G.R. No.
L-22595 November 1, 1927 Nevertheless, legal and testamentary
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo,
JUAN MICIANO,
administrator,petitioner-appellee,
vs. ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the
deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in
this
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The judicial administrator of this estate
filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The errors which the oppositor-appellant
assigns are: chanrobles virtual law library
(1) The approval of said scheme of
partition; (2) denial of his participation in
the inheritance; (3) the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order
approving the partition; (4) the approval
of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of
the deceased's business and the deed of
transfer of said business; and (5) the
declaration that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the
scheme of partition and the delivery of the
deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until
the receipt of the depositions requested in
reference to the Turkish
laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The appellant's opposition is based on the
fact that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's
will which are not in accordance with the
laws of his Turkish nationality, for which
reason they are void as being in violation
or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the
following:
such in will, it must be taken into
successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the
country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not
prove that said testimentary dispositions
are not in accordance with the Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any
evidence showing what the Turkish laws
are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed
to be the same as those of the Philippines.
(Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.) chanrobles virtual law library
It has not been proved in these
proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He,
himself, acknowledges it when he desires
to be given an opportunity to present
evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not
having deferred the approval of the
scheme of partition until the receipt of
certain testimony requested regarding the
Turkish laws on the
matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl
es virtual law library
The refusal to give the oppositor another
opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with
the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was
granted ample opportunity to introduce
competent evidence, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence
in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in
the testamentary dispositions in question
which, not being contrary to our laws in
force, must be complied with and
executed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr
obles virtual law library
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of
partition in this respect was not
erroneous.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr
obles virtual law library
In regard to the first assignment of error
which deals with the exclusion of the
herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as
he is one of the persons designated as
of the civil Code above quoted, such
consideration that such exclusion is based
on the last part of the second clause of the
will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although
by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this
citizenship having been conferred upon me
by conquest and not by free choice, nor by
nationality and, on the other hand, having
resided for a considerable length of time in
the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
acquiring all of the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that the distribution
of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting
all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand
whatever disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or persons who fail
to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is
conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property,
not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the
laws of the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan
robles virtual law library
If this condition as it is expressed were
legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor
who, by his attitude in these proceedings
has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving
his
legacy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl
es virtual law library
The fact is, however, that the said
condition is void, being contrary to law, for
article 792 of the civil Code provides the
following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary
to law or good morals shall be considered
as not imposed and shall not prejudice the
heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise
provide.
And said condition is contrary to law
because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10
national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary
dispositions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
Said condition then, in the light of the
legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in
said will is unconditional and consequently
valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr
obles virtual law library
It results from all this that the second
clause of the will regarding the law which
shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and
void, being contrary to
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
All of the remaining clauses of said will
with all their dispositions and requests are
perfectly valid and effective it not
appearing that said clauses are contrary to
the testator's national
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Therefore, the orders appealed from are
modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such
a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law
___________________________________________
___
[G.R. No. L-12105. January 30, 1960.]
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN,
deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO.,
executor and appellee, v. MAGDALENA
C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN,
and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN,
oppositors and appellants.
Jose D. Cortes for Appellants.

Ohnick, Velilla & Balonkita
for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS,
WHAT LAW GOVERNS; APPROVAL OF
PROJECT OF PARTITION. — Article 10 of
the old Civil Code (Article 16, new Civil
Code) provides that the validity of
testamentary dispositions are to be
governed by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question. In case at
bar, the testator was a citizen of the State
of Nevada. Since the laws of said state
allow the testator to dispose of all his
property according to his will, his
testamentary dispositions depriving his
wife and children of what should be their
legitimes under the laws of the Philippines,
should be respected and the project of
partition made in accordance with his
testamentary dispositions should be
approved.
2. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN
LAW IF INTRODUCED IN EVIDENCE. — The
pertinent law of the state of the testator
may be taken judicial notice of without
proof of such law having been offered at
the hearing of the project of partition
where it appears that said law was
admitted by the court as exhibit during the
probate of the will; that the same was
introduced as evidence of a motion of one
of the appellants for withdrawal of a
certain sum of money; and that the other
appellants do not dispute the said law.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San
Jose, presiding, dismissing the objections
filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary
Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the
project of partition submitted by the
executor and approving the said project.
On April 24, 1950, the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo,
presiding, admitted to probate a last will
and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed
by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. In the
said order, the court made the following
findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"According to the evidence of the
opponents the testator was born in
Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that
state, or at least a citizen of California
where some of his properties are located.
This contention is untenable.
Notwithstanding the long residence of the
decedent in the Philippines, his stay here
was merely temporary, and he continued
and remained to be a citizen of the United
States and of the state of his particular
choice, which is Nevada, as stated in his
will. He had planned to spend the rest of
his days in that state. His permanent
residence or domicile in the United States
depended upon his personal intent or
desire, and he selected Nevada as his
domicile and therefore at the time of his
death, he was a citizen of that state.
Nobody can choose his domicile or
permanent residence for him. That is his
exclusive personal right.
Wherefore, the court finds that the
testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of
his death a citizen of the United States and
of the State of Nevada and declares that
his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in
accordance with the laws of the state of
Nevada and admits the same to probate.
Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company,
named as the executor of the will, is
hereby appointed to such executor and
upon the filing of a bond in the sum of
P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be
issued and after taking the prescribed
oath, it may enter upon the execution and
performance of its trust." (pp. 26-27,
R.O.A.)
It does not appear that the order granting
probate was ever questioned on appeal.
The executor filed a project of partition
dated January 24, 1956, making, in
accordance with the provisions of the will,
the following adjudications: (1) one-half of
the residuary estate, to the Farmers and
Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. in trust only for the
benefit of testator’s grandson Edward
George Bohanan, which consists of
P90,819.67 in cash and one-half in shares
of stock of several mining companies; (2)
the other half of the residuary estate to
the testator’s brother, F.L. Bohanan, and
his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and
share alike. This consists in the same
amount of cash and of shares of mining
stock similar to those given to testator’s
grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to
his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert
Bohanan, and his daughter, Mary Lydia
Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly
installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in
the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine
Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000;
and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;
It will be seen from the above that out of
the total estate (after deducting
administration expenses) of P211,639.33
in cash, the testator gave his grandson
P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of
stock of several mining companies and to
his brother and sister the same amount.
To his children he gave a legacy of only
P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
The wife Magdalena C. Bohanan and her
two children question the validity of the
testamentary provisions disposing of the
estate in the manner above indicated,
claiming that they have been deprived of
the legitime that the laws of the forum
concede to them.
The first question refers to the share that
the wife of the testator, Magdalena C.
Bohanan, should be entitled to receive.
The will has not given her any share in the
estate left by the testator. It is argued that
it was error for the trial court to have
recognized the Reno divorce secured by
the testator from his Filipino wife
Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said
divorce should be declared a nullity in this
jurisdiction, citing the cases of Querubin v.
Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz.,
(Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz v. Fluemer, 55
Phil., 851, Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855
and Gorayeb v. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The
court below refused to recognize the claim
of the widow on the ground that the laws
of Nevada, of which the deceased was a
citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his
properties without requiring him to leave
any portion of his estate to his wife.
Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of
1925 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Every person over the age of eighteen
years, of sound mind, may, by last will,
dispose of all his or her estate, real and
personal, the same being chargeable with
the payment of the testator’s
debts."cralaw virtua1aw library
Besides, the right of the former wife of the
testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a
share in the testator’s estate had already
been passed upon adversely against her in
an order dated June 18, 1955, (pp. 155-
159, Vol. II Records, Court of First
Instance), which had become final, as
Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to
have appealed therefrom to question its
validity. On December 16, 1953, the said
former wife filed a motion to withdraw the
sum of P20,000 from the funds of the
estate, chargeable against her share in the
conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297, Vol.
I, Record, Court of First Instance), and the
court in its said error found that there
exists no community property owned by
the decedent and his former wife at the
time the decree of divorce was issued. As
already adverted to, the decision of the
court had become final and Magdalena C.
Bohanan may no longer question the fact
contained therein, i.e. that there was no
community property acquired by the
testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during
their coverture.
Moreover, the court below had found that
the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan
were married on January 30, 1909, and
that divorce was granted to him on May
20, 1922; that sometime in 1925,
Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron
and this marriage was subsisting at the
time of the death of the testator. Since no
right to share in the inheritance in favor of
a divorced wife exists in the State of
Nevada and since the court below had
already found that there was no conjugal
property between the testator and
Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now
have no legal claim to any portion of the
estate left by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of
the testator’s children, Edward and Mary
Lydia, who had received legacies in the
amount of P6,000 each only, and,
therefore, have not been given their
shares in the estate which, in accordance
with the laws of the forum, should be two-
thirds of the estate left by the testator. Is
the failure of the testator to give his
children two-thirds of the estate left by
him at the time of his death, in accordance
with the laws of the forum valid?
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to
this case because the testator died in
1944, expressly provides that successional
rights to personal property are to be
governed by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question. Says the
law on this point:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the extent of the
successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property and the
country in which it is found." (par. 2, Art.
10, old Civil Code, which is the same as
par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the
will, it was found out and it was decided
that the testator was a citizen of the State
of Nevada because he had selected this as
his domicile and his permanent residence.
(See Decision dated April 24, 1950,
supra). So the question at issue is whether
the testamentary dispositions, especially
those for the children which are short of
the legitime given them by the Civil Code
of the Philippines, are valid. It is not
disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a
testator to dispose of all his properties by
will (Sec. 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws of
1925, supra). It does not appear that at
the time of the hearing of the project of
partition, the above-quoted provision was
introduced in evidence, as it was the
executor’s duty to do. The law of Nevada,
being a foreign law, can only be proved in
our courts in the form and manner
provided for by our Rules, which are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record.
— An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the
custody.." . . (Rule 123)
We have, however, consulted the records
of the case in the court below and we have
found that during the hearing on October
4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C.
Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her
share, the foreign law, especially Section
9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was
introduced in evidence by appellants’
(herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp.
77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44,
Records, Court of First Instance). Again
said law was presented by the counsel for
the executor and admitted by the Court as
Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case
on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael
Amparo (see Records, Court of First
Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children
of the testator, do not dispute the above-
quoted provision of the laws of the State of
Nevada. Under all the above
circumstances, we are constrained to hold
that the pertinent law of Nevada,
especially Section 9905 of the Compiled
Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken
judicial notice of by us, without proof of
such law having been offered at the
hearing of the project of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old
Civil Code, the validity of testamentary
dispositions are to be governed by the
national law of the testator, and as it has
been decided and it is not disputed that
the national law of the testator is that of
the State of Nevada, already indicated
above, which allows a testator to dispose
of all his property according to his will, as
in the case at bar, the order of the court
approving the project of partition made in
accordance with the testamentary
provisions, must be, as it is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista
Angelo and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.
___________________________________________
___
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the
deceased REVEREND SANCHO
ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET
AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. MIGUEL
ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano
A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho
Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu,
executed a document purporting to be his
Last Will and Testament now marked
Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu,
he died on January 14, 1943, in the
municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he
was an evacuee. He left properties
estimated at P8,000 in value. On October
2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the
legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for
its probate in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who
would inherit the estate of the deceased if
he left no will, filed
opposition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan
robles virtual law library
During the hearing one of the attesting
witnesses, the other two being dead,
testified without contradiction that in his
presence and in the presence of his co-
witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in
longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the
testator spoke and understood; that he
(testator) signed on he left hand margin of
the front page of each of the three folios or
sheets of which the document is
composed, and numbered the same with
Arabic numerals, and finally signed his
name at the end of his writing at the last
page, all this, in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses after telling that it was
his last will and that the said three
witnesses signed their names on the last
page after the attestation clause in his
presence and in the presence of each
other. The oppositors did not submit any
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
The learned trial court found and declared
Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it
was in the handwriting of the testator and
that although at the time it was executed
and at the time of the testator's death,
holographic wills were not permitted by
law still, because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be
decided the new Civil Code was already in
force, which Code permitted the execution
of holographic wills, under a liberal view,
and to carry out the intention of the
testator which according to the trial court
is the controlling factor and may override
any defect in form, said trial court by order
dated January 24, 1952, admitted to
probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and
Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The
oppositors are appealing from that
decision; and because only questions of
law are involved in the appeal, the case
was certified to us by the Court of
Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386)
under article 810 thereof provides that a
person may execute a holographic will
which must be entirely written, dated and
signed by the testator himself and need
not be witnessed. It is a fact, however,
that at the time that Exhibit "A" was
executed in 1923 and at the time that
Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic
wills were not permitted, and the law at
the time imposed certain requirements for
the execution of wills, such as numbering
correlatively each page (not folio or sheet)
in letters and signing on the left hand
margin by the testator and by the three
attesting witnesses, requirements which
were not complied with in Exhibit "A"
because the back pages of the first two
folios of the will were not signed by any
one, not even by the testator and were not
numbered, and as to the three front
pages, they were signed only by the
testator.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
Interpreting and applying this requirement
this Court in the case of In re Estate of
Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to
the failure of the testator and his
witnesses to sign on the left hand margin
of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally
vitiates the testament. It is not enough
that the signatures guaranteeing
authenticity should appear upon two folios
or leaves; three pages having been written
on, the authenticity of all three of them
should be guaranteed by the signature of
the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil.,
700, referring to the same requirement,
this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in
question, it appears that the left margins
of the six pages of the document are
signed only by Ventura Prieto. The
noncompliance with section 2 of Act No.
2645 by the attesting witnesses who
omitted to sign with the testator at the left
margin of each of the five pages of the
document alleged to be the will of Ventura
Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an
obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of
Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of
the new Civil Code which not allows
holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which
provisions were invoked by the appellee-
petitioner and applied by the lower court?
But article 795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a will
as to its form depends upon the
observance of the law in force at the time
it is made." The above provision is but an
expression or statement of the weight of
authority to the affect that the validity of a
will is to be judged not by the law enforce
at the time of the testator's death or at the
time the supposed will is presented in
court for probate or when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. One reason in
support of the rule is that although the will
operates upon and after the death of the
testator, the wishes of the testator about
the disposition of his estate among his
heirs and among the legatees is given
solemn expression at the time the will is
executed, and in reality, the legacy or
bequest then becomes a completed act.
This ruling has been laid down by this
court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39
Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and
should be
followed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
Of course, there is the view that the
intention of the testator should be the
ruling and controlling factor and that all
adequate remedies and interpretations
should be resorted to in order to carry out
said intention, and that when statutes
passed after the execution of the will and
after the death of the testator lessen the
formalities required by law for the
execution of wills, said subsequent
statutes should be applied so as to validate
wills defectively executed according to the
law in force at the time of execution.
However, we should not forget that from
the day of the death of the testator, if he
leaves a will, the title of the legatees and
devisees under it becomes a vested right,
protected under the due process clause of
the constitution against a subsequent
change in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of wills which
would invalidate such a will. By parity of
reasoning, when one executes a will which
is invalid for failure to observe and follow
the legal requirements at the time of its
execution then upon his death he should
be regarded and declared as having died
intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by
intestate succession, and no subsequent
law with more liberal requirements or
which dispenses with such requirements as
to execution should be allowed to validate
a defective will and thereby divest the
heirs of their vested rights in the estate by
intestate succession. The general rule is
that the Legislature can not validate void
wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp.
192-
193).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, the order
appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A"
is denied probate. With
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes,
A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion and Reyes J.B.L., JJ., concur.
___________________________________________
________________
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, Petitioner, vs. RAMON
GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust,
RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive
Secretary, Respondents.
G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION
TRUST CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA,
AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as
members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING
COMMITTEES ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION
PETITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES
IN JAPAN, Respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to
enjoin respondents, their representatives and
agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale
of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi,
5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on
February 21, 1990. We granted the prayer for a
temporary restraining order effective February 20,
1990. One of the petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047)
likewise prayes for a writ of mandamus to compel
the respondents to fully disclose to the public the
basis of their decision to push through with the sale
of the Roppongi property inspire of strong public
opposition and to explain the proceedings which
effectively prevent the participation of Filipino
citizens and entities in the bidding
process.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v.
Garcia, et al. were heard by the Court on March 13,
1990. After G.R. No. 92047,Ojeda v. Secretary
Macaraig, et al. was filed, the respondents were
required to file a comment by the Court's resolution
dated February 22, 1990. The two petitions were
consolidated on March 27, 1990 when the
memoranda of the parties in the Laurel case were
deliberated
upon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The Court could not act on these cases immediately
because the respondents filed a motion for an
extension of thirty (30) days to file comment in G.R.
No. 92047, followed by a second motion for an
extension of another thirty (30) days which we
granted on May 8, 1990, a third motion for
extension of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a
fourth motion for extension of time which we
granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the attention of
the respondents to the length of time the petitions
have been pending. After the comment was filed,
the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 asked for thirty (30)
days to file a reply. We noted his motion and
resolved to decide the two (2)
cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
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I chanrobles virtual law library
The subject property in this case is one of the four
(4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement
entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other
lots being: chanrobles virtual law library
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-
machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has an area of
approximately 2,489.96 square meters, and is at
present the site of the Philippine Embassy
Chancery; chanrobles virtual law library
(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-
cho, Kobe, with an area of around 764.72 square
meters and categorized as a commercial lot now
being used as a warehouse and parking lot for the
consulate staff; and chanrobles virtual law library
(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2
Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a
residential lot which is now
vacant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The properties and the capital goods and services
procured from the Japanese government for
national development projects are part of the
indemnification to the Filipino people for their
losses in life and property and their suffering during
World War II.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The Reparations Agreement provides that
reparations valued at $550 million would be payable
in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual
schedules of procurements to be fixed by the
Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2,
Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the
Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on
procurement and utilization of reparations and
development loans. The procurements are divided
into those for use by the government sector and
those for private parties in projects as the then
National Economic Council shall determine. Those
intended for the private sector shall be made
available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one
hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities in
national development
projects.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The Roppongi property was acquired from the
Japanese government under the Second Year
Schedule and listed under the heading "Government
Sector", through Reparations Contract No. 300
dated June 27, 1958. The Roppongi property
consists of the land and building "for the Chancery
of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it
became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the
latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976
when the Roppongi building needed major repairs.
Due to the failure of our government to provide
necessary funds, the Roppongi property has
remained undeveloped since that
time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C.
Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan,
Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of
a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima
Corporation - which shall construct two (2) buildings
in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and
renovate the present Philippine Chancery in
Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction
would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one
(1) of the buildings to be constructed in Roppongi
and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other
building in Roppongi shall then be used as the
Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the end of the
lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be
occupied and used by the Philippine government.
No change of ownership or title shall occur. (See
Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The Philippine
government retains the title all throughout the
lease period and thereafter. However, the
government has not acted favorably on this
proposal which is pending approval and ratification
between the parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986,
President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government
properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through
Administrative Order No. 3, followed by
Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and
D.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive
Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or
entities to avail of separations' capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi
were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas"
clause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive
branch of the government has been pushing, with
great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations
properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The
property has twice been set for bidding at a
minimum floor price of $225 million. The first
bidding was a failure since only one bidder
qualified. The second one, after postponements, has
not yet materialized. The last scheduled bidding on
February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court.
Later, the rules on bidding were changed such that
the $225 million floor price became merely a
suggested floor
price.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The Court finds that each of the herein petitions
raises distinct issues. The petitioner in G.R. No.
92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi
property to anyone while the petitioner in G.R. No.
92047 adds as a principal objection the alleged
unjustified bias of the Philippine government in
favor of selling the property to non-Filipino citizens
and entities. These petitions have been
consolidated and are resolved at the same time for
the objective is the same - to stop the sale of the
Roppongi
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following
issues: chanrobles virtual law library
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind
be alienated by the Philippine Government?;
and chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents,
have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property? chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart
from questioning the authority of the government
to alienate the Roppongi property assails the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296 in
making the property available for sale to non-
Filipino citizens and entities. He also questions the
bidding procedures of the Committee on the
Utilization or Disposition of Philippine Government
Properties in Japan for being discriminatory against
Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities by
denying them the right to be informed about the
bidding
requirements.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
IIchanrobles virtual law library
In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the
Roppongi property and the related lots were
acquired as part of the reparations from the
Japanese government for diplomatic and consular
use by the Philippine government. Vice-President
Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified
as one of public dominion, and not of private
ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code (See
infra).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property
comes under "property intended for public service"
in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states
that being one of public dominion, no ownership by
any one can attach to it, not even by the State. The
Roppongi and related properties were acquired for
"sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular
quarters, buildings and other improvements"
(Second Year Reparations Schedule). The petitioner
states that they continue to be intended for a
necessary service. They are held by the State in
anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa
65-66). Hence, it cannot be appropriated, is outside
the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple
terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject
matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v.
Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the
Roppongi property at the moment, the petitioner
avers that the same remains property of public
dominion so long as the government has not used it
for other purposes nor adopted any measure
constituting a removal of its original purpose or
use.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The respondents, for their part, refute the
petitioner's contention by saying that the subject
property is not governed by our Civil Code but by
the laws of Japan where the property is located.
They rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in
determining the applicable law regarding the
acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a
property. They also invoke Opinion No. 21, Series of
1988, dated January 27, 1988 of the Secretary of
Justice which used the lex situs in explaining the
inapplicability of Philippine law regarding a property
situated in
Japan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The respondents add that even assuming for the
sake of argument that the Civil Code is applicable,
the Roppongi property has ceased to become
property of public dominion. It has become
patrimonial property because it has not been used
for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over
thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil
Code) and because the intention by the Executive
Department and the Congress to convert it to
private use has been manifested by overt acts, such
as, among others: (1) the transfer of the Philippine
Embassy to Nampeidai (2) the issuance of
administrative orders for the possibility of
alienating the four government properties in Japan;
(3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296; (4) the
enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657
[the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on June
10, 1988 which contains a provision stating that
funds may be taken from the sale of Philippine
properties in foreign countries; (5) the holding of
the public bidding of the Roppongi property but
which failed; (6) the deferment by the Senate in
Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future date;
thus an acknowledgment by the Senate of the
government's intention to remove the Roppongi
property from the public service purpose; and (7)
the resolution of this Court dismissing the petition
in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., G.R. No.
87478 which sought to enjoin the second bidding of
the Roppongi property scheduled on March 30,
1989.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
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III chanrobles virtual law library
In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks
this Court to rule on the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 296. He had earlier filed a
petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the Court
dismissed on August 1, 1989. He now avers that the
executive order contravenes the constitutional
mandate to conserve and develop the national
patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987
Constitution. It also allegedly violates: chanrobles
virtual law library
(1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition
of alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino
citizens. (Sections 2 and 3, Article XII, Constitution;
Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth Act
141).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony (Section 10,
Article VI, Constitution); chanrobles virtual law
library
(3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises
against unfair competition and trade
practices; chanrobles virtual law library
(4) The guarantee of the right of the people to
information on all matters of public concern
(Section 7, Article III, Constitution); chanrobles
virtual law library
(5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino
citizens or entities not wholly owned by Filipino
citizens of capital goods received by the Philippines
under the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep.
Act No. 1789); and chanrobles virtual law library
(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest (Section 28, Article III,
Constitution).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds
in the execution of an unconstitutional executive
order is a misapplication of public funds He states
that since the details of the bidding for the
Roppongi property were never publicly
disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a few days
before the scheduled bidding), the bidding
guidelines are available only in Tokyo, and the
accomplishment of requirements and the selection
of qualified bidders should be done in Tokyo,
interested Filipino citizens or entities owned by
them did not have the chance to comply with
Purchase Offer Requirements on the Roppongi.
Worse, the Roppongi shall be sold for a minimum
price of $225 million from which price capital gains
tax under Japanese law of about 50 to 70% of the
floor price would still be
deducted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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IVchanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners and respondents in both cases do
not dispute the fact that the Roppongi site and the
three related properties were through reparations
agreements, that these were assigned to the
government sector and that the Roppongi property
itself was specifically designated under the
Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine
Embassy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for
public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated
by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the
corresponding contract of procurement which bind
both the Philippine government and the Japanese
government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion
unless it is convincingly shown that the property has
become patrimonial. This, the respondents have
failed to do.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is
outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective
ownership for general use and enjoyment, an
application to the satisfaction of collective needs,
and resides in the social group. The purpose is not
to serve the State as a juridical person, but the
citizens; it is intended for the common and public
welfare and cannot be the object of appropration.
(Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino,
Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
1963 Edition, Vol. II, p.
26).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of
private
ownership.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
ART. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion chanrobles virtual law library
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads,
and others of similar character; chanrobles virtual
law library
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national
wealth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is
not of the character stated in the preceding article,
is patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under
paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as
property belonging to the State and intended for
some public
service.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Has the intention of the government regarding the
use of the property been changed because the lot
has been Idle for some years? Has it become
patrimonial? chanrobles virtual law library
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used
for a long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property.
Any such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A
property continues to be part of the public domain,
not available for private appropriation or ownership
until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio
v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335
[1960]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The respondents enumerate various
pronouncements by concerned public officials
insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize,
however, that an abandonment of the intention to
use the Roppongi property for public service and to
make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of
the Civil Code must be definite Abandonment
cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially
if the non-use was attributable not to the
government's own deliberate and indubitable will
but to a lack of financial support to repair and
improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago
v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must
be a certain and positive act based on correct legal
premises.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to
Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the
Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the
failure by the government to repair the building in
Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier
stated, there simply was a shortage of government
funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing
a study of the status and conditions of government
properties in Japan were merely directives for
investigation but did not in any way signify a clear
intention to dispose of the
properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an
"authority to sell", does not have a provision in its
text expressly authorizing the sale of the four
properties procured from Japan for the government
sector. The executive order does not declare that
the properties lost their public character. It merely
intends to make the properties available to
foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a
sale, lease or other disposition. It merely eliminates
the restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789 that
reparations goods may be sold only to Filipino
citizens and one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-
owned entities. The text of Executive Order No. 296
provides:
Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789,
as amended, and of other laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, the above-mentioned properties
can be made available for sale, lease or any other
manner of disposition to non-Filipino citizens or to
entities owned by non-Filipino citizens.
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong
premise or assumption that the Roppongi and the
three other properties were earlier converted into
alienable real properties. As earlier stated, Rep. Act
No. 1789 differentiates the procurements for the
government sector and the private sector (Sections
2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the private sector
properties can be sold to end-users who must be
Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this
nationality provision which was amended by
Executive Order No.
296.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law)
which provides as one of the sources of funds for its
implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of
the properties of the Government in foreign
countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property
from being classified as one of public dominion
when it mentions Philippine properties abroad.
Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are
alienable and not to those reserved for public use or
service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not
authorize the Executive Department to sell the
Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible
sources of future funding to augment (as and when
needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under
Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any property
outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped
as a source of
funds.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The respondents try to get around the public
dominion character of the Roppongi property by
insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code
should apply.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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It is exceedingly strange why our top government
officials, of all people, should be the ones to insist
that in the sale of extremely valuable government
property, Japanese law and not Philippine law
should prevail. The Japanese law - its coverage and
effects, when enacted, and exceptions to its
provision - is not presented to the Court It is simply
asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law
should apply without stating what that law
provides. It is a ed on faith that Japanese law would
allow the
sale.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should
apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A
conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There
is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance,
the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or
the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to
be determined (See Salonga, Private International
Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law
on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to
conflict with a domestic law on the same matters.
Hence, the need to determine which law should
apply.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
In the instant case, none of the above elements
exists.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The issues are not concerned with validity of
ownership or title. There is no question that the
property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the
authority of the respondent officials to validly
dispose of property belonging to the State. And the
validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale.
This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex
situs does not
apply.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex
situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle
the alienability of the real properties procured
through reparations nor the existence in what body
of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are
capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely
explains that it is the foreign law which should
determine who can acquire the properties so that
the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands
of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities
wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no
point in belaboring whether or not this opinion is
correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire the
Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can
be sold? chanrobles virtual law library
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by
President Aquino of the recommendation by the
investigating committee to sell the Roppongi
property was premature or, at the very least,
conditioned on a valid change in the public
character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the
approval does not have the force and effect of law
since the President already lost her legislative
powers. The Congress had already convened for
more than a agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
year.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that
the Roppongi property is no longer of public
dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by
the respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 provides
Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which
the Government is a party. - In cases in which the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a
party to any deed or other instrument conveying
the title to real estate or to any other property the
value of which is in excess of one hundred thousand
pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall
prepare the necessary papers which, together with
the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to
the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the
same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be
executed and signed by the President of the
Philippines on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines unless the Government of the
Philippines unless the authority therefor be
expressly vested by law in another officer.
(Emphasis supplied)
The requirement has been retained in Section 48,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292).
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.
- Whenever real property of the Government
is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following: chanrobles virtual law
library
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President,
unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by
law in another
officer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the
It is not for the President to convey valuable real
property of the government on his or her own sole
will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative
concurrence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989,
asking for the deferment of the sale of the Roppongi
property does not withdraw the property from
public domain much less authorize its sale. It is a
mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration
abandoning the public character of the Roppongi
property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations is conducting hearings on Senate
Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy
considerations and calls for a fact-finding
investigation of the circumstances behind the
decision to sell the Philippine government
properties in
Japan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding
Committee, et al., supra, did not pass upon the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296.
Contrary to respondents' assertion, we did not
uphold the authority of the President to sell the
Roppongi property. The Court stated that the
constitutionality of the executive order was not the
real issue and that resolving the constitutional
question was "neither necessary nor finally
determinative of the case." The Court noted that
"[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions is the use of
the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi
property." In emphasizing that "the decision of the
Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to
finance the CARP ... cannot be questioned" in view
of Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did
not acknowledge the fact that the property became
alienable nor did it indicate that the President was
authorized to dispose of the Roppongi property. The
resolution should be read to mean that in case the
Roppongi property is re-classified to be patrimonial
and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a
sale may be used for national economic
development projects including the
CARP.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The
petitions before us question the proposed 1990 sale
of the Roppongi property. We are resolving the
issues raised in these petitions, not the issues raised
in 1989.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Having declared a need for a law or formal
declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property
from public domain to make it alienable and a need
for legislative authority to allow the sale of the
property, we see no compelling reason to tackle the
constitutional issues raised by petitioner
Ojeda.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon
constitutional questions unless these questions are
properly raised in appropriate cases and their
resolution is necessary for the determination of the
case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court
will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record if the
case can be disposed of on some other ground such
as the application of a statute or general law (Siler
v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175,
[1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496
[1941]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the
Roppongi property should not be sold:
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of
property. It was given to the Filipino people in
reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who
died and suffered during the Japanese military
occupation, for the suffering of widows and orphans
who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the
homes and other properties lost by countless
Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo properties are a
monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the
Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the
monuments of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino
heroes, we do not expect economic or financial
benefits from them. But who would think of selling
these monuments? Filipino honor and national
dignity dictate that we keep our properties in Japan
as memorials to the countless Filipinos who died
and suffered. Even if we should become paupers we
should not think of selling them. For it would be as if
we sold the lives and blood and tears of our
countrymen. (Rollo- G.R. No. 92013, p.147)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:
Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by
the Japanese government in atonement for its past
belligerence for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb
and for deaths, physical dislocation and economic
devastation the whole Filipino people endured in
World War II.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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It is for what it stands for, and for what it could
never bring back to life, that its significance today
remains undimmed, inspire of the lapse of 45 years
since the war ended, inspire of the passage of 32
years since the property passed on to the Philippine
government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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Roppongi is a reminder that cannot - should not - be
dissipated ... (Rollo-92047, p. 9)
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is
valuable not so much because of the inflated prices
fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so
because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos -
veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the
Roppongi and related properties will eventually be
sold is a policy determination where both the
President and Congress must concur. Considering
the properties' importance and value, the laws on
conversion and disposition of property of public
dominion must be faithfully
followed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is
issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding
with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo,
Japan. The February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining
Order is made
PERMANENT.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Gri�o-Aquino and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
chanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library
I concur completely with the excellent ponencia of
Mr. Justice Gutierrez and will add the following
observations only for
emphasis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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It is clear that the respondents have failed to show
the President's legal authority to sell the Roppongi
property. When asked to do so at the hearing on
these petitions, the Solicitor General was at best
ambiguous, although I must add in fairness that this
was not his fault. The fact is that there is -no such
authority. Legal expertise alone cannot conjure that
statutory permission out of thin
air.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Exec. Order No. 296, which reads like so much
legislative, double talk, does not contain such
authority. Neither does Rep. Act No. 6657, which
simply allows the proceeds of the sale of our
properties abroad to be used for the comprehensive
agrarian reform program. Senate Res. No. 55 was a
mere request for the deferment of the scheduled
sale of tile Roppongi property, possibly to stop the
transaction altogether; and ill any case it is not a
law. The sale of the said property may be authorized
only by Congress through a duly enacted statute,
and there is no such
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
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Once again, we have affirmed the principle that ours
is a government of laws and not of men, where
every public official, from the lowest to the highest,
can act only by virtue of a valid authorization. I am
happy to note that in the several cases where this
Court has ruled against her, the President of the
Philippines has submitted to this principle with
becoming
grace.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
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PADILLA, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law
library
I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Gutierrez, Jr., I only wish to make a few
observations which could help in further clarifying
the issues.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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Under our tripartite system of government ordained
by the Constitution, it is Congress that lays down or
determines policies. The President executes such
policies. The policies determined by Congress are
embodied in legislative enactments that have to be
approved by the President to become law. The
President, of course, recommends to Congress the
approval of policies but, in the final analysis, it is
Congress that is the policy - determining branch of
government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The judiciary interprets the laws and, in appropriate
cases, determines whether the laws enacted by
Congress and approved by the President, and
presidential acts implementing such laws, are in
accordance with the
Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The Roppongi property was acquired by the
Philippine government pursuant to the reparations
agreement between the Philippine and Japanese
governments. Under such agreement, this property
was acquired by the Philippine government for a
specific purpose, namely, to serve as the site of the
Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Consequently,
Roppongi is a property of public dominion and
intended for public service, squarely falling within
that class of property under Art. 420 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion :chanrobles virtual law library
(1) ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
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(2) Those which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national
wealth. (339a)
Public dominion property intended for public
service cannot be alienated unless the property is
first transformed into private property of the state
otherwise known as patrimonial property of the
state. 1 The transformation of public dominion
property to state patrimonial property involves, to
my mind, a policy decision. It is a policy decision
because the treatment of the property varies
according to its classification. Consequently, it is
Congress which can decide and declare the
conversion of Roppongi from a public dominion
property to a state patrimonial property. Congress
has made no such decision or
declaration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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Moreover, the sale of public property (once
converted from public dominion to state
patrimonial property) must be approved by
Congress, for this again is a matter of policy (i.e. to
keep or dispose of the property). Sec. 48, Book 1 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.
- Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President,
unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by
law in another
officer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the
agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
But the record is bare of any congressional decision
or approval to sell Roppongi. The record is likewise
bare of any congressional authority extended to the
President to sell Roppongi thru public bidding or
otherwise.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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It is therefore, clear that the President cannot sell or
order the sale of Roppongi thru public bidding or
otherwise without a prior congressional approval,
first, converting Roppongi from a public dominion
property to a state patrimonial property, and,
second, authorizing the President to sell the
same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
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ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition
and to make PERMANENT the temporary restraining
order earlier issued by this
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
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SARMIENTO, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law
library
The central question, as I see it, is whether or not
the so-called "Roppongi property' has lost its nature
as property of public dominion, and hence, has
become patrimonial property of the State. I
understand that the parties are agreed that it was
property intended for "public service" within the
contemplation of paragraph (2), of Article 430, of
the Civil Code, and accordingly, land of State
dominion, and beyond human commerce. The lone
issue is, in the light of supervening developments,
that is non-user thereof by the National
Government (for diplomatic purposes) for the last
thirteen years; the issuance of Executive Order No.
296 making it available for sale to any interested
buyer; the promulgation of Republic Act No. 6657,
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, making
available for the program's financing, State assets
sold; the approval by the President of the
recommendation of the investigating committee
formed to study the property's utilization; and the
issuance of Resolution No. 55 of the Philippine
Senate requesting for the deferment of its
disposition it, "Roppongi", is still property of the
public dominion, and if it is not, how it lost that
character.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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When land of the public dominion ceases to be one,
or when the change takes place, is a question our
courts have debated early. In a 1906 decision, 1 it
was held that property of the public dominion, a
public plaza in this instance, becomes patrimonial
upon use thereof for purposes other than a plaza. In
a later case, 2 this ruling was reiterated. Likewise, it
has been held that land, originally private property,
has become of public dominion upon its donation to
the town and its conversion and use as a public
plaza. 3 It is notable that under these three cases,
the character of the property, and any change
occurring therein, depends on the actual use to
which it is dedicated. 4 chanrobles virtual law library
Much later, however, the Court held that "until a
formal declaration on the part of the Government,
through the executive department or the
Legislative, to the effect that the land . . . is no
longer needed for [public] service- for public use or
for special industries, [it] continue[s] to be part of
the public [dominion], not available for private
expropriation or ownership." 5 So also, it was ruled
that a political subdivision (the City of Cebu in this
case) alone may declare (under its charter) a city
road abandoned and thereafter, to dispose of
it. 6chanrobles virtual law library
In holding that there is "a need for a law or formal
declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property
from public domain to make it alienable and a land
for legislative authority to allow the sale of the
property" 7 the majority lays stress to the fact that:
(1) An affirmative act - executive or legislative - is
necessary to reclassify property of the public
dominion, and (2) a legislative decree is required to
make it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties
brought about by earlier interpretations that the
nature of property-whether public or patrimonial is
predicated on the manner it is actually used, or not
used, and in the same breath, repudiates the
Government's position that the continuous non-use
of "Roppongi", among other arguments, for
"diplomatic purposes", has turned it into State
patrimonial
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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I feel that this view corresponds to existing
pronouncements of this Court, among other things,
that: (1) Property is presumed to be State property
in the absence of any showing to the contrary; 8(2)
With respect to forest lands, the same continue to
be lands of the public dominion unless and until
reclassified by the Executive Branch of the
Government; 9 and (3) All natural resources, under
the Constitution, and subject to exceptional cases,
belong to the State. 10 chanrobles virtual law library
I am elated that the Court has banished previous
uncertainties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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FELICIANO, J., dissenting chanrobles virtual law
library
With regret, I find myself unable to share the
conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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For purposes of this separate opinion, I assume that
the piece of land located in 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome,
Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter referred to as
the "Roppongi property") may be characterized as
property of public dominion, within the meaning of
Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code:
[Property] which belong[s] to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some
public service -.
It might not be amiss however, to note that the
appropriateness of trying to bring within the
confines of the simple threefold classification found
in Article 420 of the Civil Code ("property for public
use property "intended for some public service" and
property intended "for the development of the
national wealth") all property owned by the
Republic of the Philippines whether found within
the territorial boundaries of the Republic or located
within the territory of another sovereign State,
is not self-evident. The first item of the classification
property intended for public use - can scarcely be
properly applied to property belonging to the
Republic but found within the territory of another
State. The third item of the classification property
intended for the development of the national
wealth is illustrated, in Article 339 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889, by mines or mineral properties.
Again, mineral lands owned by a sovereign State are
rarely, if ever, found within the territorial base of
another sovereign State. The task of examining in
detail the applicability of the classification set out in
Article 420 of our Civil Code to property that the
Philippines happens to own outside its own
boundaries must, however, be left to
academicians.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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For present purposes, too, I agree that there is no
question of conflict of laws that is, at the present
time, before this Court. The issues before us relate
essentially to authority to sell the Roppongi
property so far as Philippine law is
concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The majority opinion raises two (2) issues: (a)
whether or not the Roppongi property has been
converted into patrimonial property or property of
the private domain of the State; and (b) assuming
an affirmative answer to (a), whether or not there is
legal authority to dispose of the Roppongi
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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I chanrobles virtual law library
Addressing the first issue of conversion of property
of public dominion intended for some public service,
into property of the private domain of the Republic,
it should be noted that the Civil Code does not
address the question of who has authority to effect
such conversion. Neither does the Civil Code set out
or refer to any procedure for such
conversion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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Our case law, however, contains some fairly explicit
pronouncements on this point, as Justice Sarmiento
has pointed out in his concurring opinion. In Ignacio
v. Director of Lands (108 Phils. 335 [1960]),
petitioner Ignacio argued that if the land in question
formed part of the public domain, the trial court
should have declared the same no longer necessary
for public use or public purposes and which would,
therefore, have become disposable and available for
private ownership. Mr. Justice Montemayor,
speaking for the Court, said:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that
when a portion of the shore is no longer washed by
the waters of the sea and is not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment
of special industries, or for coast-guard service, the
government shall declare it to be the property of
the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as
an increment thereof. We believe that only the
executive and possibly the legislative departments
have the authority and the power to make the
declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is
not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for
the establishment of special industries, or for coast-
guard service. If no such declaration has been made
by said departments, the lot in question forms part
of the public domain. (Natividad v. Director of
Lands, supra.) chanrobles virtual law library
The reason for this pronouncement, according to
this Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y
Monteverde v. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134 (cited
in Velayo's Digest, Vol. 1, p.
52).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
... is undoubtedly that the courts are neither
primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to
determine whether any public land are to be used
for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of
Waters. Consequently, until a formal declaration on
the part of the Government, through the executive
department or the Legislature, to the effect that the
land in question is no longer needed for coast-guard
service, for public use or for special industries, they
continue to be part of the public domain not
available for private appropriation or
ownership.(108 Phil. at 338-339; emphasis supplied)
Thus, under Ignacio, either the Executive
Department or the Legislative Department may
convert property of the State of public dominion
into patrimonial property of the State. No particular
formula or procedure of conversion is specified
either in statute law or in case law. Article 422 of
the Civil Code simply states that: "Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State". I respectfully submit,
therefore, that the only requirement which is
legitimately imposable is that the intent to convert
must be reasonably clear from a consideration of
the acts or acts of the Executive Department or of
the Legislative Department which are said to have
effected such
conversion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The same legal situation exists in respect of
conversion of property of public dominion belonging
to municipal corporations, i.e., local governmental
units, into patrimonial property of such entities.
In Cebu Oxygen Acetylene v. Bercilles (66 SCRA 481
[1975]), the City Council of Cebu by resolution
declared a certain portion of an existing street as an
abandoned road, "the same not being included in
the city development plan". Subsequently, by
another resolution, the City Council of Cebu
authorized the acting City Mayor to sell the land
through public bidding. Although there was no
formal and explicit declaration of conversion of
property for public use into patrimonial
property, the Supreme Court said:
xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of
petitioner's application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
which can be the object of an ordinary
contract.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
"Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use of for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the
State." chanrobles virtual law library
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu
heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal
terms, states that "Property thus withdrawn from
public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to
the City may be lawfully used or
conveyed." chanrobles virtual law library
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in
question from public use and its subsequent sale to
the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a
registrable title over the lot in question. (66 SCRA at
484-; emphasis supplied)
Thus, again as pointed out by Sarmiento J., in his
separate opinion, in the case of property owned by
municipal corporations simple non-use or the actual
dedication of public property to some use other
than "public use" or some "public service", was
sufficient legally to convert such property into
patrimonial property (Municipality of Oas v. Roa, 7
Phil. 20 [1906]- Municipality of Hinunganan v.
Director of Lands 24 Phil. 124 [1913]; Province of
Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, 22
SCRA 1334
(1968).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
I would also add that such was the case not only in
respect of' property of municipal corporations but
also in respect of property of the State itself.
Manresa in commenting on Article 341 of the 1889
Spanish Civil Code which has been carried
over verbatiminto our Civil Code by Article 422
thereof, wrote:
La dificultad mayor en todo esto estriba,
naturalmente, en fijar el momento en que los bienes
de dominio publico dejan de serlo. Si la
Administracion o la autoridad competente
legislative realizan qun acto en virtud del cual cesa
el destino o uso publico de los bienes de que se
trata naturalmente la dificultad queda desde el
primer momento resuelta. Hay un punto de partida
cierto para iniciar las relaciones juridicas a que
pudiera haber lugar Pero puede ocurrir que no haya
taldeclaracion expresa, legislativa or administrativa,
y, sin embargo, cesar de hecho el destino publico de
los bienes; ahora bien, en este caso, y para los
efectos juridicos que resultan de entrar la cosa en el
comercio de los hombres,' se entedera que se ha
verificado la conversion de los bienes patrimoniales?
El citado tratadista Ricci opina, respecto del antiguo
Codigo italiano, por la afirmativa, y por nuestra
parte creemos que tal debe ser la soluciion. El
destino de las cosas no depende tanto de una
declaracion expresa como del uso publico de las
mismas, y cuanda el uso publico cese con respecto
de determinados bienes, cesa tambien su situacion
en el dominio publico. Si una fortaleza en ruina se
abandona y no se repara, si un trozo de la via
publica se abandona tambien por constituir otro
nuevo an mejores condiciones....ambos bienes
cesan de estar Codigo, y leyes especiales mas o
memos administrativas. (3 Manresa, Comentarios al
Codigo Civil Espanol, p. 128 [7a ed.; 1952) (Emphasis
supplied)
The majority opinion says that none of the
executive acts pointed to by the Government
purported, expressly or definitely, to convert the
Roppongi property into patrimonial property - of
the Republic. Assuming that to be the case, it is
respectfully submitted that cumulative effect of the
executive acts here involved was to convert
property originally intended for and devoted to
public service into patrimonial property of the State,
that is, property susceptible of disposition to and
appropration by private persons. These executive
acts, in their totality if not each individual act, make
crystal clear the intent of the Executive Department
to effect such conversion. These executive acts
include: chanrobles virtual law library
(a) Administrative Order No. 3 dated 11 August
1985, which created a Committee to study the
disposition/utilization of the Government's property
in Japan, The Committee was composed of officials
of the Executive Department: the Executive
Secretary; the Philippine Ambassador to Japan; and
representatives of the Department of Foreign
Affairs and the Asset Privatization Trust. On 19
September 1988, the Committee recommended to
the President the sale of one of the lots (the lot
specifically in Roppongi) through public bidding. On
4 October 1988, the President approved the
recommendation of the
Committee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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On 14 December 1988, the Philippine Government
by diplomatic note informed the Japanese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic's intention to
dispose of the property in Roppongi. The Japanese
Government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs
replied that it interposed no objection to such
disposition by the Republic. Subsequently, the
President and the Committee informed the leaders
of the House of Representatives and of the Senate
of the Philippines of the proposed disposition of the
Roppongi
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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(b) Executive Order No. 296, which was issued by
the President on 25 July 1987. Assuming that the
majority opinion is right in saying that Executive
Order No. 296 is insufficient to authorize the sale of
the Roppongi property, it is here submitted with
respect that Executive Order No. 296 is more than
sufficient to indicate an intention to convert the
property previously devoted to public service into
patrimonial property that is capable of being sold or
otherwise disposed of chanrobles virtual law library
(c) Non-use of the Roppongi lot for fourteen (14)
years for diplomatic or for any other public
purposes. Assuming (but only arguendo) that non-
use does not, by itself, automatically convert the
property into patrimonial property. I respectfully
urge that prolonged non-use, conjoined with the
other factors here listed, was legally effective to
convert the lot in Roppongi into patrimonial
property of the State. Actually, as already pointed
out, case law involving property of municipal
corporations is to the effect that simple non-use or
the actual dedication of public property to some use
other than public use or public service, was
sufficient to convert such property into patrimonial
property of the local governmental entity
concerned. Also as pointed out above, Manresa
reached the same conclusion in respect of
conversion of property of the public domain of the
State into property of the private domain of the
State.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The majority opinion states that "abandonment
cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
especially if the non-use was attributable not to the
Government's own deliberate and indubitable will
but to lack of financial support to repair and
improve the property" (Majority Opinion, p. 13).
With respect, it may be stressed that there is no
abandonment involved here, certainly no
abandonment of property or of property rights.
What is involved is the charge of the classification of
the property from property of the public domain
into property of the private domain of the State.
Moreover, if for fourteen (14) years, the
Government did not see fit to appropriate whatever
funds were necessary to maintain the property in
Roppongi in a condition suitable for diplomatic
representation purposes, such circumstance may,
with equal logic, be construed as a manifestation of
the crystalizing intent to change the character of the
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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(d) On 30 March 1989, a public bidding was in fact
held by the Executive Department for the sale of the
lot in Roppongi. The circumstance that this bidding
was not successful certainly does not argue against
an intent to convert the property involved into
property that is disposable by
bidding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The above set of events and circumstances makes
no sense at all if it does not, as a whole, show at
least the intent on the part of the Executive
Department (with the knowledge of the Legislative
Department) to convert the property involved into
patrimonial property that is susceptible of being
sold.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
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II chanrobles virtual law library
Having reached an affirmative answer in respect of
the first issue, it is necessary to address the second
issue of whether or not there exists legal authority
for the sale or disposition of the Roppongi
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The majority opinion refers to Section 79(f) of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which reads as
follows:
SEC. 79 (f). Conveyances and contracts to which the
Government is a party. - In cases in which the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a
party to any deed or other instrument conveying the
title to real estate or to any other property the
value of which is in excess of one hundred thousand
pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall
prepare the necessary papers which, together with
the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to
the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the
same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be
executed and signed by the President of the
Philippines on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines unless the authority therefor be
expressly vested by law in another officer.
(Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion then goes on to state
that: "[T]he requirement has been retained in
Section 4, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292)" which reads:
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.
- Whenever real property of the Government
is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following: chanrobles virtual law
library
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President,
unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by
law in another
officer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the
agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
Two points need to be made in this connection.
Firstly, the requirement of obtaining specific
approval of Congress when the price of the real
property being disposed of is in excess of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, has
been deleted from Section 48 of the 1987
Administrative Code. What Section 48 of the present
Administrative Code refers to is authorization by
law for the conveyance. Section 48 does not purport
to be itself a source of legal authority for
conveyance of real property of the Government. For
Section 48 merely specifies the official authorized to
execute and sign on behalf of the Government the
deed of conveyance in case of such a
conveyance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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Secondly, examination of our statute books shows
that authorization by law for disposition of real
property of the private domain of the Government,
has been granted by Congress both in the form of
(a) a general, standing authorization for disposition
of patrimonial property of the Government; and (b)
specific legislation authorizing the disposition of
particular pieces of the Government's patrimonial
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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Standing legislative authority for the disposition of
land of the private domain of the Philippines is
provided by Act No. 3038, entitled "An Act
Authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to Sell or Lease Land of the Private
Domain of the Government of the Philippine
Islands (now Republic of the Philippines)", enacted
on 9 March 1922. The full text of this statute is as
follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature
assembled and by the authority of the
same: chanrobles virtual law library
SECTION 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (now Secretary of the Environment and
Natural Resources) is hereby authorized to sell or
lease land of the private domain of the Government
of the Philippine Islands, or any part thereof, to such
persons, corporations or associations as are, under
the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-eight
hundred and seventy-four, (now Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended) known as the Public Land
Act, entitled to apply for the purchase or lease or
agricultural public
land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
SECTION 2. The sale of the land referred to in the
preceding section shall, if such land is agricultural,
be made in the manner and subject to the
limitations prescribed in chapters five and six,
respectively, of said Public Land Act, and if it be
classified differently, in conformity with the
provisions of chapter nine of said Act: Provided,
however, That the land necessary for the public
service shall be exempt from the provisions of this
Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect on its
approval.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Approved, March 9, 1922. (Emphasis supplied)
Lest it be assumed that Act No. 3038 refers only to
agricultural lands of the private domain of the State,
it must be noted that Chapter 9 of the old Public
Land Act (Act No. 2874) is now Chapter 9 of the
present Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended) and that both statutes refer to:
"any tract of land of the public domain which being
neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be
used for residential purposes or for commercial or
industrial purposes other than agricultural"
(Emphasis supplied). In other words, the statute
covers the sale or lease or residential, commercial
or industrial land of the private domain of the
State.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Implementing regulations have been issued for the
carrying out of the provisions of Act No. 3038. On 21
December 1954, the then Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources promulgated Lands
Administrative Orders Nos. 7-6 and 7-7 which were
entitled, respectively: "Supplementary Regulations
Governing the Sale of the Lands of the Private
Domain of the Republic of the Philippines"; and
"Supplementary Regulations Governing the Lease of
Lands of Private Domain of the Republic of the
Philippines" (text in 51 O.G. 28-29
[1955]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
It is perhaps well to add that Act No. 3038, although
now sixty-eight (68) years old, is still in effect and
has not been repealed. 1chanrobles virtual law
library
Specific legislative authorization for disposition of
particular patrimonial properties of the State is
illustrated by certain earlier statutes. The first of
these was Act No. 1120, enacted on 26 April 1904,
which provided for the disposition of the friar lands,
purchased by the Government from the Roman
Catholic Church, to bona fide settlers and occupants
thereof or to other persons. In Jacinto v. Director of
Lands (49 Phil. 853 [1926]), these friar lands were
held to be private and patrimonial properties of the
State. Act No. 2360, enacted on -28 February 1914,
authorized the sale of the San Lazaro Estate located
in the City of Manila, which had also been
purchased by the Government from the Roman
Catholic Church. In January 1916, Act No. 2555
amended Act No. 2360 by including therein all lands
and buildings owned by the Hospital and the
Foundation of San Lazaro theretofor leased by
private persons, and which were also acquired by
the Philippine
Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
After the enactment in 1922 of Act No. 3038, there
appears, to my knowledge, to be only one statute
authorizing the President to dispose of a specific
piece of property. This statute is Republic Act No.
905, enacted on 20 June 1953, which authorized
the chanrobles virtual law library
President to sell an Identified parcel of land of the
private domain of the National Government to the
National Press Club of the Philippines, and to other
recognized national associations of professionals
with academic standing, for the nominal price of
P1.00. It appears relevant to note that Republic Act
No. 905 was not an outright disposition in
perpetuity of the property involved- it provided for
reversion of the property to the National
Government in case the National Press Club stopped
using it for its headquarters. What Republic Act No.
905 authorized was really a donation, and not a
sale.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The basic submission here made is that Act No. 3038
provides standing legislative authorization for
disposition of the Roppongi property which, in my
view, has been converted into patrimonial property
of the Republic. 2 chanrobles virtual law library
To some, the submission that Act No. 3038 applies
not only to lands of the private domain of the State
located in the Philippines but also to patrimonial
property found outside the Philippines, may appear
strange or unusual. I respectfully submit that such
position is not any more unusual or strange than the
assumption that Article 420 of the Civil Code applies
not only to property of the Republic located within
Philippine territory but also to property found
outside the boundaries of the
Republic.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
It remains to note that under the well-settled
doctrine that heads of Executive Departments
are alter egos of the President (Villena v. Secretary
of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 [1939]), and in view of
the constitutional power of control exercised by the
President over department heads (Article VII,
Section 17,1987 Constitution), the President herself
may carry out the function or duty that is
specifically lodged in the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil. 328 [1957]). At the
very least, the President retains the power to
approve or disapprove the exercise of that function
or duty when done by the Secretary of Environment
and Natural
Resources.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
It is hardly necessary to add that the foregoing
analyses and submissions relate only to the austere
question of existence of legal power or authority.
They have nothing to do with much debated
questions of wisdom or propriety or relative
desirability either of the proposed disposition itself
or of the proposed utilization of the anticipated
proceeds of the property involved. These latter
types of considerations He within the sphere of
responsibility of the political departments of
government the Executive and the Legislative
authorities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the Petitions
for Prohibition in both G.R. Nos. 92013 and 92047.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and
Medialdea, JJ., concurring.
chanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur completely with the excellent ponencia of
Mr. Justice Gutierrez and will add the following
observations only for emphasis.chanrobles virtual
law library
It is clear that the respondents have failed to show
the President's legal authority to sell the Roppongi
property. When asked to do so at the hearing on
these petitions, the Solicitor General was at best
ambiguous, although I must add in fairness that this
was not his fault. The fact is that there is -no such
authority. Legal expertise alone cannot conjure that
statutory permission out of thin air.chanrobles
virtual law library
Exec. Order No. 296, which reads like so much
legislative, double talk, does not contain such
authority. Neither does Rep. Act No. 6657, which
simply allows the proceeds of the sale of our
properties abroad to be used for the comprehensive
agrarian reform program. Senate Res. No. 55 was a
mere request for the deferment of the scheduled
sale of tile Roppongi property, possibly to stop the
transaction altogether; and ill any case it is not a
law. The sale of the said property may be authorized
only by Congress through a duly enacted statute,
and there is no such law.chanrobles virtual law
library
Once again, we have affirmed the principle that ours
is a government of laws and not of men, where
every public official, from the lowest to the highest,
can act only by virtue of a valid authorization. I am
happy to note that in the several cases where this
Court has ruled against her, the President of the
Philippines has submitted to this principle with
becoming grace.chanrobles virtual law library
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Gutierrez, Jr., I only wish to make a few
observations which could help in further clarifying
the issues.chanrobles virtual law library
Under our tripartite system of government ordained
by the Constitution, it is Congress that lays down or
determines policies. The President executes such
policies. The policies determined by Congress are
embodied in legislative enactments that have to be
approved by the President to become law. The
President, of course, recommends to Congress the
approval of policies but, in the final analysis, it is
Congress that is the policy - determining branch of
government.chanrobles virtual law library
The judiciary interprets the laws and, in appropriate
cases, determines whether the laws enacted by
Congress and approved by the President, and
presidential acts implementing such laws, are in
accordance with the Constitution.chanrobles virtual
law library
The Roppongi property was acquired by the
Philippine government pursuant to the reparations
agreement between the Philippine and Japanese
governments. Under such agreement, this property
was acquired by the Philippine government for a
specific purpose, namely, to serve as the site of the
Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Consequently,
Roppongi is a property of public dominion and
intended for public service, squarely falling within
that class of property under Art. 420 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion :
(1) ...chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national
wealth. (339a)
Public dominion property intended for public
service cannot be alienated unless the property is
first transformed into private property of the state
otherwise known as patrimonial property of the
state. 1 The transformation of public dominion
property to state patrimonial property involves, to
my mind, a policy decision. It is a policy decision
because the treatment of the property varies
according to its classification. Consequently, it is
Congress which can decide and declare the
conversion of Roppongi from a public dominion
property to a state patrimonial property. Congress
has made no such decision or
declaration.chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, the sale of public property (once
converted from public dominion to state
patrimonial property) must be approved by
Congress, for this again is a matter of policy (i.e. to
keep or dispose of the property). Sec. 48, Book 1 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.
- Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President,
unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by
law in another officer.chanrobles virtual law library
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the
agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
But the record is bare of any congressional decision
or approval to sell Roppongi. The record is likewise
bare of any congressional authority extended to the
President to sell Roppongi thru public bidding or
otherwise.chanrobles virtual law library
It is therefore, clear that the President cannot sell or
order the sale of Roppongi thru public bidding or
otherwise without a prior congressional approval,
first, converting Roppongi from a public dominion
property to a state patrimonial property, and,
second, authorizing the President to sell the
same.chanrobles virtual law library
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition
and to make PERMANENT the temporary restraining
order earlier issued by this Court.chanrobles virtual
law library
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
The central question, as I see it, is whether or not
the so-called "Roppongi property' has lost its nature
as property of public dominion, and hence, has
become patrimonial property of the State. I
understand that the parties are agreed that it was
property intended for "public service" within the
contemplation of paragraph (2), of Article 430, of
the Civil Code, and accordingly, land of State
dominion, and beyond human commerce. The lone
issue is, in the light of supervening developments,
that is non-user thereof by the National
Government (for diplomatic purposes) for the last
thirteen years; the issuance of Executive Order No.
296 making it available for sale to any interested
buyer; the promulgation of Republic Act No. 6657,
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, making
available for the program's financing, State assets
sold; the approval by the President of the
recommendation of the investigating committee
formed to study the property's utilization; and the
issuance of Resolution No. 55 of the Philippine
Senate requesting for the deferment of its
disposition it, "Roppongi", is still property of the
public dominion, and if it is not, how it lost that
character.chanrobles virtual law library
When land of the public dominion ceases to be one,
or when the change takes place, is a question our
courts have debated early. In a 1906 decision, 1 it
was held that property of the public dominion, a
public plaza in this instance, becomes patrimonial
upon use thereof for purposes other than a plaza. In
a later case, 2 this ruling was reiterated. Likewise, it
has been held that land, originally private property,
has become of public dominion upon its donation to
the town and its conversion and use as a public
plaza. 3 It is notable that under these three cases,
the character of the property, and any change
occurring therein, depends on the actual use to
which it is dedicated. 4
Much later, however, the Court held that "until a
formal declaration on the part of the Government,
through the executive department or the
Legislative, to the effect that the land . . . is no
longer needed for [public] service- for public use or
for special industries, [it] continue[s] to be part of
the public [dominion], not available for private
expropriation or ownership." 5 So also, it was ruled
that a political subdivision (the City of Cebu in this
case) alone may declare (under its charter) a city
road abandoned and thereafter, to dispose of it. 6
In holding that there is "a need for a law or formal
declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property
from public domain to make it alienable and a land
for legislative authority to allow the sale of the
property" 7 the majority lays stress to the fact that:
(1) An affirmative act - executive or legislative - is
necessary to reclassify property of the public
dominion, and (2) a legislative decree is required to
make it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties
brought about by earlier interpretations that the
nature of property-whether public or patrimonial is
predicated on the manner it is actually used, or not
used, and in the same breath, repudiates the
Government's position that the continuous non-use
of "Roppongi", among other arguments, for
"diplomatic purposes", has turned it into State
patrimonial property.chanrobles virtual law library
I feel that this view corresponds to existing
pronouncements of this Court, among other things,
that: (1) Property is presumed to be State property
in the absence of any showing to the contrary; 8(2)
With respect to forest lands, the same continue to
be lands of the public dominion unless and until
reclassified by the Executive Branch of the
Government; 9 and (3) All natural resources, under
the Constitution, and subject to exceptional cases,
belong to the State. 10
I am elated that the Court has banished previous
uncertainties.chanrobles virtual law library
FELICIANO, J., dissenting
With regret, I find myself unable to share the
conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.chanrobles virtual law library
For purposes of this separate opinion, I assume that
the piece of land located in 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome,
Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter referred to as
the "Roppongi property") may be characterized as
property of public dominion, within the meaning of
Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code:
[Property] which belong[s] to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some
public service -.
It might not be amiss however, to note that the
appropriateness of trying to bring within the
confines of the simple threefold classification found
in Article 420 of the Civil Code ("property for public
use property "intended for some public service" and
property intended "for the development of the
national wealth") all property owned by the
Republic of the Philippines whether found within
the territorial boundaries of the Republic or located
within the territory of another sovereign State,
is not self-evident. The first item of the classification
property intended for public use - can scarcely be
properly applied to property belonging to the
Republic but found within the territory of another
State. The third item of the classification property
intended for the development of the national
wealth is illustrated, in Article 339 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889, by mines or mineral properties.
Again, mineral lands owned by a sovereign State are
rarely, if ever, found within the territorial base of
another sovereign State. The task of examining in
detail the applicability of the classification set out in
Article 420 of our Civil Code to property that the
Philippines happens to own outside its own
boundaries must, however, be left to
academicians.chanrobles virtual law library
For present purposes, too, I agree that there is no
question of conflict of laws that is, at the present
time, before this Court. The issues before us relate
essentially to authority to sell the Roppongi
property so far as Philippine law is
concerned.chanrobles virtual law library
The majority opinion raises two (2) issues: (a)
whether or not the Roppongi property has been
converted into patrimonial property or property of
the private domain of the State; and (b) assuming
an affirmative answer to (a), whether or not there is
legal authority to dispose of the Roppongi property.
I land in question is no longer needed for coast-guard
Addressing the first issue of conversion of property
of public dominion intended for some public service,
into property of the private domain of the Republic,
it should be noted that the Civil Code does not
address the question of who has authority to effect
such conversion. Neither does the Civil Code set out
or refer to any procedure for such
conversion.chanrobles virtual law library
Our case law, however, contains some fairly explicit
pronouncements on this point, as Justice Sarmiento
has pointed out in his concurring opinion. In Ignacio
v. Director of Lands (108 Phils. 335 [1960]),
petitioner Ignacio argued that if the land in question
formed part of the public domain, the trial court
should have declared the same no longer necessary
for public use or public purposes and which would,
therefore, have become disposable and available for
private ownership. Mr. Justice Montemayor,
speaking for the Court, said:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that
when a portion of the shore is no longer washed by
the waters of the sea and is not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment
of special industries, or for coast-guard service, the
government shall declare it to be the property of
the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as
an increment thereof. We believe that only the
executive and possibly the legislative departments
have the authority and the power to make the
declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is
not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for
the establishment of special industries, or for coast-
guard service. If no such declaration has been made
by said departments, the lot in question forms part
of the public domain. (Natividad v. Director of
Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to
this Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y
Monteverde v. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134 (cited
in Velayo's Digest, Vol. 1, p. 52).chanrobles virtual
law library
... is undoubtedly that the courts are neither
primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to
determine whether any public land are to be used
for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of
Waters. Consequently, until a formal declaration on
the part of the Government, through the executive
department or the Legislature, to the effect that the
service, for public use or for special industries, they
continue to be part of the public domain not
available for private appropriation or
ownership.(108 Phil. at 338-339; emphasis supplied)
Thus, under Ignacio, either the Executive
Department or the Legislative Department may
convert property of the State of public dominion
into patrimonial property of the State. No particular
formula or procedure of conversion is specified
either in statute law or in case law. Article 422 of
the Civil Code simply states that: "Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State". I respectfully submit,
therefore, that the only requirement which is
legitimately imposable is that the intent to convert
must be reasonably clear from a consideration of
the acts or acts of the Executive Department or of
the Legislative Department which are said to have
effected such conversion.chanrobles virtual law
library
The same legal situation exists in respect of
conversion of property of public dominion belonging
to municipal corporations, i.e., local governmental
units, into patrimonial property of such entities.
In Cebu Oxygen Acetylene v. Bercilles (66 SCRA 481
[1975]), the City Council of Cebu by resolution
declared a certain portion of an existing street as an
abandoned road, "the same not being included in
the city development plan". Subsequently, by
another resolution, the City Council of Cebu
authorized the acting City Mayor to sell the land
through public bidding. Although there was no
formal and explicit declaration of conversion of
property for public use into patrimonial
property, the Supreme Court said:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of
petitioner's application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
which can be the object of an ordinary
contract.chanrobles virtual law library
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
"Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use of for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu
heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal
terms, states that "Property thus withdrawn from
public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to
the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in
question from public use and its subsequent sale to
the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a
registrable title over the lot in question. (66 SCRA at
484-; emphasis supplied)
Thus, again as pointed out by Sarmiento J., in his
separate opinion, in the case of property owned by
municipal corporations simple non-use or the actual
dedication of public property to some use other
than "public use" or some "public service", was
sufficient legally to convert such property into
patrimonial property (Municipality of Oas v. Roa, 7
Phil. 20 [1906]- Municipality of Hinunganan v.
Director of Lands 24 Phil. 124 [1913]; Province of
Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, 22
SCRA 1334 (1968).chanrobles virtual law library
I would also add that such was the case not only in
respect of' property of municipal corporations but
also in respect of property of the State itself.
Manresa in commenting on Article 341 of the 1889
Spanish Civil Code which has been carried
over verbatiminto our Civil Code by Article 422
thereof, wrote:
La dificultad mayor en todo esto estriba,
naturalmente, en fijar el momento en que los bienes
de dominio publico dejan de serlo. Si la
Administracion o la autoridad competente
legislative realizan qun acto en virtud del cual cesa
el destino o uso publico de los bienes de que se
trata naturalmente la dificultad queda desde el
primer momento resuelta. Hay un punto de partida
cierto para iniciar las relaciones juridicas a que
pudiera haber lugar Pero puede ocurrir que no haya
taldeclaracion expresa, legislativa or administrativa,
y, sin embargo, cesar de hecho el destino publico de
los bienes; ahora bien, en este caso, y para los
efectos juridicos que resultan de entrar la cosa en el
comercio de los hombres,' se entedera que se ha
verificado la conversion de los bienes patrimoniales?
El citado tratadista Ricci opina, respecto del antiguo
Codigo italiano, por la afirmativa, y por nuestra
parte creemos que tal debe ser la soluciion. El
destino de las cosas no depende tanto de una
declaracion expresa como del uso publico de las
mismas, y cuanda el uso publico cese con respecto
de determinados bienes, cesa tambien su situacion
en el dominio publico. Si una fortaleza en ruina se
abandona y no se repara, si un trozo de la via
publica se abandona tambien por constituir otro
nuevo an mejores condiciones....ambos bienes
cesan de estar Codigo, y leyes especiales mas o
memos administrativas. (3 Manresa, Comentarios al
Codigo Civil Espanol, p. 128 [7a ed.; 1952) (Emphasis
supplied)
The majority opinion says that none of the
executive acts pointed to by the Government
purported, expressly or definitely, to convert the
Roppongi property into patrimonial property - of
the Republic. Assuming that to be the case, it is
respectfully submitted that cumulative effect of the
executive acts here involved was to convert
property originally intended for and devoted to
public service into patrimonial property of the State,
that is, property susceptible of disposition to and
appropration by private persons. These executive
acts, in their totality if not each individual act, make
crystal clear the intent of the Executive Department
to effect such conversion. These executive acts
include:
(a) Administrative Order No. 3 dated 11 August
1985, which created a Committee to study the
disposition/utilization of the Government's property
in Japan, The Committee was composed of officials
of the Executive Department: the Executive
Secretary; the Philippine Ambassador to Japan; and
representatives of the Department of Foreign
Affairs and the Asset Privatization Trust. On 19
September 1988, the Committee recommended to
the President the sale of one of the lots (the lot
specifically in Roppongi) through public bidding. On
4 October 1988, the President approved the
recommendation of the Committee.chanrobles
virtual law library
On 14 December 1988, the Philippine Government
by diplomatic note informed the Japanese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic's intention to
dispose of the property in Roppongi. The Japanese
Government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs
replied that it interposed no objection to such
disposition by the Republic. Subsequently, the
President and the Committee informed the leaders
of the House of Representatives and of the Senate
of the Philippines of the proposed disposition of the
Roppongi property.chanrobles virtual law library
(b) Executive Order No. 296, which was issued by
the President on 25 July 1987. Assuming that the
majority opinion is right in saying that Executive
Order No. 296 is insufficient to authorize the sale of
the Roppongi property, it is here submitted with
respect that Executive Order No. 296 is more than
sufficient to indicate an intention to convert the
property previously devoted to public service into
patrimonial property that is capable of being sold or
otherwise disposed of
(c) Non-use of the Roppongi lot for fourteen (14)
years for diplomatic or for any other public
purposes. Assuming (but only arguendo) that non-
use does not, by itself, automatically convert the
property into patrimonial property. I respectfully
urge that prolonged non-use, conjoined with the
other factors here listed, was legally effective to
convert the lot in Roppongi into patrimonial
property of the State. Actually, as already pointed
out, case law involving property of municipal
corporations is to the effect that simple non-use or
the actual dedication of public property to some use
other than public use or public service, was
sufficient to convert such property into patrimonial
property of the local governmental entity
concerned. Also as pointed out above, Manresa
reached the same conclusion in respect of
conversion of property of the public domain of the
State into property of the private domain of the
State.chanrobles virtual law library
The majority opinion states that "abandonment
cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
especially if the non-use was attributable not to the
Government's own deliberate and indubitable will
but to lack of financial support to repair and
improve the property" (Majority Opinion, p. 13).
With respect, it may be stressed that there is no
abandonment involved here, certainly no
abandonment of property or of property rights.
What is involved is the charge of the classification of
the property from property of the public domain
into property of the private domain of the State.
Moreover, if for fourteen (14) years, the
Government did not see fit to appropriate whatever
funds were necessary to maintain the property in
Roppongi in a condition suitable for diplomatic
representation purposes, such circumstance may,
with equal logic, be construed as a manifestation of
the crystalizing intent to change the character of the
property.chanrobles virtual law library
(d) On 30 March 1989, a public bidding was in fact
held by the Executive Department for the sale of the
lot in Roppongi. The circumstance that this bidding
was not successful certainly does not argue against
an intent to convert the property involved into
property that is disposable by bidding.chanrobles
virtual law library
The above set of events and circumstances makes
no sense at all if it does not, as a whole, show at
least the intent on the part of the Executive
Department (with the knowledge of the Legislative
Department) to convert the property involved into
patrimonial property that is susceptible of being
sold.
II
Having reached an affirmative answer in respect of
the first issue, it is necessary to address the second
issue of whether or not there exists legal authority
for the sale or disposition of the Roppongi
property.chanrobles virtual law library
The majority opinion refers to Section 79(f) of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which reads as
follows:
SEC. 79 (f). Conveyances and contracts to which the
Government is a party. - In cases in which the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a
party to any deed or other instrument conveying the
title to real estate or to any other property the
value of which is in excess of one hundred thousand
pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall
prepare the necessary papers which, together with
the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to
the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the
same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be
executed and signed by the President of the
Philippines on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines unless the authority therefor be
expressly vested by law in another officer.
(Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion then goes on to state
that: "[T]he requirement has been retained in
Section 4, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292)" which reads:
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.
- Whenever real property of the Government
is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President,
unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by
law in another officer.chanrobles virtual law library
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the
agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
Two points need to be made in this connection.
Firstly, the requirement of obtaining specific
approval of Congress when the price of the real
property being disposed of is in excess of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, has
been deleted from Section 48 of the 1987
Administrative Code. What Section 48 of the present
Administrative Code refers to is authorization by
law for the conveyance. Section 48 does not purport
to be itself a source of legal authority for
conveyance of real property of the Government. For
Section 48 merely specifies the official authorized to
execute and sign on behalf of the Government the
deed of conveyance in case of such a
conveyance.chanrobles virtual law library
Secondly, examination of our statute books shows
that authorization by law for disposition of real
property of the private domain of the Government,
has been granted by Congress both in the form of
(a) a general, standing authorization for disposition
of patrimonial property of the Government; and (b)
specific legislation authorizing the disposition of
particular pieces of the Government's patrimonial
property.chanrobles virtual law library
Standing legislative authority for the disposition of
land of the private domain of the Philippines is
provided by Act No. 3038, entitled "An Act
Authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to Sell or Lease Land of the Private
Domain of the Government of the Philippine
Islands (now Republic of the Philippines)", enacted
on 9 March 1922. The full text of this statute is as
follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature
assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (now Secretary of the Environment and
Natural Resources) is hereby authorized to sell or
lease land of the private domain of the Government
of the Philippine Islands, or any part thereof, to such
persons, corporations or associations as are, under
the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-eight
hundred and seventy-four, (now Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended) known as the Public Land
Act, entitled to apply for the purchase or lease or
agricultural public land.chanrobles virtual law
library
SECTION 2. The sale of the land referred to in the
preceding section shall, if such land is agricultural,
be made in the manner and subject to the
limitations prescribed in chapters five and six,
respectively, of said Public Land Act, and if it be
classified differently, in conformity with the
provisions of chapter nine of said Act: Provided,
however, That the land necessary for the public
service shall be exempt from the provisions of this
Act.chanrobles virtual law library
SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect on its
approval.chanrobles virtual law library
Approved, March 9, 1922. (Emphasis supplied)
Lest it be assumed that Act No. 3038 refers only to
agricultural lands of the private domain of the State,
it must be noted that Chapter 9 of the old Public
Land Act (Act No. 2874) is now Chapter 9 of the
present Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended) and that both statutes refer to:
"any tract of land of the public domain which being
neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be
used for residential purposes or for commercial or
industrial purposes other than agricultural"
(Emphasis supplied). In other words, the statute
covers the sale or lease or residential, commercial
or industrial land of the private domain of the
State.chanrobles virtual law library
Implementing regulations have been issued for the
carrying out of the provisions of Act No. 3038. On 21
December 1954, the then Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources promulgated Lands
Administrative Orders Nos. 7-6 and 7-7 which were
entitled, respectively: "Supplementary Regulations
Governing the Sale of the Lands of the Private
Domain of the Republic of the Philippines"; and
"Supplementary Regulations Governing the Lease of
Lands of Private Domain of the Republic of the
Philippines" (text in 51 O.G. 28-29
[1955]).chanrobles virtual law library
It is perhaps well to add that Act No. 3038, although
now sixty-eight (68) years old, is still in effect and
has not been repealed. 1
Specific legislative authorization for disposition of
particular patrimonial properties of the State is
illustrated by certain earlier statutes. The first of
these was Act No. 1120, enacted on 26 April 1904,
which provided for the disposition of the friar lands,
purchased by the Government from the Roman
Catholic Church, to bona fide settlers and occupants
thereof or to other persons. In Jacinto v. Director of
Lands (49 Phil. 853 [1926]), these friar lands were
held to be private and patrimonial properties of the
State. Act No. 2360, enacted on -28 February 1914,
authorized the sale of the San Lazaro Estate located
in the City of Manila, which had also been
purchased by the Government from the Roman
Catholic Church. In January 1916, Act No. 2555
amended Act No. 2360 by including therein all lands
and buildings owned by the Hospital and the
Foundation of San Lazaro theretofor leased by
private persons, and which were also acquired by
the Philippine Government.chanrobles virtual law
library
After the enactment in 1922 of Act No. 3038, there
appears, to my knowledge, to be only one statute
authorizing the President to dispose of a specific
piece of property. This statute is Republic Act No.
905, enacted on 20 June 1953, which authorized the
President to sell an Identified parcel of land of the
private domain of the National Government to the
National Press Club of the Philippines, and to other
recognized national associations of professionals
with academic standing, for the nominal price of
P1.00. It appears relevant to note that Republic Act
No. 905 was not an outright disposition in
perpetuity of the property involved- it provided for
reversion of the property to the National
Government in case the National Press Club stopped
using it for its headquarters. What Republic Act No.
905 authorized was really a donation, and not a
sale.chanrobles virtual law library
The basic submission here made is that Act No. 3038
provides standing legislative authorization for
disposition of the Roppongi property which, in my
view, has been converted into patrimonial property
of the Republic. 2
To some, the submission that Act No. 3038 applies
not only to lands of the private domain of the State
located in the Philippines but also to patrimonial
property found outside the Philippines, may appear
strange or unusual. I respectfully submit that such
position is not any more unusual or strange than the
assumption that Article 420 of the Civil Code applies
not only to property of the Republic located within
Philippine territory but also to property found
outside the boundaries of the Republic.chanrobles
virtual law library
It remains to note that under the well-settled
doctrine that heads of Executive Departments
are alter egos of the President (Villena v. Secretary
of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 [1939]), and in view of
the constitutional power of control exercised by the
President over department heads (Article VII,
Section 17,1987 Constitution), the President herself
may carry out the function or duty that is
specifically lodged in the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil. 328 [1957]). At the
very least, the President retains the power to
approve or disapprove the exercise of that function
or duty when done by the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources.chanrobles virtual law library
It is hardly necessary to add that the foregoing
analyses and submissions relate only to the austere
question of existence of legal power or authority.
They have nothing to do with much debated
questions of wisdom or propriety or relative
desirability either of the proposed disposition itself
or of the proposed utilization of the anticipated
proceeds of the property involved. These latter
types of considerations He within the sphere of
responsibility of the political departments of
government the Executive and the Legislative
authorities.chanrobles virtual law library
For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the Petitions
for Prohibition in both G.R. Nos. 92013 and 92047.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and
Medialdea, JJ., concurring.
___________________________________________
_ Manila.
[G.R. No. 46720. June 28, 1940.]
WELLS FARGO BANK & UNION TRUST
COMPANY, Petitioner-Appellant, v.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.
DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile
for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant
Solicitor-General Concepcion
for Appellee.
Ross, Lawrence, Selph & Carrascoso,
James Madison Ross and Federico
Agrava as amici curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT; SHARES OF
STOCK OF NONRESIDENT; RIGHT OF
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT TO IMPOSE
INHERITANCE TAX. — In the instant case,
the actual situs of the shares of stock is in
the Philippines, the corporation being
domiciled therein. And besides, the
certificates of stock have remained in this
country up to the time when the deceased
died in California, and they were in
possession of one S. McK, secretary of the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, to
whom they have been delivered and
indorsed in blank. This indorsement gave
S. McK. the right to vote the certificates at
the general meetings of the stockholders,
to collect dividends thereon, and dispose
of the shares in the manner she may deem
fit, without prejudice to her liability to the
owner for violation of instructions. For all
practical purposes, then, S. McK. had the
legal title to the certificates of stock held in
trust for the true owner thereof. In other
words, the owner residing in California has
extended here her activities with respect
to her intangibles so as to avail herself of
the protection and benefit of the Philippine
laws. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the
Philippine Government to tax must be
upheld.
DECISION
MORAN, J.:
An appeal from a declaratory judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Birdie Lillian Eye, wife of Clyde Milton Eye,
died on September 16, 1932, at Los
Angeles, California, the place of her
alleged last residence and domicile. Among
the properties she left was her one-half
conjugal share in 70,000 shares of stock in
the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company, an anonymous partnership
(sociedad anonima), organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines,
with its principal office in the City of
Manila. She left a will which was duly
admitted to probate in California where her
estate was administered and settled.
Petitioner-appellant, Wells Fargo Bank &
Union Trust Company, was duly appointed
trustee of the trust created by the said
will. The Federal and State of California’s
inheritance taxes due on said shares have
been duly paid. Respondent Collector of
Internal Revenue sought to subject anew
the aforesaid shares of stock to the
Philippine inheritance tax, to which
petitioner-appellant objected. Wherefore, a
petition for a declaratory judgment was
filed in the lower court, with the statement
that, "if it should be held by a final
declaratory judgment that the transfer of
the aforesaid shares of stock is legally
subject to the Philippine inheritance tax,
the petitioner will pay such tax, interest
and penalties (saving error in
computation) without protest and will not
file an action to recover the same; and the
petitioner believes and therefore alleges
that if it should be held that such transfer
is not subject to said tax, the respondent
will not proceed to assess and collect the
same." The Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered judgment, holding that
the transmission by will of the said 35,000
shares of stock is subject to Philippine
inheritance tax. Hence, this appeal by the
petitioner.
Petitioner concedes (1) that the Philippine
inheritance tax is not a tax on property,
but upon transmission by inheritance
(Lorenzo v. Posadas, 35 Of. Gaz., 2393,
2395), and (2) that as to real and tangible
personal property of a non-resident
decedent, located in the Philippines, the
Philippine inheritance tax may be imposed
upon their transmission by death, for the
self-evident reason that, being a property
situated in this country, its transfer is, in
some way, dependent, for its
effectiveness, upon Philippine laws. It is
contended, however, that, as to
intangibles, like the shares of stock in
question, their situs is in the domicile of
the owner thereof, and, therefore, their
transmission by death necessarily takes
place under his domiciliary laws.
Section 1536 of the Administrative Code,
as amended, provides that every
transmission by virtue of inheritance of
any share issued by any corporation or
sociedad anonima organized or constituted
in the Philippines, is subject to the tax
therein provided. This provision has
already been applied to shares of stock in
a domestic corporation which were owned
by a British subject residing and do miciled
in Great Britain. (Knowles v. Yatco, G. R.
No. 42967. See also Gibbs v. Government
of P. I., G. R. No. 35694.) Petitioner,
however, invokes the rule laid down by the
United States Supreme Court in four cases
(Farmers Loan & Trust Company v.
Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204; 74 Law. ed.,
371; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S., 586;
74 Law. ed., 1056, Beidler v. South
Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S., 1; 75
Law. ed., 131; First National Bank of
Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S., 312; 52 S. Ct.,
174, 76 Law. ed., 313; 77 A. L. R., 1401),
to the effect that an inheritance tax can be
imposed with respect to intangibles only
by the State where the decedent was
domiciled at the time of his death, and
that, under the due-process clause, the
State in which a corporation has been
incorporated has no power to impose such
tax if the shares of stock in such
corporation are owned by a non-resident
decedent. It is to be observed, however,
that in a later case (Burnet v. Brooks, 288
U. S., 378; 77 Law. ed., 844), the United
States Supreme Court upheld the authority
of the Federal Government to impose an
inheritance tax on the transmission, by
death of a non-resident, of stocks in a
domestic (American) corporation,
irrespective of the situs of the
corresponding certificates of stock. But it is
contended that the doctrine in the
foregoing case is not applicable, because
the due-process clause is directed at the
State and not at the Federal Government,
and that the federal or national power of
the United States is to be determined in
relation to other countries and their
subjects by applying the principles of
jurisdiction recognized in international
relations. Be that as it may, the truth is
that the due-process clause is "directed at
the protection of the individual and he is
entitled to its immunity as much against
the state as against the national
government." (Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.
S., 357, 370; 83 Law. ed., 1339, 1349.)
Indeed, the rule laid down in the four
cases relied upon by the appellant was
predicated on a proper regard for the
relation of the states of the American
Union, which requires that property should
be taxed in only one state and that
jurisdiction to tax is restricted accordingly.
In other words, the application to the
states of the due-process rule springs from
a proper distribution of their powers and
spheres of activity as ordained by the
United States Constitution, and such
distribution is enforced and protected by
not allowing one state to reach out and tax
property in another. And these
considerations do not apply to the
Philippines. Our status rests upon a wholly
distinct basis and no analogy, however
remote, can be suggested in the relation of
one state of the Union with another or with
the United States. The status of the
Philippines has been aptly defined as one
which, though a part of the United States
in the international sense, is, nevertheless,
foreign thereto in a domestic sense.
(Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244, 341.)
