Remedies PDF

REMEDIES FOR FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION UNDER PD 1529
NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

1. If the motion for new trial is granted, the judgment is set aside
2. If the MR is granted, the judgment is merely amended
3. Within the period to take an appeal
GROUNDS FOR FILING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
1. Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
2. Newly discovered evidence
3. Damages awarded were excessive
4. Insufficient evidence to support
CONTENTS OF THE MOTION
1. Shall be in writing—stating the grounds thereof
2. Motion for new trial: proved in the same manner provided for proof of motions
3. Section 1 (a) of Rule 37: Affidavits of Merit
4. 1(b): affidavits of the witnesses whom such evidence is expected to be given or
by duly authenticated documents which proposed to be introduced as evidence
5. A proforma MR or motion for new trial shall not toll the reglementary period
6. No motion for extension of time
AFFIDAVITS OF MERIT
> Motion for new trial
1. Affidavits setting forth the facts and circumstances alleged to constitute such
fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence
2. Affidavits setting forth the particular facts claimed to constitute the movant’s
meritorious cause of action or defense
➢ These are not necessary if the granting of the motion for new trial is not
discretionary with the court but is demandable as of a right, as where the
movant has been deprived of his day in court through no fault or
negligence on his part because no notice of hearing was furnished him in
advance
FRAUD MUST BE EXTRINSIC IN NATURE TO BE A GROUND FOR NULLITY

> Extrinsic fraud—committed outside the litigation against the defeated party
> Fraud in the procurement thereof
ON THE GROUND OF ACCIDENT OR SURPRISE, it must appear there was A/S which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against, and by reason of which, the
party applying has been probably impaired in his rights.
MISTAKE is some unintentional act, omission or error arising from ignorance,

surprise, imposition or misplaced confidence.
BELIEF THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAR DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE THERE
WAS ALREADY A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS A GROUND FOR NEW TRIAL
➢ General Rule: judgment based on a compromise agreement is not subject
to appeal and also immediately executory
➢ Exception to the rule: where a party moves to set it aside on the ground of
either fraud, mistake or deceit
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT means a failure to take the proper steps at the proper time
in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or
reliance on the case and vigilance of counsel or on promises made by the adverse
party.
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, RELIEF FROM DENIAL OF APPEAL
> Fraud, mistake, accident, excusable negligence: in accordance to Rule 38
> If prevented from taking an appeal—this petition as well
IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A FINAL JUDGMENT OR ORDER AND AN
INTERLOCUTORY ONE
1. FINAL JUDGMENT OR ORDER—one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing to be done by the court in respect thereto
2. INTERLOCUTORY—order that doesn’t finally dispose of the case and also not
end the court’s task of adjudicating
A PETITION FOR RELIEF OF JUDGMENT OR FROM DENIAL OF APPEAL MUST
CONFORM TO THE FOLLOWING
1. It must be verified
2. Filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment or order
3. And not more than 6 months after such judgment or final order was entered or
such proceeding was taken (remember that the date of entry is the date of
finality)
A PETITION FOR RELIEF AND A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
ARE EXCLUSIVE OF EACH OTHER
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, FINAL ORDERS OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS

UNDER RULE 38.
Petition for relief – a legal remedy whereby a party seeks to set aside a judgment
rendered against him by a court whenever he was unjustly deprived of hearing or
was prevented from taking an appeal because of FAME.
Nature and grounds –
The relief provided for is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases
as where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
The petition must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than 6
months after such judgment or final order was entered.
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. — When
a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that
the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. (2a)
Final and executor decision can only be annulled by a petition to annul the same
on the ground of extrinsic fraud lack or jurisdiction, or by a petition for relief from
a final order of judgment under the Rule 38.
Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. — When a judgment or final
order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he
may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be
given due course. (1a)
Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.
— A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be
verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment,
final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken,
and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good
and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. (3)
Requirements-
1. Verified, 4. State the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be. (Affidavit of merit)
Section 4. Order to file an answer. — If the petition is sufficient in form and
substance to justify relief, the court in which it is filed, shall issue an order
requiring the adverse parties to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt thereof. The order shall be served in such manner as the court may direct,
together with copies of the petition and the accompanying affidavits. (4a)
If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify relief, the court in
which it is filed, shall-
1. Shall issue an order requiring the adverse parties to answer the same within
fifteen (15) days from the receipt thereof.
2. The order shall be served in such manner as the court may direct, together with
copies of the petition and the accompanying affidavits.
Section 5. Preliminary injunction pending proceedings. — The court in which the
petition is filed may grant such preliminary injunction as may be necessary for the
preservation of the rights of the parties, upon the filing by the petitioner of a
bond in favor of the adverse party, conditioned that if the petition is dismissed or
the petitioner fails on the trial of the case upon its merits, he will pay the adverse
party all damages and costs that may be awarded to him by reason of the
issuance of such injunction or the other proceedings following the petition, but
such injunction shall not operate to discharge or extinguish any lien which the
adverse party may have acquired upon, the property, of the petitioner. (5a)
Injunction is allowed, but there must be a bond in favor of the adverse party
conditioned that if the petition is dismissed or the petitioner fails on the trial of
the case upon its merits, he will pay the adverse party all damages and costs that
may be awarded to him by reason of the issuance of such injunction or the other
proceedings following the petition
BUT, such injunction shall not operate to discharge or extinguish any lien which
the adverse party may have acquired upon, the property, of the petitioner filing
of the answer or the expiration of the period therefor, the court shall hear the
petition and if after such hearing, it finds that the allegations thereof are not true,
the petition shall be dismissed; but if it finds said allegations to be true, it shall set
aside the judgment or final order or other proceeding complained of upon such
terms as may be just. Thereafter the case shall stand as if such judgment, final
order or other proceeding had never been rendered, issued or taken. The court
shall then proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for a new
trial or reconsideration had been granted by it. (6a)
After the filing of answer or expiration of the period (15 days) thereof, the court
shall-
1. Hear the petition 2. After such hearing, it finds that the allegations thereof are
not true, the petition shall be dismissed;
3. If it finds said allegations to be true, it shall set aside the judgment or final
order or other proceeding complained of upon such terms as may be just.
Section 7. Procedure where the denial of an appeal is set aside. — Where the
denial of an appeal is set aside, the lower court shall be required to give due
course to the appeal and to elevate the record of the appealed case as if a timely
and proper appeal had been made. (7a)
Remedy in case of denial of petition for relief –
If petition for relief is denied by the trial court, the remedy of the petitioner is to
file a petition for certiorari under rule 65 pursuant to Rule 41 of rules of Civl
Procedure.
Rule 41, Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment
or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (n)
Petition for relief is a prohibited pleading in summary procedure and small claims.
APPEAL
NO APPEAL MAY BE TAKEN FROM THE FOLLOWING
1. Order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration
2. Order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment
3. Interlocutory order
4. Order disallowing or dismissing an appeal
5. Order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consider, confession, or
compromise on the ground of F/M/D or any ground vitiating consent
6. Order of execution
7. Judgment or final order for or against parties in separate claims, counter-
claims, crossclaims, and 3rd party complaints—main case is pending
8. Order dismissing an action without prejudice
MODES OF APPEAL
1. Ordinary appeal
2. Petition for review
3. Petition for certiorari
PETITION OF ORDINARY APPEAL
> Within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from
> When a record of appeal is required, within 30 days from notice of judgment or
final order
> Period of appeal shall be interrupted by a firmly motion for new trial or
reconsideration
> In the above case, there would be a “fresh 15 days”
PERFECTION OF APPEAL
> Filing of the notice of appeal in due time
> Record of appeal—approved of the record in due time
COURTS MAY REOPEN PROCEEDINGS ALREADY CLOSED BY FINAL DECISION OR
DECREE when application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within 1 year
from the issuance of the decree.
WITH REGARD TO ISSUANCE OF FREE PATENT, the date of issuance of patent is
equivalent to the date of issuance of the decree of registration
PD 1529— Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent

purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or
revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person
adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including
the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year
from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no
case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose
rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for
value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration
and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person
aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his
remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons
responsible for the fraud.
A. PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DECREE
B. [G.R. No. 113549. July 5, 1996]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the DIRECTOR OF

LANDS), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF LUIS
RIBAYA, namely, ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE, LUIS RIBAYA,
ANTONIA RIBAYACONDE, and JOHN DOE REBAYA, all
represented by ANDREA RIBAYA-BUENVIAJE
as Administratrix of the Estate of Luis Ribaya, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Resolution[1] of 24 January 1994 of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351, which set aside its earlier
decision[2] of 9 January 1991. The latter affirmed the decision[3] of 11
November 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Legazpi City,
in Civil Case No. 6198 which declared null and void an original certificate of
title issued pursuant to a decree and a decision in a land registration case
decided on 18 September 1925.
After the private respondents filed their Comment and the petitioner their
Reply, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.
The Court of Appeals' reversal was primarily due to its disagreement with
the trial court's findings of fact. Hence, such removes this case from the
general rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind us in a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[4] We are thus compelled to
review the factual antecedents.
From the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and the
pleadings of the parties, the following were established:
On the basis of the private respondents' exhibits,[5] on 9, 10, 12-16, 23,
24, 26, and 27 July 1920, a parcel of land located in the barrio of
Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, was surveyed for
the spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris (hereinafter the spouses
Ribaya) by Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of Lands surveyor. The parcel of
land was found to comprise an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The
survey plan was denominated as Plan II-13961 and allegedly approved by
the Acting Director of Lands on 3 January 1922. However, as noted by the
Court of Appeals in its 9 January 1991 decision,[6] these exhibits do not at all
show the surveyor's signature. Moreover, as per Land Classification Map No.
871 of the Bureau of Forestry, the above parcel of land was considered part
of the public forest and released for disposition only on 31 December 1930.[7]
In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and confirmation of
title of the lot covered by Plan II-13961 before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Albay. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 26050. Notice of the application, and hearing thereof were
published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette, [8] and in its
decision of 18 September 1925,[9] the CFI granted the said application.
Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30 November 1925, a
resurvey of the parcel of land covered by Plan II-13961 was conducted at
the instance of the spouses Ribaya. This gave rise to Plan II13961-Amd.,
which embraced, inter alia, four different parcels of land with an aggregate
area of only 10,975,022 square meters, instead of the original 25,542,603
square meters. Plan II-13961-Amd. appeared to have been approved by the
Director of Lands on 26 February 1926.[10] The application was not amended
to reflect the resurvey and the amended plan was not published.
On 31 July 1926, the corresponding decree of registration was
issued,[11] while on 19 August 1926, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
3947 covering the four lots embraced by Plan II-13961-Amd. was issued in
the names of the spouses Ribaya.[12]
On 11 September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was administratively
reconstituted from the owner's duplicate copy thereof and the reconstituted
title was denominated as OCT No. PO-10848 (3947).[13]
In 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya (herein private respondents) received
compensation from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United
States for damages sustained by the land during the war.[14]
In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the private
respondents herein, the land covered by OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was
subdivided per Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-96075, approved on 16 December
1968.[15] Then, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was cancelled and separate
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) were issued to the private respondents.[16]
In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two (62) farmers occupying the
land[17] and claiming ownership thereof, requested the Director of Lands to
institute an action to annul OCT No. RO-10848 (3947).[18] Finding merit in
the request, herein petitioner filed a verified complaint, dated 17 August
1978, with the CFI (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, Branch V, for the
declaration of nullity of OCT No. 3947, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), and all
subsequent titles emanating from the original title, viz., TCT Nos. T-31333 to
T-31358, inclusive. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6198.
The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was obtained through
fraud and that the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
land for lack of republication of the amended plan, neither did the spouses-
applicants comply with Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874.[19] The petitioner
further alleged that at the time the petition for registration was filed, the land
covered therein was forest land, and therefore, inalienable.
On 27 October 1979, the aforementioned 62 farmers filed a complaint-in-
intervention and prayed that the land revert to the petitioner and their titles
over the portions respectively occupied by them confirmed.
In its decision of 11 November 1987[20] the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
held for the petitioner as follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and administratively

reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10848 (3947) as
null and void ab initio and without force and effect;
2. Declaring separate Transfer Certificates of Title, to wit: T-31333, T-
31334, T-31335, T-31336, T- 31337, T-31338, T-31339, T-31340,
T-31341, T-31342, T-31343, T-31344, T-31345, T-31346, T-31347,
T- 31348, T-31349, T-31350, T-31351, T-31352, T-31353, T-
31354, T-31355, T-31356, T-31357 and T-31358, emanating from
OCT No. 3947 and OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), all issued to the
heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris, as likewise null and
void and without force and effect;
3. Ordering [respondents] Heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina
Revatoris to surrender their copy of OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) as
well as their separate transfer certificates of title to the Register of
Deeds of Albay, who (sic) is thereafter directed or ordered to cancel
the same;
4. Ordering the reversion of the land to [petitioner] Republic of the
Philippines, as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
5. And ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim.
The trial court found that at the time the spouses Ribaya filed their petition
for registration, the land was already classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land; however, the then CFI, as a land registration court, did not
acquire jurisdiction over the said lot due to lack of publication or republication
in the Official Gazette of Plan II-13961-Amd., which was the basis of the
decree of registration and OCT No. 3947. Consequently, said OCT No. 3947
and its derivative titles were void.[21] In so finding, it relied on Fewkes vs.
Vasquez,[22] where it was held that any amendment or alteration in the
description of the land after its publication and decree of registration was not
permissible unless coupled with republication.
The trial court likewise ruled that there was no evidence that the
possession of the spouses Ribaya and their predecessors-in-interests was
open, continuous, and adverse under a bona fideclaim of ownership for the
required number of years; moreover, they failed to present any tax
declarations. It then concluded that the said Spouses may have occupied
portions of the land at a later time, but not in the concept of bona fide owners,
for mere casual cultivation and raising of cattle on the land did not constitute
"possession" as contemplated by law.[23]
The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV
No. 17351), which, in its decision[24] of 9 January 1991, affirmed in toto the
appealed decision of the trial court. The appellate court further pointed out
another reason why the registration in favor of the applicants was invalid,
thus:
[W]hen [the] spouses [Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris] applied for registration
thereof in their names said land was still part of the public forest. The land was
released for public disposition only on December 31, 1930 as shown by the Land
Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry (Exhs K, K-
5). Consequently, OCT No. 3947 as reconstituted by OCT No. RO-10848 is
void ab initio.
It is well-settled that lands of the public domain classified as forest or timber lands,
are incapable of registration in the names of private persons and their inclusion in a
title nullifies the title (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 and cases cited
therein.)[25]
In refuting the claim of the private respondents that publication of the

amended survey plan was unnecessary in light of the decision of this Court
in Benin vs. Tuazon,[26] the Court of Appeals held that the facts in Benin were
different. In Benin, an approved survey plan was submitted before the
property was decreed for registration, while in the present case:
[T]he land was decreed for registration on September 18, 1925, while its survey
was performed sometime in November and December 1925. The amended survey
plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) thereof was approved by the Director of Lands
on February 26, 1926. In other words, the survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) of the
land in the instant case was approved when the land was already decreed for
registration. . . .[27]
There was then, the Court of Appeals concluded, a violation of Sections 23

and 26 of Act No. 496.[28]
The private respondents seasonably moved for a reconsideration of this
decision.
In its resolution[29] of 24 January 1994, the Court of Appeals granted the
motion for reconsideration and set aside its decision of 9 January 1991,
reversed that of the trial court of 11 November 1987, and dismissed the
complaint and the complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 6198 of Branch
7 of the RTC of Legazpi City. In overturning its previous decision, the Court
of Appeals ruled that OCT No. 3947 "is conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No.
496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496).One (1) year
after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496),
said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496)."[30]
It further applied the presumption of regularity in the grant of the land
applied for by the spouses Ribaya, and even extended said presumption to
their compliance with all conditions required by law, in particular, their "open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894." It thus burdened
the Republic "to prove otherwise."[31]
It likewise ruled that the failure of the spouses Ribaya to present tax
receipts was not fatal, and that although they actually lived in Oas, Albay,
such did not negate the character of their possession for "[p]ossession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before he can be said that he is in possession."[32]
The Court of Appeals also rejected the application of the Fewkescase
and applied, instead, the decision in Benin, where this Court held that
republication could be dispensed with in an amendment in the application or
in the survey plan, where such amendment consisted of the exclusion of a
portion covered by the original application and the original survey plan as
published. Accordingly, the land registration court retained its jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court of Appeals withdrew its earlier finding that the land in
question still formed part of the public forest at the time of the application for
registration. It asserted, instead, that there was insufficient basis to conclude
that a parcel of land only became open to disposition on the basis of the date
of approval of the land classification map, because such approval may have
been made later by authority of a prior executive declaration.[33]
Unsatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition and asserts that (1) the
indefeasibility of title does not lie against the State in an action for reversion
of land; (2) the spouses-applicants failed to prove possession of the land for
the period required by law, and the evidence shows that their possession
was not open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim
of ownership; (3) the amended survey plan was not published, (4) the land
covered by OCT No. 3947 was then part of the forest land, hence,
inalienable; and (5) the accuracy of the land survey was doubtful.[34]
In their Comment, the private respondents allege that the petition merely
raises factual matters and argue that OCT No. 3947 is absolutely
incontestable, considering that the land was no longer part of the public
forest when it was decreed in favor of their parents. They further contend,
invoking Benin, that the issue of republication is inapplicable since the
publication of the original survey plan was already had in compliance with
law. Moreover, possession of the land by their parents, the spouses-
applicants, was duly proven, i.e., donations of portions thereof in favor of the
government and the compensation they received from the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the
land during the war sufficiently proved that they were the legitimate owners
of the land. Finally, the original survey plan could no longer be questioned
by the petitioner.[35]
As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be resolved, to wit:
1. Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to
bring the action for annulment of OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative
certificates of title; and
2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the
four parcels of land subject of the amended survey plan (Plan II-
13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree issued on 31 July 1926 by
the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the
said court of 18 September 1925.
As to the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that OCT No. 3947 was, to repeat:
[C]onclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its
branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act
No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity
(Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38,
Act No. 496).[36]
First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely
refers to a petition for review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree. In
the second place, there are other remedies available to an aggrieved party
after the said one-year period, e.g.,reconveyance, covered by Section 65 of
Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that "in all cases of registration
procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies
against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of
any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title."[37] Likewise, an action
for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred
to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within four years from
discovery of the fraud.[38] Recourse may also be had against the Assurance
Fund.[39]
Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of
property which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation which was
registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land registered under the
Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. In Republic
vs. Animas,[40] we ruled:
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be
recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the
Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for
the Statute of Limitation does not run against the state. The right of reversion
or reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription.
We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya
was part of the public forest and released only on 31 December 1930,[41] the
land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land, which was not
yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action to annul the
certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not
barred by prescription.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the land registration court in LRC
Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over
the land covered by either the original plan (Plan II-13961) or the amended
plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total
want of publication of the second.
As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of
Appeals, the notice of the hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for
the registration of the land covered by the original plan was published in the
17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only
one publication thereof.Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then,
required two publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the
land registration court was void for want of the required publications.The
requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the registration court;[42] it is a jurisdictional requisite.[43] Land
registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired
unless there be constructive seizure of the Land through publication and
service of notice.[44]
Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an
alleged original survey plan. The fact remains, however, that in November of
that year that original plan was amended (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and the
amended plan was not published at all. There is no evidence that the court
amended its decision to conform to the amended plan, neither is there a
showing that the parties even attempted publication thereof. However, the
decree that was subsequently issued was based on the amended plan
insofar as the four lots were concerned.
A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the
land.[45] On the basis of the decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then
that the land registration court may have amended its decision to conform to
the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their way into the
decree issued by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT
No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the General Land Registration Office
merely adjusted the decree to conform to the amended plan, such aims were
fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended plan. As
such, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land
embraced by the amended plan.
The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 and
the private respondents, however, maintain that the publication of the
amended plan was unnecessary under our pronouncements in Benin vs.
Tuazon.[46] This case reiterates our rulings in Philippine Manufacturing Co.
vs. Imperial,[47] Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz,[48] Bank of the Philippine
Islands vs. Acua,[49]Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus,[50] and Director of
Lands vs. Benitez,[51] that only where the original survey plan is amended
during the registration proceedings, by the addition of land not previously
included in the original plan, should publication be made in order to confer
jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area added after the
publication of the original plan.Conversely, if the amendment does not
involve an addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that
was published, no new publication is required.
Reliance on Benin and its predecessors is misplaced. In the first place,
the amendment of the original survey plan for the land applied for by the
spouses Ribaya was made after the land registration court rendered its
decision. It follows then that a re-opening of the case was indispensable;
however, no such reopening appears to have been done therein. Second,
as earlier shown, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the
land covered by the original plan because of insufficient publication in the
Official Gazette. Third, it has not been sufficiently shown that the four parcels
of land covered by OCT No. 3947, which are based on the amended plan,
are but a small part of the same and covered by the original survey plan. This
conclusion is thoroughly discussed below.
In the 24 January 1994 resolution of the Court of Appeals, it found the
original areas covered by Plan 13961 to be 25,542,603 square meters and
the four parcels of land embraced in the amended plan, Plan II-13961-Amd.,
to be in the aggregate of 10,975,022 square meters. Thus:
In the case at bar, in 1925, the spouses Ribaya sought for a judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title of the land described as follows:
Parcel of land (Plan II-13961) containing an area of 25,542,603 square meters,

with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio
Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, P.I. x x x (Italics
Supplied).
Said 25,542,603 square meter land was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16,
23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of
Lands which survey was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on
January 3, 1922, (Exh. 6).
The notice of application and hearing of the land as aforedescribed, was
published in the March 17, 1925 issue of the Official Gazette (Exhs. J and J-
1).
The land registration court issued a decision in favor of the spouses
Ribaya on September 18, 1925 but for a smaller parcel of land than the
25,542,503 square meters are applied for. On November 23 and 30, 1925,
said smaller parcel of land was surveyed by Land Surveyor Wenceslao
Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926
as Plan II-13961-Amd.(Exh. H and series).
Plan II-13961-Amd. embraced 4 parcels of land in the aggregate area of
10,975,022 square meters separately described as follows:
1. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area
of 3,318,454 square meters, more or less;
of 1,575,195 square meters more or less;
of 4,844,205 square meters, more or less;
of 1,237,368 square meters, more or less.[52]
This was also its finding in its earlier decision of 9 January 1991.[53]
In their Comment of 30 May 1994, the private respondents do not, for
obvious reasons, dispute such finding and so they not only quoted it
therein,[54] they also explicitly assert that:
The undisputed facts are that the original plan of the land applied for which was
published in the Official Gazette contained an area of 25,542,603 square
meters. The land actually embraced in the decree of registration contained only
10,975,022 square meters.[55] (Italics supplied)
In hectares, the 25,542,603 square meters means Two Thousand Five

Hundred and Fifty Four Hectares, two ares, and six hundred and three
centares (2,554 has., 2 ares, and 603 centares); and the 10,975,022 square
meters means one thousand and ninety seven hectares, five ares, and
twenty-two centares (1,097 has., 5 ares, and 22 centares).
However, the trial court is somewhat confused as to the area of the land
covered by Plan II-13961, as well as, that covered by the amended plan
(Plan II-13961-Amd.). Thus:
[A]nd on March 7, 1978 Land Investigator Selecio San Felipe wrote the Director
of Lands that the report of the ocular inspection and investigation conducted on
May 14, 15 and 16, 1977 was true and correct, . . . that Plan II 3961-Amd., Sheet
no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares, located at
Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 18-21, December 8-9,
1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the
Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits G, G-l and G-2 for plaintiff and
Exhibits GG, GG-l and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no.
2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373 hectares, located at
Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 23-30, 1925 by Private
Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on
February 26, 1926 (Exhibits H, H-l and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1
and HH-2 for intervenors); . . . that Original Certificate of Title No RO-10848
(3947) covers 4 parcels of land, to wit: Lot No. 1, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing
an area of 3,318.454 square meters more or less, Lot No. 2, Plan II-13961-Amd.),
containing an area of 1,575.195 square meters more or less, Lot No. 3, Plan II-
13961- Amd.), containing an area of4,844.005 square meters more or less, and Lot
No. 4, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237.368 square metersmore or
less with a total of 10,975.022 square meters more or less; x x x that Plan II-
13961 of property as surveyed for Luis Ribaya, situated in the barrio of
Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, province of Albay, containing an area
of 25,542.603 square meters, was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27,
1920 in accordance with Section 45 of Act 2874 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor
of the Bureau of Lands, and the said plan was approved by the Acting Director of
Lands on January 3, 1922 (Exhibits 6 and 6-A). . . .[56] (Italics supplied)
Note that instead of a comma (,) before the last three digits in the areas of
the four lots covered by the amended plan, as well as the areas embraced
in the original plan, the trial court placed a period (.). The change from
a comma to a period is of vital significance.For, translated into hectares,
the 25,542.603 square meters would be only Two (2) hectares, five (5) ares,
and five hundred and forty-two (542) centares; and the aggregate
of 10,975.022 square meters for the four lots embraced in Plan II-13961-
Amd. would be one (1) hectare and nine hundred seventy-five (975)
centares.
Indeed, the disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the trial
court as to the land area of the original survey plan (Plan II-
13961), i.e., whether it was 25,542,603 square meters (twenty-five million
five hundred and forty-two thousand and six hundred three square
meters) as found by the former, or 25,542.603 square meters (twenty-five
thousand, five hundred forty-two point six hundred and three square meters)
as found by the latter, only shows the unreliability of the original plan sought
to be established through Exhibits 6 and 6-A. The Court of Appeals itself so
found it to be in its decision of 9 January 1991 because these exhibits did
not show that the survey plan was signed by the surveyor. Thus:
Although the trial court said so (decision, p. 4) its basis, which is (original) Plan II-
13961 (Exhs. 6, 6-A), did not indubitably establish the same. In the first place, said
original plan (Plan II-13961) does not bear the signature of the surveyor thereof,
thereby casting doubt on its genuineness and due execution. x x x[57] (Italics
supplied)
Such doubt gains strength if we consider that if indeed the area embraced
therein was that found by the Court of Appeals, i.e., 25,542,603 square
meters with a comma before the last three digits it would have been
physically impossible to finish the survey thereof in only eleven days (9, 10,
12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920).Plainly, the present-day sophisticated
survey instruments were not then available. Furthermore, the trial court
indicated in its findings of fact that in addition to the four lots covered by OCT
No. 3947, there were other large tracts covered by the amended survey plan
(Plan II-13961-Amd.), viz.:
[T]hat Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area
of 489.3649 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, . . . (Exhibits G, G-
1 and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-1 and GG-2 for Intervenors);
that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area
of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay,... (Exhibits H, H-1
and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors);[58] (Italics
supplied)
The disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals
cannot be definitely resolved because no reliable copy of the original Plan II-
13961 was presented. Exhibits "6 and 6-A are a machine copy of the
blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence,
which are inadmissible for failure of the offer or to prove any of the exception
provided therein and to established the conditions for their
admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value.
Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude that the four
parcels of land included in OCT No. 3947 are but a part of the land covered
by the original plan (Plan II-13961).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of
24 January 1994 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
17351 is SET ASIDE, while its decision therein of 9 January 1991 affirming in
toto that of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City of 11
November 1987 in Civil Case No. 6198 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 173289 February 17, 2010
ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

Vs.
AZUCENA GARCIA, ELINO FAJARDO, AND HEIR OF TIBURCIO MALABANAN NAMED
TERESA MALABANAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the decision1 dated February 28, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67417, which dismissed the appeal of
petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. and affirmed the Resolutions dated November 3,
1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City.
The facts of the case, as shown in the records, are the following:
Respondents Azucena Garcia, Elino Fajardo, and Teresa Malabanan, the heir of
Tiburcio Malabanan, filed a Complaint2 dated March 2, 1998 for Quieting of Title
with Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC, Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City
against petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. Respondents claimed that they are the
owners, in fee simple title, of a parcel of land identified as Lot 9250 Cad-355,
Tagaytay Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-008367, situated in Barangay Iruhin, Tagaytay City,
containing an area of Two Hundred Forty-Four Thousand One Hundred Twelve
(244,112) square meters, by occupation and possession under the provisions of
Sec. 48 (b)3 of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
For having been in continuous, public, and adverse possession as owners of the
said lot for at least thirty years, respondents stated that they were not aware of
any person or entity who had a legal or equitable interest or claim on the same lot
until the time they were requesting that the lot be declared for tax purposes.
They found out that the lot was the subject of a land registration proceeding that
had already been decided by the same court4 where their complaint was filed.
They also found out that Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, was
already issued on August 20, 1997 to the petitioner pursuant to the Decision
dated June 7, 1994 of the same court. They averred that they were not notified of
the said land registration case; thus, they claimed the presence of
misrepresentation amounting to actual or extrinsic fraud. Thus, they argued that
they were also entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction in order to restrain or
enjoin petitioner, its privies, agents, representatives, and all other persons acting
on its behalf, to refrain from committing acts of dispossession on the subject lot.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, were served on the petitioner
on April 7, 1998. On April 29, 1998, petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with
Motion for Extension of Time,5 which the trial court granted6 for a period of ten
(10) days within which to file a responsive pleading. Petitioner filed a Second
Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer7 dated April 29, 1998, which the trial
court likewise granted.8
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss9 dated May 9, 1998, stating that
the pleading asserting the claim of respondents stated no cause of action, and
that the latter were not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, setting the same for hearing on May 21, 1998. On the date of the
hearing, the trial court issued an Order,10 which granted the respondents ten (10)
days from that day to file a comment, and set the date of the hearing on July 23,
1998. Respondents filed a Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition to Defendant
Eland,11 together with the corresponding Comment/Opposition12 dated June 8,
1998.
On the scheduled hearing of September 23, 1998, the trial court issued an
Order,13 considering the Motion to Dismiss submitted for resolution due to the
non-appearance of the parties and their respective counsels. The said motion was
eventually denied by the trial court in an Order14 dated September 25, 1998,
ruling that the allegations in the complaint established a cause of action and
enjoined petitioner Eland to file its answer to the complaint within ten (10) days
from receipt of the same. Petitioner then filed two Motions for Extension to File
an Answer.15
Petitioner, on November 9, 1998, filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the trial

court’s Order dated September 25, 1998, denying the former’s Motion to Dismiss.
Again, petitioner filed a Motion for Final Extension of Time to File Answer17 dated
November 6, 1998. Respondents filed their Comment/Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 24, 1998. Subsequently, the trial court denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in an Order18 dated January 11, 1999.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendant Eland in Default19

dated November 17, 1998. On December 4, 1998 Petitioner Eland filed its
Comment (on Plaintiff’s Motion to Declare Defendant Eland in Default)20 dated
December 2, 1998, while respondents filed a Reply to Comment (on Plaintiff’s
Motion to Declare Defendant Eland in Default)21 dated December 29, 1998.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order22 dated January 11, 1999 declaring the
petitioner in default and allowed the respondents to present evidence ex parte.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order dated 11 January
1999)23 dated February 5, 1999 on the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss
and in declaring it in default. The trial court in an Order24 dated March 18, 1999,
denied the former and granted the latter. In the same Order, the trial court
admitted petitioner’s Answer Ad Cautelam.
Earlier, petitioner filed its Answer Ad Cautelam (With Compulsory
Counterclaim)25 dated November 12, 1998. Respondents countered by filing a
Motion to Expunge Eland’s Answer from the Records26 dated December 2, 1998.
Petitioner filed its Opposition (to Plaintiff’s Motion to Expunge Eland’s Answer
from the Records)27 dated December 21, 1998, as well as a Comment (on
Plaintiff’s Motion to Expunge Eland’s Answer from the Records)28 dated January
26, 1999.
Consequently, respondents filed a Motion to Set Presentation of Evidence Ex

Parte29 dated January 18, 1999, which was granted in an Order30 dated January
22, 1999.
On January 28, 1999, respondents presented their evidence before the Clerk of
Court of the trial court which ended on February 3, 1999; and, on February 10,
1999, respondents filed their Formal Offer of Evidence.31 However, petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Presentation of Evidence32
dated February 8, 1999. In that regard, the trial court issued an Order33 dated
February 11, 1999 directing the Clerk of Court to suspend the proceedings.
On May 14, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Clarification34 as to whether or

not the evidence presented ex parte was nullified by the admission of petitioner’s
Answer Ad Cautelam. Petitioner filed its Comment35 dated May 13, 1999 on the
said motion for clarification.
A pre-trial conference was scheduled on May 27, 1999, wherein the parties
submitted their pre-trial briefs.36 However, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings37 dated May 24, 1999 on the ground that the same petitioner had
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, asking for the nullification of the Order
dated March 18, 1999 of the trial court and for the affirmation of its earlier Order
denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. The petition for certiorari was
subsequently denied; and a copy of the Resolution38 dated June 14, 1999 was
received by the trial court. Hence, in an Order39 dated July 7, 1999, the trial court
ruled that the reception of evidence already presented by the respondents before
the Clerk of Court remained as part of the records of the case, and that the
petitioner had the right to cross-examine the witness and to comment on the
documentary exhibits already presented. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration40 dated July 19, 1999, but it was denied by the trial court in
an Omnibus Order41 dated September 14, 1999.
Eventually, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment42 dated August 5,

1999, while petitioner filed its Opposition43 to the Motion dated August 31, 1999.
In its Resolution44 dated November 3, 1999, the trial court found favor on the
respondents. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for summary judgment is hereby

GRANTED and it is hereby adjudged that:
1. Plaintiffs are the absolute owners and rightful possessors of Lot 9250, CAD-
355, Tagaytay Cadastre, subject to the rights of occupancy of the farm
workers on the one-third area thereof;
2. The Judgment dated June 7, 1994 in Land Registration Case No. TG-423 is
set aside and the Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. N-62686 dated
August 20, 1997 is null and void;
3. The Original Transfer Certificate of Title is ordered to be canceled, as well

as tax declaration covering Lot 9250, Cad-355.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed the Resolution of the trial court with the CA, which dismissed
it in a Decision dated February 28, 2006, which reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution
dated November 3, 1999, of the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, in Civil Case No.
TG-1784, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioner are the following:
5.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT
RULED THAT RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED
AUGUST 05, 1999 DID NOT VIOLATE THE TEN (10)-DAY NOTICE RULE UNDER
SECTION 3, RULE 35 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
RULED THAT A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER IN AN ACTION
FOR QUIETING OF TITLE.
RULED THAT THERE ARE NO GENUINE FACTUAL AND TRIABLE ISSUES IN CIVIL
CASE NO. TG-1784.
UPHELD THE RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO,
BASED ON TESTIMONIES OF RESPONDENTS’ WITNESSES TAKEN WITHOUT
GRANTING HEREIN PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE AND UPON
DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS PRESENTED BUT NOT ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE.
UPHELD THE RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO
BASED ON FALSIFIED “EVIDENCE.”
FAILED TO RULE THAT THE COURT A QUO PATENTLY DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF ITS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN RENDERING ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
HELD THAT THE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION TO CANCEL PETITIONER’S
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. 0-660 IN AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE.
According to the petitioner, a motion for summary judgment must be served at

least ten (10) days before the date set for hearing thereof, and that a hearing
must be held to hear the parties on the propriety of a summary judgment, per
Sec. 3 of Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was not observed because
the petitioner received a copy of the respondents’ motion for summary judgment
only on August 20, 1999, or the very same day that the motion was set for
hearing. Petitioner further claims that the trial court never conducted any hearing
on the motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner also argued that a summary judgment is only available to a claimant

seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief, and does not include cases for quieting of title. Furthermore,
petitioner also averred that a summary judgment has no place in a case where
genuine factual and triable issues exist, like in the present case. It added that the
genuine and triable issues were all raised in its Answer Ad Cautelam.
Another ground relied upon by petitioner is its failure to cross-examine the

witnesses for the respondents without fault on its part. It also stated that the trial
court did not issue any order admitting in evidence the documentary exhibits
presented by the respondents. Hence, according to the petitioner, the trial court
gravely erred in relying upon the testimonies of the witnesses for the
respondents, without having the latter cross-examined; and upon the
documentary exhibits presented but not admitted as evidence.
Petitioner further claimed that the trial court based its Resolution dated
November 3, 1999 on falsified evidence.
Lastly, petitioner raised the issue that by rendering summary judgment, the trial
court deprived the former of its right to due process.
Respondents, in their Comment45 dated October 16, 2006, countered the first
issue raised by the petitioner, stating that their filing of the motion for summary
judgment fourteen (14) days before the requested hearing of the same motion
was in compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court.
As to the second and third issues, respondents argued that petitioner had a
constricted perception of the coverage of the Rules of Summary Judgment, and
that the latter’s citation of cases decided by this Court showed the diverse causes
of action that could be the subject matters of summary judgment. Respondents
also posited that petitioner’s statements in its Answer Ad Cautelam, although
denominated as Specific Denial, were really general denials that did not comply
with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
Anent the fourth and fifth issues, respondents claimed that despite the
opportunity, or the right allowed in the Order dated July 17, 1999 of the trial
court, for the petitioner to cross-examine respondents’ witnesses and to
comment on the documentary evidence presented ex parte after the default
order against the same petitioner, the latter evasively moved to set aside
respondents’ evidence in order to suspend further proceedings that were
intended to abort the pre-trial conference. They added that petitioner neglected
to avail itself of, or to comply with, the prescription of the rules found in Rule 35
of the Rules of Court by opting not to avail itself of the hearing of its opposition to
the summary judgment after receiving the Order dated August 20, 1999; by failing
to serve opposing affidavit, deposition or admission in the records; and by not
objecting to the decretal portion of the said Order dated August 20, 1999, which
stated that the motion for summary judgment has been submitted for resolution
without further argument. With regard to the contention of the petitioner that
the trial court wrongly appreciated falsified evidence, respondents asserted that
petitioner’s counsel failed to study carefully the records of the proceedings for
the presentation of the evidence ex parte to be able to know that it was not only
a single-day proceeding, and that more than one witness had been presented.
They further averred that the trial court did not only rely on the photographs of
the houses of the occupants of the property in question.
Finally, as to the sixth and seventh issues, respondents asseverated that their
complaint alleged joint causes of action for quieting of title under Art. 476 of the
New Civil Code and for the review of the decree of registration pursuant to Sec.
32 of the Property Registration Decree or P.D. No. 1529, because they are
complimentary with each other.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The basic contention that must be resolved by this Court is the propriety of the
summary judgment in this particular case of quieting of title.
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. – A party seeking to recover upon a

claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any
time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. – The motion shall be served at least ten
(10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, and admissions on
file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.46
In the present case, it was the respondents who moved for a summary judgment.
Petitioner contended that the ten-day notice rule was violated, because the copy
of the motion for summary judgment was served only on August 20, 1999 or on
the same day it was set for hearing. It also added that even if the petitioner
received a copy of the motion only on August 20, 1999, there was no hearing
conducted on that date because the trial court issued an order giving petitioner
10 days within which to file its comment or opposition.
The above specific contention, however, is misguided. The CA was correct in its
observation that there was substantial compliance with due process. The CA
ruled, as the records show, that the ten-day notice rule was substantially
complied with because when the respondents filed the motion for summary
judgment on August 9, 1999, they furnished petitioner with a copy thereof on the
same day as shown in the registry receipt and that the motion was set for hearing
on August 20, 1999, or 10 days from the date of the filing thereof.
Due process, a constitutional precept, does not, therefore, always and in all
situations a trial-type proceeding. The essence of due process is found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit one’s evidence in support of his
defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the absence of previous notice, but
the absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.47
Petitioner further argues that summary judgment is not proper in an action for
quieting of title. This particular argument, however, is misplaced. This Court has
already ruled that any action can be the subject of a summary judgment with the
sole exception of actions for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or
for legal separation.48
Proceeding to the main issue, this Court finds that the grant of summary
judgment was not proper. A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their
face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented
by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.49
It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue is the
determining factor in granting a motion for summary judgment, and the movant
has the burden of proving such nonexistence. The trial court found no genuine
issue as to any material fact that would necessitate conducting a full-blown trial.
However, a careful study of the case shows otherwise.
In their motion for summary judgment, the respondents failed to clearly

demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact. They merely reiterated
their averments in the complaint for quieting of title and opposed some issues
raised by the petitioner in its Answer Ad Cautelam, to wit:
Nonetheless, going by the records of the admitted and uncontroverted facts and
facts established there is no more litigious or genuine issue of basic fact to be the
subject of further trial on the merits.
The first defense as to the identity of the subject property, the issue has already
become nil because of not only the lack of seriousness in the allegations but also
because the identity of the subject parcel of land Lot 9250 was proven by the
approved plan Ap-04-008367 that was already presented and offered in evidence
as Exhibit “B” for the plaintiffs.
The second defense that plaintiffs’ claim of the property is barred by prior
judgment rule is unavailing considering that the vital documentary evidence they
presented in Land Registration Case No. TG-423 before this Honorable Court the
markings and descriptions of such documents are stated in the Judgment quoted
as follows:
(1) Tax Declaration No. 015224-A (Exhibit “Q”; x x x.
(2) Tax Declaration No. 05019-B (Exhibit “R”; x x x.

(3) Tax Declaration No. 01926-B (Exhibit “S”; x x x.
(4) Tax Declaration No. GR-007-0007 (Exhibit “T” x x x.
Are the very documentary evidence adopted and relied upon by the plaintiffs in
seeking the review and nullity of the Decree No. 217313 issued on August 20,
1997 under LRC Record No. N-62686 pursuant to the Judgment dated June 7,
1994 rendered by this Honorable Court penned by the acting presiding Judge
Eleuterio F. Guerrero in said Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
On the other hand, as to the gravamen of the claims in the complaint, the
plaintiffs have presented clear and convincing evidence as the well-nigh or almost
incontrovertible evidence of a registerable title to the subject land in the
proceedings conducted on the reception of evidence ex-parte for the plaintiffs
establishing in detail the specifications of continuous, open, exclusive possession
as aspects of acquisitive prescription as confirmed in the affidavit herein attached
as Annex “A”;
In ruling that there was indeed no genuine issue involved, the trial court merely
stated that:
This Court, going by the records, observed keenly that plaintiffs’ cause of action
for quieting of title on the disputed parcel of land is based on the alleged fraud in
the substitution of their landholdings of Lot 9250, Cad 355, Tagaytay Cadastre
containing only an area of 244,112 square meters with Lot 9121, Cad 335,
Tagaytay Cadastre, containing only an area of 19,356 square meters. While
defendant Eland in its answer practically and mainly interposed the defenses of:
(a) the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is not the parcel of land
subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423; (b) the claim of the plaintiffs
is barred by prior judgment of this Court in said Land Registration Case; and (c)
plaintiffs’ complaint is barred by the Statute of Limitation since Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-660 has become incontrovertible.
Cross-reference of the above-cited Land Registration Case No. TG-423 that was
decided previously by this Court with the case at bench was imperatively made by
this Court. Being minded that the Court has and can take judicial notice of the said
land registration case, this Court observed that there is no genuine issue of fact to
be tried on the merits. Firstly, because the supposed identity crisis of the
controverted parcel of land covered by the Land Registration Case No. TG-423
with the subject parcel of land is established by Plan Ap-04-006275 (Exhibit “N”)
LRC Case No. 423 and by Plan A04 008367 (Exhibit “B” of the plaintiffs) and the
Technical Description of Lot 9250, Cad 355 (Exhibit “B-1” of the plaintiffs).
Secondly, the prior judgment rule cannot be availed of by defendant Eland since
not only intrinsic fraud but extrinsic fraud were alleged in and established by the
records. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 1184436, pro.
March 21, 1997). Thirdly, it is incontrovertible that the complaint in this case
seeking to review the judgment and annul the decree was filed on March 5, 1998
or within one (1) year from August 20, 1997 or the date of issuance of Decree No.
217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, hence, the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-660
issued to defendant Eland has not attained incontrovertibility. (Heirs of Manuel
Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118436, prom. March 21, 1997).
Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question of fact by the interaction of

the basic pleadings, the observation of this Court is that the plaintiffs were able to
prove by the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the aspects of possession in
accordance with Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as
hereinafter illustrated.
The CA, in affirming the above Resolution of the trial court, propounded thus:
The contention of defendant-appellant is untenable. Summary judgment is not
only limited to solving actions involving money claims. Under Rule 35 of the 1997
Rules of Court, except as to the amount of damages, when there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed. The term “genuine issue” has
been defined as an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith
and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Thus, under the aforecited rule, summary judgment is appropriate when there are
no genuine issues of fact, which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-
blown trial. Thus, even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, but
when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not
genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a
matter of law.
It should be stressed that the court a quo which rendered the assailed resolution
in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was the very court that decided the LRC Case No. TG-
423. Such being the case, the court a quo was privy to all relevant facts and
rulings pertaining to LRC Case No. TG-423 which it considered and applied to this
case. Thus, where all the facts are within the judicial knowledge of the court,
summary judgment may be granted as a matter of right.
On the contrary, in petitioner’s Answer Ad Cautelam, genuine, factual and triable

issues were raised, aside from specifically denying all the allegations in the
complaint, thus:
2. SPECIFIC DENIALS
2.1 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Complaint insofar as it alleges the personal
circumstances of the plaintiff and one A. F. Development Corporation for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Complaint for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of said allegations. And if the property
referred to in said paragraphs is that parcel of land which was the subject matter
of Land Registration Case No. TG-423 which was previously decided by this
Honorable Court with finality, said allegations are likewise specifically denied for
the obvious reason that the said property had already been adjudged with finality
by no less than this Honorable Court as absolutely owned by herein answering
defendant as will be further discussed hereunder.

paragraph 8 of the Complaint insofar as it alleged that “(u)pon exercise of further
circumspection, counsel for the plaintiffs once followed-up in writing the 1994
request of the plaintiffs to have the subject parcel of land be declared for taxation
purposes” and insofar as it is made to appear that parcel of land being claimed by
the plaintiffs is the same parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case
No. TG-423 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth thereof and for the reason that the names of the herein plaintiffs were
never mentioned during the entire proceedings in said land registration case and
by reason of the Affirmative Allegations contained hereunder.

paragraphs 9, 10, 10 (a), 10 (b), 10 (c), 10 (d), 10 €, 10 (f), 10 (g), 10 (h), and 11 for
the reason that there is no showing that the parcel of land being claimed by the
plaintiff is the same parcel of land which was the subject matter of Land
Registration Case No. TG- 423, and in the remote possibility that the parcel of
land being claimed by the plaintiffs is the same as that parcel of land subject of
Land Registration Case No. TG-423, the allegations contained in said paragraphs
are still specifically denied for the reason that no less than the Honorable Court
had decided with finality that the parcel of land is absolutely owned by herein
defendant to the exclusion of all other persons as attested to by the subsequent
issuance of an Original Certificate of Title in favor of answering defendant and for
reasons stated in the Affirmative Allegations.

paragraph 12 of the Complaint for the obvious reason that it was the plaintiffs
who appear to have been sleeping on their rights considering that up to the
present they still do not have any certificate of title covering the parcel of land
they are claiming in the instant case, while on the part of herein defendant, no
less than the Honorable Court had adjudged with finality that the parcel of land
subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423 is absolutely owned by
herein defendant.

paragraph 13 of the complaint for the reason that defendant has never
ladgrabbed any parcel of land belonging to others, much less from the plaintiffs,
and further, answering defendant specifically denies the allegations therein that
plaintiffs engaged the services of a lawyer for a fee for lack of knowledge r
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Complaint for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as the truth thereof.

paragraphs IV (a) to IV (c) for the reason that, as above-stated, if the parcel of
land being claimed by the plaintiffs is the same as that parcel of land subject
matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423, this Honorable Court had already
decided with finality that said parcel of land is absolutely owned by herein
answering defendant and additionally, for those reasons stated in defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss.

paragraph IV (d) of the Complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
Special and affirmative defenses were also raised in the same Answer Ad
Cautelam, to wit:
Xxxx
4.1 The pleading asserting the claim of the plaintiff states no cause of action as
asserted in the Motion To Dismiss filed by herein answering defendant and for
the reason that there is no evidence whatsoever showing or attesting to the fact
that the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs in the Complaint is the same
parcel of land which was the subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
4.2 The complaint was barred by the prior judgment rendered by this Honorable
in Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
4.3 The complaint is barred by the Statute of Limitation in that OCT No. 0-660 had
become incontrovertible by virtue of the Torrens System of Registration; and to
allow plaintiffs to question the validity of answering defendant’s title through the
instant complaint would be a collateral of OCT No. 0-660 which is not permissible
under the law.
4.4 Plaintiffs are barred by their own acts and/or omission from filing the present
complaint under the principles of estoppel and laches.
4.5 Plaintiffs does not to the Court with clean hands as they appear to be well
aware of the proceedings in said Land Registration Case No. TG- 423 and inspite
of such knowledge, plaintiffs never bothered to present their alleged claims in the
proceedings.
4.6 Answering defendant has always acted with justice, given everyone his due,
and observed honesty and good faith in his dealings.
Clearly, the facts pleaded by the respondents in their motion for summary
judgment have been duly disputed and contested by petitioner, raising genuine
issues that must be resolved only after a full-blown trial. When the facts as
pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of trial.50 In the present case, the petitioner was
able to point out the genuine issues. A “genuine issue” is an issue of fact that
requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim.51
It is of utmost importance to remember that petitioner is already the registered

owner (Original Certificate of Title [OCT] No. 0-660 issued by the Register of
Deeds) of the parcel of land in question, pursuant to a decree of registration
(Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. 62686) based on the ruling of the same
court that granted the summary judgment for the quieting of title.
Incidentally, the findings of the trial court contained in the disputed summary
judgment were obtained through judicial notice of the facts and rulings pertaining
to that earlier case (LRC Case No. TG-423) wherein the same trial court ruled in
favor of the petitioner. It is, therefore, disorienting that the same trial court
reversed its earlier ruling, which categorically stated that:
X x x There is overwhelming evidence or proof on record that the vendors listed in

Exhibit “HH,” with submarkings, are the previous owners of the parcel of land
mentioned in the same deed of sale and aside form the tax declarations covering
the same property (Exhibits “Q” to “T,” inclusive), the uncontroverted testimony
of Atty. Ruben Roxas establishes beyond any shadow of doubt that applicant’s
(referring to herein defendant-appellant) sellers/predecessors-in-interest are the
grandchildren, great grandchildren and great great grandchildren of the spouses
Lucio Petate and Maria Pobleta Petate, the former owners of the same property,
whose ownership is further bolstered by tax receipts showing payments of realty
taxes (Exhibits “U” to “GG,” inclusive, with submarkings).
Xxx
On the basis of the foregoing facts and circumstances, and considering that
applicant is a domestic corporation not otherwise disqualified from owning real
properties in the Philippines, this Court finds that applicant has satisfied all the
conditions/requirements essential to the grant of its application pursuant to the
provisions of the Land Registration Law, as amended, inspite of the opposition
filed by the Heirs of the late Doroteo Miranda. Hence, the grant of applicant’s
petition appears to be inevitable.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the instant petition for land registration
and, thus, places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-
04-006275 and containing an area of Two Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Ninety-Four (242,794) square meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other
proofs adduced in the name of the applicant, ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., with
principal office at No. 43 E. Rodriguez Ave. (España Extension), Quezon City,
Metro Manila.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
By granting the summary judgment, the trial court has in effect annulled its
former ruling based on a claim of possession and ownership of the same land for
more than thirty years without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The fact that the
respondents seek to nullify the original certificate of title issued to the petitioner
on the claim that the former were in possession of the same land for a number of
years, is already a clear indicium that a genuine issue of a material fact exists.
This, together with the failure of the respondents to show that there were no
genuine issues involved, should have been enough for the trial court to give the
motion for summary judgment, filed by respondents, scant consideration. Trial
courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only
when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.52
Based on the foregoing, this Court deems it necessary to delve briefly on the
nature of the action of quieting of title as applied in this case. This Court’s ruling
in Calacala, et al. v. Republic, et al.53 is instructive on this matter, thus:
To begin with, it bears emphasis that an action for quieting of title is essentially a
common law remedy grounded on equity. As we held in Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA:54
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a
common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty
with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its
purpose is to secure ‘x x x an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in
property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant
and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of
hostile claim.’ In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, ‘x x x not
only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to
said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of
both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the
property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems
best xxx.
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when,
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which
appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, a
cloud is thereby cast on the complainant’s title to real property or any interest
therein. The codal provision reads:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to
real property or any interest therein.
In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action
to quiet title, thus:
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the
real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in
possession of said property.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper, the plaintiff
must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on the real property subject
of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid. So it is that in Robles, et al. vs. CA,55 we ruled:
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or an equitable

title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.
Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud
on plaintiff’s title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to
or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
Respondents, in their Complaint, claim that they have become the owners in fee-
simple title of the subject land by occupation and possession under the provisions
of Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
Thus, it appears that the first requisite has been satisfied. Anent the second
requisite, respondents enumerated several facts that would tend to prove the
invalidity of the claim of the petitioner. All of these claims, which would
correspond to the two requisites for the quieting of title, are factual; and, as
discussed earlier, the petitioner interposed its objections and duly disputed the
said claims, thus, presenting genuine issues that can only be resolved through a
full-blown trial.
Anent the propriety of the filing of an action for the quieting of title, the
indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the decree of registration come into
question. Under Sec. 32 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The
decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence,
minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of
any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land
or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from
and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall
such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value
has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase
occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by
such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.
As borne out by the records and undisputed by the parties, OCT No. 0-660 of
petitioner was issued on August 29, 1997 pursuant to a Decree issued on August
20, 1997, while the complaint for the quieting of title in Civil Case No. TG-1784
was filed and docketed on March 5, 1998; hence, applying the above provisions, it
would seem that the period of one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of
registration has not elapsed for the review thereof. However, a closer
examination of the above provisions would clearly indicate that the action filed,
which was for quieting of title, was not the proper remedy.
Courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when
an application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within one year from the
issuance of the decree of registration.56 However, the basis of the aggrieved
party must be anchored solely on actual fraud. Shedding light on the matter is a
discussion presented in one of the recognized textbooks on property
registration,57 citing decisions of this Court, thus:
The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by

adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law
as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration.58
One of the remedies available to him is a petition for review. To avail of a petition
for review, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land;
(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of

registration;
© The petition must be filed within one year from the issuance of the decree by
the Land Registration Authority; and
(c) The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.59
A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained
under the Torrens system. An important feature of a certificate of title is its
finality. The proceedings whereby such a title is obtained are directed against all
persons, known or unknown, whether actually served with notice or not, and
includes all who have an interest in the land. If they do not appear and oppose
the registration of their own estate or interest in the property in the name of
another, judgment is rendered against them by default, and, in the absence of
fraud, such judgment is conclusive. If an interest in the land will not by itself
operate to vacate a decree of registration, a fortiori, fraud is not alone sufficient
to do so.60
As further pointed out in the same book,61 the petition for review must be filed
within one year from entry of the decree of registration. As written:
As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Authority
and period of one year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the
title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration case continues
to be under the control and sound discretion of the registration court.62 After the
lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject
to reopening or review.
Section 32 provides that a petition for review of the decree of registration may be
filed “not later than one year from and after the date of entry of such decree of
registration.” Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may at first blush
seem that the petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has
been entered. However, it has been ruled that the petition may be filed at any
time after the rendition of the court’s decision and before the expiration of one
year from the entry of the final decree of registration for, as noted in Rivera v.
Moran,63 there can be no possible reason requiring the complaining party to wait
until the final decree is entered before urging his claim for fraud.
The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a petition to re-open and
review the decree of registration refers to the decree of registration described in
Section 31, which decree is prepared and issued by the Land Registration
Administrator.64
The provision of Section 31 that every decree of registration shall bind the land,
quiet title thereto, and be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the
national government, and Sec. 32 that the decree shall not be reopened or
revised by reason of absence, minority or other disability or by any proceeding in
court, save only in cases of actual fraud and then only for one year from the entry
of the decree, must be understood as referring to final and unappealable decrees
of registration. A decision or, as it is sometimes called after entry, a decree of a
registration court, does not become final and unappealable until fifteen days after
the interested parties have been notified of its entry, and during that period may
be set aside by the trial judge on motion for new trial, upon any of the grounds
stated in the Rules of Court.65 An appeal from the decision of the trial court
prevents the judgment from becoming final until that decree is affirmed by the
judgment of the appellate court.66
A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and distinct from a
motion for new trial and the right to the remedy is not affected by the denial of
such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon which it may have been
presented. Thus, where petitioners acquired their interest in the land before any
final decree had been entered, the litigation was therefore in effect still pending
and, in these circumstances, they can hardly be considered innocent purchasers in
good faith.671avvphi1
Where the petition for review of a decree of registration is filed within the one-
year period from entry of the decree, it is error for the court to deny the petition
without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation of actual and extrinsic
fraud upon which the petition is predicated. The petitioner should be afforded an
opportunity to prove such allegation.68
In the present case, the one-year period before the Torrens title becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible has not yet expired; thus, a review of the decree
of registration would have been the appropriate remedy.
Based on the above disquisitions, the other issues raised by the petitioner are
necessarily rendered inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari of petitioner Eland Philippines,

Inc. is hereby GRANTED, and the decision dated February 28, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67417, which dismissed the appeal of petitioner
Eland Philippines, Inc. and affirmed the resolutions dated November 3, 1999 and
June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay City, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the resolutions dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006
of Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay City in Civil Case No. TG-1784 are hereby declared
NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124605. June 18, 1999]
ENRIQUITO SERNA and AMPARO RASCA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

SANTIAGO FONTANILLA, and RAFAELA RASING, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari before us seeks to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals,[1] which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court, Alaminos,
Pangasinan,[2] declaring respondents as the absolute an lawful owners of the
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 139 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Dionisio Fontanilla had four (4) children, namely, Rosa, Antonio, Jose and Lorenza,
all surnamed Fontanilla. Rosa married Estanislao Pajaro and their union produced
Fructoso and Paciencia. Lorenza married Alberto Rasca and they had a daughter,
petitioner Amparo Rasca (married to Enriquito Serna). Jose had a son, respondent
Santiago Fontanilla (married to Rafaela Rasing). Hence, the parties involved are
first cousins.
Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner and possessor of a parcel of land,
containing an area of twelve thousand five hundred eight square meters (12,508
sq. m.), located in Barangay Lucap, Alaminos, Pangasinan.[3]
In 1921, the property was declared in his name for taxation purposes. In the same
year, Turner Land Surveying Company surveyed the land for Dionisio Fontanilla,
with the agreement that the cost of survey would be paid upon approval of the
plan by the Bureau of Lands. On March 2, 1923, the Bureau of Lands approved the
survey plan.
In 1938, for failing to pay the survey costs and to prevent foreclosure, Dionisio
Fontanilla sold the land to his daughter, Rosa Fontanilla. In 1939, Rosa began
paying the real estate property tax thereon.
On August 21, 1955, for a consideration of one thousand seven hundred pesos
(P1,700.00), Rosa sold the land to her nephew, respondent Santiago Fontanilla,
evidenced by a notarized deed of absolute sale, signed by Rosa. The instrument
was not registered.
In 1955, respondents constructed their house of strong materials on the lot in

question, which was completed in 1957.
On December 16, 1957, Rosas heirs, Estanislao Pajaro and his two (2) children,
Fructoso and Paciencia, executed another deed of absolute sale over the same
land in favor of respondent Santiago Fontanilla.
In 1978, respondents went to the United States to visit their daughter Mila
Fontanilla Borillo. They stayed there until 1981.
On December 20, 1978, taking advantage of respondents’ absence from the

country, petitioners Enriquito and Amparo Serna applied to the land registration
court of Pangasinan for registration[4] of the said parcel of land in their name.
In 1979, the land registration court approved the application, and pursuant to
Decree N-176768, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued Original Certificate
of Title No. 139 to petitioners. On January 10, 1980, the title was transcribed in
the registration book of the register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
On May 27, 1981, respondents filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XIII,
Alaminos, Pangasinan, an action for reconveyance with damages, and sought the
annulment of O.C.T. No. 139.[5]
In the trial court, petitioners admitted that Dionisio Fontanilla originally owned
the land in dispute. However, they claimed that in 1978 they bought the property
for three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) from Lorenza Fontanilla-Rasca. Lorenza, in
turn, traced her title from her husband, Alberto Rasca.
Petitioner Amparo said that when Dionisio failed to pay the survey costs in 1921,
Turner Land Surveying Company took the property in question as payment for
services. Her father, Alberto Rasca, redeemed the property from Turner
evidenced by a deed of sale, which, however, Amparo could not produce in court.
When her father died, Santiago Fontanilla borrowed from her mother the deed
covering the transfer of the property, which Santiago did not return. She said that
the property was first declared in Alberto’s name for taxation purposes in 1951.
Later, the property was ceded to her.
After due trial and consideration of the evidence presented before the trial court
and in the land registration case, on June 5, 1992, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (herein respondents) spouses Santiago
Fontanilla and Rafaela Rasing, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
“(a) Declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute and legal owners of the land in
question particularly described and bounded and stated in paragraph two (2) of
the complaint;
“(b) Ordering the defendants to Transfer and Recover [sic] Original Certificate of
Title No. 139 to the plaintiffs;
“© Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 as

attorney’s fees;
“(d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
“€ And to pay the costs, without pronouncement as to moral damages.
“Done at Alaminos, Pangasinan, this 5th day of August, 1992.
“(t/s) Vivencio A. Bantugan[6]
From the decision of the trial court, both parties appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Respondents questioned the court a quo’s failure to grant their claim for
moral damages. On the other hand, petitioners claimed that the trial court
committed serious error in the appreciation of facts and application of law and
Jurisprudence.
On August 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the
trial court.
In a resolution dated February 26, 1996,[7] the Court of Appeals denied

petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners submit these issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the appealed
decision is supported by evidence; (2) whether or not the decision is in
accordance with law and Jurisprudence.[8]
The first issue is factual, which we cannot review on appeal.[9] However,

petitioners make an issue of the fact that the judge who penned the decision was
not the one who presided over the proceedings.
We have ruled in People vs. Rayray,[10] that the fact that the judge who heard
the evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the
decision constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions,
and does not per se render his decision void. While it is true that the trial Judge
who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or
falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a
judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just
decision. For a judge who was not present during the trial can rely on the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision.
Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process.[11]
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon us, and we will not normally disturb such factual findings. This is
because in an appeal by certiorari to this Court, only questions of law may be
raised.[12] And for a question to be one of law it must involve no examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.[13]
To reiterate the distinction between the two types of questions: there is a
question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when
the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts.[14]
Petitioners claim ownership of the land based on the deed of sale executed by
Turner Land Surveying Co. in favor of Alberto Rasca, which, however, they failed
to present in court. The truth or falsity of this claim is a question of fact, which, as
aforesaid, is not reviewable in this appeal.
On the other hand, respondents proved that they were enjoying open, continuous
and adverse possession of the property for more than sixty (60) years tacking in
the possession of their predecessors in interest, Dionisio Fontanilla and Rosa
Pajaro. As early as 1921, Dionisio Fontanilla was in adverse possession and paying
taxes over the land. Rosa in turn, paid taxes for the first time in 1939,[15] while
respondents began paying taxes in 1967.[16] They had their residential house
built in 1955, which was completed in 1957. In 1980, Santiago executed a tenancy
agreement[17] with Sixto Fontanilla. Until 1984, Santiago paid the taxes together
with his tenant Sixto.
Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property of the
declarant,[18] tax declarations and receipts can be strong evidence of ownership
of land when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for
prescription.[19]
Going to the second issue that the appellate court’s decision is not supported by
law and Jurisprudence, we find this to be vague and without merit as well.
At the time material hereto, registration of untitled land was pursuant to Act No.
496, as amended. Later, Presidential Decree 1529, the Property Registration
Decree, amended and codified laws relative to registration of property.
Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final
and incontrovertible until the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final
decree.”[20] After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible
and no longer subject to reopening or review.
However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is
recognized by law[21] as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a
decree of registration.
The fraud contemplated by the law is actual and extrinsic fraud, which includes an
intentional omission of a fact required by law. For fraud to Justify a review of a
decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have
not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their
opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of
a decree of registration.[22]
An action based on implied on constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. This
means that petitioners should have enforced the trust within ten (10) years from
the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the
property.”[23] Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place from
the issuance of the certificate of title because registration of real property is
considered a ‘constructive notice to all persons’ and it shall be counted ‘from the
time of such registering, filing or entering.[24]
In the present case, respondents came to know of the fraud in securing title to
the land sometime after its registration, however, an innocent purchaser for value
had not acquired the property. Extrinsic fraud attended the application for the
land registration. It was filed when respondents were out of the country and they
had no way of finding out that petitioners applied for a title under their name.
Fortunately, respondents’ action for reconveyance was timely, as it was filed

within ten (10) years from the issuance of the torrens title over the property.[25]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit. We
AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
39922.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
B. ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
Sec. 53. Presentation of owner’s duplicate upon entry of new certificate. No
voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the
owner’s duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases
expressly provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown.
The production of the owner’s duplicate certificate, whenever any voluntary

instrument is presented for registration, shall be conclusive authority from the
registered owner to the Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument, and the new
certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon the registered owner and upon
all persons claiming under him, in favor of every purchaser for value and in good
faith.
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and
equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however,
to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. After the entry
of the decree of registration on the original petition or application, any subsequent
registration procured by the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title,
or a forged deed or other instrument, shall be null and void. (PD 1529)
Sec. 96. Against whom action filed. If such action is brought to recover for loss or
damage or for deprivation of land or of any estate or interest therein arising
wholly through fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or misfeasance of the court
personnel, Register of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in
the performance of their respective duties, the action shall be brought against the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land is situated and the
National Treasurer as defendants. But if such action is brought to recover for loss
or damage or for deprivation of land or of any interest therein arising through
fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or misfeasance of person other than court
personnel, the Register of Deeds, his deputy or other employees of the Registry,
such action shall be brought against the Register of Deeds, the National Treasurer
and other person or persons, as co-defendants. It shall be the duty of the Solicitor
General in person or by representative to appear and to defend all such suits with
the aid of the fiscal of the province or city where the land lies: Provided, however,
that nothing in this Decree shall be construed to deprive the plaintiff of any right
of action which he may have against any person for such loss or damage or
deprivation without joining the National Treasurer as party defendant. In every
action filed against the Assurance Fund, the court shall consider the report of the
Commissioner of Land Registration.
G.R. No. 193787 April 7, 2014

SPOUSES JOSE C. ROQUE AND BEATRIZ DELA CRUZ ROQUE, with deceased Jose C.
Roque represented by his substitute heir JOVETTE ROQUE-LIBREA, Petitioners,
Vs.
MA. PAMELA P. AGUADO, FRUCTUOSO C. SABUG, JR., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES (NCCP), represented by its Secretary General
SHARON ROSE JOY RUIZ-DUREMDES, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP),
represented by Branch Manager EVELYN M. MONTERO, ATTY. MARIO S.P. DIAZ, in
his Official Capacity as Register of Deeds for Rizal, Morong Branch, and CECILIO U.
PULAN, in his Official Capacity as Sheriff, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Binangonan, Rizal, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 12,
2010 and the Resolution3 dated September 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA G.R. CV No. 92113 which affirmed the Decision4 dated July 8, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69 (RTC) that dismissed Civil Case
Nos. 03-022 and 05-003 for reconveyance, annulment of sale, deed of real estate
mortgage, foreclosure and certificate of sale, and damages.
The Facts
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land with an area of 20,862 square
meters (sq. m.), located in Sitio Tagpos, Barangay Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal,
known as Lot 18089.5
On July 21, 1977, petitioners-spouses Jose C. Roque and Beatriz dela Cruz Roque
(Sps. Roque) and the original owners of the then unregistered Lot 18089 – namely,
Velia R. Rivero (Rivero), Magdalena Aguilar, Angela Gonzales, Herminia R.
Bernardo, Antonio Rivero, Araceli R. Victa, Leonor R. Topacio, and Augusto Rivero
(Rivero, et al.) – executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of Real Property6 (1977 Deed
of Conditional Sale) over a 1,231-sq. m. portion of Lot 18089 (subject portion) for a
consideration of ₱30,775.00. The parties agreed that Sps. Roque shall make an
initial payment of ₱15,387.50 upon signing, while the remaining balance of the
purchase price shall be payable upon the registration of Lot 18089, as well as the
segregation and the concomitant issuance of a separate title over the subject
portion in their names. After the deed’s execution, Sps. Roque took possession and
introduced improvements on the subject portion which they utilized as a balut
factory.7
On August 12, 1991, Fructuoso Sabug, Jr. (Sabug, Jr.), former Treasurer of the
National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP), applied for a free patent
over the entire Lot 18089 and was eventually issued Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. M-59558 in his name on October 21, 1991. On June 24, 1993, Sabug, Jr.
and Rivero, in her personal capacity and in representation of Rivero, et al., executed
a Joint Affidavit9 (1993 Joint Affidavit), acknowledging that the subject portion
belongs to Sps. Roque and expressed their willingness to segregate the same from
the entire area of Lot 18089.
On December 8, 1999, however, Sabug, Jr., through a Deed of Absolute Sale10

(1999 Deed of Absolute Sale), sold Lot 18089 to one Ma. Pamela P. Aguado
(Aguado) for ₱2,500,000.00, who, in turn, caused the cancellation of OCT No. M-
5955 and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-96692 dated
December 17, 199911 in her name.
Thereafter, Aguado obtained an ₱8,000,000.00 loan from the Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank) secured by a mortgage over Lot 18089.12 When she failed
to pay her loan obligation, Land Bank commenced extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings and eventually tendered the highest bid in the auction sale. Upon
Aguado’s failure to redeem the subject property, Land Bank consolidated its
ownership, and TCT No. M-11589513 was issued in its name on July 21, 2003.14
On June 16, 2003, Sps. Roque filed a complaint15 for reconveyance, annulment of
sale, deed of real estate mortgage, foreclosure, and certificate of sale, and damages
before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-022, against Aguado, Sabug, Jr.,
NCCP, Land Bank, the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal, and Sheriff Cecilio U.
Pulan, seeking to be declared as the true owners of the subject portion which had
been erroneously included in the sale between Aguado and Sabug, Jr., and,
subsequently, the mortgage to Land Bank, both covering Lot 18089 in its entirety.
In defense, NCCP and Sabug, Jr. denied any knowledge of the 1977 Deed of
Conditional Sale through which the subject portion had been purportedly conveyed
to Sps. Roque.16
For her part, Aguado raised the defense of an innocent purchaser for value as she
allegedly derived her title (through the 1999 Deed of Absolute Sale) from Sabug,
Jr., the registered owner in OCT No. M-5955, covering Lot 18089, which certificate
of title at the time of sale was free from any lien and/or encumbrances. She also
claimed that Sps. Roque’s cause of action had already prescribed because their
adverse claim was made only on April 21, 2003, or four (4) years from the date OCT
No. M-5955 was issued in Sabug, Jr.’s name on December 17, 1999.17
On the other hand, Land Bank averred that it had no knowledge of Sps. Roque’s
claim relative to the subject portion, considering that at the time the loan was taken
out, Lot 18089 in its entirety was registered in Aguado’s name and no lien and/or
encumbrance was annotated on her certificate of title.18
Meanwhile, on January 18, 2005, NCCP filed a separate complaint19 also for
declaration of nullity of documents and certificates of title and damages, docketed
as Civil Case No. 05-003. It claimed to be the real owner of Lot 18089 which it
supposedly acquired from Sabug, Jr. through an oral contract of sale20 in the early
part of 1998, followed by the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale on December 2,
1998 (1998 Deed of Absolute Sale).21 NCCP also alleged that in October of the
same year, it entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Pilipinas Norin
Construction Development Corporation (PNCDC), a company owned by Aguado’s
parents, for the development of its real properties, including Lot 18089, into a
subdivision project, and as such, turned over its copy of OCT No. M-5955 to
PNCDC.22 Upon knowledge of the purported sale of Lot 18089 to Aguado, Sabug,
Jr. denied the transaction and alleged forgery. Claiming that the Aguados23 and
PNCDC conspired to defraud NCCP, it prayed that PNCDC’s corporate veil be
pierced and that the Aguados be ordered to pay the amount of ₱38,092,002.00
representing the unrealized profit from the JVA.24 Moreover, NCCP averred that
Land Bank failed to exercise the diligence required to ascertain the true owners of
Lot 18089. Hence, it further prayed that: (a) all acts of ownership and dominion
over Lot 18089 that the bank might have done or caused to be done be declared
null and void; (b) it be declared the true and real owners of Lot 18089; and (c) the
Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal be ordered to cancel any and all certificates of
title covering the lot, and a new one be issued in its name.25 In its answer, Land
Bank reiterated its stance that Lot 18089 was used as collateral for the
₱8,000,000.00 loan obtained by the Countryside Rural Bank, Aguado, and one Bella
Palasaga. There being no lien and/ or encumbrance annotated on its certificate of
title, i.e., TCT No. M-115895, it cannot be held liable for NCCP’s claims. Thus, it
prayed for the dismissal of NCCP’s complaint.26
On September 7, 2005, Civil Case Nos. 02-022 and 05-003 were ordered
consolidated.27
The RTC Ruling
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision28 dated July 8, 2008,
dismissing the complaints of Sps. Roque and NCCP.
With respect to Sps. Roque’s complaint, the RTC found that the latter failed to
establish their ownership over the subject portion, considering the following: (a)
the supposed owners-vendors, i.e., Rivero, et al., who executed the 1977 Deed of
Conditional Sale, had no proof of their title over Lot 18089; (b) the 1977 Deed of
Conditional Sale was not registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds;29 (c)
the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is neither a deed of conveyance nor a transfer
document, as it only gives the holder the right to compel the supposed vendors to
execute a deed of absolute sale upon full payment of the consideration; (d) neither
Sps. Roque nor the alleged owners-vendors, i.e., Rivero, et al., have paid real
property taxes in relation to Lot 18089; and € Sps. Roque’s occupation of the
subject portion did not ripen into ownership that can be considered superior to the
ownership of Land Bank.30 Moreover, the RTC ruled that Sps. Roque’s action for
reconveyance had already prescribed, having been filed ten (10) years after the
issuance of OCT No. M-5955.31
On the other hand, regarding NCCP’s complaint, the RTC observed that while it
anchored its claim of ownership over Lot 18089 on the 1998 Deed of Absolute Sale,
the said deed was not annotated on OCT No. M-5955. Neither was any certificate
of title issued in its name nor did it take possession of Lot 18089 or paid the real
property taxes therefor. Hence, NCCP’s claim cannot prevail against Land Bank’s
title, which was adjudged by the RTC as an innocent purchaser for value. Also, the
RTC disregarded NCCP’s allegation that the signature of Sabug, Jr. on the 1999 Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of Aguado was forged because his signatures on both
instruments bear semblances of similarity and appear genuine. Besides, the
examiner from the National Bureau of Investigation, who purportedly found that
Sabug, Jr.’s signature thereon was spurious leading to the dismissal of a criminal
case against him, was not presented as a witness in the civil action.32
Finally, the RTC denied the parties’ respective claims for damages.33
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the foregoing RTC findings in a
Decision34 dated May 12, 2010. While Land Bank was not regarded as a
mortgagee/purchaser in good faith with respect to the subject portion considering
Sps. Roque’s possession thereof,35 the CA did not order its reconveyance or
segregation in the latter’s favor because of Sps. Roque’s failure to pay the
remaining balance of the purchase price. Hence, it only directed Land Bank to
respect Sps. Roque’s possession with the option to appropriate the improvements
introduced thereon upon payment of compensation.36
As regards NCCP, the CA found that it failed to establish its right over Lot 18089 for
the following reasons: (a) the sale to it of the lot by Sabug, Jr. was never registered;
and (b) there is no showing that it was in possession of Lot 18089 or any portion
thereof from 1998. Thus, as far as NCCP is concerned, Land Bank is a
mortgagee/purchaser in good faith.37
Aggrieved, both Sps. Roque38 and NCCP39 moved for reconsideration but were
denied by the CA in a Resolution40 dated September 15, 2010, prompting them to
seek further recourse before the Court.
The Issue Before the Court
The central issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in not ordering the
reconveyance of the subject portion in Sps. Roque’s favor.
Sps. Roque maintain that the CA erred in not declaring them as the lawful owners
of the subject portion despite having possessed the same since the execution of
the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale, sufficient for acquisitive prescription to set in in
their favor.41 To bolster their claim, they also point to the 1993 Joint Affidavit
whereby Sabug, Jr. and Rivero acknowledged their ownership thereof.42 Being the
first purchasers and in actual possession of the disputed portion, they assert that
they have a better right over the 1,231- sq. m. portion of Lot 18089 and, hence,
cannot be ousted therefrom by Land Bank, which was adjudged as a
ortgagee/purchaser in bad faith, pursuant to Article 1544 of the Civil Code.43
In opposition, Land Bank espouses that the instant petition should be dismissed for
raising questions of fact, in violation of the proscription under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court which allows only pure questions of law to be raised.44 Moreover, it
denied that ownership over the subject portion had been acquired by Sps. Roque
who admittedly failed to pay the remaining balance of the purchase price.45
Besides, Land Bank points out that Sps. Roque’s action for reconveyance had
already prescribed.46
Instead of traversing the arguments of Sps. Roque, NCCP, in its Comment47 dated
December 19, 2011, advanced its own case, arguing that the CA erred in holding
that it failed to establish its claimed ownership over Lot 18089 in its entirety.
Incidentally, NCCP’s appeal from the CA Decision dated May 12, 2010 was already
denied by the Court,48 and hence, will no longer be dealt with in this case.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The essence of an action for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property
which was wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name to its
rightful owner or to one with a better right.49 Thus, it is incumbent upon the
aggrieved party to show that he has a legal claim on the property superior to that
of the registered owner and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value.50
Sps. Roque claim that the subject portion covered by the 1977 Deed of Conditional
Sale between them and Rivero, et al. was wrongfully included in the certificates of
title covering Lot 18089, and, hence, must be segregated therefrom and their
ownership thereof be confirmed. The salient portions of the said deed state:
DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE OF REAL PROPERTY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
Xxxx
That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
SEVENTY FIVE PESOS (₱30,775.00), Philippine Currency, payable in the manner
hereinbelow specified, the VENDORS do hereby sell, transfer and convey unto the
VENDEE, or their heirs, executors, administrators, or assignors, that unsegregated
portion of the above lot, x x x.
That the aforesaid amount shall be paid in two installments, the first installment
which is in the amount of __________ (₱15,387.50) and the balance in the amount
of __________ (₱15,387.50), shall be paid as soon as the described portion of the
property shall have been registered under the Land Registration Act and a
Certificate of Title issued accordingly;
That as soon as the total amount of the property has been paid and the Certificate
of Title has been issued, an absolute deed of sale shall be executed accordingly;
X x x x51
Examining its provisions, the Court finds that the stipulation above-highlighted
shows that the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is actually in the nature of a contract
to sell and not one of sale contrary to Sps. Roque’s belief.52 In this relation, it has
been consistently ruled that where the seller promises to execute a deed of
absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the purchase
price, the contract is only a contract to sell even if their agreement is denominated
as a Deed of Conditional Sale,53 as in this case. This treatment stems from the legal
characterization of a contract to sell, that is, a bilateral contract whereby the
prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property
despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the subject
property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition
agreed upon, such as, the full payment of the purchase price.54 Elsewise stated, in
a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the vendor and is not to pass to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price.55 Explaining the subject matter
further, the Court, in Ursal v. CA,56 held that:
[I]n contracts to sell the obligation of the seller to sell becomes demandable only
upon the happening of the suspensive condition, that is, the full payment of the
purchase price by the buyer. It is only upon the existence of the contract of sale
that the seller becomes obligated to transfer the ownership of the thing sold to the
buyer. Prior to the existence of the contract of sale, the seller is not obligated to
transfer the ownership to the buyer, even if there is a contract to sell between
them.
Here, it is undisputed that Sps. Roque have not paid the final installment of the
purchase price.57 As such, the condition which would have triggered the parties’
obligation to enter into and thereby perfect a contract of sale in order to effectively
transfer the ownership of the subject portion from the sellers (i.e., Rivero et al.) to
the buyers (Sps. Roque) cannot be deemed to have been fulfilled. Consequently,
the latter cannot validly claim ownership over the subject portion even if they had
made an initial payment and even took possession of the same.58
The Court further notes that Sps. Roque did not even take any active steps to
protect their claim over the disputed portion. This remains evident from the
following circumstances appearing on record: (a) the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale
was never registered; (b) they did not seek the actual/physical segregation of the
disputed portion despite their knowledge of the fact that, as early as 1993, the
entire Lot 18089 was registered in Sabug, Jr.’s name under OCT No. M-5955; and
(c) while they signified their willingness to pay the balance of the purchase price,59
Sps. Roque neither compelled Rivero et al., and/or Sabug, Jr. to accept the same
nor did they consign any amount to the court, the proper application of which
would have effectively fulfilled their obligation to pay the purchase price.60
Instead, Sps. Roque waited 26 years, reckoned from the execution of the 1977 Deed
of Conditional Sale, to institute an action for reconveyance (in 2003), and only after
Lot 18089 was sold to Land Bank in the foreclosure sale and title thereto was
consolidated in its name. Thus, in view of the foregoing, Sabug, Jr. – as the
registered owner of Lot 18089 borne by the grant of his free patent application –
could validly convey said property in its entirety to Aguado who, in turn, mortgaged
the same to Land Bank. Besides, as aptly observed by the RTC, Sps. Roque failed to
establish that the parties who sold the property to them, i.e., Rivero, et al., were
indeed its true and lawful owners.61 In fine, Sps. Roque failed to establish any
superior right over the subject portion as against the registered owner of Lot
18089, i.e., Land Bank, thereby warranting the dismissal of their reconveyance
action, without prejudice to their right to seek damages against the vendors, i.e.,
Rivero et al.62 As applied in the case of Coronel v. CA:63
It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a conditional contract of

sale specially in cases where the subject property is sold by the owner not to the
party the seller contracted with, but to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a
contract to sell, there being no previous sale of the property, a third person buying
such property despite the fulfilment of the suspensive condition such as the full
payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith
and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property.
There is no double sale in such case.1âwphi1 Title to the property will transfer to
the buyer after registration because there is no defect in the owner-seller’s title
per se, but the latter, of course, may be sued for damages by the intending buyer.
(Emphasis supplied)
On the matter of double sales, suffice it to state that Sps. Roque’s reliance64 on
Article 154465 of the Civil Code has been misplaced since the contract they base
their claim of ownership on is, as earlier stated, a contract to sell, and not one of
sale. In Cheng v. Genato,66 the Court stated the circumstances which must concur
in order to determine the applicability of Article 1544, none of which are obtaining
in this case, viz.:
(a) The two (or more) sales transactions in issue must pertain to exactly the
same subject matter, and must be valid sales transactions;
(b) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each represent conflicting interests; and
© The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each have bought from the same seller.
Finally, regarding Sps. Roque’s claims of acquisitive prescription and

reimbursement for the value of the improvements they have introduced on the
subject property,67 it is keenly observed that none of the arguments therefor were
raised before the trial court or the CA.68 Accordingly, the Court applies the well-
settled rule that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this
would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice. In any event, such claims
appear to involve questions of fact which are generally prohibited under a Rule 45
petition.69
With the conclusions herein reached, the Court need not belabor on the other
points raised by the parties, and ultimately finds it proper to proceed with the
denial of the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 12, 2010 and the
Resolution dated September 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No.
92113 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EMMA VER REYES VS MONTEMAYOR

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision[1] dated 20 May 2004, rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, which affirmed the Decision[2] dated 7 October 1996, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, of Imus, Cavite, in Civil Case No. 878-94,
dismissing the Complaint for Reconveyance of petitioners, spouses Emma Ver-
Reyes (Emma) and Ramon Reyes (Ramon), and declaring private respondent Irene
Montemayor as the owner of the subject property.
On 18 February 1994, petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint for

Reconveyance[3] against private respondent and the Register of Deeds of Cavite.
The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 878-94. Petitioners alleged in their
Complaint that they were the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-58459[4] situated in Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite
(subject property). They bought the subject property from the previous owner,
Marciano Cuevas (Marciano), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8
October 1976.[5] Thereafter, Marciano surrendered to petitioners the Owners
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-58459. Petitioners accordingly paid the taxes on the
sale of the subject property. However, they were unable to register the sale and
effect the transfer of the certificate of title to the subject property to their names.
Petitioners claimed that they had consistently paid the real estate taxes on the
subject property since their acquisition of the same in 1976 until 1991. In 1993,
when they went to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite to pay their real
estate taxes for the years 1992 and 1993, they were informed that the subject
property was sold by Marciano to private respondent on 10 November 1992, and
TCT No. T-369793 covering it was issued in private respondents name on 4 January
1993.
Petitioners asserted that private respondent was able to cause the issuance of TCT
No. T-369793 in her name by presenting a simulated and fictitious Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 10 November 1992. The signatures of the sellers, spouses Virginia
(Virginia) and Marciano Cuevas (spouses Cuevas), were forged in the said Deed.[6]
Hence, petitioners prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. T-369793 in private
respondents name; the issuance of a new certificate of title in petitioners names;
the award of nominal damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P100,000.00, by reason of the fraud employed by private respondent in having the
subject property registered in her name; the award of attorneys fees of not less
than P50,000; and the costs of suit. [7]
On 18 April 1994, private respondent filed with the RTC her Answer with
Counterclaim, wherein she denied petitioners allegation that the signatures of the
spouses Cuevas in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992 were forged.
Private respondent averred that the subject property was offered to her for sale,
but she did not disclose who actually made the offer. She discovered that there was
no adverse claim or any kind of encumbrance annotated on the certificate of title
of the spouses Cuevas covering the subject property. She had purchased the
subject property for value and in good faith and had been in possession thereof.
Private respondent insisted that she had a better title to the subject property, since
she was the first registrant of its sale. Private respondent thus prayed for the award
of moral damages in the amount of not less than P100,000.00 for the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, and besmirched reputation she suffered by reason of the
unjustified filing by petitioners of the case; the award of exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 for petitioners malicious filing of the case; and the award
of attorneys fees, and costs of suit. [8]
After the conduct of pre-trial, petitioners offered the testimonies of Marciano,

petitioner Emma, and Carolyn Moldez-Pitoy (Carolyn).
Marciano testified that he and his wife Virginia signed, on 8 October 1976, a Deed
of Absolute Sale covering the subject property in petitioner Emmas favor. He
denied selling the subject property to any other person, including private
respondent. Marciano, when shown the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November
1992, involving the same property, in private respondents favor, flatly stated that
the signatures found therein were not his or his wifes. [9]
Petitioner Emma personally confirmed that Marciano sold the subject property to
her in 1976. She had faithfully paid the real property taxes on it from 1976 until
1993, when she learned that it had been registered in private respondents name.
Upon examining the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992, supposedly
executed by the spouses Cuevas over the subject property in private respondents
favor, petitioner Emma observed that the spouses Cuevas signatures found therein
appeared to have been forged. She further claimed that after finding that the
subject property had been registered in private respondents name, she suffered
from nervousness and the aggravation of her rheumatoid arthritis. She was
compelled to engage the services of a lawyer to prosecute her case against private
respondent, which could cost her P100,000.00 or more. During the cross-
examination and re-direct examination, petitioner Emma explained that she had
not been able to register the subject property in her name because of her diabetes
and rheumatoid arthritis.[10]
Carolyn introduced herself as a Senior Document Examiner in the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), performing, among her other duties, handwriting analysis.
She admitted to preparing Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795, dated 18
July 1995.[11]
Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795, prepared by Carolyn, was submitted

by petitioners as evidence and was marked as Exhibit G.[12] They had obtained the
report for the purpose of finding out whether (1) the signatures of the spouses
Cuevas in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992, which they
purportedly executed in private respondents favor; and (2) the signature of
Escolastico Cuevas (Escolastico), Registrar of Deeds (ROD) of Cavite, in the Owners
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-58459, which Mariano surrendered to petitioners in
1972, were forged, by comparing them with the specimen signatures given by the
spouses Cuevas and ROD Escolastico. As stated in her Report, Carolyn found that:
1. The questioned and the standard/specimen signatures VIRGINIA M.

CUEVAS were not written by one and the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard /specimen signatures of ESCOLASTICO

CUEVAS were written by one and the same person.
3. No definite opinion on MARCIANO CUEVAS per above stated findings no.

3.[13]
On the other hand, private respondent offered the testimonies of Jaime Laudato
(Jaime) and Angelina Cortez (Angelina) in support of her version of events.
Jaime disclosed that it was Vice-Mayor Lauro Carungcong (Carungcong) of

Dasmarias who supposedly brokered the sale of the subject property, and who
instructed Jaime to verify with the Register of Deeds the existence of the Original
Copy of TCT No. T-58459, and to check for any encumbrances thereon. Three weeks
thereafter, Vice-Mayor Carungcong gave Jaime a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 10 November 1992 executed by the spouses Cuevas over the subject
property in private respondents favor, and directed Jaime to pay the obligatory
taxes and to register the subject property in private respondents name. On cross-
examination, Jaime admitted that he had never met nor was he acquainted with
either of the spouses Cuevas, the alleged vendors of the subject property.[14]
Angelina, employed as a Deeds Examiner in the Register of Deeds of Cavite, was

tasked, as part of her duties, to examine the documents related to the transfer of
the subject property in private respondents name before issuing the corresponding
certificate of title. However, she admitted during cross-examination that she was
not in a position to determine the authenticity of the documents presented to
her.[15]
The RTC rendered a Decision[16] in Civil Case No. 878-94 on 7 October 1996,
dismissing petitioners Complaint. The RTC found that the statements of their
witness Marciano and the results of Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795
issued by the NBI were contradictory. The RTC noted that Marciano testified that
the signatures found in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 October 1976 and the
Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Lupa[17] dated 15 June 1971 were Virginias; but the NBI
Report stated that the questioned and the standard/specimen signatures VIRGINIA
M. CUEVAS were not written by one and the same person. The RTC also gave little
credence to Marcianos denial of the sale of the subject property to private
respondent, on the ground that it was self-serving. Although the RTC did observe
differences in Marcianos signature in the Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Lupa dated 15
June 1971 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992, the trial court
dismissed the same as mere changes in a persons penmanship or signature that
could occur over the years. The RTC concluded that Civil Case No. 878-94 involved
a double sale of the subject property, wherein private respondent, an innocent
purchaser for value who first registered the property in her name, should be
adjudged to have a better title. The dispositive part of the RTC Decision dated 7
October 1996 reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing this case and declaring that
the true and lawful owner of the subject property as described in, and covered by,
TCT No. T-369793 is [herein respondent] Irene Montemayor.
All other claims of the parties are dismissed for inadequate substantiation.[18]
On 11 July 1997, petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, which challenged the afore-mentioned RTC judgment.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals an Urgent Manifestation[19] on 20 October 1998. According to them, they
obtained information that private respondents TCT No. T-369793 covering the
subject property had already been canceled; that a new certificate of title, TCT No.
T-784707, had been issued in the name of another person, Engracia Isip (Engracia);
and that a mortgage was constituted on the subject property. It began with private
respondent executing a Waiver and Quitclaim on 15 January 1998, wherein she
confessed to obtaining TCT No. T-369793 over the subject property in bad faith. In
the same document, private respondent recognized Engracias title to the subject
property and, thus, private respondent relinquished her right over it to Engracia
and the latters heirs and successors-in-interest. The Register of Deeds, impleaded
as a party in CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, canceled TCT No. T-369793 in private
respondents name; issued TCT No. T-784707 in the names of Engracias heirs; and
annotated on the latest certificate of title private respondents Waiver and
Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998.
On 18 November 1998, Perfecto Dumay-as, Deputy ROD of Trece Martires City,

Cavite, filed a Comment/Manifestation stating that Civil Case No. 878-94 was not
inscribed on private respondents TCT No. T-369793, since the case before the RTC
had already been resolved in favor of private respondent, thus, the presentation of
the owners original certificate of title along with the Waiver/Quitclaim, dated 15
January 1998, complied with the requirements of a voluntary transaction, justifying
the issuance of TCT No. T-784707 in the name of Engracias heirs.[20]
In its Decision dated 20 May 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, the Court of Appeals
denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision dated 7 October 1996 in
Civil Case No. 878-94. The appellate court held that petitioners were negligent in
failing to register the subject property in their names. And, just like the RTC, the
Court of Appeals declared Marcianos denial of the sale of the subject property in
private respondents favor as self-serving. The appellate court also pointed out that
the findings of the NBI were not definite as regards the alleged forgery of Marcianos
signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992. Lastly, the Court
of Appeals took judicial notice of the Comment/Manifestation of Perfecto Dumay-
as, Deputy ROD of Trece Martires City, Cavite, stating that Civil Case No. 878-94
was not inscribed on private respondents TCT No. T-369793, since the case before
the RTC had already been resolved in favor of private respondent, and the
acquisition by Engracias heirs of the subject property and TCT No. T-784707 over
the same was in good faith and, therefore, valid. The Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated October 7, 1996

of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite is hereby AFFIRMED.[21]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[22] of the foregoing Decision on 25

June 2004, which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution[23] dated 28
December 2004.
Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners made the following assignment of
errors:
I
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION

AND RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE BY SUSTAINING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
(BRANCH 21) OF CAVITE NOTWITHSTANDING THE CLEAR AND AUTHENTIC
RECORDS PRESENTED DURING TRIAL WHICH NEGATE AND CONTRADICT ITS
FINDINGS.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING

THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE BY SUSTAINING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
(BRANCH 21) OF CAVITE THEREBY IGNORING THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWING
THE PETITIONERS CLEAR RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
III
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN AFFIRMING THAT THE TRUE

AND LAWFUL OWNER OVER (sic) THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS DESCRIBED IN AND
COVERED BY TCT NO. T-369793 IS PRIVATE RESPONDENT IRENE MONTEMAYOR
DESPITE DOCUMENTARY AND TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.[24]
The fundamental issue for resolution of this Court in this case is who has better
right to the subject property. Before the Court can settle the same, it must first
determine the question of whether there was a double sale of the subject property
to both petitioners and private respondent, which is essentially a question of fact
requiring the Court to review, examine and evaluate, or weigh the probative value
of the evidence presented by the parties.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law shall be raised in
a Petition for Review before this Court. This rule, however, admits of certain
exceptions, namely, (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[25]
While as a general rule appellate courts do not usually disturb the lower court’s
findings of fact, unless said findings are not supported by or are totally devoid of or
inconsistent with the evidence on record, such finding must of necessity be
modified to conform with the evidence if the reviewing tribunal were to arrive at
the proper and just resolution of the controversy.[26] Thus, although the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive on this Court, which is not
a trier of facts, if said factual findings do not conform to the evidence on record,
this Court will not hesitate to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower
courts. In the instant case, the Court finds sufficient basis to deviate from the rule
since the extant evidence and prevailing law support a finding different from the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals and the RTC.[27]
Contrary to the findings of both the Court of Appeals and the RTC, the evidence on
record reveals that the spouses Cuevas, the previous owners of the subject
property, did not sell the said property to private respondent.
Marcianos explicit statements, made under oath before the trial court, that he did
not sell the subject property to anyone other than petitioners, and that the
signatures of the vendors appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10
November 1992 were not made by him and his wife, were not refuted. Private
respondents witness, Jaime, who was tasked to verify if there was no encumbrance
on the spouses Cuevas title to the subject property and to register it in private
respondents name after the alleged sale, admitted that he had never met the
supposed vendors of the subject property and, thus, could not competently testify
on whether it was actually the spouses Cuevas who executed the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 10 November 1992 in private respondents favor.
The pronouncement of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Marcianos
testimony was self-serving was utterly baseless. Neither the RTC nor the Court of
Appeals explained how Marcianos confirmation of the sale of the subject property
to petitioners, and his renunciation of the supposed sale of the same property to
private respondent, would accrue to Marcianos benefit. In giving such a testimony
in 1994, Marciano did not stand to gain back the subject property, which he had
already admitted to selling to petitioners 18 years prior, in 1976. On the other hand,
if Marciano falsely testified in open court that he and his wife did not sell the
subject property to private respondent, Marciano was risking prosecution for the
crime of perjury and liability for damages.
Additionally, although Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795 of the NBI did
not make a definitive finding on whether Marcianos purported signature on the
Deed of Sale dated 10 November 1992 was actually his or a forgery, the same
Report did unqualifiedly state that the signature that Virginia supposedly affixed to
the said Deed and the specimen signatures that she provided the NBI were not
written by the same person. Clearly, Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795
of the NBI established that her purported signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 10 November 1992 was forged.
It is true that a finding of forgery does not depend exclusively on the testimonies
of expert witnesses and that judges must use their own judgment, through an
independent examination of the questioned signature, in determining the
authenticity of the handwriting.[28] However, it is important to note that in this
case neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals made any finding through an
independent examination of Virginias signatures. The RTC gave credence to
Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795 of the NBI, but misread it as saying that
the two specimen signatures given by Virginia were not written by the same
person. Hence, Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795 of the NBI, finding that
the signature of Virginia in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992 is a
forgery, stands unquestioned.
That at least one of the signatures of the alleged vendors was indubitably
established as a forgery should have already raised serious doubts as to the
authenticity and validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992.
This, taken together with Marcianos candid and categorical testimony that he and
his wife did not sell the subject property to private respondent or executed any
deed to evidence the same, strongly militates against the existence of a second sale
of the subject property to private respondent.
In comparison, the circumstances surrounding the alleged second sale of the

subject property by the spouses Cuevas to private respondent are sketchy at best.
Vice Mayor Carungcong, who allegedly brokered the sale, had already died during
the pendency of the case and was not presented as witness. It was not made clear
whether he was duly authorized by the spouses Cuevas to broker such sale. Private
respondents witness, Jaime, did not claim to have been present during the
negotiations or in any part of the sale transaction, and had not even met the
spouses Cuevas. All he was able to testify on was that he verified with the Register
of Deeds that there was no encumbrance annotated on TCT No. T-58459 of the
spouses Cuevas, and eventually, he was able to cause the cancellation of TCT No.
T-58459 in the spouses Cuevas names and the issuance of TCT No. T-369793 in
private respondents name based on the questionable Deed of Absolute Sale dated
10 November 1992. Similarly ambiguous was how Jaime was able to have TCT No.
T-58459 of the spouses Cuevas cancelled when the Owners Duplicate Copy thereof
was with petitioners. When a certificate of title is cancelled, the owners duplicate
must also be surrendered to the Register of Deeds for cancellation, in accordance
with Section 53[29] of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, as amended.
Other than the forged Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992, private
respondents bad faith in registering the subject property in her name and her
dishonest scheme in appropriating the land for herself are further evidenced by her
own admissions in the Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998, which she
executed in favor of Engracias heirs, to wit[30]:
1. That, I am the holder of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 369793 covering

a parcel of land (Lot No. 6961-N) with an area of Forty One Thousand Eight
Hundred and Thirty Seven square meters (41, 837 sq. m.) situated in
Barangay Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite and declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 151746 Dasmarias, Cavite;
2. That, I know (sic) from the very beginning the dubiousness of my title to
the above described roperty (sic);
3. That, I have neither legal or equitable title to the said property as the
previous document (Deed of Conveyance) which is the basis of immediate
transfer from OCT No. 1002 is of questionable origin;
4. That, all documents relative to the issuance of subsequent transfer

certificate of titles including TCT No. 369793 under my name were in reality,
entirely simulated and fictitious;
5. That, I am recognizing the genuineness of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
769357-3911 in the name of ENGRACIA ISIP with Tax Declaration No. 151745,
which has been transferred to her heirs, APOLONIA I.R. ALCARAZ, ELIZA I.
REYES-GLORIA, VICTOR ISIP REYES and EPITACIO ISIP REYES, covered by TCT.
No. T-784707;
6. That, in the light of the foregoing, I do hereby waive and renounce, now
and forever, all claims of whatever nature to the said property in favor of the
said ENGRACIA ISIP, her heirs, executors, administrator or assigns.
Private respondents unabashed confession that she knew of the dubiousness of her
title from the very beginning is contrary to the concept of good faith. Good faith
consists in the belief of the possessors that the persons from whom they received
the thing are its rightful owners who could convey their title.[31]
Based on the foregoing, the preponderance of evidence in this case is in petitioners

favor. The spouses Cuevas only sold the subject property to them in 1976, and did
not sell it a second time to private respondent in 1992. As a consequence, the rules
on the double sale of registered property are not relevant herein. The Court then
proceeds to rule on the consequence of private respondents fraudulent
registration of the subject property in her name.
The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992, a forged deed, is a nullity and
conveys no title.[32] Paragraph 2 of Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
reads:
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and
equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however,
to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. After the entry
of the decree of registration on the original petition or application, any subsequent
registration procured by the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title,
or of a forged deed or other instrument, shall be null and void.
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the

registration of the property in said persons name would not be sufficient to vest in
him or her the title to the property. A certificate of title merely confirms or records
title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not
be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property.
Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be
an exercise in futility.[33] A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of
title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of
the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as
a mere trustee.[34]
It has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name is to bring an
ordinary action in an ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property
has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. It is one
thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one
devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to
enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed.[35] Reconveyance is all about the transfer of
the property, in this case the title thereto, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or
to one with a better right.[36] Evidently, petitioners, being the rightful owners of
the subject property, are entitled to the reconveyance of the title over the same.
However, as a further demonstration of private respondents continuing bad faith

and persistent effort to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the subject property,
private respondent executed the Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998, in
which she admitted that her title to the said property was void and, instead,
recognized the title of Engracia, who owned the subject property prior to the
spouses Cuevas. Pursuant to said Waiver and Quitclaim, the Register of Deeds
cancelled TCT No. T-369793 in private respondents name and issued TCT No. T-
784707 in the names of Engracias heirs.
It must be stressed that Engracia, whose TCT No. T-13105 over the subject property
was already cancelled on 26 April 1965, had never filed a case questioning the
cancellation of said certificate of title during her lifetime.[37] There is also nothing
in the records that would show that after Engracias death in 1981, her heirs
attempted to recover title to the subject property.
The Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998 deserves little evidentiary weight
as to the truth or veracity of the statements contained therein, considering that
they were unilaterally made by private respondent. There is no independent
evidence that all certificates of title subsequent to OCT No. 1002 covering the
subject property were simulated and fictitious. In fact, private respondent
contradicted herself by acknowledging in the very same document that Engracias
title, which was transferred to her heirs, was genuine. The only fact that said Waiver
and Quitclaim established was private respondents bad faith in having the subject
property registered in her name. For the Court to make such finding of bad faith on
private respondents part, it need not actually be true that all titles to the subject
property, prior to private respondents, were simulated and fictitious, only, private
respondent believed them to be so, but still persisted in acquiring and registering
in her name what she already knew was a dubious title.
What is apparent to this Court is that private respondent executed the Waiver and
Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998 so as to effect the transfer of the subject property
to third persons, i.e., Engracias heirs, and defeat any judgment granting the
petitioners the remedy of reconveyance of the subject property.
In connection therewith, this Court expresses its disfavor over the cavalier attitude
of the Register of Deeds of Cavite in canceling TCT No. T-369793 in private
respondents name and issuing TCT No. T-784707 in the names of Engracias heirs,
on the sole basis of the Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998, executed by
private respondent. The Register of Deeds of Cavite, who was a party to petitioners
case for reconveyance, and was undoubtedly aware of the issues involved in the
said case and the pendency of the same. Yet it blindly allowed the registration of
the alleged title to the subject property of Engracia and her heirs, in effect, reviving
a title that had already been cancelled way back in 1965, and disregarding all other
titles issued in between, based entirely on the unilateral claims of a self-confessed
fraud. Moreover, in placing its faith in the unsupported statements of the private
respondent, who had confessed to having acquired and registered the property in
bad faith, against the presumed good faith of the former owners, the Register of
Deeds acted in a manner that was highly irregular.
This having been said, an action for reconveyance is an action in personam available
to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens
system in anothers name. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property
has not passed to an innocent person for value.[38]
Engracias heirs cannot be considered innocent persons or persons who acquired

the subject property for value. Engracias heirs re-acquired the subject property by
virtue of the private respondents Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998.
That the said document was executed by private respondent, who admitted to
holding a dubious title to the subject property, should be sufficient to put Engracias
heirs on notice and to cause the latter to investigate the other transfers and titles
issued for the subject property. The Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998
also does not establish that the subject property was transferred to Engracias heirs
for value, it appearing to have been executed by private respondent in favor of
Engracias heirs without any consideration at all. Hence, the cancellation of TCT No.
T-369793 in private respondents name and the issuance of TCT No. T-784707 in the
names of Engracias heirs cannot bar the reconveyance of the subject property to
petitioners.
A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in
personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action.[39] The Court may deem
Engracias heirs as private respondents successors-in-interest, having acquired title
to the subject property through private respondent after the commencement of
petitioners action for reconveyance of the same property.
Since private respondents fraudulent registration of the subject property in her

name violated petitioners right to remain in peaceful possession of the subject
property, petitioners are entitled to nominal damages under Article 2221 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.
This Court finds that petitioners prayer for nominal damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 is proper and reasonable.
The award of attorneys fees is also in order because private respondent acted in
gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy petitioners plainly valid, just and
demandable claim.[40] Given the time spent on the present case, which lasted for
more than 15 years, the extent of services rendered by petitioners lawyers, the
benefits resulting in favor of the client, as well as said lawyers professional
standing, the award of P100,000.00 is proper.[41]
However, exemplary damages cannot be imposed in this case, where petitioners

only prayed for the award of nominal damages and attorneys fees, but not for
moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. Article 2229 of the Civil
Code imposes exemplary damages only under the following circumstances:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or

correction for public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision dated 20 May 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54517 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Register of Deeds is ORDERED to (1) CANCEL TCT No.
T-784707 over the subject property in the name of Engracias heirs, which was
derived, not in good faith or for value, but from the fraudulently procured TCT No.
T-369793 in private respondents name; and (2) ISSUE a new certificate of title over
the subject property in the name of petitioners, the rightful owners thereof. Private
respondent is ORDERED to PAY petitioners nominal damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000.00. Costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148147

FIRST DIVISION
JESSIE GASATAYA vs EDITHA MABASA

February 16, 2007
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
55055 which, in turn, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lanao del Norte, Branch 7.[2]
The facts follow.
Respondent Editha Mabasas father, Buenaventura Mabasa, was granted a

homestead patent on Lots 279, 272 and 972 located in Lala, Lanao del Norte.
Buenaventura Mabasa mortgaged these lots to secure a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Because of his failure to pay his
indebtedness, DBP foreclosed on the lots and sold them at public auction where it
emerged as the highest bidder. DBP then obtained titles to the lots: Lot 279 under
TCT No. T-2247 and consolidated Lots 272 and 972 under TCT No. T-2448.
When Buenaventura Mabasa died, respondents siblings authorized her to

negotiate with DBP for the repurchase of the lots. DBP allowed respondent to
reacquire the foreclosed properties through a deed of conditional sale for
P25,875.[3]
Subsequently, respondent entered into an agreement with petitioners father,

Sabas Gasataya, for the latter to assume payment of her obligation to DBP. They
further agreed that Sabas Gasataya would take possession of the lots for 20 years
and develop them into a fishpond. As consideration thereof, respondent received
P10,000 cash, in addition to the P25,000 that Sabas Gasataya had to pay DBP on
her behalf.
Upon representation by Sabas Gasataya that respondents obligation to DBP had
already been settled, they entered into another agreement denominated as Deed
of Sale of Fishpond Lands with Right to Repurchase.
Eight years after the execution of the above deed of sale with right to repurchase,
respondent discovered that Sabas Gasataya had stopped paying DBP. As a result,
DBP revoked her right to repurchase the subject lots.
DBP later on held a public auction of the properties where petitioner participated
and bid the highest price of P27,200. Eventually, he acquired titles to the lots for
which he was issued TCT No. T-11720 in lieu of TCT No. T-2447 (Lot 279) and TCT
No. T-11721 for TCT No. T-2448 (Lots 272 and 972).
Respondent then filed a complaint in the RTC for reconveyance of titles of lands
with damages[4] against petitioner and Sabas Gasataya (Gasatayas). She claimed
that the latter deliberately reneged on his commitment to pay DBP to: (1) revoke
her right to repurchase the lots under the deed of conditional sale and (2) subject
the properties to another public auction where petitioner could bid.
Petitioner and his father denied the allegations saying that the deed of conditional
sale assumed by the latter from respondent was rendered ineffective by DBPs
refusal to accept payments thereon.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent finding that the Gasatayas failed to
controvert her claim that they defrauded her just so petitioner could acquire the
lots at public auction.[5] According to the trial court, the Gasatayas failed to prove
that DBP indeed rejected payments from Sabas Gasataya. The trial court ruled:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent] and against

[the Gasatayas] ordering [them] to wit:
a. Ordering [petitioner] to reconvey to [respondent] TCT. No.[T-11720] and
TCT No. T-11721, both of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Lanao del
Norte, upon tender to and receipt by [petitioner] of the amount of
P37,200.00 Philippine money;
b. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds for the Province of Lanao del Norte to
procure and cause the transfer and registration of the aforesaid transfer
certificates of title in favor and in the name of herein [respondent] Editha S.
Mabasa;
c. Ordering [the Gasatayas] to cede, transfer and reconvey to [respondent]

the physical possession and occupancy of Lot 279, 272 and Lot 972as covered
by the aforesaid certificates of title;
d. Ordering [the Gasatayas] to pay [respondent] the sum of P5,000.00 for

attorneys fees; P5,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Ordering [the Gasatayas] to pay costs of this proceeding[s].
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner and his father appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTCs decision and
dismissed their appeal for lack of merit. The CA declared:
The contention of [respondent] that [the Gasatayas] deliberately chose not to pay
DBP as agreed, in order for them to acquire said properties in a fraudulent and
treacherous manner, was not fully controverted by [them]. [The Gasatayas] failed
to produce evidence to support their defenses.
Xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, [the Gasatayas] are in possession of said land[s] by virtue of a Deed of

Sale with a Right to Repurchase and not because the DBP granted it to them[T]o
facilitate their acquisition of the land in question, [they] deliberately defaulted in
the payment of the assumed obligation to the damage and prejudice of
[respondent]. Consequently, the lands in question were subjected to public bidding
wherein [petitioner] participated and eventually won[the Gasatayas] committed a
breach of trust amounting to fraud which would warrant an action for
reconveyance.[7]
Petitioner alone came to us via this appeal by certiorari seeking the reversal of the
CA decision.
Before us, petitioner contests the CA decision affirming the trial courts order to
reconvey his titles on the disputed lots to respondent who, according to him, is not
the owner thereof.
We affirm the CA.
Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the
person with a better right than the person under whose name said property was
erroneously registered.[8] While respondent is not the legal owner of the disputed
lots, she has a better right than petitioner to the contested lots on the following
grounds: first, the deed of conditional sale executed by DBP vested on her the right
to repurchase the lots and second, her right to repurchase them would have
subsisted had they (the Gasatayas) not defrauded her.
The trial courts findings, as affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and his father
deceived respondent to acquire the disputed lots bind us. Well-settled is the rule
that factual conclusions of the trial court deserve respect and become irrefutable
especially when affirmed by the CA.[9] Absent any evidence that the CA overlooked
salient matters that could justify a reversal of the outcome of this case, we decline
to disturb such factual conclusions.
Petitioner, however, insists that respondent had no right to the disputed lots since
the conditional sale agreement where such right was based had long been
cancelled by DBP. According to petitioner, a void and inexistent deed cannot
override his right as registered owner of the lots.
We disagree.
Petitioner cannot discredit the deed of conditional sale just so he can to keep his
titles to the lots. Petitioner should be reminded that DBP revoked respondents right
to repurchase the lots under said deed because of the deceitful maneuverings that
he and his father employed. If we were to sustain petitioners argument, then we
would, in effect, reward him for his misdeed.
Neither can this Court uphold petitioners contention that his titles are unsullied on
the mere fact that he purchased the properties at public auction. Fraud overthrows
the presumption that the public sale was attended with regularity. The public sale
did not vest petitioner with any valid title to the properties since it was but the
consequence of his and his fathers fraudulent schemes.
The registration of the properties in petitioners name did not obliterate the fact
that fraud preceded and facilitated such registration. Actual or positive fraud
proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of misrepresentation
of material facts,[10] which in this case was the conscious representation by
petitioners father (Sabas Gasataya) that respondents obligation to DBP had already
been settled. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is
obtained, to the prejudice of another.[11] Consequently, fraud is a ground for
reconveyance.[12]
Moreover, the law only protects an innocent purchaser for value and not one who
has knowledge of and participation in the employment of fraud. An innocent
purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in that same property, and who pays a
full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of
another persons claim.[13] Obviously, petitioner was not an innocent purchaser for
value.
As a final point, the Court takes significant note of the fact that respondents father
originally acquired the subject lots through homestead grant. Commonwealth Act
141 (Public Land Act) aims to confine and preserve to the homesteader and his kin
the homestead lots. We, therefore, agree with the CAs disquisition that courts
should lend a stout shoulder to help keep a homestead in the homesteaders family
for the stern reality cannot be belied that homesteaders and their families are
generally in the lower stratum of life and most likely, when they alienate the
homestead, it is out of dire necessity.[14] According to the CA, desperation does
not allow much of a choice, hence homesteaders and their kin should be given
every opportunity to repurchase their homestead.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55055
is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
4 YEAR PERIOD AND 10 YEAR PERIOD TO FILE ACTION
G.R. No. L-33261 September 30, 1987
LIWALUG AMEROL, MACATANTO AMEROL, TAIB AMEROL,

DIBARATUN AMEROL, DIBARATUN, MATABALAO, MINDALANO
DIBARATUN, DIPUNDUGUN MORO, and MANUCAO
MORO, petitioners,
vs.
MOLOK BAGUMBARAN, respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the then Court
of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, Branch III, Marawi City, in Civil Case No.
1354, entitled, "Molok Bagumbaran vs. Liwalug Amerol et al.," under
Republic Act No. 5400, "as only question of law is raised." 2
The only issue for resolution is the prescriptive period of an action for
reconveyance of real property which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered under the Torrens System in another's name. In other words,
what is the prescriptive period for the action to reconvey the title to real
property arising from an implied or constructive trust and, corrolarily
reference. The petitioners herein, defendants in the trial court, assert that
they have ten years to bring the action, while the respondent, plaintiff in the
court below, claims the prescriptive period is four years. The trial court
ruled tor the plaintiff, now respondent.
We reverse. We hold that the prescriptive period for such an action for
reconveyance, as this case, is ten years. The point of reference is, or the
ten-year prescriptive period commences to run from, the. date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the real property.
There is no issue as to the facts, this case having been elevated to this
Court, as aforestated, on purely a question of law. Be that as it may, in
order to satisfy constitutional requirements as well as to place the question
of law in proper perspective, there is need to state the facts of the case. On
this regard, the findings of the trial court would best serve the stated
purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
From the evidence submitted during the trial there is no dispute

concerning the fact relative to the Identity of the land in
litigation. It is commonly known as Lot No. 524, Pls-126 and
technically described and bounded in the sketch (Exh. "7 ").
This is the very tract of land alleged by the plaintiff to have been
forcibly entered into by the defendants and which plaintiff now
w&s to recover possession thereof. It has also been proven that
the same lot was covered by two free patent applications: — (l)
that of defendant Liwalug Datomanong (erroneously surnamed
Amerol) which he filed on the 4th day of September, 1953, and
(2) that of Molok Bagumbaran which was filed on December 27,
1954. There is also no question regarding the fact that as to
these two free patent applications, that of plaintiff Molok
Bagumbaran was given due course as a result of which Free
Patent No. V-19050 was issued on August 16,1955 by authority
of the President of the Philippines Ramon Magsaysay, by
Jaime Ferrer, Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and duly registered with the office of the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Lanao (now Lanao del Sur) in the mm
year whereupon Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 was duly
issued, owner's duplicate certificate having been furnished the
herein plaintiff.
This court is also inclined to believe that defendant Liwalug

Datomanong had never known of plaintiff's free patent
application on the land in question nor was he ever notified or
participated in the administrative proceedings relative to
plaintiff's free patent application. In the meantime, since the
date he purchased the land from Mandal Tondo, said defendant
has been and up to the present in con. tinuous occupation and
cultivation of the same. His co-defendants named in the
complaint are merely his tenants.
It is also incontrovertible fact that said defendant did not take

appropriate action to annul the patent and title of the plaintiff
within one year from issuance thereof and that the first step
taken by him to contest said patent and title was a formal
protest (Exh. "12", p. 408, Record) dated April 24, 1964, filed
before the Bureau of Lands after the lapse of Nine (9) long
years from the issuance of patent in favor of the plaintiff. The
second step he took was his counterclaim contained in his
answer to the complaint in the above entitled case, which
answer was filed with this court on December 4, 1964. In said
counterclaim, defendant reiterated his stand that plaintiff
secured patent on the land by means of deceit and fraud,
wherefore, defendant prayed that said title be annulled, or,
alternatively, plaintiff be ordered to reconvey the said land to
the said defendant Liwalug Datomanong.
First question to be resolved is whether or not the plaintiff is

guilty of fraud or misrepresentation in securing the Free Patent
No. V-19050 covering the land in question.
Upon a thorough examination of the evidence, proofs are

sufficient to support defendant's contention that plaintiff is guilty
of fraud and misrepresentation. In the first place, proofs are
abundant tending to show that since 1952 when Mandal Tando
transferred the land to said defendant, the latter occupied, took
possession thereof and cultivated the same continuously,
publicly, adversely against any claimant and in the concept of
owner up to the present; that said defendant had introduced
considerable improvements such as coconut and coffee
plantations and other fruit trees besides his farm house, a
mosque, cassava plantation and clearing and full cultivation of
the entire area. The fact of possession on the part of said
defendant has been attested to by competent and creditable
witnesses like Mandal Tando who conveyed the land to the
defendant; Hadji Sirad Gomandang, the barrio captain of
Montay, Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Hadji Rasol Maruhom and
Hadji Abdulcadir Pagayawan, both of Pialot, Malabang, Lanao
del Sur who are farmers and barrio-mates of said defendant;
and also Disomnong Dimna Macabuat, an employee in the
office of the District Land Officer at Marawi City who had
officially conducted occular inspection and investigation of the
premises in connection with the protest of said defendant found
thereon the above-mentioned improvements introduced by the
said defendant.
What is more, on or before filing his free patent application,

plaintiff knew that the land in question which was covered by
his free patent application was then actually occupied and
cultivated by defendant Liwalug Datomanong if not by Mandal
Tando, the original occupant. Be it remembered that Mandal
Tando had transferred to defendant Liwalug Datomanong
Twenty Four (24) hectares, more than eleven hectares of which
is (sic) outside the military reservation and designated as Lot
No. 524, Pls-126 and the rest which is in the southern portion
lies within the military reservation. Now, immediately adjacent
thereto on the south is the land claimed and occupied by the
herein plaintiff also consisting of Twenty Four (24) hectares but
wholly within the military reservation. It appears that plaintiff
declared this Twenty four hectares for the first time on October
24, 1950 for taxation purposes (Tax Declaration No. 1529,
Record) and stated in said tax declaration (Exhs. "8" and "8-A,"
p. 414, Record) regarding the boundaries that the adjacent
owner on the north is Mandal Tando. In other words, plaintiff
had expressly recognized the fact that Mandal Tando is an
adjacent land owner north of plaintiff's property. On February
19, 1951 herein plaintiff revised the above-stated tax
declaration and secured another (Tax Declaration No. 1794,
Exh. "9" and "9-A," p. 413, Record) and still plaintiff stated
therein that his boundary land owner on the north is Hadji Abdul
Gani. 3 [a.k.a.Liwalug Datomanong(Amerol)]. 4
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the aforequoted findings, very unequivocal to be sure, the

trial court denied the counterclaim of the defendants, now petitioners, for
the affirmative relief of reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Said
the court:
xxx xxx xxx
The patent of the plaintiff having been registered back in 1955

and in contemplation of law registration thereof is notice to the
whole world and yet defendant exerted no effort whatsoever
either to annul the title or institute proceedings for
reconveyance except in his counterclaim contained in his
answer to the complaint in this case at bar which answer and
counter-claim was filed on December 4, 1964, some nine long
years from the date of registration of the patent, defendant
unfortunately lost his right to reconveyance within the period of
four (4) years from the date of registration of said patent. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the dispositive portion of the assailed decision stated:
xxx xxx xxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows: (1) declaring the herein plaintiff the registered owner of
Lot No. 524, Pls-126 and sustaining and respecting the validity
of the plaintiff's Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 covering
the said land; (2) ordering the defendants to vacate the
premises of Lot No. 524; Pls-126 and deliver possession
thereof to the herein plaintiff under certain terms and conditions
herein below stated; (3) denying and hereby dismissing the
counterclaim of the herein defendants and consequently the
prayer to annul the title and/or for reconveyance of the land to
said defendant Liwalug Datomanong must Likewise be denied;
(4) that before plaintiff could take possession of said premises
he must reimburse defendant Liwalug Datomanong the total
sum of Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos and
Sixty-Two Centavos (P6,752.62) which he incurred for the
necessary and useful expenses on the land in question with the
right of said defendant to retain possession of the premises if
said reimbursement be not completely made. No
pronouncement as to costs. 6
xxx xxx xxx

Hence, this petition. 7
The petitioners in their Brief 8 assign the following two errors allegedly
committed by the trial court:
I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW TOTHE EFFECT

THAT PETITIONERS RIGHT OF ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE FOR
VIOLATION OF AN IMPLIED TRUST PRESCRIBED AFTER FOUR
YEARS FROM THE REGISTRATION OF THE PATENT OF
RESPONDENT.
II.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE INTRODUCTION OF

EVIDENCE AS BASIS IN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE FAIR MARKET
VALUE OF THE IMPROVEMENT INTRODUCED ON THE LAND IN
GOOD FAITH BY PETITIONERS INSTEAD OF BASING SUCH
ASSESSMENT UPON PURE AND SIMPLE GUESS WORKS AND WILD
ESTIMATIONS.
The first assignment of error is well-taken as adverted to at the outset.
Indubitably, the act of respondent in misrepresenting that he was in actual

possession and occupation of the property in question, obtaining a patent
and Original Certificate of Title No. P- 466 in his name, created an implied
trust in favor of the actual possessor of the said property. The Civil Code
provides:
ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or

fraud, the person obtaining it is by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes.
In this case, the land in question was patented and titled in respondent's
name by and through his false pretenses. Molok Bagumbaran fraudulently
misrepresented that he was the occupant and actual possessor of the land
in question when he was not because it was Liwalug Datomanong.
Bagumbaran falsely pretended that there was no prior applicant for a free
patent over the land but there was — Liwalug Datomanong. By such
fraudulent acts, Molok Bagumbaran is deemed to hold the title of the
property in trust and for the benefit of petitioner Liwalug Datomanong.
Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the
name of respondent, he, even being already the registered owner under
the Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law to reconvey the
subject property to Liwalug Datomanong. After all, the Torrens system was
not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or
misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith. Further, contrary to the
erroneous claim of the respondent, 9 reconveyance does not work to set
aside and put under review anew the findings of facts of the Bureau of
Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the
property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal
owner, 10 or to one with a better right. That is what reconveyance is all
about.
Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive

trust is not absolute. It is subject to extinctive prescription. 11 Happily, both
parties agree on this point. The seeming impediment however, is that while
the petitioners assert that the action prescribes in ten years, the respondent
avers that it does in only four years.
In support of his submission, the respondent invokes several cases. We

have examined the invocations and find them inapplicable. For instance,
the case of Fabian vs. Fabian, 12 relied on by the respondent, does not
square with the present case. In Fabian, the party who prayed for
reconveyance was not in actual possession and occupation of the property.
It was instead the party to whom title over the property had been issued
who occupied and possessed it. Further, the litigated property had been in
the adverse possession of the registered owner for well-nigh over twenty-
nine big years, hence, reconveyance had been irretrievably lost.
Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 13 is, likewise, inapplicable. In Miguel, the

actual occupant and possessor of the controverted parcel of land, after
having been enticed by Leonor Reyes, an ambulatory notary public, with
promise of help, engaged and retained the services of the latter to facilitate
the issuance of a patent for the said land in his (Miguel's) favor. Thus, there
existed between the parties a relationship very much akin to that of lawyer-
client and which is similarly fiduciary in character. But Reyes, inspite of his
compensation of one-fifth of the yearly produce of the property, still violated
the trust reposed on him and instead worked for the issuance of the patent
in the name of his own wife. So, after the demise of Leonor Reyes, the
property was fraudulently patented and titled in his widow's favor. The
reconveyance of the property was decreed by the Court based on "breach
of fiduciary relations and/or fraud." It was shown that the parties were
legally bound to each other by a bond of fiduciary trust, a bond lacking in
the case at bar.
Finally, the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals 14 can not be availed of
because the period of prescription was not there definitely and squarely
settled. In fact, Ramirez underscores a vacillation between the four-year
and the ten-year rule. There it was stated that "an action for relief on the
ground of fraud — to which class the remedy prayed for by Paguia belong
— scan only be brought within four years after accrual of the right of action,
or from the discovery of the fraud." If the decision just stayed pat on that
statement, there would be merit in the respondent's presentation. But
Ramirez continues: "(I)ndepedently, however, of the alleged fraud on the
part of Ramirez, the right to demand a reconveyance prescribes after 10
years from accrual of the cause of action, June 22, 1944, the date of
registration of the patent and of the issuance of OCT No. 282- A in his
name." 15
Significantly, the three cases cited by the respondent to buttress his

position and support the ruling of the trial court have a common
denominator, so to speak. The cause of action assailing the frauds
committed and impugning the Torrens titles issued in those cases, all
accrued prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code. The accrual of the
cause of action in Fabian was in 1928, in Miguel, February, 1950, and in
Ramirez, 1944. It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the
date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure
(Act No. 190) governed prescription. It provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited-Civil actions other than
for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the
following periods after the right of action accrues:
xxx xxx xxx

3. Within four years: x x x An action for relief on the ground of
fraud, but the right of action in such case shall not be deemed
to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or
constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the
corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article
1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten

years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must

perforce prescribed in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions
of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property. 16 The only discordant note,
it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, 17 which states that the prescriptive period
for a reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be
explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. 18 But in
Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3)
of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until
August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture,
that Article 1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have no
counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the
latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive
period for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under
false pretenses.
It is abundantly clear from all the foregoing that the action of petitioner
Datomanong for reconveyance, in the nature of a counterclaim interposed
in his Answer, filed on December 4, 1964, to the complaint for recovery of
possession instituted by the respondent, has not yet prescribed. Between
August 16, 1955, the date of reference, being the date of the issuance of
the Original Certificate of Title in the name of the respondent, and
December 4, 1964, when the period of prescription was interrupted by the
filing of the Answer cum Counterclaim, is less than ten years.
The respondent also interposed as a deterrent to reconveyance the

existence of a mortgage on the property. It is claimed by the respondent
that reconveyance would not be legally possible because the property
under litigation has already been mortgaged by him to the Development
Bank of the Philippines. 19 This claim is untenable otherwise the judgment
for reconveyance could be negated at the will of the holder of the title. By
the simple expedient of constituting a mortgage or other encumbrance on
the property, the remedy of reconveyance would become illusory. In the
instant case, the respondent being doubly in bad faith — for applying for
and obtaining a patent and the Original Certificate of Title therefor without
being in possession of the land and for mortgaging it to the Development
Bank knowing that his Original Certificate of Title was issued under false
pretenses — must alone suffer the consequences.
Besides, given the undisputed facts, we cannot consider the mortgage

contracted by the respondent in favor of the Development Bank of the
Philippines as valid and binding against petitioner Liwalug Datomanong. It
would be most unjust to saddle him, as owner of the land, with a mortgage
lien not of his own making and from which he derived no benefit
whatsoever. The consequences of the void mortgage must be left between
the mortgagor and the mortgagee. In no small measure the Development
Bank of the Philippines might even be faulted for not making the requisite
investigation on the possession of the land mortgaged.
Premises considered, we deemed it superfluous to rule on the second

assignment of error raised by the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated June 3,
1970 of the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur in Civil Case No.
1354 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
ORDERING the respondent to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No.
P-466 in favor of petitioner Liwalug Datomanong, free of any encumbrance.
Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO SANJORJO, namely, VICENTE SANJORJO,

MACARIA SANJORJO, DOMINGO SANJORJO, ALFREDO CASTRO, and
SPOUSES SANTOS AND LOLITA INOT, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
MANUEL Y. QUIJANO, namely, ROSA Q. LEDESMA, MILAGROS Q.
YULIONGSIU, ALAN P. QUIJANO AND GWENDOLYN P. ENRIQUEZ, and
VICENTE Z. GULBE, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised

Rules of Court of the Decision[1] dated February 17, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50246 and its Resolution[2] dated
October 12, 1999 denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
On August 29, 1988, Free Patent No. VII-4-2974 was issued to Alan P.
Quijano, married to Mila Matutina, over a parcel of land located in Antipolo,
Medellin, Cebu, with an area of 14,197 square meters identified as Lot 374,
Cadastre 374-D. Based on the said patent, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. OP-38221 was issued by the Register of Deeds to and in the
name of Alan P. Quijano on September 6, 1988.[3] On November 11, 1988,
Free Patent No. VII-4-3088 was issued to and in favor of Gwendolyn Q.
Enriquez, married to Eugenio G. Enriquez, over a parcel of land located in
Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, identified as Lot 379, Cadastre 374-D, with an
area of 6,640 square meters. Based on the said patent, OCT No. OP-
39847 was issued in her favor on February 11, 1989.[4]
In the meantime, Gwendolyn Enriquez filed an application for a free patent
over Lot 376 of Cadastre 374-D with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). The application was docketed as Free Patent
Application (F.P.A.) No. VII-4-3152. She also filed an application for a free
patent over Lot 378, docketed as F.P.A. No. VII-4-3152-A. However, the
heirs of Guillermo Sanjorjo, namely, Tranquilina, Pablo, Boir, Erlinda,
Josefina, Maria, Maximo, Isabel, Jose, Dario, Vicente, Noel, Albina,
Ramon, Domingo, Adriano and Celedonia, all surnamed Sanjorjo, filed a
protest/complaint with the DENR on May 22, 1991, praying for the
cancellation of Free Patent No. VII-4-2974, as well as Free Patent No. VII-
4-3088, and for the dismissal of the free patent applications over Lots 376
and 378.[5] The complaint was docketed as PENRO Claim No. PN 072231-
4, and was assigned to the Regional Executive Director for hearing and
decision.
The protestants/claimants alleged that the said parcels of land were

originally owned by Ananias Ursal but were exchanged for a parcel of land
located in San Remegio, Cebu, owned by their predecessor, Guillermo
Sanjorjo, married to Maria Ursal, and from whom they inherited the
property. They prayed that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and after hearing on the merits, it is

most respectfully prayed of this most Honorable Office to render judgment
ordering:
1. The cancellation of Free Patent Titles Nos. VII-4-2974 and VII-4-3088

issued to respondents Alan P. Quijano and Gwendolyn Quijano Enriquez
concerning Lot Nos. 374 and 379, respectively.
2. The cancellation of Free Patent Application Nos. VII-4-3152, VII-4-3152-

A, and VII-1-18277-I of respondents concerning Lot Nos. 376 and 378.
3. The return of possession and ownership of these lots to the

complainants/protestants who are the rightful owners by inheritance.
Protestants further pray for other relief, just and equitable, under the
premises.[6]
During the pre-trial conference of August 2, 1991, the protestants/claimants

manifested that they were withdrawing their protest/complaint. Thus, on
April 14, 1992, the Regional Executive Director rendered a
decision[7] giving due course to the applications. However, he ruled that
the free patents over Lots 374 and 379 could no longer be disturbed since
the complaint for the cancellation was filed more than one year from their
issuance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that the above-entitled administrative

case be dismissed and dropped from the records. It is further ordered that
the Free Patent Application of applicants-respondents over Lot Nos. 376
and 378 be given due course for being in the actual adverse and
continuous possession of the land in controversy. Patent/Titles already
issued and entered in the Registry Book in favor of applicants-respondents
on Lot Nos. 374 and 379 in 1988 and 1989 need not be disturbed anymore,
for failure to show evidence of actual fraud in the procurement of such
titles.[8]
On September 13, 1993, Vicente Sanjorjo, the heirs of Maximo Sanjorjo,

namely, Macaria Sanjorjo, Domingo Sanjorjo, Alfredo Castro, and the
Spouses Santos and Lolita Inot, herein petitioners, filed a complaint for
cancellation of titles under tax declarations and reconveyance of
possession of real property covering Lots 374, 376, 378 and 379 located in
Medellin, Cebu, against the private respondents, the heirs of Manuel
Quijano, namely, Rosa Q. Ledesma, Milagros Q. Yuliongsiu, Alan P.
Quijano and Gwendolyn P. Enriquez, and Vicente Gulbe. The petitioners
did not implead the rest of the heirs of Guillermo Sanjorjo, including his
daughter Tranquilina Sanjorjo, as parties-plaintiffs, and alleged, inter alia
3. That the plaintiffs are the owners of several parcels of land in Antipolo,
Medellin, Cebu, which are more particularly described as follows:
(a) Lot No. 374 with an area of 14,179 sq.m. and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 00718 in the name of PONCIANO DEMIAR and Tax
Declaration No. 01042 in the name of TRANQUILINA SANJORJO;
(b) Lot No. 376 with an area of 6,177 sq.m. and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 01038 in the name of MAURO SANJORJO;
(c) Lot No. 378 with an area of 3,201 sq.m. and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 01035 in the name of FLORENTINO SANJORJO;
(d) Lot No. 379 with an area of 6,640 sq.m. and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 00772 in the name of SANTOS INOT and Tax Declaration No. 01039
in the name of SABINIANO SANJORJO;
The said Tax Declarations are hereto attached and marked as Annexes A,
B, C, D, E and F, respectively, and made integral parts of this complaint;
4. That the aforestated lots originally belonged to the late MAXIMO

SANJORJO who died during World War II. His children MAURO,
FLORENTINO, SABINIANO, TRANQUILINA and RAYMUNDA, all
surnamed SANJORJO, inherited the said properties. They have also
passed away and the plaintiffs, who are the children of MAXIMO
SANJORJOs children are now the rightful heirs of the aforementioned
parcels of land;
5. That sometime in 1983, the parcels of land in question were leased to

MANUEL QUIJANO for a two (2) year period at the rate of P4,500.00 per
year. However, the lease was never paid for nor was possession of the
said properties ever returned to the plaintiffs, despite repeated demands on
QUIJANO to return the same;
6. That MANUEL QUIJANO died in 1987 and the herein defendants, the
heirs of MANUEL QUIJANO, divided among themselves the land belonging
to the plaintiffs. Titles and Tax Declarations were then issued on the said
lots in the name of the defendants, as follows:
(a) Lot No. 374 is now covered by OCT No. OP-38221 in the name of
defendant ALAN P. QUIJANO. A copy of the title is hereto attached and
marked as Annex G and made an integral part of this complaint;
(b) Lot No. 376 is now covered by Tax Declaration No. 10015 in the name
of MANUEL Y. QUIJANO married to FLAVIANA P. QUIJANO. A copy of
the said tax declaration is hereto attached and marked as Annex H and
made an integral part of this complaint;
(c) Lot No. 379 is now covered by OCT No. OP-39847 in the name of
GWENDOLYN Q. ENRIQUEZ. A copy of the title is hereto attached and
marked as Annex I and made an integral part of this complaint;
7. That the plaintiffs nor their ascendants have never sold, donated, or
mortgaged any of these lots in question to the defendants or their
ascendants;
8. That sometime in September 1991, the defendant ALAN QUIJANO

charged plaintiff ALFREDO CASTRO with QUALIFIED THEFT for allegedly
having stolen the coconuts on the properties in question. Subsequently, the
Municipal Court of Medellin acquitted CASTRO on the ground that he was
the real owner of the lot. It was only on that time that plaintiffs discovered
that defendants had already titled their lots. Furthermore, in 1992, the
herein plaintiffs were sued by the defendants for Quieting of Title, which
case they subsequently withdrew. This case made the plaintiffs realize that
all their properties had already been titled in defendants names;
9. That, at present, defendants have leased these lots to a certain

VICENTE GULBE, who is named as a defendant in this case. Plaintiffs also
demanded from defendant GULBE the return of their possession over
these lots but to no avail. The Certification to File Action from the barangay
captain of Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, is hereto attached and marked as
Annex J and made an integral part of this complaint;
10. That upon their discovery of defendants fraudulent acts, plaintiffs

demanded the return of their properties but the defendants have failed and
refused and continue to fail and refuse to do so.[9]
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered

in their favor:
(a) Ordering the cancellation of OCT Nos. OP-38221 and OP-39847 and
Tax Declaration No. 10015;
(b) Ordering the defendants to pay rentals to the plaintiffs in the amount
of P4,500.00 per year from 1983 up to the time the properties are returned
to the plaintiffs; and
(c) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs moral damages in the
amount of not less than P20,000.00.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other relief and remedies as this Court may
deem just and equitable under the premises.[10]
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of res judicata based on the decision of the Regional Executive
Director on April 14, 1992. They maintained that the decision of the
Regional Executive Director had become final and executory and, as such,
barred the petitioners action.
The petitioners opposed the motion. In their reply to such opposition, the
private respondents invoked another ground that the petitioners action was
barred by the issuance of OCT No. OP-38221 covering Lot 374 on August
29, 1988, and OCT No. OP-39847 covering Lot 379 on November 11,
1988.
On September 13, 1994, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the
complaint on the ground of res judicata. The petitioners appealed the order
to the CA.
We note that the petitioners limited the issues to the two titled lots, Lots 374
and 379, arguing that there can be no res judicata in this case because one
of its elements, i.e., that the former judgment is a judgment on the merits,
was lacking. The petitioners did not assail the trial courts order dismissing
the complaint insofar as Lots 376 and 378 are concerned. Moreover,
according to the petitioners, the April 14, 1992 Decision of the Regional
Executive Director was not a decision on the merits of the complaint, as
they had yet to prove their allegation of fraud as regards the said lots.
In its Decision promulgated on February 17, 1999, the appellate court

affirmed the assailed order of the trial court, albeit for a different
reason, i.e., prescription. Citing Section 32 of Presidential Decree No.
1529,[11] it held that the OCTs issued to the respondents on the basis of
their respective free patents became as indefeasible as one which was
judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
issuance of the patent. The CA did not deem it necessary to rule on the
issue of res judicata since it dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription.[12]
When their motion for reconsideration of the said decision of the CA was
denied,[13] the petitioners filed the instant petition for review, contending
that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 13, CEBU CITY, DATED SEPTEMBER 13, 1994.
PETITIONERS BEG THAT THIS PETITION BE GIVEN DUE COURSE IN

THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, [SINCE] THE DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, IF NOT CORRECTED, WOULD CAUSE
IRREPARABLE INJURY TO THE PREJUDICE OF HEREIN
PETITIONERS WHO ARE THE REAL OWNERS OF THE LOTS IN
QUESTION.[14]
The petitioners maintain that the appellate court erred in holding that their
action in Civil Case No. CEB 14580 was barred by the Decision dated April
14, 1992 of the DENR Regional Executive Director. They contend that the
latter decision is not a decision on its merits so as to bar their complaint.
We agree.
The elements of res judicata are the following: (1) the previous judgment
has become final; (2) the prior judgment was rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the first judgment
was made on the merits; and (4) there was substantial identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action, as between the prior and subsequent
actions.[15]
A judgment on the merits is one rendered after argument and investigation,

and when there is determination which party is right, as distinguished from
a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point, or by default and without trial.[16]
As gleaned from the decision of the DENR Regional Executive Director, he

dismissed the petitioners complaint for the cancellation of Free Patent Nos.
VII-4-2974 and VII-4-3088 on the ground that it was filed only on May 22,
1991, more than three years from the issuance of the said patents on
August 29, 1988 and November 11, 1988, respectively. In the said
decision, the Regional Executive Director declared that after the lapse of
one year from the issuance of patent and registry thereof in the Registry
Book of the Register of Deeds, Cebu Province, only the regular courts of
justice have jurisdiction on the matter of cancellation of title.[17] The
petitioners agreed with the Regional Executive Director and withdrew their
complaint, opting to file an appropriate action in court for the nullification of
the said patents and titles. Hence, the decision of the Regional Executive
Director was not a decision on the merits of the petitioners complaint.
On the second issue, we agree with the petitioners that their action against
the private respondents for the reconveyance of Lots 374 and 379, covered
by OCT No. OP-38221 issued on September 6, 1988 and OCT No. OP-
39847 issued on February 11, 1989, respectively, was not barred by
Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529, which reads:
SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.

