1

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN

The civil-military relations form an essential strand of national security strategy. In peace, they affect
the internal stability of a nation state; in war, they influence the outcome. In the developed
countries the military is mostly busy in participation of formulation of national security policy.
However, in the developing countries, particularly those with a colonial past, the military have long
maintained a substantive role in domestic politics. That is, the military have either overthrown the
legally constituted governments, or overly influenced decision-making at national levels. Same is the
case in Pakistan.

Historical context

The evolution of the civil-military relations in Pakistan was affected by many factors that were
unique to the developing world. The political and administration infrastructures of Pakistan have to
be built from the scratch is one these factors. Like Indian Army, Pakistan army originated from the
British Indian army. However, unlike India, the civil military relations in Pakistan evolved along the
deadly different path. That is why Pakistan witness frequent military interventions; at least three of
them were overt. Thus, Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has experienced 30 years of military
rule (1958 to 1971, 1977 to 1988 and 1999 to 2008); even when not in government the military has
constantly sought to centralise and consolidate political power, and the military (notably military
intelligence, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)) exerts significant overt and covert control over the
civilian authorities in both domestic and foreign affairs. Given Pakistan’s volatile relationship with
India, centred on the decades-long conflict for control of Kashmir, Pakistan has always been a
‘security state’, and the national military has historically been a key player in the geopolitical arena.
However, information on Pakistan’s armed forces is very limited, and interaction with Western
civilian and military institutions is heavily controlled. The climate of secrecy within the Pakistan
military and its associated security services directly and indirectly affects civil–military coordination
and presents humanitarian actors with a highly complicated operational environment.

The role of the military in Pakistani society

Pakistan’s military has multiple roles: preparing for and responding to natural disasters, contributing
military personnel to UN missions (Pakistan has a long history of contributing troops and police to
UN peacekeeping operations and has consistently been in the top three of contributor nations.),
under special circumstances maintaining law and order and defending Pakistan’s borders and
conducting security operations, counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism operations. Pakistan’s
volatile relationship with India has ensured that the military has been well-resourced.

The armed forces consist of the Army (550,000), Navy (22,000) and Air Force (70,000), totalling
642,000 military personnel in active service. Paramilitary forces number 304,000, and there is a
reserve force complement of 500,000.
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The Army is structured using the traditional British two-tier hierarchy of officers and enlisted ranks, a
legacy of colonial rule. Officer ranks follow British military naming conventions, the lowest being
Second Lieutenant and the highest Field Marshal. In addition, there are three ranks of Junior
Commissioned Officer: Naib Subedar, Subedar and Subedar-Major. Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO)
ranks range from Solider at the lowest echelon to Battalion Havildar Major at the highest. Officers
are predominantly drawn from Pakistan’s middle classes; indeed, employment as an officer is the
predominant profession of the middle and, increasingly, lower-middle classes. Selection is highly
competitive, but once recruited members of the military and their families enjoy extensive support,
including medical care at well-equipped facilities and a patronage network. According to Lieven
(2011), the military forms a separate ‘giant kinship group’ that ‘sees itself as a breed apart, and
devotes great effort to inculcating in new recruits the feeling that they belong to a military family
different from (and vastly superior to) Pakistani civilian society’. Regionally, the northwest Punjab
and KP and Punjabi and Pashtun/Pathan ethnicities respectively have provided the majority of
military recruits, particularly for the Army (Lieven, 2011). Moves are being made to make the
military a more national institution; recruitment initiatives have focused on Sindhi, Mohajir and
Baloch in an effort to increase their numbers in the forces, and new cantonments have been built in
Sindh and Balochistan. What effect this is having on the ethnic make-up of the forces is impossible to
say as statistics are not made available.

Preparing for disaster response has long been part of military training. When called on to support
civil authorities, military assistance has predominantly been channelled into less secure areas, with
civilian actors responding in the more accessible locations. The military provides relief and rescue,
logistical support, engineering expertise, emergency health provision and basic reconstruction of
infrastructure. The armed forces also have a disaster preparedness role, for example by coordinating
with the civil authorities in maintaining water channels, in joint inspections of flood defences and
participation in pre-monsoon coordination meetings. In relation to complex emergencies, the Army
feels that it has a legitimate interest not only in responding to terrorism but also in rebuilding after
security operations. Given Pakistan’s longstanding commitment and experience as one of the
principal contributors of troops and police to UN peacekeeping operations, it is conceivable that the
security services consider themselves to be the best organisation to address both disaster and
conflict. The experience and expertise the Pakistan military brings is recognized by the humanitarian
community, and the Army is considered to be a significant player, with the ability to provide
personnel, logistics and key skills in response to disasters. A cross-section of respondents were
either comfortable with the military role in disaster response, or felt that the armed forces were
obliged to act due to the high level of state funds and government resources they received.

The Army’s counter-insurgency operations against Taliban militants began in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 2001, and continue today at various points along the Afghan–
Pakistan border (the Durand Line). Pakistan’s counter-insurgency strategy has been described as
‘engage, destroy, and negotiate’, the inverse of the ‘clear, hold, build’ strategies of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/NATO military forces in Afghanistan (Zaidi, 2010). Local populations
are evacuated before overwhelming force and heavy firepower is used to attack militants headon;
this is followed by the negotiation of a ceasefire.

Collateral damage, mass internal displacement and the destruction of infrastructure have been the
result.
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A lack of reconciliation and reconstruction initiatives following these offensives has exacerbated the
conflict and generated increasingly negative opinions of military activities among local populations.

Western governments, especially the US, have been supportive of Pakistan’s counter-insurgency
operations. Foreign aid for disaster response operations, most notably from the US, has been used
to promote stability and gain local and national support for international counter-terrorism and
stabilisation objectives. This has had an impact on the provision of humanitarian aid, with the
Pakistan military controlling and in some cases blocking aid flows. As discussed in the sections that
follow, the response to the 2005 earthquake was seen as a large-scale ‘hearts and minds’
opportunity by national and international military forces, to improve local perceptions of military
forces and their respective governments.2 An essential objective from the national military
perspective was to decrease local opposition to security operations in the mountainous region of
South Waziristan on the Afghan–Pakistan border. For the US, the response was seen as a way to
reduce vitriolic anti-American sentiment amongst local populations, which had been compounded
by drone attacks against Taliban militants. With the international drawdown

from Afghanistan scheduled for 2014, Pakistan is facing increasing pressure to reform its security
strategy. In an attempt to stem insurgency and unrest during the transition, it is likely that Pakistan
will step up counter-insurgency operations along the border, with significant implications for the
humanitarian response in this highly troubled region.

Why Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan have Always been on a Bumpy Road?

The most basic precondition of a true democratic setup is a healthy civil-military relationship. In all
democratic countries, an elected civilian government enjoys full control over the military. However,
in Pakistan, control over governance has oscillated between the two; a decade of civilian supremacy
followed by a decade of military rule. The reasons for this periodic shuffling are incompetent
political leadership, weak political parties and institutions, rising power of civil-military bureaucracy,
serious security threats to the country and frequent use of military in aid of civil power.

In the early days of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam clearly articulated the role of the military in the following
words: “Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people. You do not make
national policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out these
tasks with which you are entrusted.”

Leadership Void

Soon after independence, in 1948, the Father of the Nation and the first Governor-General, Quaid-i-
Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, passed away. Thus, a leadership void was created after just one year of
the country's establishment. The first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, who was Quaid's
right hand lieutenant, was also assassinated in 1951. About the rest of the leadership lot, the Quaid
had ruefully remarked that “he had false coins in his pocket.”
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Delayed Finalisation of Constitution

Similarly, in 1954, there were nine members of the Prime Minister's cabinet, who were not members
of the Parliament, including Commander-in-Chief General Muhammad Ayub Khan. Moreover,
Pakistan took nine long years to finalise its first constitution that was enforced on 23 March 1956.
This inordinate delay allowed the Governor-General to continue with his authoritarian rule. This all
was happening at a time when the country direly needed healthy democratic traditions. In addition,
the first general elections in the country, which were due in 1951, were held after a lapse of almost
quarter of a century, in 1970. This further strengthened the non-democratic and authoritarian
tendencies providing space to civil and military bureaucracies to assume a dominant position in
governance.

Weak Political Parties

For any healthy constitutional and political system to function smoothly, strong and well-entrenched
political parties are essential. Unfortunately, political parties in Pakistan have failed to develop into
strong vehicles of national political will. The main reason is that most of our leaders belonged to
feudal and capitalist classes and were thus, by their very nature, inimical to a democratic polity.
Their incompetence and constant wrangling for power led to ceaseless infighting. For instance, as
early as 1953, a clash between the leadership of the Punjab and the central government led to the
imposition of Martial Law in Lahore, the provincial capital.