At any rate, we see nothing of
consequence in drawing any distinction
between the operation and effect of the
due-process clause as it applies to the
individual states and to the national
government of the United States. The
question here involved is essentially not
one of due-process, but of the power of
the Philippine Government to tax. If that
power be conceded, the guaranty of due
process cannot certainly be invoked to
frustrate it, unless the law involved is
challenged, which is not, on considerations
repugnant to such guaranty of due process
or that of the equal protection of the laws,
as, when the law is alleged to be arbitrary,
oppressive or discriminatory.
Originally, the settled law in the United
States is that intangibles have only one
situs for the purpose of inheritance tax,
and that such situs is in the domicile of the
decedent at the time of his death. But this
rule has, of late, been relaxed. The maxim
mobila sequuntur personam, upon which
the rule rests, has been decried as a mere
"fiction of law having its origin in
considerations of general convenience and
public policy, and cannot be applied to
limit or control the right of the state to tax
property within its jurisdiction" (State
Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National
I:)’Escompte, 191 U. S., 388, 403, 404),
and must "yield to established fact of legal
ownership, actual presence and control
elsewhere, and cannot be applied if to do
so would result in inescapable and patent
injustice." (Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Virginia, 280 U. S., 83, 91-92.) There is
thus a marked shift from artificial
postulates of law, formulated for reasons
of convenience, to the actualities of each
case.
An examination of the adjudged cases will
disclose that the relaxation of the original
rule rests on either of two fundamental
considerations: (1) upon the recognition of
the inherent power of each government to
tax persons, properties and rights within
its jurisdiction and enjoying, thus, the
protection of its laws; and (2) upon the
principle that as to intangibles, a single
location in space is hardly possible,
considering the multiple, distinct
relationships which may be entered into
with respect thereto. It is on the basis of
the first consideration that the case of
Burnet v. Brooks, supra, was decided by
the Federal Supreme Court, sustaining the
power of the Government to impose an
inheritance tax upon transmission, by
death of a non-resident, of shares of stock
in a domestic (American) corporation,
regardless of the situs of their
corresponding certificates; and on the
basis of the second consideration, the case
of Cury v. McCanless, supra.
In Burnet v. Brooks, the court, in disposing
of the argument that the imposition of the
federal estate tax is precluded by the due-
process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The point, being solely one of jurisdiction
to tax, involves none of the other
considerations raised by confiscatory or
arbitrary legislation inconsistent with the
fundamental conceptions of justice which
are embodied in the due-process clause for
the protection of life, liberty, and property
of all persons — citizens and friendly aliens
alike. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United
States, 282 U. S., 481, 489; 75 Law ed.,
473, 476; 41 S. Ct., 229; Nichols v.
Coolidge, 274 U. S., 531; 542, 71 Law ed.,
1184, 1192; 47 S. Ct., 710; 52 A. L. R.,
1081; Heiner v. Donnon, 285 U. S., 312,
326; 76 Law. ed., 772, 779; 52 S. Ct.,
358. If in the instant case the Federal
Government had jurisdiction to impose the
tax, there is manifestly no ground for
assailing it. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S.,
41, 109; 44 Law. ed., 969, 996; 20 S. Ct.,
747; McGray v. United States, 195 U. S.,
27, 61; 49 Law. ed., 78, 97; 24 S. Ct.,
769; 1 Ann. Cas., 561; Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U. S., 107, 153, 154; 55 Law.
ed., 389, 414, 415; 31 S. Ct., 342; Ann.
Cas., 1912B, 1312; Brushaber v. Union P.
R. Co., 240 U. S., 1, 24; 60 Law. ed., 493,
504; 36 S. Ct., 236; L. R. A., 1917 D; 414,
Ann. Cas., 1917B, 713; United States v.
Doremus, 249 U. S., 86, 93; 63 Law. ed.,
493, 496; 39 S. Ct., 214." Italics ours.)
And, in sustaining the power of the Federal
Government to tax properties within its
borders, wherever its owner may have
been domiciled at the time of his death,
the court ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . There does not appear, a priori, to be
anything contrary to the principles of
international law, or hurtful to the polity of
nations, in a State’s taxing property
physically situated within its borders,
wherever its owner may have been
domiciled at the time of his death.." . .
"As jurisdiction may exist in more than one
government, that is, jurisdiction based on
distinct grounds — the citizenship of the
owner, his domicile, the source of income,
the situs of the property — efforts have
been made to preclude multiple taxation
through the negotiation of appropriate
international conventions. These
endeavors, however, have proceeded upon
express or implied recognition, and not in
denial, of the sovereign taxing power as
exerted by governments in the exercise of
jurisdiction upon any one of these
grounds.." . . (See pages 39-397; 399.)
In Curry v. McCanless, supra, the court, in
deciding the question of whether the
States of Alabama and Tennessee may
each constitutionally impose death taxes
upon the transfer of an interest in
intangibles held in trust by an Alabama
trustee but passing under the will of a
beneficiary decedent domiciles in
Tennessee, sustained the power of each
State to impose the tax. In arriving at this
conclusion, the court made the following
observations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In cases where the owner of intangibles
confines his activity to the place of his
domicile it has been found convenient to
substitute a rule for a reason, cf. New York
ex rel., Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S., 308,
313; 81 Law. ed., 666, 670; 57 S. Ct.,
466; 108 A. L. R., 721; First Bank Stock
Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U. S., 234, 24I;
81 Law. ed., 1061, 1065; 57 S. Ct., 677;
113 A. L. R., 228, by saying that his
intangibles are taxed at their situs and not
elsewhere, or, perhaps less artificially, by
invoking the maxim mobilia sequuntur
personam, Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.
S., 1; 72 Law. ed., 749; 48 S. Ct., 410,
supra; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S., 586;
74 Law. ed., 1056; 50 S. Ct.; 436; 72 A.
L. R., 1303, supra, which means only that
it is the identity or association of
intangibles with the person of their owner
at his domicile which gives jurisdiction to
tax. But when the taxpayer extends his
activities with respect to his intangibles, so
as to avail himself of the protection and
benefit of the laws of another state, in
such a way as to bring his person or
property within the reach of the tax
gatherer there, the reason for a single
place of taxation no longer obtains, and
the rule is not even workable substitute for
the reasons which may exist in any
particular case to support the
constitutional power of each state
concerned to tax. Whether we regard the
right of a state to tax as founded on power
over the object taxed, as declared by Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat., 316; 4 Law. ed., 579, supra,
through dominion over tangibles or over
persons whose relationships are the source
of intangible rights, or on the benefit and
protection conferred by the taxing
sovereignty, or both, it is undeniable that
the state of domicile is not deprived, by
the taxpayer’s activities elsewhere, of its
constitutional jurisdiction to tax, and
consequently that there are many
circumstances in which more than one
state may have jurisdiction to impose a
tax and measure it by some or all of the
taxpayer’s intangibles. Shares of corporate
stock may be taxed at the domicile of the
shareholder and also at that of the
corporation which the taxing state has
created and controls; and income may be
taxed both by the state where it is earned
and by the state of the recipient’s
domicile. Protection, benefit, and power
over the subject matter are not confined to
either state.." . . (Pp. 1347-1349.)
". . . We find it impossible to say that
taxation of intangibles can be reduced in
every case to the mere mechanical
operation of locating at a single place, and
there taxing, every legal interest growing
out of all the complex legal relationships
which may be entered into between
persons. This is the case because in point
of actuality those interests may be too
diverse in their relationships to various
taxing jurisdictions to admit of unitary
treatment without discarding modes of
taxation long accepted and applied before
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted,
and still recognized by this Court as valid."
(P. 1351.)
We need not belabor the doctrines of the
foregoing cases. We believe, and so hold,
that the issue here involved is controlled
by those doctrines. In the instant case, the
actual situs of the shares of stock is in the
Philippines, the corporation being
domiciled therein. And besides, the
certificates of stock have remained in this
country up to the time when the deceased
died in California, and they were in
possession of one Syrena McKee, secretary
of the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company, to whom they have been
delivered and indorsed in blank. This
indorsement gave Syrena McKee the right
to vote the certificates at the general
meetings of the stockholders, to collect
dividends thereon, and dispose of the Sixth Judicial District, the dispositive American raw cotton consigned to the (Record on Appeal, pp. 7-14). DISC filed
shares in the manner she may deem fit, portion of which reads: order of Manila Banking Corporation, an Opposition on May 21, 1965 to which
without prejudice to her liability to the Manila and the People's Bank and Trust MCP filed a reply on May 27, 1965 (Record
owner for violation of instructions. For all Company acting for and in behalf of the on Appeal, pp. 14-24). On June 29, 1965,
practical purposes, then, Syrena McKee WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered Pan Asiatic Commercial Company, Inc., the trial court deferred the resolution of
had the legal title to the certificates of ordering the defendants National who represents Riverside Mills Corporation the motion to dismiss till after the trial on
stock held in trust for the true owner Development Company and Maritime (Exhs. K-2 to K7-A & L-2 to L-7-A). Also the merits (Record on Appeal, p. 32). On
thereof. In other words, the owner residing Company of the Philippines, to pay jointly loaded on the same vessel at Tokyo, June 8, 1965, MCP filed its answer with
in California has extended here her and severally, to the plaintiff Development Japan, were the cargo of Kyokuto Boekui, counterclaim and cross-claim against
activities with respect to her intangibles so Insurance and Surety Corp., the sum of Kaisa, Ltd., consigned to the order of NDC.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
as to avail herself of the protection and THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FOUR THOUSAND Manila Banking Corporation consisting of virtual law library
benefit of the Philippine laws. Accordingly, AND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS AND 200 cartons of sodium lauryl sulfate and
the jurisdiction of the Philippine EIGHTY SIX CENTAVOS (364,915.86) with 10 cases of aluminum foil (Exhs. M & M-1).
Government to tax must be upheld. the legal interest thereon from the filing of En route to Manila the vessel Dofia Nati NDC, for its part, filed its answer to DISC's
plaintiffs complaint on April 22, 1965 until figured in a collision at 6:04 a.m. on April complaint on May 27, 1965 (Record on
Judgment is affirmed, with costs fully paid, plus TEN THOUSAND PESOS 15, 1964 at Ise Bay, Japan with a Appeal, pp. 22-24). It also filed an answer
against Petitioner-Appellant. (Pl0,000.00) by way of damages as and Japanese vessel 'SS Yasushima Maru' as a to MCP's cross-claim on July 16, 1965
for attorney's result of which 550 bales of aforesaid (Record on Appeal, pp. 39-40). However,
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, and fee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles cargo of American raw cotton were lost on October 16, 1965, NDC's answer to
Concepcion, JJ., concur. virtual law library and/or destroyed, of which 535 bales as DISC's complaint was stricken off from the
damaged were landed and sold on the record for its failure to answer DISC's
LAUREL, J.: authority of the General Average Surveyor written interrogatories and to comply with
On defendant Maritime Company of the the trial court's order dated August 14,
Concurred in the result.. Philippines' cross-claim against the for Yen 6,045,-500 and 15 bales were not
landed and deemed lost (Exh. G). The 1965 allowing the inspection or
defendant National Development photographing of the memorandum of
___________________________________ Company, judgment is hereby rendered, damaged and lost cargoes was worth
P344,977.86 which amount, the plaintiff as agreement it executed with MCP. Said
ordering the National Development order of October 16, 1965 likewise
Company to pay the cross-claimant insurer, paid to the Riverside Mills
Corporation as holder of the negotiable declared NDC in default (Record on
G.R. No. L-49407 August 19, 1988 Maritime Company of the Philippines the
bills of lading duly endorsed (Exhs. L-7-A, Appeal, p. 44). On August 31, 1966, NDC
total amount that the Maritime Company filed a motion to set aside the order of
of the Philippines may voluntarily or by K-8-A, K-2-A, K-3-A, K-4-A, K-5-A, A- 2,
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT N-3 and R-3}. Also considered totally lost October 16, 1965, but the trial court
compliance to a writ of execution pay to denied it in its order dated September 21,
COMPANY, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE were the aforesaid shipment of Kyokuto,
the plaintiff pursuant to the judgment 1966.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
COURT OF APPEALS and Boekui Kaisa Ltd., consigned to the order
rendered in this s virtual law library
DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE & SURETY of Manila Banking Corporation, Manila,
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
CORPORATION, Respondents-Appellees. acting for Guilcon, Manila, The total loss
virtual law library
was P19,938.00 which the plaintiff as On November 12, 1969, after DISC and
insurer paid to Guilcon as holder of the MCP presented their respective evidence,
No. L-49469 August 19, 1988
With costs against the defendant Maritime duly endorsed bill of lading (Exhibits M-1 the trial court rendered a decision ordering
Company of the and S-3). Thus, the plaintiff had paid as the defendants MCP and NDC to pay jointly
MARITIME COMPANY OF THE Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan insurer the total amount of P364,915.86 to and solidarity to DISC the sum of
PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant, robles virtual law library the consignees or their successors-in- P364,915.86 plus the legal rate of interest
vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and interest, for the said lost or damaged to be computed from the filing of the
DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE & SURETY cargoes. Hence, plaintiff filed this complaint on April 22, 1965, until fully
(pp. 34-35, Rollo, GR No. L-49469)
CORPORATION, respondents- appellees. complaint to recover said amount from the paid and attorney's fees of P10,000.00.
defendants-NDC and MCP as owner and Likewise, in said decision, the trial court
The facts of these cases as found by the ship agent respectively, of the said 'Dofia granted MCP's crossclaim against
Balgos & Perez Law Office for private Nati' vessel. (Rollo, L-49469, p.38)
Court of Appeals, are as follows: NDC.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
respondent in both cases.
virtual law library
The evidence before us shows that in On April 22, 1965, the Development
PARAS, J.: Insurance and Surety Corporation filed
accordance with a memorandum MCP interposed its appeal on December
agreement entered into between before the then Court of First Instance of 20, 1969, while NDC filed its appeal on
These are appeals by certiorari from the defendants NDC and MCP on September Manila an action for the recovery of the February 17, 1970 after its motion to set
decision * of the Court of Appeals in CA 13, 1962, defendant NDC as the first sum of P364,915.86 plus attorney's fees of aside the decision was denied by the trial
G.R. No: L- 46513-R entitled preferred mortgagee of three ocean going P10,000.00 against NDC and MCP (Record court in its order dated February
"Development Insurance and Surety vessels including one with the name 'Dona on Appeal), pp. 1- 13,1970.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
Corporation plaintiff-appellee vs. Maritime Nati' appointed defendant MCP as its agent 6).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles bles virtual law library
Company of the Philippines and National to manage and operate said vessel for and virtual law library
Development Company defendant- in its behalf and account (Exh. A). Thus,
on February 28, 1964 the E. Philipp On November 17,1978, the Court of
appellants," affirming in toto the Interposing the defense that the complaint
Corporation of New York loaded on board Appeals promulgated its decision
decision ** in Civil Case No. 60641 of the states no cause of action and even if it
the vessel "Dona Nati" at San Francisco, affirming in toto the decision of the trial
then Court of First Instance of Manila, does, the action has prescribed, MCP filed
California, a total of 1,200 bales of
on May 12, 1965 a motion to dismiss
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble Ichanrobles virtual law library
s virtual law library
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
Hence these appeals by ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
certiorari.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr RESPONDENT DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE
obles virtual law library AND SURETY CORPORATION HAS NO
CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST
PETITIONER MARITIME COMPANY OF THE
NDC's appeal was docketed as G.R. No.
PHILIPPINES AND IN NOT DISMISSING
49407, while that of MCP was docketed as THE
G.R. No. 49469. On July 25,1979, this
COMPLAINT.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
Court ordered the consolidation of the nrobles virtual law library
above cases (Rollo, p. 103). On August
27,1979, these consolidated cases were
given due course (Rollo, p. 108) and IIchanrobles virtual law library
submitted for decision on February 29,
1980 (Rollo, p.
136).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE
virtual law library
OF ACTION OF RESPONDENT
DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE AND SURETY
In its brief, NDC cited the following CORPORATION IF ANY EXISTS AS
assignments of error: chanrobles virtual AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER MARITIME
law library COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES IS BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION AND HAS
ALREADY
Ichanrobles virtual law library PRESCRIBED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch
anrobles virtual law library
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPLYING ARTICLE 827 OF THE CODE OF IIIchanrobles virtual law library
COMMERCE AND NOT SECTION 4(2a) OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 65,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CARRIAGE THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
OF GOODS BY SEA ACT IN DETERMINING ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE
THE LIABILITY FOR LOSS OF CARGOES PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EXHIBIT "H" AND
RESULTING FROM THE COLLISION OF ITS IN FINDING ON THE BASIS THEREOF THAT
VESSEL "DONA NATI" WITH THE THE COLLISION OF THE SS DONA NATI
YASUSHIMA MARU"OCCURRED AT ISE AND THE YASUSHIMA MARU WAS DUE TO
BAY, JAPAN OR OUTSIDE THE THE FAULT OF BOTH VESSELS INSTEAD
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE OF FINDING THAT THE COLLISION WAS
PHILIPPINES.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch CAUSED BY THE FAULT, NEGLIGENCE AND
anrobles virtual law library LACK OF SKILL OF THE COMPLEMENTS OF
THE YASUSHIMA MARU WITHOUT THE
FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE OF THE
II chanrobles virtual law library COMPLEMENT OF THE SS DONA
NATI chanrobles virtual law library
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING THE C0MPLAINT FOR
IVchanrobles virtual law library
REIMBURSEMENT FILED BY THE INSURER,
HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENT-APPELLEE,
AGAINST THE CARRIER, HEREIN THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
PETITIONER-APPELLANT. (pp. 1-2, Brief ERRED IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE
for Petitioner-Appellant National CODE OF COMMERCE PETITIONER
Development Company; p. 96, APPELLANT MARITIME COMPANY OF THE
Rollo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble PHILIPPINES IS A SHIP AGENT OR
s virtual law library NAVIERO OF SS DONA NATI OWNED BY
CO-PETITIONER APPELLANT NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND THAT SAID
On its part, MCP assigned the following
PETITIONER-APPELLANT IS SOLIDARILY
alleged errors: chanrobles virtual law LIABLE WITH SAID CO-PETITIONER FOR
library
LOSS OF OR DAMAGES TO CARGO
RESULTING IN THE COLLISION OF SAID
VESSEL, WITH THE JAPANESE YASUSHIMA
MARU.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
Vchanrobles virtual law library
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LOSS OF OR
DAMAGES TO THE CARGO OF 550 BALES
OF AMERICAN RAW COTTON, DAMAGES
WERE CAUSED IN THE AMOUNT OF
P344,977.86 INSTEAD OF ONLY P110,000
AT P200.00 PER BALE AS ESTABLISHED IN
THE BILLS OF LADING AND ALSO IN
HOLDING THAT PARAGRAPH 1O OF THE
BILLS OF LADING HAS NO APPLICATION
IN THE INSTANT CASE THERE BEING NO
GENERAL AVERAGE TO SPEAK
OF.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
VIchanrobles virtual law library
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THE PETITIONERS
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES TO PAY
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY TO HEREIN
RESPONDENT DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE
AND SURETY CORPORATION THE SUM OF
P364,915.86 WITH LEGAL INTEREST FROM
THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT UNTIL
FULLY PAID PLUS P10,000.00 AS AND FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES INSTEAD OF
SENTENCING SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT
TO PAY HEREIN PETITIONERS ITS
COUNTERCLAIM IN THE AMOUNT OF
P10,000.00 BY WAY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND THE COSTS. (pp. 1-4, Brief for the
Maritime Company of the Philippines; p.
121, Rollo) chanrobles virtual law library
The pivotal issue in these consolidated
cases is the determination of which laws
govern loss or destruction of goods due to
collision of vessels outside Philippine
waters, and the extent of liability as well
as the rules of prescription provided
thereunder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
The main thrust of NDC's argument is to
the effect that the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act should apply to the case at bar
and not the Civil Code or the Code of
Commerce. Under Section 4 (2) of said
Act, the carrier is not responsible for the
loss or damage resulting from the "act,
neglect or default of the master, mariner,
pilot or the servants of the carrier in the
navigation or in the management of the
ship." Thus, NDC insists that based on the
findings of the trial court which were
adopted by the Court of Appeals, both
pilots of the colliding vessels were at fault
and negligent, NDC would have been
relieved of liability under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act. Instead, Article 287 of
the Code of Commerce was applied and
both NDC and MCP were ordered to
reimburse the insurance company for the
amount the latter paid to the consignee as
earlier
stated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl
es virtual law library
This issue has already been laid to rest by
this Court of Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v.
IAC (1 50 SCRA 469-470 [1987]) where it
was held under similar circumstance "that
the law of the country to which the goods
are to be transported governs the liability
of the common carrier in case of their loss,
destruction or deterioration" (Article 1753,
Civil Code). Thus, the rule was specifically
laid down that for cargoes transported
from Japan to the Philippines, the liability
of the carrier is governed primarily by the
Civil Code and in all matters not regulated
by said Code, the rights and obligations of
common carrier shall be governed by the
Code of commerce and by laws (Article
1766, Civil Code). Hence, the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely
suppletory to the provision of the Civil
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
In the case at bar, it has been established
that the goods in question are transported
from San Francisco, California and Tokyo,
Japan to the Philippines and that they were
lost or due to a collision which was found
to have been caused by the negligence or
fault of both captains of the colliding
vessels. Under the above ruling, it is
evident that the laws of the Philippines will
apply, and it is immaterial that the
collision actually occurred in foreign
waters, such as Ise Bay,
Japan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code,
common carriers from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy
are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them according to all
circumstances of each case. Accordingly,
under Article 1735 of the same Code, in all
other than those mentioned is Article 1734
thereof, the common carrier shall be
presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negigently, unless it proves that it
has observed the extraordinary diligence
required by
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
It appears, however, that collision falls
among matters not specifically regulated
by the Civil Code, so that no reversible
error can be found in respondent courses
application to the case at bar of Articles
826 to 839, Book Three of the Code of
Commerce, which deal exclusively with
collision of
vessels.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
More specifically, Article 826 of the Code
of Commerce provides that where collision
is imputable to the personnel of a vessel,
the owner of the vessel at fault, shall
indemnify the losses and damages
incurred after an expert appraisal. But
more in point to the instant case is Article
827 of the same Code, which provides that
if the collision is imputable to both vessels,
each one shall suffer its own damages and
both shall be solidarily responsible for the
losses and damages suffered by their
cargoes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
Significantly, under the provisions of the
Code of Commerce, particularly Articles
826 to 839, the shipowner or carrier, is not
exempt from liability for damages arising
from collision due to the fault or
negligence of the captain. Primary liability
is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in
recognition of the universally accepted
doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is
merely the representative of the owner
who has the actual or constructive control
over the conduct of the voyage (Y'eung
Sheng Exchange and Trading Co. v.
Urrutia & Co., 12 Phil. 751
[1909]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
There is, therefore, no room for NDC's
interpretation that the Code of Commerce
should apply only to domestic trade and
not to foreign trade. Aside from the fact
that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(Com. Act No. 65) does not specifically
provide for the subject of collision, said Act
in no uncertain terms, restricts its
application "to all contracts for the carriage
of goods by sea to and from Philippine
ports in foreign trade." Under Section I
thereof, it is explicitly provided that
"nothing in this Act shall be construed as
repealing any existing provision of the
Code of Commerce which is now in force,
or as limiting its application." By such
incorporation, it is obvious that said law
not only recognizes the existence of the
Code of Commerce, but more importantly
does not repeal nor limit its
application.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan
robles virtual law library
On the other hand, Maritime Company of
the Philippines claims that Development
Insurance and Surety Corporation, has no
cause of action against it because the
latter did not prove that its alleged
subrogers have either the ownership or
special property right or beneficial interest
in the cargo in question; neither was it
proved that the bills of lading were
transferred or assigned to the alleged
subrogers; thus, they could not possibly
have transferred any right of action to said
plaintiff- appellee in this case. (Brief for
the Maritime Company of the Philippines,
p.
16).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The records show that the Riverside Mills
Corporation and Guilcon, Manila are the
holders of the duly endorsed bills of lading
covering the shipments in question and an
examination of the invoices in particular,
shows that the actual consignees of the
said goods are the aforementioned
companies. Moreover, no less than MCP
itself issued a certification attesting to this
fact. Accordingly, as it is undisputed that
the insurer, plaintiff appellee paid the total
amount of P364,915.86 to said consignees
for the loss or damage of the insured
cargo, it is evident that said plaintiff-
appellee has a cause of action to recover
(what it has paid) from defendant-
appellant MCP (Decision, CA-G.R. No.
46513-R, p. 10; Rollo, p.
43).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
MCP next contends that it can not be liable
solidarity with NDC because it is merely
the manager and operator of the vessel
Dona Nati not a ship agent. As the general
managing agent, according to MCP, it can
only be liable if it acted in excess of its
authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr
obles virtual law library
As found by the trial court and by the
Court of Appeals, the Memorandum
Agreement of September 13, 1962 (Exhibit
6, Maritime) shows that NDC appointed
MCP as Agent, a term broad enough to
include the concept of Ship-agent in
Maritime Law. In fact, MCP was even
conferred all the powers of the owner of
the vessel, including the power to contract
in the name of the NDC (Decision, CA G.R.
No. 46513, p. 12; Rollo, p. 40).
Consequently, under the circumstances,
MCP cannot escape
liability.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob
les virtual law library
It is well settled that both the owner and
agent of the offending vessel are liable for
the damage done where both are
impleaded (Philippine Shipping Co. v.
Garcia Vergara, 96 Phil. 281 [1906]); that
in case of collision, both the owner and the
agent are civilly responsible for the acts of
the captain (Yueng Sheng Exchange and
Trading Co. v. Urrutia & Co., supra citing
Article 586 of the Code of Commerce;
Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Lopez
Castelo, 42 Phil. 256, 262 [1921]); that
while it is true that the liability of
the naviero in the sense of charterer or
agent, is not expressly provided in Article
826 of the Code of Commerce, it is clearly
deducible from the general doctrine of
jurisprudence under the Civil Code but
more specially as regards contractual
obligations in Article 586 of the Code of
Commerce. Moreover, the Court held that
both the owner and agent (Naviero) should
be declared jointly and severally liable,
since the obligation which is the subject of
the action had its origin in a tortious act
and did not arise from contract (Verzosa
and Ruiz, Rementeria y Cia v. Lim, 45 Phil.
423 [1923]). Consequently, the agent,
even though he may not be the owner of
the vessel, is liable to the shippers and
owners of the cargo transported by it, for
losses and damages occasioned to such
cargo, without prejudice, however, to his
rights against the owner of the ship, to the
extent of the value of the vessel, its
equipment, and the freight (Behn Meyer Y
Co. v. McMicking et al. 11 Phil. 276
[1908]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
As to the extent of their liability, MCP
insists that their liability should be limited
to P200.00 per package or per bale of raw
cotton as stated in paragraph 17 of the
bills of lading. Also the MCP argues that
the law on averages should be applied in
determining their
liability.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob
les virtual law library
MCP's contention is devoid of merit. The
declared value of the goods was stated in
the bills of lading and corroborated no less
by invoices offered as evidence ' during
the trial. Besides, common carriers, in the
language of the court in Juan Ysmael &
Co., Inc. v. Barrette et al., (51 Phil. 90
[1927]) "cannot limit its liability for injury
to a loss of goods where such injury or
loss was caused by its own negligence."
Negligence of the captains of the colliding
vessel being the cause of the collision, and
the cargoes not being jettisoned to save
some of the cargoes and the vessel, the
trial court and the Court of Appeals acted
correctly in not applying the law on
averages (Articles 806 to 818, Code of
Commerce).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
MCP's claim that the fault or negligence
can only be attributed to the pilot of the
vessel SS Yasushima Maru and not to the
Japanese Coast pilot navigating the vessel
Dona Nati need not be discussed lengthily
as said claim is not only at variance with
NDC's posture, but also contrary to the
factual findings of the trial court affirmed
no less by the Court of Appeals, that both
pilots were at fault for not changing their
excessive speed despite the thick fog
obstructing their
visibility.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
Finally on the issue of prescription, the
trial court correctly found that the bills of
lading issued allow trans-shipment of the
cargo, which simply means that the date
of arrival of the ship Dona Nati on April
18,1964 was merely tentative to give
allowances for such contingencies that said
vessel might not arrive on schedule at
Manila and therefore, would necessitate
the trans-shipment of cargo, resulting in
consequent delay of their arrival. In fact,
because of the collision, the cargo which
was supposed to arrive in Manila on April
18, 1964 arrived only on June 12, 13, 18,
20 and July 10, 13 and 15, 1964. Hence,
had the cargoes in question been saved,
they could have arrived in Manila on the
above-mentioned dates. Accordingly, the
complaint in the instant case was filed on
April 22, 1965, that is, long before the
lapse of one (1) year from the date the
lost or damaged cargo "should have been
delivered" in the light of Section 3, sub-
paragraph (6) of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea
Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the subject
petitions are DENIED for lack of merit and
the assailed decision of the respondent
Appellate Court is
AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan
robles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla,
and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
___________________________________________
___
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
THE HOLY SEE, Petitioner, v. THE HON.