The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of
absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments,
subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and
the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in
the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the
entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or any equivalent
phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.[18]
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the torrens title issued on the basis
of the free patents became as indefeasible as one which was judicially
secured upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance of the
patent.[19] The order or decision of the DENR granting an application for a
free patent can be reviewed only within one year thereafter, on the ground
of actual fraud via a petition for review in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
provided that no innocent purchaser for value has acquired the property or
any interest thereon. However, an aggrieved party may still file an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, which prescribes in
ten years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate of Title over the
property provided that the property has not been acquired by an innocent
purchaser for value. Thus:
The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree of registration
is no longer open to review or attack although its issuance is attended with
actual fraud. This does not mean, however, that the aggrieved party is
without a remedy at law. If the property has not yet passed to an innocent
purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is still available. The
decree becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one
(1) year from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
anothers name is to bring an ordinary action in court for reconveyance,
which is an action in personam and is always available as long as the
property has not passed to an innocent third party for value. If the property
has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy
is an action for damages. In this case, the disputed property is still
registered in the name of respondent Demetrio Caringal, so that petitioner
was correct in availing himself of the procedural remedy of
reconveyance.[20]
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property,

wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.[21] All that
must be alleged in the complaint are two (2) facts which, admitting them to
be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land,
namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and, (2) that the
defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same.[22] The body of the
pleading or complaint determines the nature of an action, not its title or
heading.[23] In their complaint, the petitioners clearly asserted that their
predecessors-in-interest have long been the absolute and exclusive owners
of the lots in question and that they were fraudulently deprived of
ownership thereof when the private respondents obtained free patents and
certificates of title in their names.[24] These allegations certainly measure
up to the requisite statement of facts to constitute an action for
reconveyance.
Article 1456 of the New Civil Code provides that a person acquiring
property through fraud becomes by operation of law a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. The presence of fraud
in this case created an implied trust in favor of the petitioners, giving them
the right to seek reconveyance of the property from the private
respondents. However, because of the trial courts dismissal order adverted
to above, the petitioners have been unable to prove their charges of fraud
and misrepresentation.
The petitioners action for reconveyance may not be said to have
prescribed, for, basing the present action on implied trust, the prescriptive
period is ten years.[25] The questioned titles were obtained on August 29,
1988 and November 11, 1988, in OCT Nos. OP-38221 and OP-39847,
respectively. The petitioners commenced their action for reconveyance on
September 13, 1993. Since the petitioners cause of action is based on
fraud, deemed to have taken place when the certificates of title were
issued,[26] the complaint filed on September 13, 1993 is, therefore, well
within the prescriptive period.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED.
Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 13, is
DIRECTED to reinstate the complaint insofar as Lots 374 and 379 are
concerned. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree
of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or
other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in
any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening
and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the
date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition
be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired
the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the
phrase “innocent purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by
such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud. (PD
1529)
Sec. 95. Action for compensation from funds. A person who, without negligence on
his part, sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest
therein in consequence of the bringing of the land under the operation of the
Torrens system of arising after original registration of land, through fraud or in
consequence of any error, omission, mistake or misdescription in any certificate of
title or in any entry or memorandum in the registration book, and who by the
provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of
any law from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the estate or
interest therein, may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the
recovery of damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund.
G.R. No. L-21362 November 29, 1968
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LOURDES GASPAR BAUTISTA, THE DIRECTOR OF THE LANDS and
THE NATIONAL TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-
appellees.
Jesus A. Avanceña for plaintiff-appellant.

Lourdes Gaspar Bautista in her own behalf as defendant-appellee.
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio Torres, Solicitor Francisco J. Bautista
and Special Attorney Daniel G. Florida for defendants-appelles Director of
Lands, et al.
FERNANDO, J.:
The question this appeal from a judgment of a lower court presents is one
that possesses both novelty and significance. It is this: What is the right, if
any, of a creditor which previously satisfied its claim by foreclosing
extrajudicially on a mortgage executed by the debtor, whose title was
thereafter nullified in a judicial proceeding where she was not brought in as
a party?
As creditor, the Development Bank of the Philippines now appellant, filed a

complaint against one of its debtors, Lourdes Gaspar Bautista, now
appellee, for the recovery of a sum of money representing the unpaid
mortgage indebtedness, which previously had been wiped out with the
creditor bank acquiring the title of the mortgaged property in an extrajudicial
sale. Thereafter, the title was nullified in a judicial proceeding, the land in
question being adjudged as belonging to another claimant, without,
however, such debtor, as above noted, having been cited to appear in such
court action.
The Development Bank was unsuccessful, the lower court being of the
view that with the due process requirement thus flagrantly disregarded,
since she was not a party in such action where her title was set aside, such
a judgment could in no wise be binding on her and be the source of a claim
by the appellant bank. The complaint was thus dismissed by the lower
court, then presided by Judge, now Justice, Magno Gatmaitan of the Court
of Appeals. Hence, this appeal by appellant bank.
Such dismissal is in accordance with law. There is no occasion for us to

repudiate the lower court.
From the very statement of facts in the brief for appellant bank, the
following appears: "On or before May 31, 1949, the defendant-appellee,
Lourdes Gaspar Bautista, who shall hereafter be referred to as Bautista,
applied to the Government for the sale favor of a parcel of land with an
area of 12 has., 44 ares, and 22 centares, located at Bo. Barbara, San
Jose, Nueva Ecija. After proper investigation, Sales Patent no. V-132
covering said property was issued in her favor on June 1, 1949 (Exh. A-1)
by the Director of Lands. Sales Patent No. V-132 was registered in the
office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija pursuant to Section 122 of
Act 496 on June 3, 1949 (Exh. A), as a result of which Original Certificate
of Title No. P-389 was issued in her favor."1
How the loan was contracted by now appellee Bautista was therein set
forth. Thus: "On July 16, 1949, Bautista applied for a loan with the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor in interest of the
plaintiff-appellee Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), offering as
security the parcel of land covered by O.C.T. No. P-389. Aside from her
certificate of title, Bautista also submitted to the RFC other documents to
show her ownership and possession of the land in question, namely, Tax
Declaration No. 5153 (Exh. A-4) in her name and the blueprint plan of the
land. On the basis of the documents mentioned and the appraisal of the
property by its appraiser, the RFC approved a loan of P4,000.00 in favor of
Bautista. On July 16, 1949, Bautista executed the mortgage contract over
the property covered by O.C.T. No. P-389 and the promissory note for
P4,000.00 in favor of RFC (Exhs. C and C-1), after which the proceeds of
the loan were released."2
The satisfaction of the mortgage debt with the acquisition of the title to such
property by appellant Bank, by virtue of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale,
and such title losing its validity in view of a court proceeding, where
however, appellee Bautista, was not made a party, was next taken up in
the brief of plaintiff-appellant. Thus: "Bautista failed to pay the amortization
on the loan so that the RFC took steps to foreclose the mortgage extra-
judicially under Act 3135, as amended. In the ensuing auction sale
conducted by the sheriff of Nueva Ecija on June 27, 1951, the RFC
acquired the mortgaged property as the highest bidder (Exh. D). On the
date of the sale, the total obligation of Bautista with the RFC was
P4,858.48 (Exh. I). On July 21, 1952, upon failure of Bautista to redeem the
property within the one (1) year period as provided bylaw, plaintiff-appellant
RFC consolidated its ownership thereon (Exhs. E and E-I). On July 26,
1952, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija cancelled O.C.T. No. P-389
and replaced it with T.C.T. No. NT-12108 in the name of the RFC (Exhs. F
and F-1). On or about this time, however, an action (Civil Case No. 870)
was filed by Rufino Ramos and Juan Ramos in the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the RFC (as successor in interest of Bautista) claiming ownership of
the land in question and seeking the annulment of T.C.T. No. 2336 in the
name of the Government, O.C.T. No. P-389 in the name of Bautista and
T.C.TG. No. NT-12108 in the name of the RFC. A decision thereon was
rendered on June 27, 1955 (Exhs. G, G-1, and G-3) whereby the
aformentioned certificates of title were declared null and void."3
Why the complaint had to be dismissed was explained thus in the decision
now on appeal: "The Court after examining the proofs, is constrained to
sustain her on that; it will really appear that she had never been placed
within the jurisdiction of the Nueva Ecija Court; as the action there was one
to annual the title, it was an action strictly in personam, if that was the case
as it was, the judgment there could not in any way bind Lourdes who had
not acquired in said decision in any way for what only happened is that as
to the mortgage, the Bank foreclosed, and then sold unto Conrada and
when the title had been annulled, the Bank reimbursed Conrada; stated
otherwise, the annulment of Lourdes' title was a proceeding ex parte as far
as she was concerned and could not bind her at all; and her mortgage was
foreclosed an the Bank realized on it, when the Bank afterwards
acquiesced in the annulment of the title and took it upon itself to reimburse
Conrada, the Bank was acting on its own peril because it could not have by
that, bound Lourdes at all."4
As stated at the outset, the decision must be affirmed. The fundamental

due process requirement having been disregarded, appellee Bautista could
not in any wise be made to suffer, whether directly or indirectly, from the
effects of such decision. After appellant bank had acquired her title by such
extrajudicial foreclosure sale and thus, through its own act, seen to it that
her obligation had been satisfied, it could not thereafter, seek to revive the
same on the allegation that the title in question was subsequently annulled,
considering that she was not made a party on the occasion of such
nullification.
If it were otherwise, then the cardinal requirement that no party should be

made to suffer in person or property without being given a hearing would
be brushed aside. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court
whenever such a question arises in a series of decisions is that a denial of
due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of
the government the impress of nullity.5
A recent decision, Macabingkil v. Yatco,6 possesses relevance. "A 1957

decision, Cruzcosa v. Concepcion, is even more illuminating in so far as
the availability of the remedy sought is concerned. In the language of this
Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes: 'The petition is clearly
meritorious. Petitioners were conclusively found by the Court of Appeals to
be co-owners of the building in question. Having an interest therein, they
should have been made parties to the ejectment proceedings to give them
a chance to protect their rights: and not having been made parties thereto,
they are not bound and can not be affected by the judgment rendered
therein against their co-owner Catalino Cruzcosa. Jr. ....' Two due process
cases deal specifically with a writ of execution that could not validly be
enforced against a party who was not given his day in court, Sicat v.
Reyes, and Hamoy v. Batingoplo. According to the former: 'The above
agreement, which served as basis for the ejectment of Alipio Sicat, cannot
be binding and conclusive upon the latter, who is not a party to the case.
Indeed, that order, as well as the writ of execution, cannot legally be
enforced against Alipio Sicat for the simple reason that he was not given
his day in court.' From the latter: 'The issue raised in the motion of Rangar
is not involved in the appeal for it concerns a right which he claims over the
property which has not so far been litigated for the reason that he was not
made a party to the case either as plaintiff for a defendant. He only came to
know of the litigation when he was forced out of the property by the sheriff,
and so he filed the present motion to be heard and prove his title to the
property. This he has the right to do as the most expeditious manner to
protect his interest instead of filing a separate action which generally is
long, tedious and protracted.'"
Reinforcement to the above conclusion comes from a codal provision.

According to the Civil Code:7 "The vendor shall not be obliged to make
good the proper warranty, unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at
the instance of the vendee. "While not directly in point, the principle on
which the above requirement is based sustains the decision of the lower
court. In effect, appellant bank would hold appellee Bautista liable for the
warranty on her title, its annullment having the same effect as that of an
eviction. In such a case, it is wisely provided by the Civil Code that appellee
Bautista, as vendor, should have been summoned and given the
opportunity to defend herself. In view of her being denied her day in court, it
would to be respected, that she is not "obliged to made good the proper
warranty."
In the suit before the lower court, the Director of Lands and the National
Treasurer of the Philippines were likewise made defendants by appellant
bank because of its belief that if no right existed as against appellee
Bautista, recovery could be had from the Assurance Fund. Such a belief
finds no support in the applicable, law, which allows recovery only upon a
showing that there be no negligence on the part of the party sustaining any
loss or damage or being deprived of any land or interest therein by the
operation of the Land Registration Act.8This certainly is not the case here,
plaintiff-appellant being solely responsible for the light in which it now finds
itself. Accordingly, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of the
Philippines are likewise exempt from any liability.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
the Development Bank of the Philippines.
OTHER REMEDIES
Section101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the
officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines. (CA 141)
CAWIS VS CERILLES
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the 17 February 2005 Decision[2] and the 6
September 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 66685. In its 17 February 2005 Decision, the appellate court affirmed the 3
November 1999 Resolution[4] of Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City (trial court), which dismissed the complaint filed by Vicente Cawis, Pedro
Baclangen, Feliza Domilies, Ivan Mandi-it, Domingo Cawis, and Gerard Libatique
(collectively petitioners). In its 6 September 2005 Resolution, the appellate court
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 23 September 1957, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), pursuant to Section 79[5] of the Public Land Act,[6] approved the sales
patent application of Jose V. Andrada (Andrada) for Lot No. 47 with an area of 1,339
square meters situated within Holy Ghost Hill Subdivision in Baguio City. Sales
Patent No. 1319 was issued to Andrada upon full payment of the purchase price of
the lot on 20 November 1968, as evidenced by O.R. No. 459651.[7]
On 4 August 1969, Republic Act No. 6099[8] took effect. It provided that subject to
certain conditions, parcels of land within the Holy Ghost Hill Subdivision, which
included Lot No. 47, would be sold to the actual occupants without the necessity
of a public bidding, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 730.[9]
Claiming to be the actual occupants referred to in R.A. No. 6099, petitioners

protested the sales patent awarded to Andrada. The Bureau of Lands denied their
protest on the ground that R.A. No. 6099, being of later passage, could no longer
affect the earlier award of sales patent to Andrada. Petitioners sought
reconsideration, but the Bureau of Lands denied it on 19 May 1987. Petitioners
failed to appeal the adverse decision of the Bureau of Lands to any higher
administrative authority or to the courts. Thus, the decision had attained
finality.[10]
Sometime in 1987, private respondent Ma. Edeliza S. Peralta (Peralta) purchased

Lot No. 47 from Andrada. On 28 October 1987, the Deputy Public Land Inspector,
in his final report of investigation,[11] found that neither Andrada nor Peralta had
constructed a residential house on the lot, which was required in the Order of
Award and set as a condition precedent for the issuance of the sales patent.
Apparently, it was Vicente Cawis, one of the petitioners, who had built a house on
Lot No. 47.
On 13 November 1987, Sales Patent No. 1319 was nonetheless transferred to

Peralta. In the Order for the Issuance of Patent,[12] the Assistant Director of Lands
verified the investigation conducted by the Land Inspector, whose report was fully
endorsed by the District Land Officer, that Peralta had complied with the
requirements of the law regarding the construction of improvements on the land
applied for. In the Order for Transfer of Sales Rights,[13] the Director of Lands
confirmed that before the transfer of the sales patent to Peralta, Andrada had
complied with the construction requirement. On 4 December 1987, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1604[14] was duly issued in Peraltas name.
On 8 September 1998, petitioners filed a complaint[15] before the trial court

alleging fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in the issuance of the sales patent and
the original certificate of title over Lot No. 47. They claimed they had interest in the
lot as qualified beneficiaries of R.A. No. 6099 who met the conditions prescribed in
R.A. No. 730. They argued that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6099, Andradas
sales patent was deemed cancelled and revoked in their favor.
In her answer with a motion to dismiss,[16] Peralta averred that petitioners have
no cause of action against her, that she obtained her title after compliance with the
legal requirements, that her title was issued more than ten years prior to the filing
of the complaint, that the action was a collateral attack on a title, and that even if
the action was a direct attack, petitioners were not the proper parties.
The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court issued a Resolution dated 3 November 1999 dismissing the
complaint filed by petitioners. The trial court held that reversion of title on the
ground of fraud must be initiated by the government through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). In its 13 January 2000 Order,[17] the trial court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Ruling of the Appellate Court

In its 17 February 2005 Decision, the appellate court affirmed the resolution of the
trial court. The appellate court explained that under Section 2[18] of R.A. No. 6099,
ownership of public land within the Holy Ghost Hill Subdivision was not
automatically conferred on petitioners as occupants. The appellate court stated
that petitioners must first apply for a sales patent in order to avail of the benefits
of the law. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that petitioners had no
standing to file a suit for annulment of Sales Patent No. 1319 and OCT No. P-1604.
It cited Section 101[19] of the Public Land Act, which provides that only the
government, through the OSG, could file an action for reversion. In its 6 September
2005 Resolution, the appellate court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The Issues
The twin issues raised by petitioners are (1) whether the actual occupants of parcels
of land covered by R.A. No. 6099, which includes Lot No. 47, have standing to
question the validity of the sales patent and the original certificate of title issued
over Lot No. 47; and (2) whether the suit for annulment of title allegedly issued
through fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, has prescribed.
The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.
Petitioners contend private respondent misrepresented that there was no

improvement on Lot No. 47 at the time she filed her sales patent application when
in fact, there were numerous improvements consisting of residential houses
erected by them. Petitioners argue neither private respondent nor her
predecessor-in-interest has introduced any improvement on Lot No. 47, which is a
condition precedent before she can be a qualified awardee. Petitioners take
exception to the rule that only the OSG is allowed to file a suit questioning the
validity of the sales patent and the original certificate of title. As to the second
issue, petitioners argue that since the sales patent and the original certificate of
title are void from the beginning, the complaint filed by petitioners cannot be
deemed to have prescribed.
In her Comment, private respondent asserts that petitioners have no personality
to question the validity of the sales patent and the original certificate of title issued
in her name. She maintains that only the government, through the OSG, may file
an action for reversion on the ground of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. As to
the second issue, private respondent claims that petitioners annulment suit has
prescribed pursuant to Section 32[20] of Presidential Decree No. 1529.[21]
At the outset, we must point out that petitioners complaint questioning the validity
of the sales patent and the original certificate of title over Lot No. 47 is, in reality,
a reversion suit. The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the
cancellation of the certificate of title and the resulting reversion of the land covered
by the title to the State. This is why an action for reversion is oftentimes designated
as an annulment suit or a cancellation suit.
Coming now to the first issue, Section 101 of the Public Land Act[22] clearly states:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the
officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Even assuming that private respondent indeed acquired title to Lot No. 47 in bad
faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings, pursuant to Section 101 of
the Public Land Act and our ruling in Alvarico v. Sola.[23] Private persons may not
bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling
a land patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis of the
patent, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public
domain.[24] Only the OSG or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since the
title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee.[25]
Similarly, in Urquiaga v. CA,[26] this Court held that there is no need to pass upon
any allegation of actual fraud in the acquisition of a title based on a sales patent.
Private persons have no right or interest over land considered public at the time
the sales application was filed. They have no personality to question the validity of
the title. We further stated that granting, for the sake of argument, that fraud was
committed in obtaining the title, it is the State, in a reversion case, which is the
proper party to file the necessary action.[27]
In this case, it is clear that Lot No. 47 was public land when Andrada filed the sales
patent application. Any subsequent action questioning the validity of the award of
sales patent on the ground of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation should thus be
initiated by the State. The State has not done so and thus, we have to uphold the
validity and regularity of the sales patent as well as the corresponding original
certificate of title issued based on the patent.
At any rate, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may directly resolve
the issue of alleged fraud in the acquisition of a sales patent although the action is
instituted by a private person. In this connection, the 19 May 1987 letter of the
Director of Lands to petitioner Vicente Cawis is instructive:
As to your allegation that the award in favor of applicant-respondent (Andrada)

should be cancelled as he failed to introduce improvements on the land, we find
the said contention to be untenable. Somewhere in your letter dated July 11, 1983,
you stated that you took possession of the lot in question in the early 1950s,
introduced improvements thereon, and resided therein continuously up to the
present. By your own admission, it would appear that you were the ones who made
it impossible for Mr. Andrada to take possession of the said lot and to improve the
same. This being the case, the failure of the applicant-respondent (Andrada) to
introduce improvements on the land in question is not attributable to him.
In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, we regret to inform you that we
cannot reconsider our position on this matter. It is further advised that you vacate
the premises and remove all your improvements thereon so that the applicant-
awardee (Andrada) can take immediate possession of the land in question.[28]
Clearly then, fraud cannot be imputed to Andrada. His supposed failure to

introduce improvements on Lot No. 47 is simply due to petitioners refusal to vacate
the lot. It appears from the factual finding of the Director of Lands that petitioners
are the ones in bad faith. Contrary to petitioners claim, R.A. No. 6099 did not
automatically confer on them ownership of the public land within Holy Ghost Hill
Subdivision. The law itself, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6099, provides that the occupants
must first apply for a sales patent in order to avail of the benefits of the law, thus:
SEC. 2. Except those contrary to the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Seven
Hundred and Thirty, all other provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered One
hundred and Forty-One governing the procedure of issuing titles shall apply in the
disposition of the parcels above-described to the beneficiaries of this Act.
The complaint filed by petitioners did not state that they had filed an application
for a sales patent over Lot No. 47. Even if it did, an application for a sales patent
could only create, at most, an inchoate right. Not being the real parties-in-interest,
petitioners have no personality to file the reversion suit in this case.
Consequently, the prescription issue pertaining to the action for reversion initiated
by petitioners who could not have successfully initiated the reversion suit in the
first place, is now moot.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. We AFFIRM the 17 February 2005
Decision and the 6 September 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 66685.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45202 September 11, 1980

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
Vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LANDOLINO ALPUERTO, PAZ ALPUERTO,
NORMA ALPUERTO, FRANCISCA ALPUERTO, in their capacity as heirs of PERPETUO
ALPUERTO, HENRY O. ANTONIO ANGELES, AUREA ANGELES, INDUSTRIAL
MARKETING & INVESTMENT CORP., LANDOLINO ALPUERTO, LUCILA UNLAYAO,
ARTEMIO CALUSIN, LUCIANO POTESTADES, ELPIDIO BANAGAN, LUZ OLIVEROS,
DIONISIO LLAMAS, ALICIA CAPARROS, CORAZON ALFUENTE, EMILIO CALIWARA,
ANDRES LARIEDO, LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSIONER and REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF QUEZON, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52323-
R, entitled Republic of the Philippines, vs. Landolino Alpuerto, et al., affirming the
order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon which dismissed the complaint for
annulment and cancellation of titles and reversion of lands filed by petitioner, as
well as from the resolution dated November 22, 1976 of the Court of Appeals,
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
This case involves Lot No. 7718 of the cadastral survey of Mauban, Quezon,
containing an area of 19,873,835 square meters, more or less.
On May 16, 1966, Perpetuo Alpuerto, now deceased, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon (Branch II), a motion to reopen Cadastral Case No. 97, LCR Cad.
Rec. No. 1555, and to admit his answer over Lot No. 7718 of the Mauban (Quezon)
cadastre. After trial, the lower court rendered its decision dated August 3, 1966,
adjudicating to said Perpetuo Alpuerto Lot No. 7718 together with its
improvements, and ordering the issuance in his favor of the corresponding decree
of registration. On September 22, 1966, the lower court issued an order for the
issuance of a decree of registration over the said lot, and pursuant thereto, the
Land Registration Commission issued Decree No. 127177 which was subsequently
transcribed in the Registration book of the Register of Deeds of Quezon on
November 18, 1969. This was the basis of the issuance of Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-13541 in favor of Perpetuo Alpuerto. Portions of the lot were subsequently
transferred to various persons who were issued their respective transfer
certificates of title, among whom are private respondents Henry O. Antonio
Angeles, Industrial Marketing & Investment Corporation, Landolino Alpuerto,
Artemio Calusin, Luciano Potestades, Alpidio Banagan, Dionisio Llamas, Corazon
Alpuente and Andres Laredo.
On September 26, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (pp. 78-80, rec.) of the decision dated August 3, 1966, on the
ground that the said decision was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation and
deceit. Then on March 14, 1967, Attys. Amado Aquino and Francisco Lopez, special
attorneys of the Office of the Solicitor General, filed, also for the Director of Lands,
a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial (pp. 82-87, rec.),
alleging that the cadastral case was improperly reopened despite the absence of
the necessary conditions for such reopening, and that the Director of Lands was
not duly notified of the hearing and therefore denied his day in court. Both these
motions were denied by the lower court on June 19, 1970. (Please note that no
copy of said order of denial is found in the record).
Before the issuance of the order of denial dated June 18, 1970, the Provincial Fiscal
of Quezon again filed on May 25, 1970 a motion for cancellation of titles and for
preliminary injunction (pp. 89-90, rec.), assailing the order for the issuance of the
decree of registration dated September 22, 1966 for being illegal, invalid and
without effect because it was issued when the decision of August 3, 1966 had not
yet become final and his timely motion for reconsideration was still pending. On
July 14, 1970, the Director of Lands, again through Attys. Aquino and Lopez, filed a
motion for reconsideration (pp. 91-92, rec.) of the order dated June 18, 1970 on
the ground that the same was issued on the wrong premise, i.e., that the decision
of the court had already become final and executory when in fact it had not. These
two motions were likewise denied by the court in its order of July 27, 1970 (Note:
no copy of said order in the records).
On April 6, 1971, the Solicitor General filed for the government a complaint for
annulment, cancellation of titles and for reversion of Lot No. 7718 of Cadastral
Survey of Mauban, Quezon to the State (pp. 96-100, rec.), on the ground that the
decision of the court dated August 3, 1966 adjudicating Lot No. 7718 to Perpetuo
Alpuerto, its order for the issuance of the decree of registration dated September
22, 1966, as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. 013541 and all the transfer
certificates of title derived therefrom, are all null and void and without legal effect
because the court had no jurisdiction to allocate the subject land, which is
inalienable.
On May 11, 1971, defendants Industrial Marketing and Investments Corporation,

