PALE Sixth Batch PDF

PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
JUDICIAL ETHICS (New Code of Judicial Conduct)
IX. NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
A. Bangalore Draft
B. Applicability of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct
C. Qualities of an Ideal Judge
1. Independence
#1 DECENA v. MALANYAON A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217 April 8, 2013 BERSAMIN, J.
PETITIONER: SONIA C. DECENA RESPONDENT: JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON
DOCTRINE: An attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a member
of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his
incumbency as a judge.
FACTS: The complainants allege that Rey Decena brought an administrative case before the CSC against Judge Malanyaon‘s wife,
Dr. Amelita. During the hearing of said case, Judge Malanyaon sat beside his daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina Malanyaon, the counsel of
Dr. Amelita. During the early stage of the hearing, Judge Malanyaon coached his daughter in making manifestations/motions before
the hearing officer, by scribbling on some piece of paper and giving the same to the former, thus prompting her daughter to rise from
her seat and/or ask permission from the officer to speak, and then make some manifestations while reading or glancing on the
paper given by Judge Malanyaon.
When the complainants‘ counsel inquired regarding his personality, he proudly introduced himself and manifested that he was the
"counsel of the respondent‘s counsel.‖ He asked that he be shown a rule which prohibits him from sitting with his daughter and
insisted that he was merely assisting his daughter, who just passed the bar, defend the respondent, and was likewise helping the
latter defend herself. He also replied ―And so what?‖ when he was asked about his personality to sit at the counsel‘s table.
The complainants filed an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming of a judge against Judge Malanyaon. He filed a
comment thereto, reiterating most of what he said during the hearing and alleging that he had previously helped complainants
regarding legal matters but the latter did not complain. The court administrator recommended to the court that the judge be found
guilty of gross misconduct. Judge Malanyaon was unable to submit his compliance because he suffered a stroke. Thereafter, his
wife submitted an urgent motion to dismiss, claiming that her husband has already been pronounced permanently mentally impaired
and thus cannot defend himself anymore.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge‘s acts constitutes conduct unbecoming of a judge - YES
HELD: Sec. 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11, Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law or giving
professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties,
privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers,
discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties,
prevent them from extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of
their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest.
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine
Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. To the Court,
Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his wife‘s administrative case, coaching his
daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to the hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he prompted to his
daughter.
A judge may not involve himself in any activity that is an aspect of the private practice of law. His acceptance of an appointment to
the Bench inhibits him from engaging in the private practice of law, regardless of the beneficiary of the activity being a member of
his immediate family.
#2 ONGCUANGCO v. PINLAC A.M. No. RTJ-14-2402 April 15, 2015 REYES, J.
COMPLAINANT: Josefina M. Ongcuangco Trading RESPONDENT: Judge Renato D. Pinlac, Regional Trial Court,
Corporation, Represented By Josefina M. Branch 57, San Carlos City, Pangasinan
Ongcuangco,
DOCTRINE: The proscription against borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the
court is imposed on Judges to avoid the impression that the Judge would rule in favor of a litigant because the former is
indebted to the latter.
FACTS: Ongcuangco, the president and majority shareholder of Josefina M. Ongpauco Trading Corporation (JMOTC), filed with
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Cabanatuan City several cases against Yolanda Lazaro (Lazaro) for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22). The said cases were raffled to Branch 1 of the MTCC wherein Judge Pinlac was then the
Presiding Judge.
During the course of the trial, the judge learned that Ongcuangco is engaged in the business of selling, marketing and distribution of
animal feeds. Judge Pinlac then purchased on credit animal feeds from JMOTC for his hog farm in Pangasinan and issued 8
postdated checks. Upon the judge‘s request, JMOTC did not deposit the checks due to lack of funds. The judge told JMOTC that he
secured a loan from the bank, but the latter learned that the loan has not been approved. He failed to pay despite demands, so
JMOTC filed an administrative complaint against Judge Pinlac. It alleged that the judge took advantage of his position by availing of
credit purchases from a litigant with pending cases before his sala and his deliberate failure to pay his debts.
In his comment, Judge Pinlac claimed that he did not personally transact the purchase of animal feeds from JMOTC, and it was
Belinda Austria, the manager of the hog farm who did it. He also alleged that while he was the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the
MTCC, JMOTC was not involved in any case. Furthermore, his failure to pay the debt was not willful but was due to losses suffered
by his hog farm.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Pinlac must be held administratively liable for failing to pay his loan from a party in a case in his court.
HELD: NO. The Court finds that JMOTC failed to adduce substantial evidence that would establish that Judge Pinlac used the
prestige of his office in negotiating the purchase on credit of animal feeds from JMOTC or that the loan accommodation was
extended to Judge Pinlac in exchange for anything to be done or omitted to be done by him in connection with his judicial functions.
The proscription against borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court is imposed on
Judges to avoid the impression that the Judge would rule in favor of a litigant because the former is indebted to the latter. In order
for the said proscription to operate, it should first be established that the Judge knows that the person or entity from whom he or she
is borrowing money or property is actually a lawyer or litigant in a case pending before his or her sala. Ongcuangco, in her personal
capacity, instituted several criminal cases against Lazaro. Judge Pinlac transacted with JMOTC – a corporation that has a
personality separate and distinct from its officers – for the purchase on credit of animal feeds. It would be unjust to administratively
penalize him for obtaining a loan from JMOTC notwithstanding that the latter is not a litigant in any pending case in his sala. The
mere failure of a Judge to pay a loan he obtained on the due date despite written demands cannot be instantly characterized as
willful. The term "willful" means voluntary and intentional. Thus, a Judge‘s failure to pay a just debt, as would constitute a serious
charge under Section 8(6) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, must not only be voluntary, but also intentional, i.e., that the Judge no
longer has any intention to satisfy his obligation. In this case, Judge Pinlac had every intention to pay his obligation but was
prevented from doing so due to the losses suffered by his farm. However, he is found guilty of IMPROPRIETY, considering the large
amount of his unpaid obligation.
2. Integrity
#1 ANONYMOUS v. ACHAS A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801 February 27, 2013 MENDOZA, J.
PETITIONER: ANONYMOUS RESPONDENT: JUDGE RIO C. ACHAS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Ozamis
City, Misamis Occidental
DOCTRINE: No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial
office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with
safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings.
FACTS: An anonymous letter-complaint calls on the Court to look into the morality of respondent Judge Achas and alleges that: (1)
it is of public knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is living scandalously with a woman who is not his wife; (2) he lives beyond his
means; (3) he is involved with illegal activities through his connection with bad elements, the kuratongs; (4) he comes to court very
untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and monetary consideration; and (6) he is involved with
cockfighting/gambling.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the matter to Executive Judge Miriam Orquieza-Angot (Judge Angot) for
Discreet Investigation and Report. In her report, (1) Judge Achas had been separated from his legal wife for quite some time and
they are living apart; and that he found for himself a young woman with whom he would occasionally go out with in public and it was
not a secret around town. As to (2) & (3), Judge Angot reported that she could not be certain whether such were true, and only
ascertained that he had established friendships or alliances with people of different social standings from around the city. (4) This is
a matter of personal hygiene and in the eye of the beholder. (5) Judge Angot found this charge to be vague and unsubstantiated.
Judge Achas denied all the allegations against him and claimed that they were hatched to harass him, pointing to disgruntled
professionals, supporters and local candidates who lost during the May 2010 elections. He asserted that after 28 years in the
government service, he had remained loyal to his work and conducted himself in a righteous manner.
The Court resolved to re-docket the case as a regular administrative matter and to refer the same to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Ozamiz City for investigation, report and recommendation. Executive Judge Salome P. Dungog (Judge
Dungog) stated that an investigation was conducted. Judge Achas and his two witnesses testified in his defense, namely, his
Branch Clerk of Court, Renato Zapatos; and his Process Server, Michael Del Rosario. The anonymous complainant never appeared
to testify. During the investigation, Judge Achas again denied all the charges but admitted that he was married and only separated
de facto from his legal wife for 26 years, and that he reared game cocks for leisure and extra income, having inherited such from his
forefathers. Judge Dungog found that "it is not commendable, proper or moral per Canons of Judicial Ethics to be perceived as
going out with a woman not his wife," and for him to be involved in rearing game cocks.
OCA‘s reco: reprimand as to the charge of immorality. It was further recommended that he be ordered to refrain from going to
cockpits or avoid such places altogether, with a warning that the same or similar complaint in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of (1) living scandalously with a woman not his wife and (2) being involved in cockfighting /
gambling violate the new code of judicial conduct?
HELD: YES
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be
so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
1. For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by the above-cited canon
(+Canon 4) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary. The Court, therefore, agrees with Judge Dungog
in finding that it is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife.
Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the Judiciary.
2. Regarding his involvement in cockfighting, there is no clear evidence. While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge
Achas should avoid mingling with a crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the respect
due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in
particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court
and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. His personal behaviour outside the court, and
not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law
and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents.
WHEREFORE, for violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge Rio Concepcion Achas is REPRIMANDED and
FINED in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), ADMONISHED not to socially mingle with cockfighting
enthusiasts and bettors, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
#2 IN RE GREGORY ONG G.R. No. DATE PONENTE
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
DOCTRINE: Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential
manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their
conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.
FACTS: In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds channeled through bogus
foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted
to members of the House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest actions all over the country. In
the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue
Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are
former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities
identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.
Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges
against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous
transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers
for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement, in which she stated that among other personalities, she has seen Justice Gregory
Ong visit the office of Ms. Napoles.
The social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court
Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public figures involved in the pork
barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs.
Napoles and recalled that the photograph was probably taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who is his
longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different
context; nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one advising Mrs.
Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan
of which respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting Presiding Justice
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent meticulously explained
the controversial photograph which raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision
rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted
Mrs. Napoles. Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator Estrada in February, either in the
year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would
have been rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator Estrada during the party.
As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs. Napoles at her office and having a
meeting with her at the conference room, respondent said that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada where the controversial
photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual conversation during which the miraculous healing power of the robe
or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a close friend of the
Quiapo Church's parish priest, he requested her help to gain access to the Black Nazarene icon. Eventually, respondent, who is
himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was undergoing treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special permission and was
able to drape the Black Nazarene's robe or clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive a fragrant ball of cotton taken
or exposed to the holy image, which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe any ailing part of his body in order to receive
healing. Because of such favor, respondent out of courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank her. Respondent
stressed that that was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit when she said she saw respondent
talking with Mrs. Napoles at the conference room of their office in Discovery Suites.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the time in order
to thank her, considering that she no longer had any pending case with his court, and to his knowledge, with any other division of
the Sandiganbayan at the time and even until the date of the preparation of his Comment. He thus prays that this Court duly note his
Comment and accept the same as sufficient compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the pendency of the
Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case.
HELD: YES. Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper and violated
Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this
appearance.20 Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all
impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.21
In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance
of impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. [Respondent's] acts have been less than
circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act
liable to create an impression of indecorum.
x x x x
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for o ccupying an exalted
position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid
not just impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct
himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)
#3 BARIAS v. RUBIA A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388 June 10, 2014 PONENTE
PETITIONER:EMILIE SISON-BARIAS RESPONDENT: JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DOCTRINE: Public trust requires that we exact strict integrity from judges and court employees. This case emphasizes the
need for members of the judiciary and those within its employ to exhibit the impartiality, prudence, and propriety that the
New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel require when dealing with parties in pending
cases.
FACTS: Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of respondent Judge Marino Rubia
Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration filed.
She was then informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike" Sison, that respondent Eileen Pecaña, the daughter of his good friend, was a
data encoder in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.
Complainant, met with respondent Pecaña on February 20, 2010. During this meeting, complainant informed respondent Pecaña of
the delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration. She then asked respondent Pecaña
to check the status of the publication of the notice. Respondent Pecaña asked for complainant‘s number so that she could inform
her as soon as any development takes place in the case. Enrique and Perlito executed affidavits to corroborate these allegations.
Respondent Pecaña asked complainant to meet her again at her house in Biñan, Laguna.15 Complainant went there with
Enrique.16 Respondent Pecaña then informed complainant that she could no longer assist her since respondent Judge Rubia had
already given administration of the properties to Evelyn Tanael.
Complainant stated that she was not interested in the grant of administration to Tanael because these concerned the properties of
her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias. She was only concerned with the administration of the properties of her late husband,
to which respondent Pecaña replied, "Ah ganun ba? Iba pala ung kaso mo."
Complainant alleged that respondent Pecaña sent her a text message on March 2, 2010 asking complainant to call her.
Complainant called respondent Pecaña who informed her that respondent Judge Rubia wanted to talk to her. Complainant agreed
to meet with respondent Judge Rubia over dinner, on the condition that respondent Pecaña would be present as well.
On March 3, 201023 at around 7:00 p.m, complainant picked up respondent Pecaña at 6750 Ayala Avenuein Makati City. They
proceeded to Café Juanita in The Fort, Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Pecaña said that respondent Judge Rubia would arrive
late as he would be coming from a Rotary Club meeting held at the Mandarin Hotel.24
Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Café Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During the dinner meeting, respondents allegedly asked
complainant inappropriate questions. Respondent Judge Rubia allegedly asked whether she was still connected with Philippine
Airlines, which she still was at that time. Complainant was then informed that respondent Judge Rubia knew of this fact through Atty.
Noe Zarate, counsel of Romelias Almeda-Barias. This disclosure surprised complainant,as she was under the impression that
opposing counsel and respondent JudgeRubia had no business discussing matters that were not relevant to their pending cases.
Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her supposed involvement with another man and other
accusations made by Romelias Almeda-Barias.28 She was asked about the hospital where she brought her husband at the time of
his cardiac arrest.
These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the pleadings or in the course of the trial. Thus, she inferred that
respondent Judge Rubia had been talking to the opposing counsel regarding these matters outside of the court proceedings The
impression of complainant was that respondent Judge Rubia was actively taking a position in favor of Atty. Zarate.
To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told complainant to just talk to Atty. Zarate, counsel for the oppositor, claiming
that he is a nice person. Complainant was appalled by such suggestion and replied[,] ‗Why will I talk to him? Judge di ko yata kaya
gawin un.‘"
After dinner, complainant stayed behind to settle the bill. Even before he left, she alleged that respondent Judge Rubia had made
insinuations that she was awaiting the company of another man.
From then on, complainant and respondents did not communicate and/or meet outside the courtroom until August 8, 2010.
Complainant filed a complaint affidavit51 before the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondent Pecaña for gross
misconduct and respondent Judge Rubia for conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance of the law or procedure,
incompetence, and gross misconduct.
Due to the gravity of the charges and the conflicting facts presented by the parties, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended the referral of the administrative complaint to a Court of Appeals Justice for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held administratively liable
HELD: Yes. After scrutinizing the testimony of complainant and the evidence she presented to support her allegations, we find her
account of the event to be genuine and believable.
Complainant‘s narration of the dinner meeting held on March 3, 2010 and her account of events leading up to the dinner meeting
were detailed and comprehensive. The conversation alleged by complainant that took place with respondents during the meeting
was replete with details.
The strongest corroborative evidence to support complainant‘s allegations was the exchange of text messages between
complainant and respondent Pecaña regarding the dinner meeting. These text messages were admitted by respondent Pecaña.128
However, Justice Gaerlan failed to give any weight to the exchange of text messages. This fact was not included in his investigation
report.129
The content of the text messages of respondent Pecaña belied respondents‘ claim that the alleged dinner meeting in Burgos Circle
was only a chance encounter.
For respondent Pecaña, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a position that could cause suspicion toward her work as a
court personnel is disconcerting.
As a court employee, respondent Pecaña should have known better than to interact with litigants in a way that could compromise
the confidence that the general public places in the judiciary. Respondent Pecaña should have refused to meet with complainant in
her home. She should have refused any other form of extended communication with complainant, save for those in her official
capacity as a Data Encoder of the court. This continued communication between complainant and respondent Pecaña makes her
culpable for failure to adhere to the strict standard of propriety mandated of court personnel.
Respondent Pecaña admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the former‘s knowledge of the pendency of cases
in the court where she is employed and in addition to the text messages exchanged between them. She had a duty to sever all
forms of communication with complainant or to inform her superiors or the proper authority of complainant‘s attempts to
communicate with her. Respondent Pecaña failed to do so. Instead, she continued to communicate with complainant, even to the
extent of advising complainant against filing an administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.
Respondent Pecaña violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:
CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY
....
SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to anyone. They shall not allow kinship, rank,
position or favors from any party to influence their official acts or duties.
....
SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official custody in a judicious manner and
solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory and regulatory guidelines or procedures.
Respondent Pecaña‘s actions constitute a clear violation of the requirement that all court personnel uphold integrity and prudence in
all their actions. As stated in Villaros v. Orpiano:138
Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration of justice, from
judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and
decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the public‘s respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all court
personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and uprightness.139
Respondent Pecaña should, thus, be held administratively liable for her actions.
Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge Rubia violated several canons of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct.
In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin,142 this court reminded judges:
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety
in all activities.
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting standard of morality and
decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his official acts but also through his private morals as
reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge‘s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties
and his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge
Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated that:
While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of the people in the administration of justice.
The totality of the actions of respondent Judge Rubia is a clear manifestation of a lack of integrity and impartiality essential to a
judge.
By meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 4. PROPRIETY
Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued after the meeting, respondent Judge Rubia violated the notions of
propriety required of his office. Respondents have relentlessly stood by their position that the meeting was a chance encounter, and,
thus, no impropriety could be attributed to the meeting itself.
Respondent Judge Rubia‘s actions belittled the integrity required of judges in all their dealings inside and outside the courts. For
these actions, respondent Judge Rubia now lost the requisite integrity, impartiality, and propriety fundamental to his office. He
cannot be allowed to remain a member of the judiciary.
3. Impartiality
#1 BERNAS v. REYES G.R. No. March 5, 2014 PONENTE
PETITIONER: ATTY. JOSE A. RESPONDENT: JUDGE JULIA A. REYES, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
BERNAS 69, PASIGCITY
DOCTRINE: Established is the norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. Judges
must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free from any suspicion as to their
fairness, impartiality and integrity.
FACTS: Atty. Jose Bernas was the counsel for Oakridge Properties in an eviction suit filed by the latter against Atty. Joseph
Alejandro, a tenant in one of its condo units, who had refused to pay rentals and expenses. On June 1, 2004, and during the
pendency of the eviction suit, Oakridge padlocked the leased premises, alleging that it was authorized to do so by the terms and
conditions of the Contract of Lease. Atty. Alejandro then filed a Petition for Writ of Preliminary Injunction with prayer for a TRO to
have the unit reopened. At the hearing on June 11, 2004, the Judge granted the TRO and ordered Oakridge to reopen the leased
premises and to padlock it only if the proper bond was not posted on or before June 18, 2004.
On June 18, 2004, the judge issued another TRO, ordering Oakridge to remove the padlock in the premises. On August 16, 2004,
she issued another order, directing Oakridge and Atty. Bernas to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for failure to
comply with the TROs. However, the following day, the judge rendered a decision even if there was still a pre-scheduled hearing on
September 21.
Atty. Bernas then filed a complaint alleging that Judge Reyes displayed gross ignorance of the law and manifest partiality in
extending the life of the TRO, granting reliefs not prayed for and awarding excessive damages.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge is guilty of partiality
HELD: YES. The OCA summarized the charge of manifest partiality as follows: a) cancellation of the hearings on June 22, 2004 and
September 21, 2004; b) refusal to calendar for hearing on June 4, 2004 Oakridge‘s manifestation and motion; c) delay in resolving
the case since it was submitted for resolution in November 2002; d) disregard of the evidence favorable to Oakridge; e) rendering
the August 17, 2004 Decision which disposed of the merits of the case despite the pendency of unresolved incidents; and f) undue
haste in the issuance of the successive Orders dated August 16 and 17, 2004.
After a close scrutiny of all the foregoing circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that respondent Judge was guilty of such
misapplication of elementary court rules and procedure as to constitute gross ignorance of the law. However, the same
circumstances, taken together and measured against the high ethical standards set for members of the Judiciary, are clear
indicators of manifest bias and partiality as well as grave abuse of authority on the part of respondent Judge. Indubitably, the
unseemly haste with which respondent Judge issued the August 17, 2004 Decision without waiting for complainant‘s explanation to
her August 16, 2004 show-cause order plainly prejudiced complainant and favored the other party.
Established is the norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. Judges must not only render just,
correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free from any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity. As
a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although
said acts may be erroneous. It is true that a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was
made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. This does not mean, however, that a judge need not observe
propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official functions. Indeed, all members of the Bench are enjoined to
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
#2 JORDA v. BITAS A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376 [Formerly OCA March 5, Peralta, J.