Weak Institutions

After independence, Pakistan had to start from scratch. There was no established parliament, no
civil secretariat, no supreme court, no central bank and no organised armed forces. There was a
paucity of competent parliamentarians. The proportion of the Indian Civil Service officers who opted
for Pakistan was small. The same was true of the higher judiciary. Unlike other institutions, the
proportion of Muslims in the Indian Army was comparatively substantial, i.e., 33 per cent. This is also
one of the reasons why the armed forces of Pakistan assumed greater importance right in the
beginning and were better established than other institutions of the state.

Rising Power of Civil-Military Bureaucracy

Due to lack of basic infrastructure, Pakistan had to make new beginning in all spheres. But the low
level of literacy made this task very difficult. The country needed competent and a determined
leadership to build and nurture democratic institutions. But such a leadership was hard to come by
in a rural society in which the political, social and economic life was dominated by the landed
aristocracy. The feudal leadership of political parties was not capable of dealing with the
multifarious problems faced by the country. It depended heavily on the civil and military
bureaucracy. The result was the bureaucratic elite became disproportionately assertive, steadily
increasing their power at the expense of the political elite. For instance, a civil bureaucrat Governor-
General of Pakistan, Ghulam Muhammad (1951-55), dissolved the National Assembly in 1954 and
the Federal Court justified and validated his unconstitutional act on the basis of the “law of
necessity.”
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Wrangling for Power

The first President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza, relied on the military to ensure state's integrity when
the PML President, Qayyum Khan, threatened direct action and the Khan of Kalat declared his
secession from Pakistan. In order to deal with the disturbed situation, Mirza took extreme step; he
abrogated the Constitution, dissolved the legislative assemblies, dismissed the central and provincial
governments, banned all political parties and postponed general elections indefinitely. He also
declared Martial Law and appointed General Ayub as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA),
who in turn removed Iskander Mirza on October 27, 1958 and himself became the President. Thus
began the era of military-dominated governance.

Military's Sway over Political Setup

After seven years of instability (1951-58), in which as many as seven prime ministers rose and fell,
the military regime put the country on the path of economic and political stability. Hamid Khan, a
renowned lawyer, writes in “Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan”, “Ayub's term of office
[1958-69] was the golden era for the bureaucracy, which exercised its powers, unbridled by any
political interference.”

Again, after the restoration of democratic governance during 1988-99, four governments were
dissolved by the President of Pakistan invoking Article 58 (2)(b). On 12 October, 1999, the military
once again ousted the elected government and Pakistan was again under their despotic rule.

Civil Dependence on Army

From the very beginning, the Army remained involved in civil administration. In 1947, it was the
Army that was asked to establish civil secretariat in Karachi. They vacated their barracks, renovated
them to house the secretariat and the staff coming from Delhi. It was the Army which largely
contributed to safeguarding the movement of several refugee convoys carrying millions of refugees
from East Punjab as well as establishing their camps at Lahore. In short, the army was frequently
called in aid of civil authorities in all natural disasters, emergencies and other civil functions.

Present Situation

Presently, however, the situation is different. Pakistan's political leadership is more mature and
political parties are better established. The country has developed a middle class, an active civil
society, a vibrant media and an independent judiciary. Whenever required, Parliament is getting
briefing on security matters from the Services Chiefs and decisions are taken through consensus.
Although military enjoys autonomy in its internal affairs, somewhat healthy civil-military relations
exist. The Army is more deeply involved now than a decade ago in support of activities for the
civilian government: law-and-order tasks; relief and rescue operations after natural disasters; the
use of its organisational and technological resources for public welfare projects; greater induction of
its personnel in civilian institutions; anti-terrorist activities; and containing narcotics trafficking.

A National Action Plan (NAP) was jointly formulated by the political parties and the armed forces to
win the war in the cities. Speaking to Russian magazine Sputnik, DG ISPR conceded that only a part
of the plan has so far been implemented while the rest remains stalled due to ‘political challenges’.
There is a need to correctly define the political challenges. The major challenge is the pressure from
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the religio-political parties which are strongly opposed to any government regulation or external
oversight of the madrassas. They also reject any revision of the mainstream educational curricula to
remove hate material and introduce tolerance. The army has to support the government in blocking
the two major sources of the spread of extremist ideas.

There has to be full cooperation between the army and the civilian governments at the centre and
the provinces. Similarly, Rangers and Police, and military and civilian intelligence agencies have to
work together rather than work at cross purposes. Terrorists will have a field day if a tug of war was
to ensue between governments led by the mainstream parties and the establishment or if there is
disregard for civilian institutions by the military-controlled intelligence and law enforcement
agencies.

The civilian institutions have to play a major role in the war against urban terrorism. What one sees
happening vis-a-vis the delay in setting up of NACTA indicates a trend which is not healthy. The
arrest of a policeman by Rangers after raiding a police station and his subsequent release is also an
indication of the malaise. One also does not expect military commanders to issue statements with
political implications.

The Way Forward

Presently, civil-military relations do not seem as healthy and cordial as they should be. There are
apprehensions on both sides. The government's tacit support to Geo in ISI bashing case has
increased the tensions between the two pillars of the state. Apparently, army and the government
are poles apart on the issue of operation against Taliban.

It is imperative that in the larger interest of the country both these institutions join hands to save
Pakistan from the monster of terrorism and steer the country out of multifaceted crises which are
adversely affecting Pakistan and its citizens. It is often said that Pakistan is in a state of war and no
war can be won when there is disunity among the state institutions.

1. Laws and clear constitutional provisions should be put in place that define the chain of
command and civilian authority over the military. Although apparently a piece of paper, this
provision establishes the legitimacy for any action to resist any encroachment by the military.

2. Bring a change in culture, values and acceptability among the masses that civilian rule is
possible and should be put in place. This enculturation would be possible through a committed
media and impartial press.

3. Structures and processes should be put in place, detailing who will command. Fourth,
openness and transparency or freedom of information is vital so that everything is open to the
public and civilian leadership.

4. Let the military budgets or expenditures be controlled by civilian authorities. No doubt the
civilians linked to this process should be thoroughly scrutinised for their integrity.
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The Future of Civil-Military Relations of Pakistan.

Outlines:

1. Introduction.

2. Brief History of Civil-Military relations.

a. First and second martial law

b. Third martial law

c. Fourth martial law

3. Events which shown improved civil-military relations.

a. 2008 and 2013 general elections

b. Operation Zarb-e-Azab and National Action Plan

c. Memogate scandal

d. 2014 and 2017 sit-ins and military role

e. Dawn Leaks

4. Recommendations to improve further relations.

a. Public awareness about democracy.

b. Supremacy of the constitution

c. Harmony between civil and military leadership

d. Independence of Judiciary

5. Conclusions

The relations between military and civil government is improving and gradually leading towards
bright future in Pakistan. Although, the relation in the past- since its inception- was very much hard.
In the last decade, since the martial is lifted, many times Pakistan faced deteriorated situations but
the civil-military relations not only remain stable but also both leadership united and decided
various key matters pertaining to the country national security. This shows a positive sign for the
future.

To analyze the past, civil-military relations were very much deteriorated. In 1951 a Major-General
tried to remove the civilian government- Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case. In 1953 Lahore Martial Law
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was declared when the situation became out of control of the civilian government. Later on in 1954,
the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army was invited to join the government which he did. As a
result first martial law was imposed on 27th October 1958. After the 1965 war political leaders
aroused people against Chief Martial Law Administrator. The public started protests for the
resignation of President of Pakistan. In 1969 he resigned but instead of handing over the charge to a
civilian government, he appointed another Commander-in-Chief as President of Pakistan. The
president hold the 1970 elections which lead to the Tug of War between East Pakistan and West
Pakistan. As a result, East Pakistan was separated from West Pakistan. The second martial law was
ended on 20th December 1971.

In 1972 the President of Pakistan removed the last Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army in light of
the Hamood ur Rehamn Commission Report. This report accused the military for the atrocities
committed in the East Pakistan. After the 1977 general election, political instability occurred in the
country. On 5th July 1977 third martial law was imposed and the Prime Minister of Pakistan and his
federal cabinet members were arrested. Later on the arrested Prime Minister was executed, in a
murder case of a political party member, on 4th April 1979. The government remained in the control
of military till 1988.

In 1988, after the death of President of Pakistan in a plane crash, the general elections were
scheduled. The military intervened in the electoral process by reducing the edge of a political party
popularity. The relations between civil and military always remain tottered till 1999. The President
thrice used his power under the Article 58 (2) b, for the removal of the Prime Minster with the
consent of military and the military captured the important government buildings and offices. In
1998, Prime Minister removed Chief of Army Staff. Later on, in 1999, when Prime Minister removed
Chief of Army Staff, when he was on a visit to Sri Lanka, the army took control of the government
which lasted till 2008.

