PALE Fourth Batch

PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
E. Duty of Fiduciary
#1 JISON v. JIZ A.C. No. 9615 March 5, 2013 Perlas- Bernabe, J.
PETITIONER: GLORIA P. JINON, RESPONDENT: ATTY. LEONARDO E. JIZ
DOCTRINE: Undeniably, "when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family
makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to client but also
to the legal profession, the court and society.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the
purpose, should be immediately returned.15 "A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of
his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed
to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
FACTS: The complaint alleged that Gloria, after the death of her brother Charlie in July 2001, entrusted two (2) land titles covering
properties owned by their deceased parents to her sister-in-law, Viola J. Jinon (Viola): one located in Mangasina, Sta. Barbara, Iloilo
(Sta. Barbara Property) and the other at No. 12 Valencia St., Poblacion, Leganes, Iloilo (Leganes Property) covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-119598.
Eventually, Gloria sold the Sta. Barbara Property, which resulted in disagreements between her and Viola regarding their respective
shares in the proceeds. Consequently, Viola refused to return to Gloria TCT No. T-119598, prompting Gloria to engage the services
of Atty. Jizon April 29, 2003 to recover the said title, for which she immediately paid an acceptance fee of ₱17,000.00.3
In their subsequent meeting, Atty. Jiz assured the transfer of the title in Gloria's name. On August 13, 2003, Gloria, upon Atty. Jiz's
instructions, remitted the amount of ₱45,000.00 to answer for the expenses of the transfer. However, when she later inquired about
the status of her case, she was surprised to learn from Atty. Jiz that a certain Atty. Caras was handling the same. Moreover, when
she visited the Leganes Property, which has been leased out to one Rose Morado (Rose), she discovered that Atty. Jiz has been
collecting the rentals for the period June 2003 up to October 2004, which amounted to ₱12,000.00. When she demanded for the
rentals, Atty. Jiz gave her only ₱7,000.00, explaining that the balance of ₱5,000.00 would be added to the expenses needed for the
transfer of the title of the Leganes Property to her name.
The foregoing incidents prompted Gloria to terminate the legal services of Atty. Jiz and demand the return of the amounts of
₱45,000.00 and ₱5,000.00 through a letter5dated September 22, 2004, which has remained unheeded.
To date, Atty. Jiz has not complied with his undertaking to recover TCT No. T-119598 from Viola and effect its transfer in Gloria‘s
name, and has failed to return her money despite due demands. Hence, the instant administrative complaint praying that Atty. Jiz:
(1) be ordered to reimburse the total amount of ₱67,000.00 (₱17,000.00 acceptance fee, ₱45,000.00 for the transfer of title, and
₱5,000.00 as unremitted rentals for the Leganes Property); and (2) be meted disciplinary action that the Court may deem fit under
the circumstances.
The Action and Recommendation of the IBP - found Atty. Jiz to have been remiss in his duty to update his client, Gloria, regarding
her case, and to respond to Gloria‘s letter terminating his services and demanding the refund of the sum of ₱45,000.00, in violation
of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states: A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client‘s request for information.
IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution adopting with modification the Commission‘s Report and Recommendation.
ISSUE/S: Whether Atty. Jiz should be held administratively liable for having been remiss in his duties as a lawyer with
respect to the legal services he had undertaken to perform for his client, Gloria.
HELD: Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties as a lawyer in neglecting his client‘s case, misappropriating her funds and disobeying the
CBD‘s lawful orders requiring the submission of his pleadings and his attendance at hearings. He should thus be suspended from
the practice of law in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
RULE 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Moreover, money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the
purpose, should be immediately returned.15 "A lawyer‘s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client.
Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment."16
In this case, Atty. Jiz committed acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar.Aside from the demand letter 17 dated April
29, 2003 which he sent to Viola, he failed to perform any other positive act in order to recover TCT No. T-119598 from Viola for
more than a year. He also failed to return, despite due demand, the funds allocated for the transfer of the title that he received from
her.
The claim that the total amount of ₱62,000.00 that Gloria paid him was for the services he rendered in facilitating the sale of the Sta.
Barbara Property is belied by the receipt18 dated April 29, 2003, which states that the amount of ₱17,000.00 paid by Gloria was for
"consultation and other legal services" he would render "up to and including April 30, 2003." His handwritten notation at the bottom
portion made it clear that he received the said amount "as full payment." He likewise failed to substantiate his averment that he
actually facilitated the sale of the Sta. Barbara Property.
Furthermore, respondent‘s infractions were aggravated by his failure to comply with CBD‘s directives for him to file his pleadings on
time and to religiously attend hearings, demonstrating not only his irresponsibility but also his disrespect for the judiciary and his
fellow lawyers. Such conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected
to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court. 19 As a member of the bar, he ought to have known that
the orders of the CBD as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers were not mere requests but
directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely.
Considering the foregoing relevant jurisprudence, the Court finds it appropriate to adopt the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors to suspend Atty. Jiz from the practice of law for two (2) years. With respect to the amount that he should refund to Gloria,
only the sum of ₱45,000.00 plus legal interest should be returned to her, considering the finding that the initial payment of
₱17,000.00 was reasonable and sufficient remuneration for the actual legal services he rendered.
#2 SAN PEDRO v. MENDOZA A.C. No. 5440 December 10, 2014 PONENTE
PETITIONER: SPOUSES NICASIO DONELITA SAN RESPONDENT: ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA

PEDRO
DOCTRINE: The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account
for the money or property collected or received for or from the client[,] [thus] . . . [w]hen a lawyer collects or receives
money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office
expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its
intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the
money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
FACTS: Complainants engaged the services of respondent to facilitate the transfer of title to property, in the name of Isabel
Azcarraga Marcaida, to complainants. Complainants then gave respondent a check for ₱68,250.00 for the payment of transfer
taxes. They also gave respondent a check for ₱13,800.00 for respondent‘s professional fee. Respondent failed to produce the title
despite complainants‘ repeated follow-ups.
Several letters were sent by respondent explaining the delay in the transfer of title. However, respondent still failed to produce the
title.
Complainants subsequently referred the case to the barangay. Respondent refused to return the amount complainants gave for the
transfer taxes. Complainants were then issued a certificate to file action. They also sent a letter demanding the refund of the money
intended for the transfer taxes. Respondent still did not return the money.
Respondent sent another letter to complainants. He promised to settle the transfer of the land title.However, respondent reneged on
this promise. Complainants were then forced to obtain a loan from Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company to
secure the transfer of the title to the property in their names.
Respondent contested the allegations of complainants. According to him, it was complainants who caused the three-year delay in
the transfer of title to complainants‘ names. Complainants were not able to furnish respondent several important documents: (a)
original copy of the deed of extrajudicial petition; (b) affidavit of publication with the clippings of the published item in a newspaper of
general circulation; and (c) a barangay certificate from the barangay where the property is located as required by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.
In addition, respondent argued that complainants paid him the measly sum of ₱13,800.00 despite all the work he did for them,
including facilitating the sale of the property ("being-pulled from the office four or five times to discuss . . . the details of the
transaction [with the sellers]; going twice to the RTC of Biñan, Laguna to expedite the . . . issuance of a [n]ew owner‘s duplicate
copy of the title; going twice to the office of the Register of Deeds for Calamba, Laguna to make verification and submit the court
[o]rder; [and facilitating the] preparation and notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale."
Respondent also claimed that retention of the money is justified owing to his receivables from complainants for the services he
rendered in various cases of complainants.
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent violated Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended censure and warning. The Investigating Commissioner found that both checks issued to
respondent were encashed despite respondent‘s failure to facilitate the release of the title in the name of complainants. Moreover,
respondent admitted his liability in his letters to complainants. Complainant Nicasio San Pedro‘s affidavit of desistance is immaterial.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the resolution but modified the penalty to suspension for 3 months and ordered the return of
the P68,250.00.
ISSUE/S: Whether respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for failing to hold
in trust the money of his clients
HELD: Yes. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO
HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien
over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his
client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client‘s interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after
it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions;
but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
A lawyer‘s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear:
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from the client[,] [thus] . . . [w]hen a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a
particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the
client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.
His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize)
constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[The lawyer‘s] failure to return the client‘s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.
After three (3) years and several demands from complainants, respondent failed to accomplish the task given to him and even
refused to return the money. Complainants‘ alleged failure to provide the necessary documents to effect the transfer does not justify
his violation of his duty under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent‘s assertion of a valid lawyer‘s lien is also untenable. A valid retaining lien has the following elements: (1) lawyer-client
relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client‘s funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney‘s fees. Further,
the attorney‘s retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the
documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorney‘s possession in the course of his employment.
Respondent did not satisfy all the elements of a valid retaining lien. He did not present evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for
attorney‘s fees. Furthermore, assuming that respondent had proven all the requisites for a valid retaining lien, he cannot appropriate
for himself his client's funds without the proper accounting and notice to the client. The rule is that when there is "a disagreement, or
when the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer . . . the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to
the payment of his fees
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. He is also
ordered to RETURN to complainants the amount of ₱68,250.00 with 6% legal interest from the date of finality of this judgment until
full payment.
#3 LUNA v. GALARRITA A.C. No. 10662 [Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2654] July 07, 2015 Leonen, J.
PETITIONER: Jun B. Luna RESPONDENT: Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita
DOCTRINE: The CPR allows the lawyer to apply the money retained to satisfy his lawful fees. However, this provision
assumes that the client agrees with the lawyer as to the amount of the attorney’s fees and as to the application of the
client’s fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursements.
FACTS: Luna filed an Affidavit-Complaint against his lawyer, Atty. Galarrita before the IBP. He alleged that he retained Atty.
Galarrita‘s legal services in filing a foreclosure complaint against Jose Calvario who allegedly owed him P100,000 secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage. After his formal offer of evidence, Atty. Galarrita opted to enter into a settlement with the other party without
informing him and without delivering to him the settlement proceeds.
When Luna learned of the settlement, he wrote to the respondent stating that the settlement is beyond what they discussed. Atty.
Galarrita replied that he entered into the settlement because he was certain that it was better than winning the case and asked for
understanding since he had not received any appearance fee for numerous hearings. Luna mentioned that delay in retainer‘s fee
payments was due to Atty. Galarrita‘s negligence in handling the case. The respondent explained that the reason why the case was
archived was because he could not attend several hearings for lack of meal and transportation allowance going to Gumaca,
Quezon, but such fact is moot because the case was not dismissed by the court.
Luna received a letter from one of the heirs of Jose Calvario, Emma Tayag, and again from Lutchiare Calvario, regarding the
delivery of title since they paid the P100,000 settlement amount.
In his answer, Atty. Galarrita prays for the dismissal of the disbarment case, claiming that he entered into the Compromise
Agreement by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney. Also, he added that under their General Retainership Agreement, Luna shall
pay him P4,000 monthly and after 4 years, the client owes him an unpaid balance of P208,000. He argues for an application of the
rule on retaining lien.
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Galarrita guilty of violation Rule 16.03 of the CPR and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for 1 year. The IBP board of Governors modified the recommendation, recommending the respondent‘s
suspension from the practice of law for 6 months and ordered to return the amount of P100,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the CPR for entering into a Compromise Agreement without his client’s
consent, then refusing to turn over the settlement proceeds received
HELD: Yes. Complainant Luna entrusted Atty. Galarrita with handling the civil case involving a mortgaged land in Quezon Province,
however, without his consent, the latter settled the case with the other party. There are compelling reasons to believe that Luna had
not given any authority to enter into a Compromise Agreement: firstly, Luna was not a party to the Compromise Agreement despite
the fact that he was not abroad when the agreement was executed; secondly, there was no indication that he had agreed to the
amount of P100,000; thirdly, he was not seasonable informed of the execution of the Compromise Agreement.
Even if such authority was given, the SPA still cannot justify the Compromise Agreement on February 14, 2006. The SPA was
executed on September 16, 2002 before the filing of the complaint. The conclusion seems to be that the authority given was to enter
into a possible settlement during the preliminary conference or pre-trial.
Rule 16.03 under Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.
The respondent entered into the Compromise Agreement without the client‘s consent and continued to act in bad faith by refusing to
turn over the P100,000 settlement amount received. It is not amiss to state that he entered into the said agreement with the
motivation to hold on to it and pave the way for the payment of his attorney‘s fees. In doing so, he violated the trust reposed in him
by his client and violated Rule 16.03.
The CPR allows the lawyer to apply the money retained to satisfy his lawful fees. However, this provision assumes that the client
agrees with the lawyer as to the amount of the attorney‘s fees and as to the application of the client‘s fund to pay his lawful fees and
disbursements.
Atty. Galarrita is suspended from the practice of law for 2 years, with a stern warning. He is ordered to return to the complainant
Luna the amount of P100,000 with legal interest of 6% per annum from February 2006 until fully paid, without prejudice to the filing
of a collection case for retainer‘s fee against complainant Luna.
#4 FORONDA v. ALVAREZ A.C. No. 9976 June 25, 2014 REYES, J.
PETITIONER: ALMIRA C. FORONDA RESPONDENT: ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR.
DOCTRINE: Rule 1.01, Canons 15, Rule 16.04, Canon 17, 18, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
FACTS: Complainant is an OFW worker in Dubai. In May 2008, she returned to the Philippines to file a case for the nullification of
her marriage. The respondent was referred to her and the complainant agreed to engage his services for a fee of ₱195,000.00 to be
paid as follows:
(a) 50% or ₱100,000.00 upon the signing of the contract;
(b) 25% or ₱50,000.00 on or before June 10, 2008; and
(c) 25% or ₱45,000.00 before the filing of the case.
The complainant paid the amounts as agreed. The amount of ₱45,000.00 was even paid on June 10, 2008, after being informed by
the respondent that the petition for the annulment of marriage was ready for filing.
Respondent promised to file the petition after he received the full payment of his attorney‘s fee, or on June 11, 2008. Later on,
complainant inquired about the status of her case and respondent told her that the petition was pending in court; and in another
time, she was told that a decision by the court was already forthcoming. However, when she came back to the country in May 2009,
the respondent told her that her petition was still pending in court and apologized for the delay. Eventually, the complainant was able
to get a copy of her petition and found out that it was filed only on July 16, 2009.
In addition, the respondent invited complainant to be an investor in the lending business allegedly ran by the respondent‘s sister-in-
law. The respondent encouraged her to invest ₱200,000.00 which he said can earn five percent (5%) interest per month.
Complainant agreed on the condition that the respondent shall issue personal and post-dated checks in her favor. Upon
presentment of these checks, the drawee-bank honored the first two (2) checks. All of the replacement checks, however, were
dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. When respondent was unable to pay respondent, complainant filed a criminal
complaint against him for violation of BP 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa. The criminal complaint was
eventually dismissed after complainant executed an affidavit of desistance after she was paid a certain amount by respondent.
In his Answer, the respondent alleged that the delay was caused by the complainant as the latter allegedly instructed him to hold
the filing of the said petition for possible reconciliation. However, when such negotiationsfailed, he filed the petition on July 16,
2009. The respondent admitted that only the first two (2) of the checks he issued were honored by the drawee-bank. He stated that
prior to the presentment and dishonor of the rest of the UCPB checks, he advised the complainant that the third check should not be
deposited just yet due to losses in their lending business caused by the failure of some borrowers to settle their obligations.
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent is liable. For delaying in filing the petition for complainant, respondent should
be deemed guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner,
thereby, recommended the penalty of two years suspension from the practice of law with a warning that a repetition of the offenses
shall merit a heavier penalty. IBP- Board of Governors affirmed with modification to suspend the respondent for 1 year, instead of 2,
from practice of law.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the act of respondent in belatedly filing the case constitutes a violation of his duty of fiduciary
HELD: Yes. Respondent is liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canons 15,Rule 16.04, Canon 17, 18, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01. - a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 15. – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interest are fully protected by the nature of the case
or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE[.]
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client‘s request for information.
In the case at bar, Respondent Atty. Alvarez, Jr. is guilty of delay in the filing of the petition for annulment of the marriage of
complainant for almost a year. Initially, in his Answer, he claims that the delay was due to the instruction of complainant to hold in
abeyance the filing of the petition as she and her husband discussed possible reconciliation. In his Position Paper, he claims that
the delay was due to the failure of the complainant to submit to an interview by the psychologist and the time it took him to research
on the guidelines on the matter. Finally, in his Supplemental Affidavit, he admits the delay and apologizes for it. For delaying in filing
the petition for complainant, respondent should be deemed guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of CPR.
Respondent lied about the delay. The allegations of complainant about how respondent lied to her about the delay in the filing of the
petition are very detailed. In doing so, respondent is guilty of violating not only Canon 15 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The act of issuing worthless checks is a violation of Rule 1.01 of CPR. Issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer‘s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action.
Respondent‘s act of inducing complainant to lend him money at 5% interest per month but failed to pay the same violates Rule
16.04 of CPR. Obviously, respondent borrowed money from his client and his client‘s interest was not fully protected. In fact,
respondent repeatedly failed to comply with his promise to pay complainant. The fact that he subsequently paid complainant more
than the amount due from him as part of the settlement of the criminal complaint filed by her against him hardly serves to mitigate
his liability.
The Court very well takes note of the fact that the criminal charges filed against the respondent have been dismissed upon an
affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant. The Court also acknowledges that he dutifully participated in the proceedings
before the IBP-CBD and that he completely settled his obligation to the complainant, as evidenced by the Acknowledgment Receipt
signed by the complainant's counsel. Therein, it was acknowledged that the respondent paid the amount of ₱650,000.00 in payment
for the: (1) ₱200,000.00 for the amount of checks he issued in favor of the complainant; (2) ₱195,000.00 for the attorney's fees he
received for the annulment case; and (3) cost and expenses that the complainant incurred in relation to the cases the latter filed
against the respondent including the instant complaint with the IBP.
Unlike in Solidon case, where the respondent failed to file the required petition and did not account for the money he received, the
respondent was able to file, albeit belatedly, the complainant's petition. In addition, he returned in full the money he received as
attorney's fee in spite of having gone through all the trouble of preparing the required petition and in filing the same - not to mention
the cost he incurred for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose L. Alvarez, Jr. is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS from the practice of law.
#5 NAVARRO v. SOLIDUM G.R. No. DATE PONENTE
PETITIONER: NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. RESPONDENT: ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR.
PRESBITERO
DOCTRINE: Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his client,
Presbitero.1âwphi1 Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client
FACTS: On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release of the payment for the
latter‘s 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). The agreement also included the payment of the debts of Presbitero‘s late husband to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), the sale of the retained areas of the property, and the collection of the rentals due for the retained areas from
their occupants. It appeared that the DAR was supposed to pay ₱700,000 for the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and
her late husband to PNB for ₱1,200,000. Presbitero alleged that PNB‘s claim had already prescribed, and she engaged the services
of respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed the filing of a case for quieting of title against PNB. Respondent
and Presbitero agreed to an attorney‘s fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the property, with the expenses to be
advanced by Presbitero but deductible from respondent‘s fees. Respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for the
expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.
In May 2006, Presbitero‘s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent‘s services to handle the registration of
her 18.85-hectare lot located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the
expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent undertook to register the property in consideration of 30% of the value of
the property once it is registered. Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from Navarro for the registration expenses. Navarro later learned
that the registration decree over the property was already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would
not have spent for the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real situation of the property.
On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar trading business. Respondent and
Navarro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a period of one year; (b) shall earn
interest at the rate of 10% per month; and (c) shall be secured by a real estate mortgage over a property located in Barangay Alijis,
Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688. They also agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to
cover the principal amount of the loan as well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against
an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a second MOA with the same terms
and conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro, through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against an account in
Bank of Commerce, Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no agreement was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third MOA, except that the real estate
mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property located in Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero postdated
checks drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch.
Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property mortgaged under the third MOA, and respondent
promised to execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property
he mortgaged to Navarro.
However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay complainants a total of ₱900,000. Thereafter, he
failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon. In September 2006, the checks issued by respondent to
complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn were already closed. When
complainants called respondent‘s attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for September and October 2006 but asked for a
reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero terminated the services of respondent
as counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of the mortgages executed by respondent in their favor.
Respondent countered that the 10% monthly interest on the loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.
Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering very high interest rates. He also prepared and
signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his son‘s accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived
them regarding the identity and value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a different property from that which he
owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold
it for only ₱150,000.
Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty business and that it was Yulo who convinced
Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Yulo also assured him that Presbitero would help him with the refining of raw sugar
through Victorias Milling Company, Inc. Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed the interest rate and he agreed because he needed
the money. He alleged that their business transactions were secured by real estate mortgages and covered by postdated checks.
Respondent denied that the property he mortgaged to Presbitero was less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold
the property because the sale was actually rescinded. Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged to Navarro was valuable
and it was actually worth more than ₱8,000,000.
Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good but he was unable to continue paying when the
price of sugar went down and when the business with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. did not push through because Presbitero did
not help him. Respondent also denied that he was hiding from complainants.
Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him ₱530,000 as interest due for September to December 2005. He denied
making any false representations. He claimed that complainants were aware that he could no longer open a current account and
they were the ones who proposed that his wife and son issue the checks. Respondent further alleged that he already started with
the titling of Yulo‘s lot but his services were terminated before it could be completed.
ISSUE/S: (According to case itself) whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: YES. The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on the loan he obtained
from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the
ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property
to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only ₱150,000, showing that he deceived his client as to the real value
of the mortgaged property. Respondent‘s allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did
not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia
Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer open a current bank
account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-
CBD‘s finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of
Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch
of checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in respondent‘s
name.
It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We have ruled that conduct, as used in the
Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer‘s professional duties.1 A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed
either in his professional or private capacity.2 The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.3
In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent‘s private capacity. Although Navarro financed the
registration of Yulo‘s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero‘s counsel
at the time she granted him a loan. It was established that respondent misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged
as a collateral for his loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of Undertaking that he would give her
another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional collateral but he failed to do so.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his
client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent
to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later,
using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his
son‘s account whose name was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will show
that respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO
HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money
or property collected or received for or from his client.4 We agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this
case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received various amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of
them.
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo‘s 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent received ₱265,000 from her.
Respondent countered that ₱105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he could not present any receipt to prove his claim.
Respondent also claimed that he paid ₱70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt was only for ₱15,000. Respondent claimed that he
paid ₱50,000 for filing fee, publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not substantiate his claims with any receipt. As
pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had been less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the
registration of Yulo‘s property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who had since passed away.
As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero. As the
IBP-CBD pointed out, the records do not show how respondent spent the funds because he was not transparent in liquidating the
money he received from Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his client, Presbitero.1âwphi1
Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.5
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client‘s interests are fully protected by the nature of the
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the time he secured the loan,
respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero.
While respondent‘s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate mortgage, it turned out that
respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn from his account
but from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the
interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored
because the accounts were already closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected.
Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the
lawyer‘s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent
took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.
#6 VIRAY v. SANICAS A.C. No. 7337 September 29, 2014 DEL CASTILLO, J
ROLANDO VIRAY ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS
DOCTRINE: The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account
for the money or property collected or received for or from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the
property and money he has collected for his client. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney’s fees on the money in
his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting. Moreover, a
lawyer has no right to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him
attorney’s fees.
FACTS: Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case he filed against Spouses Lopez.
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and ordered Spouses Lopez to pay the former the following: backwages; separation pay;
service incentive leave pay; and, attorney‘s fees. Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued relative to aforesaid
decision. During the implementation of said writ, however, complainant discovered that respondent had already collected
P95,000.00 from the Spouses Lopez. Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to Spouses Lopez that he is
authorized to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not. Consequently, complainant made several verbal
demands to the respondent to remit to him the money less his attorney‘s fees. Respondent did not budge. Thus, complainant
lodged a complaint before the Office of the Punong Barangay. Respondent, however, ignored the summons to attend a conference
before the barangay to resolve the issues. In his Comment, respondent admits that he received a sum of money from spouses
Lopez on installments, but denies that he was not authorized to accept it. He explains that complainant agreed to pay him additional
25% attorney‘s fees, on top of the attorney‘s fees that may be awarded by the labor tribunal, and to refund all expenses respondent
incurred relative to the case. After receiving the amount of P95,000.00 and deducting therefrom the amounts of attorney‘s fees; that
earlier given to complainant; and, that paid to the sheriff, what was left to respondent allegedly was way below the promised 25%
attorney‘s fees and refund of expenses. Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will still be receiving a sum greater than
what he expects to receive.
Investigating Commissioner recommended that the respondent be meted the penalty of two-year suspension. Respondent is also
ordered to return, in restitution all the amounts in his possession which are due to complainant, less his rightful attorney‘s fees. IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, suspending
respondent from the practice of law for two years, but with the modification that respondent should restitute a specific sum of money
to complainant.
ISSUE/S: W/N the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to promptly account to his client the funds
received in the course of his professional engagement and return the same upon demand.
HELD: YES. The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the
moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship. Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer
the duty to ―account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.‖ Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand,
mandates that ―[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds x x x of his client when due or upon demand.‖
In this case, respondent on separate occasions, received payments for attorney‘s fees and partial payments for monetary awards on
behalf of complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite the number of times he had been receiving payment, respondent neither
informed the complainant of such fact nor rendered an accounting thereon. It was only when an Alias Writ of Execution was issued
and being implemented when complainant discovered that spouses Lopez had already given respondent the total amount of
P95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary awards granted to him by the labor tribunal. To make matters worse, respondent
withheld and refused to deliver to the complainant said amount, which he merely received on behalf of his client, even after
demand. Complainant brought the matter before the barangay, but respondent simply ignored the same. Such failure and
inordinate refusal on the part of the respondent to render an accounting and return the money after demand raises the presumption
that he converted it to his own use. His unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against
him.
On respondent‘s alleged authority to receive payments on behalf of complainant, there is nothing in the records which would support
said claim, other than his self-serving statements. Neither is there proof that complainant agreed to pay him additional 25%
attorney‘s fees and reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly incurred in connection with the case. Respondent did not present
any document, retainer‘s agreement, or itemized breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim. In any event,
even assuming that respondent was authorized to receive payments, the same does not exempt him from his duty of promptly
informing his client of the amounts he received in the course of his professional employment. The fiduciary nature of the
relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for
or from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has collected for his client. The fact
that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney‘s fees on the money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the
obligation to make a prompt accounting. Moreover, a lawyer has no right to unilaterally appropriate his client‘s money for himself by
the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney‘s fees. Considering, however, that this is respondent‘s first offense and he is
already a nonagenarian, the Court, in the exercise of its compassionate judicial discretion, finds that a penalty of one year
suspension is sufficient.
#7 CONCEPCION v. DE LA ROSA A.C. No.10681 Feb 3, 2015 Perlas-Bernabe
PETITIONER: SPOUSES HENRY and BLESILDA S. RESPONDENT: ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA
CONCEPCION
DOCTRINE: The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. The rule against
borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence
over his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings
to renege on his obligation.
In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same, respondent abused the trust
and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.
FACTS: Spouses Henry and Blesilda Concepcion (complainants) alleged that from 1997 to August 2008, respondent Atty. Dela
Rosa served as their retained lawyer.
On March 23, 2006, respondent asked to borrow the amount of P2.5M, which he promised to return with interest after 5 days.
Complainants agreed and issued 3 checks in respondent's name, totalling P2.5M. Upon receipt, respondent signed a piece of paper
containing: (a) photocopies of the checks; (b) an acknowledgment that he received the checks and that he agreed to return the
P2.5M, plus monthly interest of 5%, within 5 days. Respondent encashed the checks, but after 5 days, he failed to pay his loan.
Despite several demands, respondent failed to pay. By August 2008, complainants through their new counsel, Atty. dela Serna, sent
a demand letter. This time, respondent denied borrowing any money from them but claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault
(Nault), one of his other clients, was the real debtor. Complainants brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in Barangay
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City but failed to reach a settlement.
Complainants filed a complaint with IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter charging respondent with violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
Respondent denied borrowing money from complainants, insisting that Nault was the real debtor. Complainants denied knowing
Nault and said that it defies common sense for them to extend an unsecured loan in the amount of P2.5M to a person they don't
even know. Besides, the checks were issued in Dela Rosa's name. Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint, categorically
denied knowing the complainants and incurring the same obligation.
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer shall
not borrow money from his clients unless the client's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice;
(b) Canon 7 which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all monies and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. IBP Board of Governors adopted the Commissioner's Report but reduced the penalty against the respondent to
indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordered the return of P2.5M with legal interest.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for obtaining a loan from his clients and failing
to pay the same
HELD: Yes. Respondent's receipt of the P2.5M loan from complainants is amply supported by substantial evidence. His theory that
Nault is the real debtor hardly inspires belief as the latter himself denied knowing the complainants and incurring the obligation.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his client unless the client's interests are
fully protected:
CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.04 — A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully protected by the nature of the
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client."
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. The rule against borrowing of money by a
lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes that
the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. The respondent
borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and whose interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully
protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely on the former's word that he will return the
money plus interest within 5 days. However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients
the runaround up to this day. Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same, respondent abused the trust and
confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, thereby
violating Canon 7 of the CPR:
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
For this case, the Court's only concern is the determination of respondent's administrative liability; it should not involve his civil
liability. Hence, the IBP's recommended return of the P2.5M (which was a loan and not paid consideration of his professional
services) lies beyond the ambit of this administrative case. Having been found guilty of violating Canon 7, Rule 16.04, and Canon 16
of the CPR, respondent is given a 3-year suspension and a stern warning.
#8 YU v. DE LA CRUZ A.C. NO. 10912 JANUARY 19, 2016 PONENTE
PETITIONER: PAULINA T. YU RESPONDENT: ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ
DOCTRINE: The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking
advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use
all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property from a client
outside the limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.
FACTS: On November 29, 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting, respondent lawyer borrowed pieces of jewelry
from complainant and pledged the same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. for the amount of P29,945.50, as shown in the
Promissory Note with Deed of Pledge. Respondent lawyer appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to
facilitate the redemption of the said jewelry, respondent lawyer issued to complainant, Citystate Savings Bank Check No. 0088551,
dated August 31, 2011, in the amount of P34,500.00. Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the check
was dishonored for the reason, "Account Closed." Complainant immediately notified respondent lawyer of the dishonor of the check.
In a letter, dated March 23, 2012, complainant demanded for the refund of the acceptance fees received by respondent lawyer prior
to the "abandonment" of the cases and the payment of the value of the jewelry, but to no avail. In another letter, dated April 18,
2012, this time represented by another lawyer, Atty. Francisco C. Miralles, complainant yet again demanded the redemption of the
check in cash within five days from notice; the refund of the paid acceptance fees, in exchange for which no service was rendered;
the payment of the value of the pledged jewelry in the amount of PI00,000.00 in order to avoid the interests due and the possible
foreclosure of the pledge; and moral damages of P 300,000.00. For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pinas City, against him.
On June 7, 2012, a verified complaint was filed with the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), where complainant prayed
for the disbarment of respondent lawyer on account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and commission of acts
in violation of the lawyer's oath. The IBP-CBD required respondent lawyer to submit his answer to the complaint. Despite having
been duly served with a copy of the complaint and the order to file his answer, as shown in a certification issued by the Post Master
of the Las Piñas Central Post Office, respondent still failed to file an answer. Respondent lawyer was likewise notified of the
scheduled mandatory conference/hearing on November 23, 2012, but only the complainant and her counsel appeared on the said
day. The IBP-CBD then ordered the resetting of the mandatory conference for the last time to January 11, 2013 and the personal
service of the notice thereof to respondent lawyer's given address. Notwithstanding the receipt of the notice by respondent lawyer's
mother, he still failed to appear during the conference, prompting complainant to move for the termination of the conference and the
submission of the case for report and recommendation.
On June 7, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of respondent lawyer from the practice of law.
Based on the evidence on record, respondent lawyer was found to have violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the borrowing of money from a client, unless the latter's interests were fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Worse, respondent lawyer had clearly issued a worthless check in violation of law
which was against Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR stating that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct."
ISSUE/S: Whether or not respondent’s unfulfilled promise to facilitate the redemption of the jewelry and his act of issuing
a worthless check constitute grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath
HELD: YES. In the case at bench, the complaint stemmed from the use by respondent lawyer of his client's property. He had,
indeed, come into possession of valuable pieces of jewelry which he presented as security in a contract of pledge. Complainant
voluntarily and willingly delivered her jewelry worth P135,000.00 to respondent lawyer who meant to borrow it and pawn it thereafter.
This act alone shows respondent lawyer's blatant disregard of Rule 16.04. Complainant's acquiescence to the "pawning" of her
jewelry becomes immaterial considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are proscribed from borrowing money or property from
clients, unless the latter's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Here, respondent lawyer's
act of borrowing does not constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer used his client's jewelry in order to obtain, and then
appropriate for himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his
client. That he might have intended to subsequently pay his client the value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves
detestation was the very act of his exercising influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits from the
latter's property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust
and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing
of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.
Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property from a client outside the limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical act that
warrants sanction.
Due to complainant's respect for respondent lawyer, she trusted his representation that the subject jewelry would be redeemed
upon maturity. She accepted respondent lawyer's check, which was eventually dishonored upon presentment. Despite notice of the
dishonor, respondent lawyer did not take steps to remedy the situation and, on the whole, reneged on his obligation, constraining
complainant to avail of legal remedies against him.
#9 RAMOS v. MANDAGAN G.R. No. A.C. No. 11128 April 6, 2016 Reyes, J.
PETITIONER: Pedro Ramos RESPONDENT
DOCTRINE: When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer must render an accounting
to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the
money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client
FACTS: Ramos alleged that Atty. Mandagan demanded from him the amount of P300,000 in connection with the criminal case filed
against him for murder before the Sandiganbayan. He further alleged that the said P300,000 shall be used as a bail bond in the
event that his petition for bail in the said case criminal case is granted. Thereafter, Atty. Mandagan collected a additional amount of
P10,000 for operating expenses. An Acknowledgment Receipt was issued in his favor of herein complainant. Unfortunately, the
petition for bail was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, Atty. Mandagan withdrew as his counsel without returning the amount
of ₱300,000.00 despite the demand sent by Ramos‘ counsel. As such, herein complainant filed a disbarment case against Atty.
Mandagan for gross misconduct. In her Answer, Atty. Mandagan argued that the amount of ₱300,000.00 was not intended for
payment of bail, but as mobilization expenses for preparation of witnesses, defenses, and other documentary exhibits for both
Ramos and his co-accused Gary Silawon. Atty. Mandagan likewise alleged that Ramos never paid her for acceptance, appearance
fees, and legal services rendered in the entire course of the proceedings until her withdrawal as counsel.
On December 18, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation, finding Atty. Mandagan liable for gross misconduct
and for failure to render an accounting of funds, and recommended that Atty. Mandagan be suspended for a period of one (1) year.
Subsequently, the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in a
Resolution dated October 11, 2014.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty Mandagan violated Canon 16 of the CPR-YES
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court explained that when a lawyer receives money from the client for a
particular purpose, the lawyer must render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the
client. In the present case, Atty. Mandagan never denied receiving the amount of ₱300,000.00 from Ramos for the purpose of
posting a bond to secure the latter‘s provisional liberty. When the petition for bail of Ramos, however, was denied by the
Sandiganbayan, Atty. Mandagan failed to return the amount to Ramos. Worse, she unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to
Ramos despite demand from Ramos‘ counsel. Clearly, Atty. Mandagan failed to act in accordance with the rule stated in Canon 16
of the CPR, to wit:
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
A lawyer has the duty to deliver his client‘s funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand. His failure to return the client‘s
money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation
of the trust reposed in him by the client.
The Court disregarded the defense of Atty. Mandagan for failing to substantiate the same.
#10 MALANGAS v. ZAIDE G.R. No. DATE PONENTE
PETITIONER: DATU ISMAEL MALANGAS RESPONDENT: ATTY. PAUL C. ZAIDE
DOCTRINE: "The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with
the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship." Any lawyer who does not live up to this duty
must be prepared to take the consequences of his waywardness.|
FACTS: Datu Malangas engaged the services of Atty. Paul Zaide to prosecute his claim for damages against Paul Alfeche and
NEMA Electric and Industrial Sales. The complaint arose from an accident when two vehicles hit nad pinned Malangas in between
them, causing him to lose consciousness.
Malangas alleged that he gave respondent lawyer P20,000 as acceptance fee and P50,000 as filing fees; that respondent made him
believe that the amount of P50,000.00 was needed as filing fees in order to commence a P5 million-damage suit; that subsequently,
respondent lawyer filed on his behalf a complaint for damages before the RTC; that respondent lawyer then furnished him
(complainant) with a copy of said Complaint seeking to recover damages in the amount of P5 million.
However, Malangas later discovered that the complaint had been dismissed because of failure to prosecute because Zaide failed to
attend 2 hearings and he also did not submit an opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by NEMA. When he asked the respondent
to file an MR, the lawyer filed a withdrawal of appearance as counsel. Malangas also found out that Atty. Zaide only asked for
P250,000damages and not P5M as stated in the copy of the complaint given to him.
Atty. Zaide claimed that complainant was a client of the Zaragoza-Macabangkit Law Offices and he only received appearance fees
in attending to Malangas‘ civil case, denying the receipt of any fees. He also contended that he intentionally filed no opposition to
the MTD because they discovered that NEMA‘s car did not in fact hit Malangas and that despite the fact that Alfeche had already
settled with complainant, the latter still persisted in pursuing the civil case and that at this point, he realized that complainant was
acting under the compulsion of greed so he decided to withdraw from the case as complainant's counsel.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty. Zaide violated the CPR.
HELD: YES. Respondent lawyer claims that as a mere associate in the Zaragoza Macabangkit Law offices, "he has NO
participation whatsoever regarding the fees the complainant is giving to the office." But respondent lawyer himself admitted that he
received P7,000 for the docket fees and the rest was paid as advance fees for his services and the usual visitation done by him at
the hospital. His former law partners also said that the payment made by complainant to Atty. Zaide belongs to him exclusively and
they do not interfere in the arrangement and they do not have any share thereof.‖
Respondent's refusal to account for the funds given to him, especially his refusal to return the amount paid in excess of what was
required as docket fees, clearly violated Rules 16.01and16.03 of the CPR.
By his deliberate failure to file a Comment on or Opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss, and by his failure to appear at the
hearings in connection therewith, respondent lawyer unduly delayed the case as the trial court had to postpone the hearings
thereon, and this, in turn, naturally arrested the progress of the case insofar as NEMA was concerned. As previously mentioned, the
RTC had to put off for 37 days its ruling on NEMA.'s Motion to Dismiss because respondent lawyer moved for time to oppose the
same.
F. Duty of Fairness
#1 CADAVEDO v. LACAYA G.R. No. January 15, Brion,