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 61 and
STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES,
INC., Respondents.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.chanrobles
virtual law library
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for
private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse
and set aside the Orders dated June 20,
1991 and September 19, 1991 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati,
Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-
183.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the
motion of petitioner to dismiss the
complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183, while
the Order dated September 19, 1991
denied the motion for reconsideration of
the June 20,1991
Order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises
sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome,
Italy, and is represented in the Philippines
by the Papal
Nuncio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
Private respondent, Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate
business.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
This petition arose from a controversy over
a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square
meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 390440) located in the
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila
and registered in the name of
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr
obles virtual law library
Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and
5-D which are covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and
265388 respectively and registered in the
name of the Philippine Realty Corporation
(PRC).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup,
through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup
assigned his rights to the sale to private
respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychan
robles virtual law library
In view of the refusal of the squatters to
vacate the lots sold to private respondent,
a dispute arose as to who of the parties
has the responsibility of evicting and
clearing the land of squatters.
Complicating the relations of the parties
was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to
Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation (Tropicana).
I itself
On January 23, 1990, private respondent
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for
annulment of the sale of the three parcels
of land, and specific performance and
damages against petitioner, represented
by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana (Civil
Case No.
90-
183).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The complaint alleged that: (1) on April
17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of
petitioner and the PRC, agreed to sell to
Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the
price of P1,240.00 per square meters; (2)
the agreement to sell was made on the
condition that earnest money of
P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the
sellers, and that the sellers clear the said
lots of squatters who were then occupying
the same; (3) Licup paid the earnest
money to Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in the same
month, Licup assigned his rights over the
property to private respondent and
informed the sellers of the said
assignment; (5) thereafter, private
respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos
that the sellers fulfill their undertaking and
clear the property of squatters; however,
Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent
of the squatters' refusal to vacate the lots,
proposing instead either that private
respondent undertake the eviction or that
the earnest money be returned to the
latter; (6) private respondent
counterproposed that if it would undertake
the eviction of the squatters, the purchase
price of the lots should be reduced from
P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter;
(7) Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest
money of P100,000.00 and wrote private
respondent giving it seven days from
receipt of the letter to pay the original
purchase price in cash; (8) private
respondent sent the earnest money back
to the sellers, but later discovered that on
March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC,
without notice to private respondent, sold
the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by two
separate Deeds of Sale, one over Lot 5-A,
and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and
that the sellers' transfer certificate of title
over the lots were cancelled, transferred
and registered in the name of Tropicana;
(9) Tropicana induced petitioner and the
PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched
at the expense of private
respondent; (10) private respondent
demanded the rescission of the sale to
Tropicana and the reconveyance of the
lots, to no avail; and (11) private
respondent is willing and able to comply
with the terms of the contract to sell and
has actually made plans to develop the
lots into a townhouse project, but in view
of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not
less than
P30,000.000.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Private respondent thus prayed for: (1)
the annulment of the Deeds of Sale
between petitioner and the PRC on the one
hand, and Tropicana on the other; (2) the
reconveyance of the lots in question; (3)
specific performance of the agreement to
sell between it and the owners of the lots;
and (4)
damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr.
Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the
complaint - petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity
from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an
improper party. An opposition to the
motion was filed by private
respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychan
robles virtual law library
On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an
order denying, among others, petitioner's
motion to dismiss after finding that
petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign
immunity by entering into the business
contract in question" (Rollo, pp. 20-
21).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the order. On August
30, 1991, petitioner filed a "Motion for a
Hearing for the Sole Purpose of
Establishing Factual Allegation for claim of
Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense." So
as to facilitate the determination of its
defense of sovereign immunity, petitioner
prayed that a hearing be conducted to
allow it to establish certain facts upon
which the said defense is based. Private
respondent opposed this motion as well as
the motion for
reconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued
an order deferring the resolution on the
motion for reconsideration until after trial
on the merits and directing petitioner to
file its answer (Rollo, p.
22).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to
us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the
privilege of sovereign immunity only on its
own behalf and on behalf of its official
representative, the Papal
Nuncio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
On December 9, 1991, a Motion for
Intervention was filed before us by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming
that it has a legal interest in the outcome
of the case as regards the diplomatic
immunity of petitioner, and that it "adopts
by reference, the allegations contained in
the petition of the Holy See insofar as they
refer to arguments relative to its claim of
sovereign immunity from suit" (Rollo, p.
87).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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Private respondent opposed the
intervention of the Department of Foreign
Affairs. In compliance with the resolution
of this Court, both parties and the
Department of Foreign Affairs submitted
their respective memoranda.
II
A preliminary matter to be threshed out is
the procedural issue of whether the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to
question the order denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss. The general rule is that
an order denying a motion to dismiss is
not reviewable by the appellate courts, the
remedy of the movant being to file his
answer and to proceed with the hearing
before the trial court. But the general rule
admits of exceptions, and one of these is
when it is very clear in the records that the
trial court has no alternative but to dismiss
the complaint (Philippine National Bank v.
Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada
v. Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA
114 [1992]. In such a case, it would be a
sheer waste of time and energy to require
the parties to undergo the rigors of a
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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The other procedural question raised by
private respondent is the personality or
legal interest of the Department of Foreign
Affairs to intervene in the case in behalf of
the Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-
190).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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In Public International Law, when a state
or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a
foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office
of the state where it is sued to convey to
the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
In the United States, the procedure
followed is the process of "suggestion,"
where the foreign state or the international
organization sued in an American court
requests the Secretary of State to make a
determination as to whether it is entitled
to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds
that the defendant is immune from suit,
he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to
submit to the court a "suggestion" that the
defendant is entitled to immunity. In
England, a similar procedure is followed,
only the Foreign Office issues a make their own determination as to the
certification to that effect instead of
submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I
International Law 130 [1965]; Note:
Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign
Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale
Law Journal 1088
[1941]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
In the Philippines, the practice is for the
foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive
endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the
Philippine Foreign Office conveys its
endorsement to the courts varies.
In International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130
(1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
just sent a letter directly to the Secretary
of Labor and Employment, informing the
latter that the respondent-employer could
not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic
immunity. In World Health Organization v.
Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial
court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v.
Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S.
Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs to request the Solicitor General to
make, in behalf of the Commander of the
United States Naval Base at Olongapo City,
Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent
Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the
"suggestion" in a Manifestation and
Memorandum as amicus
curiae.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
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In the case at bench, the Department of
Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal
Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed
to intervene on the side of petitioner. The
Court allowed the said Department to file
its memorandum in support of petitioner's
claim of sovereign
immunity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
In some cases, the defense of sovereign
immunity was submitted directly to the
local courts by the respondents through
their private counsels (Raquiza v.
Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v.
Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262
[1948]; United States of America v.
Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and
companion cases). In cases where the
foreign states bypass the Foreign Office,
the courts can inquire into the facts and
nature of the acts and transactions
involved.
III
The burden of the petition is that
respondent trial court has no jurisdiction
over petitioner, being a foreign state
enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other
hand, private respondent insists that the
doctrine of non-suability is not anymore
absolute and that petitioner has divested
itself of such a cloak when, of its own free
will, it entered into a commercial
transaction for the sale of a parcel of land
located in the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr
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A. The Holy See
Before we determine the issue of
petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into
its status as a sovereign state is in
order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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Before the annexation of the Papal States
by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the
monarch and he, as the Holy See, was
considered a subject of International Law.
With the loss of the Papal States and the
limitation of the territory under the Holy
See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position
of the Holy See in International Law
became controversial (Salonga and Yap,
Public International Law 36-37
[1992]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered
into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy
recognized the exclusive dominion and
sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over
the Vatican City. It also recognized the
right of the Holy See to receive foreign
diplomats, to send its own diplomats to
foreign countries, and to enter into treaties
according to International Law (Garcia,
Questions and Problems In International
Law, Public and Private 81
[1948]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
The Lateran Treaty established the
statehood of the Vatican City "for the
purpose of assuring to the Holy See
absolute and visible independence and of
guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty
also in the field of international relations"
(O'Connell, I International Law 311
[1965]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
In view of the wordings of the Lateran
Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether
the statehood is vested in the Holy See or
in the Vatican City. Some writers even
suggested that the treaty created two
international persons - the Holy See and
Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra,
37).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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The Vatican City fits into none of the
established categories of states, and the
attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be
made in a sense different from that in
which it is applied to other states
(Fenwick, International Law 124-125
[1948]; Cruz, International Law 37
[1991]). In a community of national
states, the Vatican City represents an
entity organized not for political but for
ecclesiastical purposes and international
objects. Despite its size and object, the
Vatican City has an independent
government of its own, with the Pope, who
is also head of the Roman Catholic Church,
as the Holy See or Head of State, in
conformity with its traditions, and the
demands of its mission in the world.
Indeed, the world-wide interests and
activities of the Vatican City are such as to
make it in a sense an "international state"
(Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles
of International Law 160
[1956]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
One authority wrote that the recognition of
the Vatican City as a state has significant
implication - that it is possible for any
entity pursuing objects essentially different
from those pursued by states to be
invested with international personality
(Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in
International Law, 46 The American
Journal of International Law 308
[1952]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct
foreign relations and enter into
transactions as the Holy See and not in the
name of the Vatican City, one can
conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is
the Holy See that is the international
person.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
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The Republic of the Philippines has
accorded the Holy See the status of a
foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through
its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had
diplomatic representations with the
Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo,
p. 87). This appears to be the universal
practice in international
relations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
B. Sovereign Immunity
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted
the generally accepted principles of
International Law. Even without this
affirmation, such principles of International
Law are deemed incorporated as part of
the law of the land as a condition and
consequence of our admission in the
society of nations (United States of
America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
[1990]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
There are two conflicting concepts of
sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign
cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state,
but not with regard to private acts or
acts jure gestionis
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136
SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-
Santiago, Public International Law 194
[1984]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
Some states passed legislation to serve as
guidelines for the executive or judicial
determination when an act may be
considered as jure gestionis. The United
States passed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, which defines a
commercial activity as "either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act."
Furthermore, the law declared that the
"commercial character of the activity shall
be determined by reference to the nature
of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by
reference to its purpose." The Canadian
Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to
Provide For State Immunity in Canadian
Courts. The Act defines a "commercial
activity" as any particular transaction, act
or conduct or any regular course of
conduct that by reason of its nature, is of
a "commercial character."chanrobles
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The restrictive theory, which is intended to
be a solution to the host of problems
involving the issue of sovereign immunity,
has created problems of its own. Legal
treatises and the decisions in countries
which follow the restrictive theory have
difficulty in characterizing whether a
contract of a sovereign state with a private
party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure
imperii.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
The restrictive theory came about because
of the entry of sovereign states into purely
commercial activities remotely connected
with the discharge of governmental
functions. This is particularly true with
respect to the Communist states which
took control of nationalized business
activities and international
trading.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
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This Court has considered the following
transactions by a foreign state with private
parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease
by a foreign government of apartment
buildings for use of its military officers
(Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2)
the conduct of public bidding for the repair
of a wharf at a United States Naval Station
(United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.);
and (3) the change of employment status
of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano,
162 SCRA 88
[1988]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
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On the other hand, this Court has
considered the following transactions by a
foreign state with private parties as
acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook
in the recreation center, consisting of three
restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store,
and a coffee and pastry shop at the John
Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to
American servicemen and the general
public (United States of America v.
Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2)
the bidding for the operation of barber
shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City
(United States of America v. Guinto, 182
SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation of the
restaurants and other facilities open to the
general public is undoubtedly for profit as
a commercial and not a governmental
activity. By entering into the employment
contract with the cook in the discharge of
its proprietary function, the United States
government impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from
suit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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In the absence of legislation defining what
activities and transactions shall be
considered "commercial" and as
constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to
come out with our own guidelines,
tentative they may
be.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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Certainly, the mere entering into a
contract by a foreign state with a private
party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an
act can only be the start of the inquiry.
The logical question is whether the foreign
state is engaged in the activity in the
regular course of business. If the foreign
state is not engaged regularly in a
business or trade, the particular act or
transaction must then be tested by its
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a
sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,
then it is an act jure imperii, especially
when it is not undertaken for gain or
profit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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As held in United States of America v.
Guinto, (supra):
There is no question that the United States
of America, like any other state, will be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-
suability if it has entered into a contract in
its proprietary or private capacity. It is
only when the contract involves its
sovereign or governmental capacity that
no such waiver may be implied.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has
bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of a real estate business, surely the
said transaction can be categorized as an
act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has
denied that the acquisition and subsequent
disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit
but claimed that it acquired said property
for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said
claim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a
donation from the Archdiocese of Manila.
The donation was made not for commercial
purpose, but for the use of petitioner to
construct thereon the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of
a foreign sovereign to acquire property,
real or personal, in a receiving state,
necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is
recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This
treaty was concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and entered into force in the
Philippines on November 15,
1965.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a
diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from
the civil and administrative jurisdiction of
the receiving state over any real action
relating to private immovable property
situated in the territory of the receiving
state which the envoy holds on behalf of
the sending state for the purposes of the
mission. If this immunity is provided for a
diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason
should immunity be recognized as regards
the sovereign itself, which in this case is
the Holy
See.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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The decision to transfer the property and
the subsequent disposal thereof are
likewise clothed with a governmental
character. Petitioner did not sell Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to
dispose off the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost
impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation. The fact that
squatters have occupied and are still
occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly
refuse to leave the premises, has been
admitted by private respondent in its
complaint (Rollo, pp. 26,
27).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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The issue of petitioner's non-suability can
be determined by the trial court without
going to trial in the light of the pleadings,
particularly the admission of private
respondent. Besides, the privilege of
sovereign immunity in this case was
sufficiently established by the
Memorandum and Certification of the
Department of Foreign Affairs. As the
department tasked with the conduct of the
Philippines' foreign relations
(Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV,
Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign
Affairs has formally intervened in this case
and officially certified that the Embassy of
the Holy See is a duly accredited
diplomatic mission to the Republic of the
Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction
and entitled to all the rights, privileges and
immunities of a diplomatic mission or
embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-
157). The determination of the executive
arm of government that a state or
instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or
diplomatic immunity is a political question
that is conclusive upon the courts
(International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130
[1990]). Where the plea of immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch, it is the duty of the courts to
accept this claim so as not to embarrass
the executive arm of the government in
conducting the country's foreign relations
(World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48
SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International
Catholic Migration Commission and
in World Health Organization, we abide by
the certification of the Department of
Foreign
Affairs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
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Ordinarily, the procedure would be to
remand the case and order the trial court
to conduct a hearing to establish the facts
alleged by petitioner in its motion. In view
of said certification, such procedure would
however be pointless and unduly circuitous
(Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge
Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25,
1994).
IV
Private respondent is not left without any
legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International
Law and Transnational Law, a person who
feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign
sovereign can ask his own government to
espouse his cause through diplomatic
channels.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
Private respondent can ask the Philippine
government, through the Foreign Office, to
espouse its claims against the Holy See.
Its first task is to persuade the Philippine
government to take up with the Holy See
the validity of its claims. Of course, the
Foreign Office shall first make
determination of the impact of its espousal
on the relations between the Philippine
government and the Holy See
(Young, Remedies of Private Claimants
Against Foreign States, Selected Readings
on Protection by Law of Private Foreign
Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the
Philippine government decides to espouse
the claim, the latter ceases to be a private
cause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
According to the Permanent Court of
International Justice, the forerunner of the
International Court of Justice:
By taking up the case of one of its subjects
and by reporting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its
own rights - its right to ensure, in the
person of its subjects, respect for the rules virtual 1aw library
of international law (The Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions, 1 Hudson, World a.) Immediately upon the filing of this
Court Reports 293, 302 [1924]). petition, an Order be issued restraining the
respondents from applying and enforcing
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is 960;chanrobles.com : virtual law library
GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case
No. 90-183 against petitioner is b.) After hearing, judgment be
DISMISSED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarycha rendered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
nrobles virtual law library
1.) Declaring the respective rights and
duties of petitioners and respondents;
SO ORDERED.
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Circular No. 960 as contrary to the
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, provisions of the Constitution, hence void;
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., because its provision that "Foreign
concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl currency deposits shall be exempt from
es virtual law library attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any
Padilla, J., took no
administrative body whatsoever"
part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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i.) has taken away the right of petitioners
to have the bank deposit of defendant
Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
satisfy the judgment rendered in
petitioners’ favor in violation of substantive
___________________________________________ due process guaranteed by the
___________ Constitution;
G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997.] ii.) has given foreign currency depositors
an undue favor or a class privilege in
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution;
Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and
Natural Guardian, and Spouses
FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals
EVELINA E. SALVACION, Petitioners, v. like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Northcott since criminals could escape civil
a
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and liability for their wrongful acts by merely
GREG BARTELLI y converting their money to a foreign
NORTHCOTT, Respondents. currency and depositing it in a foreign
currency deposit account with an
authorized bank.
DECISION
The antecedent facts:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
TORRES, JR., J.:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y
Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and
In our predisposition to discover the lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12
"original intent" of a statute, courts years old to go with him to his apartment.
become the unfeeling pillars of the status Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen
quo. Little do we realize that statutes or Salvacion for four days, or up to February
even constitutions are bundles of 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child
compromises thrown our way by their once on February 4, and three times each
framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On
statute may already be out of tune and February 7, 1989, after policemen and
irrelevant to our day. people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg
Bartelli was arrested and detained at the
The petition is for declaratory relief. It Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen
prays for the following reliefs:chanrob1es recovered from Bartelli the following
items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control
No. 021000678-1166111303, US
3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No.
104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar
Account — China Banking Corp.,
US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877;
5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.)
Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll
(Teddy Bear) used in seducing the
complainant.
On February 16, 1989, Makati
Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed
against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No.
801 for Serious Illegal Detention and
Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804 and
805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the
same day, petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case
No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary
attachment against Greg Bartelli. On
February 24, 1989, the day there was a
scheduled hearing for Bartelli’s petition for
bail the latter escaped from jail.
On February 28, 1989, the court granted
the fiscal’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold
Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the
accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the
criminal cases were archived in an Order
dated February 28, 1989.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the
Judge issued an Order dated February 22,
1989 granting the application of herein
petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment. After petitioners
gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU
Insurance Corporation in the amount of
100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment was issued by the trial court
on February 28, 1989.
On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of
Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on
China Banking Corporation. In a letter
dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy
Sheriff of Makati, China Banking
Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405
as its answer to the notice of garnishment
served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy
Sheriff of Makati Armando De Guzman
sent his reply to China Banking
Corporation saying that the garnishment
did not violate the secrecy of bank
deposits since the disclosure is merely
incidental to a garnishment properly and
legally made by virtue of a court order
which has placed the subject deposits in
custodia legis. In answer to this letter of
the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China
Banking Corporation, in a letter dated
March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect
that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg
Bartelli are exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body,
whatsoever,
This prompted the counsel for petitioners
to make an inquiry with the Central Bank
in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether
Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any
exception or whether said section has been
repealed or amended since said section
has rendered nugatory the substantive
right of the plaintiff to have the claim
sought to be enforced by the civil action
secured by way of the writ of preliminary
attachment as granted to the plaintiff
under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The Central Bank responded as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"May 26, 1989
"Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino
12 Pres. Osmeña Avenue
South Admiral Village
Parañaque, Metro Manila
Dear Ms. Carolino:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This is in reply to your letter dated April
25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section
113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).
"The cited provision is absolute in
application. It does not admit of any
exception, nor has the same been repealed
nor amended.
"The purpose of the law is to encourage
dollar accounts within the country’s
banking system which would help in the
development of the economy. There is no
intention to render futile the basic rights of
a person as was suggested in your subject
letter. The law may be harsh as some
perceive it, but it is still the law.
Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.
"Very truly yours,
(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
Director" 1 motion of plaintiffs, through counsel,
Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial
court granted petitioner’s motion for leave
to serve summons by publication in the
Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled "Karen
Salvacion, Et. Al. v. Greg Bartelli y
Northcott." Summons with the complaint
was published in the Manila Times once a
week for three consecutive weeks. Greg
Bartelli failed to file his answer to the
complaint and was declared in default on
August 7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-
parte, the court rendered judgment in
favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the
dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendant, ordering the
latter:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the
amount of P500,000.00 as moral
damages;
"2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses
Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E.
Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each
or a total of P300,000.00 for both of them;
"3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of
P100,000.00; and
"4. To pay attorney’s fees in an amount
equivalent to 25% of the total amount of
damages herein awarded;chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
"5. To pay litigation expenses of
P10,000.00; plus
"6. Costs of the Suit.
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
The heinous acts of respondent Greg
Bartelli which gave rise to the award were
related in graphic detail by the trial court
in its decision as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The defendant in this case was originally
detained in the municipal jail of Makati but
was able to escape therefrom on February
24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden
of Makati to the Presiding Judge,
Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136,
where he was charged with four counts of
Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim.
Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly, upon
summons was served upon defendant by
publication in the Manila Times, a
newspaper of general circulation as
attested by the Advertising Manager of the
Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of
the said newspaper. Defendant, however,
failed to file his answer to the complaint
despite the lapse of the period of sixty
(60) days from the last publication; hence,
upon motion of the plaintiffs, through
counsel, defendant was declared in default
and plaintiffs were authorized to present
their evidence ex parte.
"In support of the complaint, plaintiffs
presented as witnesses the minor Karen E.
Salvacion, her father, Federico N.
Salvacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and
a certain Liberato Madulio, who gave the
following testimony:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Karen took her first year high school in
St. Mary’s Academy in Pasay City but has
recently transferred to Arellano University
for her second year.
"In the afternoon of February 4, 1989,
Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati
Cinema, Square, with her friend Edna
Tangile whiling away her free time. At
about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing
her snack on a concrete bench in front of
Plaza Fair, an American approached her.
She was then alone because Edna Tangile
had already left, and she was about to go
home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)
"The American asked her name and
introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat
beside her when he talked to her. He said
he was a Math teacher and told her that he
has a sister who is a nurse in New York.
His sister allegedly has a daughter who is
about Karen’s age and who was with him
in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN,
Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5)
"The American asked Karen what was her
favorite subject and she told him it’s
Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him
to his house where she could teach Pilipino
to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed to
persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp.
5-6)
"They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong
Tamo, turning right to reach the
defendant’s house along Kalayaan Avenue.
(Id., p. 6)
"When they reached the apartment house,
Karen noticed that defendant’s alleged
niece was not outside the house but
defendant told her maybe his niece was
inside. When Karen did not see the alleged
niece inside the house, defendant told her
maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited
Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)
"Upon entering the bedroom defendant
suddenly locked the door. Karen became
nervous because his niece was not there.
Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and
tied Karen’s hands with it, and then he
undressed her. Karen cried for help but
defendant strangled her. He took a
packing tape and he covered her mouth
with it and he circled it around her head.
(Id., p. 7)
"Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen
towards the bed which was just near the
door. He tied her feet and hands spread
apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of
her and inserted his finger in her sex
organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to
shout but no sound could come out
because there were tapes on her mouth.
When defendant withdraw his finger it was
full of blood and Karen felt more pain after
the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8)
"He then got a Johnson’s Baby Oil and he
applied it to his sex organ as well as to her
sex organ. After that he forced his sex
organ into her but he was not able to do
so. While he was doing it, Karen found it
difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot
while feeling severe pain. She merely
presumed that he was able to inset his sex
organ a little, because she could not see.
Karen could not recall how long the
defendant was in that position. (Id. pp. 8-
9)
"After that, he stood up and went to the
bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to
take a shower and he untied her hands.
Karen could only hear the sound of the
water while the defendant, she presumed,
was in the bathroom washing his sex
organ. When she took a shower more
blood came out from her. In the
meantime, defendant changed the
mattress because it was full of blood. After
the shower, Karen was allowed by
defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because
she got tired crying. The incident
happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen has
no way of determining the exact time
because defendant removed her watch.
Defendant did not care to giver her food
before she went to sleep. Karen woke up
at about 8:00 o’clock the following
morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)
"The following day, February 5, 1989, a
Sunday, after a breakfast of biscuit and
coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant
raped Karen while she was still bleeding.
For lunch, they also took biscuit and coke.
She was raped for the second time at
about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening,
they had rice for dinner which defendant
had stored downstairs; it was he who
cooked the rice that is why it looks like
"lugaw." For the third time, Karen was
raped again during the night. During those
three times defendant succeeded in
inserting his sex organ but she could not
say whether the organ was inserted
wholly.
"Karen did not see any firearm or any
bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie
her hands and feet nor put a tape on her
mouth anymore but she did not cry for
help for fear that she might be killed;
besides, all the windows and doors were
closed. And even if she shouted for help,
nobody would hear her. She was so afraid
that if somebody would hear her and
would be able to call the police, it was still
possible that as she was still inside the
house, defendant might hill her. Besides,
the defendant did not leave that Sunday,
ruling out her chance to call for help. At
nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN,
Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)
"On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was
raped three times, once in the morning for
thirty minutes after a breakfast of biscuits;
again in the afternoon; and again in the
evening. At first, Karen did not know that
there was a window because everything
was covered by a carpet, until defendant
opened the window for around fifteen
minutes or less to let some air in, and she
found that the window was covered by
styrofoam and plywood. After that, he
again closed the window with a hammer
and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and
carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
"That Monday evening, Karen had a
chance to call for help, although defendant
left but kept the door closed. She went to
the bathroom and saw a small window
covered by styrofoam and she also spotted
a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and
she cried for help through the hole. She
cried: ‘Maawa na po kayo sa akin.
Tulungan n’yo akong makalabas dito.
Kinidnap ako! Somebody heard her. It was
a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got
angry and said she was ‘istorbo’. Karen
pleaded for help and the woman told her
to sleep and she will call the police. She
finally fell asleep but no policeman came.
(TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)
"She woke up at 6:00 o’clock the following
morning, and she saw defendant in bed,
this time sleeping. She waited for him to
wake up. When he woke up, he again got
some food but he always kept the door
locked. As usual, she was merely fed with
biscuit and coke. On that day, February 7,
1989, she was again raped three times.
The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the
second at about 8:30 - 9:00, and the third
was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he
had raped her for the second time he left
but only for a short while. Upon his return,
he caught her shouting for help but he did
not understand what she was shouting
about. After she was raped the third time,
he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989,
pp. 16-17) She again went to the
bathroom and shouted for help. After
shouting for about five minutes, she heard
many voices. The voices were asking for
her name and she gave her name as Karen
Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice
of a woman saying they will just call the
police. They were also telling her to
change her clothes. She went from the
bathroom to the room but she did not
change her clothes being afraid that should
the neighbors call for the police and the
defendant see her in different clothes, he
might kill her. At that time she was
wearing a T-shirt of the American because
the latter washed her dress. (Id., p.
16)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"Afterwards, defendant arrived and he
opened the door. He asked her if she had
asked for help because there were many
policemen outside and she denied it. He
told her to change her clothes, and she did
change to the one she was wearing on
Saturday. He instructed her to tell the
police that she left home and willingly;
then he went downstairs but he locked the
door. She could hear people conversing
but she could not understand what they
were saying. (Id., p. 19)
"When she heard the voices of many
people who were conversing downstairs,
she knocked repeatedly at the door as
hard as she could. She heard somebody
going upstairs and when the door was
opened, she saw a policeman. The
policemen asked her name and the reason
why she was there. She told him she was
kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five
policemen in uniform and the defendant
was talking to them.’Nakikipag-areglo po
sa mga pulis,’ Karen added. "The
policeman told him to just explain at the
precinct. (Id., p. 20)
They went out of the house and she saw
some of her neighbors in front of the
house. They rode the car of a certain
person she called Kuya Boy together with
defendant, the policeman, and two of her
neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong
Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were
brought to sub-Station I and there she was
investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00
a.m., her father arrived, followed by her
mother together with some of their
neighbors. Then they were brought to the
second floor of the police headquarters.
(Id., p. 21)
"At the headquarters, she was asked
several questions by the investigator. The
written statement she gave to the police
was marked as Exhibit A. Then they
proceeded to the National Bureau of
Investigation together with the
investigator and her parents. At the NBI, a
doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined
her private parts. It was already 3:00 in
the early morning of the following day
when they reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug.
15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the
medico-legal officer has been marked as
Exhibit B.
"She was studying at the St. Mary’s
Academy in Pasay City at the time of the
incident but she subsequently transferred
to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University,
situated along Taft Avenue, because she
was ashamed to be the subject of
conversation in the school. She first
applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos,
Arellano University along Taft Avenue near
the Light Rail Transit Station but she was
denied admission after she told the school
the true reason for her transfer. The
reason for their denial was that they might
be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15,
1989, p. 46)
x x x
"After the incident, Karen has changed a
lot. She does not play with her brother and
sister anymore, and she is always in a
state of shock; she has been absent-
minded and is ashamed even to go out of
the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10)
She appears to be restless or sad. (Id., p.
11)The father prays for P500,000.00 moral
damages for Karen for this shocking
experience which probably, she would
always recall until she reaches old age,
and he is not sure if she could ever
recover from this experience." (TSN, Sept.
24, 1989, pp. 10-11)

Pursuant to an Order granting leave to
publish notice of decision, said notice was
published in the Manila Bulletin once a
week for three consecutive weeks. After
the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the
date of the last publication of the notice of
judgment and the decision of the trial
court had become final, petitioners tried to
execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit with
China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the
bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief
from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments
articulated by the parties boil down to
two:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
May this Court entertain the instant
petition despite the fact that original
jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory
relief rests with the lower court? Should
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as
amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known
as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be
made applicable to a foreign transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 providing that "Foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body
whatsoever." should be adjudged as
unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it
has taken away the right of petitioners to
have the bank deposit of defendant Greg
Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the
judgment rendered in petitioners’ favor in
violation of substantive due process
guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has
given foreign currency depositors an
undue favor or a class privilege in violation
of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe
haven for criminals like the herein
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since
criminals could escape civil liability for
their wrongful acts by merely converting
their money to a foreign currency and
depositing it in a foreign currency deposit
account with an authorized bank and 4.)
The Monetary Board, in issuing Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has
exceeded its delegated quasi-legislative
power when it took away: a.) the plaintiff’s
substantive right to have the claim sought
to be enforced by the civil action secured
by way of the writ of preliminary
attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the
Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiff’s
substantive right to have the judgment
credit satisfied by way of the writ of
execution out of the bank deposit of the
judgment debtor as granted to the
judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its
power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central
bank, in its Comment alleges that the
Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of
CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its
power or authority because the subject
Section is copied verbatim from a portion
of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D.
1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary
Board that grants exemption from
attachment or garnishment to foreign
currency deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426
as amended) itself; that it does not violate
the substantive due process guaranteed by
the Constitution because a.) it was based
on a law; b.) the law seems to be
reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to
regular methods of procedure; and d.) it
applies to all members of a class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one
reason for exempting the foreign currency
deposits from attachment, garnishment or
any other order or process of any court, is
to assure the development and speedy
growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit
System and the Offshore Banking System
in the Philippines; that another reason is
to encourage the inflow of foreign currency
deposits into the banking institutions
thereby placing such institutions more in a
position to properly channel the same to
loans and investments in the Philippines,
thus directly contributing to the economic
development of the country; that the
subject section is being enforced according
to the regular methods of procedure; and
that it applies to all foreign currency
deposits made by any person and
therefore does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers
that the questioned provision is needed to
promote the public interest and the
general welfare; that the State cannot just
stand idly by while a considerable segment
of the society suffers from economic
distress; that the State had to take some
measures to encourage economic
development; and that in so doing persons
and property may be subjected to some
kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the
general welfare or public interest.
Respondent Central Bank also alleges that
Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules
of Court provide that some properties are
exempted from execution/attachment
especially provided by law and R.A. No.
6426 as amended is such a law, in that it
specifically provides, among others, that
foreign currency deposits shall be
exempted from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever.
For its part, respondent China Banking
Corporation, aside from giving reasons
similar to that of respondent Central Bank,
also stated that respondent China Bank is
not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings
experienced by the minor Karen E.
Salvacion from the breastly hands of Greg
Bartelli; that it is only too willing to release
the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may
perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings
petitioners has undergone; but it is
restrained from doing so in view of R.A.
No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular NO. 960; and that despite the
harsh effect of these laws on petitioners,
CBC has no other alternative but to follow
the same.
This Court finds the petition to be partly
meritorious.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages
awarded to her by the court. But this
petitioner for declaratory relief can only be
entertained and treated as a petition for
mandamus to require respondents to
honor and comply with the writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.
This Court has no original and exclusive
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief. 2 However, exceptions to this rule
have been recognized. Thus, where the
petition has far-reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved, it
may be treated as one for mandamus. 3
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in
her belief that all Americans are good, and
in her gesture of kindness by teaching his
alleged niece the Filipino language
requested by the American, trustingly
went with said stranger to his apartment,
and that she was raped by said American
tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten
times. She was detained therein for four
(4) days. This American tourist was able to
escape from the jail and avoid
punishment. On the other hand, the child,
having received a favorable judgment in
the Civil Case for damages in the amount
of more than P1,000,000.00, which
amount could alleviate the humiliation,
anxiety, and besmirched reputation she
had suffered and may continue to suffer
for a long, long time; and knowing that
this person who had wronged her has the
money, could not, however get the award
of damages because of this unreasonable
law. This questioned law, therefore makes
futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that she and her parents fully
deserve. As stated by the trial court in its
decision.
"Indeed, after hearing the testimony of
Karen, the Court believes that it was
undoubtedly a shocking and traumatic
experience she had undergone which could
haunt her mind for a long, long time, the
mere recall of which could make her feel
so humiliated, as in fact she had been
actually humiliated once when she was
refused admission at the Abad Santos High
School, Arellano University, where she
sought to transfer from another school,
simply because the school authorities of
the said High School learned about what
happened to her and allegedly feared that
they might be implicated in the case.
x x x
The reason for imposing exemplary or
corrective damages is due to the wanton
and bestial manner defendant had
committed the acts of rape during a period
of serious illegal detention of his hapless
victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose
only fault was in her being so naive and
credulous to believe easily that defendant,
an American national, could not have such
a bestial desire on her nor capable of
committing such a heinous crime. Being
only 12 years old when that unfortunate
incident happened, she has never heard of
an old Filipino adage that in every forest
there is a snake, . . ." 4
If Karen’s sad fate had happened to
anybody’s own kin, it would be difficult for
him to fathom how the incentive for
foreign currency deposit could be more
important that his child’s rights to said
award of damages; in this case, the
victim’s claim for damages from this alien
who had the gall to wrong a child of tender
years of a country where he is a mere
visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in
the questioned provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426
was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the
country’s economy was in a shambles; ". . . Respondents China Banking
when foreign investments were minimal Corporation and Central Bank of the
and presumably, this was the reason why Philippines refused to honor the writ of
said statute was enacted. But the realities execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214
of the present times show that the country on the strength of the following provision
has recovered economically; and even if of Central Bank Circular No.
not, the questioned law still denies those 960:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
entitled to due process of law for being
unreasonable and oppressive. The ‘Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. —
intention of the questioned law may be Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt
good when enacted. The law failed to from attachment, garnishment, or any
anticipate the iniquitous effects producing other order or process of any court,
outright injustice and inequality such as legislative body, government agency or
the case before us. any administrative body whatsoever.’
It has thus been said that — "Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued
pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No.
"But I also know, 5 that laws and 6426:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
institutions must go hand in hand with the
progress of the human mind. As that ‘Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. — The
becomes more developed, more Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, promulgate such rules and regulations as
new truths are disclosed and manners and may be necessary to carry out the
opinions change with the change of provisions of this Act which shall take
circumstances, institutions must advance effect after the publication of such rules
also, and keep pace with the times . . . We and regulations in the Official Gazette and
might as well require a man to wear still in a newspaper of national circulation for
the coat which fitted him when a boy, as at least once a week for three consecutive
civilized society to remain ever under the weeks. In case the Central Bank
regimen of their barbarous promulgates new rules and regulations
ancestors."cralaw virtua1aw library decreasing the rights of depositors, the
rules and regulations at the time the
In his Comment, the Solicitor General deposit was made shall govern.’
correctly opined,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "The aforecited Section 113 was copied
from Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426,
"The present petition has far-reaching as amended by P.D. 1246,
implications on the right of a national to thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
obtain redress for a wrong committed by
an alien who takes refuge under a law and ‘Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency
regulation promulgated for a purpose Deposits. — All foreign currency deposits
which does not contemplate the authorized under this Act, as amended by
application thereof envisaged by the alien. Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as
More specifically, the petition raises the foreign currency deposits authorized under
question whether the protection against Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby
attachment, garnishment or other court declared as and considered of an
process accorded to foreign currency absolutely confidential nature and, except
deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular upon the written permission of the
No. 960 applies when the deposit does not depositor, in no instance shall such foreign
come from a lender or investor but from a currency deposits be examined, inquired or
mere transient or tourist who is not looked into by any person, government
expected to maintain the deposit in the official, bureau or office whether judicial or
bank for long. administrative or legislative or any other
entity whether public or private: Provided,
"The resolution of this question is however, that said foreign currency
important for the protection of nationals deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
who are victimized in the forum by garnishment, or any other order a process
foreigners who are merely passing of any court, legislative body, government
through. agency or any administrative body
whatsoever,’chanrobles.com : virtual law
library
x x x
system, such as political stability, a
"The purpose of PD 1246 in according growing economy and adequate
protection against attachment, communication facilities, among others,
garnishment and other court process to exist in the Philippines;
foreign currency deposits is stated in its
whereases, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw ‘WHEREAS, it is in the interest of
library developing countries to have as wide
access as possible to the sources of capital
‘WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, funds for economic development;
as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1035, certain Philippine banking ‘WHEREAS, an offshore banking system
institutions and branches of foreign banks based in the Philippines will be
are authorized to accept deposits in advantageous and beneficial to the country
foreign currency; by increasing our links with foreign
lenders, facilitating the flow of desired
‘WHEREAS, under the provisions of investments into the Philippines, creating
Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing employment opportunities and expertise in
the establishment of an offshore banking international finance, and contributing to
system in the Philippines, offshore banking the national development effort.
units are also authorized to receive foreign
currency deposits in certain cases; ‘WHEREAS, the geographical location,
physical and human resources, and other
‘WHEREAS, in order to assure the positive factors provide the Philippines
development and speedy growth of the with the clear potential to develop as
Foreign Currency Deposit System and the another financial center in Asia;’
Offshore Banking System in the
Philippines, certain incentives were "On the other hand, the Foreign Currency
provided for under the two Systems such Deposit system was created by PD No.
as confidentiality of deposits subject to 1035. Its purposes are as
certain exceptions and tax exemptions on follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
the interest income of depositors who are
nonresidents and are not engaged in trade ‘WHEREAS, the establishment of an
or business in the Philippines; offshore banking system in the Philippines
has been authorized under a separate
‘WHEREAS, making absolute the protective decree;
cloak of confidentiality over such foreign
currency deposits, exempting such ‘WHEREAS, a number of local commercial
deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the banks, as depository bank under the
vested rights of depositors would better Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No.
encourage the inflow of foreign currency 6426), have the resources and managerial
deposits into the banking institutions competence to more actively engage in
authorized to accept such deposits in the foreign exchange transactions and
Philippines thereby placing such participate in the grant of foreign currency
institutions more in a position to properly loans to resident corporations and firms;
channel the same to loans and
investments in the Philippines, thus ‘WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the
directly contributing to the economic foreign currency lending authority of the
development of the country;’ said depository banks under RA 6426 and
apply to their transactions the same taxes
"Thus, one of the principal purposes of the as would be applicable to transaction of
protection accorded to foreign currency the proposed offshore banking units;’
deposits is ‘to assure the development and
speedy growth of the Foreign Currency "It is evident from the above [Whereas
Deposit system and the Offshore Banking clauses] that the Offshore Banking System
in the Philippines’ (3rd Whereas). and the Foreign Currency Deposit System
were designed to draw deposits from
"The Offshore Banking System was foreign lenders and investors (Vide second
established by PD. No. 1034. In turn, the Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of
purposes of PD No. 1034 are as PD No. 1035). It is these deposits that are
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library induced by the two laws and given
protection and incentives by them.
‘WHEREAS, conditions conductive to the
establishment of an offshore banking "Obviously, the foreign currency deposit
made by a transient or a tourist is not the
kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos.
1034 and 1035 and given incentives and
protection by said laws because such
depositors stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore, will maintain his
deposit in the bank only for a short time.
"Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is
just a tourist or a transient. He deposited
his dollars with respondent China Banking
Corporation only for safekeeping during his
temporary stay in the Philippines.
"For the reasons stated above, the
Solicitor General thus submits that the
dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli
is not entitled to the protection of Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and
P.D. No. 1246 against attachment,
garnishment or other court processes." 6
In fine, the application of the law depends
on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if
we rule that the questioned Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice
would result specially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused
Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10
of the New Civil Code which provides that
"in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice
to prevail. "Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de
otro." Simply stated, when the statute is
silent or ambiguous, this is one of those
fundamental solutions that would respond
to the vehement urge of conscience.
(Padilla v. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
It would be unthinkable, that the
questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
No. 960 would be used as a device by
accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and
in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the
expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may — but is there no
conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against
Peso? Upholding the final and executory
judgment of the lower court against the
Central Bank Circular protecting the
foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting
the dollar deposit of a transient alien
depositor against injustice to a national
and victim of a crime? This situation calls
for fairness against legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and
rest in the belief that we have served the
ends of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of
Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD
No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8
of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its
peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ
of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-
3214, "Karen Salvacion, Et. Al. v. Greg
Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC
Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the
dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott in such amount as would satisfy
the judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., are on
leave.
___________________________________________
__________
[G.R. No. 119602. October 6, 2000.]
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO.,
LTD., Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT
LINES INC., Respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari seeking to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals which
reversed the decision of the lower court in
CA-G.R. CV No. 36821, entitled "Wildvalley
Shipping Co., Ltd., plaintiff-appellant,
versus Philippine President Lines,
Inc., Defendant-Appellant." chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The antecedent facts of the case are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine
Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine
President Lines, Inc., private respondent
herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, and interest thereon amounting to US
to load iron ore. Upon the completion of $400,000.00 plus attorney’s fees, costs,
the loading and when the vessel was ready and expenses of litigation. The complaint
to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano against Pioneer Insurance Company was
Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was dismissed in an Order dated November 7,
designated by the harbour authorities in 1988. 17
Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine
Roxas through the Orinoco River. 1 He was At the pre-trial conference, the parties
asked to pilot the said vessel on February agreed on the following
11, 1988 2 boarding it that night at 11:00 facts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
p.m. 3
"1. The jurisdictional facts, as specified in
The master (captain) of the Philippine their respective pleadings;
Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the
bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), "2. That defendant PPL was the owner of
the vessel’s third mate (then the officer on the vessel Philippine Roxas at the time of
watch), and a helmsman when the vessel the incident;
left the port 4 at 1:40 a.m. on February
12, 1988. 5 Captain Colon left the bridge "3. That defendant Pioneer Insurance was
when the vessel was under way. 6 the insurance underwriter for defendant
PPL;
The Philippine Roxas experienced some
vibrations when it entered the San Roque "4. That plaintiff Wildvalley Shipping Co.,
Channel at mile 172. 7 The vessel Inc. is the owner of the vessel
proceeded on its way, with the pilot Malandrinon, whose passage was
assuring the watch officer that the obstructed by the vessel Philippine Roxas
vibration was a result of the shallowness of at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, as specified in
the channel. 8 par. 4, page 2 of the complaint;
Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel "5. That on February 12, 1988, while the
again experienced some vibrations. 9 Philippine Roxas was navigating the
These occurred at 4:12 a.m. 10 It was channel at Puerto Ordaz, the said vessel
then that the watch officer called the grounded and as a result, obstructed
master to the bridge. 11 navigation at the channel;
The master (captain) checked the position "6. That the Orinoco River in Puerto Ordaz
of the vessel 12 and verified that it was in is a compulsory pilotage channel;
the centre of the channel. 13 He then went
to confirm, or set down, the position of the "7. That at the time of the incident, the
vessel on the chart. 14 He ordered vessel, Philippine Roxas, was under the
Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the command of the pilot Ezzar Solarzano,
President Roxas, to check all the double assigned by the government thereat, but
bottom tanks. 15 plaintiff claims that it is under the
command of the master;
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas
ran aground in the Orinoco River, 16 thus "8. The plaintiff filed a case in Middleburg,
obstructing the ingress and egress of Holland which is related to the present
vessels. case;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
As a result of the blockage, the "9. The plaintiff caused the arrest of the
Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein Philippine Collier, a vessel owned by the
petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, defendant PPL;
Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto
Ordaz on that day.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw "10. The Orinoco River is 150 miles long
1ibrary and it takes approximately 12 hours to
navigate out of the said river;
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping
Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the "11. That no security for the plaintiffs
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III claim was given until after the Philippine
against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Collier was arrested; and
Pioneer Insurance Company (the
underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for "12. That a letter of guarantee, dated 12-
damages in the form of unearned profits, May-88 was issued by the Steamship
Mutual Underwriters Ltd." 18 SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT books of reports of decisions of the courts English case where a witness was called
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW NO FAULT OR of the country concerned if proved to be upon to prove the Roman laws of marriage
The trial court rendered its decision on NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE commonly admitted in such and was permitted to testify, though he
October 16, 1991 in favor of the petitioner, MASTER NOR THE OWNER OF THE courts.25cralaw:red referred to a book containing the decrees
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. The "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" FOR THE of the Council of Trent as controlling,
dispositive portion thereof reads as GROUNDING OF SAID VESSEL RESULTING Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Jones on Evidence, Second Edition,
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph IN THE BLOCKAGE OF THE RIO ORINOCO; Court, as amended, Volume 4, pages 314S3152.) . . . ."cralaw
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph virtua1aw library
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered for 2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
the plaintiff, ordering defendant Philippine SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE "Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The We do not dispute the competency of
President Lines, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT record of public documents referred to in Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the Assistant
the sum of U.S. $259,243.43, as actual CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE; paragraph (a) of Section 19, when Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto
and compensatory damages, and U.S. admissible for any purpose, may be Ordaz, Venezuela, 28 to testify on the
$162,031.53, as expenses incurred abroad 3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS evidenced by an official publication thereof existence of the Reglamento General de la
for its foreign lawyers, plus additional sum SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE or by a copy attested by the officer having Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela)
of U.S. $22,000.00, as and for attorney’s "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" IS SEAWORTHY; the legal custody of the record, or by his 29 and the Reglamento Para la Zona de
fees of plaintiffs local lawyer, and to pay deputy, and accompanied, if the record is Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing
the cost of this suit. 4. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS not kept in the Philippines, with a the navigation of the Orinoco River).
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING certificate that such officer has the Captain Monzon has held the
"Defendant’s counterclaim is dismissed for VENEZUELAN LAW DESPITE THE FACT custody. If the office in which the record is aforementioned posts for eight years. 30
lack of merit. THAT THE SAME HAS BEEN kept is in a foreign country, the certificate As such he is in charge of designating the
SUBSTANTIALLY PROVED IN THE TRIAL may be made by a secretary of the pilots for maneuvering and navigating the
"SO ORDERED." 19 COURT WITHOUT ANY OBJECTION FROM embassy or legation, consul general, Orinoco River. He is also in charge of the
PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND WHOSE consul, vice consul, or consular agent or documents that come into the office-of the
Both parties appealed: the petitioner OBJECTION WAS INTERPOSED BELATEDLY by any officer in the foreign service of the harbour masters. 31
appealing the non-award of interest with ON APPEAL; Philippines stationed in the foreign country
the private respondent questioning the in which the record is kept, and Nevertheless, we take note that these
decision on the merits of the case. 5. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS authenticated by the seal of his office." written laws were not proven in the
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AWARDING (Emphasis supplied) manner provided by Section 24 of Rule
After the requisite pleadings had been ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS TO 132 of the Rules of Court.
filed, the Court of Appeals came out with PRIVATE RESPONDENT WITHOUT ANY The court has interpreted Section 25 (now
its questioned decision dated June 14, FAIR OR REASONABLE BASIS Section 24) to include competent evidence The Reglamento General de la Ley de
1994, 20 the dispositive portion of which WHATSOEVER; like the testimony of a witness to prove Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial
reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph the existence of a written foreign law. 26 32 Of the Republic of Venezuela. A
6. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was
"WHEREFORE, finding defendant- SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT In the noted case of Willamette Iron & presented in evidence as an official
appellant’s appeal to be meritorious, PETITIONER’S CAUSE IS MERITORIOUS Steel Works v. Muzzal, 27 it was held publication of the Republic of Venezuela.
judgment is hereby rendered reversing the HENCE, PETITIONER SHOULD BE that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Decision of the lower court. Plaintiff- ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES, COSTS The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje
appellant’s Complaint is dismissed and it is AND INTEREST.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw ". . . Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at- No 1 del Orinoco is published in a book
ordered to pay defendant-appellant the 1ibrary law of San Francisco, California, since the issued by the Ministerio de
amount of Three Hundred Twenty-three year 1918 under oath, quoted verbatim Comunicaciones of Venezuela. 33 Only a
Thousand, Forty-two Pesos and Fifty-three The petition is without merit. section 322 of the California Civil Code and photocopy of the said rules was likewise
Centavos (P323,042.53) as and for stated that said section was in force at the presented as evidence.
attorney’s fees plus cost of suit. Plaintiff- The primary issue to be determined is time the obligations of defendant to the
appellant’s appeal is whether or not Venezuelan law is plaintiff were incurred, i.e. on November 5, Both of these documents are considered in
DISMISSED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw applicable to the case at bar. 1928 and December 22, 1928. This Philippine jurisprudence to be public
1ibrary evidence sufficiently established the fact documents for they are the written official
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not that the section in question was the law of acts, or records of the official acts of the
"SO ORDERED." 21 prove themselves in our jurisdiction and the State of California on the above dates. sovereign authority, official bodies and
our courts are not authorized to take A reading of sections 300 and 301 of our tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.
Petitioner filed a motion for judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, Code of Civil Procedure will convince one 34
reconsideration 22 but the same was they must be alleged and proved. 24 that these sections do not exclude the
denied for lack of merit in the resolution presentation of other competent evidence For a copy of a foreign public document to
dated March 29, 1995. 23 A distinction is to be made as to the to prove the existence of a foreign be admissible, the following requisites are
manner of proving a written and an law.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the
Hence, this petition. unwritten law. The former falls under officer having legal custody of the records
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, "The foreign law is a matter of fact . . . or by his deputy; and (2) It must be
The petitioner assigns the following errors as amended, the entire provision of which You ask the witness what the law is; he accompanied by a certificate by a
to the court a quo:chanrob1es virtual 1aw is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign may, from his recollection, or on producing secretary of the embassy or legation,
library law sought to be proved is "unwritten," the and. referring to books, say what it is.’ consul general, consul, vice consular or
oral testimony of expert witnesses is (Lord Campbell concurring in an opinion of consular agent or foreign service officer,
1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS admissible, as are printed and published Lord Chief Justice Denman in a well-known and with the seal of his office. 35 The
latter requirement is not a mere
technicality but is intended to justify the
giving of full faith and credit to the
genuineness of a document in a foreign
country. 36cralawred
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or
a book published by the Ministerio de
Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was
presented as evidence with Captain
Monzon attesting it. It is also required by
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court that a certificate that Captain
Monzon, who attested the documents, is
the officer who had legal custody of those
records made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and
authenticated by the seal of his office
accompanying the copy of the public
document. No such certificate could be
found in the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol
proof is objectionable, for the written law
itself is the best evidence. According to the
weight of authority, when a foreign statute
is involved, the best evidence rule requires
that it be proved by a duly authenticated
copy of the statute. 37
At this juncture, we have to point out that
the Venezuelan law was not pleaded
before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if
there is an allegation in the pleading about
the existence of the foreign law, its import
and legal consequence on the event or
transaction in issue. 38
A review of the Complaint 39 revealed that
it was never alleged or invoked despite the
fact that the grounding of the M/V
Philippine Roxas occurred within the
territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private
international law, a foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In
the absence of pleading and proof, the
laws of a foreign country, or state, will be
presumed to be the same as our own local
or domestic law and this is known as
processual presumption. 40
Having cleared this point, we now proceed
to a thorough study of the errors assigned
by the petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that there was
negligence on the part of the private
respondent that would warrant the award
of damages.
There being no contractual obligation, the
private respondent is obliged to give only
the diligence required of a good father of a
family in accordance with the provisions of
Article 1173 of the New Civil Code,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time
and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171
and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
"If the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a
good father of a family shall be
required." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The diligence of a good father of a family
requires only that diligence which an
ordinary prudent man would exercise with
regard to his own property. This we have
found private respondent to have
exercised when the vessel sailed only after
the "main engine, machineries, and other
auxiliaries" were checked and found to be
in good running condition; 41 when the
master left a competent officer, the officer
on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is
experienced in navigating the Orinoco
River; when the master ordered the
inspection of the vessel’s double bottom
tanks when the vibrations occurred anew.
42
The Philippine rules on pilotage, embodied
in Philippine Ports Authority Administrative
Order No. 03-85, otherwise known as the
Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage
Services, the Conduct of Pilots and
Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports enunciate
the duties and responsibilities of a master
of a vessel and its pilot, among other
things.
The pertinent provisions of the said
administrative order governing these
persons are quoted
hereunder:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 11. Control of Vessels and Liability
for Damage. — On compulsory pilotage
grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the
service to a vessel shall be responsible for
the damage caused to a vessel or to life
and property at ports due to his negligence
or fault. He can be absolved from liability if
the accident is caused by force majeure or
natural calamities provided he has
exercised prudence and extra diligence to
prevent or minimize the damage.
"The Master shall retain overall command
of the vessel even on pilotage grounds
whereby he can countermand or overrule
the order or command of the Harbor Pilot
on board. In such event, any damage
caused to a vessel or to life and property
at ports by reason of the fault or
negligence of the Master shall be the
responsibility and liability of the registered
owner of the vessel concerned without
prejudice to recourse against said Master.
"Such liability of the owner or Master of
the vessel or its pilots shall be determined
by competent authority in appropriate
proceedings in the light of the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.
x x x
"Sec. 32. Duties and Responsibilities of the
Pilots or Pilots’ Association. — The duties
and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot
shall be as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
x x x
"f) A pilot shall be held responsible for the
direction of a vessel from the time he
assumes his work as a pilot thereof until
he leaves it anchored or berthed safely;
Provided, however, that his responsibility
shall cease at the moment the Master
neglects or refuses to carry out his
order."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Code of Commerce likewise provides
for the obligations expected of a captain of
a vessel, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 612. The following obligations shall
be inherent in the office of
captain:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x and that he does not even refer to river
"7. To be on deck on reaching land and to
take command on entering and leaving
ports, canals, roadsteads, and rivers,
unless there is a pilot on board discharging
his duties. . . ." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
The law is very explicit. The master
remains the overall commander of the
vessel even when there is a pilot on board.
He remains in control of the ship as he can
still perform the duties conferred upon him
by law 43 despite the presence of a pilot
who is temporarily in charge of the vessel.
It is not required of him to be on the
bridge while the vessel is being navigated
by a pilot.
However, Section 8 of PPA Administrative
Order No. 03 85,
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service —
For entering a harbor and anchoring
thereat, or passing through rivers or
straits within a pilotage district, as well as
docking and undocking at any pier/wharf,
or shifting from one berth or another,
every vessel engaged in coastwise and
foreign trade shall be under compulsory
pilotage.
x x x
The Orinoco River being a compulsory
pilotage channel necessitated the engaging
of a pilot who was presumed to be
knowledgeable of every shoal, bank, deep
and shallow ends of the river. In his
deposition, pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez
testified that he is an official pilot in the
Harbour at Port Ordaz, Venezuela, 44 and
that he had been a pilot for twelve (12)
years. 45 He also had experience in
navigating the waters of the Orinoco River.
46
The law does provide that the master can
countermand or overrule the order or
command of the harbor pilot on board. The
master of the Philippine Roxas deemed it
best not to order him (the pilot) to stop
the vessel, 47 mayhap, because the latter
had assured him that they were navigating
normally before the grounding of the
vessel. 48 Moreover, the pilot had
admitted that on account of his experience
he was very familiar with the configuration
of the river as well as the course headings,
charts when navigating the Orinoco River.
49
Based on these declarations, it comes as
no surprise to us that the master chose
not to regain control of the ship. Admitting
his limited knowledge of the Orinoco River,
Captain Colon relied on the knowledge and
experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the
vessel safely.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
"Licensed pilots, enjoying the emoluments
of compulsory pilotage, are in a different
class from ordinary employees, for they
assume to have a skill and a knowledge of
navigation in the particular waters over
which their licenses extend superior to that
of the master; pilots are bound to use due
diligence and reasonable care and skill. A
pilot’s ordinary skill is in proportion to the
pilot’s responsibilities, and implies a
knowledge and observance of the usual
rules of navigation, acquaintance with the
waters piloted in their ordinary condition,
and nautical skill in avoiding all known
obstructions. The character of the skill and
knowledge required of a pilot in charge of
a vessel on the rivers of a country is very
different from that which enables a
navigator to carry a vessel safely in the
ocean. On the ocean, a knowledge of the
rules of navigation, with charts that
disclose the places of hidden rocks,
dangerous shores, or other dangers of the
way, are the main elements of a pilot’s
knowledge and skill. But the pilot of a river
vessel, like the harbor pilot, is selected for
the individual’s personal knowledge of the
topography through which the vessel is
steered." 50
We find that the grounding of the vessel is
attributable to the pilot. When the
vibrations were first felt the watch officer
asked him what was going on, and pilot
Vasquez replied that" (they) were in the
middle of the channel and that the
vibration was as (sic) a result of the
shallowness of the channel." 51
Pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez was
assigned to pilot the vessel Philippine
Roxas as well as other vessels on the
Orinoco River due to his knowledge of the
same. In his experience as a pilot, he
should have been aware of the portions
which are shallow and which are not. His
failure to determine the depth of the said
river and his decision to plod on his set
course, in all probability, caused damage
to the vessel. Thus, we hold him as
negligent and liable for its grounding.
In the case of Homer Ramsdell
Transportation Company v. La Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406, it
was held that:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
". . . . The master of a ship, and the owner
also, is liable for any injury done by the
negligence of the crew employed in the
ship. The same doctrine will apply to the
case of a pilot employed by the master or
owner, by whose negligence any injury
happens to a third person or his property:
as, for example, by a collision with another
ship, occasioned by his negligence. And it
will make no difference in the case that the
pilot, if any is employed, is required to be
a licensed pilot; provided the master is at
liberty to take a pilot, or not, at his
pleasure, for in such a case the master
acts voluntarily, although he is necessarily
required to select from a particular class.
On the other hand, if it is compulsive upon
the master to take a pilot, and, a fortiori, if
he is bound to do so under penalty, then,
and in such case, neither he nor the owner
will be liable for injuries occasioned by the
negligence of the pilot; for in a such a case
the pilot cannot be deemed properly the
servant of the master or the owner, but is
forced upon them, and the maxim Qui facit
per alium facit per se does not apply."
(Emphasis supplied)
Anent the river passage plan, we find that,
while there was none, 52 the voyage has
been sufficiently planned and monitored as
shown by the following actions undertaken
by the pilot, Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez, to
wit: contacting the radio marina via VHF
for information regarding the channel,
river traffic, 53 soundings of the river,
depth of the river, bulletin on the buoys.
54 The officer on watch also monitored the
voyage. 55
We, therefore, do not find the absence of a
river passage plan to be the cause for the
grounding of the vessel.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not
apply to the case at bar because the
circumstances surrounding the injury do
not clearly indicate negligence on the part
of the private Respondent. For the said
doctrine to apply, the following conditions
must be met: (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it
would not have happened except for
defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident
must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person
charged with the negligence complained
of; and (3) the accident must not have
been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person
injured. 56chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
As has already been held above, there was
a temporary shift of control over the ship
from the master of the vessel to the pilot
on a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus,
two of the requisites necessary for the
doctrine to apply, i.e., negligence and
control, to render the respondent liable,
are absent.
As to the claim that the ship was
unseaworthy, we hold that it is not.
The Lloyd’s Register of Shipping confirmed
the vessel’s seaworthiness in a
Confirmation of Class issued on February
16, 1988 by finding that "the above named
ship (Philippine Roxas) maintained the
class" +100A1 Strengthened for Ore
Cargoes, Nos. 2 and 8 Holds may be
empty (CC) and +LMC" from 31/12/87 up
until the time of casualty on or about
12/2/88." 57 The same would not have
been issued had not the vessel been built
according to the standards set by Lloyd’s.
Samuel Lim, a marine surveyor, at Lloyd’s
Register of Shipping testified
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Now, in your opinion, as a surveyor, did
top side tank have any bearing at all to the
seaworthiness of the vessel?
"A Well, judging on this particular vessel,
and also basing on the class record of the
vessel, wherein recommendations were
made on the top side tank, and it was
given sufficient time to be repaired, it
means that the vessel is fit to travel even
with those defects on the ship.
"COURT
What do you mean by that? You explain.
The vessel is fit to travel even with
defects? Is that what you mean? Explain.
"WITNESS
"A Yes, your Honor. Because the class
society which register (sic) is the third
party looking into the condition of the
vessel and as far as their record states,
the vessel was class or maintained, and
she is fit to travel during that
voyage."cralaw virtua1aw library
"x x x
"ATTY. MISA
Before we proceed to other matter, will
you kindly tell us what is (sic) the ‘class
+100A1 Strengthened for Ore Cargoes’,
mean?
"WITNESS
"A Plus 100A1 means that the vessel was
built according to Lloyd’s rules and she is
capable of carrying ore bulk cargoes, but
she is particularly capable of carrying Ore
Cargoes with No. 2 and No. 8 holds
empty.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"x x x
"COURT
The vessel is classed, meaning?
"A Meaning she is fit to travel, your Honor,
or seaworthy." 58
It is not required that the vessel must be
perfect. To be seaworthy, a ship must be
reasonably fit to perform the services, and
to encounter the ordinary perils of the
voyage, contemplated by the parties to the
policy. 59
As further evidence that the vessel was
seaworthy, we quote the deposition of pilot
Vasquez:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Was there any instance when your
orders or directions were not complied
with because of the inability of the vessel
to do so?
"A No.
"Q Was the vessel able to respond to all
your commands and orders?
"A The vessel was navigating normally."
60
Eduardo P. Mata, Second Engineer of the
Philippine Roxas submitted an accident
report wherein he stated that on February
11, 1988, he checked and prepared the
main engine, machineries and all other
auxiliaries and found them all to be in
good running condition and ready for
maneuvering. That same day the main
engine, bridge and engine telegraph and
steering gear motor were also tested. 61
Engineer Mata also prepared the fuel for
consumption for maneuvering and checked
the engine generators. 62
Finally, we find the award of attorney’s fee
justified.
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation,
attorney’s fees and; expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
x x x on the part of the lower court, which so
"(11) In any other case where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.
"x x x"
Due to the unfounded filing of this case,
the private respondent was unjustifiably
forced to litigate, thus the award of
attorney’s fees was proper.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 36821 is
AFFIRMED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
___________________________________________
___________________
G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. WONG
CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), Defendant-
Appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges
the revocation of the order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, sustaining the
demurrer presented by the defendant to
the information that initiated this case and
in which the appellee is accused of having
illegally smoked opium, aboard the
merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was anchored
in Manila Bay two and a half miles from
the shores of the
city.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction
held and dismissed the
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The question that presents itself for our
consideration is whether such ruling is
erroneous or not; and it will or will not be
erroneous according as said court has or
has no jurisdiction over said
offense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob
les virtual law library
The point at issue is whether the courts of
the Philippines have jurisdiction over
crime, like the one herein involved,
committed aboard merchant vessels
anchored in our jurisdiction
waters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl
es virtual law library
There are two fundamental rules on this
particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule,
according to which crimes committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessels should
not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction
they were committed, unless their
commission affects the peace and security
of the territory; and the English rule,
based on the territorial principle and
followed in the United States, according to
which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they
were committed. Of this two rules, it is the
last one that obtains in this jurisdiction,
because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United
States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the
United
States.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl
es virtual law library
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs.
M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.],
116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the
purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society,
and would subject the laws to continual
infraction, and the government to
degradation, if such individuals or
merchants did not owe temporary and
local allegiance, and were not amenable to
the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this
court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had
jurisdiction over an offense or crime
committed on the high seas or within the
territorial waters of any other country, but
when she came within three miles of a line
drawn from the headlands, which embrace
the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within
territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note
105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et
seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship
and her crew were then subject to the
jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign
subject to such limitations as have been
conceded by that sovereignty through the
proper political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity
of nations is observed, as in Mali and
Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common
Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole
matter is this: Disorder which disturb only
the peace of the ship or those on board
are to be dealt with exclusively by the
sovereignty of the home of the ship, but
those which disturb the public peace may
be suppressed, and, if need be, the
offenders punished by the proper
authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may
not be easy at all times to determine
which of the two jurisdictions a particular
act of disorder belongs. Much will
undoubtedly depend on the attending
circumstances of the particular case, but
all must concede that felonious homicide is
a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that
if the proper authorities are proceeding
with the case in the regular way the consul
has no right to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18
Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article
of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands,
aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any
local port, does not, as a general rule,
constitute a crime triable by the courts of
the Islands, such vessels being considered
as an extension of its own nationality, the
same rule does not apply when the article,
the use of which is prohibited in the
Islands, is landed from the vessels upon
Philippine soil; in such a case an open
violation of the laws of the land is
committed with respect to which, as it is a
violation of the penal law in force at the
place of the commission of the crime, no
court other than that established in the
said place has jurisdiction of the offense,
in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever
consented by treaty or otherwise to
renouncing such jurisdiction or a part
thereof, we find nothing to this effect so
far as England is concerned, to which
nation the ship where the crime in
question was committed belongs. Besides,
in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.,"
volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the
following:
There shall be between the territories of
the United States of America, and all the
territories of His Britanic Majesty in
Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce.
The inhabitants of the two countries,
respectively, shall have liberty freely and
securely to come with their ships and
cargoes to all such places, ports and
rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which
other foreigners are permitted to come, to
enter into the same, and to remain and
reside in any parts of the said territories,
respectively; also to hire and occupy
houses and warehouses for the purposes
of their commerce; and, generally, the
merchants and traders of each nation
respectively shall enjoy the most complete
protection and security for their
commerce, but subject always to the laws
and statutes of the two countries,
respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and
Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of
opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit
was held by this court not triable by or
courts, because it being the primary object
of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the
disastrous effects entailed by the use of
this drug, its mere possession in such a
ship, without being used in our territory,
does not being about in the said territory
those effects that our statute contemplates
avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is
not considered a disturbance of the public
order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
But to smoke opium within our territorial
limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the
public order here established, because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious
effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our
Legislature has in mind in enacting the
aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as
the Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium
securely on board a foreign vessel at
anchor in the port of Manila in open
defiance of the local authorities, who are
impotent to lay hands on him, is simply
subversive of public order. It requires no
unusual stretch of the imagination to
conceive that a foreign ship may come into
the port of Manila and allow or solicit
Chinese residents to smoke opium on
board.
The order appealed from is revoked and
the cause ordered remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings in
accordance with law, without special
findings as to costs. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña,
Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
___________________________________
G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, Petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P.
MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A.
ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul
and set aside the Resolution 1 dated
September 27, 1995 and the
Decision 2 dated April 10, 1996 of the
3
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
36533, 4 and the Orders 5 dated August 29,
1994 6 and February 2, 1995 7 that were
issued by the trial court in Civil Case No.
Q-93-18394. 8
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave
rise to the instant petition, as stated in the
questioned Decision 9, are as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA
hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its
airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. . . .
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in
Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco
dance with fellow crew members Thamer
Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both
Saudi nationals. Because it was almost
morning when they returned to their
hotels, they agreed to have breakfast
together at the room of Thamer. When
they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on
some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer
attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a
roomboy and several security personnel
heard her cries for help and rescued her.
Later, the Indonesian police came and
arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the
latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few
days later, several SAUDIA officials
interrogated her about the Jakarta
incident. They then requested her to go
back to Jakarta to help arrange the release
of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA
Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base
manager Baharini negotiated with the
police for the immediate release of the
detained crew members but did not
succeed because plaintiff refused to
cooperate. She was afraid that she might
be tricked into something she did not want
because of her inability to understand the
local dialect. She also declined to sign a
blank paper and a document written in the
local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed
plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her
from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the
intercession of the Saudi Arabian
government, the Indonesian authorities
agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after
two weeks of detention. Eventually, they
were again put in service by defendant
SAUDI (sic). In September 1990,
defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to
Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff
thought that the Jakarta incident was
already behind her, her superiors
requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy,
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he
brought her to the police station where the
police took her passport and questioned
her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy
simply stood by as the police put pressure
on her to make a statement dropping the
case against Thamer and Allah. Not until
she agreed to do so did the police return
her passport and allowed her to catch the
afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on lune 16,
1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few
minutes before the departure of her flight
to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to
board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr.
Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of
the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi
court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her
that this was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,
plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear
before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff
then returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA
summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah
once again and see Miniewy on June 27,
1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did
so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi,
that the investigation was routinary and
that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought
plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June
27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on
June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated
plaintiff through an interpreter about the
Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the
airport, however, just as her plane was
about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her
that the airline had forbidden her to take
flight. At the Inflight Service Office where
she was told to go, the secretary of Mr.
Yahya Saddick took away her passport and
told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew
quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer
again escorted plaintiff to the same court
where the judge, to her astonishment and
shock, rendered a decision, translated to
her in English, sentencing her to five
months imprisonment and to 286 lashes.
Only then did she realize that the Saudi
court had tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta.
The court found plaintiff guilty of (1)
adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and
listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the
male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition. 10
Facing conviction, private respondent
sought the help of her employer, petitioner
SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied
any assistance. She then asked the
Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her
while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to
pay for her upkeep, she worked on the
domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer
and Allah continued to serve in the
international
flights. 11
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the
Prince of Makkah dismissed the case
against her and allowed her to leave Saudi
Arabia. Shortly before her return to
Manila, 12 she was terminated from the
service by SAUDIA, without her being
informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a
Complaint 13 for damages against SAUDIA,
and Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its
country manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an
Omnibus Motion To Dismiss 14 which raised
the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the
Complaint states no cause of action
against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-
Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3)
that the claim or demand set forth in the
Complaint has been waived, abandoned or
otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the
trial court has no jurisdiction to try the
case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her
Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) 15.
 16
Saudia filed a reply thereto on March 3,
1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an
Amended Complaint 17 wherein Al-Balawi
was dropped as party defendant. On
August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint 18.
The trial court issued an Order 19 dated
August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by
Saudia.
From the Order of respondent
Judge 20 denying the Motion to Dismiss,
SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its
Motion for Reconsideration 21 of the Order
dated August 29, 1994. It alleged that the
trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and
try the case on the basis of Article 21 of
the Civil Code, since the proper law
applicable is the law of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. On October 14, 1994,
Morada filed her Opposition 22 (To
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration).
In the Reply 23 filed with the trial court on
October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that
since its Motion for Reconsideration raised
lack of jurisdiction as its cause of action,
the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply,
even if that ground is raised for the first
time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA
alleged that the Philippines does not have
any substantial interest in the prosecution
of the instant case, and hence, without
jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued
another Order 24 dated February 2, 1995,
denying SAUDIA's Motion for
Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of
the assailed Order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of
defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru
counsel, on September 20, 1994, and the
Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed,
thru counsel, on October 14, 1994, as well
as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi
Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on
October 24, 1994, considering that a
perusal of the plaintiffs Amended
Complaint, which is one for the recovery of
actual, moral and exemplary damages plus
attorney's fees, upon the basis of the
applicable Philippine law, Article 21 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines, is,
clearly, within the jurisdiction of this Court
as regards the subject matter, and there
being nothing new of substance which
might cause the reversal or modification of
the order sought to be reconsidered, the
motion for reconsideration of the
defendant, is DENIED.
25
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, on February 20, 1995,
SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order 26 with the
Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated
a Resolution with Temporary Restraining
Order 27 dated February 23, 1995,
prohibiting the respondent Judge from
further conducting any proceeding, unless
otherwise directed, in the interim.
28
In another Resolution promulgated on
September 27, 1995, now assailed, the
appellate court denied SAUDIA's Petition
for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to
wit:
The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED,
after considering the Answer, with Prayer
to Deny Writ of Preliminary Injunction
(Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it
appearing that herein petitioner is not
clearly entitled thereto (Unciano
Paramedical College, et. Al., v. Court of
Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April 7, 1993,
Second Division).
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with
this Honorable Court the instant
Petition 29 for Review with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order dated
October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the
instant Petition, respondent Court of
Appeals rendered the Decision 30 dated
April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled
that the Philippines is an appropriate
forum considering that the Amended
Complaint's basis for recovery of damages
is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus,
clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent
Court. It further held thatcertiorari is not
the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion
to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner
should have proceeded to trial, and in case
of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an
appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its
Supplemental Petition for Review with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order 31 dated April 30, 1996, given due
course by this Court. After both parties
submitted their Memoranda, 32 the instant
case is now deemed submitted for
decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following
issues:
I ARABIAN AIRLINES".
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear
and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 based
on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since
the proper law applicable is the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this
case involves what is known in private
international law as a "conflicts problem".
Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines
will sit in judgment of the acts done by
another sovereign state which is abhorred.
II
Leave of court before filing a supplemental
pleading is not a jurisdictional
requirement. Besides, the matter as to
absence of leave of court is now moot and
academic when this Honorable Court
required the respondents to comment on
petitioner's April 30, 1996 Supplemental
Petition For Review With Prayer For A
Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten
(10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further,
the Revised Rules of Court should be
construed with liberality pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the
April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP NO.
36533 entitled "Saudi Arabian Airlines v.
Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al." and filed its
April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For
Review With Prayer For A Temporary
Restraining Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29
a.m. or within the 15-day reglementary
period as provided for under Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP NO.
36533 has not yet become final and
executory and this Honorable Court can
take cognizance of this case. 33
From the foregoing factual and procedural
antecedents, the following issues emerge
for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY
CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED
"MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE
COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THIS
CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is
a conflict of laws that must be settled at
the outset. It maintains that private
respondent's claim for alleged abuse of
rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a
foreign element qualifies the instant case
for the application of the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of
the lex loci delicti commissirule. 34
On the other hand, private respondent
contends that since her Amended
Complaint is based on Articles 19 35 and
21 36 of the Civil Code, then the instant
case is properly a matter of domestic
law. 37
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in
this case, there is no dispute that the
interplay of events occurred in two states,
the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her
Amended Complaint 38 dated June 23,
1994:
2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or
SAUDIA is a foreign airlines corporation
doing business in the Philippines. It may
be served with summons and other court
processes at Travel Wide Associated Sales
(Phils.). Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building,
114 Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati,
Metro Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
6. Plaintiff learned that, through the
intercession of the Saudi Arabian
government, the Indonesian authorities
agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after
two weeks of detention. Eventually, they
were again put in service by defendant
SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant
SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff
thought that the Jakarta incident was
already behind her, her superiors
reauested her to see MR. Ali Meniewy,
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he
brought her to the police station where the
police took her passport and questioned
her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy
simply stood by as the police put pressure
on her to make a statement dropping the
case against Thamer and Allah. Not until
she agreed to do so did the police return
her passport and allowed her to catch the
afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
8. One year and a half later or on June 16,
1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few
minutes before the departure of her flight
to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to
board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr.
Meniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of
the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi
court where she was asked to sigh a
document written in Arabic. They told her
that this was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,
plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear
before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff
then returned to Manila.
9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA
summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah
once again and see Miniewy on June 27,
1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did
so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIA's Manila manger, Aslam Saleemi,
that the investigation was routinary and
that it posed no danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer
brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court
on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then
but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge
interrogated plaintiff through an
interpreter about the Jakarta incident.
After one hour of interrogation, they let
her go. At the airport, however, just as her
plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA
officer told her that the airline had
forbidden her to take that flight. At the
Inflight Service Office where she was told
to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick
took away her passport and told her to
remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters,
until further orders.
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer
again escorted plaintiff to the same court
where the judge, to her astonishment and
shock, rendered a decision, translated to
her in English, sentencing her to five
months imprisonment and to 286 lashes.
Only then did she realize that the Saudi
court had tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta.
The court found plaintiff guilty of (1)
adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing,
and listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; (3) socializing with the male
crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a
hand in the case, plaintiff sought the help
of the Philippines Embassy in Jeddah. The
latter helped her pursue an appeal from
the decision of the court. To pay for her
upkeep, she worked on the domestic
flights of defendant SAUDIA while,
ironically, Thamer and Allah freely served
the international flights. 39
Where the factual antecedents
satisfactorily establish the existence of a
foreign element, we agree with petitioner
that the problem herein could present a
"conflicts" case.
A factual situation that cuts across
territorial lines and is affected by the
diverse laws of two or more states is said
to contain a "foreign element". The
presence of a foreign element is inevitable
since social and economic affairs of
individuals and associations are rarely
confined to the geographic limits of their
birth or conception. 40
The forms in which this foreign element
may appear are many. 41 The foreign
element may simply consist in the fact that
one of the parties to a contract is an alien
or has a foreign domicile, or that a
contract between nationals of one State
involves properties situated in another
State. In other cases, the foreign element
may assume a complex form. 42
In the instant case, the foreign element
consisted in the fact that private
respondent Morada is a resident Philippine
national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a
resident foreign corporation. Also, by
virtue of the employment of Morada with
the petitioner Saudia as a flight
stewardess, events did transpire during
her many occasions of travel across
national borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and
vice versa, that caused a "conflicts"
situation to arise.
We thus find private respondent's
assertion that the case is purely domestic,
imprecise. A conflictsproblem presents
itself here, and the question of
jurisdiction 43 confronts the court a quo.
After a careful study of the private
respondent's Amended Complaint, 44 and
the Comment thereon, we note that she
aptly predicated her cause of action on
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil
Code provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith.
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New
Civil Code provides:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter
for damages.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs.
Court of Appeals, 45 this Court held that:
The aforecited provisions on human
relations were intended to expand the
concept of torts in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide in the statutes.
Although Article 19 merely declares a
principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its
provisions. Thus, we agree with private
respondent's assertion that violations of
Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with
judicially enforceable remedies in the
municipal forum.
Based on the allegations 46 in the
Amended Complaint, read in the light of
the Rules of Court on jurisdiction 47 we find
that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the suit. 48 Its
authority to try and hear the case is
provided for under Section 1 of Republic
Act No. 7691, to wit:
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. -
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which
demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and cots or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or,
in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand, exclusive of the above-
mentioned items exceeds Two hundred
Thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis
ours)
xxx xxx xxx
And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court - the venue,
Quezon City, is appropriate:
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. -
[Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions. - All other actions
may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides
or may be found, or where the plaintiff or
any of the plaintiff resides, at the election
of the plaintiff.
Pragmatic considerations, including the
convenience of the parties, also weigh
heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City
assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the
private interest of the litigant.
Enforceability of a judgment if one is
obtained is quite obvious. Relative
advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are
equally important. Plaintiff may not, by
choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex",
"harass", or "oppress" the
defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him
needless expense or disturbance. But
unless the balance is strongly in favor of
the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed. 49
Weighing the relative claims of the parties,
the court a quo found it best to hear the
case in the Philippines. Had it refused to
take cognizance of the case, it would be
forcing plaintiff (private respondent now)
to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no
longer maintains substantial connections.
That would have caused a fundamental
unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the
Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either
of the parties. The choice of forum of the
plaintiff (now private respondent) should
be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
herein. By filing her Complaint and
Amended Complaint with the trial court,
private respondent has voluntary
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the
court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA
has filed several motions 50 praying for the
dismissal of Morada's Amended Complaint.
SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex
Abundante Cautelam dated February 20,
1995. What is very patent and explicit
from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA
prayed for other reliefs under the
premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA
has effectively submitted to the trial
court's jurisdiction by praying for the
dismissal of the Amended Complaint on
grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker
and Company, Ltd.: 51
We observe that the motion to dismiss
filed on April 14, 1962, aside from
disputing the lower court's jurisdiction over
defendant's person, prayed for dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's
cause of action has prescribed. By
interposing such second ground in its
motion to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd.
availed of an affirmative defense on the
basis of which it prayed the court to
resolve controversy in its favor. For the
court to validly decide the said plea of
defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily
had to acquire jurisdiction upon the latter's
person, who, being the proponent of the
affirmative defense, should be deemed to
have abandoned its special appearance
and voluntarily submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs.
Ferandos, held that;
When the appearance is by motion for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person, it must be for
the sole and separate purpose of objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court. If his
motion is for any other purpose than to
object to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, he thereby submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. A special
appearance by motion made for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person will be held to be
a general appearance, if the party in said
motion should, for example, ask for a
dismissal of the action upon the further
ground that the court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter. 52
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial
court has jurisdiction over the case and
that its exercise thereof, justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note
that choice-of-law problems seek to
answer two important questions: (1) What
legal system should control a given
situation where some of the significant
facts occurred in two or more states; and
(2) to what extent should the chosen legal
system regulate the situation. 53
Several theories have been propounded in
order to identify the legal system that
should ultimately control. Although ideally,
all choice-of-law theories should
intrinsically advance both notions of justice
and predictability, they do not always do
so. The forum is then faced with the
problem of deciding which of these two
important values should be stressed. 54
Before a choice can be made, it is
necessary for us to determine under what
category a certain set of facts or rules fall.
This process is known as
"characterization", or the "doctrine of
qualification". It is the "process of deciding
whether or not the facts relate to the kind
of question specified in a conflicts
rule." 55 The purpose of "characterization"
is to enable the forum to select the proper
law. 56
Our starting point of analysis here is not a
legal relation, but a factual situation,
event, or operative fact. 57 An essential
element of conflict rules is the indication of
a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of
contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably
consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contact, such
as the situs of theres, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or
the place of wrongdoing. 58
Note that one or more circumstances may
be present to serve as the possible test for
the determination of the applicable
law. 59 These "test factors" or "points of
contact" or "connecting factors" could be
any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his
domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person,
such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place
where a thing is, or is deemed to be
situated. In particular, the lex situs is
decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done,
the locus actus, such as the place where a
contract has been made, a marriage
celebrated, a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and
torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to
come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or the
place where a power of attorney is to be
exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties
as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or
administrative proceedings are instituted
or done. Thelex fori - the law of the forum
- is particularly important because, as we
have seen earlier, matters of "procedure"
not going to the substance of the claim
involved are governed by it; and because
the lex fori applies whenever the content
of the otherwise applicable foreign law is
excluded from application in a given case
for the reason that it falls under one of the
exceptions to the applications of foreign
law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases
is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master
or owner as such. It also covers
contractual relationships particularly
contracts of affreightment. 60 (Emphasis
ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on
record, including allegations in the
Amended Complaint deemed admitted for
purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are
convinced that there is reasonable basis
for private respondent's assertion that
although she was already working in
Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah
on the pretense that she would merely
testify in an investigation of the charges
she made against the two SAUDIA crew
members for the attack on her person
while they were in Jakarta. As it turned
out, she was the one made to face trial for
very serious charges, including adultery
and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for
the claim that the "handing over" or
"turning over" of the person of private
respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner
may have acted beyond its duties as
employer. Petitioner's purported act
contributed to and amplified or even
proximately caused additional humiliation,
misery and suffering of private
respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly
facilitated the arrest, detention and
prosecution of private respondent under
the guise of petitioner's authority as
employer, taking advantage of the trust,
confidence and faith she reposed upon it.
As purportedly found by the Prince of
Makkah, the alleged conviction and
imprisonment of private respondent was
wrongful. But these capped the injury or
harm allegedly inflicted upon her person
and reputation, for which petitioner could
be liable as claimed, to provide
compensation or redress for the wrongs
done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the
court a quo is one involving torts, the
"connecting factor" or "point of contact"
could be the place or places where the
tortious conduct or lex loci actusoccurred.
And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, we find that the Philippines
could be said as a situs of the tort (the
place where the alleged tortious conduct
took place). This is because it is in the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly
deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to
her, she had honestly believed that
petitioner would, in the exercise of its
rights and in the performance of its duties,
"act with justice, give her due and observe
honesty and good faith." Instead,
petitioner failed to protect her, she
claimed. That certain acts or parts of the
injury allegedly occurred in another
country is of no moment. For in our view
what is important here is the place where
the over-all harm or the totality of the
alleged injury to the person, reputation,
social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged, according to the
plaintiff below (herein private respondent).
All told, it is not without basis to identify
the Philippines as the situs of the alleged
tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of
the traditional rule of lex loci delicti
commissi, modern theories and rules on
tort liability 61 have been advanced to offer
fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just
results. In keeping abreast with the
modern theories on tort liability, we find
here an occasion to apply the "State of the
most significant relationship" rule, which in
our view should be appropriate to apply
now, given the factual context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the
State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to
be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue: (a) the
place where the injury occurred; (b) the
place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and (d)
the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered. 62
As already discussed, there is basis for the
claim that over-all injury occurred and
lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise
no question that private respondent is a
resident Filipina national, working with
petitioner, a resident foreign corporation
engaged here in the business of
international air carriage. Thus, the
"relationship" between the parties was
centered here, although it should be
stressed that this suit is not based on
mere labor law violations. From the record,
the claim that the Philippines has the most
significant contact with the matter in this
dispute, 63 raised by private respondent as
plaintiff below against defendant (herein
petitioner), in our view, has been properly
established.