LP.I. No. 11-3625-RTJ] 2014
PETITIONER: MA. LIZA M. JORDA, City RESPONDENT: JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, Regional Trial Court,
Prosecutor's Office, Tacloban City Branch 7, Tacloban City
DOCTRINE: In pending or prospective litigations before them, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything
that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity. Not
only must judges possess proficiency in law, they must also act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants
and their counsel of the judges’ competence, integrity and independence.
FACTS: The complaint stemmed from Criminal Cases for Qualified Trafficking and Child Abuse which were filed against Danilo
Miralles, et al. before the RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City where Judge Bitas presides.
Complainant alleged that accused Miralles, through counsel, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion
to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest. On the same day, he issued an order taking cognizance of the same and
directed the Prosecutor to file her comment on the motion. The prosecution then filed its opposition and moved for the issuance of
the warrant of arrest. No warrant was issued against Miralles. On February 2, 2011, the Judge issued an order finding that there is
probable cause to hold the accused for trial and ordered accused to put up bail but did not order his arrest.
Complainant lamented that the judge violated mandatory provisions of the Rules of Court when he did not issue a warrant of arrest
against the accused Miralles, who was charged with 2 non-bailable offenses. Moreover, respondent judge granted a reduced bail of
P40,000.00 even without any petition for the fixing of bail. She also found out that the family members of the judge are close
associates of Miralles. She also filed a motion for inhibition, but was denied. This angered the judge, so she was told to transfer to
another court and told she should not participate anymore, when she was supposed to conduct cross examination.
In his Answer, the judge reasoned that it was wrong to arrest Miralles, because the court was still in the process of determining
whether there is sufficient evidence to hold the accused for trial. He explained that Miralles had always made himself available
during the hearings for the determination of probable cause; thus, the court already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. Thus, there is no more need to issue a warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Bitas is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and impartiality
HELD: YES. The Court held that Miralles was charged with qualified trafficking with life imprisonment as one of the penalties
prescribed for the offense charged. Thus, he cannot be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, in accordance with the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Clearly, in the instant case, respondent judge's act of fixing the accused's bail and reducing
the same motu proprio is not mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of respondent judge, but a patent
disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the
judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Likewise, the Court was convinced that respondent judge‘s actuations in the court premises during the hearing of the petition for
commitment to the DSWD constitute abuse of authority and manifest partiality to the accused. Indeed, respondent judge‘s utterance
of: "I don‘t want to see your face!";
"You better transfer to another court!; You are being influenced by politicians" was improper and does not speak well his stature as
an officer of the Court. We note the improper language of respondent judge directed towards complainants in his Answers and
Comments where he criticized them for their incompetence in handling the subject case. Respondent Bitas' use of abusive and
insulting words, tending to project complainant‘s ignorance of the laws and procedure, prompted by his belief that the latter
mishandled the cause of his client is obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Complainants, likewise, cannot
be blamed for being suspicious of respondent‘s bias to the accused considering that the former can be associated with the accused
following his admission that his sister was a classmate of one Nora Miralles. Considering the apprehension and reservation of the
complainants, prudence dictates that respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing the case. Such abuse of power and
authority could only invite disrespect from counsels and from the public.
In pending or prospective litigations before them, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken
the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity. Not only must judges possess proficiency
in law, they must also act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants and their counsel of the judges‘ competence,
integrity and independence. Even on the face of boorish behavior from those he deals with, he ought to conduct himself in a manner
befitting a gentleman and a high officer of the court.
#3 LOPEZ v. LUCMAYON A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837 September 24, 2014 PONENTE
PETITIONER: CONRADO ABE LOPEZ, RESPONDENT: JUDGE ROGELIO S. LUCMAYON, Municipal Trial Court in
represented by ATTY. ROMUALDO JUBAY Cities, Branch 1, Mandaue City, Cebu
DOCTRINE: On the charge of impropriety, we have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to keep their conduct
beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, both in the
discharge of their official duties and in their everyday lives.
Canon II of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Rule 2.00: A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01: A judge should
so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
FACTS: The complainant, through his counsel Atty. Romualdo M. Jubay, alleged that he inherited from his adoptive father Restituto
Lopez a parcel of land located in Balamban, Cebu. He took over the cultivation of the land after he retired as a seafarer in 1988.
The complainant alleged that sometime in October 2004, he and the respondent met in a waiting shed located in front of the house
of the latter‘s grandmother in Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu. At that meeting, the respondent allegedly deceived him into signing a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to process the sale of the lot to the prospective buyer, Aboitiz Group of Company. Unknown to the
complainant, the said SPA contained at the bottom portion, a so-called "Waiver of Rights" that the respondent had deceptively
inserted in order to strip him of his ownership of the lot. After signing the document (notarizedby a certain Atty. Arturo C. Mata (Atty.
Mata) without the complainant‘s presence), the respondent allegedly told the complainant that he no longer had any right over the
property.
The complainant also asserted that the respondent had caused Pedro and his siblings to execute a document entitled
"Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Moises Legaspino and Victoria Lopez" to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant and his adoptive mother. He alleged that in the extrajudicial settlement, his name and the name of his adoptive mother
were excluded. They claimed that as legal heirs of the late Restituto Lopez (Restituto) who, in turn, had inherited the property from
his late mother Victoria Lopez (the co-owner of the property), their exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement was an act of
dishonesty to which the respondent should be held administratively liable.
In defense, respondent vehemently denied the allegations and claimed that it was the complainant who was interested in selling his
shares after he got tired of cultivating the land. He also denied that he deceived the complainant into signing the Waiver of Rights.
He contended that the filing of the administrative case against him was intended to embarrass and harass him. The respondent
further stated that the signing of the Waiver of Rights was done after he discovered that the complainant was not legally adopted,
and so, was not entitled to any portion of the land. He stated, too, that his participation in the sale transaction was limited to
informing his parents and relatives that the complainant is not a legal heir of Resitituto.
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dismissed the complaint. It noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint are
basically the same allegations the complainant raised in the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents, which was
dismissed. The City Prosecutor found that the complainant‘s allegations lacked merit and evidentiary proof. It also found that the
complainant failed to discharge the burden of proving the respondents‘ administrative liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge Lacmayon as an attorney-in-fact of the petitioner is guilty of impropriety
HELD: Yes. Respondent is Guilty of Impropriety. On the charge of impropriety, we have repeatedly reminded members of the
Judiciary to keep their conduct beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal
behavior, both in the discharge of their official duties and in their everyday lives.
Canon II of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Rule 2.00: A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
By the very nature of their work, judges should observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. For no position exacts a
greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed
as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
In the present administrative complaint, we agree with the OCA that the respondent‘s acts of: (1) making the complainant sign at
least two (2) documents – consisting of SPA and Waiver of Rights – without the presence of a counsel; and (2) allowing the
notarization of the documents outside the presence of the executor, amount to impropriety. While no evidence directly shows that
the respondent had deceived the complainant into signing these documents, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the documents
the respondent himself prepared greatly prejudiced the complainant. We also note that the Waiver of Rights benefitted the
respondent and his family. As a judge who is more learned in the law than the complainant, the respondent, at the very least should
have taken the appropriate steps (e.g. advise the former to engage the services of a lawyer who could lend him unbiased legal
advice regarding the legal effects of the waiver) to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in his dealings. This step,
the respondent failed to take. In these lights, the Court finds the respondent guilty of impropriety.
#4 TORMIS v. PAREDES G.R. No. DATE PONENTE
PETITIONER: JILL TORMIS RESPONDENT: JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES
DOCTRINE: Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another
person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official
duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in
his class discussions, they cannot be considered as ―misconduct.‖ They are simply not related to the discharge of his official
functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.
FACTS: Jill Tormis charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review at
the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes
named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class
that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times. In one session, Judge
Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he
was a ―court-noted addict.‖4 She was absent from class at that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang
(Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge
Paredes and transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.
Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled ―Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis‖5(Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended
from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused for
the warrant she had issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings
conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.
Jill also averred that Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the temporary
release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, ―People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,‖.
Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he
had investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used
Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis‘
involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never
personally attacked Judge Tormis‘ dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for
all the judges and should be discussed so that other judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such
misdeeds; that the marriage scams were also discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remedial law and
legal ethics were taught; that he talked about past and resolved cases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there
was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the legal
community and some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications; and that
when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, but she resented his advice.
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute his discussions in class
regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also brought to the attention of the Dean of
Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis who was a
drug addict and that drug dependents had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested that Francis should be removed from the
judiciary.
He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of the influence of Judge Tormis. She
is not an influential person and it is the Supreme Court who determines the persons to be appointed as court employees. Judge
Tormis, however, allowed her drug dependent son to apply for a position in the judiciary.
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted a cash bail bond of P6,000.00
for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though that the approval of the bail bond was in
accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other
urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely followed the procedure.
As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt and on the following business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of
Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an
official receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon of March
21, 2011.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge Tormis could not be the subject of
an administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance of his judicial duties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Paredes could be held administratively liable
HELD: YES. In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the Code and to use
temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.
When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances, as properly
observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to
taint their reputations.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes who merely justified his
action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon
4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always
conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedom of expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of
which he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have been more
circumspect in his language. Being a judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak with self-
restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively liable for his negative portrayal of
Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him as a
judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon
2 of the Code mandates:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people‘s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge
only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a
private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times.
A judge‘s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public
scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy correctly found that it cannot be regarded as
grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in the position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as the receipt, of the cash bail
bond, was in accordance with the rules. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill‘s allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave misconduct when he personally
received cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely following
the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail
on Saturdays after 1:00 o‘clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should
the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary
receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot be held administratively liable for his
act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case is pending, or with any
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the
place of arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are authorized to exercise other powers and
prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of their functions in relation to court administration. In the instant
case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions as an Executive Judge since he was the only judge
available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguio‘s payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In addition,
the judge assigned to the court where the Guioguio case was then pending and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were
not available to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice was for one judge to be
present on Saturdays. However, there was no judge assigned for duty during Sundays.
Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any irregularity reflected in the issuance of the
two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by sufficient evidence.
#5 PANGANDAG v. ABINAL A.M. No. MTJ-16-1877 June 13, 2016 SERENO, C.J.
PETITIONER: MOAMAR PANGANDAG RESPONDENT: PRESIDING JUDGE OTTOWA B. ABINAL, 8TH MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT IN MULONDO, MAGUING, LUMBA-BAYABAO, AND
TARAKA, LANAO DEL SUR
DOCTRINE: Judges should not preside over a case in which they are not wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and
independent. The rule on disqualification remains even if the present case merely involves the determination of probable
cause and the eventual issuance of a warrant of arrest.
FACTS: Herein complainant Moamar Pangandag was criminally charged with grave threats for allegedly threatening to commit the
crime of murder against a certain Monaoray Nahara Abdullah and her companions. Judge Abinal was the Presiding Judge of the
MTC where the information against Pangandag was filed. Judge Abinal, upon finding of existence of probable cause, issued a
warrant of arrest against Pangandag and two others. However, fifteen (15) days later, Judge Abinal voluntarily inhibited himself from
hearing the case because of his relationship to Abdullah, the latter being his niece. The case was eventually transferred to the
Presiding Judge of the Marawi City MTCC. The criminal complaint was later on dismissed in light of the prosecution's Motion to
Withdraw Information based on the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainant.
Pangandag is now before the SC to complain against the actions of Judge Abinal. He argues, among others, that Judge Abinal
should have disqualified himself from hearing the case in light of his relationship to the private complainant, who was his third-
degree relative by consanguinity. In his Comment, Judge Abinal admits that private complainant was indeed his niece; however, he
stresses that this relationship was the reason why he voluntarily inhibited from the case immediately after issuing the warrant. He
argues that he did not have to inhibit himself from deciding whether to issue a warrant of arrest, as it was his ministerial duty to do
so.
ISSUE: W/N the disqualification of Judge Abinal to sit in the criminal case, in light of his relationship with the private complainant
therein, PRECLUDES him from determining probable cause and issuance of warrant of arrest thereto
HELD: YES. The rule on disqualification remains even if the present case merely involves the determination of probable cause and
the eventual issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court clearly disqualifies judges from hearing cases if they are related to one of the parties within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity. As expressed in Section 5(c), Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges should not
take part in proceedings in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including those in which a party litigant is related
to them by consanguinity or affinity. The disqualification rule was put into place to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the
courts of justice. Thus, judges should not preside over a case in which they are not wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and
independent. Contrary to the insistence of Judge Abinal, the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not merely ministerial in nature.
Pursuant to Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, judges are required to personally examine private complainants and
witnesses, as well as any supporting documents that they may produce. The purpose is to determine whether there is probable
cause to believe that the persons being prosecuted are guilty of the crime charged. Afterwards, judges would again be required to
exercise judicial discretion to ascertain if there is a necessity to place the accused in custody so that the ends of justice would not be
frustrated.
MCTC judges may even choose to merely issue a summons, instead of a warrant of arrest, if they do not find it necessary to place
the accused under custody even after the determination of the existence of probable cause. By issuing a warrant of arrest, Judge
Abinal is assumed to have applied Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which required the examination of his own niece to
determine the existence of probable cause. Further, he is also deemed to have relied on her (niece) testimony to determine whether
the ends of justice necessitated that Pangandag be placed in custody, instead of merely issuing summons to compel him to appear
before the court. Clearly, Judge Abinal should not have participated in any of these courses of action, as he might have appeared
biased in issuing the warrant of arrest that would ensure that the accused in the case filed by the judge's own niece would stand
trial. Judge Abinal should have disqualified himself the moment he read the criminal complaint containing the name of his relative.
He committed an administrative offense once he took cognizance of the case and issued a warrant of arrest.
SC has ruled that ignorance and disregard of the rule on compulsory disqualification constitutes a serious charge pursuant to
Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 11 thereof, a fine of "more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00" may be imposed if the respondent is guilty of a serious charge. WHEREFORE, Judge Ottowa B. Abinal is found
GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW OR PROCEDURE for failing to immediately inhibit himself in the criminal case.
Accordingly, he was meted out a penalty of a FINE in the amount of P25,000.
4. Propriety
#1 LORENZANA v. AUSTRIA A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014 BRION, J.
PETITIONER: ANTONIO LORENZANA RESPONDENT: JUDGE MA. CECILIA AUSTRIA
DOCTRINE: The Code does not prohibit a judge from joining social networking sites as it is an exercise of one’s freedom
of expression. As the visible personification of law and justice, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus
must accordingly comport themselves.
FACTS: Antonio Lorenzana (complainant), as Exec. Vice President and Chief Operating Officer filed a petition to place Steel
Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) under Corporate Rehabilitation. RTC Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent) was the
presiding judge in the said case. Later, he filed an administrative complaint where he accused respondent of committing Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Gross Misconduct, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility among others.
Complainant alleged that respondent conducted informal meetings where she dictated the terms of the rehabilitation plan, effectively
usurping the rehabilitation receiver‘s functions, acted with bias towards one creditor, and refused to inhibit herself despite showing
special interest and personal involvement in the case. In addition, complainant accused the respondent of committing an act of
impropriety when she displayed pictures in a social networking website called "Friendster" where her upper body was barely
covered by a shawl, suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. She submits that her pictures in "Friendster" could hardly be
considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards
and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges and that she is proud of her
photo for having been aesthetically made.
The CA Investigating Justice declared that respondent's act of maintaining a personal social networking account (displaying photos
of herself and disclosing personal details as a magistrate in the account) constitutes an act of impropriety violating the Code of
Judicial Conduct. CANON 4 of the Code states that "Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of
all the activities of a judge" and that "judges shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office"
(SECTION 2). Thus, the respondent‘s act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of
propriety set forth by the Code. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) affirmed the CA report and fined respondent P20,000
and admonished to refrain from further acts of impropriety.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge's act of posting in social media photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress
constitutes an act of impropriety
HELD: YES. While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of social networking activities, they do not thereby shed off
their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected
to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted
her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Canon 4 (PROPRIETY) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office.
In communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind that what they communicate – regardless of
whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people‘s opinion not just of the
judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part.
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising
such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary."
The Code does not prohibit a judge from joining social networking sites as it is an exercise of one‘s freedom of expression. Though
the respondent‘s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive if done by an ordinary member of the public, as the
visible personification of law and justice, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport
themselves. This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters.
Respondent is ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A
JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition will be dealt more severely.
#2 AREVALO v. MANTUA A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360 November 19, 2014 PERLAS - BERNABE, J.
PETITIONER: DOROTHY FE MAH- RESPONDENT: JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
AREVALO PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17
DOCTRINE: The Halls of Justice may be used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the
courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or court
personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or profession.
Immorality has been defined "to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative
of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and
public welfare.”
FACTS: Petitioner Arevalo, the court stenographer of the RTC of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17, brought this administrative complaint
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), against Judge Celso L. Mantua (respondent) of the same court, accusing him of
Disgraceful/Immoral Conduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Gross
Violation of the Judicial Code of Conduct, Abuse of Authority, and Gross Ignorance of the Law. In her complaint, it was alleged that
respondent: (a) used the Hall of Justice, particularly his chamber, as his residence; (b) openly brought his mistress in court as
observed by all of his staff, especially by a former Utility Worker of the Metropolitan Trial Court of the same station, Dyndee Nuñez
(Nuñez); (c) used the court process server, Benjamin Pepito (Pepito), as his personal driver; (d) delegated his work load tohis legal
researcher, Atty. Elmer Mape (Atty. Mape), because he could no longer attend to the same due to his many vices; (e) committed
gross ignorance of the law when, in one criminal case that he handled, he proceeded to trial and allowed the private complainant to
testify in open court even if the accused was not assisted by counsel, and furthermore, extorted money from the accused in the
amount of ₱200,000.00; (f) asked for gasoline, personal allowance, and other benefits from the local government; and (g) failed to
decide cases within the prescribed 90-day period because he was waiting for litigants to offer him monetary consideration.
Respondent submitted an undated comment denying all accusations against him. In particular, respondent maintained that he: (a)
could not be residing at the Hall of Justice as he was already renting a vacant house near the same during his tenure as judge of the
RTC; (b) had no mistress, explaining that the woman that often goes inside his office was his caterer who brought him food; (c)
merely requested to hitchhike with Pepito from Palompon to Ormoc City and viceversa on Mondays and Fridays since the latter
synchronized his process serving to litigants and lawyers of Ormoc City on such days; (d) personally prepared his decisions as Atty.
Mape only assisted him with legal research; (e) indeed allowed trial to proceed without the accused being assisted by counsel in
that criminal case pointed out by the complainant, but only because the accused violated the three (3)-day rule of filing
postponements and failed to inform the adverse party of such intention, and that he never extorted money from the accused; and (f)
never asked for gasoline allowance, but nevertheless affirmed that he, like all other local officials, received allowances from the local
government. Further, respondent averred that as of January 9, 2009, he had already been separated from service due to
compulsory retirement.
The Investigating Justice found respondent guilty of violating Canon 2 and Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and
accordingly, recommended that he be fined in the amount of 25,000.00. The Investigating Justice concluded that respondent indeed
made his chamber in the Hall of Justice as his residence and that respondent indeed brought his mistress and slept with her inside
his chamber. He, however, exonerated respondent from the other charges for failure of the complainant to substantiate the same.
He noted that respondent‘s acts would have warranted the latter‘s suspension and even dismissal from service, if not for his
compulsory retirement on January 9, 2009. In lieu thereof, respondent was instead meted a fine in the aforesaid amount. The OCA
increased the recommended fine to 40,000.00, which amount shall be deducted from the retirement benefits due him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent shall be held administratively liable 1. for using his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his
residential and dwelling place and 2. for immorality in engaging in an extramarital affair with his mistress - YES
HELD: In this case, complainant‘s evidence had sufficiently established that respondent used his chambers in the Hall of Justice as
his residential and dwelling place. As correctly pointed out by both the Investigating Justice and the OCA, respondent‘s defense that
he rented a house did not negate the possibility that he used the Hall of Justice as his residence, since it is possible that a person
could be renting one place while actually and physically residing in another.
Further, the Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of Immorality. Immorality has been defined "to
include not only sexual matters but also ‗conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.‘" It is a serious charge which may be punishable by
any of the following: (a) dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine except accrued
leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; (b) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months;
or (c) a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
In the case at bar, it was adequately proven that respondent engaged in an extramarital affair with his mistress. The respective
testimonies of complainant and Nuñez clearly demonstrated how respondent paraded his mistress in full view of his colleagues,
court personnel, and even the general public by bringing her to fiestas and other public places, without any regard to consequences
that may arise as a result thereof. Worse, respondent even had the audacity to use his chambers as a haven for their morally
depraved acts. In doing so, respondent failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of
the judiciary is expected to observe. There is no doubt that engaging in an extra marital affair is not only a violation of the moral
standards expected of the members and employees of the judiciary but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of
marriage which the Court abhors and is, thus, punishable.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA that since respondent can no longer be
dismissed or suspended from office on account of his compulsory retirement on January 9, 2009, he should be fined instead. In this
light, the Court deems that given the circumstances herein discussed, it is proper to impose upon respondent the penalty of fine in
the amount of ₱40,000.00.
5. Equality
6. Competence and Diligence
#1 OCA v. NECESSARIO A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013 PONENTE
PETITIONER: Office of the Court Administrator RESPONDENT: Judge Necessario et al.
DOCTRINE: The respondent judges violated Canons 2 and 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence,
integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. This Court previously said that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of
incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of
integrity." In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office,
a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and more importantly of
justice.
FACTS: On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and headed the audit team
created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City, for the alleged irregularities in the solemnization
of marriages. A female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. They went to the
Palace of Justice and were directed by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared
that he would be recognized by other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school
classmate. The two lawyers then agreed that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage application
process. Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if the
marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be solemnized the next day, but the marriage
certificate would only be dated the day the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process
for a fee of three thousand pesos (₱3,000) only. On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida
N. Elepaño submitted its Memorandum dated 29 August 2007 and Supplemental Report. Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage
certificates were examined by the judicial audit team. The team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280
marriages were solemnized under Article 34 of the family code. There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from
the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage
licenses obtained on the same day.
The following are some of the testimonies of the concerned Court personnel: (see full text for complete narration):
Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario. There were also "assistants" who would go
over the couples‘ documents before these couples would be referred to Judge Necessario. Retuya also narrated several anomalies
involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the fact that
parties were not residents of Barili. Those anomalous marriages were solemnized by Judge Tormis.
Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges. She admitted that after the payment of the
solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (₱300), a different amount, as agreed upon by the parties and the judge, was paid to the
latter. She admitted that she accepted four thousand pesos (₱4,000) for facilitating the irregular marriage of Moreil Baranggan
Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the payment to a certain "Mang Boy."
Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage licenses were obtained
from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns were not strict about couples‘
attendance in the family planning seminar. She also admitted that couples gave her food while the judge received five hundred
pesos (₱500) if the marriage was solemnized inside the chambers. Foreigners were said to have given twice the said amount. The
judge accepted one thousand five hundred pesos (₱1,500) for gasoline expenses if the marriage was celebrated outside the
chambers;
Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to get married
under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten pesos (₱10);
Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera was a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo,
Cebu and on 21 May 2007, she and her then fiancé wanted to set a marriage date. Her younger sister who was married in a civil
wedding last year gave her the number of a certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy on the phone, the wedding was scheduled at 2
p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their birth certificates. No marriage license was required from them. Meloy
asked for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (₱1,500). According to Baguio-Manera, their marriage certificate was marked as
"No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive Order No. 209". Their marriage was
solemnized that day by Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera claimed that they did not understand what that statement
meant at that time. However, in her affidavit, she declared that the situation premised under Article 34 did not apply to her and her
fiancé.
On the other hand, Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents presented to him
by contracting parties. He claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code had the required affidavit of
cohabitation. He claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even before he became a judge.
He avers that he ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the existence of an impediment to marry. He also asks the
parties searching questions and clarifies whether they understood the contents of the affidavit and the legal consequences of its
execution. Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not required to inquire whether
the license was obtained from a location where one of the parties is an actual resident. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the
charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of the judicial audit team during the investigation an "entrapment". She also
claims that there is nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license and with the fact
that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of the parties resided. Lastly, Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
denies violating the law on marriage. He maintains that it is the local civil registrar who evaluates the documents submitted by the
parties, and he presumes the regularity of the license issued. It is only when there is no marriage license given that he ascertains
the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to marry.
In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges and some court
employees, and the suspension or admonition of others for gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross
neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service-
YES
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages.
The respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties and the proper
administration of justice.
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples were
incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections or
superimpositions of entries related to the parties‘ place of residence. These included indistinguishable features such as the font, font
size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage license. These actions of the respondent
judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance,
and carelessness. Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The
Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one‘s attention to a task expected of him and it is
gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or
threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official receipts for the
solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on different dates. The OCA emphasizes
that the payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on
the process. Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner
who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners submitted were mere
affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the
Family Code displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents
required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract
marriage. Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the
Family Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the
minority status of one party. The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages ranged from
eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation. These
affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself. Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the
solemnization of marriages of some couples where no marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made
to fill up the application for a license on the same day the marriage was solemnized.
The judges‘ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code without
the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional
character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but
reasonably construed. The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled
rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
Thus, respondent judges violated Canons 2 and 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in
the performance of their duties. The Court also ruled that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law
involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity." In connection with this, the
administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or
she becomes the visible representation of the law and more importantly of justice.
#2 GARADO v. TORRES G.R. No. DATE PONENTE
PETITIONER: MARICOR L. GARADO RESPONDENT: JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES
DOCTRINE: Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to act promptly upon cases and matters pending before their courts.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to "dispose of the court's business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods." Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt
and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice
denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and
attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create
dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
FACTS: Maricor L. Garado charged respondent Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres with violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct in connection with Civil Case No. 20129 entitled "Maricor Garado v. Rose Virgie Estor."
Complainant alleges that she is the plaintiff in the aforesaid civil case for sum of money and damages. She complains that the case
is covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and only involves a claim for the payment of a loan amounting to
P50,000 plus interest and a claim for damages amounting to P30,000, but the case has remained unresolved for more than
20 months from the time it was filed.
Complainant narrates that her complaint against defendant Rose Virgie Estor was filed on August 22, 2005. After respondent judge
denied defendant Estor's motion to dismiss on July 3, 2006, Estor thereafter filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Extension of Time
(To File Responsive Pleading) followed by a second motion to dismiss on November 16, 2006. Complainant, meanwhile, filed a
motion to render judgment with an opposition to the second motion to dismiss on November 27, 2006. The two motions were
submitted for resolution on November 27, 2006 and January 15, 2007, respectively, but both motions remained unresolved
as of the date of the filing of the complaint on May 9, 2007.
In a 1st Indorsement, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge Torres to file her Comment on the
complaint within ten days. Respondent judge received the 1st Indorsement on May 25, 2007, but failed to comply with the
directive. Thus, the OCA issued a 1st Tracer against respondent judge on July 24, 2007 requiring her to file the required Comment
within five days from notice. Respondent judge also received the 1st Tracer on August 3, 2007, but still failed to comply.
On March 10, 2008, this Court's Third Division issued a Resolution directing respondent judge to: (1) show cause why she
should not be administratively sanctioned in view of her refusal to submit her Comment despite the two directives, and (2)
file her Comment within five days from receipt of notice, otherwise, an administrative case will be filed against her.
Respondent judge received a copy of the Resolution on April 16, 2008, but again ignored the same. Consequently, the Court issued
another Resolution on July 14, 2008 imposing upon Judge Torres a fine of P1,000, to be paid within ten days from receipt,
or imprisonment of five days if the fine is not paid within the period of ten days. The July 14, 2008 Resolution also directed
respondent judge to comply with the Court's Show Cause Resolution dated March 10, 2008. Despite receipt of the Resolution,
however, Judge Torres neither complied with the Resolution nor paid the fine.
Thus, on April 21, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution and resolved to await the payment of the fine by respondent judge; to
consider the filing of her Comment as waived; and to refer this administrative matter to the OCA for final evaluation, report
and recommendation.
On November 11, 2010, the OCA submitted its Memorandum to the Court finding respondent judge administratively liable.
In recommending the penalty of dismissal, the OCA noted that in five previous administrative cases, respondent was found liable
for undue delay in rendering a decision, resolution or order, and sternly warned that the commission of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely. The OCA also noted eight other pending administrative cases filed by different litigants against
respondent judge involving offenses of similar nature. As well, the OCA noted the four instances under the present
administrative case where respondent judge failed to comply with directives/orders issued by this Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE VIOLATED THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.
HELD: YES. Respondent had been given ample opportunity to address the complaint against her.
Respondent's failure to submit her Comment and compliance as required by the OCA and this Court is tantamount to
insubordination, gross inefficiency, and neglect of duty. It was respondent's duty then not only to obey the lawful orders of her
superiors, but also to defend herself against complainant's charges and prove her fitness to remain a member of the bench. By her
failure to comply with the OCA and this Court's directives, respondent judge has completely lost her chance to defend herself.
As to the merits of the administrative complaint, the pleadings and evidence on record clearly establish respondent's liability
for undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20129.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or
resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit
and position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment. Section 6 of the said Rule
also requires first level courts to render judgment motu proprio or upon motion of the plaintiff if the defendant fails to file an answer
to the complaint within the allowable period.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to act promptly upon cases and matters pending before their courts. Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to "dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods." Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and
punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice
denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and
attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to
create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 likewise reminds all judges to observe scrupulously the periods
prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters
pending before their courts.
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not
possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should
be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice
promptly. In this case, respondent judge failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that her position
required. Upon the failure of the defendant Estor to file her Answer in Civil Case No. 20129, respondent was then required under
Section 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure to render judgment in Civil Case No. 20129 within 30 days. She failed
to do so contrary to the rationale behind the said Rule, which was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision and violation of Supreme
Court directives as less serious charges which are punishable with the penalty of suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for one month to three months, or a fine of P10,000 to P20,000. Given that respondent had been previously dismissed from
the service in Lugares v. Gutierrez-Torres, however, the penalty of suspension is already inapplicable. Thus, the Court imposes
upon respondent for her undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20129 a fine in the maximum amount of P20,000, and another fine
of P10,000 for her repeated failure to obey this Court's directives, both amounts to be deducted from her accrued leave credits.
#3 CARBAJOSA v. PATRICIO G.R. No. DATE PONENTE
PETITIONER: JESUS D. RESPONDENT: JUDGE HANNIBAL R. PATRICIO, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit
CARBAJOSA Trial Court,President Roxas, Capiz
DOCTRINE: The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to apply them or to be
confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial.
In other words, a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is to effect execution
without delay and supervise implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment.
FACTS: Carbajosa is the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 2540 for grave coercion against accused Dolores Bieles
(Bieles), heard and tried before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of President Roxas-Pilar, President Roxas, Capiz, in the
sala of then Presiding Judge Geomer C. Delfin. The charge stemmed from Bieles' menacing and intimidating attitude in preventing
Carbajosa from bringing to Iloilo City fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn by removing and unloading the same out of the latter's Efren
Bus Liner.
The MCTC convicted Bieles of the crime charged and sentenced her to imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor as minimum to six (6) months of arresto mayor as maximum, and ordered her to pay: (1) a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and (2) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn or its
equivalent value as the first lien on judgment.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 18, affirmed Bieles' conviction but modified her sentence by
increasing the maximum penalty imposed to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. This modified
judgment was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) and eventually by this Court when Bieles' petition for review on certiorari
was denied. Likewise denied was Bieles' ensuing motion for reconsideration. The Court thereafter issued an Entry of Judgment
stating that the Resolution has become final and executory on January 15, 2009.
Meanwhile, Carbajosa filed a motion before the RTC for the remand of the case to the court of origin for proper execution. The
motion was granted in the RTC's Order. Carbajosa thereafter filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment before the MCTC presided by
herein respondent Judge Patricio. Bieles opposed the motion stating that she sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, Honorable
Reynato S. Puno asking for a review of her case on the merits. She claimed that the letter was favorably acted upon as evidenced
by the first endorsement dated January 25, 2010 requesting the Clerk of Court of the Third Division to include the case in its
agenda.
Judge Patricio resolved the conflict by issuing an Order dated wherein he reckoned that it will be best to hold in abeyance the
resolution of Carbajosa's Motion for Execution of Judgment and await the result of the referral/endorsement made by the Chief
Justice before a ruling on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution is made.
On April 19, 2010, Carbajosa manifested his objection to the foregoing order and insisted on the issuance of a writ of execution
averring that in the absence of any restraining order, its issuance is imperative so as not to unduly delay the administration of
justice.
On May 24, 2010, Judge Patricio issued an Order reiterating his previous stance that there is a necessity to await the result of the
referral made by the Chief Justice to the Third Division Clerk of Court.
On May 31, 2011, through an Order, Judge Patricio disclosed that he sent a query to the OCA regarding the effect of the Chief
Justice's endorsement of Bieles' letter to the implementation of the final judgment of her conviction. In a letter dated September 5,
2011, Atty. Geronga informed Judge Patricio that the subject matter of his query is judicial in nature hence, beyond the mandate of
the OCA. Also, as a matter of policy, the OCA refrains from rendering an opinion on matters that may later on be brought to the
Court for judicial determination. Atty. Geronga suggested that the issue be resolved based on pertinent jurisprudence and relevant
laws.
Bieles' motion to suspend proceedings was granted.
In so ruling, Judge Patricio again reasoned that any action on the issuance of the writ of execution should await the resolution by the
Third Division of the Supreme Court on Bieles' letter asendorsed by the Chief Justice
These circumstances prompted Carbajosa to institute the herein administrative complaint imputing gross ignorance of the law,
manifest partiality and evident bad faith against Judge Patricio in continuously deferring the issuance of a writ of execution for the
final and executory judgment in Criminal Case No. 2540.
In his Comment, Judge Patricio admitted postponing the resolution of Carbajosa's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution but
he denied that he acted in bad faith and/or with partiality. He claimed that he was merely abiding by the endorsement made by the
Chief Justice that the letter of accused Bieles be referred to the Third Division for action.
The OCA found Judge Patricio guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he should be fined in the amount of
P21,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Patricio‘s act of continuously deferring the issuance of a writ of execution for the final and executory
judgment in Criminal Case No. 2540 constitutes a gross ignorance of law.
HELD: YES. Any delay in the full execution of a final and executory decision is repugnant to the ideal administration of justice.
Hence the rule that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such
judgment should not be hampered or evaded; for the immediate enforcement of the parties' rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a
major component of the ideal administration of justice. Our penal laws and rules of procedure, in particular, enjoin that when the
judgment of conviction is already final and executory its execution is ministerial.
Respondent Judge Patricio, however, demonstrated ignorance of the above rule by repeatedly refusing to execute the final and
executory judgment of conviction against Bieles.
The justification proffered by Judge Patricio is not well-taken. As correctly observed by the OCA, the Court's Resolution dated
August 13, 2008 in G.R. No. 182956 affirming the conviction of Bieles and the Entry of Judgment dated January 15, 2009 evidently
carried more legal and procedural significance and effect in Criminal Case No. 2540, as against the endorsement referring the letter\
of Bieles to the Third Division for Agenda. The endorsement did not result in a definite action on the part of the Court as it did not
even remotely suggest that G.R. No. 182956 will be re-opened. Hence, there was absolutely no justifiable reason for Judge Patricio
to rely on the latter and thereby thwart the basic rules on execution of judgment.
The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary
incidents. The issuance of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In other words, a judge is not given
the discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and supervise implementation
strictly in accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricio's actuations unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law.
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross
ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the
service. Based on the attendant circumstances of this case, a fine of P21,000.00 is the appropriate penalty.
#4 JUNIO v. BELTRAN A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367 January 13, 2014. BRION J.
PETITIONER: SR. REMY ANGELA RESPONDENT: JUDGE MARIVIC A. CACATIANBELTRAN, BRANCH 3, REGIONAL
JUNIO, SPC TRIAL COURT, TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN,
DOCTRINE: Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution requires lower court judges to decide a case within the period of
ninety (90) days. Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue
delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge, with the following administrative sanctions: (a) suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more
than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
FACTS: Claire Ann Campos, a 17-year old student, filed an affidavit-complaint for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (the
Child Abuse Law) and R.A. No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for the Disabled) before the Tuguegarao City Prosecution Office against Sr.
Remy Angela Junio and Dr. Josephine D. Lorica, the President and the Dean of the School of Health Services, respectively, of St.
Paul University of the Philippines (SPUP). Claire alleged that she was refused enrolment by SPUP for the B.S. Nursing course in
her sophomore year because of her cleft palate; she alleged that the refusal was made despite her completion of SPUP‘s College
Freshmen Program Curriculum. The prosecutor‘s office found probable cause to indict Junio and Lorica of the crimes charged, and
recommended the filing of the corresponding informations against them.
Junio and Lorica appealed the resolution of the prosecutor‘s office, but Undersecretary Jose Vicente Salazar of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) denied their petition for review in his resolution. The prosecutor‘s office filed two informations against Junio and
Loricabefore the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, presided by Judge Lyliha Aquino. The cases were
assigned to Judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran of the RTC, Branch 3, Tuguegarao City, due to the inhibition of Judge Aquino. Junio
and Lorica sought a reconsideration of the DOJ‘s resolution. The RTC found probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against
Junio and Lorica. Accordingly, it issued the warrants of arrest against them. Lorica posted bail for her provisional liberty. Junio and
Lorica filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings and to recall warrants of arrest. Junio posted bail on the same
day. The RTC denied Junio and Lorica‘s urgent motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings and to recall warrants of arrest.
Meanwhile, DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima granted Junio and Lorica‘s motion for reconsideration as she directed the Cagayan
Provincial Prosecutor to immediately cause the withdrawal of the informations for violations of R.A. Nos. 7610 and 7277 against
Junio and Lorica for lack of probable cause. Junio and Lorica filed a manifestation and motion before the RTC, praying for the
cancellation of their scheduled arraignment, and for the dismissal of the cases against them. The City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica
filed a joint motion to withdraw informations in view of Secretary De Lima‘s resolution. Judge Cacatian-Beltran issued an order
stating that ―the motion relative to the resolution of the Department of Justice is deemed submitted for resolution.‖ Junio, Lorica and
the City Prosecutor filed a joint motion for resolution. In its order, the RTC denied the joint motion to withdraw informations for lack of
merit. The City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica moved to reconsider this order, but the RTC denied their motion.
Junio and Lorica filed an affidavit-complaint against Judge Cacatian-Beltran for violation of Rules 1.02, 3.01, 3.02, and 3.05 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. They alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran only resolved the joint motion to withdraw informations after
almost four months from the time it was submitted for resolution. They claimed that four months was beyond the period prescribed
by existing rules for the resolution of simple motions. Junio and Lorica further alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran ―arrogated unto
herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge‖ when she insisted that they stand for trial although she did not find any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Justice Secretary De Lima.
In her comment, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio and Lorica might have conducted a follow-up of the motions to
dismiss at Branch 4 where the records of the criminal cases had been retained, and that the staff of Branch 4 failed to inform her of
any follow-up by Junio and Lorica and/or by their counsel. She maintained that she ―lost no time in finishing the draft of her January
6, 2012 order when the joint motion for resolution was brought to her attention. Judge Cacatian-Beltran maintained that the RTC
was not bound by the findings of the Secretary of Justice since her court had already acquired jurisdiction over the case. She added
that she made an independent assessment of the evidence before denying the motion. She further stated that she acted promptly
on all other incidents in the case.
The OCA recommended that: (1) the administrative complaint against Judge Cacatian-Beltran be dismissed for being judicial in
nature; and (2) Judge Cacatian-Beltran be admonished to strictly comply with the reglementary periods to act on pending motions
and other incidents in her court. The OCA held that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot
be corrected through administrative proceedings. It explained that the aberrant acts allegedly committed by Judge Cacatian-Beltran
relate to the exercise of her judicial functions, and added that only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad
faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice should be administratively sanctioned. The OCA, nonetheless, ruled that Judge Cacatian-
Beltran should be admonished to be more mindful of the reglementary periods to resolve pending motions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Beltran committed undue delay in the resolution of the motions which sanctions administrative
liabilities
HELD: The SC Ruled to approve and adopt the OCA‘s recommendations as their own ruling.
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution requires lower court judges to decide a case within the period of ninety (90) days. Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise holds that judges should administer justice without delay and directs every
judge to dispose of the courts‘ business promptly within the period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain
acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the ninety
(90) day period is mandatory. This mandate applies even to motions or interlocutory matters or incidents pending before a
magistrate. In the present case, the City Prosecutor‘s joint motion to withdraw informations was deemed submitted for resolution on
September 14, 2011. Judge Cacatian-Beltran, however, did not act on the motion within the prescribed three (3) month period (or up
to December 13, 2011), and instead ruled on it only on January 6, 2012.
In her defense, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio and Lorica might have conducted a follow-up of the motions to dismiss
at Branch 4 where the records of the criminal cases were retained, and that the staff of Branch 4 failed to inform her of any follow-up
by Junio and Lorica and/or their counsel. We note, however, that Branch 4 is paired with Judge Cacatian-Beltran‘s Branch 3 per
Circular No. 7-74, as amended by SC Circular No. 19-98. Since Criminal Case Nos. 14053-54 had been assigned to Judge
Cacatian-Beltran, it was incumbent upon her to update herself on the developments in these consolidated cases; she should have
kept her own record of cases and noted therein the status of each case to ensure prompt and effective action. To do this, Judge
Cacatian-Beltran should have adopted a record management system and organized her docket — an approach that she appears
not to have done. Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue delay in
rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge, with the following administrative sanctions: (a) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00. However, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that there had been undue delay (as shown by the
records), any attendant bad faith, any intent to prejudice a party to the case, or some other ulterior ends. The OCA, in fact, pointedly
ruled that the inaction was not attended with malice: Judge Cacatian-Beltran resolved the joint motion to withdraw informations two
(2) days after she learned of its existence on January 4, 2012. These circumstances are sufficient to mitigate the liability of Judge
Cacatian-Beltran and keep us from imposing a fine or suspension from office. Accordingly, we find sufficient and warranted the
OCA‘s recommended penalty of admonition.
The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently evaluate or
assess the merits of the case; in the exercise of its discretion, it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of the trial court‘s duty and jurisdiction to
determine a prima facie case. We stress that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case
(whether it be a dismissal, an acquittal or a conviction of the accused) rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court; it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. Once a criminal complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case (whether it be a dismissal, an acquittal or a conviction of the accused) rests
within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court; it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case
before it.
In resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw the information filed by the public prosecutor (on his own initiative or pursuant
to the directive of the Secretary of Justice), either for insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or for lack of
probable cause, the trial court should not merely rely on the findings of the public prosecutor or of the Secretary of Justice that no
crime had been committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction of the accused. When a court acts, whether its action is consistent or inconsistent with a prosecutor’s recommendation, it
rules on the prosecutor’s action and does not thereby assume the role of a prosecutor. We also find unmeritorious Junio and
Lorica’s argument that Judge Cacatian-Beltran “arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge” when she insisted that
the accused stand trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Secretary de Lima. When a
court acts, whether its action is consistent or inconsistent with a prosecutor’s recommendation, it rules on the prosecutor’s action
and does not thereby assume the role of a prosecutor. The case of Hipos, Sr. v. Bay, 581 SCRA 674 (2009), best explains why we
so rule: To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Information from the
prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal. Neither did we
rule therein that where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw
Information is void. What we held therein is that a trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a Motion to Withdraw
Information without an independent and complete assessment of the issues presented in such Motion.
#5 TUPAL v. ROJO A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014 Leonen, J.
PETITIONER: REX M. RESPONDENT: JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
TUPAL Bacolod City, Negros Occidental
DOCTRINE: Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity, "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer." If the law involved is basic,
ignorance constitutes "lack of integrity." Violating basic legal principles and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of
the law.
FACTS: Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. Judge Rojo
allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation and issued
them to the contracting parties. He notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties‘ marriage. These "package marriages" are
allegedly common in Bacolod City.
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the Code of
Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of cohabitation all
notarized by Judge Rojo. All affidavits were notarized on the day of the contracting parties‘ marriages. For notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990.
Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected
with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge‘s official functions
and duties as solemnizing officer. Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he
solemnized. Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized
affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did not require the parties to present their
competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by law. These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law as
notarial rules "[are] x x x simple and elementary to ignore."
Judge Rojo argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch
5 for allegedly making false statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to delay
Frialyn‘s case. He did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was
connected with his official functions and duties as a judge. The Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary does not prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Thus,
Judge Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90. He also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a
judge, not a notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized. Also, Judge Rojo argued
that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Since he
interviewed the parties as to the contents of their affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who executed the
affidavit. The parties‘ identities are "unquestionable."
The Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90. The Office of the Court Administrator
recommended that Judge Rojo be fined ₱9,000.00 and sternly warned that repeating the same offense will be dealt with more
severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law.
HELD: Yes. Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in their ex
officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and
duties as provided under Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990. They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers
or notaries public are lacking in their courts‘ territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when
notarizing documents ex officio.
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and
duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were
lacking in his court‘s territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment to marry, they are
exempt from the marriage license requirement. Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of
cohabitation and execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the parties‘ qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the
contracting parties‘ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties‘ marriage. Thus, affidavits of
cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge‘s official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties‘ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the
affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit‘s statements before performing the marriage
ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to
admit that he solemnized the marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation. Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of
cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with their
official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Hence, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary
public must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity. In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo
notarized, he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the
parties were personally known to him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo
violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is guilty of gross ignorance
of the law.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith. However, this court also held in Santos that "good
faith in situations of fallible discretion [inheres] only within the parameters of tolerable judgment x x x." Good faith "does not apply
where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error."
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts‘ territorial jurisdiction before
notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires notaries public to personally know the signatory to the
document they will notarize or require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity. These are basic legal principles and
procedure Judge Rojo violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements nine times is not good faith.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity, "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer." If the law involved is basic, ignorance constitutes "lack of integrity."
Violating basic legal principles and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.
This court may impose the following sanctions for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it being a serious charge:
a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations;
b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
c. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been dismissed from the service for gross ignorance of the law.
However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges‘ practice of notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in Bacolod City and
Talisay City. Thus, this court finds suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months sufficient sanction.
Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the requirements of the law.1âwphi1 They should act with caution with respect
to affidavits of cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical requirements as in this case will be dealt with strictly.
#6 MARCELO v. PICHAY A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838 March 12, 2014 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
PETITIONER:SPOUSES RICARDO and RESPONDENT:JUDGE RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY, METROPOLITAN