173188 2014 J.
PETITIONER: THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE RESPONDENT: VICTORINO (VIC) T.
CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased), substituted by LACAYA, married to Rosa Legados
their heirs, namely: HERMINIA, PASTORA, Heirs of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of
RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO
DOCTRINE: The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response "to medieval practice of assigning
doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation that such individuals would enjoy
greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in exchange for which they would receive an entitlement to the
spoils of the litigation." "In order to safeguard the administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance were
made subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a common law rule was developed, striking down champertous
agreements and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds of public policy."
FACTS: The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses Cadavedo) acquired a homestead
grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land known as Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte.
They were issued Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on March 13, 1953 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-376 on July 2, 1953. On
April 30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses
Ames). Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name of the spouses Ames.
The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action before the RTC (then Court of First Instance) of
Zamboanga City against the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed
to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for
health reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty. Lacaya.
On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in
the names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses
Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads:
10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if they become the
prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum of P2,000.00 for attorney's fees.
In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the subject lot to the spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo, thru
Atty. Lacaya, appealed the case to the CA. On August 13, 1980, the CA issued its decision in Civil Case No. 1721 , reversing the
decision of the RTC and declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest to the spouses Ames null and void ab
initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the initial payment and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the spouses Ames'
TCT No. T- 4792 and to reissue another title in the name of the spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via the
spouses Ames' petition for review on certiorari which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.
With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721 , Atty. Lacaya filed on September 21, 1981 a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution. On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 ,
and the spouses Cadavedo were placed in possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981.
Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorney's fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal
portions, based on area, and selected the more valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses
Cadavedo.
Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the respondents and ejected them. The
latter responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
On May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement (compromise agreement) in Civil Case No. 215 (the
ejectment case), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the
agreement. The MTC approved the compromise agreement in a decision dated June 10, 1982.
On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the respondents, assailing the MTC-approved
compromise agreement. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses
Cadavedo prayed, among others, that the respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered
to render an accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from 1981; and that the RTC fix the attorney's fees on a quantum
meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the attorney's fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is valid and reasonable, and binds the
petitioners.
HELD: NO. The alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of one-half of the subject lot was not reduced to writing prior to or, at
most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya's engagement as the spouses Cadavedo's counsel in Civil Case No. 1721. An agreement between
the lawyer and his client, providing for the former's compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing contracts in general. As
the rules stand, controversies involving written and oral agreements on attorney's fees shall be resolved in favor of the former.
Hence, the contingency fee of P2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee
agreement of one-half of the subject lot.
The respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses Cadavedo in Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the
litigation expenses, without providing for reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot.
This agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy. Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an
aggravated form), is a common law doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period. The doctrine of maintenance was directed
"against wanton and inofficious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the intermeddler has no interest whatever, and
where the assistance rendered is without justification or excuse." Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by "the receipt of a
share of the proceeds of the litigation by the intermeddler." Some common law court decisions, however, add a second factor in
determining champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer must also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the
litigation."
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response "to medieval practice of assigning doubtful or fraudulent
claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation that such individuals would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those
claims in court, in exchange for which they would receive an entitlement to the spoils of the litigation." "In order to safeguard the
administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a
common law rule was developed, striking down champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on
the grounds of public policy."
In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for public policy considerations. As
matters currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to
save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law." The rule of the
profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case
at the lawyer's expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these
arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his
own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice
of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his client's cause."
In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly transgresses the Canons of
Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a
lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation. The same reasons discussed
above underlie this rule.
We likewise strike down the questioned attorney's fee and declare it void for being excessive and unconscionable.While Civil Case
No. 1721 took twelve years to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a
large fee in the absence of any showing that special skills and additional work had been involved. The issue involved in that case,
as observed by the RTC (and with which we agree), was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and
research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the sale of a homestead lot within five years from its acquisition.
That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedo's counsel in the two subsequent cases did not and could not otherwise
justify an attorney's fee of one-half of the subject lot. As asserted by the petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made
separate arrangements for the costs and expenses for each of these two cases. Thus, the expenses for the two subsequent cases
had been considered and taken cared of. Based on these considerations, we therefore find one-half of the subject lot as attorney's
fee excessive and unreasonable.
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject
of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession. The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics.
A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is subject of the judicial action. 34 Following this
definition, we find that the subject lot was still in litigation when Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this
regard the following established facts: (1) on September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
in Civil Case No. 1721 ; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses Cadavedo; (3)
on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the
spouses Cadavedo took possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot was surveyed and
subdivided into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one of the subdivided portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982,
Vicente and Atty. Lacaya executed the compromise agreement.
From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement or an agreement subsequently entered into,
Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion (which was after October 24, 1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 were already pending before the lower courts. Similarly, the compromise
agreement, including the subsequent judicial approval, was effected during the pendency of Civil Case No. 3352 . In all of these, the
relationship of a lawyer and a client still existed between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.
Thus, whether we consider these transactions — the transfer of the disputed one-half portion and the compromise agreement —
independently of each other or resulting from one another, we find them to be prohibited and void by reason of public policy. Under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are contrary to public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law
are considered inexistent and void from the beginning.
In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in effect, impliedly set aside any express stipulation on the attorney's
fees, and the petitioners, by express contention, submit the reasonableness of such fees to the court's discretion. We thus have to
fix the attorney's fees on a quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit — meaning 'as much as he deserves' — is used as basis for determining a lawyer's professional fees in the
absence of a contract . . . taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees." "Its essential requisite is the
acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him
that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation" for it. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to
prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, factors such as the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the time spent and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges
for similar services, the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service, to name a few,
are considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer is entitled.
In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and setting Atty. Lacaya's fees based on quantum
meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases were not novel and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms
of time, skill or the performance of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three
civil cases beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases (Cadavedo v.
Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching up to this Court; the second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third
(Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property subject of these civil cases is of a
considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765 hectares.
All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTC's considerations in appreciating the character of the services that Atty.
Lacaya rendered in the three cases, subject to modification on valuation. We believe and so hold that the respondents are entitled to
two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the fruits previously received from the disputed one-half
portion, as attorney's fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half portion.
The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit of the client, not the lawyer,
particularly in a legal situation when the law itself holds clear and express protection to the rights of the client to the disputed
property (a homestead lot). Premium consideration, in other words, is on the rights of the owner, not on the lawyer who only helped
the owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise, the lawyer does indeed effectively acquire a
property right over the disputed property. If at all, due recognition of parity between a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of
the disputed property, which in this case, the Court properly accords.
#2 DALUPAN v. GACOTT A.C. No. 5067 June 29, 2015 PONENTE
PETITIONER: Corazon M. Dalupan RESPONDENT: Atty. Glenn C. Gacott
DOCTRINE: There is a distinction between attorney’s fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled that attorney’s fee is
understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept. In its ordinary sense, attorney’s fee refers to the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney’s
fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages.
FACTS: Complainant Corazon M. Dalupan filed a complaint against Atty. Gacott in April 20, 1999. In her complaint-affidavit, she
alleged that was a defendant in a criminal case for grave slander pending before the MTC of Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Meanwhile,
her son, Wilmer Dalupan, was also a defendant in a separate criminal case for grave slander and malicious mischief pending before
the same court. In order to represent the complainant and her son, the complainant engaged the legal services of the respondent
Atty. Glenn C. Gacot who then charged an acceptance fee of ₱10,000.
On August 20, 1996, Dalupan paid the Atty. Gacott ₱5,000 as initial payment for his acceptance fee.
On August 27, 1996, Dalupan requested Atty. Gacott to draft a Motion to Reduce Bail Bond. However, Atty. Gacott allegedly denied
the request and claimed that it was beyond the scope of his retainer services. Thus, the Dalupan alleged that she caused a certain
Rolly Calbento to draft the same which was however signed by the respondent.
On January 31, 1997, after Dalupan paid Atty. Gacott the remaining balance of ₱5,000 for his acceptance fee, she asked for an
Official Receipt from the latter. However, Atty. Gacott latter refused saying that there was no need for the issuance of a receipt. On
that same day, Dalupan also paid the respondent ₱500 for his appearance fee in the preliminary conference and arraignment which
occurred on the same day.
Thereafter, Atty. Gacott neglected his duties as counsel and failed to attend any of the hearings before the MTC. As a result, a
counsel de oficio was appointed to represent Dalupan.
This prompted Dalupan to file the instant complaint for disbarment against the respondent.
Atty. Gacott‘s defense:

Atty. Gacott denied the allegations in the complaint. He averred that Dalupan approached him to engage his services for several
criminal cases where her family or a relative of hers was a party.
As regards the issue on the motion for reduction of bail bond, Atty. Gacott avers that he actually drafted the same and filed it with
the MTC. On the same day that it was filed, Dalupan approached Atty. Gacott in his law officeand demanded that the latter negotiate
with the MTC judge to ensure the grant of the Motion of Bail.
Atty. Gacott refused. Dalupan replied at the top of her voice: "Binabayaran kita, bakit hindi mo ginagawa ang gusto ko?"
Atty. Gacott answered: "Hindi po lahat ng gusto ninyo ay gagawin ko, sa tama lamang po tayo, abogado po ninyo ako, hindi ako
fixer."
Dalupan threatened Atty. Gacott that he will replace him. However, when the MTC of Puerto Princesa City eventually granted the
motion, Dalupan revoked her threat that she will replace the Atty. Gacott.
On August 19, 1997, the MTC of Puerto Princesa City issued a Notice of Hearing to the complainant and her son Wilmer Dalupan in
connection with their criminal cases pending therein. However, Atty. Gacott failed to attend the scheduled hearing as he allegedly
failed to receive a copy of the Notice of Hearing. Thus, in his written explanation he attributed his failure to appear before the MTC
to the inefficiency of the process server of the said court.
Dalupan terminated the services of Atty. Gacott and replaced him with with Atty. Roland Pay. The MTC relieved Atty. Gacott of any
responsibility in the criminal cases involving Dalupan and her son.
Atty. Gacott argued that he was not guilty of abandonment or neglect of duty because it was the complainant who willfully
terminated his services even without fault or negligence on his part.
The case was referred to the IBP for investigation. Investigating commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E Reyes recommended the dismissal of
the complaint for disbarment since it was Dalupan who discharged Atty. Gacott. At the same time, he also recommended that the
respondent return the payment of the attorney‘s fee to the complainant in the amount of ₱5,000.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved in toto the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It
denied Atty. Gacott‘s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition which raises the sole issue of whether the respondent should return the payment of the attorney‘s fee to
the complainant in the amount of ₱5,000.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty. Gacott is guilty of negligence in the performance of his obligations to his client
HELD: No. Respondent did not commit any fault or negligence in the performance of his obligations under the retainer agreement
which was wilfully terminated by the complainant on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. As held by the Investigating
Commissioner, the evidence on record shows that the respondent is not liable for abandonment or neglect of duty. Thus, the return
of the acceptance fee is not warranted.
As regards the return of the amount of ₱5,000

There is a distinction between attorney‘s fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled that attorney‘s fee is understood both in its
ordinary and extraordinary concept. In its ordinary sense, attorney‘s fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by
his client for legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney‘s fee is awarded by the court to the
successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages. In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner
referred to the attorney‘s fee in its ordinary concept.
On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because once
the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the opposing party based on the prohibition on
conflict of interest. Thus, the incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore indemnified by
the payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not
measured by the nature and extent of the legal services rendered.
In the present case, based on a simple reading of the Official Receipt dated August 20, 1996, the parties clearly intended the
payment of ₱5,000 to serve as acceptance fee of the respondent, and not attorney‘s fee. Moreover, both parties expressly claimed
that they intended such payment as the acceptance fee of the respondent. Absent any other evidence showing a contrary intention
of the parties, we find that the Investigating Commissioner gravely erred in referring to the amount to be returned by the respondent
as attorney‘s fee.
No fault or negligence
Once a lawyer receives the acceptance fee for his legal services, he is expected to serve his client with competence, and to attend
to his client‘s cause with diligence, care and devotion.
In the present case, the complainant alleged that she requested the respondent to draft a Motion to Reduce Bail Bond which was
denied by the latter. She also claimed that the respondent failed to attend any of the hearing before the MTC. Thus, the complainant
filed the present complaint for disbarment on the ground of abandonment or neglect of duty. On the other hand, the respondent
denied the allegation that he failed to draft the Motion to Reduce Bail Bond and submitted a copy of the MTC Order dated August
28, 1996 granting the motion to reduce bail. He also justified his failure to attend the hearings before the MTC to the failure of the
process server to provide him with a Notice of Hearing.
Other than her bare allegations, the complainant failed to present any evidence to support her claim that the respondent committed
abandonment or neglect of duty. Thus, we are constrained to affirm the factual findings of the Investigating Commissioner that the
presumption of regularity should prevail in favor of the respondent. Absent any fault or negligence on the part of the respondent, we
see no legal basis for the order of the Investigating Commissioner to return the attorney‘s fee (acceptance fee) of ₱5,000.
G. Duty of Competence and Diligence
#1 PENILLA v. ALCID A.C. No. 9149 September 4, 2013 VILLARAMA, JR
PETITIONER JULIAN PENILLA RESPONDENT ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR
DOCTRINE: A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an
odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy
adopted in the criminal complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could have been easily
averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for complainant. A lawyer is expected to be
acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just
a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole hearted fealty to the client’s cause. Similarly,
under Rule 18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments of the case and all other
information relevant thereto. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, it is the complainant
who has the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence the allegations in the complaint.
FACTS: Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Rey and Evelyn Garin (the spouses) for the repair of
his Volkswagen automobile. Despite full payment, the spouses defaulted in their obligation. Thus, complainant decided to file a case
for breach of contract against the spouses where he engaged the services of respondent as counsel. Respondent sent a demand
letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of complainant‘s payment. When the spouses failed to return the payment,
respondent advised complainant that he would file a criminal case for estafa against said spouses. Respondent charged P30,000 as
attorney‘s fees and P10,000 as filing fees. Respondent then filed the complaint for estafa before Asst. City Prosecutor Jose C.
Fortuno of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Respondent attended the hearing with complainant but the spouses did
not appear. After the hearing, complainant paid another P1,000 to respondent as appearance fee.
When the case was submitted for resolution, respondent told him that they have to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City
Prosecutor Fortuno to expedite a favorable resolution of the case. Despite initial reservations, he later acceded to respondent‘s
suggestion, bought a bottle of Carlos Primero I for P950 and delivered it to respondent‘s office. Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later
issued a resolution dismissing the estafa case against the spouses. Respondent allegedly told complainant that a motion for
reconsideration was ―needed to have the resolution reversed.‖ Respondent then prepared the motion and promised complainant
that he would fix the problem. The motion was denied for lack of merit. Respondent then told complainant that he could not do
anything about the adverse decision and presented the option of filing a civil case for specific performance against the spouses for
the refund of the money plus damages. Complainant paid an additional P10,000 to respondent which he asked for the payment of
filing fees. After complainant signed the complaint, he was told by respondent to await further notice as to the status of the case.
Complainant claims that respondent never gave him any update thereafter, despite numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-
up the status of the case and meet with respondent at his office. He admits, however, that in one instance he was able to talk to
respondent who told him that the case was not progressing because the spouses could not be located.
Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several letters conveying his disappointment and requesting for
the return of the money and the documents in respondent‘s possession. Complainant then sought the assistance of the radio
program ―Ito ang Batas with Atty. Aga‖ to solve his predicament. Following the advice he gathered, complainant went to the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court. Complainant learned that a civil case for
Specific Performance and Damages was filed but was dismissed. He also found out that the filing fee was only P2,440 and not
P10,000 as earlier stated by respondent. Atty. Aga of the same radio program also sent respondent a letter calling his attention to
complainant‘s problem. The letter, like all of complainant‘s previous letters, was unheeded. complainant filed before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant administrative case praying that respondent be found
guilty of gross misconduct for violating the Lawyer‘s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for appropriate
administrative sanctions to be imposed.
In his answer, respondent prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of merit. He denied the allegations of the complaint that he
assured the success of the case before the prosecutor; that he asked complainant to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to the
prosecutor; that he promised to fix the case; and that he charged P10,000, as he only charged P5,000, as filing fee for the civil
case.. Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when he failed to inform petitioner of the status of
the case. In fact, he was willing to return the money and the documents of complainant. What allegedly prevented him from
communicating with complainant was the fact that complainant would go to his office during days and times that he would be
attending his daily court hearings.
The IBP-CBD recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six months ―for negligence within the
meaning of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted the resolution.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the acts of the respondent constituted a violation of Canon 18 and 18.04 of the CPR
HELD: We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent committed professional negligence under Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a modification that we also find respondent guilty of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03
of the Code and the Lawyer‘s Oath.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment
unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fibern which are not only conditions precedent to
his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.
A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that respondent violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant correctly alleged that respondent violated his oath under Canon 18 to
―serve his client with competence and diligence‖ when respondent filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would
have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was dismissed, respondent
committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and damages before the RTC. The complaint,
having an alternative prayer for the payment of damages, should have been filed with the Municipal Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over complainant‘s claim which amounts to only P36,000. The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature
of the remedy adopted in the criminal complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could have been
easily averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for complainant. What aggravates respondent‘s
offense is the fact that his previous mistake in filing the estafa case did not motivate him to be more conscientious, diligent and
vigilant in handling the case of complainant. The civil case he subsequently filed for complainant was dismissed due to what later
turned out to be a basic jurisdictional error.
After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was plainly negligent and did not apprise complainant of the status
and progress of both cases he filed for the latter. He paid no attention and showed no importance to complainant‘s cause despite
repeated follow-ups. Respondent is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in dealing with
complainant is also gross and inexcusable. In what may seem to be a helpless attempt to solve his predicament, complainant even
had to resort to consulting a program in a radio station to recover his money from respondent, or at the very least, get his attention.
A client pays his lawyer hard-earned money as professional fees. In return, ―[e]very case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Rule 18.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to ‗neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.‘ He must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding
upon his client. He is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has
the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a wholehearted fealty to the client‘s
cause.‖ Rule 18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments of the case and all other information
relevant thereto. He must be consistently mindful of his obligation to respond promptly should there be queries or requests for
information from the client.
In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the status of the cases he filed because their time
did not always coincide. The excuse proffered by respondent is too lame and flimsy to be given credit. Respondent himself admitted
that he had notice that complainant had visited his office many times. Yet, despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance exhibited by
complainant, respondent neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 to keep his client informed of the
status of his case and to respond within a reasonable time to the client‘s request for information.
Respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that ―[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.‖ The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a
lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client‘s interest. The most thorough
groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor bestowed on his person to
carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyer‘s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches
to him for the entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only satisfying the basic
requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of he interests of the client and the pursuit of justice. Respondent has
defied and failed to perform such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer‘s Oath.
As to respondent‘s proven acts and omissions which violate Canons 17 and 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer‘s Oath, we find the same to constitute gross misconduct for which he may be
suspended under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
#2 SOTTO v. PALICTE G.R. No. Feb 17, Bersamin,