After the end of martial law in 2008, the civil-military relation shown a positive sign. The general
election of 2008 were held without the intervention of the military, as they used to do in the past.
The civilian government completed its constitutional term for the first time in the history of Pakistan.
In addition to this, 2013 election was held. The military supported the election by providing security
to the electoral process. Despite some unpleasant situation in the last decade, the civil military
relations not only remain in their constitutional role but also did some major decisions unanimously
for the protection of national security.

Operation Zarb-e-Azab was started on 15th June 2014, with the consent of both civil and military
leadership, after the failure of peace talks with Taliban. The civil government and all the political
parties supported the operation. After the success of operation, both the political and military
leadership took several steps to rehabilitate the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
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In retaliation to the operation Zarb-e-Azab, seven terrorists of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan entered the
Army Public School Peshawar on 16th December 2016, and killed 145 people, most of them were
students and wounded more than 200 people. In response to the attack, the civil government and
military agreed to form military courts in the All Parties Conference through 21st constitutional
amendment which was passed by the National Assembly unanimously. In addition, National Action
Plan was formed; both civil and military leadership committed to work according to the National
Action Plan. These unanimous decisions shown the sign of stability and harmony in the civil military
relations.

In 2014, two political parties started protest against civil government on alleged rigging in the
electoral process. The political conditions of the country was very horrified. The military not only
remain in their constitutional role but also did the mediator job in order to settle the matter, when
asked by the government to perform the job of mediator. Furthermore, in November 2017, the
people started protest and sit-in in Faizabad Islamabad demanded resignation of the Law Minister
due to the alteration in the Finish of Prophethood article in the constitution 24th amendment. Later
on when the government used the violence to end the protest, the protest started in the other parts
of the country. The country was leading to a civil war but the military played the mediator role and
saved the country and the civilian government also.

Many times the civil-military relations was so much deteriorated in the last decade that it was
generally believed that the martial law would be imposed but every time the matter was solved
peacefully. In 2011, after the Abbottabad operation, a letter was written to the American high
Authorities that the military is unhappy and want to take over the government. Although it did not
happened. This scandal is known as Memogate scandal. The relation between civil and military
became very tense. The military did not took control of the government rather than the matter was
decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Another breach of civil-military relation was seen in the shape of Dawn Leaks. In October 2016, a
secret meeting was held between the civil and military leadership to discuss the further course of
action due to international pressure to take action against terrorists or face isolation- the civil
government told the military leadership. However, this news was reported in the daily Dawn
newspaper which the army termed as a breach of national security. The government formed an
Enquiry Commission to probe the matter and find out the culprit for the leak of the news. In light of
the Enquiry Commission report the government removed Information Minister Pervaiz Rasheed and
Specail Assistant on Foreign Affairs Tariq Fatmi. The military, however, rejected the Commission
report in a tweet. The matter was then settled peacefully and the ISPR DG took the tweet back.

As the civil-military relations are heading towards better with the passage of time, however, certain
steps are necessary to strengthen the relation better in the long term. The people must be aware
about the democracy and the constitutional role of military in the country. The supremacy of the
constitution should be made possible. All the problems and matters pertaining to the country should
be solved in the light of the constitution. The military should work in their boundaries and the
environment for complete harmony between civil and military leadership should be maintained. The
Judiciary should be made more independent and empower to decide matter relating to civil-military
issues in order to avoid conflicts between civil and military leadership.
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To sum up, despite some hard time in civil-military relation in the last decade such as the Memogate
Scandle and Dawn Leaks, yet the civil-military relations remain stable as compared to the past.
Besides the mediator role in the sit-ins, the unanimous decisions regarding military courts, National
Action Plan and Operation Zarb-e-Azab proved that the civil and military relations are going towards
a bright future.
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CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN

by Hasan Askari Rizvi

Governance in is a delicate balancing act between the military chiefs and the elected civilian
government. It is a power-sharing arrangement whereby the military has important influence over
foreign, security and key domestic issues, and mediates confrontations among feuding political
leaders, parties or state institutions- if such confrontations are deemed threatening to political
order and stability. Although the civilian government enjoys considerable autonomy for political
and economic management and exercise of state authority, it is expected always to consider the
military's sensibilities. The military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can and will influence the
nature and direction of political change without necessarily assuming power.

How to cope with this kind of 'soft' military intervention is a common dilemma for civilian leaders
of states that have experienced prolonged military rule. The civilian regimes that succeed military
rule face serious identity crises. On the one hand, these governments want to prove that they are
not under the tutelage of the military and can act autonomously. On the other hand, they cannot
afford to alienate the military leadership, whose support is crucial to their survival. Their task is
complicated by the fact that the top brass are loath to surrender the power and privileges that
they enjoyed during the years of military rule. The military ensures that there are sufficient
constitutional and political safeguards to sustain their entrenched position in the period after their
withdrawal from direct rule. Extended military rule in a multi-ethnic and diversified society also
increases political fragmentation and creates vested interests supporting authoritarian and non-
democratic political arrangements. These conditions make the task of political management
difficult for any post-martial law civilian regime aiming to establish its credentials as a genuine
democratic government while not alienating the senior commanders.
The Transition to Civilian Rule
The ascendancy of 's military began shortly after the country-achieved independence in 1947. The
rapid degeneration of the political process enabled the military to become an important decision-
maker at the national level, culminating in the direct assumption of power by the Army Chief,
General (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan, through a coup in October 1958. He ruled under martial
law until June 1962, when he civilianised his regime by co-opting some politicians and establishing
a constitution, which legitimized the continuation of his rule after the withdrawal of martial law. A
second coup was staged in March 1969' by General Yahya Khan, who surrendered power to an
elected civilian leader in December 1971' after the military debacle in the 1971 Indo- war. The
military overcame the trauma of defeat within a few years, and General Zia ul-Haq reasserted
military dominance by overthrowing the civilian government in July 1977. He presided over the
longest period of martial law in 's history (July 1977 December 1985) and handed power over to a
civilian government through a carefully managed disengagement.

The civilian system that replaced Zia's military rule in 1985 enabled the military to shift its
emphasis from overt 'rule' to a more subtle, but still ubiquitous 'role'. Instead of exercising power
directly (although the coup option is still available), the military has become a formidable political
actor, influencing the nature and direction of political change. This planned transition began when
Zia introduced far-reaching changes in the 1973 Constitution, emphasising an all-powerful
President (Zia himself) and a weak Prime Minister. Zia saw his relationship with the Army as
crucial to his survival and thus guarded its professional and corporate interests. He underlined his
primacy in the political process, not merely through his enhanced presidential powers, but also by
projecting his position of Army Chief as a 'bridge' between the newly established civilian
government and the powerful armed forces.1 He periodically lashed out at the civilian government
to keep it in line. When the Prime Minister tried to assert his autonomy, Zia sacked him in May
1988, thereby demolishing the civilianised system he had created. He was trying to co-opt another
set of civilian leaders who could serve as 'adjuncts to military supremacy' when he was killed in an
air crash in August.2

The military's decision not to assume power after Zia's death led to the holding of multi-party
elections and subsequent transfer of power to a civilian government in December 1988.3 Since
then, the Army Chiefs have emphasised professionalism and no direct involvement of soldiers in
politics; they have generally supported the democratic process and civilian governance.4 This
support is tactical, however, based on a realistic assessment of the political situation. It does not
change the fact that they are central to the political process.
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A Pivot in the Power Structure

The Army Chief is a pivot in 's post-1988 power structure. Together with the President and the
Prime Minister, he constitutes one-third of the 'Troika' -an extra-constitutional arrangement for
civilian-military consensus-building on key domestic, foreign policy and security issues. The Troika
meets periodically; senior military and civilian officials are summoned to give briefings relating to
the issues under discussion. The Army Chief also holds meetings separately with the President and
Prime Minister on political and security affairs. Another institution that has gained prominence is
the Corps Commanders' meeting. Presided over by the Army chief, this conference includes top
commanders, Principal Staff Officers at the Army Headquarters and other senior officers holding
strategic appointments. Its members not only discuss security and organisational and professional
matters, but also deliberate on domestic issues such as law and order, and general political
conditionsÑespecially when the government and the opposition are engaged in intense
confrontation. These discussions are intended both to underline senior officers' political concerns
and to develop a broad-based military consensus. Executing the consensus decisions is left to the
Army Chief, thereby strengthening his position when he interacts with the President and the Prime
Minister.