EVELYN MARCELO TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 78, PARANAQUE CITY
DOCTRINE: In Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City
Bohol,41 the Court held that non-compliance with the periods prescribed under Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution constitutes gross inefficiency, and, perforce, warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against the
defaulting judge
FACTS: Complainants Sps. Marcelo were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2004-286 for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Parañaque City, Branch 78 (MeTC). By virtue of a Joint Decision2 dated September 5, 2005 (subject decision), the
defendants therein, Sps. Magopoy, were ordered by the MeTC to vacate and surrender the possession of the property located at
Marcelo Compound, Philip Street Extension, Barangay Moonwalk, Parañaque City (subject property) to Sps. Marcelo.3 On April 14,
2006, a writ of execution4 was issued, and later implemented by Branch Sheriff Hildo D. Epres (Sheriff Epres) on July 27, 2006.5
Thus, Sps. Marcelo obtained the possession of the subject property on the said date, as shown in the Certificate of Turn-over of
Possession. However, at around 6 o‘clock in the evening of the same day, Sps. Magopoy successfully re-entered the subject
property and regained its possession
Sps. Marcelo moved to cite Sps. Magopoy in contempt for disobedience/resistance to lawful court processes. While finding the act
of re-entry by Sps. Magopoy as a clear defiance of a lawful writ, (i.e., the April 14, 2006 writ of execution) which is a form of indirect
contempt punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the MeTC, in an Order8 dated February 25, 2009, did not cite them in
contempt but, instead, ordered them to surrender the subject property to Sps. Marcelo within ten (10) days from receipt of the
order.9
Sps. Marcelo filed an Ex-Parte Constancia in view of the continued refusal of Sps. Magopoy to surrender the subject property.10
This prompted Judge Pichay to issue an Order11 dated August 7, 2009, giving Sheriff Epres12 three (3) days within which to effect
Sps. Magopoy‘s eviction from the subject property. Consequently, Sps. Magopoy filed a motion for reconsideration13 on August 26,
2009, which was opposed14 by Sps. Marcelo on September 8, 2009.1
The hearing on the aforesaid motion was conducted on September 11, 2009, wherein Sps. Magopoy were directed to file their reply.
In compliance, Sps. Magopoy filed their Supplemental Motion and Reply on September 24, 2009 (supplemental motion),16 alleging
that the miscellaneous sales application of Sps. Marcelo over the subject property had been denied by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.17 The following day, Sps. Marcelo filed a motion submitting all incidents for resolution.
Instead of resolving the pending incidents, Judge Pichay, in an Order19 dated October 1, 2009 (October 1, 2009 Order), directed
Sps. Marcelo to file their comment and/or opposition to Sps. Magopoy‘s supplemental motion within five (5) days from receipt of the
order, with a warning that upon the expiration of said period, the court will resolve the pending incidents.
With respect to the Supplemental Motion and Reply, and in the interest of justice, the Court directs [Sps. Marcelo] to file their
Comment and/or Opposition to said Supplemental Motion and Reply within five (5) days.
Considering the Ex-Parte Constancia, the Court makes it clear to the parties that the only pleading left to be received by this Court is
the Comment and/or Opposition of [Sps. Marcelo] on the Supplemental Motion and Reply of [Sps. Magopoy] and the Reply of [Sps.
Magopoy] to said [Sps. Marcelo‘s] Comment and/or Opposition.
The Court will no longer conduct a hearing on the pending incidents.
Hence, upon the expiration of the periods given above, the Court will resolve the pending incidents.
Despite the directive of the court a quo, Sps. Marcelo failed to file their comment and/or opposition. Nonetheless, Judge Pichay, set
Sps. Magopoy‘s previous motion for reconsideration as well as their supplemental motion for hearing
Disconcerted with Judge Pichay‘s continuous inaction, Sps. Marcelo filed an administrative complaint24 on March 10, 2010 before
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging him and Sheriff Epres with inordinate delay in the disposition of the pending
incidents in Civil Case No. 2004-286 relating to the implementation of the writ of execution of the subject decision.
In his Comment dated September 8, 2010,25 Judge Pichay attributed the delay to the new arguments raised in Sps. Magopoy‘s
supplemental motion. In particular, he considered the denial of the sales application of Sps. Marcelo over the subject property, as
brought to his attention by Sps. Magopoy, as a supervening event that may materially change the situation of the parties26 and,
thus, render the execution of the subject decision inequitable.27 Therefore, in the interest of justice and equity, he scheduled the
supplemental motion for hearing in order to be better apprised of the situation of the parties. Unfortunately, the hearing dates
therefor were further reset due to the requests of Sps. Marcelo,28 and because he went on sick leave from June 8 to 29, 2010.
In a Memorandum30 dated July 22, 2013, the OCA recommended31 that Judge Pichay be held administratively liable for undue
delay in the resolution of the pending incidents relative to the execution of the subject decision in Civil Case No. 2004-286, and that
a fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00 be imposed for the infraction.32 The OCA found that Judge Pichay entertained dilatory
machinations that resulted in the delay in the implementation of the writ of execution issued as early as in 2006 for the eviction of
Sps. Magopoy from the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Pichay is guilty of undue delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 2004-286?
HELD: The Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe the time periods in deciding cases and resolving matters
brought to their adjudication, which, for lower courts, is three (3) months from the date they are deemed submitted for decision or
resolution. Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (1987 Constitution) states this rule, viz.:
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
In consonance with the foregoing, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct For the Philippine Judiciary36 states
that:
Sec. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently fairly and with reasonable
promptness. (Emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of the foregoing mandate, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 13-8737 [dated July 1, 1987], which states:
The reorganized judiciary is tasked with the tremendous responsibility of assisting parties litigants in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of their cases and proceedings as directed in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.
Delay is a recurring complaint of every litigant. The main objective of every judge, particularly trial judges, should be to avoid delays,
or if it cannot be totally avoided, to hold them to the minimum and to repudiate manifestly dilatory tactics.
GENERAL GUIDELINES
For all members of the judiciary, the following guidelines are hereby issued:
xxxx
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and
resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve
months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do
so. x x x x
Also, [the] Court's Administrative Circular No. 1-8839 [dated January 28, 1988] states that:
Pursuant to Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating the adoption of a systematic plan to expedite the decision or
resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court and the lower courts prior to the effectivity of the Constitution on
February 2, 1987, the following directives must be complied with strictly by all concerned.
In Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City Bohol,41 the Court
held that non-compliance with the periods prescribed under Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution constitutes gross
inefficiency, and, perforce, warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against the defaulting judge, viz.:
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored
precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and
observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in
the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.
While trial court judges are often burdened with heavy case loads which, in turn, preclude the expeditious resolution of disputes,
they are given the option to, for good reasons, ask for an extension of the period within which to resolve a particular case or any
pending incident therein. In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches 72 And 22, Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur,42 citing the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Javellana, the Court thus remarked:
x x x [A] judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by the Court, the
failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. If a
judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension.
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition
of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in
each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, such as the
presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age
of the judge, and other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
As correctly observed by the OCA in this case, Judge Pichay failed to resolve the subject motions, namely the motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion, within the three (3) month-period prescribed therefor. Records show that Sps. Marcelo‘s
period to file their comment/opposition to the supplemental motion and/ or rejoinder to the reply lapsed on October 18, 2009,44 at
which time, the pending incidents were, as stated in the Order dated October 1, 2009, already deemed submitted for resolution. This
is concordant with Section 15(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that "[a] case or matter shall be deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by
the court itself."
Notwithstanding that the matter had already been submitted for resolution, Judge Pichay continued with the proceedings by setting
the motions for hearing to the effect of unreasonably delaying the execution of the subject decision. Indeed, while it has been held
that a presiding judge shall at all times remain in firm control of the proceedings, he is nevertheless mandated to adopt a policy
against unwarranted delays.
In this case, Judge Pichay did not sufficiently explain the reasons as to why he failed to resolve the pending incidents on time, as
well as to why he still had to set the same for hearing and repeatedly grant postponements therefor, either motu proprio or by
motion, despite the summary nature of ejectment proceedings and the ministerial nature of the subsequent issuance of a writ of
execution. These considerations he should have been fully aware of.
As case law instructs, "[e]jectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or right of possession of property,"46 and that "it becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of
execution to enforce the judgment which has become executory,"47 as in Civil Case No. 2004-286. To add, the fact that Judge
Pichay required medical attention on June 7, 2010 is no excuse for his default, considering that on such date, the subject motions
were already due for resolution.48 Thus, without having duly applied for any extension before the Court, Judge Pichay was bound to
resolve the pending incidents in the said case within the three (3) month-period prescribed by the Constitution. This, he, however,
failed to do, and, as such, the imposition of administrative sanctions against him remains in order.
Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is considered as a less serious
offense which is punishable49 by either: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00. Considering, however, that Judge
Pichay was held administratively liable for the same offense in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1763 (formerly OCA IPI No. 09-2209-MTJ),50 and
hitherto warned that a repetition of a similar infraction would warrant a more severe penalty, the Court deems it apt to increase the
fine recommended by the OCA from ₱10,000.00 to ₱12,000.00.
#7 GARAY v. VENADAS A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000 DATE PONENTE
DOCTRINE: A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and to have the basic rules of
procedure at the palm of his hand||| (Spouses Sombilon v. Garay, G.R. Nos. 179914, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000, [June 16, 2014],
736 PHIL 355-373)
FACTS: Spouses Sombilon were the previous owners of a 601-square meter property, with two buildings constructed on it which
was foreclosed and sold at public auction on July 15, 1998, where PNB emerged as the winning bidder in the amount of
P2,355,000.00. Spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Garay! A Public Attorney‘s Office (PAO) lawyer. They told Atty. Garay
that they wanted to reacquire the property from PNB, but had no money to repurchase it. Few days after, Atty. Garay went to the
bank alone and offered to buy the property by making a downpayment of P587,600.00 or 20% the purchase price, which the bank
approved.
Spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration of the issuance of the writ of possession arguing that Atty. Garay, who was the
former counsel of Hilly, was barred from purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
RTC Judge Venadas Sr. Issued an order holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession on the ground that the
implementation and enforcement of it would work great injustice to the registered owner because PNB or in this case Atty Garay,
counsel for the Sombilons is not entitled thereto. There is much to be said about the conduct of Atty. Garay in manipulating that the
property in question was finally bought by him from the bank not to mention the possible violation of the canons of legal and judicial
ethics.
Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA but it was dismissed but later reinstated.
Spouses Sombilon moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same. Hence, an instant petition for review on certiorari
contending that Judge Venadas Sr. did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the writ
of possession after the redemption period has lapsed. Lastly, PNB denies it hs committed forum shopping claiming it did not institute
another action simultaneous with the petition for certiorari it filed with the CA.
Meanwhile, Atty. Garay filed a verified complaint against Judge Venadas Sr. Charging him with grave abuse of authority and grave
misconduct when he proceeded with the hearing of the spouses‘ motion for reconsideration of the order granting the issuance of the
writ of possession despite lack of notice to PNB and for holding in abeyance said writ.
In his defense, Judge 9enadas, Sr denies the charges against him arguing that he did not annul the qrit of possession but merely
stayed its execution and implementation to prevent any injustice. He insists there was no violation of due process because he
immediately scheduled a hearing for PNB to present its evidence.
The OCA, in its report found Judge Venadas, Sr. Administratively liable for grave abuse of authority bearing bordering on gross
ignorance of procedure. It found him guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Courtwhen he
acted on the defective motion filed by spouses Sombilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Venadas Sr. Committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the
writ of possession
HELD: YES. Records show that the spouses failed to comply with the three day notice rule and the required proof of awrvice
embodied in Sections 4,5,6 of rule 15 of the Rules of Court, thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge
Venadas Sr. Still took cognizance of the motion filed by the spouses, depriving PNB and Atty Garay of their right to due process.
To exculpate himself from the charges against him, he claims that the motion was personally served on PNB and its counsel on July
12,2005, but they refused to receive the same. However, as correctly pointed out by the OCA, no affidavit was submitted to
substantiate such allegation. Thus, we agree with the Court Administrator that Judge Venadas Sr. Is guilty of grave abuse of
authority bordering of gross ignorance of procedure for blatantly disregarding Sections 4,5,6, rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Blatant disregard of basic, elementary and well-known rules of procedure and law if gross ignorance of the law, which is classified
as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. no. 01-08-10 SC, punishable by either
dismissal from service, suspension for more than three months but not exceeding six a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00 to be deducted from the withheld amount of P100,000.00 from his retirement benefits pursuant to the April
18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.
#8 UY v. FLORES A.M. No. RTJ-12-2332 June 25, 2014 Villarama,J.
PETITIONER:EFREN T. UY, NELIA B. LEE, RESPONDENT:JUDGE ALAN L. FLORES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
RODOLFO L. MENES and QUINCIANO H. LUI TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE
DOCTRINE: The rules on jurisdiction are basic and judges should know them by heart.
FACTS: In a Revenue Travel Assignment Order,2 Commissioner of Internal Revenue Lilian B. Hefti relieved Mustapha M.
Gandarosa as Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 16, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Cagayan de Oro City. Hefti reassigned
Gandarosa as Chief of Staff of the Special Concerns Group at the Bureau's Head Office in Quezon City. Secretary of Finance
Margarito B. Teves approved Hefti's order.
Gandarosa filed a Rule 65 petition3 for certiorari and/or prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, presided by Judge Flores. Gandarosa prayed that Hefti‘s order be declared void and
that a writ of injunction be issued prohibiting the Secretary of Finance and the new Commissioner of Internal Revenue from
enforcing Hefti‘s order and from replacing or reassigning him. Judge Flores granted a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of Gandarosa.
Meanwhile, the new Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Sixto S. Esquivias IV, issued a new Revenue Travel Assignment Order4
reiterating Hefti‘s order. Secretary Teves also approved Esquivias‘s order. Gandarosa thus filed a petition 5 for indirect contempt
against Secretary Teves and Commissioner Esquivias.
Judge Flores issued the following orders: (1) Order6 dated November 3, 2008 granting a 72-hour temporary restraining order; (2)
Order7 dated November 7, 2008 extending the temporary restraining order; (3) Order 8 dated November 21, 2008 admitting
Gandarosa‘s documentary exhibits; (4) Order9 dated November 21, 2008 granting a writ of preliminary injunction; (5) Omnibus
Order10 dated November 25, 2008 treating the comment to the Rule 65 petition, filed through LBC, as a mere scrap of paper; (6)
Order11 dated December 15, 2008 requiring Secretary Teves and Commissioner Esquivias to file their comment to the contempt
petition; and (7) Omnibus and Interim Order12 dated December 22, 2008, which, among others, (a) impleaded Deputy Commissioner
Nelson Aspe and Alberto Olasiman, Officer-in-Charge, Revenue Region No. 16, as respondents in the contempt petition, and (b)
ordered Secretary Teves, Commissioner Esquivias and their subordinate officials to maintain the status quo and retain Gandarosa
as Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 16.
The Court of Appeals (CA) in its Decision13 dated August 3, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02753-MIN annulled all seven orders and
ordered Judge Flores to dismiss Gandarosa‘s Rule65 and contempt petitions. The CA ruled that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over
the Rule 65 petition. Said CA Decision attained finality and entry of judgment was made.
Complainants Efren T. Uy, Nelia B. Lee, Rodolfo L. Menes and Quinciano H. Lui now allege that Judge Flores exhibited gross
ignorance of the law when he assumed jurisdiction over the Rule 65 petition as it is the Civil Service Commission which has
jurisdiction over the issue of Gandarosa‘s reassignment. They add that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte,
which is within the 12th Judicial Region, also lacks jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction effective in Metro Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, where the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue hold office, and in Cagayan de Oro City, 10th Judicial Region, where the Regional Office of Revenue Region No.
16 is based. Moreover, Judge Flores treated the comment to the Rule 65 petition as a mere scrap of paper contrary to the basic rule
that if a private carrier, LBC in this case, is used by a party, the date of actual receipt by the court of such pleading is deemed to be
the date of filing of that pleading.
Complainants also allege that Judge Flores violated the right to due process of the Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of
Internal Revenue when he treated their comment to the Rule 65 petition as a mere scrap of paper. And in impleading Aspe and
Olasiman as respondents to the contempt petition, Judge Flores sentenced them even if they had no opportunity to speak a single
word in their defense.
In his comment, Judge Flores cites an earlier complaint filed against him by the Coalition of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
Associations, Northern Mindanao which was docketed as A.M. No. 09-1-46-RTC. He cites that upon recommendation of the Office
of the Court Administrator in its Report dated January 28,2009, we dismissed said complaint in a minute Resolution dated March 11,
2009 on the ground that (1) there was no sufficient evidence to show any anomaly or irregularity in the trial court‘s proceedings and
(2) the propriety of the temporary restraining order, writ of preliminary injunction and Omnibus and Interim Order dated December
22, 2008 was a judicial matter which should be properly resolved in a judicial proceeding. Judge Flores also claims that while he
may have erred in taking cognizance of Gandarosa‘s cases, he did so in good faith and without malice.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge, in taking cognizance of a matter not within his jurisdiction and in issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction outside his territorial jurisdiction is guilty of gross ignorance of law.
HELD: YES. But first, we address Judge Flores‘s statement that he had been exonerated in an earlier complaint filed by the
Coalition of Chambers of Commerce and Industry Associations, Northern Mindanao. We examined the record of the earlier
complaint against Judge Flores and we find that it is not identical to the present complaint. The Coalition of Chambers of Commerce
and Industry Associations, Northern Mindanao, had asked the Office of the Court Administrator to review the temporary restraining
order issued by Judge Flores. The Coalition said that the venue of the Rule 65 petition gives the impression that Gandarosa hand-
picked the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte. The Coalition also said that the Rule 65 petition is a wrong
remedy as Gandarosa could have availed of administrative remedies within the Bureau of Internal Revenue all the way up to the
Office of the President. The Coalition also claimed that Judge Flores prejudged the case and showed his bias and overreaching
accommodation of Gandarosa by issuing the Omnibus and Interim Order dated December 22, 2008.
On the other hand, in the present case, we are called upon to determine whether Judge Flores committed gross ignorance of the
law, manifest partiality, violation of due process, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Contrary to Judge
Flores‘s contention, there is no reason to treat the former complaint as having a substantial bearing on the present charges. Now on
the merits of the complaint.
We agree with the Office of the Court Administrator that Judge Flores committed gross ignorance of the law but we dismiss the
other charges.
When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law.1âwphi1 Anything less is gross ignorance of the
law. There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. It may
also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. When an error is
so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.
In Republic v. Judge Caguioa, we said that the rules on jurisdiction are basic and judges should know them by heart.
Here, Judge Flores assumed jurisdiction over the Rule 65 petition assailing Hefti‘s order when he should have dismissed the petition
for Gandarosa‘s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. An employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to
the Civil Service Commission per Section 26(3), Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, which reads:
SEC. 26. Personnel Actions. – x x x