169691 2014 J
PETITIONER: HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO, REPRESENTED BY: LOLIBETH SOTTO RESPONDENT: MATILDE S.
NOBLE, DANILO C. SOTTO, CRISTINA C. SOTTO, EMMANUEL C. SOTTO and PALICTE
FILEMON C. SOTTO; and SALVACION BARCELONA, AS HEIR OF DECEASED
MIGUEL BARCELONA
DOCTRINE: Upon learning in the due course of his professional service that a complaint is nothing but a replication of the
other cases, the Rules of Court and the canons of professional ethics bound him to have his clients desist from pursuing
the case. Instead, he opted to re-litigate the same issues all the way up to this Court.
FACTS: In a June 13, 2013 decision in this case, the Court directed Petitoner‘s counsel Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay to show cause
"why he should not be sanctioned as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for committing a clear violation of the rule
prohibiting forum-shopping by aiding his clients in asserting the same claims at least twice.
The Court was alarmed that this case is the fifth suit to reach the Court dividing the several heirs of the late Don Filemon Y. Sotto
(Filemon) respecting four real properties that had belonged to Filemon‘s estate (Estate of Sotto).
The first case (No. L-55076) held that herein respondent Matilde S. Palicte (Matilde), one of four declared heirs of Filemon, had
validly redeemed the four properties pursuant to the assailed deed of redemption, and was entitled to have the title over the four
properties transferred to her name, subject to the right of the three other declared heirs to join her in the redemption of the four
properties within a period of six months.
The second was the civil case filed by Pascuala against Matilde (Civil Case No. CEB-19338) to annul the former‘s waiver of rights,
and to restore her as a co-redemptioner of Matilde with respect to the four properties (G.R. No. 131722).
The third was an incident in Civil Case No. R-10027 (that is, the suit brought by the heirs of Carmen Rallos against the Estate of
Sotto) wherein the heirs of Miguel belatedly filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the order issued be set aside, and that
they be still included as Matilde‘s co-redemptioners. After the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit,
the heirs of Miguel elevated the denial to the CA on certiorari and prohibition, but the CA dismissed their petition and upheld the
order. Thence, the heirs of Miguel came to the Court on certiorari (G.R. No. 154585), but the Court dismissed their petition for being
filed out of time and for lack of merit.
The fourth was The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto, represented by its duly designated Administrator, Sixto Sotto Pahang, Jr. v.
Matilde S. Palicte, et al. (G.R. No. 158642), whereby the Court expressly affirmed the ruling rendered by the probate court in Cebu
City in Special Proceedings No. 2706-R entitled Intestate Estate of the Deceased Don Filemon Sotto denying the administrator‘s
motion to require Matilde to turn over the four real properties to the Estate of Sotto.
The fifth is this case. It seems that the disposition by the Court of the previous cases did not yet satisfy herein petitioners despite
their being the successors-in-interest of two of the declared heirs of Filemon who had been parties in the previous cases either
directly or in privity. They now pray that the Court undo the decision, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) declared their action for the
partition of the four properties as already barred by the judgments previously rendered, and the resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration.
Atty. Mahinay submitted a so-called Compliance containing his explanations, praying that he not be sanctioned for violating the rule
against forum shopping, as follows:
1. The first three cases did not resolve the issues raised in Civil Case No. CEB-24393;
2. Marcelo Sotto‘s cause of action arose only when respondent Palicte violated her "hypothetically admitted" agreement with
Marcelo Sotto;
3. He (Atty. Mahinay) was not the one who had prepared and signed the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-24393, although he
assumed the responsibility as to its filing;
4. He (Atty. Mahinay) had filed a motion for referral or consolidation of Civil Case No. CEB-24293 with the intestate proceedings of
the Estate of Filemon Y. Sotto, and
5. He (Atty. Mahinay) had acted in good faith in assisting the administrator of the Estate of Filemon Y. Sotto in filing the Motion to
Require Matilde Palicte To Turn Over And/or Account Properties Owned by the Estate in Her Possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mahinay committed forum shopping, hence violated his duty of competence and diligence.
HELD: YES. The Court considers Atty. Mahinay‘s explanations unsatisfactory. The complaint was properly dismissed because of
res judicata. There is no question that the ultimate objective of each of the actions was the return of the properties to the Estate in
order that such properties would be partitioned among the heirs. In the other cases, the petitioners failed to attain the objective
because Palicte‘s right in the properties had been declared exclusive. There was between Civil Case No. CEB-24293 and the other
cases a clear identity of the parties, of subject matter, of evidence, and of the factual and legal issues raised. The Court saw through
the petitioners‘ "ploy to countermand the previous decisions‘ sustaining Palicte‘s rights over the properties."
Rather than prove good faith, the filing of the complaint, "simply guided by the facts as narrated and the documentary evidence
submitted by petitioners,"smacked of professional irresponsibility. It is axiomatic that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation.He is expected to make a thorough study and an independent assessment of the case he is about to
commence. As such, his claim of good faith was utterly baseless and unfounded.
Moreover, laying the blame on the associate lawyer is not plausible. Any client who employs a law firm undeniably engages the
entire law firm, not a particular member of it. Consequently, it was not only the associate lawyer but the entire law firm, Atty.
Mahinay included, who had presumably prepared the complaint. For Atty. Mahinay to insist the contrary is the height of professional
irresponsibility.
Even assuming that Atty. Mahinay did not himself prepare the complaint, it remains that he subsequently personally handled the
case. In so doing, he had sufficient time to still become fully acquainted with the previous cases and their incidents, and thereby
learn in the due course of his professional service to the petitioners that the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was nothing but
a replication of the other cases. Under the circumstances, the Rules of Court and the canons of professional ethics bound him to
have his clients desist from pursuing the case. Instead, he opted to re-litigate the same issues all the way up to this Court. His
actuations did not manifest good faith on his part. Instead, they indicated an obsession to transfer the case to another court to
enable his clients to have another chance to obtain a favorable resolution, and still constituted deliberate forum shopping.
And, lastly, Atty. Mahinay insists that his disclosure of the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-24293 proved that forum shopping was
not in his mind at all. The insistence cannot command belief. The disclosure alone of the pendency of a similar case does not
negate actual forum shopping. Had Atty. Mahinay been sincere, the least he could have done was to cause the dismissal of the
action that replicated those already ruled against his clients. The records show otherwise. The filing of the Motion to Require Matilde
Palicte To Turn Over And/or Account Properties Owned by the Estate in Her Possession on June 7, 2000, a day after the trial court
denied his motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. CEB-24293, was undeniably another attempt of the petitioners and Atty.
Mahinay to obtain a different resolution of the same claim.
The acts of a party or his counsel clearly constituting willful and deliberate forum shopping shall be ground for the summary
dismissal of the case with prejudice, and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as be a cause for administrative sanctions against
the lawyer. If the forum shopping is not willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of
the two grounds mentioned above. But if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions
shall be dismissed with prejudice.
In view of the foregoing, Atty. Mahinay was guilty of forum shopping. Under Revised Circular No. 28-91, any willful and deliberate
forum shopping by any party and his counsel through the filing of multiple petitions or complaints to ensure favorable action shall
constitute direct contempt of court. Direct contempt of court is meted the summary penalty of fine not exceeding ₱2,000.00.
#3 FIGUERAS v. JIMENEZ A.C. No. 9116 March 12, 2014 VILLARAMA, JR., J.
PETITIONER: NESTOR B. FIGUERAS and BIENVENIDO RESPONDENT: ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ

VICTORIA, JR
DOCTRINE: A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with
utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties
as counsel
FACTS: Congressional Village Homeowner‘s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the homeowners of
Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for
damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag8 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building
a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way.
The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71
which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to
any subdivision or community street.
The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with respondent as the
counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the
Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999,
the CA issued a Resolution11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577 dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the
appellant‘s brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated
that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not
meritorious. The CA resolution became final.
Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association,
filed a Complaint12 for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in
handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.
Respondent claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowner‘s association in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was
actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over
the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling
lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and spent
personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander at no cost to the Association.
Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for President of the homeowner‘s
association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other
assessments. Complainants and other delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were
sued by the association before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present
disbarment case against him and several other cases against him and other officers of the association before the HLURB to
question, among others, the legitimacy of the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the Association.
Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him.
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months
Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009-1415 adopting the recommendation with modifications deleting the
warning
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the respondent’s acts constitute violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing to file the same?
HELD: The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit
does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyer‘s misconduct "is in no sense
a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome."17
In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that "[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings." The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining
suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.
Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel for Congressional
Village Homeowner‘s Association, Inc. Records show that respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellant‘s
brief 95 days after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of the
homeowner‘s association. To justify his inexcusable negligence, respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer and
that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed
with the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous motion had
been filed but "due to the health condition of the undersigned counsel…he was not able to finish said Appellants‘ Brief within the
fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by him."19 Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter‘s interest with utmost diligence. In
failing to file the appellant‘s brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule
12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case
and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyer‘s failure to file brief for his client as amounting to inexcusable
negligence. The Court held:
An attorney is bound to protect his client‘s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.1âwphi1 (Del Rosario vs. Court
of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs.
Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the
Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice.
#4 BAENS v. SEMPIO G.R. No. AC 10378 DATE June 9, 2014 PONENTE Reyes, J.
PETITIONER: JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS RESPONDENT: ATTY. JONATHAN T. SEMPIO
DOCTRINE: It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the complainant's case, he became duty-
bound to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to champion his cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing
to afford his client every remedy and defense that is authorized by law, the respondent fell short of what is expected of him
as an officer of the Court.
FACTS: Jose Francisco Baens engaged the services of Atty. Jonathan Sempio to represent him and file a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage against his wife, Lourdes Mendiola-Baens.
Jose alleged that despite receiving P250,000, the respondent failed to file the petition and it was Lourdes who filed the same; that
Jose was given a copy of a summons dated December 15, 2008 but respondent only filed an answer on March 13, 2009; that
respondent failed to make an objection on the ground of improper venue because he and his wife were not residents of Dasmariñas,
Cavite; he never bothered to check the status of the case and failed to attend all the hearings; and that as a result, the case was
decided without the complainant without being able to present his evidence.
Respondent denied the allegations in the complaint and claimed that the petition was filed in Malabon but the complainant refused
to testify, so the case was withdrawn; and that it was the complainant‘s fault why the answer was filed late. He also alleged that his
failure to attend the hearings was due to his not having received any notices from the trial court.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not respondent failed to diligently attend to the case and was grossly negligent in discharging his
responsibilities considering the fact that he has already been fully compensated
HELD: YES. The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients
are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote
his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
The excuse proffered by the respondent that he did not receive any orders or notices from the trial court is highly intolerable. In the
first place, securing a copy of such notices, orders and case records was within the respondent‘s control and is a task that a lawyer
undertakes. Moreso, the preparation and the filing of the answer is a matter of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control
and responsibility of the respondent. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures necessary and incidental to the
advancement of his client‘s cause of action.
In this case, the respondent‘s reckless and inexcusable negligence deprived his client of due process and his actions were evidently
prejudicial to his clients‘ interests.
A lawyer‘s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal
advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their
termination even without prodding from the client or the court. It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the
complainant‘s case, he became duty-bound to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to champion his cause with
whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his client every remedy and defense that is authorized by law, the respondent fell short of
what is expected of him as an officer of the Court.
Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which states that "a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." It further mandates
that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence," and that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
#5 FORONDA v. ALVAREZ G.R. No. A.C. No. 9976 June 25, 2014 PONENTE Reyes, J.
PETITIONER ALMIRA C. FORONDA RESPONDENT: ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR
DOCTRINE: Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."27 "[H]e is required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility
to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion."28 "A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor
not only protects the interest of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession.
FACTS: From the foregoing, it appears that the following facts are not disputed. The complainant is an overseas Filipino worker
based in Dubai. During her vacation in the Philippines in May 2008, she contracted the services of respondent to file a petition for
the annulment of her marriage for an agreed packaged fee of [P]195,000.00 which she paid in full by June 2008. Respondent,
however, filed the petition for the annulment of her marriage only in July 2009. In the meantime, more specifically in June 2008,
respondent obtained [P]200,000.00 from complainant with the promise to pay the same with interestat 4% per month starting July
2008 until June 2009. Respondent issued complainant eleven (11) checks for [P]8,000.00 each postdated checks monthly from 10
July 2008 until 10 May 2009 plus a check for [P]108,000.00 payable on 10 June 2009 and another check for [P]100,000.00 payable
on 8 June 2009. When presented for payment, the first two (2) checks were good but the rest of the checks were dishonored for
being drawn against a closed account. When complainant demanded payment, respondent issued to her eight (8) new replacement
postdated checks dated 25th of every month from June 2009 to January 2010. All of the replacement checks, however, were
likewise dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. When respondent was unable to pay respondent, complainant filed a
criminal complaint against him for violation of BP 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa. The criminal complaint
was eventually dismissed after complainant executed an affidavit of desistance after she was paid a certain amount by respondent.
The Investigating Commissioner found that there was basis to hold the respondent liable, to wit:
1. Respondent Atty. Alvarez, Jr. is guilty of delay in the filing of the petition for annulment of the marriage of complainant for almost a
year. Initially, in his Answer, he claims that the delay was due to the instruction of complainant to hold in abeyance the filing of the
petition as she and her husband discussed possible reconciliation. In his Position Paper, he claims that the delay was due to the
failure of the complainant to submit to an interview by the psychologist and the time it took him to research on the guidelines on the
matter. Finally, in his Supplemental Affidavit, he admits the delay and apologizes for it. For delaying in filing the petition for
complainant, respondent should be deemed guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
pertinent read:
CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE[.]
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and the negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
2. Respondent lied about the delay. The allegations of complainant about how respondent lied to her about the delay in the filing of
the petition are very detailed. While denying he misrepresented to complainant that the petition has been filed when it was not,
respondent did not care to refute also in detail the allegations of complainant. In his Answer, he simply denied the same for the
reason [that] he has no sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth thereof. It should be noted, however, that the allegations
pertains [sic] to things respondent said and did[,] and are therefore[,] matters which he knew or should have known. His denial is
therefore tantamount to an admission. In doing so, respondent is guilty of violating not only Canon 15 but also Rule 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
CANON 15. – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
3. Respondent induced complainant to lend him money at 5% interest per month but failed to pay the same. This is admitted by
respondent. Rule 16.04 provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client‘s interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Obviously, respondent borrowed money from his client and his client‘s interest
was not fully protected. In fact, respondent repeatedly failed to comply with his promise to pay complainant. The fact that he
subsequently paid complainant more than the amount due from him as part of the settlement of the criminal complaint filed by her
against him hardly serves to mitigate his liability. x x x.
4. He issued two sets of checks which were dishonored when presented for payment. This is admitted by respondent. x x x.20
The Investigating Commissioner, thereby, recommended the penalty of two years suspension from the practice of law with a
warning that a repetition of the offenses shall merit a heavier penalty.
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved with modification the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner. It directed the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for one year with warning
that repetition of the similar conduct shall be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE/S:(DC type): 1. Whether or not the dishonesty and misrepresentation of the respondent when the latter misinformed
[the complainant] that [her] annulment case was already filed when in fact it was not, constitutes a violation of a lawyer’s
duty of Competence and Diligence to his client.
2. Whether or not Fraud and deceit in luring [the complainant] in transacting business with [the respondent] and in Issuing
unfunded checks as payment for [the respondent's] obligations to [the complainant constituted a violation of a lawyer’s
duty of competence and diligence to his client.
HELD: 1. Yes. It was established that the complainant engaged the professional services of the respondent. She expected the
immediate filing of the petition for the nullity of her marriage after the full payment of attorney‘s fees on June 10, 2008. However, the
respondent filed the said petition only on July 16, 2009. The respondent gave out different reasons for the delay in an attempt to
exculpate himself. At the end, the respondent admitted the delay and apologized for it. It cannot be gainsaid that the complainant
through her agent was diligent in following up the petition. The different excuses proffered by the respondent also show his lack of
candor in his dealings with the complainant.
"Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him."27 "[H]e is required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with
zeal, care and utmost devotion."28 "A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.
2. Yes. Anent the ₱200,000.00 which was received by the respondent from the complainant, the respondent argued that it was a
loan and not really meant to be the latter‘s investment in any money-lending business. At any rate, the respondent issued 13 UCPB
checks to serve as security for the alleged loan; among which, only two of said checks were honored by the drawee-bank while the
rest were dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. By reason of said dishonor, the respondent paid certain
amounts in cash to the complainant as interest to the said loan. Ultimately, the respondent issued eight BDO checks as replacement
for the dishonored UCPB checks. However, the BDO checks were also dishonored due to the same reason – they were drawn
against a closed account.
The respondent‘s act of issuing worthless checks is a violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."30 "[T]he issuance of checks which
were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer‘s unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence,
and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action."
It cannot be denied that the respondent‘s unfulfilled promise to settle his obligation and the issuance of worthless checks have
seriously breached the complainant‘s trust. She went so far as to file multiple criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against him.
"The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that ‗a
lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.‘ Necessity and public interest
enjoin lawyers to be honest and truthful when dealing with his client.
#6 LAYOS v. VILLANUEVA A.C. No. 8085 December 1, 2014 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
PETITIONER: FELIPE LAYOS RESPONDENT: ATTY. MARLITO I. VILLANUEVA
DOCTRINE: It is the lawyer’s duty to serve his client’s interest with utmost zeal, candor and diligence. As such, he must
keep abreast of all the developments in his client’s case and should inform the latter of the same, as it is crucial in
maintaining the latter’s confidence.
FACTS: Atty. Marlito I. Villanueva is Felipe Layos‘ counsel of record in criminal case pending before the RTC of Laguna, wherein
the former's constant failure to appear during court hearings resulted in the RTC's issuance of an order, waiving the defense‘s right
to cross-examine a prosecution witness. Despite the issuance of such order, Atty. Villanueva remained absent and thus, Layos was
only able to move for reconsideration only four (4) years later, which was then denied. Aggrieved, Layos, also thru Atty. Villanueva,
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition on the merits. The CA likewise chastised
respondent for his "lack of candidness and fervor on [his part] to champion the cause" of his client, considering that: (a) Atty.
Villanueva never bothered to know the outcome of the hearings where he was absent from; (b) it took him a long amount of time
before moving to reconsider the RTC‘s order ; and (c) Atty. Villanueva never questioned the appearances of other lawyers as
complainant‘s counsel during his absence. Citing as basis such disquisition by the CA, complainant filed the instant administrative
case against respondent.
Atty. Villanueva denied being remiss in his duty as complainant‘s counsel. He averred that during the hearing where the criminal
case was supposed to be amicably settled, his car broke down and thus, he was unable to attend the hearing. After his car was
fixed, he decided to go back to his office and asked his secretary to call complainant to know what happened in the said hearing.
However, he was unable to contact Layos and that he never heard from the latter for a long time. Atty. Villanueva claimed that he no
longer received any notices from the RTC, and thus, he assumed that the amicable settlement pushed through and that the case
was dismissed already.
Further, Atty. Villanueva maintained that it was only sometime when he received a notice of hearing from the RTC. Pursuant to the
same, he went to the RTC and found out about the order and that other lawyers were appearing for Layos. After the hearing, Atty.
Villanueva approached the RTC personnel in order to get a copy of the order but was unable to do so due to lack of manpower in
the RTC. Thus, he relied on the RTC personnel‘s word that they would mail him a copy of such order, but they were unable to do so.
Hence, he was only able to move for reconsideration of the order upon securing a copy of the same. Finally, Atty. Villanueva
averred that he had a hard time locating Layos who was not at his home address and was staying at his workplace in Carmona,
Cavite. According to him, this caused him to advance the filing fees and other expenses of Layos‘ cases, not to mention that the
latter has failed to pay the agreed appearance fees and attorney‘s fees due him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constant failure of a lawyer to appear during court hearings and to further his client’s interests
are acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: YES. Under Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR, it is the lawyer‘s duty to serve his client‘s interest
with utmost zeal, candor and diligence. As such, he must keep abreast of all the developments in his client‘s case and should inform
the latter of the same, as it is crucial in maintaining the latter‘s confidence, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with shall render him
liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to client‘s
request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important information he may have acquired
affecting his client‘s case. He should notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an
appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of
trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client‘s
interests. In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding
upon his client. As such, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who
deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted
fealty to the client‘s cause.
In the case at bar, records reveal that since missing the hearing due to car trouble, Atty. Villanueva no longer kept track of Layos‘
criminal case and merely assumed that the same was already amicably settled and terminated. Thereafter, when respondent finally
knew that the case was still on-going, he attended the hearing, and discovered the RTC‘s issuance of the order which is prejudicial
to complainant‘s cause. Despite such alarming developments, respondent did not immediately seek any remedy to further the
interests of his client. Instead, he passively relied on the representations of the court employees that they would send him a copy of
the aforesaid Order. Worse, when he finally secured a copy, it still took him over a year, just to move the RTC to reconsider its
Order. Naturally, the RTC and the CA denied the motion for being filed way beyond the reglementary period, to the detriment of
complainant. Clearly, Atty. Villanueva failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly
possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment.
PENALTY: Suspension for 3 months from the practice of law

#7 TEJANO v. BATERINA A.C. No. 8235 January 27, 2015 PONENTE
PETITIONER: JOSELITO F. TEJANO RESPONDENT: ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA
DOCTRINE: When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are engaged, “he is duty bound to serve his client with competence,
and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.” A lawyer’s
acceptance to take up a case “impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes
final and executory.”
FACTS: On 26 March 2009, Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the
Supreme Court against Judge Dominador LL. Arquelada, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Vigan City, Ilocos Sur,
Branch 21, and Tejano‘s own counsel, Atty. Baterina. Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of acting in conspiracy with Atty. Baterina
for the former to take possession of his (Tejano) property, which was the subject matter of litigation in the judge‘s court.
The case stems from a civil case, a suit for recovery of possession and damages filed by Tejano, his mother and sisters against the
Province of Ilocos Sur. The lot was wholly owned by Tejano‘s family, but the Province of Ilocos Sur constructed an access road
stretching from the provincial highway in the east to the provincial government‘s motor pool in the west without instituting the proper
expropriation proceedings.
The case was raffled off to Branch 21 of the Vigan City RTC in October 1988. Four judges would hear the case before Judge
Arquelada became the branch‘s presiding judge in 2001. In his Affidavit-Complaint, Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of colluding
with Atty. Baterina in the former‘s bid to ―take possession‖ of their property and was ―collecting rentals from squatters who had set
up their businesses inside the whole of Lot [No.] 5663.‖
As to his counsel, Tejano claims that Atty. Baterina ―miserably failed to advance [his] cause.‖ Specifically, Tejano alleged that Atty.
Baterina:
(1) failed to object when the trial court pronounced that he and his co-plaintiffs had waived their right to present evidence after
several postponements in the trial because his mother was ill and confined at the hospital;
(2) manifested in open court that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the order declaring their presentation of evidence
terminated but failed to actually do so;
(3) not only failed to file said motion for reconsideration, but also declared in open court that they would not be presenting any
witnesses without consulting his clients; and
(4) failed to comply with the trial court‘s order to submit their formal offer of exhibits.
In a letter dated 27 March 2009, then Court Administrator (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Jose P. Perez informed Tejano
that the OCA has no jurisdiction over Atty. Baterina since it only has administrative supervision over officials and employees of the
judiciary. However, Tejano was informed to file the complaint against his counsel at the Office of the Bar Confidant, and that the
complaint against Judge Arquelada was already ―being acted upon‖ by the OCA.
In a Resolution dated 6 July 2009, the Court required Atty. Baterina to file a Comment on the complaint within 10 days from notice.
Failing to comply with the Court‘s order, Atty. Baterina was ordered to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with and
once again ordered to comply with the Court‘s 6 July 2009 Order.
In his Compliance dated 28 March 2010, Atty. Baterina explained that he had been recuperating from a kidney transplant when he
received a copy of the complaint. He begged the Court‘s indulgence and said that his failure to comply was ―not at all intended to
show disrespect to the orders of the Honorable Tribunal.‖ Atty. Baterina also denied the allegation of bad faith and negligence in
handling the Tejano case. He explained that the reason he could not attend to the case was that in 2002, after the initial
presentation of the plaintiffs‘ case, he was suspended by the Court from the practice of law for two years. He alleged that this fact
was made known to Tejano‘s mother and sister. However, the trial court did not order plaintiffs to secure the services of another
lawyer. On the contrary, it proceeded to hear the case, and plaintiffs were not represented by a lawyer until the termination of the
case. Atty. Baterina instead points to the ―displayed bias‖ and ―undue and conflict of interest‖ of Judge Arquelada as the culprit in
Tejano‘s predicament.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty. Baterina is guilty of gross negligence in handling Tejano’s case.
HELD: YES.
The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers states:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
Lawyers have a ―fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients,‖ and must act ―in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.‖
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due diligence in protecting the
latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are engaged, “he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend
to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.” A lawyer‘s acceptance to
take up a case ―impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory.‖
Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the very least, such suspension gave
him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he would be unable to attend to their case and advise them to retain
another counsel.
A lawyer – even one suspended from practicing the profession – owes it to his client to not ―sit idly by and leave the rights of his
client in a state of uncertainty.‖ The client ―should never be left groping in the dark‖ and instead must be ―adequately and fully
informed about the developments in his case.‖
Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to run its course without any effort to safeguard his
clients‘ welfare in the meantime. His failure to file the required pleadings on his clients‘ behalf constitutes gross negligence in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and renders him subject to disciplinary action. The penalties for a lawyer‘s failure
to file the required brief or pleading range from warning, reprimand, fine, suspension, or in grave cases, disbarment.
Further, Atty. Baterina‘s reckless disregard for orders and directives of the courts is unbecoming of a member of the Bar. His
conduct has shown that he has little respect for rules, court processes, and even for the Court‘s disciplinary authority. Not only did
he fail to follow the trial court‘s orders in his clients‘ case, he even disregarded court orders in his own disciplinary proceedings.
Considering Atty. Baterina‘s medical condition at that time, a simple explanation to the Court would have sufficed. Instead, however,
he simply let the orders go unheeded, neglecting his duty to the Court.
Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, ―are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are
expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court.‖32 As such, Atty. Baterina
should ―know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and
completely.‖
WHEREFORE, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of gross negligence. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
five (5) years. He is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
This decision shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Sto be appended to
respondent‘s personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to circulate copies of this decision to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
#8 NONATO v. FUDOLIN A.C. No. 10138. DATE: June 16, 2015 PONENTE
COMPLAINANT:: Roberto P. Nonato RESPONDENT: Atty.. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr.
DOCTRINE: Canon 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
FACTS: Roberto Nonato, herein respondent, avers that his deceased father, Restituto Nonato is the duly registered owner of a real
property in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. This property was subjected to an ejectment proceeding filed by Restituto against
Anselmo Tubngbanua where Atty. Felino Garcia was hired as counsel by the former. At the pre-trial stage, Atty. Garcia was
replaced by Atty. Eutiquio Fudolin, herein respondent.
Roberto claims that Restituto paid Atty. Fudolin his acceptance fees but they did not execute formal retainer agreements. The latter
also did not issue any receipt for the acceptance fees paid by the former. Moreover, Roberto contended that Atty Fudolin failed to
fully inform his father of the developments in the case and that he could not be contacted despite efforts. They were also not
furnished with copies of pleadings, motions and other documents filed with the court.
The MTC where the ejectment case was pending dismissed the case because both parties failed to file their respective position
papers. Motions for Reconsiderations were also denied. Upon Restituto‘s death, all his properties passed on to his heirs, Roberto
among them. Both Roberto and his father did not know of the ejectment suit's dismissal as Atty. Fudolin had failed to furnish them a
copy of the MTC's dismissal order. Moreover, Roberto claims that they were not informed about the filing of the motion for
reconsideration or of its denial by the MTC. Roberto claims that he only had knowledge of the dismissal of the case when he
personally went to the Office of the MTC Clerk of Court and was informed of the dismissal.
Because of the patent negligence, Roberto informed the Atty. Fudolin that his failure to file the position paper could be a ground
for his disbarment. Furthermore, the complainant, without the respondent's intervention, entered into an oral extrajudicial
compromise with the daughter of defendant Anselmo.
Atty. Fudolin on the other hand raises that at the time he received the MTC‘s directive to submit a position paper, he was
already suffering from ―Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Atrial Fibrillation, Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II.‖
Moreover, averred that his failure to file the position paper in the ejectment proceedings was not due to willful negligence
but to his undetected stroke. He never revealed the gravity of his illness to his clients or to the court out of fear that
his disclosure would affect his private practice. Lastly, the Atty. Fudolin alleged that after the ejectment suit‘s dismissal, he
exerted all efforts, to the point of risking his poor health, by filing successive pleadings to convince the court to reconsider its
dismissal order.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Fudolin should be held administratively liable for failing to file the necessary position papers
which ultimately caused the dismissal of the ejectment case of his client.
HELD: YES. A lawyer is bound to protect his client‘s interests to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. He should serve his
client in a conscientious, diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the quality of service at least equal to that which he,
himself, would expect from a competent lawyer in a similar situation. By consenting to be his client‘s counsel, a lawyer
impliedly represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by his
profession, and his client may reasonably expect him to perform his obligations diligently. The failure to meet these
standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
In this case, the record clearly shows that Atty. Fudolin has been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel. His inaction on
the matters entrusted to his care is plainly obvious. He failed to file his position paper despite notice from the MTC. His omission
greatly prejudiced his client as the Court in fact dismissed the ejectment suit. In addition, he also failed to inform Restituto and the
complainant of the status of the case. His failure to file the position paper, and to inform his client of the status of the case, not only
constituted inexcusable negligence; but it also amounted to evasion of duty. All these acts violate the CPR.
We also find the respondent‘s excuse– that he had an undetected stroke and was suffering from other illnesses– unsatisfactory and
merely an afterthought. Even assuming that he was then suffering from numerous health problems (as evidenced by the medical
certificates he attached), his medical condition cannot serve as a valid reason to excuse the omission to file the necessary court
pleadings. He could have requested an extension of time to file the required position paper, or at the very least, informed
his client of his medical condition; all these, the Atty. Fudolin failed to do.
#9 ENRIQUEZ v. LAVADIA A.C. No. 5686 June 16, 2015 PER CURIAM
TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ ATTY. EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR.
FACTS: Mr. Ernesto Ouano, Sr. filed a complaint for forcible entry against complainant Teodulo Enriquez before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Talibon, Bohol. To defend his interests, Enriquez engaged the services of the law office of Attys.
Joselito M. Alo, R. L. C. Agapay, and Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. with Atty. Lavadia as the assigned attorney. In open court, Atty.
Lavadia agreed to submit their position papers and affidavits within 30 days from the receipt of the pre-trial order after which, the
case would be submitted for decision. However, Atty. Lavadia failed to file the position paper resulting in the defendants being
declared in default. The MCTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. Atty. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal with sufficient
bond. The RTC dismissed the appeal and stated that Atty. Lavadia failed to file the appeal memorandum after more than 71 days.
Atty. Lavadia filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied as well.
Complainant Enriquez filed a complaint for disbarment before the Office of the Bar Confidant against Atty. Lavadia for gross
negligence and inefficiency in the performance of his duties as a lawyer. He alleged that in failing to file the necessary pleadings
before the court, Atty. Lavadia caused them great damage and prejudice.
Atty. Lavadia was asked to comment, but he filed two motions for extension citing his heavy case load and family problems as
reasons in both instances for not filing the comment. Said motions were granted by the Court giving Atty. Lavadia another 60 days
within which to file his comment. However, he filed another motion to extend to file his comment due to his wife's continued illness.
The Court granted another 30-day period, stating that it would be the last extension it would grant.
For failing to submit the requirement comment within the period, the Court required Atty. Lavadia to show cause, but he failed to
comply. The Court thus imposed on him a P1,000.00 fine or imprisonment of five days if he failed to pay the fine and ordered him to
comply with its previous resolutions. Atty. Lavadia paid the fine and asked for additional time to file his comment this time stating
that he had moved from Tagbilaran to Cebu because of his wife's illness which was caused by "dark-beings." He claimed that a
series of unfortunate events plagued them, i.e., their house was razed by a fire, the hard drive of his computer crashing, and his
family members falling ill due to a "dark being." The Court granted another 30-day extension. Once again, he failed to file his
comment.
IBP CBD recommended Atty. Lavadia to be disbarred. Not only did Atty. Lavadia cause material prejudice to his clients by
neglecting his duties as counsel in failing to file the necessary pleadings to defend his client's interest, he also displayed a willful,
defiant and cavalier attitude by repeatedly defying the resolutions of the Court.
IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt IBP-CBD‘s recommendation.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. LAVADIA’S FAILURE TO FILE THE NECESSARY PLEADINGS CONSTITUTES GROSS
NEGLIGENCE?
HELD: YES.
In the present case, the duties transgressed by Atty. Lavadia fall under those duties to his client and to the court. This Court notes
Atty. Lavadia's propensity for filing motions for extension of time to file pleadings but failing to file the same, in violation of Rule
12.03 of the CPR which states:
Rule 12.03. — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to
do so. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Lavadia requested and was granted extensions of time to file the appeal memorandum after he filed the notice of appeal with
sufficient bond. The lower court granted him four extensions totaling 71 days after which time he still failed to file the appeal
memorandum. His failure adversely affected the cause of Enriquez, his client. In repeatedly asking for extensions of time without
actually filing the appeal memorandum, Atty. Lavadia is liable under Rule 12.03 of the CPR.
LAWYER AND CLIENT: RULE 12.03 AND CANON 18 AND RULE 18.03
In fact, such proclivity on the part of Atty. Lavadia to file such motions precisely led to the filing of this complaint. In the course of this
administrative proceeding, he continued to flaunt to this Court his willful defiance and disregard for court orders. A lawyer is
expected to serve his client with competence and diligence. Lawyers are reminded to note Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR:
Rule 18.03. — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Here, Enriquez paid a total of P29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other fees relating to the preparation of pleadings for the case
including the appeal. Atty. Lavadia however failed to discharge his duties. He failed to file his client's position paper rendering his
client in default. While he filed a notice of appeal and several motions for extension of time to file the appeal memorandum, all of
which were granted by the lower court, he ultimately neglected to file the appeal memorandum. Thus, following our pronouncement
in Solidon, Atty. Lavadia has clearly transgressed Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR thereby making him administratively liable.
LAWYER AND THE COURTS: RULE 12.03 IN RELATION TO CANON 11

