G.R. No.

144735 October 18, 2001

YU BUN GUAN, petitioner,

vs.
ELVIRA ONG, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A simulated deed of sale has no legal effect, and the transfer certificate of title issued in
consequence thereof should be cancelled. Pari delicto does not apply to simulated sales.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 25, 2000
Decision1 and the August 31, 2000 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
61364. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

"We cannot see any justification for the setting aside of the contested Decision.

"THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED."4

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's "Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Leave to
Submit [Newly] Discovered Evidence."

The CA sustained the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch 60), which
had disposed as follows:5

"23. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

23.1 The Deed of Sale dated July 24, 1992 (Exh. EE on Exh. 3) is declared VOID.

23.2 The plaintiff ELVIRA ONG is declared the OWNER of the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 217614, Registry of Deeds, Makati (Exh. DD).

23.3 The Register of Deeds, City of Makati is ordered to:

23.2.1. Cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181033 (Exh. HH); and

23.2.2. Issue in lieu thereof, a transfer certificate of title in the name of

ELVIRA A. ONG, of legal age, single, Filipino';

23.[4]. The defendant YU BUN GUAN is ordered to pay to the said plaintiff, the
following:

23.[4].1. P48,631.00 – As reimbursement of the capital gains tax (Exh. FF);

23.[4].2. Six (6) percent of P48,631.00 – per annum from November 23,
1993, until the said P48,631.00 is paid – as damages;

23.[4].3. P100,000.00 – as moral damages;

 23.[4].4. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

23.[4].5. P100,000.00 – as attorney's fees.

23.[5]. The COUNTERCLAIM is DISMISSED.

23.[6]. Cost is taxed against the defendant.

"24. In Chambers, City of Makati, June 23, 1998.

The Facts

The antecedents of the case are succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:

'[Herein respondent] said that she and [petitioner] are husband and wife, having been
married according to Chinese rites on April 30, 1961. They lived together until she and her
children were abandoned by [petitioner] on August 26, 1992, because of the latter's
'incurable promiscuity, volcanic temper and other vicious vices'; out of the reunion were born
three (3) children, now living with her [respondent].

"She purchased on March 20, 1968, out of her personal funds, a parcel of land, then referred
to as the Rizal property, from Aurora Seneris, and supported by Title No. 26795, then
subsequently registered on April 17, 1968, in her name. 1âwphi 1.nêt

"Also during their marriage, they purchased, out of their conjugal funds, a house and lot, in
1983, thereafter, registered in their names, under Title No. 118884.

'Before their separation in 1992, she 'reluctantly agreed' to the [petitioner's] 'importunings'
that she execute a Deed of Sale of the J.P. Rizal property in his favor, but on the promise
that he would construct a commercial building for the benefit of the children. He suggested
that the J.P. Rizal property should be in his name alone so that she would not be involved in
any obligation. The consideration for the 'simulated sale' was that, after its execution in which
he would represent himself as single, a Deed of Absolute Sale would be executed in favor of
the three (3) children and that he would pay the Allied Bank, Inc. the loan he obtained.

"Because of the 'glib assurances' of [petitioner], [respondent] executed a Deed of Absolute

Sale in 1992, but then he did not pay the consideration of P200,000.00, supposedly the
'ostensible' valuable consideration. On the contrary, she paid for the capital gains tax and all
the other assessments even amounting to not less than P60,000.00, out of her personal
funds.

"Because of the sale, a new title (TCT No. 181033) was issued in his name, but to 'insure'
that he would comply with his commitment, she did not deliver the owner's copy of the title to
him.

"Because of the refusal of [petitioner] to perform his promise, and also because he insisted
on delivering to him the owner's copy of the title [to] the JP Rizal property, in addition to
threats and physical violence, she decided executing an Affidavit of Adverse Claim.
 Also to avoid burdening the JP Rizal property with an additional loan amount, she wrote the
Allied Bank, Inc. on August 25, 1992, withdrawing her authority for [petitioner] to apply for
additional loans.

