Imbong vs Ochoa

Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; Due Process Clause;
Equal Protection Clause
Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject
One Title Rule
 

G.R. No. 204819               April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT
CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,

vs.

HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

Facts:
  Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce. Challengers from various sectors of
society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional on the
following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products.

3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the

Constitution.

8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the
Constitution

9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10. Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

 1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy

3. Facial Challenge

4. Locus Standi

5. Declaratory Relief

6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating
the:

1. Right to life

2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6. Due process clause

7. Equal protection clause

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10. Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge

3. Locus Standi

4. Declaratory Relief

5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited
by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners
must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that
is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting
of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement
of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that
is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press,
and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest
in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede
legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must
not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”  

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it

confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this
view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the
statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal
effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid
portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid
portion can stand independently as law.    

Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper
hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their
own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret
this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using
the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning
of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the
Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are
made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the
DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure
shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only

after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA.
Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in
support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or
wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies
of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would
violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus,
the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes
into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution
mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance
 with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the
right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)
(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in
their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in
elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where
what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in
this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed
before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not
yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development
of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest

groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program
will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n)
of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care
institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service
provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information
and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are
exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1),
the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of
the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of
the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a
couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children.
The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program
under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health
care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to
involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17
only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono 
Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do
not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL
 
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out
the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also
a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague
violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from
the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the
matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to
cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For
unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated
by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no
actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino
people.

 3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a
procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need.
This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs,
the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis
of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to
control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves
in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood”
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought
to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of
his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer
a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void
for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.