Under Canon 11 of the CPR a lawyer is required to observe and maintain due respect to the court and its judicial officers. We read
this provision in relation to Rules 10.03 and 12.03 of the CPR for this rule does not merely affect the client but the judicial process.
The present complaint was filed January 2002. We granted Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment to the complaint. We
issued no less than eight resolutions ordering Atty. Lavadia to comment: two of which ordered him to pay fines of P1,000.00 and
P2,000.00 and requiring him to show cause for his failure to file and to comply with the Court's resolutions. In fine, we have granted
him a total of 155 days extension to file his comment, in response to his repeated pleas contained in his numerous ex parte
motions. After a lapse of eight years, this Court referred the case to the IBP where Atty. Lavadia once again filed a motion for
extension to file his position paper but nevertheless failed to file the same.
While this Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, we cannot countenance his act of repeatedly pleading for
extensions of time and yet not submitting anything to the Court. This reflects his willful disregard for Court orders putting in question
his suitability to discharge his duties and functions as a lawyer. The Court's Resolution is not a mere request. A lawyer's blatant
disregard or refusal to comply with the Court's orders underscores her disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too
deserving of reproof. Here, this disbarment case has dragged on for years while we gave Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his
comment. Despite the extended time granted him, he continued to fail to do so. Such obstinate disobedience to the Court's orders
merits disciplinary action.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED for violating Canons 11 and 18 and Rules 10.03,
12.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
#10 FRANCISCO v. FLORES G.R. No. DATE PONENTE
PETITIONER: ATTY. PABLO B. FRANCISCO RESPONDENT: ROMEO B. FLORES
DOCTRINE: Failure of counsel to act upon a client's case resulting in the prescription of available remedies is negligence
in violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The general rule is that notice to counsel is notice to
client. This rule remains until counsel notifies the court that he or she is withdrawing his or her appearance, or client
informs the court of change of counsel. Untruthful statements made in pleadings filed before courts, to make it appear that
the pleadings are filed on time, are contrary to a lawyer's duty of committing no falsehood.
FACTS: Atty. Francisco alleged that he filed a Complaint for forcible entry against Rainier Fineza and his mother, Teodora Fineza,
(Finezas) before the Municipal Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal.2 The Finezas were represented by Atty. Flores.3
The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the Finezas.4 Atty. Francisco filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Rizal.5 However, the appeal was denied.6
Atty. Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by the Regional Trial Court. The Finezas were then ordered to
vacate the property and to pay rentals. Atty. Flores filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the trial court's Order granting Atty.
Francisco's Motion for Reconsideration. Atty. Francisco filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration and the MR was
denied.
The registry return receipt shows that Atty. Flores received a copy of the Regional Trial Court's Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration on April 3, 2009, while the Finezas received their copy of the Order on April 7, 2009.
On April 7, 2009, Atty. Francisco filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Remand Records of the case to the Municipal Trial Court for Execution
of Judgment. He alleges that a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion was served on Atty. Flores through registered mail.14
On May 20, 2009, Analiza P. Santos, Officer-in-Charge of Branch 67, Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, issued a
Certification stating that the Order of dated January 23, 2009 relative to the above-entitled case [referring to Pablo B. Francisco v.
Rainier Fineza and Teddy Fineza] has become FINAL and EXECUTORY.
Atty. Francisco filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution Atty. Francisco alleges that a copy of the Motion was personally
served on Atty. Flores on the same day. Atty. Francisco also alleges that hearings on the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
were scheduled on June 17 and 24, 2009, which were attended by Atty. Flores and the Finezas. Atty. Francisco's Motion was
granted and a writ of execution was issued.
On July 8, 2009, the Finezas filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with application for temporary restraining order and
injunction. The Petition was signed by the Finezas and not by Atty. Flores.22 Atty. Francisco claims that the Petition, while not
signed by counsel, "was ostensibly prepared by respondent Atty. Romeo M. Flores[.]"23 The allegations in the Petition for Relief
from Judgment stated:
3. Defendants did not receive a copy or have no knowledge of the Order dated 26 March 2009 denying their motion for
reconsideration, hence, was not able to hire the services of other lawyer to seek relief from the adverse consequences of the said
Order;
4. It was only on June 29, 2009 that defendants through their lawyer came to know of the Order dated March 26, 2009[,] denying
their "Motion for Reconsideration" of the decision/Order dated January 15, 2009.
The Petition for Relief from Judgment was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court in an Order29dated August 28, 2009. On February
8, 2010, the Finezas were evicted.30Their "personal properties were levied upon, then sold on execution to settle their judgment
debt.
Atty. Pablo B. Francisco (Atty. Francisco) now filed an administrative Complaint1 for violation of Canons 10 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility against Atty. Romeo M. Flores (Atty. Flores) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
dishonesty and negligence on the part of Atty. Flores. Atty. Francisco contends that Atty. Flores was negligent when he "did not
make himself available" during that period when his clients could still question the trial court's denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration by filing a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, Atty. Flores alleges that he was on vacation from February 9, 2009 until May 2009.37 The copy of the trial
court's Order sent to the Finezas was received by Glen Fineza on April 7, 2009, but allegedly, Glen Fineza did not inform Teodora
Fineza and Rainier Fineza that he received the trial court's Order.38 Atty. Flores claims that he only learned about the Order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration when he received a copy of Atty. Francisco's Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution.
Regarding the Finezas' Petition for Relief from Judgment, Atty. Flores alleges that he only assisted in the filing of the Petition.40 He
could not act as counsel because he had "no personal knowledge as to when the [Finezas] learned ... of the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration. "
ISSUE/S: Whether respondent Atty. Romeo M. Flores violated Canons 10 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: YES. This court accepts the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Based on the records of this
administrative Complaint, respondent is guilty of violating Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.03.
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.
Respondent was not entirely truthful. He alleged in his Position Paper that:
4. Herein respondent himself only came to know of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration in June, 2009 when he received a
copy of the motion of complainant for issuance of a writ of execution against the FINEZA[S]. This fact was immediately relayed to
the FINEZA[S].
....
6. FINEZAS in filing the petition for relief from judgment believe in good faith that they have complied with the requirement of the
rule. They learned only of the judgment on June 29, 2009.
Herein RESPONDENT only assisted the FINEZA[S] in filing the petition for relief from judgment. He could not personally act as
counsel considering that he has no personal knowledge as to when the FINEZA[S] learned or had knowledge of the denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration.
Although the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration was received in his office on April 3, 2009, respondent was in the United
States of America (U.S.A.) for a 3-month vacation from February 9, 2009 to May, 2009. He had given instructions to his staff to
furnish copies of all court processes to his clients and to refer all legal matters to either Atty. Leonardo C. Aseoche or Atty. Baltazar
O. Abasolo as collaborating counsels, both practicing lawyers in Binangonan, Rizal.73 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent did not state the exact date when he received a copy of the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. The record
shows that he received it on June 3, 2009.74 Respondent then alleges that he immediately informed the Finezas about the matter,
but later on contradicted himself when he stated "that he has no personal knowledge as to when the Fineza[s] learned or had
knowledge of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration."75
Respondent's statement that he had no knowledge when the Finezas learned about the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration is
also contradicted by the Finezas' allegations in their Petition for Relief from Judgment that:
4. It was only on June 29, 2009 that defendants through their lawyer came to know of the Order dated March 26, 2009[,] denying
their "Motion for Reconsideration" of the decision/Order dated January 15, 2009 reversing the Order of Dismissal by the Municipal
Trial Court, Branch 2, Binangonan, Rizal[.]76 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, respondent does not deny complainant's allegation that he and the Finezas were present when the Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Execution was heard by the trial court on June 17 and 24, 2009.77
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent and the Finezas knew about the trial court's Order denying their Motion for
Reconsideration before June 29, 2009.
While the Complaint is limited to the allegations in the Petition for Relief from Judgment, this court notes that respondent was also
not truthful in his Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he
alleged that:
The allegation of complainant that respondent received on April 3 1, 2009 the Order of March 26, 2009 denying his motion for
reconsideration is not correct. It was the law office through his staff that received on 26 March 2009 the Order of Denial, per Reg.
Receipt No. 190. Herein respondent was on vacation in U.S.A. from February 11, 2009 up to June _y 2009.78 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's allegations are conflicting. He initially claimed that he was on vacation from February 9, 2009 to May 2009.79 He
subsequently claimed that his vacation was from February 11, 2009 to June 2009.80
The glaring inconsistencies in respondent's statements are sufficient to show that he is guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01.
The importance of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 was extensively discussed in Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera,81 which involved the
submission of a falsified affidavit in an electoral protest. This court discussed that:
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with
integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every
member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer's Oath that every lawyer of this country has
taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:
I,_________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of
court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the
rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values
of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule
10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. "82 (Emphasis and underscoring in the
original, citations omitted)
This court also finds that respondent violated Rule 10.03 of Canon 10, which provides:
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Respondent admitted that he assisted the Finezas "in filing the petition for relief from judgment."83 Subsequently, respondent
moved to withdraw the Petition for Relief from Judgment after recognizing that it was filed erroneously.
Furthermore, this court finds respondent guilty of violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
....
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Respondent's explanation that he was on vacation is not sufficient. Being the lawyer who filed the Motion for Reconsideration, he
should have been prepared for the possibility that his Motion would be acted upon by the trial court during the time that he was on
vacation. In addition, he does not deny that his office, through his staff, received by registered mail a copy of the trial court's Order
on April 3, 2009.
Respondent argues that he instructed his staff to inform his clients of court processes and to refer legal matters to Atty. Leonardo C.
Aseoche or Atty. Baltazar O. Abasolo.87 However, respondent did not present evidence to support his argument.
Respondent further argues that he was not negligent and explained that in the case docketed as Civil Case 384-B for Quieting of
Title with Prayer for Restraining Order/Injunction, he successfully prevented the demolition of the Finezas' family home.88
Respondent may not have been negligent in handling Civil Case No. 384-B, but he was negligent in handling SCA No. 08-018.
When he allegedly informed the Finezas of the trial court's Order, he should have immediately discussed the matter with his clients.
The records of this case show that he did not consult his clients on what legal remedies they would like to avail themselves of after
the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondent attended the hearing on the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution, and that it was allegedly the Finezas, on their
own, who filed the Petition for Relief from Judgment. Respondent claims that he merely assisted the Finezas in filing the Petition for
Relief, but was not representing them. He argues that he could not represent the Finezas because "he has no personal knowledge
as to when the Fineza[ s] learned or had knowledge of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration."
Respondent also seems to have forgotten the general rule that notice to counsel is also notice to client.1âwphi1 Thus,
when his office received a copy of the trial court's Order on April 3, 2009, his clients are also deemed as having been
notified on the same date. It is axiomatic that when a client is represented by counsel, notice to counsel is notice to client.
In the absence of a notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel, the Court will rightly assume that the counsel of record
continues to represent his client and receipt of notice by the former is the reckoning point of the reglementary period. As
heretofore adverted, the original counsel did not file any notice of withdrawal. Neither was there any intimation by
respondent at that time that it was terminating the services of its counsel. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted).
#11 GIMENA v. SABIO A.C. No. 7178 August 23, 2016 Jardeleza
PETITIONER: VICENTE M. GIMENA RESPONDENT: ATTY. SALVADOR T. SABIO
DOCTRINE: Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Code") mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence. Corollarily, Rule 18.03 directs that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him. He must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family with respect to the case that he is handling. This is true
whether he accepted the case for free or in consideration of a fee. Lawyering is not primarily concerned with money-
making; rather, public service and administration of justice are the tenets of the profession.
FACTS: Complainant is the president and general manager of the company. In his Complaint dated March 7, 2006, he narrated that
he engaged the legal services of respondent in relation to a case for illegal dismissal filed against him and the company. All the
pleadings and orders were directed to respondent because the company no longer had active presence in Bacolod, save for the
stockpile of construction equipment found in Barangay Mansilingan. Sometime in February 2000, complainant signed the verification
page of the position paper for the case and sent it to respondent for his signature. However, respondent filed the position paper
without signing it.6 The labor arbiter noticed the unsigned pleading and directed respondent to sign it within 10 days from notice.
Respondent did not comply with the directive.
The labor arbiter ruled against the company and noted that: "[the company] filed an unsigned position paper which cannot be
considered as such. Despite the order to Atty. Salvador Sabia to sign said position paper, the order was deemed to have been taken
for granted." Respondent received a copy of the Decision on January 13, 2005 but he did not notify complainant about it.
Complainant only learned of the Decision after a writ of execution was served on the company on June 2005 and by that time, it was
already too late to file an appeal.
Complainant stressed that respondent was previously suspended from the practice of law on two (2) occasions: first was in the case
of Cordova v. Labayen, where respondent was suspended for six (6) months, and the second was in the case of Credito v. Sabio,13
where he was suspended for one (1) year. The latter case involved facts analogous to the present Complaint.
In his Comment, respondent countered that complainant engaged his services in 2000. Complainant, however, did not pay the
expenses and attorney's fees for the preparation and filing of the position paper in the amount of P20,000.00. The lack of payment
contributed to respondent's oversight in the filing of the unsigned position paper.16 Respondent also insisted that the unfavorable
Decision of the labor arbiter is based on the merits and not due to default. Respondent further explained that he was not able to
inform complainant of the outcome of the case because he does not know the address of the company after it allegedly abandoned
its place of business in Barangay Mansilingan, without leaving any forwarding address.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there was attorney-client relationship between respondent and the company?
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not respondent was negligent in handling the and whether such negligence
renders him liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: We concur with the findings of the IBP, with the addition that respondent also violated Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We also find that a longer period of suspension is warranted in view of the number of times that
respondent had been disciplined administratively.
1. Yes. There is attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The contention of respondent that there
was no attorney-client relationship between him and the company is, at best, flimsy. It is improper for him to capitalize on
the fact that no formal contract for legal retainer was signed by the parties, for formality is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney. The contract may be express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of
the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An attorney impliedly accepts the relation when
he acts on behalf of his client in pursuance of the request made by the latter. Respondent acted on behalf of the company
and the complainant in relation to the case. Albeit unsigned, he allowed his name to appear as "counsel for respondent" in
the position paper that he filed before the labor arbiter.
2. Respondent was negligent. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Code") mandates that a lawyer
shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Corollarily, Rule 18.03 directs that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him. He must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family with respect to the case that he is handling. This is true
whether he accepted the case for free or in consideration of a fee. Every law student is taught that an unsigned pleading creates no
legal effect, such that the party may be deemed not to have filed a pleading at all. Yet, respondent, a long standing legal
practitioner, did not sign a position paper that he filed in a labor suit allegedly due to oversight. What more, he claimed that his
client's failure to pay legal expenses and attorney's fees contributed to such oversight. These actuations of respondent demean the
legal profession. Lawyering is not primarily concerned with money-making; rather, public service and administration of justice are
the tenets of the profession.49 Due to respondent's negligence, the labor arbiter did not consider the position paper of the company
and the complainant. This circumstance deprived the company of the chance to explain its side of the controversy - an unfortunate
incident brought about by its own counsel. Respondent's inattention is further highlighted by his disobedience to the labor arbiter's
directive that he sign the position paper. His conduct evinces a willful disregard to his duty as officer of the court. This alone
warrants the imposition of administrative liability. Respondent's irresponsibility went beyond the unsigned pleading and refusal to
obey court orders; he also admittedly failed to apprise the company and the complainant of the adverse decision against them. He
even had the audacity to place the blame on his client for not communicating to him as regards the status of the case. He
furthermore justified his omission by saying that he was not aware of the address of the company. Contrary to his contention, it
appears from the records that he was fully aware of the address of the company. There was no justifiable reason for him not to
notify complainant and the company of the adverse decision against them.

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PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

#1 JISON v. JIZ A.C. No. 9615 March 5, 2013 Perlas- Bernabe, J.

PETITIONER: GLORIA P. JINON, RESPONDENT: ATTY. LEONARDO E. JIZ

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

PETITIONER: SPOUSES NICASIO DONELITA SAN RESPONDENT: ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA

HELD: Yes. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:

PETITIONER: Jun B. Luna RESPONDENT: Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita

#4 FORONDA v. ALVAREZ A.C. No. 9976 June 25, 2014 REYES, J.

PETITIONER: ALMIRA C. FORONDA RESPONDENT: ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR.

#5 NAVARRO v. SOLIDUM G.R. No. DATE PONENTE

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

ROLANDO VIRAY ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS

#7 CONCEPCION v. DE LA ROSA A.C. No.10681 Feb 3, 2015 Perlas-Bernabe

#8 YU v. DE LA CRUZ A.C. NO. 10912 JANUARY 19, 2016 PONENTE

PETITIONER: PAULINA T. YU RESPONDENT: ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ

PETITIONER: Pedro Ramos RESPONDENT

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty Mandagan violated Canon 16 of the CPR-YES

#10 MALANGAS v. ZAIDE G.R. No. DATE PONENTE

PETITIONER: DATU ISMAEL MALANGAS RESPONDENT: ATTY. PAUL C. ZAIDE

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty. Zaide violated the CPR.

#1 CADAVEDO v. LACAYA G.R. No. January 15, Brion,

#2 DALUPAN v. GACOTT A.C. No. 5067 June 29, 2015 PONENTE

PETITIONER: Corazon M. Dalupan RESPONDENT: Atty. Glenn C. Gacott

Atty. Gacott‘s defense:

As regards the return of the amount of ₱5,000

G. Duty of Competence and Diligence

#1 PENILLA v. ALCID A.C. No. 9149 September 4, 2013 VILLARAMA, JR

PETITIONER JULIAN PENILLA RESPONDENT ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR

#2 SOTTO v. PALICTE G.R. No. Feb 17, Bersamin,

PETITIONER: NESTOR B. FIGUERAS and BIENVENIDO RESPONDENT: ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ

PETITIONER: JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS RESPONDENT: ATTY. JONATHAN T. SEMPIO

PETITIONER ALMIRA C. FORONDA RESPONDENT: ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR

#6 LAYOS v. VILLANUEVA A.C. No. 8085 December 1, 2014 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

PETITIONER: FELIPE LAYOS RESPONDENT: ATTY. MARLITO I. VILLANUEVA

PENALTY: Suspension for 3 months from the practice of law

#7 TEJANO v. BATERINA A.C. No. 8235 January 27, 2015 PONENTE

PETITIONER: JOSELITO F. TEJANO RESPONDENT: ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA

The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers states:

COMPLAINANT:: Roberto P. Nonato RESPONDENT: Atty.. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr.

TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ ATTY. EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR.

IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt IBP-CBD‘s recommendation.

LAWYER AND THE COURTS: RULE 12.03 IN RELATION TO CANON 11

#10 FRANCISCO v. FLORES G.R. No. DATE PONENTE

PETITIONER: ATTY. PABLO B. FRANCISCO RESPONDENT: ROMEO B. FLORES

Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

PETITIONER: VICENTE M. GIMENA RESPONDENT: ATTY. SALVADOR T. SABIO

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