"To save their marriage, she even sought the help of relatives in an earnest effort [at]
reconciliation, not to mention a letter to [petitioner] on November 3, 1992.

"[Petitioner], on the other hand, filed with the RTC, Makati, in 1993 (Case No. M-2905), a
'Petition for Replacement' of an owner's duplicate title.

"Attached to the Petition was the Affidavit of Loss dated March 26, 1993, in which he falsely
made it appear that the owner's copy of the title was lost or misplaced, and that was granted
by the court in an Order dated September 17, 1993, following which a new owner's copy of
the title was issued to [petitioner].

"Upon discovery of the 'fraudulent steps' taken by the [petitioner], [respondent] immediately
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on November 29, 1993.

"She precisely asked the court that the sale of the JP Rizal property be declared as null and
void; for the title to be cancelled; payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages; and
attorney's fees.

"It was, on the other hand, the version of [petitioner] that sometime in 1968 or before he
became a Filipino, 'through naturalization' the JP Rizal property was being offered to him for
sale. Because he was not a Filipino, he utilized [respondent] as his 'dummy' and agreed to
have the sale executed in the name of [respondent], although the consideration was his own
and from his personal funds.

"When he finally acquired a Filipino citizenship in 1972, he purchased another property being
referred to as the 'Juno lot' out of his own funds. If only to reflect the true ownership of the JP
Rizal property, a Deed of Sale was then executed in 1972. Believing in good faith that his
owner's copy of the title was lost and not knowing that the same was surreptitiously
'concealed' by [respondent], he filed in 1993 a petition for replacement of the owner's copy of
the title, in court.

"[Petitioner] added that [respondent] could not have purchased the property because she
had no financial capacity to do so; on the other hand, he was financially capable although he
was financially capable although he was disqualified to acquire the property by reason of his
nationality. [Respondent] was in pari delicto being privy to the simulated sale.

"Before the court a quo, the issues were: who purchased the JP Rizal property? [W]as the
Deed of Sale void? and damages.6

Ruling of the Trial Court

After examining the evidence adduced by both parties, the RTC found that the JP Rizal property was
the paraphernal property of the respondent, because (1) the title had been issued in her name; (2)
petitioner had categorically admitted that the property was in her name; (3) petitioner was estopped
from claiming otherwise, since he had signed the Deed of Absolute Sale that stated that she was the
"absolute and registered owner"; (4) she had paid the real property taxes thereon.7
The trial court further held that the in pari delicto rule found in Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil
Code was not applicable to the present case, because it would apply only to existing contracts with
an illegal cause or object, not to simulated or fictitious contracts or to those that were inexistent due
to lack of an essential requisite such as cause or consideration.8 It likewise voided the Deed of
Absolute Sale of the JP Rizal property for having been simulated and executed during the marriage
of the parties.9

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's findings that the JP Rizal property had been acquired
by respondent alone, out of her own personal funds. It ruled thus:

"x x x [T]he JP Rizal property was purchased by the [respondent] alone; therefore it is a
paraphernal property. As a matter of fact, the title was issued in her name, Exh. 'DD' This
was even admitted by [petitioner] in the Answer that the sale was executed in her name
alone. He also signed the sale mentioning [respondent] to be an absolute owner; therefore
he should be estopped from claiming otherwise. She alone likewise did the payment of the
taxes.10

The CA debunked the contention of petitioner that he had purchased the property out of his own
funds and merely used respondent as his dummy.11 It also held that the latter was not in pari
delicto with him, because the contract was simulated or fictitious due to the lack of consideration.
The contract was deemed void for having been executed during the couple's marriage.12 The CA
likewise affirmed the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages to respondent.13

Hence, this Petition.14

Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Court's consideration:

"Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not applying [the] rules on co-
ownership under Article 144 of the New Civil Code in determining the proprietary rights of the
parties herein even as respondent herself expressly declared that the money with which she
allegedly bought the property in question in 1968 came from her funds, salaries and savings
at the time she and petitioner already lived as husband and wife.

II

"Whether or not the Court of Appeals likewise palpably erred in declaring the sale of the
subject property to herein petitioner in 1992 to be fictitious, simulated and inexistent.

III

"Whether or not the Court of Appeals further erred in not applying the '[in] pari delicto' rule to
the sale of the subject property in favor of the petitioner in 1992 contrary to the express
declaration to that effect in the very same case it cited (Rodriguez v. Rodriguez; 20 SCRA
908) in the decision herein sought to be reviewed.
 IV

"Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in annul[l]ing the title (TCT No. 181033)
to the subject property in the name of herein petitioner in the absence of actual
fraud."15 (Underscoring in the original.)

This Court's Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue:

Nature of the Property

Petitioner contends that the JP Rizal property should be deemed as co-owned, considering that
respondent testified during trial that the money she used in purchasing it had come from her income,
salaries and savings, which are conjugal in nature.

On the other hand, respondent maintains that the finding of the two lower courts that the property
was acquired using funds solely owned by her is binding and supported by evidence. She further
argues that the two defenses of petitioner are contradictory to each other because, if the property is
co-owned, he cannot claim to own it in its entirety.

We find no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA that the source of the money used
to acquire the property was paraphernal. This issue is factual in nature. It is axiomatic that "factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case, are
binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. It is not the function of this Court to reexamine the
lower courts' findings of fact. While there are exceptions to this rule, petitioner has not shown its
entitlement to any of them."16

The testimony of petitioner as to the source of the money he had supposedly used to purchase the
property was at best vague and unclear. At first he maintained that the money came from his own
personal funds. Then he said that it came from his mother; and next, from his father. Time and time
again, "we [have] held that the unnatural and contradictory testimony of a witness, x x x makes him
unreliable x x x."17 His statement that the JP Rizal property was bought with his own money can
hardly be believed, when he himself was unsure as to the source of those funds.

On the other hand, the capacity of respondent to purchase the subject property cannot be
questioned. It was sufficiently established during trial that she had the means to do so. In fact, her
testimony that she had purchased several other lots using her personal funds was not disputed.

Equally without merit is the contention of petitioner that, because he was a Chinese national at the
time, respondent was merely used as a dummy in acquiring the property; thus, she could not have
legally acquired title thereto. He testified that sometime during the last month of 1968, he had
consulted a certain Atty. Flores, who advised him that the property be registered in the name of
respondent. However, TCT No. 217614 had been issued earlier on April 17, 1968. Thus, it appears
that the subject property had already been bought and registered in the name of respondent, long
before Atty. Flores allegedly advised him to have the property registered in her name.

We therefore agree with the CA's affirmation of the RTC's findings that the property had been
acquired using respondent's paraphernal property. The CA rule thus:
 "The fact however, is that Yu never refuted Elvira's testimony that: (a) the money with which
she acquired the JP Rizal property came from": (1) her income as a cashier in the Hong Kiat
Hardware: a (2) income from her paraphernal property – a lot in Guadalupe; (3) her savings
from the money which her parents gave her while she was still a student; and (4) the money
which her sister gave her for helping her run the beauty parlor; (b) her parents were well off –
they had stores, apartments and beauty parlors from which they derived income; (c) before
her marriage she bought lots in different places (p. 8, TSN, Jan. 26, 1998; pp. 22-23, TSN
March 10, 1998)."18

Second Issue:

Fictitious, Simulated and Inexistent Sale

Next, petitioner argues that there was a valid sale between the parties, and that the consideration
consisted of his promise to construct a commercial building for the benefit of their three children and
to pay the loan he had obtained from Allied Bank.

We disagree. In Rongavilla v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court declared that a deed of sale, in which the
stated consideration had not in fact been paid, is null and void:

"The 'problem' before the Court is whether a deed which states a consideration that in fact
did not exist, is a contract, without consideration, and therefore void ab initio, or a contract
with a false consideration, and therefore, at least under the Old Civil Code, voidable. x x x."