A smooth interaction among the Troika members ensures the military's support for the Prime
Minister, which contributes to general political stability. If serious differences develop among these
key players, political uncertainty and instability are likely. The Prime Minister - the civilian side of
the power equation - can find him or herself in a difficult situation. The military is well placed to
exert pressure on him. Furthermore, the 1973 Constitution, as amended by Zia in 1985, greatly
strengthened the position of the President vis-a-vis the Prime Minister, making it difficult for the
latter to emerge as an autonomous power.

The Prime Minster's position was boosted somewhat by an April 1997' Constitutional amendment
curtailing the President's powers so that he cannot dismiss the Prime Minister. However, so long as
the Prime Minister presides over divided and mutually hostile political forces, he will have to work
in harmony with the President - and the Army.

The military's primary consideration is not direct exercise of power, but protection and
advancement of its professional and corporate interests. If these interests can be protected, it
would prefer to stay on the sidelines. Given military's political experience, organisational resources
and institutional strengths, its senior commanders are reasonably confident that they can pursue
such a strategy. The senior commanders are willing to negotiate their interests and accommodate
the civilian leaders. What is not acceptable to them, however, is a frontal attack on their
institutional and corporate interests as they define them, a deliberate campaign to malign the
military, or unilateral decision-making by the civilian leaders on matters which directly concern
them. They will not support a discredited civilian government nor allow the military's name to be
used by civilian leaders, whether in government or in opposition, in their power struggle. The
scope for manoeuvre for the civilian leaders can thus expand if they establish a relationship of
trust and confidence with the military.

The Military's Interests

Among the military's major interests and concerns, six stand out:

National security is obviously paramount. During the Zia era, the military directly controlled
nuclear policy and the conduct of the Afghan War. Nuclear policy has remained their close
preserve, even under civilian rule. Benazir Bhutto complained in September 1991 that she was
denied information about highly sensitive aspects of the country's nuclear programme during her
first term as Prime Minister. The role of the Foreign Office and the civilian leadership in formulating
and implementing the Afghanistan policy increased after the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops, but
senior Army commanders and the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) continue to have a significant
input. Similarly, the Army maintains deep interest in policy towards India, including Kashmir. The
military elite are not opposed in principle to Indo-i rapprochement, but they are concerned that the
civilian government not ignore what they see as New Delhi's 'hegemonic' agenda. Strong and
credible conventional defence and nuclear-weapons capabilities are considered vital to ward off
Indian pressures and to enable to conduct independent foreign and domestic policies. Unless the
military is satisfied that there are credible guarantees against India's efforts to interfere, it will
resist surrendering its nuclear-weapon option and advise caution on normalising relations.
 13

Furthermore, the military-like most civilian policy-makersÑwill not want to improve bilateral
relations unless India addresses the issue of Kashmir.

Overseas weapons and equipment procurement is another military interest with foreign-policy
implications. The three military services thus press the civilian government to pursue foreign policy
to facilitate this objective.

Military autonomy and civilian non-interference in internal organisational matters and service
affairs is jealously guarded by senior commanders. The service chiefs generally resist any Ministry
of Defence tampering with their personnel recommendations, including promotions, transfers and
postings. Military leaders view their autonomy and civilian non-interference as crucial in
maintaining service discipline and professionalism. If the political leaders are able to make in-roads
into the military and establish their lobbies, the senior commanders think, the military's overall
discipline, organisational coherence and institutional capacity to cope with the political
environment will be compromised.

The military is opposed to any unilateral cut in defence expenditure by civilian leaders. Its senior
commanders are prepared to discuss budgetary issues with their non-military leaders, but they are
opposed to critical public statements by government leaders or to any reduction that has not
previously been cleared with them.

The repeated exercise of power under martial law has enabled officers to accumulate considerable
perks and privileges, which the military inevitably wants protected - along with generally
improving service conditions.

The military also expects a civilian government to ensure socio-political stability. The senior
commanders therefore constantly review the government's political and economic management,
especially its interaction with the political adversaries, the handling of law and order, and such
issues as corruption, use of state machinery and patronage. Army Chiefs have not hesitated to
comment publicly on the political situation, advising political leaders to put their house in order,
not to crush their opposition, to settle contentious issues through political means and negotiations,
and on the need to establish a corruption-free, transparent and effective administration. Their
interest in these matters stems from the assumption that a polity in turmoil cannot sustain a
professional military. Furthermore, with the military's industrial and commercial activities
expanding through its four welfare foundations, the government's economic and industrial policies
have also acquired direct relevance.5

On a number of occasions, top Army commanders have used their influence to moderate a conflict
among the politicians and/or forced them into a settlement when they felt that a confrontation
would cause a major constitutional or political breakdown. They supported the President in
removing civilian governments in August 1990, April 1993 and November 1996, having concluded
that these governments could no longer ensure domestic peace, stability and order. In December
1997, on the other hand, the Army ultimately supported the Prime Minister in his bitter
confrontation with the President and the judiciary.

The Military and the Intelligence Agencies

The military also relies on intelligence agencies to influence the political process. Using intelligence
services to monitor dissident political activity is nothing new in . However, the role of the Military
Intelligence (MI), the ISI and Intelligence Bureau (IB) increased during the Zia era. While the MI is
a purely military agency, the ISI might be called 'semi-military'. The ISI's Director-General is a
serving Army officer (a Lieutenant-General or Major-General), but he is appointed by the Prime
Minister and reports both to the civil and the military authorities. The IB is a civilian agency.
Although the MI focuses on military-security related affairs, it overstepped its domain during the
Zia years by becoming involved in domestic political activity and undertaking some political
assignments similar to those given to the ISI. It also counter-checked the intelligence gathered by
the ISI and other agencies and played an important role in implementing orders to dismiss the
governments in August 1990 and November 1996.6

The ISI and the IB have been more active in domestic politics. The former gained prominence due
to its association with the Afghan War and the close links it cultivated with the US Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a 1979-80, which enabled it to amass sizeable material resources.7
Since the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the MI and the ISI have focused more
 14

on domestic i affairs, the latter working to implement the military's political agenda. In the 1988
general elections, Army leaders directed the ISI to help to establish a right-wing political alliance
to counterbalance the expected victory of Benazir Bhutto's People's Party (PPP). The ISI arranged
the reunification of the Muslim League (PML)'s two faction, and then encouraged a number of
other parties to join the PML to set up an electoral alliance, named Islami Jamhoori Itehad (IJI).
The ISI remained associated with the IJI election campaign and helped to coin anti-PPP slogans.8
In September-October 1989, two ISI officers launched Operation Midnight Jackals in a bid to sway
PPP members of the National Assembly to back a vote of no-confidence against the Bhutto
government.9 Similarly, the agency played a role in the switching the Mohajir Qaumi Movement
(MQM)'s support from Bhutto to the opposition. However, Bhutto managed to survive the no-
confidence vote. The ISI was again active in the October 1990 general elections. It obtained Rs
140 million ($6.45m) from a banker and distributed it mainly to the IJI and other Bhutto
opponents.10 In the case of the October 1993 general elections, the MQM leaders maintained that
they withdrew from the National Assembly contest under pressure from the Army and the ISI.

Information collected by intelligence agencies is used by the Army Chief to take up internal and
external security issues in Troika meetings and in his individual meetings with the President and
the Prime Minister. The President has also relied on such intelligence to formulate charge sheets
against civilian governments he has dismissed. The Army authorities persuaded the caretaker
government that was in power from November 1996' February 1997 to give the military greater
say in the civilian IB's affairs, by inducting more Army personnel in the service, and giving the MI
a greater role in it. Intelligence gathering has become increasingly important for senior
commanders pursuing behind-the-scenes political intervention. These agencies have been used to
support or oppose a particular political group and to encourage the government's adversaries to
take it on.

Benazir Bhutto and the Military

Benazir Bhutto was in power twice - from December 1988-August 1990 and from October 1993-
November 1996 - in each case heading a coalition government. Despite the military's distrust of
the PPP, Bhutto was allowed to assume power in December 1988 (following Zia's death that
August) after the PPP emerged as the largest party in the parliamentary elections. She made three
major concessions towards the military: support for a five -year term for acting President Ishaq
Khan, a Zia loyalist who enjoyed the military's support; retention of Lt.-Gen. Yaqub Ali Khan (Zia's
Foreign Minister) in her cabinet to ensure continuity in Afghanistan policy; and a promise not to
make unilateral reductions in defence expenditure and service conditions. She publicly lauded the
military's role in restoring democracy and vowed to strengthen the armed forces by making
resources available to them. The military budget continued to rise during both terms and her
government worked closely with the military on Afghanistan and the nuclear issue. Her second
government's efforts to improve relations with the US, especially the one-time waiver to the
application of the Pressler Amendment in 1995-96, were appreciated by the military, enabling the
latter to receive weapons and equipment withheld by the US since October 1990.11

Bhutto's relations with the military soured, mainly because of her government's political and
economic mismanagement and bitter confrontation with her political adversaries that virtually
paralysed the administration. Senior commanders also bridled at what they took to be civilian
interference in the military's internal and organisational affairs.

The military considered its internal autonomy to be challenged by the civilian government's
interference with appointments and transfers. The first dispute arose in May 1989, when the
government changed the ISI's Director-General to reduce the ISI's involvement in domestic
politics.12 Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg reluctantly agreed, but was annoyed by the Prime
Minister's decision to appoint a retired Major-General instead of a serving officer, as was
traditional. General Beg also resented the government's efforts to persuade the Army not to press
punitive action against the officers who had been removed from service for indiscipline after the
execution of Benazir Bhutto's father, former President and Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.13 A
more serious row developed when the government unsuccessfully attempted to retire Admiral
Iftikhar Ahmad Sirohi, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, in 1989. Similarly, the
government's attempts to interfere with retirement and extension of some senior officers in June-
July 1990 further strained civil-military relations.14 The military was also wary of Bhutto's
keenness to cultivate India's Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, during his visits to in December 1988
and July 1989. Army intelligence sources collected enough evidence on the dialogue between the
two leaders to lead the Army commanders to view her as unreliable on security matters.
 15

The government's position towards the military was also weakened because of its disappointing
political performance. It was so haunted by fear that the ruling coalition might collapse that the
government spent most of its energies on sustaining its partners' support through political
compromises, material rewards and corruption. Political freedoms increased during this period, but
Bhutto was unable to adopt policies for long-term socio-economic transformation.15

The government and military also developed differences over how to handle a 1989-90 breakdown
of law and order in Sindh, caused by ethnic divisions in the province. Army authorities, while
assisting Sindh's civilian authorities, resented what they perceived as the government's attempt to
use troops to settle its scores with political adversaries. In an attempt to distance themselves from
the government, the Army commanders asked for no political interference in their work,
permission to set up military courts, and the invocation of a constitutional article that restricted
the superior judiciary's powers to enforce fundamental rights in areas under army control. The
civilian government refused. This severely strained civil-military relations and the Army Chief
issued several public statements on the Sindh situation with strong political overtones.16 The
opposition political parties sided with the Army by supporting its demands, and the dispute went
unresolved.

Most disastrous was the Bhutto government's confrontation with the Punjab, whose provincial
government was controlled by the opposition IJI, with Nawaz Sharif as Chief Minister. The federal
government and the Punjab's provincial government confronted each other on nearly every
administrative and political issue, causing much confusion and uncertainty.

In the face of these developments, the Prime Minister's relations with the President deteriorated.
President Ishaq Khan supported the military in its confrontations with Bhutto and criticised her
political and economic management. The Troika broke down. After detailed consultations between
the President and the Army Chief and a decision on the political situation in the Corps
Commanders' meeting in late July 1990, the President sacked Bhutto in the first week of
August.17

The Second Bhutto Government

Benazir Bhutto began her second term of office in October 1993' after her party and the allies won
the largest number of seats in the National Assembly in the 1993 general elections. She again
headed a coalition but she had the advantage of having two provinces - Sindh and the Punjab -
under the party's control. A PPP government was also established in the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) in April 1994. A PPP nominee, Farooq Ahmed Leghari, was elected President.
Bhutto's relations with the military were much improved as her government studiously avoided
interference in its internal affairs and considered its input on major security and foreign-policy
matters.

What got the Bhutto government into trouble in 1996 was its abysmal performance in the civilian
sector and its failure again to provide an effective and transparent administration. Ethnic violence
in Karachi and Hyderabad intensified during 1995-96 as the MQM hardcore and law-enforcement
agencies (the police and rangers) confronted each other.18 Amid this confrontation there emerged
a nexus among organised crime, drug mafia, Afghan War veterans and the MQM. The result was
increased violence, including indiscriminate killings by unidentified gunmen, arson and looting of
government and private property. Unable to cope with the situation, the government gave a
relatively free hand to the police and the rangers, who resorted to excessive force. There were
serious complaints about human-rights violations as a number of accused died in police custody.
There were also religious-sectarian killings, mainly but not exclusively in the Punjab, as two
extreme groups of Shi'a and Sunni Muslims engaged in an armed gang war.19

The economy too began to falter in 1996, after reasonable growth during 1994 and 1995.
Inflation, devaluation, price hikes, poor fiscal management and corruption added to the
government's woes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s pressures for structural changes,
declining foreign-exchange reserves and the threat of defaulting on loan repayments dogged the
government.

As in its first term, the ruling PPP and the main opposition, the Muslim League (PML)-Nawaz (the
former IJI) engaged in combative political discourse. It was a bitter struggle, and Bhutto created
 16

additional problems for her government by antagonising the top judiciary in an attempt to fill it
with political appointees.20

The President expressed concern about deteriorating economic conditions and advised Bhutto to
take effective measures against civil unrest and crime, including alleged corruption by her husband
Asif Ali Zardari. The ensuing breach between the two became a complete rupture after Bhutto's
estranged brother, Murtaza, was killed in a police shoot-out in Karachi in September 1996 and the
Prime Minister hinted that this could have been done at the President's behest.

Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat interceded to defuse the conflict between the President and
the Prime Minister, but he soon decided that Bhutto was not amenable to advice. By this time,
Bhutto's popular base had eroded. The PPP was a shambles, it had been neglected by the
leadership and the population at large was disaffected by inflation and general economic
insecurity. The opposition parties organised street protests and demanded the government's
dismissal. Under these circumstances, the President had no difficulty in enlisting the Army Chief's
support to remove Bhutto from office21

As in 1990, this dismissal was carried out coup-style. The Army took control of the Prime Minister's
house, all key government offices and media stations in Islamabad before the President issued the
dismissal order. Airports were closed for several hours, mobile phones and pagers were switched
off, and the MI took control of the IB headquarters in Islamabad. The Army Corps headquarters in
the four provincial capitals were open on the night of the dismissal and passed on the initial
instructions of the Presidency and the Army headquarters to top civil servants.

Nawaz Sharif and the Military

Nawaz Sharif began his first term as Prime Minister in November 1990, with the endorsement of
the President and leading military officers. Groomed during Zia's martial law, he won the
appreciation of the senior commanders, thanks to his defiant posture towards the first Bhutto
government.22 He maintained cordial relations with military leaders and did not reprimand the
Army Chief, General Beg, for publicly opposing the government's pro-US policy during the 1991
Gulf War. A supporter of strong military deterrence, Sharif continued to allocate considerable
resources to the military. And he left the military personnel's various perks and privileges alone.
Nonetheless, civil-military differences once again emerged over appointments and transfers,
maintaining law and order in Sindh, and the government's performance both at home and abroad.

Civil unrest in Sindh, which had caused problems between the Army and the two Bhutto
governments, created similar strains for the Sharif government. Although the Army agreed to
undertake a security operation in May 1992, it again balked at being viewed as an instrument of
the civilian government. As the security operation was launched in rural areas, an opposition
stronghold, Army commanders realised that the government wanted them to target PPP workers
and that the local administration was protecting the pro-government elements. They also felt that
the security environment could not improve unless similar action was taken in the urban areas. In
June, the Army decided to extend its operation to the urban areas, resulting in a direct
confrontation between the Army and the MQM activists who were entrenched there, and causing
much embarrassment to the Sharif government, as the MQM was its ally. Some cabinet members
publicly expressed strong resentment towards the Army decision, the Sharif government disowned
these statements but the damage was done. Tensions were worsened by allegations that the
government tried to 'buy off' the Army Chief and senior commanders with substantial material
rewards. General Janjua, at a Corps Commanders' meeting in late 1992, referred to government
efforts 'to corrupt the Army'.23

The military also worried about the government's foreign-policy performance. In October 1990, a
month before Sharif assumed power, the US retaliated against Islamabad's nuclear programme by
invoking the 1985 Pressler Amendment to suspend economic assistance and military sales to .
While agreeing that should not unilaterally surrender its nuclear-weapon options, the military
expected the government to devise a diplomatic solution for reviving weapons procurement from
the US. Such a prospect was marred, however, as Islamabad and Washington diverged on issues
of drug-trafficking and the activities of the -based Islamic extremists - the so-called Afghan War
veterans. In 1992, the US State Department placed on the 'watch list' of states allegedly
sponsoring terrorism (it was removed in 1993). The military, concerned about 's image abroad and
keen to obtain weapons, felt that the government was not doing enough to counter these
unfavourable developments.
 17

What kept the strains in civil-military relations under control was President Ishaq Khan's support
for the Sharif government. He acted as a bridge and a buffer between Sharif and the top
commanders. But this crucial relationship was damaged when, having successfully neutralised the
PPP-led agitation in December 1992, Sharif's advisers decided to take steps to curtail the
President's power.

The stage for a confrontation was set when the Army Chief, General Janjua, died of a sudden heart
attack in January 1993. Sharif and his advisers insisted on appointing Corps Commander Ashraf as
the new Army Chief. As his connections with Sharif were well known, the President used his
discretionary powers to appoint the little-known General Abdul Waheed Kaker, to the position
instead.

Sharif retaliated by declaring that his government would amend the constitution to deny the
President this discretionary power. The ruling party subsequently indicated that it might not
nominate Ishaq Khan for a second term when his term expired in late 1993, sparking a power
struggle between pro-President and pro-Prime Minister camps. The main opposition party, the PPP,
repeated its demand to hold fresh elections under a neutral administration.

The Army Chief tried unsuccessfully to mediate the conflict, but there was no respite. Sharif lost
patience and accused the President of conspiring to dislodge his government in a national address
on April 17 . The strategy of going public against the President did not help Sharif, but only
alienated the top brass - already unhappy about the government's performance. As expected, the
President moved decisively, first by seeking the blessings of the Army Chief. He then approached
the PPP for support, which was willingly offered.

After securing his position, the President dismissed Sharif the next day on charges of corruption,
nepotism, terrorising opponents, violating the Constitution and subverting the armed forces'
authority.24 A legal battle ensued, and on May 26 the Supreme Court declared the Presidential
order as unconstitutional and restored Sharif's government. The confrontation did not end. Much
to the Prime Minister's dismay, the Punjab and NWFP governments were collaborating with the
President, making it difficult for the restored federal government to function effectively. In a bid to
oust the pro-presidential Governor and Chief Minister in the Punjab, Chaudhry Altaf Hussain and
Manzoor Watto respectively, Sharif used his parliamentary majority to pass a resolution which
called upon the President to hand over the Punjab administration to his own nominee. Without
seeking the required approval of the President, the Sharif government issued a proclamation to
implement the resolution. This bid failed because the Army Chief refused to make any paramilitary
forces available to effect the change in the Punjab on the grounds that the presidential
proclamation was unauthorised.

It was after this take-over bid that the Army Chief and other senior commanders decided to
contain the crisis. In a July 1 special meeting, the Corps Commanders underlined the need to use
constitutional and legal methods for resolving the crisis and suggested that, given the widespread
demand for new elections, it would be desirable to hold them. These views were communicated to
the President and the Prime Minister by the Army Chief. Meanwhile, the opposition, led by the PPP,
infuriated by the government's attempt to take over the Punjab government, declared that it
would not accept anything other than new general elections and announced a 'Long March' to
Islamabad to blockade the city until the government resigned.

The Army Chief and his senior staff engaged in hectic mediation between the President and the
Prime Minister to develop a mutually acceptable formula for elections. The Chief also met Bhutto
and persuaded her to withdraw her 'Long March' call. It was this intense military pressure that
made the President and Prime Minister quit their offices simultaneously, making way for a
caretaker government to hold new elections that brought in Bhutto for a second term as Prime
Minister.25

The Second Sharif Government

Sharif returned to power in February 1997' after a gap of over three years. His government
dominated parliament with over two-thirds of the seats in both houses. The PPP was reduced to 17
seats in the National Assembly and was almost destroyed in the Punjab's provincial assembly.
Sharif's PML-N party also assumed power in three provinces - NWFP, the Punjab and Sindh. The
President and the military elite welcomed the change, especially the magnitude of Sharif's success,
hoping that he would be able to create a stable, effective and transparent administration.
 18

Sharif adopted a new strategy during his second term using his numerical strength in parliament
to secure his hold over power, undermining other Troika members and state institutions. He
engineered the passage, in April 1997, of the 13th constitutional amendment, which withdrew the
President's power to dismiss the government and dissolve the National Assembly. The amendment
also assigned the Prime Minister a greater role in appointing service chiefs, thereby eliminating the
President's discretionary powers. The 14th amendment, passed in July, enhanced the party
leader's powers at the expense of party members in parliament and provincial assemblies by
declaring that a member would lose his or her seat if he or she defected, violated party discipline
or voted against the party. The party leader was the final authority in judging members' conduct
on these matters with no recourse to the judiciary or any independent authority. This amendment
in effect created a dictatorship for the party leader and insured Sharif against any intra-party
dissension.

The parliament also adopted new legislation in May 1997' to dilute the autonomous character of
the accountability process established by the caretaker government in November 1996 for dealing
with corruption complaints against those holding high public offices. The power to appoint the
Chief Accountability Commissioner shifted from the President to the Prime Minister. The latter's
secretariat was assigned a key role in initiating and investigating charges of corruption, thereby
making it possible for the ruling party to use the accountability process to pressure political
adversaries.26
While taking these measures to strengthen its position, the government also took care to avoid
triggering any negative reaction from the military. Before introducing the 13th amendment, the
Prime Minister discussed the matter with the Army Chief, General Jehangir Karamat. Although the
top commanders had valued the President's dismissal powers over the government - since this was
one avenue for the military to press for change - the Army Chief agreed out of respect for Sharif's
electoral mandate. Similarly, General Karamat was consulted before the government asked the
Naval Chief to resign after his alleged involvement in defence-deal kickbacks in April 1997, and on
the appointment of a new Naval Chief. The government agreed to induct army officers between
the ranks of captain and colonel on a permanent basis into the police, the IB and the Federal
Investigation Agency (FIA) helping to satisfy long-term military aspiration for greater control over
intelligence services.27 In March 1997, Lt.-Gen. Moeenuddin Haider was appointed Governor of
Sindh within a week of his retirement, although the MQM, an ally of the ruling PML-N, wanted to
hold the post. Another Lt.-Gen., appointed Governor of NWFP by the caretaker government in
November 1996, was allowed to continue by Sharif. Finally, Sharif accepted Army's proposal to
allow the Army Chief to hold simultaneously the post of Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff
Committee when its incumbent, Air Chief Marshal Farooq Firoz Khan, retired in November 1997.

The crisis that nearly destroyed the second Sharif government started with its confrontation with
the judiciary. The crisis erupted when the Chief Justice, Sajjad Ali Shah, asked for the elevation of
three Chief Justices and two senior judges of the provincial High Courts to the Supreme Court. The
government nullified this recommendation by reducing the number of Supreme Court judges
through an executive order. As the Chief Justice persisted in his demand, the government
threatened to pass a law to legitimise the executive order. This dispute turned into a general
confrontation between the superior judiciary and the executive. The government used its executive
powers and control of the parliament and the media to discredit the Supreme Court, especially the
Chief Justice, while the Chief Justice employed his constitutional authority and judicial powers to
challenge the government.

Taking advantage of the crisis, opposition leaders filed several court challenges against Sharif and
the constitutional changes he had introduced. The Supreme Court took up these cases and
suspended the 14th amendment regarding party discipline and the defection of members of
parliament. The government saw this action as an attempt by the Court to dislodge it from power.
When, in response to bitter criticism from Sharif and other party leaders, the Supreme Court
initiated contempt of court proceedings, the government retaliated by amending the contempt of
court law in parliament.28 When the President delayed signing the new legislation by invoking his
constitutional powers to keep the matter pending up to 30 days, the ruling party threatened to
impeach him.

Some of the judges who diverged from the Chief Justice's strategy of confrontation were
encouraged by the government to revolt. This caused the first ever split in the Supreme Court,
with pro-government and pro-Chief Justice judges passing orders against each other. When
government supporters mobbed the Chief Justice's court to disrupt contempt proceedings against
the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice approached the President and the Army Chief to make troops
 19

available for the Court's security.29 As the President endorsed the demand, battle lines were
clearly drawn between the government on the one hand, and the Chief Justice and the President
on the other. The opposition parties supported the Chief Justice.
The Army leadership grew increasingly alarmed at these developments. It temporarily defused the
situation by persuading the Prime Minister to appoint judges recommended by the Chief Justice.
Later, the Army Chief tried to restrain Sharif from impeachment proceedings against the President,
but to no avail; the crisis escalated. Pro-government judges ordered the suspension of the Chief
Justice. The Prime Minister then asked the President to appoint a new Chief Justice, which he
refused to do. While the government repeated its threat to impeach the President, the Chief
Justice restored the powers of the President to dismiss the government, the pro-government
judges hurriedly suspended this order.

Without the Army's support, the President could neither avoid impeachment nor remove the Prime
Minister from office. All previous government dismissals had been implemented through the Army.
But this time, crucially, the military elite refused to side with the President. Removing the Prime
Minister and dissolving of the National Assembly less than 12 months after the elections would
have been awkward, especially because the government's support - both in parliament and outside
- was still intact. The confrontation was expected to persist and any caretaker administration
would have faced serious problems in holding new elections. Such a situation was bound to affect
's faltering economy. The senior commanders therefore felt that removing the President was the
least problematic way to resolve the conflict. Realising that the Army would not support him, the
President decided to resign.30 The Chief Justice was subsequently eased out when the acting
President appointed a new Chief Justice proposed by the government.

The crisis exposed the continuing frailty of 's political and constitutional arrangements. The
outcome can be interpreted as a success for Sharif, but it also underscored his dependence on the
military. With a new, pliant President in office, Sharif may be tempted to use his parliamentary
support to strengthen his position even further. However, in the face of serious political and
economic problems, he will continue to need solid military support.

Conclusion
The military's decision to stay in the barracks after President Zia's death in 1988, began 's
democratic transition. However, the four civilian governments that followed were troubled by the
necessity of balancing democratic imperatives with the legacy of long military rule. These
governments, dependent on fractious and diverse political forces, have had to contend with a
powerful and disciplined military that guarded its professional and corporate interests jealously.

The military elite concedes that governance is not one of its primary tasks, and gives this right to
the civilian leaders. But the military leadership also firmly believes that it must play an
autonomous role, with input into important political decisions and that it must mediate when
political competition between civilian groups appears disorderly. The elite is prepared to support a
government as long as it ensures stability and effectively performs its duties towards the citizenry
and the state, and does not threaten military interests.

This is a power-sharing arrangement, a hybrid between civilian and military rule. It has created a
space for the political leaders and participatory political processes, it has expanded the scope of
political freedoms; and the infrastructure of civil society is growing. However, sustaining this space
and political leaders' room for manoeuvre depends on working harmoniously with the senior
commanders. The greater the confidence and trust between the two, and the smoother the
functioning of the Troika, the better are the prospects for stability and continuity in the political
process.
Civilian governments face numerous handicaps, which make it difficult for them to command the
political process fully. 's civil order and domestic political economy is in turmoil. Widening ethnic,
regional and religious-sectarian cleavages, the after-effects of the Afghan War, and weapons
proliferation, all pose serious challenges to the government. The Army is more deeply involved
now than a decade ago in support activities for the civilian government: law-and-order tasks; relief
and rescue operations after natural disasters; the use of its organisational and technological
resources for public welfare projects; greater induction of its personnel in civilian institutions; anti-
terrorist activities; and containing narcotics trafficking.

Competing political forces tend to be intolerant towards each other, thereby undermining political
institutions and processes. There is no consensus among them as to how to keep the military out
of politics. On the contrary, feuding politicians have not hesitated to use the military to dislodge
 20

their adversaries from power. In a situation of acute confrontation and crisis, the military can
always find civilian support for its expanded role.
The military's position has also been strengthened because South Asia's regional security
environment has not improved with the end of the Cold War. 's security predicament persists
because of civil war in Afghanistan, and because and India are engaged in an undeclared nuclear-
weapons and missile race. Such regional insecurity increases the military's relevance to decision-
making.

All these factors make it easy for the military to maintain its central role in the political process.
The military's profile depends on the civilian government's performance - how it maintains
economic and political stability and civic peace and order, and how it deals with the military's
professional and corporate interests. The military's options increase if the government's political
and economic performance falters, if it faces a crisis of legitimacy aggravated by popular unrest in
the major urban centres, or if political competition turns nasty. The military retains the capability
to veto 's transition to democracy.

The civil-military dynamics

By:Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi

Troubled, to say the least

Harmonious civil-military interaction holds the key to political stability in Pakistan. The civilian
government has always found it difficult to keep a balance between the imperatives of democratic
politics and the need of keeping the top brass of the military satisfied and happy. The civilian
government has to pursue its political agenda in a manner that the generals are not alienated.
The domain of interaction between the civil and the military can be divided into three broad
categories. First, there are policy areas that are of no interest to the military. These include the
day-to-day administrative and civilian management affairs that do not impinge on military’s
interest. Second, the shared decision making on foreign policy and security issues, defence budget
and the military’s perks and privileges and related matters. Any unilateral decision making by the
civilian government on these issues causes resentment in the military. They are, however, open to
dialogue on these issues and accommodate the civilians. Third, the military top brass resist any
civilian interference in their internal service affairs, discipline, promotions, posting and transfers,
military intelligence services and disbursement of defence budget and their economic and business
interests. This is a flexible relationship that varies from issue to issue and also depends on the
political and societal context of the issue under consideration.

The present civilian government made amateurish attempt in 2008 to place the ISI under the
interior ministry. Within hours, this decision was reversed. In 2009, President Zardari made an
offer of no-first use of nuclear weapons to India in total disregard to the shared civilian-military
decision of not committing on this issue. Zardari was unable to follow-up on his statement.
The civil-military relations stabilised as the two sides adopted accommodative disposition towards
each other. Gradually, the military top command and the ISI took virtual control of Pakistan’s
foreign policy towards India, Afghanistan and the United States as well as the operational side of
countering terrorism. The military already enjoyed primacy in the nuclear policy. However, the
military needed civilian leadership because it wanted the civilian government to own and support
its efforts to counter terrorism protect Pakistan’s interests at the global level.
It appears strange that at a time when the federal government faces a difficult internal political
situation and the economy is faltering, it could risk adventurism in its relations with the military.
The military top brass took a strong exception to the reports that the presidency indirectly sought
the support of the US military top command for dissuading the Pakistan military from staging a
coup in the immediate aftermath of the killing of Osama bin Laden in the raid by American security
personnel in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011. What perturbed the military most were the proposals in
the memo for curbing the role of the military and regulating its counter terrorism role.
To register their resentment, the army and the navy chiefs did not attend the president’s dinner in
honour of the visiting President of Turkmenistan (The air force chief and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff committee were out of the country) on November 14. The army chief held a
meeting with the President on November 15. The army chief met with both president and the
prime minister of November 16.
 21

The president and the federal government are expected to adopt some corrective administrative
measures. However, the military’s distrust of the civilian federal government, especially the
presidency, is likely to persist. This will have negative ramifications for the civilian government and
democracy in the long run. In order to pacify the top brass the civilian government may have to
yield more space to the military that will further reduce the former’s role in foreign policy and
security domains. There was no likelihood of military takeover after the Abbottabad raid. The raid
exposed the weakness of the air force and the army because they could not make any military
move while American helicopters stayed in Pakistan’s airspace for over an hour and the raid was
conducted in the vicinity of army installations. The military was busy in damage control. At that
time the military needed the support of the civilian government which was available. One wonders
why some senior civilian leaders dreaded a coup?
It is not clear that the proposals for controlling the military and revamping the security and
counter-terrorism arrangements in the memo were the brainchild of Mansoor Ijaz, known for
shrewd manipulation or were partly or totally suggested by the Pakistani diplomat in question.
Though it would be difficult to link these proposals directly to the president, the episode is an
embarrassment for the Pakistani government and the president.
Any person who understands the dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan knows that the
present federal government cannot implement any of the offers projected in the memo to control
the military.
The military top brass are perturbed but they are not expected to remove the federal government
because the direct assumption of power does not appear to be on their agenda, although they
jealously guard their professional and corporate interests from the sidelines. The direct assumption
of power exposes them to a lot of opposition within and outside Pakistan. Further, the military is
committed to counter-terrorism that requires civilian support rather than overwhelming civilian
political order.
The memo issue has got entangled into Pakistan’s highly partisan politics, reducing the prospects
of a dispassionate and professional investigation of the issue. The political parties opposed to the
PPP are using this incident as yet another opportunity to pull down the government.
The PML(N) pursues contradictory policies. On the one hand, it wants to knock out the federal
government and President Zardari and it is now using the memo issue to accuse the key officials of
high treason. On the other hand, it wants to control the role of generals in politics. How can the
military be contained if the political forces are divided and have declared war on each other?
No civilian government can assert its role over the military through political adventurism or by
seeking external support. It needs to put its economic and political house in order to create a
credible civilian alternative to military rule that enjoys widespread popular support.
Civilian primacy cannot be guaranteed without changing Pakistan’s internal and external security
profile, ensuring peace in and around Pakistan, and strengthening of the civilian order by political
coherence, economic rehabilitation and popular legitimacy.
Success is never achieved by the size of our brain but it is always achieved by the quality of our
thoughts.
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Civil-military Relations & Democracy

he word ‘civil’ refers to the civil government as an entity, of which the military itself is a significant
part. The civil government is decidedly the superior of the two and the only relationship between
them should be that of a superior and a subordinate. But, in Pakistan’s case, the subordinate entity
has, time and again, toppled the superior entity’s rule. These interventions have impacted all state
institutions including the Constitution, Parliament, Judiciary and the Civil Services so hugely that all
sections of the society abhor any repeat of such intervention.

