CIVIL LAW REVIEW I TAÑADA VS.

TUVERA
A. When do laws take effect?
Cases: 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
1. Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146
SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) FACTS:
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
FACTS: while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on themselves declared that they were to become
matters of public concern as well as the principle that effective immediately upon their approval.
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of ISSUES:
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, of general applicability and laws which are not as to
proclamations, executive orders, letters of their publication;
implementations and administrative orders. 2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in
publications of general circulation.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents,
moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that HELD:
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant
petition. The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
ISSUE: publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislature may
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
required before any law or statute becomes valid and in any other date, without its previous publication.
enforceable.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of
HELD: general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
The clear object of this provision is to give the general legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without only to one individual, or some of the people only, and
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for not to the public as a whole.
the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or All statutes, including those of local application and
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication
constructive one. unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there
shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all,
“shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an since its purpose is to inform the public of the content
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the of the law.
constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matter of public concern is to be given substance and Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of
validity. laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
The publication of presidential issuances of public Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
nature or of general applicability is a requirement of wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may impractical.
be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as
that presidential issuances of general application which soon as possible.
have not been published have no force and effect.
J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the
sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.
2. RAMONITO O. ACAAC v. MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, GR
No. 187378, 2013-09-30
Facts:
The Facts
Petitioner People's Eco-Tourism and Livelihood
Foundation, Inc. (PETAL) is a non-governmental
organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac,
which is engaged in the protection and conservation of
ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis
Occidental.
PETAL built some cottages... on Capayas Island... in
1995 as well as a seminar cottage in 2001
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents
Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and Building
Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of
Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply
for a building permit prior to the construction of its...
buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1096,[8]
otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the
Philippines
PETAL failed to comply with the requirements for the...
issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of
Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against it
on July 8, 2002... on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang
Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance
No. 02, Series of 2002... which prohibited, among
others... the entry of any entity, association,
corporation or... organization inside the sanctuaries;[11]
and (b) the construction of any structures, permanent
or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by
the local government.
On August 23, 2002,... a Notice of Voluntary Demolition
was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the
structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons
cited was its violation of the subject ordinance. A similar
notice was also served against individual petitioners on
October 25, 2002.
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
injunction and damages[15] against respondents before
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that
they have prior vested rights to occupy... and utilize
Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession thereof since 1961
PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on
the following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public
consultation; (b) it was not published in a... newspaper
of general circulation in the province as required by
Republic Act No. 7160,[16] otherwise known as "The
Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC); and (c) it was
not approved by the SP. Therefore, its implementation
should be... enjoined.
Issues:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are
the Decision[2] dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution[3] dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
00284-MIN which reversed and set aside the
Decision[4] dated November 26, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 2 (RTC) in Civil
Case No. 4684 for injunction.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the
subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against
petitioners.
Ruling:
The RTC Ruling... the RTC rendered a Decision[19]
declaring the subject ordinance as invalid/void based on
the following grounds: (a) PETAL's protest has not been
resolved and that the subject ordinance was not duly
approved by the SP; (b)... the said ordinance was not
published in a newspaper of general circulation nor was
it posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified
as timberland, hence, not suited to be a bird or fish
sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over
timberlands... belong to the national government,
through the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR)
However, the petitioners were ordered to remove the
structures they built thereon without valid building
permits
The Proceedings Before the CA
Contrary to the RTC's ruling, it held that the subject
ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP
to declare the same invalid within 30 days after its
submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC.
Moreover, public consultations were conducted with
various groups before the subject ordinance was
passed.
The CA further ruled that the Municipality of Lopez
Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to
pass and adopt the subject ordinance under Section 447
in relation to Section 16 of the LGC.
CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.
CA upheld the RTC's finding that petitioners have no
proprietary rights over the Capayas Island, thereby
rendering their action for injunction improper.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration[32] therefrom
was denied by the CA in a Resolution[33] dated March
9, 2009
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that
no publication or posting of the subject ordinance was
made. In contrast,... Azcuna had testified that they have
complied with the publication and posting
requirements.[40] While it is true that he likewise failed
to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in
accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of
an ordinance,... its constitutionality or legality should be
upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence
that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed
in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden
of proving their own allegation, which they, however,
failed to do... the Court upheld the presumptive validity
of the ordinance therein despite the lack of
controverting evidence on the part of the local
government... to show that public hearings were
conducted... petitioner Figuerres has not presented any
evidence to show that no public hearings were
conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in
question. On the other hand, the Municipality of
Mandaluyong... claims that public hearings were indeed
conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted,
although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to
establish this allegation.
However, in accordance with the presumption of
validity in favor of an ordinance, their... constitutionality
or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence
showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed in their enactment.
We have a right to assume that officials have done that
which the law requires them to do, in the absence of
positive proof to the... contrary.
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative
allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in the
present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting
it, she has the burden of proof.
In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid
title[44] to the property in dispute to be entitled to its
possession. Besides, the RTC's order directing the
removal of the structures built by petitioners on
Capayas Island without building permits was... not
appealed. As such, the same should now be deemed as
final and conclusive upon them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
September 30, 2008 and Resolution dated March 9,
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-
MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
Principles:
Section 56 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal
Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. (a) Within three (3) days after approval,
the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for... review, copies of approved
ordinances and the resolutions approving the local
development plans and public investment programs
formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such
ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit
them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to
the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The
provincial... attorney or provincial prosecutor shall,
within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the
documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
writing his comments or recommendations, which may
be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
making its decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an
ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred
upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or
resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan... shall enter its action in the minutes and
shall advise the corresponding city or municipal
authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of
such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be
presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
3. G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS
AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 187654
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its Board of Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS
AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.
THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423,
President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in
the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province
of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The
military reservation, then known as Fort William
McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio
(Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208,
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a
certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a
national shrine. The excluded area is now known as
Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the
administration of herein respondent Military Shrine
Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-
PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation
No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan,
Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for
disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos.
(R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President
Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation
No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette3 on 3
February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C.
Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172
which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476,
as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of
Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation
No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition
under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing
Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and
occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including
portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier
General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No.
1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to
prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause
the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI)
filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of
Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as
COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the
following: (1) the reclassification of the areas they
occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western
Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable
land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the
subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands;
and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of
the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona
fide occupants.4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot
Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-
Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as
those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the
former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302
in Western Bicutan.5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a
Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring the
portions of land in question alienable and disposable,
with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General
dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation
No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention
of the President could not be defeated by the
negligence or inadvertence of others. Further,
considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was
exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended,
repealed or superseded, by a mere executive
enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have
superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476,
as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when
President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina
AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the
Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case.
Likewise, she held that when the provision of the law is
clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for
the court to look into legislative intent, the law must be
taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the
Commission had no authority to supply the addendum
originally omitted in the published version of
Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be
tantamount to encroaching on the field of the
legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the COSLAP in a
Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals
seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1
September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First
Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-
PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 1,
2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission
on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No.
99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case
No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as
discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed
by respondents are likewise
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said
Decision by filing their respective Petitions for Review
with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY
PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN
NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID
PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE
PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN
PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON.
COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE
PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE
EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole
issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476
BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF
PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING
WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS
NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of
whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue
of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not
included in the publication of the said law.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and
7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were
anchored on the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the
former President intended to include all Western
Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort
Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a
notation just below the printed version of Proclamation
No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten
addendum was not included when Proclamation No.
2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were
declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum
of President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In
relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly
provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of
publication is indispensable to give effect to the law,
unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase
"unless otherwise provided" refers to a different
effectivity date other than after fifteen days following
the completion of the law’s publication in the Official
Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of
publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the
requirement of publication was already settled in the
landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had
the occasion to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An
example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in
his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the
Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen
days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one
year after such publication." The general rule did not
apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the
legislature could validly provide that a law shall become
effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence. Significantly,
this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures,
like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before
they can begin to operate.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. An example is
a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like
a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political
forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of
justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To
be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to
one individual, or some of the people only, and not to
the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be published as
a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
xxxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be
published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only
the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees
must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they
are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce.
xxxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number
of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement
of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which
the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a
presidential decree undeniably of general applicability
and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. The evident purpose was to withhold
rather than disclose information on this vital law.
xxxx
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the
sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this
Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not
part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without
publication, the note never had any legal force and
effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the
Administrative Code, "the publication of any law,
resolution or other official documents in the Official
Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority."
Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to
include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but
speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as
to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the
words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule
that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is
none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we
ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts
can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law,
not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be
violative of the principle of separation of powers,
inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply
or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae
exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not
arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy
sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation,
but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to
include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June
2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to
cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been
rendered moot. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
B. Legal Periods
Cases:
1. CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007
FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on
March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income tax
which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are
entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that
year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials,
etc. However, despite the losses, they still paid their
quarterly income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence,
they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999,
revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to
submit additional documents to which Primetown
complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon
which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on
April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed
beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial
claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC.
According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to
730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown
filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and
that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed
731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return.
Hence, beyond the reglementary period. Primetown
appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year
period
HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987, a year shall be understood to be 12 calendar
months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month
designated in the calendar without regard to the
number of days it may contain. The court held that
Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13
of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown
is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-
year reglementary period.
2. Montajes vs. People
G.R. No. 183449, March 12, 2012
Facts: The original period for filing the petition for
review with the CA was on May 19, 2007, a Saturday.
On May 21, 2007, a Monday (the next working day
which followed the last day for filing which fell on a
Saturday), petitioner filed a motion for extension of
time to file a petition for review wherein he prayed that
he be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to June
5, 2007 within which to file his petition. He then filed
his petition for review on June 5, 2007. Was the petition
for review filed on time?
Held: The petition for review was filed out of time
based on our clarification in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC that
the 15-day extension period prayed for should be
tacked to the original period and commences
immediately after the expiration of such period. Thus,
counting 15 days from the expiration of the period
which was on May 19, 2007, the petition filed on June 5,
2007 was already two days late. However, we find the
circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal
application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair
play.
Notably, the petition for review was already filed on
June 5, 2007, which was long before the CA issued its
Resolution dated September 21, 2007 dismissing the
petition for review for being filed out of time. There was
no showing that respondent suffered any material
injury or his cause was prejudiced by reason of such
delay. Moreover, the RTC decision which was sought to
be reversed in the petition for review filed in the CA had
affirmed the MTC judgment convicting petitioner of
direct assault, hence, the petition involved no less than
petitioners liberty. We do not find anything on record
that shows petitioner's deliberate intent to delay the
final disposition of the case as he had filed the petition
for review within the extended period sought, although
erroneously computed. These circumstances should
have been taken into consideration for the CA not to
dismiss the petition outright.
We have ruled that being a few days late in the filing of
the petition for review does not automatically warrant
the dismissal thereof. And even assuming that a petition
for review is filed a few days late, where strong
considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the
petition, we may relax the stringent application of
technical rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction.

Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses

that do not really impair the proper administration of
justice. After all, the higher objective of procedural rule
is to insure that the substantive rights of the parties are
protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every
party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his case, free from
the unacceptable plea of technicalities.