"In our view, therefore, the ruling of this Court in Ocejo, Perez & Co. vs. Flores, 40 Phil.
921[,] is squarely applicable herein. In that case we ruled that a contract of purchase and
sale is null and null and void and produces no effect whatsoever where the same is without
cause or consideration in that the purchase price which appears thereon as paid has in fact
never been paid by the purchaser to vendor."20

In the present case, it is clear from the factual findings of both lower courts that the Deed of Sale
was completely simulated and, hence, void and without effect. No portion of the P200,000
consideration stated in the Deed was ever paid. And, from the facts of the case, it is clear that
neither party had any intention whatsoever to pay that amount.

Instead, the Deed of Sale was executed merely to facilitate the transfer of the property to petitioner
pursuant to an agreement between the parties to enable him to construct a commercial building and
to sell the Juno property to their children. Being merely a subterfuge, that agreement cannot be
taken as the consideration for the sale.

Third Issue:

Inapplicability of the in Pari Delicto Principle

The principle of in pari delicto provides that when two parties are equally at fault, the law leaves
them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. However, this principle does not apply
with respect to inexistent and void contracts. Said this Court in Modina v. Court of Appeals:21

"The principle of in pari delicto non oritur actio denies all recovery to the guilty parties inter
se. It applies to cases where the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration or the
purpose of the contract. When two persons are equally at fault, the law does not relieve
 them. The exception to this general rule is when the principle is invoked with respect to
inexistent contracts."22

Fourth Issue:

Cancellation of TCT

Finally, based on the foregoing disquisition, it is quite obvious that the Court of Appeals did not err in
ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 181033, because the Deed of Absolute Sale transferring
ownership to petitioner was completely simulated, void and without effect. In fact, there was no legal
basis for the issuance of the certificate itself.
1âw phi 1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed. Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J. On Official Leave.

G.R. No. L-11024 January 31, 1958

ALFONSO ANGELES, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GREGORIO STA. INES and ANASTACIA DIVINO, respondents.

Ernesto Angeles and Ildefonso M. Bleza for petitioners.

Pedro D. Maldia for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No. 631, entitled Alfonso Angeles, et al., vs. Gregorio
Santa Ines, et al., and dismissing the complaint and counterclaim, without pronouncement as to
costs.

On March 12, 1935, homestead patent No. 31613 was issued for a parcel of land in the municipality
of Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija, containing an area 13.6696hectares more or less. Pursuant to the
issuance of this homestead patent, original certificate of title No. 4906 was issued to the patentee
Juan Angeles on March 28, 1935. On May 28, 1937, Juan Angeles said the above landto defendants
Gregorio Santa Ines and Anastacia Divino, who thereupon took possession thereof. Juan Angeles
died in the year 1938, and thereafter his heirs, the petitioner herein, sought to recover the land from
the defendantson the ground that the sale was null and void (Sec. 116, Act No. 2874). The
defendants refused to re turn the land, so daid heirs, petitioner herein, brought this action in the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.

In the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs the allegation is made thatdefendants' possession of
the land was the virtue of the sale which isagainst the law and therefore did not convey title to them.
It is alsoalleged that the homestead produces an average of 200 cavans per year as share for the
owner. Prayer is made that the defendants be ordered to vacatethe land and the possession thereof
returned to the plaintiffs, and thatthe defendants be condemned to pay damages at the rate of 200
cavans of palayper year from 1938, valued at P12 per cavan, until the return of the land.Defendants
answered the amended complaint alleging that the purchase was for a valuable consideration, in
outmost good faith, and that the defendants tookpossession of the land with the knowledge, consent
of plaintiffs. They deniedthat the harvest of the land is 200 cavans per year for the ownerand that the
alleged price is P12 per cavan. As special defenses, they alleged that the plaintiffs are guilty of
laches for having allowed 12 years to pass, after the death of the original homesteader, before they
brought the action; that the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed; but more than five yearshad
elapsed from the date of the final approval of the homestead, when the sale was made on May 28,
1937; etc. It is, therefore, prayed that the complaint be dismissed that the sale be declared valid and
defendant's be declared owners of the property; and that the certificate of title be cancelled and one
issued in the name of the defendants. As an alternative remedy, it was prayed that should the court
declare the sale null and void the defendants be reimbursed in the amount of P6,000 which they
incurred incleaning the land, etc.

That trial court found that when the sale was made by the deceased Angeles,five years had not
passed from the issuance of the certificate of title tothe homestead; that both vendor and vendee
knew that the sale was void because the five-year period prescribed by law had not yet elapsed; as
a consequence of this bad faith of both parties, they should be considered ashaving acted in good
faith (Art. 364 Civil Code of Spain), and that defendants are entitled to the fruits of the land. The
court further held that the right of action of plaintiffs had already prescribed before the complaint was
filed on June 12, 1950, in accordance with Section 40 of Act No. 190. The trial court also found that
the land was levied and a dike was built thereon at a coast of P3,000.00 to prevent it from being
flooded everyyear; that defendants paid P2,500.00 for the homestead. Wherefore, the court declared
that the sale of the homestead is null and void and ordered plaintiffs to return the price of the land of
P2,500.00 to the defendants andto reimburse the latter in the amount of P3,000, for expenses
incurred in levelling the land and the construction of the dike thereon. The court ordered the
defendants to return the homestead to the plaintiffs upon the payment to the defendants of
P2,500.00 and that the P3,000.00, value of theimprovements, should consititute a lien on the land.

Tha case having been appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter held thatArticle 1306, paragraph 1
of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides:

. . . When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what he mayhave given by
virtue of the contract, or enforce the performance of the undertaking of the other party;

which legal provisions is founded on the principle of in pari delicto, is applicable, it held that none of
the parties should be given any remedy dueto the fact that they did not only violate the prohibition
contained in thePublic Land but because they knowingly tried to cheat the prohibition (by
theinsertion of a prohibition for the execution of another deed of sale afterfive years). The decision of
the lower court was, therefore, reversed and theaction dismissed.

In this Court it is claimed by the petitioners that the application of Article 1306, par. 1, of the Spanish
Civil Code is null and void,; and thatthe heirs of the homesteader should be declared entitled to the
possessionof the homeasted and the fruits of the same.

The most important issue raised in the appeal is whether the doctrine of in pari delicto is applicable
to sales of homesteads. This question was squarelydecided in the case of Catalina de los Santos vs.
Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, et al., 94 Phil., 405; 50 Off. Gaz. 1588, in the negative. In
thecase we held that the principle of in pari delicto is not applicable to ahomestead which has been
illegally sold, in violation of the homestead law.Reason for the rule is that the policy of the law is to
give land to a familyfor home and cultivation and the law allows the homesteader to reacquire
theland even if it has been sold; hence, the right may not be waived. Thisprinciple was again
confirmed in the case of Ancierto, et al. vs. De los Santos, et al., (95 Phil. 887) in which, through
Mr.Justice Alex, Reyes, we said:

Appelants, however, contended that the voiding of the Act may not be invoked in favor of
plaintiffs as their predecessor in interest was in pari delcto, since the same provision says
the illegal sale shall have the effect of annuling the grant and cause the reversion of the
property and its improvements to the State, plaintiffs may no longer claim the
homestead.Similar contentions were made in the Case of Catalina de los Santos, vs.Roman
Catholic Church of Midsayap et al., 94 Phil., 405, 50 Off. Gaz., 1588, but they were
overrruled, this Court holding that the in pari delicto doctrine may not be invoked in a case of
this kind since it would turn counter to an avowed fundamental policy of the State that the
forfeiture of the homestead is a matter between the State and the grantee of his heirs, and
that until the State has taken steps to annul the grant and asserts titleto the homestead the
purchaser is, as grant the vendor or his heirs, 'no more entitled to keep the land any intruder.

