RAYTHEON v.

ROUZIE
G.R. No. 162894 February 26, 2008

FACTS:

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an
American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative
to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed
remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. Respondent secured a service contract with the
Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.

Respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G.
Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of
employment contract. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay
respondent’s money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) where it essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case.

In its answer, the petitioner contended that the “Special Sales Representative Agreement” shall
be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also sought the dismissal of the case on
the ground of forum non conveniens. It also filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of, among others, forum non conveniens.

RTC denied the motion and ruled that it can validly render judgment thereon and that the
principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could enforce
judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.

Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA under rule 65, however, CA sustained the decision of
the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC can validly assumed jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

YES. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case - namely, the parties and
witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is
located outside the Philippines - are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction. That
the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal
for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are
two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to
this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law
which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.33 The choice of law
stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop,
that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura, the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in
judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances where the Court held that
the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element, the
following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the
power to enforce its decision.28 On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem
where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of
conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of
sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.
TAMANO v. ORTIZ
G.R. No. 126603 June 29, 1998

FACTS:

Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and
subsisting until his death. Prior to his death, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J.
Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites. Private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano
(Adib) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullify of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the
ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented
themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage
contract false and fraudulent. Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda
and that Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her
previous marriage with Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance
with publication requirements.

Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC was without jurisdiction over the
subject and nature of the action since "only a party to the marriage" could file an action for
annulment of marriage against the other spouse, hence, it was only Tamano who could file an
action for annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and
Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the
instant case was vested in the shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married
in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 or the
Code of Muslim Personal laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence,
petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

YES. Considering that in the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private
respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with
the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were
married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion
to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws.
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all
actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. There should be no question by
now that what determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case.
Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 1083 provides —
Art. 13. Application.

(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.

(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance
with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.

As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil
Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant
case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws,
the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.

Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both
in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari'a courts are not vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
LLAVE v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011

FACTS:

(Related ni sa Tamano v. Ortiz na case)

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the
Islamic laws and subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge. In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’

Private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate
children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint
alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda under civil rites, and that this marriage
remained subsisting when he married Estrellita.

Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both
Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites and that Sen. Tamano have divorced
Zorayda under P.D 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Estrellita
argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
(Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts. She also argued that her marriage with the late senator
is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her.
She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased
without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims
whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. The motion was, however, denied by the
RTC. On appeal the motion was also denied. RTC rendered judgment declaring Estrellita’s
marriage void ab initio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano is void ab initio?

RULING:

YES, because the marriage between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano was celebrated in 1958 under
civil and Muslim rites where the law in force at the time governing relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950 and where under the said code only
one marriage can exist at any given time. The Muslim Code took effect only on February 4,
1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain
rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. Hence, the Civil Code governs the marriage
of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano, rendering void ab initio any subsequent marriages.

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent
marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the
legitimate union of a married couple.

A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with
non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses
register their mutual desire to this effect. Even granting that there was registration of mutual
consent for the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the
registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as
both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as
we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at
the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which
subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by
the CA as void ab initio.
ZAMORANOS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 193902 June 1, 2011

FACTS:

Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos
was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two wed again, this time,
in civil rites. A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by Talaq. The
dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Shari’a Circuit District Court which issued a
Decree of Divorce.

Zamoranos married anew. She wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum) under Islamic rites.
Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony. The relationship
between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated.
Eventually Pacasum filed a petition to declare their marriage void alleging among others that at
the time of their marriage Zamoranos was already previously married to de Guzman. A criminal
complaint for bigamy was also filed by Pacasum against Zamoranos.

RTC ruled in favor of Zamoranos. It found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and
were such at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines. This was affirmed with finality by the CA and the SC.

With respect to the criminal case for bigamy, Zamoranos filed a motion to quash the
information which was however denied by the RTC and the CA. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the information for bigamy should be quashed?

RULING:

YES, because it was sufficiently established that Zamoranos and de Guzman were both Muslim
and married under Islamic rites and accordingly the nature, consequences, and incidents of
such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083, therefore the the divorce by Talaq should be
upheld. The charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasum’s claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and
her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This in effect divest the jurisdiction of
the RTC over the subject matter of the offense.

Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:

TITLE II. CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

Article 3. Conflict of provisions.

(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, the
former shall prevail.
(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or laws of local
application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the former.

(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be
construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.

In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazali’s Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim
Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim personal laws
expound thereon: The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any
provision of this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For example,
there is conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law
of general application and Article of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail,
in the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized "in accordance with" the
Muslim Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not apply. The second
provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this Code which is a special law and
another special law or laws of local application. The latter should be liberally construed to carry
out the provision of the Muslim Code.

If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is
complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in
accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage
rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one.
But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two
situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both
parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of
the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman was valid, and, thus,
entitled her to remarry Pacasum. Consequently, the RTC is without jurisdiction to try
Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
VILLAGRACIA v. SHARIA
G.R. No. 188832 April 23, 2014

FACTS:

Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang,

Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Cañete. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-15633 covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s name. At the time of the purchase,
Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land.

Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration
Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land.

Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court. In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is the
registered owner of the lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15633; and that Vivencio
occupied his property, depriving him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy it. He prayed that
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court order Vivencio to vacate his property. Fifth Shari’a
District Court ruled that Roldan, as registered owner.

Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction.14 In his petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph (2)
of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines15 and argued that Shari’a District
Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that
he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. He prayed
that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court set aside.

Fifth Shari’a District Court denied Vivencio’s petition for relief from judgment for lack of merit.
Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order
with this court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sharia District Courts have jurisdiction over real actions where one of the
parties is not a Muslim?

RULING:

NO. The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts
have concurrent original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising
from customary contracts41 wherein the parties involved are Muslims. In such actions, the
parties involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance of them.
The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court does not validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the
Muslim Code, customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim law. Hence,
Shari’a District Courts apply Muslim law when resolving real actions arising from customary
contracts.

In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a
District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily
apply the laws of general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines,
regardless of the court taking cognizance of the action. This is the reason why the original
jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is
concurrent with that of regular courts.

However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the parties involved are
Muslims. Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had
no jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real property. The proceedings
before it are void, regardless of the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines in resolving the action.
WASSMER v. VELEZ
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

FACTS:

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to
get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day.

On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be: “Dear Bet — Will have to
postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today. Please do not ask
too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.”

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram: “NOTHING CHANGED REST
ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE.” Thereafter Velez did not
appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.

Defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for
new trial and reconsideration which was denied by the court. Defendant filed an MR and
Motion for new trial arguing that there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for
breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendant should be held liable for damages?

RULING:

YES, considering that the instant case in not a case of mere breach or promise to marry.

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4,
1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The
bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial
bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to
postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and
the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.

As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of
it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
TANJANCO v. CA
G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966

FACTS:

The defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both
being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for
plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of
defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for
carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love and
promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of
which the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment
and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., that
thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's
refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree
compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing, support,
moral and exemplary damages.

CFI dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action. CA modified the decision stating the
plaintiff has a cause of action for damages based on Article 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not plaintiff has a cause of action for damages?

RULING:

NO, because the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff
appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant,
she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.

The memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the
original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code),
the Commission stated:

But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined
by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:

"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The
girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen
years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore,
though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages.
But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.

The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise
of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded.