G.R. No. L-35377-78 July 31, 1975 3949 to another court.
3949 to another court. According to Crisologo's motion, the alleged evidence against him is
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL and ERNING ABANO,
defendants-appellants.
Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer to the New
Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of
Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole
defendant, is charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were to be
confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are many political
enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity; some of the adherents of the Crisologos had
in fact been murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his father, Congressman Floro Crisologo, was shot
to death while hearing mass at the Vigan cathedral.
Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting duck for a gunwielder or
grenade-thrower who wants to assassinate him. He could even be lynched or shot to death
on the specious pretext that he was trying to escape.
Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur signified his conformity
to the transfer of the venue of the trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.
Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court to "order a change
of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice". Here, what is involved is not
merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant Crisologo, the accused. It
would be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperilled.
Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a justification for
transfer of venue (See State vs. Siers, 136 S. E. 503, 103, W. Va. 30; 22 C.J.S.
310).1äwphï1.ñët
We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves not merely the
change of the place of hearing but also the transfer of the expediente of Criminal Case No.
in the custody of the authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The transfer of Criminal
Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City and the holding of the trial at Camp Crame
appear to be the most convenient arrangement.
WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of Criminal
Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City where it should be re-docketed and raffled
to any Judge thereof. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and
security measures should be adopted in bringing defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on
the occasion of the hearing.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO (ECOT)
GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL,
CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER, OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD,
JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed
DOES respondents.
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of venue to avoid
any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained in the implementation of the
right to bail 2 are involved in this petition which, even if not so denominated, partakes of the
nature of a certiorari. It must have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and
Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the conviction that there was no time to lose, that must
have led them to devote less than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals.
They ignored the principle that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is with
the public officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised, the
need for a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that further
action be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after the
filing of the petition, the Court required the comment of the Solicitor General as well as of
the private respondents, 4 the accused in six pending criminal cases before the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 5
It opened with this preliminary statement: "The present petition was filed by the private
prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial
1
before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this
Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines can, under the law, be instituted
only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they
are instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will not,
therefore, improve their legal standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but
instead adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of
the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya,
granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a
change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the evidence
presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the
Court of First Instance of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure
of tile deceased bodies of seven persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo
Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On September 16,
1980 armed with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company
proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves
containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio
Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and
October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7)
separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo
Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of
unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137,
4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary
examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court
found probable cause against the accused. It thus issued an order for their a. rest.
However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt
of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary
release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed
themselves of this right and have since been released from detention. In a parallel
development. the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that
if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10
kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused
are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail.
In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made
to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged
argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation of
the bail bonds.
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court
Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for
change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely,
(1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan,
presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same
criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid
criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod
City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge
Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at
Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to
March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is
the nearest court station to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the
petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the
necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." 9 Thus, the
issue of a change of venue has become moot and academic. The comments respectively
submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco
Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with
the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments were considered as
answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decision.
The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents, there being a
failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the
accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in
favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of
Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So we rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the place of
trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The Constitution is quite explicit. The
Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice." 10 The Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the
landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente
vigorously and categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us, to compel the
prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal
what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose
for which courts have been established." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was
made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable
Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the
case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from
Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of qqqts fear, they may either refuse to
testify or testimony falsely to save their lives. 13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not
averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro Manila. 14
Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question of the cancellation of
2
the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no objection to the transfer.
15 It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to
some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has
on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever
be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a
matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a
plea could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is
justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the change of
venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought.
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail was
granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the prosecution
That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As
pointed out by Justice Capistrano, speaking for the Court: "The question presented before
us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in
the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a
defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in
the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within
a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should
resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil
action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void
on that ground." 17 These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we have
seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of
procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to
be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of
reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure
of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also.
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep
the balance true." 18 This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the
embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that
there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions
asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching.
That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private
respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect. Executive
Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the
cases had been transferred by virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is
directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents, with the prosecution
being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
CAMILO PILOTIN, FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN PIANO PEDRO PATAO, VINCENT
CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO, CAMILO PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO PUGAL,
ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO PIANO,
FERMIN PUGAL, CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and EIGHTY-TWO
(82) JOHN DOES, respondents.
Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by the
Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the order of Judge Mario J.
Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (respondent herein), dated 20 July
1970, denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-
V of said Court of First Instance, entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the Circuit Criminal
Court of the Second Judicial District; to direct the respondent Judge to effectuate such
transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases aforesaid in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan, capital of the province.
In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro,
municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses
therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and
province, several residential houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the
destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa.
After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, with several state prosecutors
assigned by the Department of Justice to collaborate with him, on 10 June 1970 filed in the
Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations (Criminal Cases 47-V for arson
with homicide and 48-V for arson) charging that the seventeen private respondents herein,
together with 82 other unidentified persons, "confederating, conspiring, confabulating and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or cause to
be burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied" and
belonging to certain persons named in the filed informations in barrios Ora Este and Ora
Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur (Petition, Annexes B and B-1). Accused Camilo Pilotin and
Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared before
respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for
27, 28 and 29 July 1970.
It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice issued Administrative
Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District, with official station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in
3
Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July 1970. Three days thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the
Secretary further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to
transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest of
justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by Administrative Order
Nos. 258 and 274" of the Department of Justice.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47-V
and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned
and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the
witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or
Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The
accused vigorously opposed such transfer, and on 20 July 1970, the respondent judge
declined the transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative Order No. 258 only provided
for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for
the more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had
already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a
change of venue from the Supreme Court under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179 the
same should have been done right at the very inception of these cases.
In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Circuit Criminal
Court, the prosecution resorted to Us for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse
of discretion and praying this Court to set aside the order of denial of the transfer and to
compel the respondent Court of First Instance to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal
Court of the Second Judicial District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V
and 48-V) at either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the
Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but did not require or
command it, to transfer the cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and likewise
denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer.
At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge Gutierrez from proceeding
with the trial of the cases until further orders.
We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon the Secretary of
Justice power to determine what court should hear specific cases. Any such power, even in
the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the time-honored
separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while not directly depriving the courts of
their independence, it would endanger the rights and immunities of the accused or civil
party. It could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome
of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with the Administration's
preferences. The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts for the
purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate
the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent
to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts. Neither do
Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any such intention; particularly since
Administrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, in Section 2 of its Part V, as confirmed by
Administrative Order No. 274 of the same year, in Section 3 of Part III thereof, provides that
the transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of First
Instance should be effected by raffle, chance here operating to nullify any executive
arbitration of what particular cases should be apportioned to either tribunal. The very terms
of Administrative Order No. 226, issued on 18 June 1970 by Secretary of Justice Makasiar,
relied upon by the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing, Judges Arciaga and
Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 44-V
and 47-V (People vs. Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District, reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety of imperatively
directing transfer of specified cases. Respondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing
Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his
discretion and violated neither the law nor the Executive Orders heretofore mentioned.
It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider Department Administrative Order No.
226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon
the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases against private respondents herein
should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District because a
miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to
testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be
endangered. This claim was buttressed by the affidavits of the injured parties and
prosecution witnesses, reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to testify in cases 47-V and
48-V and expressing their willingness to testify if the cases are heard outside of Ilocos Sur,
where they can be free from tension and terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear thus
expressed can not be considered fanciful and unfounded when account is taken of the
circumstances that the informations filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur show
that of the one hundred armed participants in the burning of the houses at barrios Ora Este
and Ora Centro, Municipality of Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are still unidentified and at
large; that one of the accused, private respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an
influential family in the province, being concededly the son of the Congressman for the first
district of Ilocos Sur and of the lady Governor that the reluctant witnesses are themselves
the complainants in the criminal cases, and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts
will be made to silence them; that it is not shown that the Executive branch is able or willing
to give these witnesses full security during the trial and for a reasonable time thereafter, that
even if armed security escorts were to be provided, the same would be no guarantee
4
against the possibility of murderous assault against the affiant witnesses, as recent events
have proved; that Constabulary reports (Annex H) show that between 1 January and 31
May 1970 no less than 78 murders have been reported committed in said province, of
which number only 21 were solved; and, finally, that the promotion and confirmation of
respondent Judge Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the Court of First
Instance of the Second Judicial District, Branch III, was actively supported by Congressman
and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent Crisologo (Annexes H, H-1, and K to
N-2 to petitioner's supplemental memorandum).
This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining witnesses, who had
on a previous occasion freely given evidence before the investigators in Manila, renders
manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos
Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and
justice and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.
The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the trial site can not be made,
because it is a long standing rule of criminal procedure in these Islands that one who
commits a crime is amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction where the crime is committed,
for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376, and People vs. Mercado, 65
Phil. 665, that the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance in the Philippines is limited to
certain well-defined territory and they can not take jurisdiction of persons charged with one
offense committed outside of that limited territory, and they invoke Rule 110, Section 14 (a),
of the Revised Rules of Court providing that "in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was
committed or any one of the essential ingredient thereof took place."
It is well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149, 150, that
the purpose of the rule invoked by accused respondents herein was "not to compel the
defendant to move to and appear in a different court from that of the province where the
crime was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his
witnesses and other evidence in another place." Where the convenience of the accused is
opposed by that of the prosecution, as in the case at bar, it is but logical that the court
should have power to decide where the balance of convenience or inconvenience lies, and
to determine the most suitable place of the trial according to the exigencies of truth and
impartial justice.
In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality
where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of
the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established.
Since the rigorous application of the general principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would
result here in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the case, it must
be admitted that the exigencies of justice demand that the general rule relied upon by
accused respondents should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty
reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice —
"summum jus, summa in juria."
The respondents accused can not complain that to transfer the trial to a site where the
prosecution's witnesses can feel free to reveal what they know would be equivalent to
railroading them into a conviction. Because regardless of the place where its evidence is to
be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The scales of justice clearly lean in favor of the prosecution being given
full opportunity to lay its case before a proper arbiter: for a dismissal of the charges for lack
of evidence is a verdict that the prosecution can neither challenge nor appeal.
We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse of the kind now before
Us, are to confess themselves impotent to further the cause of justice. The Constitution has
vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain
incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of
justice. The courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and
maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government"
(Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322).
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases
from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of
securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. This
authority was early recognized in England as inhering in the courts of justice even prior to
the eighteenth century. The opinion in Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior Court, 208
Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cases 1067, has shown how the eminent Lord Chief Justice Mansfield,
in Rex vs. Cowle (Eng.) 2 Burr 834, decided in 1759, said that, in this respect, "the law is
clear and uniform as far back as it can be traced."
And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question was fully discussed, and all the
judges appear to have agreed as to the power of the court, Cramption, Jr., saying at page
525:
5
There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants and prosecutors, ... that
where it appears that either party cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the proper
county, then this court ... has jurisdiction to take the case out of the proper county, as it is
called, and to bring it into an indifferent county ... This jurisdiction to change the venue ...
has been exercised by this court from a very early period. We have reported cases, where
the doctrine is laid down in emphatic language; we have the practice of the Court of
Queen's Bench in England independently of any practice of our own court ... The general
jurisdiction of the court, in a proper case, to change the venue from one county to any other,
cannot be the subject of doubt.
This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of justice, exercised through
writs of certiorari, has, according to the weight of authority, passed to the State Supreme
Courts of the American Union.1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs. Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, at page
436, it was held that the power to transfer the place of holding trials —
became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long before the independence of this
country; and from that time forth, not only has the practice prevailed in the courts of
England, but the power is now exercised by the Courts of very many if not all of our states,
either by force of express statute or the adoption of the common law in the jurisprudence of
the same.
That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Philippine courts admits of no
doubt, because they were organized on the American pattern with the enactment of the first
judicial organic law, Act 136, on 11 June 1901, by the Philippine Commission, then
composed by a majority of able American lawyers, fully familiar with the institutions and
traditions of the common law.
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333, this Court stated:
And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine Reports, numbers of cases might
be cited wherein recourse has been had to the rules, principles and doctrines of the
common law in ascertaining the true meaning and scope of the legislation enacted in and
for the Philippine Islands since they passed under American sovereignty.
Among the earliest measures of the Philippine Commission, after the establishment of Civil
Government under American sovereignty, was the enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No.
136, "An Act providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine Islands." This Act in
express terms abolished the then existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of First
Instance, and substituted in their place the courts provided therein. It sets out in general
terms the jurisdiction, duties, privileges, and powers of the new courts and their judges. The
majority of the members of the body which enacted it were able American lawyers. The
spirit with which it is informed, and indeed its very language and terminology would be
unintelligible without some knowledge of the judicial systems of England and the United
States. Its manifest purpose and object was to replace the old judicial system, with its
incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish sources, with a new system modeled in all its
essential characteristics upon the judicial systems of the United States. It cannot be
doubted, therefore, that any incident of the former system which conflicts with the essential
principles and settled doctrines on which the new system rests, must be held to be
abrogated by the law organizing the new system.
While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to believe that the framers'
intent was to deny, by silence, to the Philippine Courts, and particularly upon this Supreme
Court, the inherent jurisdiction possessed by the English and American courts under their
common law heritage to transfer the place of trial of cases in order to secure and promote
the ends of justice, by providing fair and impartial inquiry and adjudication.
Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or general authority from liability in a civil
action for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions, upheld in the Alzua
case as essentially inherent in the courts established by Act 136, even if not expressly
provided for, the power to transfer the place of trials when so demanded by the interest of
justice is equally essential and possesses no inferior rank. To it apply, mutatis mutandis, the
words of this Court in the Alzua case just cited:
The grounds of public policy and the reasoning upon which the doctrine is based are not
less forceful and imperative in these Islands than in the countries from which the new
judicial system was borrowed; and an examination of the reasons assigned ... leaves no
room for doubt that a failure to recognize it as an incident to the new judicial system would
materially impair its usefulness and tend very strongly to defeat the ends for which it was
established. (21 Phil. 333-334)
Not only has there been since then no proof of any specific pronouncement, by Constitution
or Congress, against the exercise by our Courts of the power discussed heretofore: on the
contrary, the law establishing the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act No. 5179, in its
Section 4, provides express legislative recognition of its existence:
6

SEC. 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions anywhere within their respective
districts: Provided, however, that cases shall be heard within the province where the crime
subject of the offense was committed. And provided further, that when the interest of justice
so demands, with prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a
neighboring province within the district ... (Emphasis supplied)
Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by the filing of the criminal
case in question with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which province the
offenses charged were committed, according to the informations; since the holding of the
trial in a particular place is more a matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction; since the
interests of truth and justice can not be subserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed
to trial in the respondent court in Ilocos Sur, because its witnesses, for just and weighty
reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the respondent court, ignoring their safety, has
abusively denied the motion to have the case transferred to another court, this Supreme
Court, in the exercise of judicial power possessed by it under the Constitution and the
statutes, should decree that the trial of cases 47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided
by the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La
Union, or in Baguio City, at the earlier available date. This arrangement would have the
advantage that the same trial judge could later be authorized to hear the defense witnesses
in Vigan, if circumstances so demanded. Furthermore, the adjudication of the case by a
judge other than respondent Gutierrez, if resulting in acquittal, would remove any doubt or
suspicion that the same was in any way influenced by the trial Judge's being beholden to
the Crisologo family.
The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals set by this Court in Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, where We said:
... The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the
most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by
natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the
powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the
parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter but to give it effective facility in righteous action.
It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged against
procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's power by technicalities that
part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many times in inconsiderable
portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not
to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not
constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an
end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments.
When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of
justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism.
(Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523, 529 [1911]. Emphasis and
paragraphing supplied.)
In resume, this Court holds, and so rules:
(1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does
not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases;
(2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the
Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to
decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be
transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district whenever the interest
of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a
trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and
impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.
(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer
of the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and
justice.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs of certiorari and mandamus prayed for are
granted; the order of the respondent Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated 20 July
1970, is sustained in so far as it holds that the Administrative Order No. 221 of the
Department of Justice is not mandatory, but only directory; nevertheless, said order is
declared in grave abuse of discretion and set aside in so far as it declines to transfer the
trial of its cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to another court within the district; and said respondent
Court is accordingly directed and ordered to remand the two criminal cases aforesaid to the
Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District for hearing of the evidence for the
prosecution either in Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at the earliest available date, and
7
such other proceedings as the Circuit Criminal Court may determine in the interest of
justice.
The accused are required to file bail bonds to answer for their appearance at the trial and
sentence by the Circuit Criminal Court for the Second Judicial District, in the same amount,
and under the same terms and conditions as their present bail bonds, which will be
replaced by those herein ordered, all within fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12
June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive
portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED
and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint
Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the
two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad
in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the
Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the
docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith
Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda,
SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela,
which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of
private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand
Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4
Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted
all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2
Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to
this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed
a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and
SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons
responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela
Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June
2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
8

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard
by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo
T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and
issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he
ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He
likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but
the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the
prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and
Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October
2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal
cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19
November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s cash bond evidenced by O.R. No.
15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while
referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of
Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the
petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as
well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following
assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting
aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21,
2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-
3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6,
2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an
accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal
Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in
ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
9
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active
criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in
ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the
order of dismissal issued therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals’
ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either
through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the
processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764,
November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before
the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon
and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise
deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary
investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners
argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act
on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of
applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright
dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno
(232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable
cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254
SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance
pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301
SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC
which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by
their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the
same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either
by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but
not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person
arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On
the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet
not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial
has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of
the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes,
but is not limited to, detention.
10
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not
have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to
bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our
pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have
diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction
over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify
that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the
applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he
purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one
who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is
in the custody of law.’" The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages
and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send
another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2)
in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the
very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the
court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving
special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there
is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking
the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the
accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody
of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to
accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their
persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the
application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the
person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the
ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC
from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further
proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused’s Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that
they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent
judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to
defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for
certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed
the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before
the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for
bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail
11
to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford
the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the
offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of
arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not
genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge
who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution
in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he
really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant
continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any
day and at any time of the day and night.22 Furthermore, the continued absence of the
accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is
indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise
incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy
a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,23 demanding that due
process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad.
Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the
petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor
because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his
doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second,
after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed the criminal
cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing
so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further
proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda
appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge
Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said
appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity,
a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge
Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of
arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the
assistant prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for
review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the
pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash
the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the
filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to
appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as
premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in
order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the
question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted
constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112,
Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or
issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular
Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe"
Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been
violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
12
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting
evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find
that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is
apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of
probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a
separate determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could
be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the
fiscal’s certification.28
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such indication that
he relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification. The Joint Order even indicated the
contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to
determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was accompanied by
supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v.
Inting.31 The supporting documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la
Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal
Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge
Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on
the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find
probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for
the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody of the National
Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy
for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of
discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a
"politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against each other
along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro,
and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the
findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
13
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within
the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need
not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands
more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x
conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not
a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with
different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that
there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary
of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution,
Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the
basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch
41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda – the
mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the
October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly
makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the
decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in
his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value." This
Court agrees with the defense’s views. Indeed, of what use is Maderal’s statements when
the Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced in Criminal
Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2)
cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his
statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001,
praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest
decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R.
No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence
presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder
filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision
and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of
the prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting
the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against
different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more
pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We
never ruled in Leaño that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on
circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of
the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The
accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son, whereas
petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it
is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
statements and therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are
to permit the use of our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt
actually points to the probability of the prosecution’s version of the facts therein. Such
probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the informations two days after
we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him
from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations
were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the
temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this
Court’s resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the
motives of Judge Anghad.
14

Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set
aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall
or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge
Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an
error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable
cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest
or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is
merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be
allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other
dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals
had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of
arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by
Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to
carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge
Anghad’s order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants
of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest
based on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for
them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court
of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this
Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification
of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals,
the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had
resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision
of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-
3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory.
According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated
November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private
respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private
respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the
assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by
private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the
assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the
validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of
Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001
Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14
November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent
Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of
15
Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt
places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of
Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14
November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more
serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15
November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001
Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases
upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent
Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as
disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect
contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39
the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14
November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not
constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not
been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his
motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to
convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow
the case of People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-
3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the
Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled
in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of
Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days
after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to
report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within
ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court
compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases
with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for
the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and
accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18
December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby
LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164170 April 16, 2009
MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, ISAGANI ABDUL y SIACOR, and SARAH
LANGCO y ANGLI, Petitioners,
16
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, P/C
INSP. MICHAEL ANGELO BERNARDO MARTIN, P/INSP. ALLANJING ESTRADA
MEDINA, PO3 ARNOLD RAMOS ASIS, PO2 PEDRO SANTOS GUTIERREZ, PO2
IGNACIO DE PAZ, and PO2 ANTONIO SEBASTIAN BERIDA, JR., Respondents.
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 4 February 2004 Decision2 and 25
June 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76345. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Maca-Angcos Alawiya y
Abdul, Isagani Abdul y Siacor, and Sarah Langco y Angli.
The Facts
On 18 September 2001, petitioners executed sworn statements4 before the General
Assignment Section of the Western Police District in United Nations Avenue, Manila,
charging accused P/C Insp. Michael Angelo Bernardo Martin, P/Insp. Allanjing Estrada
Medina, PO3 Arnold Ramos Asis, PO2 Pedro Santos Gutierrez, PO2 Ignacio De Paz and
PO2 Antonio Sebastian Berida, Jr., who were all policemen assigned at that time at the
Northern Police District, with kidnapping for ransom.
The sworn-statements of petitioners commonly alleged that at about 10:00 in the morning of
11 September 2001, while petitioners were cruising on board a vehicle along United
Nations Avenue, a blue Toyota Sedan bumped their vehicle from behind; that when they
went out of their vehicle to assess the damage, several armed men alighted from the
Toyota Sedan, poked guns at, blindfolded, and forced them to ride in the Toyota Sedan;
that they were brought to an office where ₱10,000,000 and two vehicles were demanded
from them in exchange for their freedom; that, after haggling, the amount was reduced to
₱700,000 plus the two vehicles; that the money and vehicles were delivered in the late
evening of 11 September 2001; that they were released in the early morning of 12
September 2001 in Quiapo after they handed the Deed of Sale and registration papers of
the two vehicles.
After the initial investigation by the Western Police District, the case was reported to the
Philippine National Police Intelligence Group in Camp Crame, where a lateral coordination
was made with the Philippine National Police-National Capital Regional Police Office
Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (PNP-NCR-RID) for the identification, arrest
and filing of appropriate charges against the accused. After its own investigation, the PNP-
NCR-RID recommended that accused be charged with violation of Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code,5 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (State Prosecutor Velasco), who conducted the
preliminary investigation, issued a Resolution6 dated 14 January 2002, recommending that
the accused be indicted for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The Resolution was
endorsed for approval by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano and approved by
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño.
On 24 January 2002, State Prosecutor Velasco filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 41,7 an Information for Kidnapping for Ransom against the accused with no bail
recommended. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 02198832, reads as
follows:
That on September 11, 2001 at about 10:00 AM along United Nations Avenue, Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Accused, who are all police
officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping
themselves together, did then and there by force and intimidation, and by the use of high-
powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive MACA-
ANGCOS ALAWIYA, ISAGANI ABDUL and ZARAH LANGCO of their liberty against their
will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a
condition for their release amounting to TEN MILLION PESOS (PHP10,000,000.00) which
amount was later reduced to SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND (PHP700,000.00) plus two
vehicles consisting of TOYOTA FX and MITSUBISHI ADVENTURE to the damage and
prejudice of MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA, ISAGANI ABDUL and SARAH LANGCO in said
amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the
Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On 28 January 2002, the trial court, upon motion by the prosecution, issued a Hold
Departure Order against the accused.9 On even date, the trial court issued a Warrant of
Arrest against all the accused.10
Meanwhile, on 8 February 2002, the accused filed a petition for review of the Resolution of
State Prosecutor Velasco with the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
17
On 18 February 2002, the accused moved for the quashal of the Information on the ground
that "the officer who filed the Information has no authority do so."11
In an Order12 dated 27 February 2002, the trial court denied the motion to quash on the
ground that under the ruling in People v. Mapalao,13 an accused who is at large is not
entitled to bail or other relief. The trial court also held that the jurisdiction and power of the
Ombudsman under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770),14 as well as
Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, are not exclusive but shared or
concurrent with the regular prosecutors. Thus, the authority of the Department of Justice to
investigate, file the information and prosecute the case could no longer be questioned.
In a Resolution15 promulgated on 24 September 2002, then Secretary of Justice Hernando
B. Perez reversed the ruling of State Prosecutor Velasco and ordered the latter to cause the
withdrawal or dismissal of the Information for kidnapping for ransom. The Secretary of
Justice ruled that there was no prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman before the
Information for kidnapping was filed with the trial court. He also found that the incident
complained of was a bungled buy-bust operation, not kidnapping for ransom.
On 11 October 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by
then Secretary of Justice Simeon A. Datumanong in a Resolution promulgated on 17
February 2003.16
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking the nullification of
the Secretary of Justice’s ruling for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision of 4 February 2004 dismissing the petition for
certiorari. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution of 25 June 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the Secretary of Justice that the incident
complained of was a bungled buy-bust operation, contrary to the finding of State Prosecutor
Velasco, that it was a kidnapping for ransom.
The Court of Appeals gave credence to the accused’s documentary evidence which
supported their claim that the incident was a botched buy-bust operation. The Court of
Appeals specifically noted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Cesar Landayan (Landayan), who
was driving a taxi at the time of the incident and was apprehended together with petitioners.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay categorically stated that he and petitioners were released from
accused’s custody at about 12:50 in the afternoon of the same day, 11 September 2001.
Thus, Cesar’s statement refuted the complaint of petitioners that they were freed only in the
morning of 12 September 2001 after a pay-off of ₱700,000 in casino chips and two
vehicles. The Court of Appeals stressed that Landayan’s Sinumpaang Salaysay was given
on 14 September 2001, prior to petitioners’ complaint for kidnapping for ransom which was
filed on 18 September 2001 before the Western Police District. Having been executed prior
to the filing of the complaint for kidnapping for ransom by petitioners, Cesar’s Sinumpaaang
Salaysay could not be discredited as a cover-up evidence.
The Court of Appeals upheld the Secretary of Justice’s ruling that prior approval by the
Office of the Ombudsman for the Military was needed for the filing of the Information before
the RTC, pursuant to OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001.17 The Court of Appeals further
sustained the finding that there were sufficient evidence that the offense charged against
accused was committed in relation to their office and that the accused were all acting in the
discharge of their functions as policemen.
The Issues
The issues in this case are:
1. Whether the prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military is required for
the investigation and prosecution of the instant case against the accused;
2. Whether the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of State Prosecutor
Velasco amounted to an "executive acquittal;"
18

3. Whether the accused policemen can seek any relief (via a motion to quash the
information) from the trial court when they had not been arrested yet; and
4. Whether there was probable cause against the accused for the crime of kidnapping for
ransom.
The Ruling of this Court
On the prior approval by the Ombudsman for the investigation and prosecution of the case
against the accused policemen
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which is representing the Secretary of Justice,
agrees with petitioners that prior approval by the Ombudsman is not required for the
investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the accused policemen. The OSG
correctly cites the case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice,18 where the Court held that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent
with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and
state prosecutors. In view of the foregoing, both the Court of Appeals and the Secretary of
Justice clearly erred in ruling that prior approval by the Ombudsman is required for the
investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the accused policemen.
On the reversal by the Secretary of Justice
of the resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco
Settled is the rule that the Secretary of Justice retains the power to review resolutions of his
subordinates even after the information has already been filed in court.19 In Marcelo v.
Court of Appeals,20 reiterated in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court clarified that
nothing in Crespo v. Mogul22 forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice
to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already
having been filed in court.23 The nature of the power of control of the Secretary of Justice
over prosecutors was explained in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals24 in this wise:
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of justice
who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their
rulings. (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the Secretary of Justice’s reversal of the Resolution of
State Prosecutor Velasco did not amount to "executive acquittal" because the Secretary of
Justice was simply exercising his power to review, which included the power to reverse the
ruling of the State Prosecutor. However, once a complaint or information is filed in court,
any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound
discretion of the court.25 Trial judges are not bound by the Secretary of Justice’s reversal of
the prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause. Trial judges are required to make their
own assessment of the existence of probable cause, separately and independently of the
evaluation by the Secretary of Justice.26
On the motion to quash the information
when the accused had not been arrested yet
People v. Mapalao,27 as correctly argued by the OSG, does not squarely apply to the
present case. In that case, one of the accused, Rex Magumnang, after arraignment and
during the trial, escaped from detention and had not been apprehended since then.
Accordingly, as to him the trial in absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment of
conviction was promulgated. The Court held that since the accused remained at large,
he should not be afforded the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction unless he
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested. While at large, the
accused cannot seek relief from the court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he
has no standing in court.28 In Mapalao, the accused escaped while the trial of the case was
on-going, whereas here, the accused have not been served the warrant of arrest and have
not been arraigned. Therefore, Mapalao is definitely not on all fours with the present
case.lavvphil.net
Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash29 which requires
that the accused should be under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to
quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no authority to do so. Custody
of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.30
However, while the accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on the
19
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files
any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.31
At any rate, the accused’s motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority of the filing
officer, would have never prospered because as discussed earlier, the Ombudsman’s
power to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government.
On the existence or non-existence of probable cause
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an
appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination,
as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.32 However, in the following
exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of
probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation.33
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied; [and]
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners.
There is no clear showing that the present case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions. Moreover, as stated earlier, once the information is filed with the trial court, any
disposition of the information rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is
mandated to independently evaluate or assess the existence of probable cause and it may
either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The trial court
is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.34 Reliance alone on the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice amounts to an abdication of the trial court’s duty and
jurisdiction to determine the existence of probable cause.35
Considering that the Information has already been filed with the trial court, then the trial
court, upon filing of the appropriate motion by the prosecutor, should be given the
opportunity to perform its duty of evaluating, independently of the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice recommending the withdrawal of the Information against the accused,
the merits of the case and assess whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for
trial for kidnapping for ransom.36
WHEREFORE, we REMAND this case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case to determine whether probable
cause exists to hold the accused for trial.
SO ORDERED.
20