
Cesa for his signature in the same box. By signing, Bacasmas and Cesa
certify that the expense or cash advance is necessary, lawful, and
incurred under their direct supervision.
Thereafter, the voucher is forwarded to City Accountant Edna C. Jaca
(Jaca) for processing and pre-audit. She also signs the voucher to
certify that there is adequate available funding/budgetary allotment;
that the expenditures are properly certified and supported by
documents; and that previous cash advances have been liquidated and
accounted for. She then prepares an Accountant's Advice (Advice).
This Advice is returned with the voucher to the Chief Cashier for the
preparation of the check. After it has been prepared, she affixes her
initials to the check, which Cesa then signs. Afterwards, City
Administrator Gaviola approves the voucher and countersigns the
check.
The voucher, the Advice, and the check are then returned to the Cash
Division, where Gonzales signs the receipt portion of the voucher, as
well as the Check Register to acknowledge receipt of the check for
encashment.
Upon receipt of the check, Gonzales encashes it at the bank, signs the
voucher, and records the cash advance in her Individual Paymaster
Cashbook. She then liquidates it within five days after payment.
A report of those cash advances liquidated by Gonzales is called a
Report of Disbursement (RD). An RD must contain the audit voucher
number, the names of the local government employees who were paid
using the money from the cash advance, the amount for each
employee, as well as the receipts. The RDs are examined and verified
by the City Auditor and are thereafter submitted to the Cash Division
for recording in the official cash book.
On 4 March 1998, COA issued Office Order No. 98-001
creating a team to conduct an examination of the cash and accounts
of the accountable officers of the Cash Division, City Treasurer's Office
of Cebu City. This team conducted a surprise cash count on 5 March
1998. The examination revealed an accumulated shortage of
P9,810,752.60 from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998 from the
cash and accounts of Gonzales. The team found that Bacasmas,
Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca failed to follow the above-mentioned
procedure, thus facilitating the loss of more than nine million pesos on
the part of the city government. Specifically, the team said in its report
that there were irregularities in the grant, utilization, and liquidation of
cash advances; shortages were concealed; and inaccurate and
misleading pieces of information were included in the financial
statements. These irregularities were manifested in the following:
additional cash advances were granted even if previous cash advances
had not yet been liquidated, cash advance vouchers for salaries were
not supported by payrolls or lists of payees, and cash advances for
salaries and wages were not liquidated within five days after each 15th
day or end-of-the-month pay period.
256
 The report stated that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca
not only signed, certified, and approved the cash advance vouchers,
but also signed and countersigned the checks despite the deficiencies,
which amounted to a violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160;
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1445; and the circulars issued by the
Commission on Audit (COA), specifically COA Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-
382 and 97-002. According to the COA, the violation of the foregoing
laws, rules, and regulations facilitated the loss of a huge amount of
public funds at the hands of Gonzales.
Hence, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on
30 July 2001 against Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca for conniving
and confederating together and mutually helping with each other [sic],
with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and
with gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there allow LUZ M.
GONZALES, Accountant I, Disbursing Officer-Designate of the Cebu
City Government, to obtain cash advances despite the fact that she
has previous unliquidated cash advances, thus allowing LUZ M.
GONZALES to accumulate Cash Advances amounting to P9,810,752.60
which remains unliquidated, thus accused in the performance of their
official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to LUZ M.
GONZALES and themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the
government, particularly the Cebu City Government.
The Sandiganbayan, found that the accused, as public
officers, had acted with gross inexcusable negligence by religiously
disregarding the instructions for preparing a disbursement voucher and
by being totally remiss in their respective duties and functions
under the Local Government Code of 1991. Their gross inexcusable
negligence amounted to bad faith, because they still continued with
the illegal practice even if they admittedly had knowledge of the
relevant law and COA rules and regulations. The Sandiganbayan held
that the acts of the accused had caused not only undue injury to the
government because of the P9,810,752.60 shortage, but also gave
unwarranted benefit to Gonzales by allowing her to obtain cash
advances to which she was not entitled. Lastly, it found conspiracy to
be present in the acts and omissions of the accused showing that they
had confederated, connived with, and mutually helped one another in
causing undue injury to the government through the loss of public
money.
Issue:
Are the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of confederating,
conniving with, and mutually helped one another in causing undue
injury to the government through the loss of public money by allowing
Luz M. Gonzales, disbursing officer, to accumulate Cash Advances
amounting to P9,810,752.60 which remains unliquidated?
Held:
Petitioners committed gross negligence amounting to bad faith
when they approved and disbursed the cash advances in violation of
law and rules and regulations.
Petitioners — being the Cash Division Chief, City Treasurer and City
Administrator — have to comply with R.A. 7160, P.D. 1445, and COA
Circulars 90-331, 92-382, and 97-002 on the proper procedure for the
approval and grant of cash advances. These laws and rules and
regulations state that cash advances can only be disbursed for a
legally authorized specific purpose and cannot be given to officials
whose previous cash advances have not been settled or properly
accounted for. Cash advances should also be equal to the net amount
of the payroll for a certain pay period, and they should be supported
by the payroll or list of payees and their net payments.
When he testified before the anti-graft court, Bacasmas admitted
that she did not consider the net pay, which was lower than the
amount requested, when she affixed her signature to the vouchers,
because it was supposedly common practice for the paymaster to
round off the figures. Furthermore, she signed the vouchers after
relying on the representation of Jaca, Cesa, and Gaviola.
During his direct and cross-examination, Gaviola admitted that he
had affixed his signature to the vouchers, because they had already
been signed by Bacasmas, Cesa, and Jaca despite the incompleteness
thereof — the periods covered by the vouchers were not stated; the
employees who were to be paid by the cash advance were not
specified; no supporting documents were attached to the cash
advances requested; and there was no determination of whether the
amounts requested were equivalent to the net pay.
Cesa said that because it was impossible for him to supervise all the
personnel, he instructed Bacasmas to examine and check the
documents before signing them. Thus, once Cesa saw the signature of
Bacasmas, he immediately assumed that the documents were in order,
and he then signed the vouchers.
These facts show that petitioners failed to act in accordance
with their respective duties in the grant of cash advances. Moreover
they repeatedly failed to do so. Bacasmas signed 294 requests for
cash advance, 11 disbursement vouchers, and 7 checks. Cesa signed
cash advance requests and 299 disbursement vouchers. Gaviola
approved 303 disbursement vouchers and signed 355 checks. SDEITC
All these acts demonstrate that petitioners, as correctly
found by the Sandiganbayan, were guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith. Gross and inexcusable negligence is
characterized by a want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation in which there is a duty to act — not inadvertently,
but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons are affected. Bad faith does
not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill
will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Petitioners were well aware of their responsibilities before
they affixed their signatures on the cash advance vouchers. Yet, they
still chose to disregard the requirements laid down by law and rules
and regulations by approving the vouchers despite the incomplete
information therein, the previous unliquidated cash advances, the
absence of payroll to support the cash requested, and the disparity
between the requested cash advances and the total net pay. What is
worse is that they continue to plead their innocence, allegedly for the
reason that it was "common practice" in their office not to follow the
law and rules and regulations to the letter. For them to resort to that
defense is preposterous, considering that as public employees they are
required to perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree
of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. The law and the
rules are clear and do not provide for exceptions.
Petitioners' acts show that they were unified in illegally approving
irregular cash advance vouchers in order to defraud the government.
As found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners' acts not only
show gross negligence amounting to bad faith, but, when taken
together, also show that there was conspiracy in their willful
noncompliance with their duties in order to defraud the government.
In order to establish the existence of conspiracy, unity of purpose and
unity in the execution of an unlawful objective by the accused must be
proven. Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It is enough
that there be proof that two or more persons acted towards the
accomplishment of a common unlawful objective through a chain of
circumstances, even if there was no actual meeting among
them. HDIATS
A cash advance request cannot be approved and disbursed
without passing through several offices, including those of petitioners.
It is outrageous that they would have us believe that they were not in
conspiracy when over hundreds of vouchers were signed and approved
by them in a course of 30 months, without their noticing irregularities
therein that should have prompted them to refuse to sign the
vouchers. Clearly, they were in cahoots in granting the cash advances
to Gonzales. By these acts, petitioners defrauded the government of
such a large sum of money that should not have been disbursed in the
first place, had they been circumspect in performing their functions.
Not only were petitioners unified in defrauding the
government, but they were also unified in not reporting the negligence
of their cohorts because of their own negligence. Cesa himself
admitted knowing that Gonzales had unliquidated cash advances, yet
he signed the vouchers. He also failed to inform the other officials that
they should not sign the vouchers and tolerated their negligence when
they affixed their signatures thereto. Petitioners, through their
admissions before the Sandiganbayan, all knew that there were
irregularities in the vouchers; still they failed to correct one another,
because they themselves signed the vouchers despite the glaring
irregularities therein.
257
 Petitioners cannot hide behind our declaration in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan that heads of offices cannot be convicted of a
conspiracy charge just because they did not personally examine every
single detail before they, as the final approving authorities, affixed
their signatures to certain documents. The Court explained in that case
that conspiracy was not adequately proven, contrary to the case at bar
in which petitioners' unity of purpose and unity in the execution of an
unlawful objective were sufficiently established. Also, unlike in Arias,
where there were no reasons for the heads of offices to further
examine each voucher in detail, petitioners herein, by virtue of the
duty given to them by law as well as by rules and regulations, had the
responsibility to examine each voucher to ascertain whether it was
proper to sign it in order to approve and disburse the cash advance.
J. LIABILITY FOR ACTS COMMITTED OUTSIDE OF DUTY
[34] ESTELITO V. REMOLONA vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 137473. August 2, 2001
Dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for
the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292. Dishonesty, in order to warrant
dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of
duty by the person charged.
Rationale for the rule: if a government officer or employee is
dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said
defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his
right to continue in office.
The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even
if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his
government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to
commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices
and entities of the government other than the office where he is
employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a
certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave
misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to
resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations.