Consistent with the above decisions, we must hold that in the case at bar the sale of the homestead
by the deceased homesteader was null and void and his heirs have the right to recover the
homestead illegally disposed of.

It now becomes necessary to determine if the defense of prescription raisedin the answer to the
amended complaint can be sustained, it appearing thatwhen the action was brought in the year
1950, about 13 years had elapsed since the date of the sale. The precise question was also passed
upon by Usadversely to the defendant's respondents in the case of Eugenio, et al., vs.Perdido, et al.,
97 Phil., 41. In that case we held, thru Mr. JusticeBengzon:

There is no question that the sale in March 1932 having clean made withinfive years from
'the date of the issuance of the patent' was 'unlawful andnull and void from its execution', by
expressed provision of sections 116 and122 of Act No. 2874 (Now com. Act No. 141).

Under the existing classification, such contract would be 'in existent' and'the action or
defense for declaration' of such inexistence 'does notprescribed'. (Art. 1410 new Civil Code).
While it is true that this is a newprovision of the new Civil Code, it is nevertheless a principle
recognized seems Tipton V. Velasco, 6 Phil., 67 that 'mere lapse of time cannot giveefficacy
to contracts that are null and void'.

Having found that the sale of the homestead is null and void, and that the action to recover the same
does not prescribe, we now come to the effectsof these rulings on the price paid for the sale and the
value of the improvements made on the homestead and of the products realized from thehomestead
by the buyer. The stipulation of the parties (pp. 39-40, R.O.A.)shows that the deed after the
expiration of five years, and that this factwas explained by the notary to the parties. The notary must
have informed the latter that renewal of the deed was necessary to avoid the prohibition against the
sale of the homestead within five years after the issuance of thetitle. This circumstance shows that
the parties to the were aware of theexistence of the prohibition such knowledge. As a matter of fact,
the Court of Appeals predicated its decision on the finding that the parties to the sale where both
guilty of bad faith.

The question that no possess is whether the return of the value of the products gathered from the
land by the defendants and the expenses incurredin the construction of the dike—all useful and
necessary expenses—should be odered to be retuned by the defendants of the plaintiffs. While we
believethat the rule of in pari delicto should not apply to the sale of the homestead, because such
sale is contrary to the public poliuvy enunciated in the hometsead law, the loss of the produts
realized by the defendants andthe value of the necessary improvements made by them on the land
should notbe expected from the application of the said rule because no cause or reason can be cited
to justify an exception. It has been held that the rule of in pari delicto is inapplicable only where the
same violates a well established public policy.

. . . But we doubt if these principles can now be involved considering thephilosophy and the
policy behind the approval of the Public Land Act. The principle underlying pari delicto has
known here and in the United Statesis not absolute in its application. It recognizes certain
exceptions one of them being when its enforcement or application runs counter to an
avowedfundamental policy or public interest. As stated by us in the Rellosa case,"This
doctrine is subject to one important limitation, namely, "whenever public policy is considered
advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against the transaction. (Rellosa vs. Gaw
Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827; 49 Off. Gaz. 4345.) (De los Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church of
Midsayap,94 Phil. 405; 50 Off. Gaz. 1588).

We are constrained to hold that the heirs of the homesteader should be declared to have lost and
forfeited the value of the products gathered fromthe land, and so should the defendants lose the
value of the necessary improvements that they have made thereon.

With respect to the price that the defendants had paid for the land P2,500, in view of the rule that no
one should enrich himself at the expense of another, the return of the said amount by the plaintiffs
should be decreed,before the plaintiffs may be allowed to recover back the possession of
thehomestead, subject to the action.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and judgment is hereby entered declaring
the sale of the homestead null and void, orderingthe defendants to return the same to the plaintiffs
upon payment by the latter to them of the sum of P2,500. The claim of the plaintiffs for value of the
products of the land and that of defendants for the expenses in theconstruction of the dike are both
dismissed. Without costs in this appeal.