Professor Samuel P. Huntington, in his book ‘Soldier in the State’ and Morris Janowitz in the
‘Professional Soldier’, agree that the worlds of the military and the civil are fundamentally different
from one another. Both these political scientists discussed in their respective books that how best
the two can coexist without endangering liberal democracy.

Huntington believes there is a strong contrast between the attitudes and values held by the military
personnel, who are mostly conservative, and those held by the civilians, who are mostly liberal. Each
of their separate world consisted of separate institutions with their own operative rules and norms.
Huntington suggested that in order for the civilian authority to maintain control, it needs to find a
way to direct the military without unduly infringing on their internal autonomous character and
organisation or the prerogatives of the military world and thus provoking a backlash. The civilian
authority has to determine the quantum of control which must necessarily be institutional and
lawful and not for seeking political advantages.

Professor Janowitz more or less agrees with the above thesis, but introduces a theory of
convergence, meaning that while the differences remain within the two separate worlds, the civil
authority, understanding the need for a strong professional military and still desiring supremacy in
control and direction within a democratic state, must try to get institutionally closer to each other
through better understanding and arrangements. The arrangements proposed by him are the
establishment of large paramilitary forces fully trained and equipped to remain at the backup of the
police and other civil forces, which must also be equally well trained and equipped but which must
be able to deal effectively as a first layer with the internal disturbances.

In essence, both Huntington and Janowitz would want the military to remain totally away from the
negative political and social influences of the civilian world on a professional army and, to a lesser
degree, on the paramilitary forces.

Pakistan Army inherited strong British traditions of strict meritorious recruitment, a very rigorous
and professional training for the officers’ core leading to a recognised university degree, inculcation
of strict discipline, goal orientation, refresher courses and mid-service training as well as a high level
of esprit de corps. They are encouraged to live in isolated cantonments with their families and
generally come in contact with their civilian counterparts sometimes in city markets or on TV. They
have their own sports grounds, own social get-togethers, own schools and colleges and own
hospitals. So, the Pakistani military has a world of its own where the rules of behaviour, conduct of
business, modalities of doing work, respect for orders from above, nature of conferences, levels and
depths of discussions are totally different from their civilian counterparts.
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Pak Army’s Strengths

Let us look at the institutional arrangements of Pakistan Army Officers’ Corps a little more closely for
a better understanding. The following attributes in Pak Army officers are more conspicuous:

The military is a highly organized and disciplined force with a clear command and control structure
from top to bottom. It recruits its soldiers and officers quite transparently on merit and in
accordance with fixed standards to ensure quality of intake. It is highly disciplined and abhors
disorganisation and ill discipline. What the civilians may consider the political convulsions as the
beauty of democracy, the military would consider, chaotic and undesirable. The military’s concept of
loyalty to Pakistan is somewhat fixed and is a result of its own acquired knowledge and perceptions
of the currents, cross-currents and under-currents prevailing in the region.

The military believes that it is mandated to fight such subversive attempts by the Constitution and
defence policy. It, therefore, keeps fighting for budget in proportion to India’s much larger budget to
be able to pursue its defence.

The military believes in preparing itself for various eventualities and variants of war in great detail.
These follow the Defence Policy objectives and guidelines approved from time to time by the federal
cabinet. Detailed planning is done, for instance, for evacuation of people in case of damage to a river
or canal to safer places and for that to pinpoint places for lodging/boarding, identification of boats
and boatmen, hospitals, food, transportation etc. Nothing is left to chance or to verbal orders.

The military believes in looking after its soldiers and officers in peacetime to enable them to fight
any war without domestic worries. The military looks after their health and other basic needs, even
after retirement. These measures include many privileges greatly criticised by many civilians, but
jealously guarded by the military.

The military believes in strict discipline, which would forbid unauthorised contact by any officer with
any outsider or a political personage. The promotions and appointments within the military are
made by following strict standards and all outside influences in this regard are greatly discouraged
and looked down upon.

Since soldiers and officers are drawn mainly from rural lower middle class, largely from Punjab, KP
and Sindh, few even from Balochistan; they are mainly conservative, and religiously inclined and by
and large averse to Western modernism. The military has fought three wars with India, and is
fighting presently an elusive war against the terrorists whom one cannot even easily recognise that
who are from within Pakistan and our own people but led astray by adverse beliefs and propaganda.

Strengths of the Civilian Government

On the other hand, the civilian government draws its strength from the political party who had won
an election. But, in Pakistan, the contesting parties not only appeal directly to the voters but also
seek support of multiple smaller interest groups who all become the winner after the elections for
their return of favour. These favours usually are beyond the pale of legal propriety and devoid of
merit. Generally, the parties do have their manifestos containing their proposed political, social,
economic and other programmes and policies. These policies are implemented by the bureaucrats
 24

who are recruited on merit, trained in various professions and placed in jobs with appropriate tools
and work environment for carrying out the programmes and policies.

In a parliamentary democracy, where governments can change after elections, such trained
specialists should be totally neutral and apolitical. Otherwise, every new government will have to
recruit hundreds and thousands of these specialists afresh which would be a tortuous process. The
worse will be if a party in power tries to woo these permanent state servants to serve their own
party and personal interests by various means which would come within the definition of corruption.
To prevent such eventualities, the framers of the Constitution provided a framework which holds the
governments accountable and checks them from indulging in malpractices. This framework is in the
form of:

Parliament, with opposition parties free to ask any question and enquire into anything.Judiciary,
which not only interprets laws but also checks the government where it goes wrong.

Auditor General, a senior post protected by the Constitution to audit the government expenditures.

The Executive, comprising the military and the civil service under the control of the executive
government to carry out all its lawful orders.

Conclusion

The strength of an elected government lies in its popularity amongst the people which is determined
by the effectiveness and quality of the various services performed by the state functionaries under
the general policy control and guidance of the political government. The true fruits of democracy are
enjoyed by the people of a state through good governance.

The people want democracy, but they also want peace, order and justice around them within their
own life time. They want end to their poverty within their own lives. They want health, education,
equal opportunities of development for all children now, not tomorrow. This is the essence of social
contract. The convergence between the civilian government, the political elite and the civil and
military professionals takes place around good governance delivered to the governed whose
ultimate satisfaction is the guarantee of a sound polity.
 25

Contagious issues between Civil and Military

Establishment:

 Role of military in national politics

 Military influence over foreign policy affairs

 Unilateral role of military in designing defense policy

 Scrutiny of Military defense budget

 Issues on domain of intelligence agencies

 Military demand for non interference in their promotions

 Military resistance to civilian leadership in their command and control system

 Differences of opinion over nuclear policy

 Issue of military industrial complex like FWO, FFC, Askari Bank, Askari housing

 Societies and Fauji foundation

 Differences over land and cantonment boards

 Issues over control of ISI and other intelligence agencies by the civilian
leadership

Guidelines for regulating civil military

relationship

 In order to establish sustainable civil military relationship following guidelines are

proposed by the youth minister of Interior:

 National security strategy must involves civilian leadership and professional

military officials

 A new counter terrorism force is established under ministry of interior which

undertakes operations against terrorists and non state actors thus giving an
opportunity to military to concentrate on national defense.

 Political parties need to initiate party elections and democracy within their ranks
so that democratic culture is developed and the roots of democracy be
strengthened among the masses.

 Military budgets must be scrutinized by the civilian leadership.

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 Foreign policy must be under civilian control and a comprehensive mechanism

being established for smooth decision making process under foreign office in
collaboration with the think tanks.

 In order to secure the sanctity and discipline in military apparatus there would be
no political appointments in military command and control system.

 Rule of law and good governance must be ensured by the civilian governments.

 Political activities and political cells of intelligence agencies must be dismantled on

war footing.

 Media, civil society, philanthropists and writers need to take on board in diffusing
mistrust between the civilian and the military establishment.

 Recruitment in the military must be ensured from all over Pakistan therefore the
impression of Punjabi security establishment be removed.

 Paramilitary forces such as Frontier constabulary and frontier corps must be

placed under civilian control.

 Frontier works organization (FWO), national logistic cell (NLC), canteen store

 department (CSD) and other military industrial adventures must be under civilian
check.

 Parliamentary committee on national security must be strengthened and all major

steps by the military will be ratified by this forum.