Facts:
Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal Office while his
wife Nery Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary School.
An inquiry with the CSC was made as to the status of the civil service
eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who purportedly got a rating of 81.25% as
per Report of Rating issued by the National Board for Teachers. Mr.
America likewise disclosed that he received information that Mrs.
Remolona was campaigning for a fee of P8,000.00 per examinee for a
passing mark in the teacher's board examinations.
Upon investigation, it was revealed that Remolona's name is not in the
list of passing and failing examinees, and that the list of examinees for
December 10, 1989 does not include the name of Remolona.
Furthermore, Examination No. 061285 as indicated in her report of
rating belongs to a certain Marlou C. Madelo, who took the
examination in Cagayan de Oro and got a rating of 65.00%.
Petitioner Remolona said that he met one Atty. Hadji Salupadin who
represented himself as working at the Batasan. Petitioner confided that
his wife is having difficulty acquiring an eligibility. Atty. Salupadin
offered to help for a fee of P3,000, which petitioner paid. Remolona
admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake
eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge thereof, and that he did it
because he wanted them to be together.
The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public
life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or
employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the
service.
The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the
object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but
the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the
public’s faith and confidence in the government.
We find no merit in the contention of Remolona that the penalty of
dismissal is too harsh considering that there was no damage caused to
the government since the certificate of rating was never used to get an
appointment for his wife, Nery Remolona. Although no pecuniary
damage was incurred by the government, there was still falsification of
an official document that constitutes gross dishonesty which cannot be
countenanced, considering that he was an accountable officer and
occupied a sensitive position. The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees enunciates the State
policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service

CSC found the evidence against petitioner substantial enough to effect

his conviction. As for Nery, the CSC found her innocent since it was her
husband who unilaterally worked to secure a fake eligibility for her.

On appeal, the CA ruled against petitioner.

Petitioner’s contention:

Remolona insists that his dismissal is a violation of his right to due

process under Section 2(3), Article XI (B) of the Constitution which
provides that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause. Although the offense of
dishonesty is punishable under the Civil Service law, Remolona opines
that such act must have been committed in the performance of his
function and duty as Postmaster. Considering that the charge of
dishonesty involves the falsification of the certificate of rating of his
wife Nery Remolona, the same has no bearing on his office and hence,
he is deemed not to have been dismissed for cause.

Issue:
Can a civil service employee be dismissed from the government service
for an offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with
the performance of his official duty?

Held:
Yes.

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