Henry O. Antonio Angeles and Aurea Angeles filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint (pp. 103-105, rec.), alleging that the action is barred by a prior judgment
and that the court lacks jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit. Another
defendant, Andres Laredo, likewise on May 17, 1971, filed a motion for dismissal
of the complaint, based on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action
and that venue is improperly laid.
After hearing the motions for dismissal and the opposition thereto, the lower court,
on September 28, 1971, issued an order denying the motion to dismiss filed by
defendant Andres Laredo, but granting the motion to dismiss tied by defendants
Industrial Marketing and Investments Corporation, Henry O. Antonio Angeles and
Aurea Angeles and dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner.
Petitioner filed on October 29, 1971 a motion seeking to reconsider the lower
court’s order of dismissal (pp. 119-124, rec.) which, however, was denied by the
said court in an order dated December 24, 1971 (pp. 130-134, rec.). Consequently,
petitioner appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which, on August 25, 1976,
promulgated a decision (pp. 27-37, rec.), affirming the order of dismissal by the
lower court. Petitioner again filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
likewise denied (p. 38, rec.).
Forthwith, petitioner elevated the matter to US through the present petition, which
WE find to be meritorious.
In the first place, the land in question is not within the jurisdiction of the Director
of Lands but of the Director of Forestry. Although the Public Land Act vests upon
the Director of Lands, subject to the immediate control of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, direct executive control of the survey, classification,
lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the
lands of the public domain (Sec. 4, Commonwealth Act No. 141), the same law
explicitly states that timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws.
And the Forestry Law (Secs. 1814-1842, Revised Administrative Code, as amended)
now vests in the Director of Forestry (now Director of Forest Development under
P.D. No. 705) the jurisdiction and authority over forest or timberland.
As held in the case of Mejia Vda. De Alfafara vs. Mapa, et al. (95 Phil. 125) wherein
WE upheld the findings of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources thus:
“Where the land covered by the homestead application of petitioner was still
within the forest zone or under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry, the
Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of said land under the provisions of
the Public Land Law, and the petitioner acquired no right to the land.” It follows
that “if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by
oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the
Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public
forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become
the owner of the land illegally included” (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503;
Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769).
The patent or title thus issued is void at law, since the officer who issued it had no
authority to do so (Republic vs. de la Cruz, 67 SCRA, 221).
Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may be ordered cancelled

(Republic vs. Animas, et al., supra), and the cancellation may be pursued through
an ordinary action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of
the land registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter. And if there was no such jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does
not apply. For it is a well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar
to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur; (1) it must be a final
judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity
of subject matter and Identity of cause of action (Municipality of Daet vs. CA, 93
SCRA 503; Mendoza vs. Arrieta, et al., 91 SCRA 113). Certainly, one of the essential
requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the subject matter, is absent in this case.
The argument that the subject land being a timberland is urged only now, is not
well-taken. So also is the contention that it is not enough for the land to be within
a timberland in the absence of evidence showing conclusively that it is covered by
natural growth of trees of such considerable extent to bring it within the definition
of forest land. This is because the Director of Forestry was not notified of the
proceedings. Under the law, the Director of Forestry is the official clothed with
jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management,
reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all forests and forest resources
(Sec. 1816, Revised Administrative Code, as amended).
In any case, even granting that the said official was negligent, the doctrine of
estoppel cannot operate against the State. “It is a well-settled rule in our
jurisdiction that the Republic or its government is usually not estopped by mistake
or error on the part of its officials or agents (Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. CA, 73 SCRA
166, 186; Republic vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238, 244; Luciano vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769).
Consequently, the State may still seek the cancellation of the title issued to
Perpetuo Alpuerto and his successors-interest pursuant to Section 101 of the Public
Land Act. Such title has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be
invoked against the State (Republic vs. Animas, supra).
WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT PETITION IS GRANTED, THE DECISION OF THE

RESPONDENT COURT DATED AUGUST 25, 1976 AND ITS RESOLUTION OF
NOVEMBER 22, 1976 ARE HEREBY VACATED AND SET ASIDE. LET THIS CASE BE
REMANDED TO THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.
ANNULMENT OF JUDGEMENT
RULE 47, RULES OF COURT
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS
OR FINAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
Section 1. Coverage.chanrobles virtual law library
This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment.chanrobles virtual law library
The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.chanrobles virtual law library
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.chanrobles virtual law
library
Sec. 3. Period for filing action.chanrobles virtual law library
If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four (4) years from its
discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or
estoppel.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 4. Filing and contents of petition.chanrobles virtual law library
The action shall be commenced by filing a verified petition alleging therein with
particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those
supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the
case may be.chanrobles virtual law library
The petition shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies, together with sufficient
copies corresponding to the number of respondents. A certified true copy of the
judgment or final order or resolution shall be attached to the original copy of the
petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner.chanrobles
virtual law library
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition affidavits of witnesses
or documents supporting the cause of action or defense and a sworn certification
that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state
the status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
thereof within five (5) days therefrom.chanrobles virtual law library chan robles
virtual law library
Sec. 5. Action by the court.chanrobles virtual law library
Should the court find no substantial merit in the petition, the same may be
dismissed outright with specific reasons for such dismissal.chanrobles virtual law
library
Should prima facie merit be found in the petition, the same shall be given due
course and summons shall be served on the respondent.chanrobles virtual law
library
Sec. 6. Procedure.chanrobles virtual law library
The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary,
the reception of the evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge
of a Regional Trial Court.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 7. Effect of judgment.chanrobles virtual law library
A judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or
resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original
action being refiled in the proper court. However, where the judgment or final
order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on
motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had
been granted therein.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 8. Suspension of prescriptive period.chanrobles virtual law library
The prescriptive period for the refiling of the aforesaid original action shall be
deemed suspended from the filing of such original action until the finality of the
judgment of annulment. However, the prescriptive period shall not be suspended
where the extrinsic fraud is attributable to the plaintiff in the original
action.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 9. Relief available.chanrobles virtual law library
The judgment of annulment may include the award of damages, attorney’s fees
and other relief.chanrobles virtual law library
If the questioned judgment or final order or resolution had already been executed,
the court may issue such orders of restitution or other relief as justice and equity
may warrant under the circumstances.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial

Courts.chanrobles virtual law library
An action to annul a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed
in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. It shall be treated as
an ordinary civil action and sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule shall be applicable
thereto.
ESTATE OF THE LATE G.R. No. 168661

JESUS S. YUJUICO, represented
by ADMINISTRATORS
BENEDICTO V. YUJUICO and Present:
EDILBERTO V. YUJUICO; and
AUGUSTO Y. CARPIO, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
- versus - NACHURA,* JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Promulgated:

and the COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents. October 26, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and confirmation
of her title over a parcel of land with an area of 17,343 square meters covered by
plan (LRC) Psu-964 located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (now
Paraaque City), in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 22. The
application was docketed LRC Case No. N-8239. The application was opposed by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the Director of Lands, and by
Mercedes Dizon, a private party.Both oppositions were stricken from the records
since the opposition of Dizon was filed after the expiration of the period given by
the court, and the opposition of the Director of Lands was filed after the entry of
the order of general default. After considering the evidence, the trial court
rendered its April 26, 1974 Decision. The dispositive portion reads:
____________________________
* As per September 3, 2007 raffle.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicant, Fermina Castro,
of legal age, single, Filipino and a resident of 1515 F. Agoncillo St.,
Corner J. Escoda St., Ermita, Manila, the true and absolute owner of
the land applied for situated in the Municipality of Paraaque, Province
of Rizal, with an area of 17,343 square meters and covered by plan
(LRC) Psu-964 and orders the registration of said parcel of land in her
name with her aforementioned personal circumstances.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, let the corresponding
order for the issuance of the decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The Director of Lands and Mercedes Dizon did not appeal from the adverse decision
of the Pasig-Rizal CFI. Thus, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration
became final, and Decree No. N-150912 was issued by the Land Registration
Commission (LRC).[2] Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10215 was issued in the
name of Fermina Castro by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal on May
29, 1974.[3]
The land was then sold to Jesus S. Yujuico, and OCT No. 10215 was
cancelled. On May 31, 1974,[4] Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 445863 was
issued in Yujuicos name, who subdivided the land into two lots. TCT No.
446386[5] over Lot 1 was issued in his name, while TCT No. S-29361[6] over Lot 2 was
issued in the name of petitioner Augusto Y. Carpio.
Annotations at the back of TCT No. 446386 show that Yujuico had, at one time or
another, mortgaged the lot to the Philippine Investments System Organization
(PISO) and Citibank, N.A. Annotations in the title of petitioner Carpio reveal the lot
was mortgaged in favor of Private Development Corporation (PDC), Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and then Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to secure
various loans.
Sometime in 1977, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1085 entitled Conveying the Land
Reclaimed in the Foreshore and Offshore of the Manila Bay (The Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road Project) as Property of the Public Estates Authority as well as Rights
and Interests with Assumptions of Obligations in the Reclamation Contract Covering
Areas of the Manila Bay between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (1977) was issued.
Land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay became the
properties of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government corporation that
undertook the reclamation of lands or the acquisition of reclaimed
lands. On January 13, 1989, OCT No. SP 02 was issued in favor of PEA. The PEA also
acquired ownership of other parcels of land along the Manila Bay coast, some of
which were subsequently sold to the Manila Bay Development Corporation
(MBDC), which in turn leased portions to Uniwide Holdings, Inc.[7]
The PEA undertook the construction of the Manila Coastal Road. As this was being
planned, Yujuico and Carpio discovered that a verification survey they
commissioned showed that the road directly overlapped their property, and that
they owned a portion of the land sold by the PEA to the MBDC.
On July 24, 1996, Yujuico and Carpio filed before the Paraaque City Regional
Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for the Removal of Cloud and Annulment of Title with
Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0317 against the PEA. On May 15, 1998 the
parties entered into a compromise agreement approved by the trial court in a
Resolution dated May 18, 1998. On June 17, 1998, the parties executed a Deed of
Exchange of Real Property, pursuant to the compromise agreement, where the PEA
property with an area of 1.4007 hectares would be conveyed to Jesus Yujuico and
petitioner Carpio in exchange for their property with a combined area of 1.7343
hectares.
On July 31, 1998, the incumbent PEA General Manager, Carlos P. Doble, informed
the OSG that the new PEA board and management had reviewed the compromise
agreement and had decided to defer its implementation and hold it in abeyance
following the view of the former PEA General Manager, Atty. Arsenio Yulo, Jr., that
the compromise agreement did not reflect a condition of the previous PEA Board,
requiring the approval of the Office of the President.The new PEA management
then filed a petition for relief from the resolution approving the compromise
agreement on the ground of mistake and excusable negligence.
The petition was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it was filed
out of time and that the allegation of mistake and excusable negligence lacked basis.
The PEA fared no better in the Court of Appeals (CA), as the petition was
dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fees and for lack of merit.
The matter was raised to the Supreme Court in Public Estates Authority v.
Yujuico[8] but PEAs petition was denied, upholding the trial courts dismissal of the
petition for relief for having been filed out of time. The allegation of fraud in the
titling of the subject property in the name of Fermina Castro was not taken up by the
Court.
On June 8, 2001, in a Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of Decree No. N-

150912 and its Derivative Titles, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Fermina
Castro, Jesus S. Yujuico, August Y. Carpio and the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque
City docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0222, filed with the Paraaque City RTC,
respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, alleged that when the
land registered to Castro was surveyed by Engr. H. Obreto on August 3, 1972 and
subsequently approved by the LRC on April 23, 1973, the land was still a portion of
Manila Bay as evidenced by Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243, Surveys to 1980;
1st Ed/. January 9/61: Revised 80-11-2; that Roman Mataverde, the then OIC of the
Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands, informed the OIC of the Legal Division that
[w]hen projected on Cadastral Maps CM 14 deg. 13 N-120 deg, 59E, Sec.2-A of
Paraaque Cadastre (Cad. 299), (LRC) Psu-964 falls inside Manila Bay, outside Cad.
299; that then Acting Regional Lands Director Narciso V. Villapando issued a Report
dated November 15, 1973 stating that plan (LRC) Psu-964 is a portion
of Manila Bay; that then Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Director of Lands, Ernesto C.
Mendiola, submitted his Comment and Recommendation re: Application for
Registration of Title of FERMINA CASTRO, LRC Case No. N-8239, dated Dec. 1, 1977,
praying that the instant registration case be dismissed; and that Fermina Castro
had no registrable rights over the property.
More significantly, respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land
was still underwater, it could not be registered in the name of Fermina
Castro. Second, the land registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
inalienable lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to
Fermina Castro was void. And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived
from a void title, were likewise void.[9]
On September 13, 2001, Yujuico and Carpio filed a Motion to Dismiss (With
Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens),[10]on the grounds that: (1) the cause of
action was barred by prior judgment; (2) the claim had been waived, abandoned,
or otherwise extinguished; (3) a condition precedent for the filing of the complaint
was not complied with; and (4) the complaint was not verified and the certification
against forum shopping was not duly executed by the plaintiff or principal party.
On November 27, 2001, respondent Republic filed an Opposition[11] to the

motion to dismiss to which defendants filed a Reply[12] on January 14, 2002,
reiterating the grounds for the motion to dismiss.
In the August 7, 2002 Order of the RTC,[13] Civil Case No. 01-0222 was
dismissed. The trial court stated that the matter had already been decided in LRC
Case No. N-8239, and that after 28 years without being contested, the case had
already become final and executory. The trial court also found that the OSG had
participated in the LRC case, and could have questioned the validity of the decision
but did not. Civil Case No. 01-0222 was thus found barred by prior judgment.
On appeal to the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76212, respondent Republic alleged

that the trial court erred in disregarding that appellant had evidence to prove that
the subject parcel of land used to be foreshore land of the Manila Bay and that the
trial court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 01-0222 on the ground of res judicata.[14]
The CA observed that shores are properties of the public domain intended for
public use and, therefore, not registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title
does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon
the registrant.
Further, according to the appellate court res judicata does not apply to lands
of public domain, nor does possession of the land automatically divest the land of
its public character.
The appellate court explained that rulings of the Supreme Court have made
exceptions in cases where the findings of the Director of Lands and the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) were conflicting as to the true
nature of the land in as much as reversion efforts pertaining foreshore lands are
embued with public interest.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby

GRANTED. The appealed Order dated August 7, 2002 of the trial court
in Civil Case No. 01-0222 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is hereby REMANDED to said court for further proceedings and a full-
blown trial on the merits with utmost dispatch.[15]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners now raise the following issues before this Court:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND

DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS NECESSITATING THE HONORABLE
COURTS EXERCISE OF ITS POWER OF SUPERVISION CONSIDERING
THAT:
I. THE REVERSAL BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE TRIAL

COURTS APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE
INSTANT CASE IS BASED ON ITS ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION THAT
THE SUBJECTLAND IS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN, ALLEGEDLY PART
OF MANILA BAY.
A. IN THE FIRESTONE CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT APPLIED

THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATANOTWITHSTANDING
ALLEGATIONS OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OF A LAND
REGISTRATION COURT, FORECLOSING ANY FURTHER
ATTEMPT BY RESPONDENT THEREIN, AS IN THE INSTANT
CASE, TO RESURRECT A LONG-SETTLED JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION OF REGISTRABILITY OF A PARCEL OF LAND
BASED ON THE SHEER ALLEGATION THAT THE SAME IS PART
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
B. THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO

DETERMINE WHETHER THE SUBJECT LAND WAS PART OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
C. RESPONDENTS REVERSION CASE SEEKS TO RETRY THE VERY

SAME FACTUAL ISSUES THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN
JUDICIALLY DETERMINED OVER THIRTY (30) YEARS AGO.
D. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BASES APPLIED BY THE COURT OF

APPEALS IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION ARE MISPLACED,
CONSIDERING THAT THEY ARE ALL PREDICATED ON THE
ERRONEOUS PREMISE THAT IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT
THE SUBJECT LANDIS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
II. RESPONDENT IS BARRED BY JURISDICTIONAL ESTOPPEL AND

LACHES FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE LAND
REGISTRATION COURT.
III. RELIANCE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ON THE ISOLATED

PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE PEA CASE IS
UNWARRANTED AND MISLEADING CONSIDERING THAT THE
MATTER OF WHETHER RES JUDICATA APPLIES WITH RESPECT
TO THE LAND REGISTRATION COURTS DECISION IN 1974 WAS NOT
IN ISSUE IN SAID CASE.
A. THE INSTANT REVERSION CASE IS NOT THE PROPER
RECOURSE.
B. THE VALIDITY OF THE COURT-APPROVED COMPROMISE

AGREEMENT 15 MAY 1998 HAS ALREADY BEEN AFFIRMED
BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE PEA CASE.
IV. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS MANDATE THE APPLICATION

OF THE RULE ON ORDINARY ESTOPPEL AND LACHES IN THE INSTANT
CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT.
V. RESPONDENT CANNOT BE GIVEN SPECIAL CONSIDERATION

AND EXCUSED FOR TRANSGRESSING RULES OF PROCEDURE.[16]
Essentially, the issues boil down to three: (1) Is a reversion suit proper in this
case? (2) Is the present petition estopped by laches? (3) Did the CA erroneously
apply the principle of res judicata?
An action for reversion seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and
disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public
domain.[17] This remedy is provided under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141 (Public
Land Act) which became effective on December 1, 1936. Said law recognized the
power of the state to recover lands of public domain. Section 124 of CA No. 141
reads:
SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or

other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions
of Sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one
hundred and twenty one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one
hundred twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void
from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued,
recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the
reversion of the property and its improvements to the
State.(Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act, reversion suits are proper in
the following instances, to wit:
1. Alienations of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions in

violation of Section 118, CA No. 141;
2. Conveyances made by non-Christians in violation of Section 120, CA No.

141; and
3. Alienations of lands acquired under CA No. 141 in favor of persons not

qualified under Sections 121, 122, and 123 of CA No. 141.
From the foregoing, an action for reversion to cancel titles derived from
homestead patents or free patents based on transfers and conveyances in violation
of CA No. 141 is filed by the OSG pursuant to its authority under the Administrative
Code with the RTC. It is clear therefore that reversion suits were originally utilized
to annul titles or patents administratively issued by the Director of the Land
Management Bureau or the Secretary of the DENR.
While CA No. 141 did not specify whether judicial confirmation of titles by a
land registration court can be subject of a reversion suit, the government availed
of such remedy by filing actions with the RTC to cancel titles and decrees granted
in land registration applications.
The situation changed on August 14, 1981 upon effectivity of Batas

Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 which gave the Intermediate Appellate Court the exclusive
original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs.
When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on July 1, 1997, it
incorporated Rule 47 on annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions of
the RTCs. The two grounds for annulment under Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within
four (4) years from its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is
barred by laches or estoppel as provided by Section 3, Rule 47. Thus, effective July
1, 1997, any action for reversion of public land instituted by the Government was
already covered by Rule 47.
The instant Civil Case No. 01-0222 for annulment and cancellation of Decree
No. N-150912 and its derivative titles was filed on June 8, 2001 with the Paraaque
City RTC. It is clear therefore that the reversion suit was erroneously instituted in
the Paraaque RTC and should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
proper court is the CA which is the body mandated by BP Blg. 129 and prescribed
by Rule 47 to handle annulment of judgments of RTCs.
In Collado v. Court of Appeals,[18] the government, represented by the
Solicitor General pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129, filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the CA. Similarly in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[19] the Solicitor General correctly filed the annulment of judgment with the
said appellate court.
This was not done in this case. The Republic misfiled the reversion suit with
the Paraaque RTC. It should have been filed with the CA as required by Rule
47. Evidently, the Paraaque RTC had no jurisdiction over the instant reversion case.
Assuming that the Paraaque RTC has jurisdiction over the reversion case, still
the lapse of almost three decades in filing the instant case, the inexplicable lack of
action of the Republic and the injury this would cause constrain us to rule for
petitioners. While it may be true that estoppel does not operate against the state
or its agents,[20] deviations have been allowed. In Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of
Appeals,we said:
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not
be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be
invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation
of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with
circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases
where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the
government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or
capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do
a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well
as against private individuals.[21] (Emphasis supplied.)
Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this

case, the lot was already alienated to innocent buyers for value and the
government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an unreasonable
length of time.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where the title of an innocent purchaser for

value who relied on the clean certificates of the title was sought to be cancelled
and the excess land to be reverted to the Government, we ruled that [i]t is only fair
and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the
government to avoid an injustice to innocent purchasers for value (emphasis
supplied).[22] We explained:
Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third

persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title, acquire
rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and order
the cancellation of the certificate. Such cancellation would impair
public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire
in every instance whether the title has been regularly issued or
not. This would be contrary to the very purpose of the law, which is to
stabilize land titles. Verily, all persons dealing with registered land may
safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefore, and the law or the courts do not oblige them to go behind
the certificate in order to investigate again the true condition of the
property. They are only charged with notice of the liens and
encumbrances on the property that are noted on the certificate.[23]
xxxx
But in the interest of justice and equity, neither may the

titleholder be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or
negligence of the States agents, in the absence of proof of his
complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. First, the
real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land to put a stop
forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that
were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may
arise subsequent thereto. Second, as we discussed earlier, estoppel by
laches now bars petitioner from questioning private respondents titles
to the subdivision lots. Third, it was never proven that Private
Respondent St. Jude was a party to the fraud that led to the increase
in the area of the property after its subdivision. Finally, because
petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error that might
have been committed by its agents who had surveyed the property,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions
must be respected. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrenssystem,
which petitioner purportedly aims to protect by filing this case, shall
forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land
registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.[24]
Republic v. Court of Appeals is reinforced by our ruling in Republic v.

Umali,[25] where, in a reversion case, we held that even if the original grantee of a
patent and title has obtained the same through fraud, reversion will no longer
prosper as the land had become private land and the fraudulent acquisition cannot
affect the titles of innocent purchasers for value.
Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the lot in 1974,
and more than 27 years had elapsed before the action for reversion was filed, then
said action is now barred by laches.
While the general rule is that an action to recover lands of public domain is
imprescriptible, said right can be barred by laches or estoppel. Section 32 of PD
1592 recognized the rights of an innocent purchaser for value over and above the
interests of the government. Section 32 provides:
SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for

value.The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person
adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land
or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper
Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date
of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such
petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for
value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may
be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or
an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrances for
value. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this petition, the LRC (now LRA), on May 30, 1974, issued Decree No. N-
150912 in favor of Fermina Castro and OCT No. 10215 was issued by the Rizal
Registrar of Deeds on May 29, 1974. OCT No. 10215 does not show any annotation,
lien, or encumbrance on its face. Relying on the clean title, Yujuico bought the same
in good faith and for value from her. He was issued TCT No. 445863 on May 31,
1974. There is no allegation that Yujuico was a buyer in bad faith, nor did he acquire
the land fraudulently. He thus had the protection of the Torrens System that every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in
good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on
the certificate and any of the x x x encumbrances which may be subsisting. [26] The
same legal shield redounds to his successors-in-interest, the Yujuicos and Carpio,
more particularly the latter since Carpio bought the lot from Jesus Y. Yujuico for
value and in good faith.
Likewise protected are the rights of innocent mortgagees for value, the PISO,
Citibank, N.A., PDC, RCBC, PCIB, and DBP.Even if the mortgagors title was proved
fraudulent and the title declared null and void, such declaration cannot nullify the
mortgage rights of a mortgagee in good faith.[27]
All told, a reversion suit will no longer be allowed at this stage.
More on the issue of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled thereto has either abandoned or declined to assert it.[28]
When respondent government filed the reversion case in 2001, 27 years had
already elapsed from the time the late Jesus Yujuico purchased the land from the
original owner Castro. After the issuance of OCT No. 10215 to Castro, no further
action was taken by the government to question the issuance of the title to Castro
until the case of Public Estates Authority, brought up in the oral argument before
this Court on September 6, 2000.[29] We then held that allegation of fraud in the
issuance of the title was not proper for consideration and determination at that
stage of the case.
From the undisputed facts of the case, it is easily revealed that respondent
Republic took its sweet time to nullify Castros title, notwithstanding the easy access
to ample remedies which were readily available after OCT No. 10215 was registered
in the name of Castro. First, it could have appealed to the CA when the Pasig-Rizal
CFI rendered a decision ordering the registration of title in the name of applicant
Castro on April 26, 1974. Had it done so, it could have elevated the matter to this
Court if the appellate court affirms the decision of the land registration
court. Second, when the entry of Decree No. N-150912 was made on May 29,
1974 by the Rizal Register of Deeds, the Republic had one (1) year from said date
or up to May 28, 1975 to file a petition for the reopening and review of Decree No.
N-150912 with the Rizal CFI (now RTC) on the ground of actual fraud under section
32 of PD 1592. Again, respondent Republic did not avail of such remedy. Third,
when Jesus Yujuico filed a complaint for Removal of Cloud and Annulment of Title
with Damages against PEA before the Paraaque RTC in Civil Case No. 96-0317,
respondent could have persevered to question and nullify Castros title.Instead, PEA
undertook a compromise agreement on which the May 18, 1998 Resolution[30] was
issued. PEA in effect admitted that the disputed land was owned by the
predecessors-in-interest of petitioners and their title legal and valid; and impliedly
waived its right to contest the validity of said title; respondent Republic even filed
the petition for relief from judgment beyond the time frames allowed by the rules,
a fact even acknowledged by this Court in Public Estates Authority. Lastly,
respondent only filed the reversion suit on June 8, 2001 after the passage of 27
years from the date the decree of registration was issued to Fermina Castro.
Such a Rip Van Winkle, coupled with the signing of the settlement with PEA,
understandably misled petitioners to believe that the government no longer had
any right or interest in the disputed lot to the extent that the two lots were even
mortgaged to several banks including a government financing institution. Any
nullification of title at this stage would unsettle and prejudice the rights and
obligations of innocent parties. All told, we are constrained to conclude that laches
had set in.
Even granting arguendo that respondent Republic is not precluded by laches

from challenging the title of petitioners in the case at bar, still we find that the
instant action for reversion is already barred by res judicata.
Petitioners relying on Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[31] as a

precedent to the case at bar contend that the instant reversion suit is now barred
by res judicata.
We agree with petitioners.

The doctrine on precedents is expressed in the latin maximStare decisis et
non quieta movere. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled.[32] In order however that a case can be considered as a precedent to
another case which is pending consideration, the facts of the first case should be
similar or analogous to the second case.
A perusal of the facts of the Firestone case and those of the case at bar
reveals that the facts in the two (2) cases are parallel. First, in Firestone and in this
case, the claimants filed land registration applications with the CFI; both claimants
obtained decrees for registration of lots applied for and were issued OCTs. Second,
in Firestone, the Republic filed a reversion case alleging that the land covered by
the OCT was still inalienable forest land at the time of the application and hence
the Land Registration Court did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the property
to the claimant. In the instant case, respondent Republic contend that the land
applied for by Yujuico was within Manila Bayat the time of application and
therefore the CFI had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint. Third, in Firestone, the validity of the title of the claimant was favorably
ruled upon by this Court in G.R. No. 109490entitled Patrocinio E. Margolles v. CA. In
the case at bar, the validity of the compromise agreement involving the disputed
lot was in effect upheld when this Court in Public Estates Authority v.
Yujuico dismissed the petition of PEA seeking to reinstate the petition for relief
from the May 18, 1998 Resolution approving said compromise agreement.With the
dismissal of the petition, the May 18, 1998 Resolution became final and executory
and herein respondent Republic through PEA was deemed to have recognized
Castros title over the disputed land as legal and valid. In Romero v. Tan,[33] we ruled
that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. We also made clear that a
judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits, wherein
the parties have validly entered into stipulations and the evidence was duly
considered by the trial court that approved the agreement.In the instant case, the
May 18, 1998 Resolution approving the compromise agreement confirmed the
favorable decision directing the registration of the lot to Castros name in LRC Case
No. N-8239. Similarly, in Firestone, the Margolles case confirmed the decision
rendered in favor of Gana in Land Registration Case No. 672 ordering the issuance
of the decree to said applicant. Fourth, in Firestone, the Supreme Court relied on
the letter of then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez that the evidence of the
Bureau of Lands and the LRC was not sufficient to support an action for cancellation
of OCT No. 4216. In the instant case, both the Solicitor General and the
Government Corporate Counsel opined that the Yujuico land was not under water
and that there appears to be no sufficient basis for the Government to institute the
action for annulment. Fifth, in Firestone, we ruled that the Margolles case had long
become final, thus thevalidity of OCT No. 4216 should no longer be disturbed and
should be applied in the instant case (reversion suit) based on the principle of res
judicata or, otherwise, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.[34]
Clearly from the above, Firestone is a precedent case. The Public Estates
Authority had become final and thus the validity of OCT No. 10215 issued to Castro
could no longer be questioned.
While we said in Public Estates Authority that the court does not foreclose
the right of the Republic from pursuing the proper recourse in a separate
proceedings as it may deem warranted, the statement was obiter dictum since the
inquiry on whether or not the disputed land was still under water at the time of its
registration was a non-issue in the said case.
Even granting for the sake of argument that Firestone is not squarely
applicable, still we find the reversion suit already barred by res judicata.
For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the

following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2)
the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be
between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.[35]
There is no question as to the first, third and last requisites. The threshold
question pertains to the second requisite, whether or not the then Pasig-Rizal CFI,
Branch 22 had jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC Case No. N-8239. In Civil
Case No. 01-0222, the Paraaque City RTC, Branch 257 held that the CFI had
jurisdiction. The CA reversed the decision of the Paraaque City RTC based on the
assertion of respondent Republic that the Pasig-Rizal CFI had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, and that there was a need to determine the character of the
land in question.
The Paraaque City RTC Order dismissing the case for res judicata must be
upheld.
The CA, in rejecting the dismissal of the reversion case by the Paraaque RTC,
relied on two cases, namely: Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta[36] and Republic v.
Vda. De Castillo.[37]
In Municipality of Antipolo, we held that the land registration court had no

jurisdiction to entertain any land registration application if the land was public
property, thus:
Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the

application for registration of public property of ANTIPOLO, its
Decision adjudicating the DISPUTED PROPERTY as of private
ownership is null and void. It never attained finality, and can be
attacked at any time. It was not a bar to the action brought by
ANTIPOLO for its annulment by reason of res judicata.
[x x x] the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject matter

renders the judgment void and a mere nullity, and considering
that a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no
rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which
neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts
performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and
considering, further, that the decision, for want of jurisdiction
of the court, is not a decision in contemplation of law, and
hence, can never become executory, it follows that such a void
judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason
of res judicata.
xxxx
It follows that if a person obtains a title under the Public Land
Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be
registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of
Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a
public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said
certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally
included (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503; Ledesma vs.
Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769).
[x x x x]
Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may be

ordered cancelled (Republic vs. Animas, et al., supra), and the
cancellation maybe pursued through an ordinary action
therefore. This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of
the land registration court, since the said court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was no such
jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. [x
x x] Certainly, one of the essential requisites, i.e., jurisdiction
over the subject matter, is absent in this case. (Italics
supplied).[38]
The plain import of Municipality of Antipolo is that a land registration court, the
RTC at present, has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application which
respondent Republic claims is public land. This ruling needs elucidation.
Firmly entrenched is the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law.[39] Consequently, the proper CFI (now the RTC) under Section 14
of PD 1529[40](Property Registration Decree) has jurisdiction over applications for
registration of title to land.
Section 14 of PD 1592 provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. (Emphasis supplied.)
Conformably, the Pasig-Rizal CFI, Branch XXII has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the land registration case filed by Fermina Castro, petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, since jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
the allegations of the initiatory pleadingthe application.[41] Settled is the rule that
the authority to decide a case and not the decision rendered therein is what makes
up jurisdiction. When there is jurisdiction, the decision of all questions arising in
the case is but an exercise of jurisdiction.[42]
In our view, it was imprecise to state in Municipality of Antipolo that
the Land Registration Court [has] no jurisdiction to entertain the application for
registration of public property x x x for such court precisely has the jurisdiction to
entertain land registration applications since that is conferred by PD 1529. The
applicant in a land registration case usually claims the land subject matter of the
application as his/her private property, as in the case of the application of
Castro. Thus, the conclusion of the CA that the Pasig-Rizal CFI has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the application of Castro has no legal mooring. The land
registration court initially has jurisdiction over the land applied for at the time of
the filing of the application. After trial, the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
can determine whether the title to the land applied for is registrable and can be
confirmed. In the event that the subject matter of the application turns out to be
inalienable public land, then it has no jurisdiction to order the registration of the
land and perforce must dismiss the application.
Based on our ruling in Antipolo, the threshold question is whether the land
covered by the titles of petitioners is under water and forms part of Manila Bay at
the time of the land registration application in 1974. If the land was
within Manila Bay, then res judicata does not apply. Otherwise, the decision of the
land registration court is a bar to the instant reversion suit.
After a scrutiny of the case records and pleadings of the parties in LRC Case
No. N-8239 and in the instant petition, we rule that the land of Fermina Castro is
registrable and not part of Manila Bay at the time of the filing of the land
registration application.
The trial courts Decision in 1974 easily reveals the basis for its conclusion
that the subject matter was a dry land, thus:
On February 1, 1974, the applicant presented her evidence

before the Deputy Clerk of this Court and among the evidence
presented by her were certain documents which were marked as
Exhibits D to J, inclusive. The applicant testified in her behalf and
substantially declared that: she was 62 years old, single, housekeeper
and residing at 1550 J. Escoda, Ermita, Manila; that she was born on
June 3, 1911; that she first came to know of the land applied for which
is situated in the Municipality of Paraaque, province of Rizal, with an
area of 17,343 square meters and covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 while
she was still ten (10) years old or sometime in 1921; that when she
first came to know of the land applied for, the person who was in
possession and owner of said land was her father, Catalino Castro; that
during that time her father used to plant on said land various crops
like pechay, mustard, eggplant, etc.; that during that time, her father
built a house on said land which was used by her father and the other
members of the family, including the applicant, as their residential
house; that the land applied for was inherited by her father from her
grandfather Sergio Castro; that Catalino Castro continuously
possessed and owned the land in question from 1921 up to the time
of his death in 1952; and that during that period of time nobody ever
disturbed the possession and ownership of her father over the said
parcel of land; that after the death of her father in 1952 she left the
place and transferred her place of residence but she had also
occasions to visit said land twice or thrice a week and sometimes once
a week; that after she left the land in question in 1952, she still
continued possessing said land, through her caretaker Eliseo Salonga;
that her possession over the land in question from the time she
inherited it up to the time of the filing of the application has been
continuous, public, adverse against the whole world and in the
concept of an owner; that it was never encumbered, mortgaged, or
disposed of by her father during his lifetime and neither did she ever
encumber or sell the same; that it was declared for taxation purposes
by her father when he was still alive and her father also paid the real
estate taxes due to the government although the receipt evidencing
the payment of said real estate taxes for the property applied for have
been lost and could no longer be found inspite of diligent effort
exerted to locate the same.
The other witness presented by the applicant was Emiliano de
Leon, who declared that he was 70 years old, married, farmer and
residing at San Jose, Baliwag, Bulacan; that he knew Catalino Castro,
the father of the applicant because said Catalino Castro was his
neighbor in Tambo, Paraaque, Rizal, he had a house erected on the
land of Catalino Castro; that he was born in 1903 and he first came to
know of the land in question when in 1918 when he was about 18
years old; that the area of the land owned and possessed by Catalino
Castro where he constructed a residential house has an area of more
than one and one-half (1 ) hectares; that the possession of Catalino
Castro over the land in question was peaceful, continuous, notorious,
adverse against the whole world and in the concept of an owner; that
during the time that Catalino Castro was in possession of the land
applied for he planted on said parcel of land mango, coconut and
banana, etc.; that Catalino Castro continuously possessed and owned
said parcel of land up to the year 1952 when he died; that during the
time that Catalino Castro was in possession of said land, nobody ever
laid claim over the said property; that said land is not within any
military or naval reservation; that upon the death of Catalino Castro,
the applicant took possession of the land applied for and that up to
the present the applicant is in possession of said land; that he resided
in the land in question from 1918 up to the time he transferred his
place of residence in Baliwag, Bulacan in the year 1958.
On February 11, 1974, the Court, pursuant to the provision of

Presidential Decree No. 230 issued by his Excellency, Ferdinand E.
Marcos dated July 9, 1973 held in abeyance the rendition of a decision
in this case and directed the applicant to submit a white print copy of
plan (LRC) Psu-964 to the Director of lands who was directed by the
Court to submit his comment and recommendation thereon.
The property in question is declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 51842 (Exhibit G) and real estate taxes due
thereon have been paid up to the year 1973 (Exhibit H).
In compliance with the Order of this Court February 11, 1974, the
Director of Lands, thru Special Attorney Saturnino A. Pacubas,
submitted a report to this Court dated April 25, 1974, stating among
other things, that upon ocular inspection conducted by Land
Inspector Adelino G. Gorospe and the subsequent joint ocular
inspection conducted by Geodetic Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes and
Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania, it was established that
the parcel of land covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 no longer forms part
of the Manila Bay but is definitely solid and dry land.
In this connection, it should be noted that Administrative

Assistant Lazaro G. Berania and Geodetic Engineer Manuel A.
Cervantes, in their report dated March 22, 1974 have also stated
that the land applied for cannot be reached by water even in the
highest tide and that the said land is occupied by squatter families
who have erected makeshift shanties and a basketball court which
only prove that the same is dry and solid land away from the shores
of Manila Bay.
Furthermore, Land Inspector Adelino G. Gorospe in his letter-report

dated November 28, 1973 has also stated that there is a house of pre-
war vintage owned by the applicant on the land in question which in
effect corroborates the testimony of the applicant and her witness
that they have lived on the land in question even prior to the outbreak
of the second world war and that the applicant has been in possession
of the land in question long time ago.[43]
To counter the evidence of applicant Castro, and bolster its claim that she
has no valid title, respondent Republic relies on the July 18, 1973 Office
Memorandum[44] of Roman Mataverde, OIC, Surveys Division, to the OIC, Legal
Division, of the Bureau of Lands, stating that when projected on cadastral maps CM
14 13N - 120 59 E., Sec. 3-D and CM 14 30N - 120 59E., Sec. 2-A of Paranaque [sic]
Cadastre (Cad-299), (LRC) Psu-964 falls inside Manila Bay, outside Cad-299.[45]
The same conclusion was adopted in a November 15, 1973 letter of Narciso
Villapando, Acting Regional Lands Director to the Chief, Legal Division, Bureau of
Lands and in the Comment and Recommendation of Ernesto C. Mendiola, Assistant
Director, also of the Bureau of Lands.
Respondent likewise cites Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 Revised 80-
11-2 to support its position that Castros lot is a portion of Manila Bay.
The burden of proving these averments falls to the shoulders of respondent

Republic. The difficulty is locating the witnesses of the government. Roman
Mataverde, then OIC of the Surveys Division retired from the government service
in 1982. He should by this time be in his 90s.Moreover, Asst. Regional Director
Narciso Villapando and Asst. Director Ernesto C. Mendiola are no longer connected
with the Bureau of Lands since 1986.
Assuming that OIC Roman Mataverde, Asst. Regional Director Narciso

Villapando and Assistant Director Ernesto C. Mendiola are still available as
witnesses, the projections made on the cadastral maps of the then Bureau of Lands
cannot prevail over the results of the two ocular inspections by several Bureau of
Lands officials that the disputed lot is definitely dry and solid land and not part of
Manila Bay.Special Attorney Saturnino A. Pacubas, Land Inspector Adelino G.
Gorospe, Geodetic Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes and Administrative Asst. Lazaro
A. Berana, all officials of the Bureau of Lands, were positive that the disputed land
is solid and dry land and no longer forms part of Manila Bay.Evidence gathered
from the ocular inspection is considered direct and firsthand information entitled
to great weight and credit while the Mataverde and Villapando reports are
evidence weak in probative value, being merely based on theoretical projections in
the cadastral map or table surveys.[46] Said projections must be confirmed by the
actual inspection and verification survey by the land inspectors and geodetic
engineers of the Bureau of Lands.Unfortunately for respondent Republic, the
bureau land inspectors attested and affirmed that the disputed land is already dry
land and not within Manila Bay.
On the other hand, the Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 does not reveal
what portion of Manila Bay was Castros lot located in 1974. Moreover, a
hydrographic map is not the best evidence to show the nature and location of the
lot subject of a land registration application. It is derived from a hydrographic
survey which is mainly used for navigation purposes, thus:
Surveys whose principal purpose is the determination of data

relating to bodies of water. A hydrographic survey may consist of the
determination of one or several of the following classes of data: depth
water; configuration and nature of the bottom; directions and force of
currents; heights and times of tides and water stages; and location of
fixed objects for survey and navigation purposes.[47]
Juxtaposed with finding of the ocular inspection by Bureau of Lands Special
Attorney Pacubas and others that Castros lot is dry land in 1974, Namria
Hydrographic Map No. 4243 is therefore inferior evidence and lacking in probative
force.
Moreover, the reliability and veracity of the July 18, 1973 report of Roman
Mataverde based on the alleged projection on cadastral maps and the Villapando
report dated November 15, 1973 are put to serious doubt in the face of the opinion
dated October 13, 1997 of the Government Corporate Counsel, the lawyer of the
PEA, which upheld the validity of the titles of petitioners, thus:
We maintain to agree with the findings of the court that the
property of Fermina Castro was registrable land, as based on the two
(2) ocular inspections conducted on March 22, 1974 by Lands
Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania and Lands Geodetic Engr.
Manuel Cervantes, finding the same no longer forms part of Manila
Bay but is definitely solid land which cannot be reached by water even
in the highest of tides. This Berania-Cervantes report based on ocular
inspections literally overturned the findings and recommendations
of Land Director Narciso V. Villapando dated November 15, 1973, and
that of Director Ernesto C. Mendiola dated December 1, 1977, and
the fact that the Villapando-Mendiola reports were merely based on
projections in the cadastral map or table surveys.
xxxx
A. The Legal prognosis of the case is not promising in favor of PEA.

4.1 LRC Case No. N-8239 has already become final and
executory and OCT No. 10215 was already issued in favor of Fermina
Castro. Any and all attempts to question its validity can only be
entertained in a quo warranto proceedings (sic), assuming that there
are legal grounds (not factual grounds) to support its nullification.
Subjecting it to a collateral attack is not allowed under the Torrens
Title System. In Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 208
SCRA 215, the Supreme Court held that the present petition is not the
proper remedy in challenging the validity of certificates of titles since
the judicial action required is a direct and not a collateral attack (refer
also to: Toyota Motor Philippine Corporation vs. CA, 216 SCRA 236).
4.2 OCT No. 10215 in favor of Fermina Castro was issued

pursuant to a cadastral proceeding, hence is a rem proceedings which
is translated as a constructive notice to the whole world, as held in
Adez Realty Incorporated vs. CA, 212 SCRA 623.
4.3 From the cursory and intent reading of the decision of Judge
Sison in LRC Case No. N-8239, we cannot find any iota of fraud having
been committed by the court and the parties. In fact, due process was
observed when the Office of the Solicitor General represented ably the
Bureau of Lands. In Balangcad vs. Justices of the Court of Appeals, 206
SCRA 169, the Supreme Court held that title to registered property
becomes indefeasible after one-year from date of registration except
where there is actual fraud in which case it may be challenged in a
direct proceeding within that period. This is also the ruling in Bishop
vs. CA, 208 SCRA 636, that to sustain an action for annulment of a
torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it must be shown that the
registration court had not acquired jurisdiction over the case and there
was actual fraud in securing the title.
4.4 As to priority of torrens title, PEA has no defense, assuming

that both PEA and Yujuico titles are valid, as held in Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. CA, 215 SCRA 783, where two
(2) certificates purport to include the same land, the earlier in date
prevails.
4.5 The documents so far submitted by the parties to the court

indicate that the mother title of the Yujuico land when registered in
1974 was not underwater. This was shown in the two (2) ocular
inspections conducted by the officials of the Land Bureau.
4.6 The provision of P.D. 239 that no decree of registration may

be issued by the court unless upon approval and recommendation of
the Bureau of Lands was substantially complied with in the Report of
Lands Special Attorney Saturnino Pacubas, submitted to the court.[48]
Even the counsel of respondent Republic, the OSG, arrived at the conclusion
that there is no sufficient legal basis for said respondent to institute action to annul
the titles of petitioners, thus:
It may be stated at the outset that a petition for annulment of
certificate of title or reconveyance of land may be based on fraud
which attended the issuance of the decree of registration and the
corresponding certificate of title.
Based on the decision in the LRC Case No. N-8239 involving the
petition for registration and confirmation of title filed by Fermina
Castro, there is no showing that fraud attended the issuance of OCT
No. 10215. it appears that the evidence presented by Fermina Castro
was sufficient for the trial court to grant her petition.
The testimony of Fermina Castro, which was corroborated by

Emiliano de Leon, that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been
in possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years sufficiently
established her vested right over the property initially covered by OCT
No. 10215. The report dated April 25, 1974 which was submitted to
the trial court by the Director of Lands through Special Attorney
Saturnino Pacubas showed that the parcel of land was solid and dry
land when Fermina Castros application for registration of title was
filed. It was based on the ocular inspection conducted by Land
Inspector Adelino Gorospe and the joint circular inspection conducted
by Geodetic Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes and Administrative
Assistant Lazaro Berania on November 28, 1973 and March 22,
1974 respectively.
The aforesaid report must be requested unless there is a
concrete proof that there was an irregularity in the issuance thereof.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the ocular inspection of
the parcel of land, which was made the basis of said report, is
presumed to be in order.
Based on the available records, there appears to be no

sufficient basis for the Government to institute an action for the
annulment of OCT No. 10215 and its derivative titles. It is opined that
a petition for cancellation/annulment of Decree No. N-150912 and
OCT No. 10215 and all its derivative titles will not prosper unless
there is convincing evidence to negate the report of the then Land
Management Bureau through Special Attorney Pacubas. Should the
Government pursue the filing of such an action, the possibility of
winning the case is remote.[49]
More so, respondent Government, through its counsel, admits that the land
applied by Fermina Castro in 1973 was solid and dry land, negating the nebulous
allegation that said land is underwater. The only conclusion that can be derived
from the admissions of the Solicitor General and Government Corporate Counsel is
that the land subject of the titles of petitioners is alienable land beyond the reach
of the reversion suit of the state.
Notably, the land in question has been the subject of a compromise
agreement upheld by this Court in Public Estates Authority.[50] In that compromise
agreement, among other provisions, it was held that the property covered by TCT
Nos. 446386 and S-29361, the land subject of the instant case, would be exchanged
for PEA property. The fact that PEA signed the May 15, 1998 Compromise
Agreement is already a clear admission that it recognized petitioners as true and
legal owners of the land subject of this controversy.
Moreover, PEA has waived its right to contest the legality and validity of
Castros title. Such waiver is clearly within the powers of PEA since it was created by
PD 1084 as a body corporate which shall have the attribute of perpetual succession
and possessed of the powers of the corporations, to be exercised in conformity
with the provisions of this Charter [PD 1084].[51] It has the power to enter into,
make, perform and carry out contracts of every class and description, including loan
agreements, mortgages and other types of security arrangements, necessary or
incidental to the realization of its purposes with any person, firm or corporation,
private or public, and with any foreign government or entity.[52] It also has the
power to sue and be sued in its corporate name.[53] Thus, the Compromise
Agreement and the Deed of Exchange of Real Property signed by PEA with the
petitioners are legal, valid and binding on PEA. In the Compromise Agreement, it is
provided that it settles in full all the claims/counterclaims of the parties against
each other.[54] The waiver by PEA of its right to question petitioners title is fortified
by the manifestation by PEA in the Joint Motion for Judgment based on
Compromise Agreement that
4. The parties herein hereto waive and abandon any and all
other claims and counterclaims which they may have against each
other arising from this case or related thereto.[55]
Thus, there was a valid waiver of the right of respondent Republic through
PEA to challenge petitioners titles.
The recognition of petitioners legal ownership of the land is further bolstered
by the categorical and unequivocal acknowledgment made by PEA in its September
30, 2003 letter where it stated that: Your ownership thereof was acknowledged by
PEA when it did not object to your membership in the CBP-IA Association, in which
an owner of a piece of land in CBP-IA automatically becomes a member
thereof.[56] Section 26, Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The admissions of
PEA which is the real party-in-interest in this case on the nature of
the land of Fermina Castro are valid and binding on respondent
Republic. Respondents claim that the disputed land is underwater falls flat in the
face of the admissions of PEA against its interests. Hence, res judicatanow
effectively precludes the relitigation of the issue of registrability of petitioners lot.
In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the Paraaque RTC. Even if we treat said case as a
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the dismissal of the case nevertheless has to be upheld because it is
already barred by laches. Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is already
precluded by res judicatain view of the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining
therein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76212 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the August 7, 2002 Order of the Paraaque City RTC, Branch 257 in Civil Case No. 01-
0222 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Fermina Castro, et al. dismissing the
complaint is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ACTION FOR PERJURY

ART. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. — The
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making
untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next
preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or to make an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in the case of solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall
commit any of the falsehood mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of
this section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein. (REVISED PENAL
CODE)
How is Perjury Punished?
A person convicted of perjury under federal law may face up to five years in
prison and fines. The punishment for perjury under state law varies from
state to state, but perjury is a felony and carries a possible prison sentence
of at least one year, plus fines and probation. Penalties are increased in
relation to how much the perjury interfered with the proceeding. When the
perjurer was a witness in his own criminal trial, his sentence for the
underlying conviction may also be increased, on the grounds that a lying
defendant is one who has a bad character and is not likely to be
rehabilitated quickly.
Judges can punish a perjurer who lied under oath to hide or assist a crime
in a way that goes beyond the sentence for perjury. That defendant may
also be charged as an accessory to the crime he was attempting to hide or
assist, if that charge will carry a greater sentence. And a perjurer may even
be charged as an accessory to a crime of which he is convicted, if he lied to
conceal that crime.
There is no civil remedy for a criminal defendant wrongly convicted based
on another’s perjury, nor for a party to a civil lawsuit who loses because of
a witness’s perjury.
A person who commits perjury also may have violated other laws that do
provide remedies, however.

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REMEDIES FOR FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION UNDER PD 1529

NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

FRAUD MUST BE EXTRINSIC IN NATURE TO BE A GROUND FOR NULLITY

MISTAKE is some unintentional act, omission or error arising from ignorance,

PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, FINAL ORDERS OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS

PD 1529— Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent

A. PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DECREE

B. [G.R. No. 113549. July 5, 1996]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the DIRECTOR OF

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Resolution[1] of 24 January 1994 of

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and administratively

In refuting the claim of the private respondents that publication of the

There was then, the Court of Appeals concluded, a violation of Sections 23

Parcel of land (Plan II-13961) containing an area of 25,542,603 square meters,

In hectares, the 25,542,603 square meters means Two Thousand Five

ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

Petitioner, on November 9, 1998, filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the trial

Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendant Eland in Default19

Consequently, respondents filed a Motion to Set Presentation of Evidence Ex

On May 14, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Clarification34 as to whether or

Eventually, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment42 dated August 5,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for summary judgment is hereby

3. The Original Transfer Certificate of Title is ordered to be canceled, as well

Hence, the present petition.

The grounds relied upon by the petitioner are the following:

According to the petitioner, a motion for summary judgment must be served at

Petitioner also argued that a summary judgment is only available to a claimant

Another ground relied upon by petitioner is its failure to cross-examine the

The petition is impressed with merit.

Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. – A party seeking to recover upon a

In their motion for summary judgment, the respondents failed to clearly

(1) Tax Declaration No. 015224-A (Exhibit “Q”; x x x.

(2) Tax Declaration No. 05019-B (Exhibit “R”; x x x.

(4) Tax Declaration No. GR-007-0007 (Exhibit “T” x x x.

Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question of fact by the interaction of

On the contrary, in petitioner’s Answer Ad Cautelam, genuine, factual and triable

2.2 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in

2.3 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in

2.4 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in

2.5 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in

2.6 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in

2.7 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in

2.8 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in

2.9 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in

It is of utmost importance to remember that petitioner is already the registered

X x x There is overwhelming evidence or proof on record that the vendors listed in

It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or an equitable

The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by

(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land;

(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari of petitioner Eland Philippines,

[G.R. No. 124605. June 18, 1999]

ENRIQUITO SERNA and AMPARO RASCA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In 1955, respondents constructed their house of strong materials on the lot in

On December 20, 1978, taking advantage of respondents’ absence from the

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

“© Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 as

“€ And to pay the costs, without pronouncement as to moral damages.

“Done at Alaminos, Pangasinan, this 5th day of August, 1992.

“(t/s) Vivencio A. Bantugan[6]