xxxx
(3) Transfer. x x x
x x x. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the [Civil Service]
Commission.
The law is basic and jurisprudence is clear but Judge Flores failed to apply them. Judge Flores committed a gross and patent error
which makes him liable for gross ignorance of the law notwithstanding his claim of good faith. Judge Flores even mentioned in the
Order dated November 21, 2008 the contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the
case. Judge Flores‘s gross and patent error produces an inference of bad faith on his part, considering that the issue of jurisdiction
was raised.
And even if we assume that the trial court has jurisdiction over Gandarosa‘s Rule 65 petition, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court requires that the petition must be filed in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area asdefined by
the Supreme Court. But the trial court presided by Judge Flores is within the 12th Judicial Region while the Head Office and
Regional Office, Revenue Region No. 16, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue are respectively located in Metro Manila, National
Capital Judicial Region,and Cagayan de Oro City, 10th Judicial Region. Judge Flores issued a temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction against the Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue who both hold office in Metro
Manila, outside the territorial area where his court can exercise its jurisdiction. And while Revenue Region No. 16 has a district office
in Tubod, Lanao del Norte, where the trial court is situated, the CA found that no court process was served on the said district office
or in Gandarosa‘s residence in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. All court processes were served in the Regional Office of Revenue Region
No. 16 based in Cagayan de Oro City, 10th Judicial Region. In Republic v. Judge Caguioa, we found Judge Caguioa guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. Among others, we said that the writ of preliminary injunction was issued to enjoin acts performed outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. It was directed against government officials whose offices are
located in Manila.
Another gross and patent error of Judge Flores is treating the comment of the Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal
Revenue as a mere scrap of paper because the comment was filed through LBC, not by personal filing or registered mail. But the
established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of
filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private
carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading. 23 Thus, even if the comment was filed through LBC, it cannot be considered as
a mere scrap of paper. The comment was duly filed on the date it was received by the trial court. Under Section 8(9) and Section
11(A) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more than ₱20,000
but not exceeding ₱40,000, or by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not
exceeding six months, or by dismissal from the service. Considering the circumstances of this case, we agree with the
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that Judge Flores be suspended from office without salary and, other
benefits for three months and one day.
We note, however, that the Office of the Court Administrator did not discuss the charges of manifest partiality, denial of due process
and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. This implies that Judge Flores is not guilty of these charges. In any event, we
dismiss the charge of manifest partiality against Judge Flores for complainants‘ failure to prove by extrinsic evidence this serious
allegation. We cannot presume that Judge Flores was biased and partial simply because he enjoined the implementation of Hefti
and Esquivias‘s orders. We have held that there should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.
Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias. Absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case
against the judge.
WHEREFORE, we FIND respondent Judge Alan L. Flores of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, LIABLE
for gross ignorance of the law, and SUSPEND him from office without salary and other benefits for three months and one day, with
WARNING that similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
#9 ANDRES v. NAMBI A.C. No. 7158 March 09, 2015 DEL CASTILLO, J.
PETITIONERS: YOLANDA A. ANDRES, RESPONDENT: ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI

MINETTE A. MERCADO, and ELITO P.
ANDRES
DOCTRINE: A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do.
FACTS: Then Labor Arbiter Salimathar V. Nambi rendered a Decision in a consolidated labor case against M.A. Mercado
Construction and spouses Maximo and Aida Mercado. The respondents in the labor case, namely the Spouses Mercado, doing
business under the name and style of M.A. Mercado Construction, interposed an appeal which was dismissed for failure to post an
appeal bond. Thus, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued to implement the Decision.
Thereafter, the complainants in the labor case filed an Ex Parte Motion for Amendment of an Alias Writ of Execution. They claimed
that they could hardly collect the judgment award from M.A. Mercado Construction because it allegedly transferred its assets to M.A.
Blocks Work, Inc. They thus prayed that the Alias Writ of Execution be amended to include M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its
incorporators/stockholders as additional entity/personalities against which the writ of execution shall be enforced. In an Order, Labor
Arbiter Nambi granted the motion to amend the alias writ of execution. Accordingly, an Amended Alias Writ of Execution was issued
to enforce the monetary judgment amounting to P19,527,623.55 against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators.
By way of special appearance, M.A. Blocks Work, Inc., together with three of its stockholders who are the complainants in this
administrative case, namely Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and Elito P. Andres, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the
Amended Alias Writ of Execution, contending that they are not bound by the judgment as they were not parties to the labor case. In
an Order, however, Labor Arbiter Nambi denied the Urgent Motion to Quash. Aggrieved, herein complainants filed the instant
Complaint for Disbarment.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: As a rule, for one to be held administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the law, there must be a showing that the
error was gross and patent as to support a conclusion that the actor was so moved with malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud, and
dishonesty.
As culled from the case record, there is substantial evidence that respondents Maximo A. Mercado and Aida A. Mercado, who are
doing business under the name and style of M.A. Mercado Construction put up a corporation in the name of M.A. Block Works, Inc.
where individual movants are one of the incorporators. It is apparent from the foregoing disquisition that respondent‘s conclusion
had some bases and was not plucked from thin air, so to speak. Clearly, respondent did not act whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling
could not in any manner be characterized as imbued with malice, fraud or bad faith.
However, we note that respondent had consistently and obstinately disregarded the Court's and IBP's orders. It is on record that
respondent totally ignored the Court's Resolution directing him to file his Comment. He also failed to attend the mandatory
conference before the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline despite notice. Neither did he file his Position Paper. As a former Labor
Arbiter, respondent should know that orders of the court "are not mere requests but directives which should have been complied
with promptly and completely." "He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession 'to obey the laws
and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities.' His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey
court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court."
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.- A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Considering that this appears to be respondent's first infraction, we find it proper to impose on him penalty the of reprimand with
warning that commission of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
#10 COMPLAINT BY PARRENO AGAINST JUSTICES LEAGOGO, YBANEZ, OCA IPI MARCH BERSAMIN,
LAZARO-JAVIER NO. 14- 17, 2015 J.
220-CA-J
RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO PARREÑO, ET

AL., AGAINST HON. CELIA C. LIBREA-LEAGOGO, HON. ELIHU A. YBAÑEZ
AND HON. AMY C. LAZARO-JAVIER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE: The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a case within 12 months from the
submission of the last required pleading or as set by the court itself. This is clear from paragraphs (1) and (2), Section 15
of Article VIII of the Constitution.
FACTS: Complainants Wenefredo Parreño and Ronnie Cuevas, with Joseph Denamarca, filed a protest in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources of the National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) against the issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 14391 and TCT No. 14188 in favor of Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez covering two lots inside the Signal
Village, Taguig. The DENR-NCR dismissed the protest, but the dismissal was subsequently reversed by the DENR. Aggrieved,
Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which denied their appeal. With their motion for
reconsideration having been similarly denied, Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the CA by petition for review, and it is such
appeal from which this administrative complaint arose.
It appears that on June 26, 2012, the Special Sixteenth (16th) Division of the CA issued its resolution submitting C.A.-G.R. SP No.
108807 for decision. However, the complainants lament that from the issuance of the resolution until the filing of their complaint on
February 8, 2014, the respondents, who comprised the Special 16 th Division of the CA, had not rendered the decision, which the
complainants insist was in patent violation of the mandatory period within which the respondents should decide under Section 15(1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court required the respondents to submit their comments on the administrative complaint.
In her comment, Justice Librea-Leagogo narrated that she became the Chairperson of the CA 16thDivision effective June 4, 2012
conformably with CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, and she served as such until July 5, 2012 in accordance with the successive
reorganizations implemented in the CA under CA Office Order No. 198-12-ABR and CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, respectively.
Citing Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (2009 IRCA), Justice Librea-Leagogo denied liability for
incurring any undue delay because of her short stint as the Chairperson of the 16th Division, and considering further that C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 108807 followed Justice Ybañez as the assigned ponente in his transfer to the Fourteenth (14th) Division pursuant to CA
Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, and eventually to the Thirteenth (13th) Division, the Division that ultimately promulgated the awaited
decision on February 28, 2014.
Justice Ybañez admitted in his comment that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was part of his initial caseload following his transfer to
Manila in December 2009. He stated that he had conscientiously complied with the Zero Backlog Project (ZBP) initiated by
Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. by giving utmost priority to the older cases assigned to him; that he had already assigned
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had meanwhile fallen seriously ill; that due to lack of
personnel and a heavy caseload, he had hired a contractual-lawyer who later resigned upon being offered a permanent position in
another agency of the Government; that after disposing of the older cases assigned to him, he had rendered the decision in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 108807 on February 28, 2014 before becoming aware of the administrative complaint; and that he had not been remiss
in his duty and responsibility to promptly administer justice by virtue of his disposing a monthly average of 15 cases.
Justice Lazaro-Javier explained her participation in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 as limited to the adoption and promulgation on June
26, 2012 of the resolution submitting the case for decision because only filled in the brief vacancy occasioned by the temporary
absence of Justice Victoria Isabel Paredes, then the regular Member of the 16 th Division. She pointed out, however, that she had
nothing more to do with the case upon the return of Justice Paredes; hence, she could not be administratively liable for any delay in
deciding the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are liable for undue delay in deciding C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 - NO
HELD: Although C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was submitted for decision by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 after the
parties did not file their memoranda, it was the 13th Division of the CA (composed of Justice Ybañez as the ponente, Justice Japar
B. Dimaampao as the Chairman, and Justice Melchor Quirino C. Sadang) that promulgated the decision on February 28, 2014, or
nearly 20 months later. Accordingly, the Court answers the query in the negative, for, pursuant to Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009
IRCA, the adjudication of cases was the responsibility of the assigned Justice and the Members of the Division to which he or she
then belonged. Determining who should be administratively accountable must consider the specific role each of the respondents
played leading to the resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807. Under the applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the liability for undue
delay in resolving C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 might devolve only on the Members of the 13 th Division who actually promulgated the
decision.
Justice Librea-Leagogo and Justice Lazaro-Javier were not accountable for the delay in rendering the judgment. Justice Librea-
Leagogo had a limited participation in respect of C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807 because the reorganization of the CA ensuing after the
promulgation of the resolution by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 caused her transfer to the 15 th Division through CA
Office Order No. 220-12-ABR,19 terminating her responsibility in C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807. Justice Lazaro-Javier should also be
exculpated because her participation was limited to her acting as a special Member of the 16 th Division in lieu of Justice Paredes.
Such substitution prevented a vacuum in the regular 16th Division, and conformed to the procedure stated in Section 6(d), Rule I of
the 2009 IRCA.20 The constitution of the Special 16th Division was by virtue of CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR.
Justice Ybañez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No. 108807, carried the case with him when he was transferred to the 13 th
Division. But whether or not he was administratively liable for the delay of eight months should depend on the relevant
circumstances. Although often holding that a heavy caseload is insufficient reason to excuse a Judge from disposing his cases
within the reglementary period,22 the Court has applied this rule by considering the causes of the delay. The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred by Justice Ybañez with malice or deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation
of justice. He assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the meantime,
forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose. The latter subsequently joined another agency of the Government on a
permanent basis. Thus, Justice Ybañez could promulgate the decision only on February 28, 2014. His explanation for the delay,
being entirely plausible, is accepted.
#11 BANDOY v. JACINTO A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399 November 19, 2014 Mendoza, J.
PETITIONER: Gaspar Bandoy RESPONDENT: Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr., Presiding Judge, Branch 45, and Acting
Presiding Judge, Branch 46, both at Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro
DOCTRINE: Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial."
Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is
rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in
a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
FACTS: Bandoy alleged that he was one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 2-1928, for Serious Illegal Detention filed by Romulo
De Jesus, Jr. (De Jesus, Jr.). This Criminal Case was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro (RTC-Br.
44), with Judge Jacinto, Jr. as the Assisting Presiding Judge. Bandoy claimed that the case was initiated by De Jesus, Jr. to get
back at him for being instrumental in the filing of an earlier criminal complaint against him for Violation of the Omnibus Election Code
(Ballot Switching). The Election case was likewise raffled to RTC-Br. 44.
Bandoy was an election watcher of former Mayor Joel Panaligan during the 2007 local elections, while De Jesus, Jr., a teacher of
their municipality's public elementary school, was one of the chairpersons of the Board of Election Inspectors; that they were both
assigned in Precinct 3-A of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. De Jesus, Jr. was rumored to be closely associated with the rival
mayoralty candidate, Voltaire Anthony C. Villarosa (Voltaire). In the said local elections, De Jesus, Jr. was caught in the act of ballot
switching, which was captured on video by a member of the media and that by virtue of a search warrant from the Commission of
Elections (COMELEC), De Jesus, Jr. was caught in possession of some ballots inside his backpack. This caused De Jesus to be
criminally charged with the offense of ballot switching and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.
According to Bandoy, De Jesus, Jr. personally appeared before Provincial Prosecutor Levitico Salcedo to file a criminal case for
Serious Illegal Detention against him, Peter Alfaro, Randolph Ignacio, and then Election Supervisor, Atty. Judy Lorenzo (Atty.
Lorenzo). Apparently, De Jesus, Jr. did this while there was a standing warrant of arrest against him. Worse, De Jesus, Jr. remained
at-large until he was able to post bail on March 7, 2008 before then Las Piñas RTC Judge Raul B. Villanueva. Because complainant
Bandoy was charged with Serious Illegal Detention, the provincial prosecutor recommended "no bail" leaving them incarcerated for
more than two years.
Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. displayed manifest bias and partiality in favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he granted several
postponements of De Jesus, Jr.'s arraignment, and was reset for seven times due to De Jesus, Jr.'s non-appearance and for failure
to locate him at his given address. Eventually De Jesus, Jr. entered a plea of not guilty supposedly inside Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s
chambers.
Despite these supposed obvious court defiance, Judge Jacinto, Jr. remained lenient and seemingly tolerated his continuous non-
appearance in the court's subsequent scheduled hearings. Another example of Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s supposed unreasonable bias
towards Bandoy was his lack of interest to dispose of the case of serious illegal detention despite De Jesus, Jr.'s obvious dilatory
tactics and unjustified absences when his appearance was necessary. EScIAa
Bandoy, along with his co-accused, moved for reconsideration and filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ)
to have the serious illegal detention case dismissed. Atty. Lorenzo filed a separate petition with the Court of Appeals (CA) and won
the case. The Court later affirmed the dismissal of the case against her. At first, the DOJ denied their petition. Upon reconsideration,
however, the DOJ, under the helm of Justice Secretary Leila De Lima, directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Occidental
Mindoro, to cause the withdrawal of the case against Bandoy and his co-accused. Accordingly, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor filed its Motion to Withdraw Information.
Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order, denied the motion to withdraw information. In the end, Bandoy was only able to regain temporary
freedom when Judge Jacinto, Jr. allowed him to post a bail bond of P100,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00. Bandoy added that
Voltaire was a principal sponsor in the wedding of Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s child.
Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala, while Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor (Judge Mayor) became the
assisting presiding judge of Branch 44. It was during this time that the case for serious illegal detention was temporarily dismissed,
but upon reconsideration, Judge Mayor decided to reinstate and continue the case against Bandoy. Meanwhile, the case of ballot
switching against De Jesus, Jr. was dismissed while their bail for the serious illegal detention case was cancelled.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Jacinto should be held administratively liable for committing acts that were seemingly bias to a part in
a case before its court
HELD: YES. Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and
the Court the duty to maintain professional competence at all times.
In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an allegation that he arraigned De Jesus, Jr. inside his chambers. He
was given the opportunity to answer, but he chose not to delve into it. Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely face the issues
being imputed against him, which was quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a member of the bench, that was
being challenged. As aptly observed by the OCA, "the natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation
and defend himself. It is against human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations." His silence
introduces doubt in the minds of the public, which is not acceptable.
Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law and procedure, the Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr.
administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1 (a) thereof requiring
arraignment of an accused to be made in open court.
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1 (a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that a judge can take nonchalantly. Each step
constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal litigation "where the issues are joined . . . and without which the
proceedings cannot advance further." 39
Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1 (a) of Rule 116 constitutes gross ignorance of the law. There is gross ignorance of
the law when the error committed by the judge was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. It may also be committed when a judge
ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Gross
ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith.
The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public and the legal profession to know the very law that they are
supposed to apply in a given controversy. They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence. When a judge displays
an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the Court
the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a
judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.
Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise emphasize that judges, as officers of the court, have the
duty to see to it that justice is dispensed with evenly and fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial, but they must also
appear to be honest and impartial in the dispensation of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are circumspect and do not
arouse suspicion in the minds of the public. When they fail to do so, such acts may cast doubt upon their integrity and ultimately the
judiciary in general.
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly
teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process,
like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must
not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality
and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein respondent, because
they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting
interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond reproach.
Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was postponed from 2007 to 2011 without appropriate action
coming from the court. Judge Jacinto, Jr. should have availed of known legal remedies to compel De Jesus, Jr. to personally appear
for his arraignment, but he did not. The appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in favor of De Jesus, Jr. gives an impression of
bias and partiality that should be addressed and corrected.
Consequently, under Section 8 (9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law
or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Section 11 (A) of the same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if a
respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious charge is either a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00,
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
#12 BALANAY v. WHITE A.M. No. RTJ-16-2443 January 11, 2016 DEL CASTILLO, J.
PETITIONER: ARMANDO M. RESPONDENT: JUDGE JULIANA ADALIM-WHITE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 5,
BALANAY Eastern Samar
DOCTRINE: Respondent's act of directing her subordinate to alter the TSN by incorporating therein statements pertaining
to substantial matters that were not actually made during the hearing constitutes gross misconduct which warrants
administrative sanction.
FACTS: Complainant Armando Balanay filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a verified Affidavit-Complaint
charging respondent Judge Juliana Adalim-White with the following:
1. gross ignorance of the law for allowing Isidoro N. Adamas, Jr. (Adamas) six furloughs despite being charged with
murder in Criminal Case No. 10-07, a non-bailable offense. Worse, respondent granted Adama's motions without
requiring the prosecution to comment or giving it opportunity to be heard thereon.
2. serious misconduct in precipitately dismissing Criminal Case No. 10-07 by declaring that the prosecution had no
witnesses to present when the records showed otherwise. According to the complainant, the prosecution witnesses were not able to
attend the hearing on July 22, 2010 because they were not duly notified. In fact, he and his son were willing to testify provided they
are placed under the witness protection program.
3. Falsification of the July 22, 2010 transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) in Criminal Case No. 10-07. During the hearing
held on said date, the prosecution made a reservation to present additional witnesses. Respondent, however, instructed her court
stenographer, Prescila V. Mosende (Mosende), to delete from said TSN such reservation and insert therein other statements which
were not made during the said hearing. Complainant likewise submitted a piece of paper containing the respondent‘s handwritten
notes that were incorporated therein.
Complainant prayed for respondent judge‘s dismissal from from the service with forfeiture of her retirement benefits.
Respondent Judge Adalim-White’s comment:

1. She admitted that she instructed Mosende to correct the July 22, 2010 TSN to make it more coherent and accurate. The
changes were based on her OWN notes which Mosende adopted after verifying them from the taped recordings of the
proceedings.
2. She claims that the prosecution NEVER made any reservation to present additional witnesses.
3. She explained that she granted Adamas six furloughs based on the affidavits of desistance subscribed before
Prosecutor Raquel G. Kho (Prosecutor Kho) which were already attached to the records of Criminal Case No. 10-07. She also
insisted that Adamas is not a flight risk because he voluntarily surrendered himself to the police.
Respondent Judge prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and that complainant be cited for contempt.
Report and recommendation of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy:

1. Justice Diy opined that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for allowing Adamas several furloughs
based on motions that did not contain a notice of hearing, did not comply with the 3-day notice rule, and were not set
for hearing.
2. She recommended that respondent be absolved from the charge of serious misconduct in dismissing the case for want
of proof of corruption or willful intent to violate the law.
3. With regard the alleged falsification of the TSN, Justice Diy recommended its dismissal for failure to formally offer in
evidence the subject July 22, 2010 TSN. Nonetheless, she found respondent guilty of simple misconduct considering
that the records amply show that respondent attempted to alter the questioned TSN.
4. She recommended that respondent be fined in the amounts of P30,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and
P10,000.00 for simple misconduct.
OCA: Agrees with Justice Diy. It recommended that respondent be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross
misconduct, and that she be suspended from office without salary and other benefits for six months.
ISSUE: Whether or not judge white is guilty of gross ignorance of law & serious misconduct
HELD: YES
A. Respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting ex parte motions to allow Adama's temporary
liberty without setting the same for hearing. If hearing is indispensable in motions for bail, more so in this case where the motions
for the temporary liberty of Adamas were filed without offering any bail or without any prayer that he be released on recognizance.
Besides, the reasons relied upon in said motions — to allow Adamas to attend the Sangguniang Bayan sessions — had already
been rebuked by this Court. That the prosecution has already filed affidavits of desistance and that, to the opinion of respondent,
the accused is not a flight risk, do not justify non-compliance with procedural rules. It is basic that bail cannot be allowed without
prior hearing. It is also basic that litigious motions that do not contain a notice of hearing are nothing but a useless piece of paper
which the court should not act upon.
B. Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
There is substantial proof to hold respondent liable for gross misconduct even if the altered TSN was not formally offered in
evidence. A TSN "is supposed to be a faithful and exact recording of all matters that transpired during a court proceeding."
Respondent's act of directing her subordinate to alter the TSN by incorporating therein statements pertaining to substantial
matters that were not actually made during the hearing constitutes gross misconduct which warrants administrative sanction.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Juliana Adalim-White GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and GROSS
MISCONDUCT and SUSPENDS her from office for one (1) year without salary and other benefits, and STERNLY WARNS her
that this Court will not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, with all its accessory penalties, in
case she commits the same or other similar acts.
X. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
A. Supreme Court
#1 IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM AGAINST J. DEL G.R. No. DATE PONENTE
CASTILLO
DOCTRINE: The researcher’s technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a carpenter. The
carpenter first gets the pieces of lumber he would need, choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has in
mind, say a table. When ready, he would measure out the portions he needs, cut them out of the pieces of lumber he had
collected, and construct his table. He would get rid of the scraps.
FACTS: Petitioners claimed that in destroying villages in the Philippines during World War II, the Japanese army systematically
raped them and a number of other women, seizing them and holding them in houses or cells where soldiers repeatedly ravished and
abused them.
Petitioners alleged that they have since 1998 been approaching the Executive Department, represented by the respondent public
officials, requesting assistance in filing claims against the Japanese military officers who established the comfort women stations.
But that Department declined, saying that petitioners individual claims had already been fully satisfied under the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners wanted the Court to render judgment, compelling the Executive Department to
espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and
other international tribunals.
On April 28, 2010, the Court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners action. Justice Mariano C. del Castillo wrote the decision for
the Court. The Court essentially gave two reasons for its decision: it cannot grant the petition because, first, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative under the Constitution and the law to determine whether to espouse petitioners claim
against Japan; and, second, the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse their claims.
On June 9, 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Courts decision. More than a month later on July 18, 2010,
counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., announced in his online blog that his clients would file a supplemental
petition detailing plagiarism committed by the court under the second reason it gave for dismissing the petition and that these stolen
passages were also twisted to support the courts erroneous conclusions that the Filipino comfort women of World War Two have no
further legal remedies. The media gave publicity to Atty. Roques announcement.
On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental motion for reconsideration that Atty. Roque announced. It accused Justice Del
Castillo of manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism[1] when he wrote the decision for the Court and of twisting the true
intents of the plagiarized sources to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment.[2] They charged Justice Del Castillo of copying
without acknowledgement certain passages from three foreign articles:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006);
and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).
Petitioners claim that the integrity of the Courts deliberations in the case has been put into question by Justice Del Castillos fraud.
The Court should thus address and disclose to the public the truth about the manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism[3] that
resulted in gross prejudice to the petitioners.
Because of the publicity that the supplemental motion for reconsideration generated, Justice Del Castillo circulated a letter to his
colleagues, subsequently verified, stating that when he wrote the decision for the Court he had the intent to attribute all sources
used in it. He said in the pertinent part:
It must be emphasized that there was every intention to attribute all sources, whenever due. At no point was there ever any
malicious intent to appropriate anothers work as our own. We recall that this ponencia was thrice included in the Agenda of the
Court en banc. It was deliberated upon during the Baguio session on April 13, 2010, April 20, 2010 and in Manila on April 27, 2010.
Each time, suggestions were made which necessitated major revisions in the draft. Sources were re-studied, discussions modified,
passages added or deleted. The resulting decision comprises 34 pages with 78 footnotes.
x x x x
As regards the claim of the petitioners that the concepts as contained in the above foreign materials were twisted, the same remains
their opinion which we do not necessarily share.[4]
on July 19, 2010, Evan Criddle wrote on his blog that he and his co-author Evan Fox-Descent (referred to jointly as Criddle-Descent)
learned of alleged plagiarism involving their work but Criddles concern, after reading the supplemental motion for reconsideration,
was the Courts conclusion that prohibitions against sexual slavery are not jus cogens or internationally binding norms that treaties
cannot diminish.
On July 23, 2010, Dr. Mark Ellis wrote the Court expressing concern that in mentioning his work, the Court may have misread the
argument [he] made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. Dr. Ellis said that he wrote the article precisely to argue
for appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes.
On August 8, 2010, after the referral of the matter to the Committee for investigation, the Dean of the University of the Philippines
(U.P.) College of Law publicized a Statement from his faculty, claiming that the Vinuya decision was an extraordinary act of injustice
and a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The statement said that
Justice Del Castillo had a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors work, and that the Courts decision amounted to an
act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.[5]
On August 18, 2010 Mr. Christian J. Tams wrote Chief Justice Renato C. Corona that, although relevant sentences in the Courts
decision were taken from his work, he was given generic reference only in the footnote and in connection with a citation from
another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the passages taken from his work. He thought that the form of referencing
was inappropriate. Mr. Tams was also concerned that the decision may have used his work to support an approach to erga omnes
concept (obligations owed by individual States to the community of nations) that is not consistent with what he advocated.
ISSUE: Whether or not plagiarism was committed by Justice De Castillo
HELD: NO. At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To plagiarize, as it is
commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as ones own. The
passing off of the work of another as ones own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism. Unless amply explained, the above
lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be construed as plagiarism. But one of Justice Del Castillo‘s researchers, a
court-employed attorney, explained how she accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts of her
report to him, which report eventually became the working draft of the decision. She said that, for most parts, she did her research
electronically. For international materials, she sourced these mainly from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-
related materials to which the Court subscribes. With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillo‘s researcher also
explained, most legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in internet
websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items that were relevant to her assignment,
she downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need. The
researcher‘s technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a carpenter. The carpenter first gets the pieces of
lumber he would need, choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has in mind, say a table. When ready, he would
measure out the portions he needs, cut them out of the pieces of lumber he had collected, and construct his table. He would get rid
of the scraps.
Here, Justice Del Castillo‘s researcher did just that. She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw
website and pasted these to a main manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed report to
the Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the general shape that her report would take, she
began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions in the general scheme of those that
remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her
chief editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use everyday in their
work.
Justice Del Castillo‘s researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in the Vinuya case and these included the
passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of Ellis with proper attributions to these authors. But, as it
happened, in the course of editing and cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the attributions.
Petitioners of course insist that intent is not material in committing plagiarism since all that a writer has to do, to avoid the charge, is
to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and acknowledge the sources from which these were taken.[14] Petitioners point out
that the Court should apply to this case the ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and
Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine. They argue that standards on plagiarism in the academe should apply with more force to the
judiciary. But petitioners theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to deceive is inherent.
Their theory provides no room for errors in research, an unrealistic position considering that there is hardly any substantial written
work in any field of discipline that is free of any mistake. The theory places an automatic universal curse even on errors that, as in
this case, have reasonable and logical explanations.
B. Lower Court Judges and Justices of the CA, SB and CTA
#1 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. AMOR A.M. No. RTJ-08- October 7, 2014 PERLAS-BERNABE, J
2140
PETITIONER: OFFICE OF THE COURT RESPONDENT: EXECUTIVE JUDGE OWEN B. AMOR

ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant
DOCTRINE: It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on
their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s confidence in it. The Institution
demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct
which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in
the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards
an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.
FACTS: First, Respondent impounded the tricycle of a certain Gervin Ojeda at the Hall of Justice of Daet, Camarines Norte, when
the latter bumped the former‘s vehicle and was unable to pay the amount demanded for the incurred damages. As such impounding
was entered in the Guard‘s Logbook, Judge Contreras was able to secure a certification regarding the same from Security Guard
Virginia Morico (SG Morico). However, SG Morico inadvertently dated the certification October 11, 1999, instead of November 11,
1999. When Judge Contreras called the attention of SG Morico of the wrong date, the latter took the certification and went straight to
respondent‘s chambers. After leaving the chambers, SG Morico became "belligerent and discourteous" and refused to return the
certification to Judge Contreras. Thus, Judge Contreras sought the assistance of Judge Sancho Dames and 2nd Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Leo Intia in order to retrieve the aforesaid certification from SG Morico, but to no avail. Thereafter, Judge
Contreras learned that respondent had berated the guards of the Hall of Justice, including SG Morico, for issuing the certification,
and that SG Morico and Head Guard Quintin Fernandez tried to conceal the alleged acts of grave abuse of authority by respondent.
Second, (Judge Lalwani) of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Norte called respondent to seek reconsideration of her detail to
another station. Respondent then berated Judge Lalwani and accused her of being lazy and abusive like the other judges of
Camarines Sur who were also detailed at Camarines Norte. Further, respondent instructed Judge Lalwani to go slow with the trial of
a BP 22 case as the accused therein was his friend.
Third, respondent visited Judge Contreras at the latter‘s chambers and personally intervened for one Atty. Freddie Venida (Atty.
Venida), who was previously arrested and charged with indirect contempt for his failure to appear in 3 criminal cases for which he
stood as an accused. Respondent then told Judge Contreras that he does not mind Atty. Verida‘s abusive practice as he gives him
gold which was abundant in Paracale, Camarines Norte. Respondent further sneered at Judge Contreras for "not exploiting the
situation" and intimated to the latter that Atty. Venida would give him gold. Judge Contreras rejected respondent‘s indecent
overtures, resulting in the latter publicly announcing in open court that he is an abusive judge for persecuting Atty. Venida.
Fourth, lawyers, prosecutors, and litigants complained about the habitual absenteeism of respondent, especially during Mondays
and Fridays, resulting in delays in the disposition of cases in violation of existing laws and circulars on speedy trial.
Lastly, respondent ordered Clerk of Court Atty. Perfecto Loria (Atty. Loria) to submit all petitions for extra-judicial foreclosures to him
for scrutiny, especially those requiring publication upon filing, resulting in the delay in the proceedings. Respondent also ordered
Atty. Loria to ask for "grease money" from the newspaper publishers under the pain of being blacklisted.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Insubordination, and Acts Inimical to Judicial Service.
HELD: Yes. Grave abuse of authority is defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who, under color of his office,
wrongfully inflicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act characterized with cruelty, severity, or
excessive use of authority.
Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and
must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer‘s official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate grave
misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest in the former.
In the instant case, the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of the charges against him. As aptly pointed out, respondent‘s failure
to file a comment despite all the opportunities afforded him constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself. In the natural order of
things, a man would resist an unfounded claim or imputation against him. It is generally contrary to human nature to remain silent
and say nothing in the face of false accusations. As such, respondent‘s silence may thus be construed as an implied admission and
acknowledgement of the veracity of the allegations against him. 24 Hence, the Court upholds the OCA‘s findings that respondent: (a)
abused his authority in impounding the tricycle and exerted undue influence on the security guards of the Hall of Justice in his
attempt to obstruct the investigation of Judge Contreras; (b) was discourteous in dealing with a fellow judge when the latter was
merely asking for reconsideration of her detail to another station; (c) used his office and position to intervene in behalf of Atty.
Venida and tolerated the latter‘s abusive practice as a lawyer in exchange for gold; (d) was habitually absent; and (e) gave orders to
Atty. Loria to submit all petitions for extra-judicial foreclosures to him which resulted in delays in the proceedings and asked the
latter to demand "grease money" from newspaper publishers in order not to be blacklisted.
It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably
affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people‘s confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals
in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public
accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. As such, the Court will not
hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus
tainting its image in the eyes of the public.
#2 CAMPOS v. CAMPOS G.R. No. DATE PONENTE
PETITIONER: AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS and RESPONDENT: ATTY. ELISEO M. CAMPOS
CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS
DOCTRINE: Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
conduct that "adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
FACTS: Before this Court is a complain for disbarment on grounds of serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty filed against
Atty. Eliseo M. Campos (Eliseo), former presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. The complainants
herein are his wife, Aida R. Campos (Aida), and their children, Alistair R. Campos (Alistair) and Charmaine R. Campos (Charmaine).
Eliseo and Aida were married in 1981. Alistair was born in 1982, and Charmaine, in 1986. In 1999, Eliseo purchased by installment
a property in Bayugan, Agusan del Sur from a certain Renato Alimpoos. Eliseo thereafter applied for the issuance of a title in
Alistair‘s name while the latter was still a student without an income and capacity to buy. The OCT was issued in 2006 and in 2008,
when Alistair got married, he resided therein with his wife and child.
On July 16, 2008, Eliseo filed with the RTC a Petitionfor the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. He alleged that both he and Aida are
psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations. He claimed that during the first few days of their marriage,
he realized that he finds no gratification in engaging in sexual intercourse with his wife. He alleged that he is a homosexual. He also
averred that Aida experienced severe pain when she delivered Alistair. Consequently, Aida no longer wanted to bear children. He
likewise ascribed acts of infidelity to Aida.
Eliseo executed an Affidavit of Loss wherein he represented himself as the owner of the property covered by OCT No. P-28258. He
declared that he unknowingly lost the owner‘s certificate of title which used to be in his files. He caused the annotation of said
affidavit in the copy of OCT in the Register of Deeds. In the Affidavit of No Loss executed on October 21, 2008 and likewise
inscribed in the certificate of title, Alistair refuted Eliseo‘s representations.
Alistair filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur a complaint for perjury against Eliseo and
alleged that he (Alistair) that the owener‘s copy of the OCT was in his posseession and that Eliseo was aware of such fact. In
Eliseo‘s Counter-Affidavit, he insisted that he is the sole owner of the property.
Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Sur dismissed for lack of probable cause Alistair‘s complaint for
perjury against Eliseo.
Aida filed a Complaint for Legal Separation, Support and Separation of Conjugal Properties against Eliseo. Aida alleged that Eliseo
confessed under oath that he is a homosexual. However, Eliseo, in effect, contradicted the said confession when he admitted to
Alistair and Charmaine that he was then intimately involved with another woman. Aida likewise claimed that Eliseo is temperamental
and had stopped giving support to their family.
Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an administrative complaint for serious
misconduct, immorality and dishonesty against Eliseo. Formal investigation was thereafter conducted. Pending the resolution of the
above-mentioned administrative complaint against Eliseo, he resigned from his judicial post.
After the conclusion of a hearing on Eliseo‘s Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC, Judge Eduardo Casals
(Judge Casals) called the parties for a conference in his chamber where a scuffle ensued.The police blotter filed promptly after the
incident indicated that Eliseo choked Charmaine and attempted to box but failed to hit Alistair.
Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed the instant complaint for disbarment against Eliseo. They alleged that Eliseo committed acts of
dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in (a) causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair‘s name; (b) subsequently
misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot covered by OCT No. P-28258; (c) falsely declaring under oath in the Affidavit of
Loss executed on September 10, 2008 that the owner‘s copy of OCT No. P-28258 is missing despite his knowledge that the said
title is with Alistair; (d) stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit admitting to his
children that he has an intimate relation with another woman; and (e) choking and boxing his children on September 14, 2009.
Eliseo refuted the accusations and narrated his own version of the events where he alleged that the choking mishap was brought
about by Charmaine‘s own misdemeanor and initial provocation.
The IBP-CBD dismissed the case for lack of evidence because all the allegations were refuted by respondent. The IBP-BOG
reversed the findings and suspended Eliseo from practice for 2 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct.
HELD: Yes, only the allegation of Eliseo‘s engagement in the scuffle inside the chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009
shall be resolved. Anent the foregoing, this Court is compelled to once again impose a fine upon Eliseo for violating Rule 7.03,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he conducted himself in a manner not befitting a member of the bar.
However, this Court, on February 8, 2012, in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, had already imposed upon Eliseo a fine of Php20,000.00 for
simple misconduct in causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair‘s name when the subject property actually belongs to the
former. The charges of (a) immorality in engaging in extra-marital affairs; and (b) dishonesty in executing the Affidavit of Loss on
September 10, 2008, were, on the other hand, dismissed by the Court after finding either the evidence of the complainants as
insufficient or the issues raised being already the subjects of Eliseo‘s pending Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
It is worth emphasizing that the instant disbarment complaint and A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are anchored upon almost the same set of
facts, except that in the former, the issue of occurence of the scuffle on September 14, 2009 is raised as well. This Court does not
intend to punish Eliseo twice for the same acts especially since they pertain to his private life and were not actually committed in
connection with the performance of his functions as a magistrate before.
In the instant disbarment complaint, tirades and bare accusations were exchanged. It bears stressing that not one of the parties had
presented even one independent witness to prove what transpired inside the chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009.
That a scuffle took place is a fact, but the question of who started what cannot be determined with much certainty.
While admitting his engagement in the scuffle, Eliseo vigorously attempts to justify his conduct as self-defense on his part
Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly proscribes a lawyer from engaging in conduct that
"adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession."
Sans any descriptive sophistry, what Eliseo did was to engage in a brawl with no less than his own children inside the chamber of a
judge. This Court shall not countenance crude social behavior. Besides, the courtroom is looked upon by people with high respect
and is regarded as a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled, and justice solemnly dispensed.
Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity. Although Alistair and Charmaine were not entirely
faultless, a higher level of decorum and restraint was then expected from Eliseo, whose conduct failed to show due respect for the
court and lend credit to the nobility of the practitioners of the legal profession.
Further, albeit not raised as an issue, this Court views with disfavor Eliseo‘s statement during the hearing conducted by the CBD on
March 18, 2011 that he doubts Alistair to be his biologiocal son. As a lawyer, Eliseo is presumably aware that ascribing illegitimacy
to Alistair in a proceeding not instituted for that specific purpose is nothing short of defamation.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds that respondent Eliseo M. Campos violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) is hereby imposed upon him, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
#3 OCA v. TORMIS A.C. No. 9920 [Formerly A.M. No. August 30, 2016 PER CURIAM
MTJ-07-1691]
PETITIONER: OFFICE OF THE COURT RESPONDENT: FORMER JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS

ADMINISTRATOR
DOCTRINE: A lawyer, as an officer and an essential partner of the court in the solemn task of giving justice, is given the
grave obligation of maintaining the integrity of the courts. This is especially so with judges. A judge is "the visible
representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to
return that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow."
FACTS: This disbarment complaint is an offshoot of our Decision in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et al.
Respondent Former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis (Tormis), together with other judges and employees of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Cebu City, was dismissed for turning the solemnization of marriages into a business. Tormis was dismissed from the service
for the second time, and this Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate disbarment proceedings against her.
On July 3, 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, led the judicial audit.team created by the Office of the Court
Administrator to investigate Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City for alleged misdeeds in the
solemnization of marriages.
Two (2) undercover agents from the judicial audit team, posing as a couple, went to the Palace of Justice to ask about the marriage
application process. They were told by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy."
Fearing that the male undercover would be recognized by the court employees in Branch 4, the two agreed that only the female
undercover would go inside the court. She was then assisted by a woman named Helen.Helen assured the female undercover that
their marriage process could be hurried. She also claimed that it was possible for the marriage to be solemnized the next day, but
the marriage certificate would only be dated when the marriage license became available.
The Office of the Court Administrator found that the respondent judges in that case connived with the court personnel, who acted as
"fixers" in solemnizing marriages. The judges heedlessly kept solemnizing marriages despite irregularities in the requirements
provided under the law.
In the Resolution dated July 10, 2007, this Court treated the judicial audit team's memorandum as an administrative complaint
against the respondent judges, including Tormis.The judges were directed to file their comments on the charges against them. 12
They were also suspended pending resolution of the case.
On August 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepafio of the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a
Memorandum dated August 29, 2007 and Supplemental Report.
Affidavits of private individuals were also attached to the records.26 Among these individuals was Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera
(Baguio-Manera), a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu. Baguio-Manera claimed that her marriage was solemnized by Tormis with
the aid of "Meloy," who asked for a fee of ₱l,500.00.27 She and her then fiance were not required to present a marriage license;
they were only directed to bring their birth certificates.28 She averred that while Article 3429 did not apply to them, their marriage
certificate was marked with the annotation, "No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Article 34 of
Executive Order No. 209."
On November 27, 2007, this Court En Banc issued the Resolution requiring all the judges involved, including Tormis, to comment on
the Supplemental Report. 31 The Resolution also directed the Process Servicing Unit to furnish all the judges with a copy of the
Report. Further, all the court personnel involved were asked to show cause why they should not be disciplined for their misconduct.
In her comment, Tormis denied the charges against her.34 She claimed that the action of the Office of the Court Administrator was
an "entrapment." According to her, there was nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the same date the marriage license was
issued. In view of the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she relied on the presumption of regularity. Tormis asserted that she
should not be blamed for assuming that the affidavits were true since judges are not handwriting experts.
Tormis also claimed that Baguio-Manera's affidavit was hearsay. She averred that when Baguio-Manera and her husband was
asked about the affidavit, they confirmed the truthfulness of their statements, particularly that they had been living together for five
(5) years. Lastly, Tormis blamed the filing clerks for the irregularities in the number of marriages solemnized in her sala.
On November 12, 2007, Tormis, together with Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early
Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of the Case. This Court lifted the suspension of the judges but forbade them from
solemnizing marriages. On December 7, 2007, both judges moved for early resolution with a waiver of formal and/or further
investigation and to dismiss. This Court noted their Motion and affirmed the relief they sought, thus allowing the payment of the
judges' unpaid salaries and benefits from July 9, 2007.
The Office of the Court Administrator, through a memorandum dated June 15, 2010, found Tormis guilty of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been
paid, for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to
marry in lieu of the required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged irregularities committed by respondent in the solemnization of marriages, where she was found
guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law, constitute gross misconduct warranting her
disbarment.
HELD: While respondent blatantly violated particular Canons of Judicial Ethics with her participation in the alleged marriage scam,
she similarly breached the following Canons on the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession ....
....
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law[.]
Membership in the bar is an essential requirement for membership in the bench. "[T]he moral fitness of a judge also reflects his [or
her] moral fitness as a lawyer.". Consequently, a judge who violates the code of judicial conduct similarly violates his or her lawyer's
oath.
Respondent's act of heedlessly solemnizing marriages in utter disregard of the law and jurisprudence clearly constitutes gross
misconduct. The repetitiveness of her act shows her clear intent to violate the law. She disregarded the lawyer's oath, which
mandates lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. In view of this, either the penalty of suspension or disbarment is
warranted. Rule 138, Section 27 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
Gross misconduct is an "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." To consider gross
misconduct "the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest[.]"
Although it is true that marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code merit exemption from a marriage license, respondent should
have complied with the mandate of personally ascertaining the circumstances of cohabitation of the parties. Records reveal that the
declarations embodied in the required joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties do not actually represent the accurate
circumstances of their alleged cohabitation.
In addition, there were marriages solemnized by respondent involving foreigners who only submitted affidavits in lieu of a certificate
of legal capacity to marry.135 In cases where one or both of the contracting parties are foreigners, Article 21 of the Family Code
provides that a certificate of legal capacity to marry is necessary before the acquisition of a marriage license. As the solemnizing
officer, respondent should have ensured that pertinent requirements were secured before the issuance of the marriage license.
Thus, the absence of a certificate of legal capacity to marry should have prompted her to question the propriety of the issuance.
The connivance between respondent and the court employees is settled. The court employees acted as "'fixers' and
'facilitators" that mediated between the judges and the contacting parties. Apparent are the superimpositions and erasures in the
addresses of the contracting parties so they would appear to be residents of either Barili or Liloan, Cebu. For the contracting parties
to easily obtain their marriage license, discrepancies between their true addresses as declared in their marriage certificates and
their addresses in their marriage licenses were made. The contracting parties were able to get married despite incomplete
requirements. Thus, the handwritten marginal notes of monetary figures attached to the marriage certificates show the presence of
consideration.
Respondent used her authority as a judge to make a mockery of marriage. As a judicial officer, she is expected to know the law on
solemnization of marriages. "A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he [or she] must also be conscientious and
thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office[,] should be more circumspect in the performance
of their duties."
Similarly, as a lawyer who is an officer of the court, respondent should have not permitted herself to be an instrument of any
violation of law. Her careless attention in dispensing with the necessary requirements of marriage and in conniving with court
employees to further monetary interests underscores her utter disregard of the sanctity of marriage.
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his or her professional dealings or in a private capacity, is basis for suspension or
disbarment. Possession of good character is a fundamental requirement not only for admission to the bar but also for the
continuance of exercising the privilege to practice law. However, as a rule, disbarment is only warranted in cases of misconduct that
"seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court."
Respondent's undue haste in repeatedly solemnizing marriages despite incomplete and irregular requirements shows indifference to
her role as an officer of the court. The repetitiveness of her acts shows her proclivity in transgressing the law and protecting these
violations with her authority. A lawyer, as an officer and an essential partner of the court in the solemn task of giving justice, is given
the grave obligation of maintaining the integrity of the courts. This is especially so with judges. A judge is "the visible representation
of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter
must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow."
C. Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)

PALE Sixth Batch PDF

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

PALE Sixth Batch PDF

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

JUDICIAL ETHICS (New Code of Judicial Conduct)

IX. NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

C. Qualities of an Ideal Judge

#1 DECENA v. MALANYAON A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217 April 8, 2013 BERSAMIN, J.

PETITIONER: SONIA C. DECENA RESPONDENT: JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON

#2 ONGCUANGCO v. PINLAC A.M. No. RTJ-14-2402 April 15, 2015 REYES, J.

#1 ANONYMOUS v. ACHAS A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801 February 27, 2013 MENDOZA, J.

#2 IN RE GREGORY ONG G.R. No. DATE PONENTE

In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that:

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

#3 BARIAS v. RUBIA A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388 June 10, 2014 PONENTE

PETITIONER:EMILIE SISON-BARIAS RESPONDENT: JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated that:

#1 BERNAS v. REYES G.R. No. March 5, 2014 PONENTE

ISSUE: WON respondent judge is guilty of partiality

#2 JORDA v. BITAS A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376 [Formerly OCA March 5, Peralta, J.

#3 LOPEZ v. LUCMAYON A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837 September 24, 2014 PONENTE

Canon II of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Canon II of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

#4 TORMIS v. PAREDES G.R. No. DATE PONENTE

PETITIONER: JILL TORMIS RESPONDENT: JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Paredes could be held administratively liable

#1 LORENZANA v. AUSTRIA A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014 BRION, J.

PETITIONER: ANTONIO LORENZANA RESPONDENT: JUDGE MA. CECILIA AUSTRIA

6. Competence and Diligence

#1 OCA v. NECESSARIO A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013 PONENTE

PETITIONER: Office of the Court Administrator RESPONDENT: Judge Necessario et al.

#2 GARADO v. TORRES G.R. No. DATE PONENTE

PETITIONER: MARICOR L. GARADO RESPONDENT: JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES

for undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20129.

#3 CARBAJOSA v. PATRICIO G.R. No. DATE PONENTE

Bieles' motion to suspend proceedings was granted.

#4 JUNIO v. BELTRAN A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367 January 13, 2014. BRION J.

#5 TUPAL v. ROJO A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014 Leonen, J.

#6 MARCELO v. PICHAY A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838 March 12, 2014 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

PETITIONER:SPOUSES RICARDO and RESPONDENT:JUDGE RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY, METROPOLITAN

#7 GARAY v. VENADAS A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000 DATE PONENTE

#8 UY v. FLORES A.M. No. RTJ-12-2332 June 25, 2014 Villarama,J.

SEC. 26. Personnel Actions. – x x x

PETITIONERS: YOLANDA A. ANDRES, RESPONDENT: ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI

RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO PARREÑO, ET

Respondent Judge Adalim-White’s comment:

Report and recommendation of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy:

X. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY

ISSUE: Whether or not plagiarism was committed by Justice De Castillo

B. Lower Court Judges and Justices of the CA, SB and CTA

PETITIONER: OFFICE OF THE COURT RESPONDENT: EXECUTIVE JUDGE OWEN B. AMOR

#2 CAMPOS v. CAMPOS G.R. No. DATE PONENTE

PETITIONER: OFFICE OF THE COURT RESPONDENT: FORMER JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS

C. Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)

Você também pode gostar