Prescinding from this premise that the
Philippines is the situs of the tort
complained of and the place "having the
most interest in the problem", we find, by
way of recapitulation, that the Philippine
law on tort liability should have paramount
application to and control in the resolution
of the legal issues arising out of this case.
Further, we hold that the respondent
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter of the
complaint; the appropriate venue is in
Quezon City, which could properly apply
Philippine law. Moreover, we find
untenable petitioner's insistence that
"[s]ince private respondent instituted this
suit, she has the burden of pleading and
proving the applicable Saudi law on the
matter." 64 As aptly said by private
respondent, she has "no obligation to
plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is
based on Articles 19 and 21" of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. In her Amended
Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she
never alleged that Saudi law should govern
this case. 65 And as correctly held by the
respondent appellate court, "considering
that it was the petitioner who was invoking
the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia,
then the burden was on it [petitioner] to
plead and to establish what the law of
Saudi Arabia is". 66
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the
respondent appellate court in upholding
the trial court's denial of defendant's
(herein petitioner's) motion to dismiss the
case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and
venue properly laid, but appeal after trial
was obviously available, and expeditious
trial itself indicated by the nature of the
case at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines
is the state intimately concerned with the
ultimate outcome of the case below, not
just for the benefit of all the litigants, but
also for the vindication of the country's
system of law and justice in a was born on April 20, 1980. 1 chanrobles virtual law
transnational setting. With these
guidelines in mind, the trial court must
proceed to try and adjudge the case in the
light of relevant Philippine law, with due
consideration of the foreign element or
elements involved. Nothing said herein, of
course, should be construed as prejudging
the results of the case in any manner
whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil
Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled "Milagros P.
Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby
REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 89 for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and
Panganiban, JJ., concur.
___________________________________________
_______________________
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, Petitioner, vs. HON.
CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the
City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, Respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner
which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be
followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter
against the former, provides Us the opportunity to
lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears
to be an unresolved jurisdictional
question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay
Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married
before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths
at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany.
The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the
couple lived together for some time in Malate,
Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling,
library
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual
recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was
failure of their marriage and that they had been living
apart since April, 1982. 2 chanrobles virtual law
library
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3 chanrobles
virtual law library
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg
Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to petitioner. The records show
that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding
and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally
founded on and authorized by the applicable law of
that foreign jurisdiction. 4 chanrobles virtual law
library
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the
issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent
filed two complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to
said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a
certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the
corresponding investigation, recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent
city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8,
1986, directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints
were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to
two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case
No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided
by the respondent judge; while the other
case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and
James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-
52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz,
Branch XXV, of the same court. 7 chanrobles virtual
law library
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with
the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the
cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition
was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal
Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through
the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both
petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to
inform the Department of Justice "if the accused
have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned,
to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate
the entire records of both cases to his office for
review. 9 chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal
cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence,
Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand,
respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6,
1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved
for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the
suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No.
87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for
review then pending before the Secretary of
Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8,
1987. The same order also directed the arraignment
of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and
William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty
while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such
refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her
counsel were fined and the former was ordered
detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a
plea of not guilty. 14 chanrobles virtual law library
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil
action for certiorariand prohibition, with a prayer for
a temporary restraining order, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying
her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the
main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to
try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de
officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15 chanrobles virtual law library
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8,
1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the
aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution
directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the
dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner. 16 chanrobles virtual law library
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed
for shall accordingly
issue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the
crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has
long since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in
it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn
written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate
since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory
proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Now, the law specifically provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be
the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or
guardian of the offended party. The so-called
exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of
the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply
to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and
vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with
the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In
other words, only the offended spouse, and no other,
is authorized by law to initiate the action
therefor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar
and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in
civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or
petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the
prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply.
Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and
fundamentally commenced by the State, through the
People of the Philippines, the offended party being
merely the complaining witness therein. However, in
the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot
be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution
for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse
assumes a more predominant role since the right to
commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a
matter exclusively within his power and
option.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal
of a public trial. 20Hence, as cogently argued by
petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the
criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical
consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision
of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the
criminal case. 21 chanrobles virtual law library
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the
status and capacity of the complainant to commence
the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must
indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action.
It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action
would be determined by his
status before or subsequentto the commencement
thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior
to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to
but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the
case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time
when he is without the legal capacity to do
so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local
precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to
when precisely the status of a complainant as an
offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in
law can be categorized as possessed of such status.
Stated differently and with reference to the present
case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in
the commencement of a criminal action for adultery
that the marital bonds between the complainant and
the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of
the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes
in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with
ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been
decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right
to institute proceedings against the offenders where
the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall
have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been
properly commenced, a divorce subsequently
granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution
of the criminal proceedings to a The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot
conclusion. 22 chanrobles virtual law library
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa
held that -
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced
except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of
defendant when the offense is said to have been
committed, he had ceased to be such when the
prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his
status was not such as to entitle him to make the
complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense
is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the
state, in explaining the reason for this provision in
the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the
prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should
not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the
matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the
accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates
the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and
by this is meant that he is still married to the accused
spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of
persons.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.,
et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United
States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and
her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a
trial court here alleging that her business concern
was conjugal property and praying that she be
ordered to render an accounting and that the
plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously
demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent
as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any State of the Union.
...chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law.
...chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The allegation of private respondent that he could
not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no
legal significance or consequence in this case. When
said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a
family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would
there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into
the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for
the particular formulation of our law on
adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no
spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of
one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code,
substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised
Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the
marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court
merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to
declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman
to her marital vows, even though it should be made
to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage
contract declared null and void, until and unless she
actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that
effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after
the declaration of nullity because such declaration
that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to
stating that it never existed. There being no marriage
from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed
after said declaration of nullity would no longer have
a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently
contemplated and within the purview of the decision
in said case is the situation where the criminal action
for adultery was filed before the termination of the
marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab
initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily
apply where the termination of the marriage was
effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign
divorce.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al.
vs. Vamenta,hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the
same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said
case reveals that the offended spouse therein had
duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery,
although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but
which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said
case did not involve a factual situation akin to the
one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy
herein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying
petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction.
The temporary restraining order issued in this case
on October 21, 1987 is hereby made
permanent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
chanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library
It is my considered opinion that regardless of
whether We consider the German absolute divorce
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the
husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no
longer be considered as the offended party in case
his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with
another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual
relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less
than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be
allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]),
the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American
wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the
theory that their status and capacity are governed by
their National law, namely, American law. There is no
decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the
validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an
American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two
(2) different nationalities would be
involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga
entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers
the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American
husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino
wife is involved. This results in what he calls a
"socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino
woman is still married to a man who is no longer her
husband. It is the opinion however, of the
undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses
the correct view. While under the national law of the
husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of
the exceptions to the application of the proper
foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when
the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the
people or residents of the forum. Consequently since
to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part
of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to
the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid
under her national law, it would seem that under our
law existing before the new Family Code (which took
effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be
considered void both with respect to the American
husband and the Filipino
wife.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA
[1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the
husband was an American can with a Filipino wife
because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar
as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in
issue.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of
whether We consider the German absolute divorce
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the
husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no
longer be considered as the offended party in case
his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with
another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual
relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less
than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be
allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]),
the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American
wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the
theory that their status and capacity are governed by
their National law, namely, American law. There is no
decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the
validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an
American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two
(2) different nationalities would be
involved.chanrobles virtual law library
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga
entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers
the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American
husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino
wife is involved. This results in what he calls a
"socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino
woman is still married to a man who is no longer her
husband. It is the opinion however, of the
undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses
the correct view. While under the national law of the
husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of
the exceptions to the application of the proper
foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when
the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the
people or residents of the forum. Consequently since
to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part
of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to
the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid
under her national law, it would seem that under our
law existing before the new Family Code (which took
effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be
considered void both with respect to the American
husband and the Filipino wife.chanrobles virtual law
library
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA
[1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the
husband was an American can with a Filipino wife
because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar
as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in
issue.
__________________________________
[G.R. NO. 154380 October 5, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CIPRIANO
ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two
Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise remarry under Philippine
law?cralawlibrary
Before us is a case of first impression that
behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question,
presented as a pure question of law.
In this Petition for Review , the Solicitor
General assails the Decision1dated May
15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23
and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002
denying the motion for reconsideration.
The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the
impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of
the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the divorce
decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by
the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III
married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines
in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United
States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that
his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from
his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
child by him currently live at 5566 A.
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court
a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code. No opposition was filed. Finding
merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner,
through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure
question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN
REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues
there is no law that governs respondent's
situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article
26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife
obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant
to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for
authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection,
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR
REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition' Any
person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory
relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe
for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one
later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the
U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also
adverse, as petitioner representing the
State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of
his capacity to remarry. Respondent,
praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe
for judicial determination inasmuch as
when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity
of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent?
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first
place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon
Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family
Code," which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing
of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into
law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of
the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
On its face, the foregoing provision does
not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to
apply only to cases where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while
residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public
Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops' Conference of the Philippines
(CBCP) registered the following objections
to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It
discriminates against those whose spouses
are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not
be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition
of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses
validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and
can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family
Code deliberations showed that the intent
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26
traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case
where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?cralawlibrary
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in
the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in
this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court
therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum,
that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the
legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization
of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter
of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative
intent to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin
elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; andcralawlibrary
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship
of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano's wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien
wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the
twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present
in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG's
theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long
and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that
the marriage of the parties appears to
have all the badges of validity. On the
other hand, legal separation would not be
a sufficient remedy for it would not sever
the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.
However, we note that the records are
bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondent's wife. It is settled rule that
one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper,
respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as
an American citizen. Likewise, before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must
also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must
also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare
that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our
holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who
has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry. However, considering that
in the present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent's
bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly
upon respondent's submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the
Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.
The assailed Decisiondated May 15, 2002,
and Resolutiondated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga
del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
___________________________________________
_ any responsive pleading but submitted
[G.R. No. 186571 : August 11, 2010]
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, PETITIONER,
VS. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS
AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from
the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevated via a petition for review
[2]
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former
Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on
November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18,
2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig
[4]
City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. He returned to
the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair
with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerbert's petition for divorce on December
8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has
moved on and has found another Filipina
to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite
the registration of the divorce decree, an Filipino spouse remains married to the
official of the National Statistics Office alien spouse who, after obtaining a
(NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
between him and Daisylyn still subsists spouse."[11]
under Philippine law; to be enforceable,
the foreign divorce decree must first be
THE PETITION
judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular
From the RTC's ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the
No. 4, series of 1982.[6] present petition.[13]
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the
judicial recognition of foreign divorce RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
and/or declaration of marriage as
similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus,
dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
similarly asks for a determination of his
Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file
rights under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to
account the rationale behind the second
the trial court. She offered no opposition
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
to Gerbert's petition and, in fact, alleged
he contends that the provision applies as
her desire to file a similar case herself but
well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He
was prevented by financial and personal claims that the RTC ruling unduly
circumstances. She, thus, requested that
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by
she be considered as a party-in-interest limiting the standing to file the petition
with a similar prayer to Gerbert's.
only to the Filipino spouse - an
interpretation he claims to be contrary to
In its October 30, 2008
the essence of the second paragraph of
decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerbert's Article 26 of the Family Code. He
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
considers himself as a proper party, vested
was not the proper party to institute the with sufficient legal interest, to institute
action for judicial recognition of the foreign
the case, as there is a possibility that he
divorce decree as he is a naturalized
might be prosecuted for bigamy if he
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
Philippines since two marriage certificates,
under the second paragraph of Article 26
involving him, would be on file with the
of the Family Code,[8] in order for him or
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the
her to be able to remarry under Philippine
Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their
law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code respective Comments,[14] both support
reads: Gerbert's position.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside Essentially, the petition raises the issue
the Philippines, in accordance with the of whether the second paragraph of
laws in force in the country where they Article 26 of the Family Code extends
were solemnized, and valid there as such, to aliens the right to petition a court
shall also be valid in this country, except of this jurisdiction for the recognition
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), of a foreign divorce decree.
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
THE COURT'S RULING
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly
The alien spouse can claim no right
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
under the second paragraph of Article
validly obtained abroad by the alien
26 of the Family Code as the
spouse capacitating him or her to
substantive right it establishes is in
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
favor of the Filipino spouse
likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
The resolution of the issue requires a
review of the legislative history and intent
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is
behind the second paragraph of Article 26
consistent with the legislative intent
of the Family Code.
behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
The Family Code recognizes only two types
as determined by the Court in Republic v.
of defective marriages - void[15] and
Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the
to "avoid the absurd situation where the
basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time
of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the
lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.[17] Our family laws do not
recognize absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a
possibility in marriages between a Filipino
and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino,
in the exercise of her legislative powers
under the Freedom
Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the
Family Code to its present wording, as
follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Court's
holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In
both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouse's assertion
of marital rights after a foreign court's
divorce decree between the alien and the
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that
the foreign divorce had already severed
the marital bond between the spouses.
The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws,
[the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be
served.[22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision
was included in the law "to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse." [23] The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his
or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating
him or her to remarry.[24] Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to
the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil
Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree.
If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,
the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other
than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity
are generally governed by his national
law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the
enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit
of the Filipino spouse. In other words,
only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code; the alien spouse can claim
no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion - i.e., that
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens - with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis
to dismiss Gerbert's petition before the
RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition
the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the alien's national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect
of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or
final orders.--The effect of a judgment
or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order
upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final
order against a person, the judgment
or final order is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order
may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being
the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action
before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation,
we have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the
divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that,
as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another
country."[28] This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien's
applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.[29] The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign
divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to
obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts
of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court comes into play.
This Section requires proof, either by (1)
official publications or (2) copies attested
by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records
are not kept in the Philippines, these must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal
of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to
his petition a copy of the divorce decree,
as well as the required certificates proving
its authenticity,[30] but failed to include a
copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31]
Under this situation, we can, at this point,
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency
of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce
decree is consistent with the Canadian
divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this
latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the
Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at
the same time, will allow other interested
parties to oppose the foreign judgment
and overcome a petitioner's presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution
must be taken to ensure conformity with
our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized,
shall have the effect of res
judicata[32] between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity
that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between
nations, the res judicata effect of the
foreign judgments of divorce serves as the
deeper basis for extending judicial
recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain
for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition
of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we
note that the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn's marriage certificate based
on the mere presentation of the
decree.[34] We consider the recording to
be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to
what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that
"[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register." The law
requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person's
legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his
own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or
not."[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree,
although a foreign one, affecting a
person's legal capacity and status that
must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753
or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of
divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. - A civil register is registration of the decree. For being the foreign judgment can be measured
established for recording the civil contrary to law, the registration of the and tested in terms of jurisdictional
status of persons, in which shall be foreign divorce decree without the infirmities, want of notice to the party,
entered: requisite judicial recognition is patently collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
void and cannot produce any legal effect. fact.
(a) births;
Another point we wish to draw attention to WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for
(b) deaths;
is that the recognition that the RTC may review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages; extend to the Canadian divorce decree October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional
does not, by itself, authorize Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as
(e) divorces;
the cancellation of the entry in the civil well as its February 17, 2009 order. We
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions; registry. A petition for recognition of a order the REMAND of the case to the trial
foreign judgment is not the proper court for further proceedings in accordance
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
(i) naturalization; and
of Court, for the cancellation of entries in Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
(j) changes of name.
the civil registry. General. No costs.
xxxx
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that SO ORDERED.
"no entry in a civil register shall be
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. -- The local
changed or corrected, without judicial Carpio Morales, (Chairperson),
registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they order." The Rules of Court supplements Bersamin, *Abad, and Villarama, Jr.,
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically JJ., concur.
shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons: providing for a special remedial proceeding ___________________________________________
by which entries in the civil registry may ______________________
be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
(1) Birth and death register;
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
(2) Marriage register, in which shall
that must be complied with before a
be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil REPUBLIC OF THE
dissolved marriages. PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN
registry. It also requires, among others,
TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, that the verified petition must be filed with
the RTC of the province where the
adoption, change of name and
corresponding civil registry is DECISION
naturalization register.
located;[38] that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest
But while the law requires the entry of the
must be made parties to the PERALTA, J.:
divorce decree in the civil registry, the law
and the submission of the decree by proceedings;[39]and that the time and
place for hearing must be published in a
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the This petition for review on certiorari under
decree's registration. The law should be newspaper of general circulation.[40] As
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks
these basic jurisdictional requirements
read in relation with the requirement of a to reverse and set aside the September
have not been met in the present case, we
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed
before it can be given res judicata effect. Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108
In the context of the present case, no CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive
of the Rules of Court.
judicial order as yet exists recognizing the portion of the Decision states:
foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig
We hasten to point out, however, that this
City Civil Registry Office acted totally out
ruling should not be construed as requiring WHEREFORE, the instant appeal
of turn and without authority of law when
two separate proceedings for the is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15
it annotated the Canadian divorce decree
on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage registration of a foreign divorce decree in October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
certificate, on the strength alone of the the civil registry - one for recognition of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch
the foreign decree and another specifically 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
for cancellation of the entry under Rule is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office was aware of the requirement of a of the foreign divorce decree may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the Let a copy of this Decision be served on
court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular
object of special proceedings (such as that the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and Department
in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is Manila.
of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
precisely to establish the status or right of
1982[37] - both of which required a final
a party or a particular fact. Moreover,
order from a competent Philippine SO ORDERED.3
court before a foreign judgment, dissolving Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve
as the appropriate adversarial
a marriage, can be registered in the civil
proceeding[41] by which the applicability of The facts are undisputed.
registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn
Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in the
Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila,
by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by a Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form
and in substance, Branch 43 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City
set the case for initial hearing on April 25,
2012. The petition and the notice of initial
hearing were published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation. During the initial
hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the
documentary evidence (consisting of the
trial court's Order dated January 25, 2012,
affidavit of publication, and issues of the
Northern Journal dated February 21-27,
2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of
compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
entered its appearance for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines authorizing the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to
appear on its behalf. Likewise, a
Manifestation and Motion was filed
questioning the title and/or caption of the
petition considering that, based on the
allegations therein, the proper action
should be a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an
Amended Petition, which the court
granted. The Amended Petition, which
captioned that it is also a petition for
recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgment, alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in
the Philippines to a Japanese national
named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by
their Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was
filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and
after due proceedings, a divorce decree
dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by
the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said
divorce decree, petitioner and her divorced
Japanese husband are no longer living
together and in fact, petitioner and her
daughter are living separately from said
Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to
have the entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the
former Japanese husband's marriage was
previously registered, in order that it
would not appear anymore that petitioner
is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is
no longer married to her; furthermore, in
the event that petitioner decides to be
remarried, she shall not be bothered and
disturbed by said entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for
the purpose of causing the cancellation of
entry of the marriage between the
petitioner and the said Japanese national,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which marriage was already
dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others,
that together with the cancellation of the
said entry of her marriage, that she be
allowed to return and use. her maiden
surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance
as she was scheduled to leave for Japan
for her employment. Among the
documents that were offered and admitted
were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012,
finding the petition and its attachments to
be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated
February 21-27, 2012, February 28 -
March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo
and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the
Philippine Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting
evidence to rebut the allegations of
Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court
denied the petition for lack of merit. In
ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo
in Japan should not be recognized, it
opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does
not afford Filipinos the right to file for a
divorce, whether they are in the country or
living abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines
or in another country" and that unless
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of
another country, Philippine laws shall have
control over issues related to Filipinos'
family rights and duties, together with the
determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil
relations, including marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC
decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo
who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree they obtained
makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec.
Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the
meaning of the law should be based on the
intent of the lawmakers and in view of the
legislative intent behind Article 26, it
would be the height of injustice to consider
Manalo as still married to the Japanese
national, who, in turn, is no longer married
to her. For the appellate court, the fact
that it was Manalo who filed the divorce
case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to
this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo,
Jr.8 where the marriage between a
foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved
through a divorce filed abroad by the
latter.
The OSG filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied; hence,
this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm
the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage,
are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the
marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro, which suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force. 9 In this
jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of
the New Civil Code, the marital bond
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by an absolute divorce obtained
abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by
a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national
laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner, the former is allowed to
contract a subsequent marriage in case
the absolute divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C.
Aquino signed into law Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as The
Family Code of the Philippines, which took
effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly
thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was issued on
July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a
second paragraph was added to Article
26.18 This provision was originally deleted
by the Civil Code Revision Committee
(Committee), but it was presented and
approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres.
Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified,
Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to
adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because
it is tantamount to trying a divorce
case.22 Under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce
obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support
of the children or property relations of the
spouses, must still be determined by our
courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd
situation of a Filipino as still being married
to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the former
because he or she had obtained a divorce
abroad that is recognized by his or her
national law.24 The aim was that it would
solve the problem of many Filipino women
who, under the New Civil Code, are still
considered married to their alien husbands
even after the latter have already validly
divorced them under their (the husbands')
national laws and perhaps have already
married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case
where, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a
divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree. We held in Republic of
the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in
the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.
In Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
Filipino citizens when they got married.
The wife became a naturalized American
citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in
the same year. The Court therein hinted,
by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse
is no longer married under Philippine law
and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the
legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization
of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x
x Both Dacasin
If we are to give meaning to the legislative
intent to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin
elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid
marriage that has
been celebrated
between a Filipino
citizen and a divorce decree obtained by his former wife
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is
obtained abroad by
the alien spouse
capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship
of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.27
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve
whether, under the same provision, a
Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry
under Philippine law after initiating a
divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a
favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
Specifically, Manalo pleads for the
recognition and enforcement of the divorce
decree rendered by the Japanese court
and for the cancellation of the entry of
marriage in the local civil registry "in order
that it would not appear anymore that
[she] is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is
no longer married to her; [and], in the
event that [she] decides to be remarried,
she shall not be bothered and disturbed by
said entry of marriage," and to return and
to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
v. Dacasin28 and Van
Dorn29 already recognized a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of
child custody and property relation,
respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former
spouses executed an Agreement for the
joint custody of their minor daughter.
Later on, the husband, who is a US citizen,
sued his Filipino wife to enforce the
Agreement, alleging that it was only, the
latter who exercised sole custody of their
child. The trial court dismissed the action
for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground,
among others, that the divorce decree is
binding following the "nationality rule"
prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband
moved to reconsider, arguing that the
is void, but it was denied. In ruling that
the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain
the suit but not to enforce the Agreement,
which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce
decree's alleged invalidity - not because
the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that
the divorce decree violated Illinois law,
but because the divorce was obtained by
his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability. The argument
that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly
novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a
Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the
alien divorcee's Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his
submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not
valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family
Code took into effect. There, a complaint
was filed by the ex-husband, who is a US
citizen, against his Filipino wife to render
an accounting of a business that was
alleged to be a conjugal property and to be
declared with right to manage the same.
Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action was
barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings that she initiated, but
the trial court denied the motion. On his
part, her ex-husband averred that the
divorce decree issued by the Nevada court
could not prevail over the prohibitive laws
of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign court cannot, especially if the same
is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction. In
dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of
the foreign divorce on the parties and their
conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity
of that Nevada divorce in any of the States
of the United States. The decree is binding
on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce
is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction,
the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.
As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of
the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of
divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage
tie, when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that
the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he
is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does,
that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are
to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained
foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
spouse can be recognized and given legal
effects in the Philippines is implied from
Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et
al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of
her first husband, who is a Japanese
national, was able to obtain a judgment
from Japan's family court, which declared
the marriage between her and her second
husband, who is a Japanese national, void
on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the
issue of whether a husband or wife of a
prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition
to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to
file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the
entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of
the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has
a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that
he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in
limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage. These
property interests in marriage include the
right to be supported "in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family" and
preserving the property regime of the
marriage.
Property rights are already substantive
rights protected by the Constitution, but a
spouse's right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized
under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino
wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed
for divorce, which was granted.
Subsequently, she filed a petition before
the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article
26. The RTC denied the petition on the
ground that the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien spouse
recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce
decree must be proven in accordance with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court
agreed and ruled that, consistent
with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et
al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien
spouse must be proven. Instead of
dismissing the case, We referred it to the
CA for appropriate action including the
reception of evidence to determine and
resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate
from the above-mentioned rulings. When
this Court recognized a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by
the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation, it should not stop short
in likewise acknowledging that one of the
usual and necessary consequences of
absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual
obligation to live together and observe
fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed
and ceased to exist, the civil status and
the domestic relation of the former
spouses change as both of them are freed
from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the
nationality principle, Manalo's personal
status is subject to Philippine law, which
prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the
divorce decree which she obtained under
Japanese law cannot be given effect, as
she is, without dispute, a national not of
Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that
a contrary ruling will subvert not only the
intention of the framers of the law, but
also that of the Filipino people, as
expressed in the Constitution. The Court
is, therefore, bound to respect the
prohibition until the legislature deems it fit
to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of
"a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. " Based on a clear and plain
reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be
the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It
does not distinguish whether the Filipino
spouse is the petitioner or the respondent
in the foreign divorce proceeding. The
Court is bound by the words of the
statute; neither can We put words in the
mouths of the lawmakers.37 "The
legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent
by the use of such words as are found in
the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that
the word "obtained" should be interpreted
to mean that the divorce proceeding must
be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
still, the Court will not follow the letter of
the statute when to do so would depart
from the true intent of the legislature or
would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of
39
the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to
defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of
the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times
accurately reflected in the manner in which
the resulting law is couched. Thus,
applying a verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an
absurd situation or injustice. To obviate
this aberration, and bearing in mind the
principle that the intent or the spirit of the
law is the law itself, resort should be to the
rule that the spirit of the law controls its
letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to
address an anomaly where the Filipino
spouse is tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the
laws of his or her country.42 Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to
remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same
place and in "like circumstance as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an
alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended
as a means to recognize the residual effect
of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operation of the latter's
national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality
principle is erroneous. Such principle,
found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is
not an absolute and unbending rule. In
fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is a testament that the State
may provide for an exception thereto.
Moreover, blind adherence to the
nationality principle must be disallowed if
it would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals
whose rights are equally protected by law.
The courts have the duty to enforce the
laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid
classification and that its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the
courts of justice, such classification may
be subjected to judicial review.44 The
deference stops where the classification
violates a fundamental right, or prejudices
persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution.45 When these violations arise,
this Court must discharge its primary role
as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more
exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations.46 If a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required
since it is presumed unconstitutional, and
the burden is upon the government to
prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and
that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement
leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.48 It includes the right of
procreation, the right to marry, the right
to exercise free speech, political
expression, press, assembly, and so forth,
the right to travel, and the right to
vote.49 On the other hand, what
constitutes compelling state interest is
measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and
calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which
some individual liberties must give way,
such as the promotion of public interest,
public safety or the general welfare.51 It
essentially involves a public right or
interest that, because of its primacy,
overrides individual rights, and allows the
former to take precedence over the
latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted
by the Congress, the same principle
applies with respect to the acts of the
President, which have the force and effect
of law unless declared otherwise by the
court. In this case, We find that Paragraph
2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential
requisites53 of the equal protection
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the
provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is
unreasonable as it is based on superficial,
arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another
Filipino is not similarly situated with a
Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
There are real, material and substantial
differences between them. Ergo, they
should not be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and liabilities imposed.
Without a doubt, there are political,
economic, cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal
systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar,
that a Filipino national who is married to
an alien spouse has to contend with. More
importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce
decree obtained by an alien against his or
her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the
foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and
substantial difference between a Filipino
who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings
and a Filipino who obtained a divorce
decree upon the instance of his or her
alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine
and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and
obligations in a alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike.
Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a
distinction between them based merely on
the superficial difference of whether they
initiated the divorce proceedings or not is
utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2
of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is
inequality in treatment because a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or
her alien spouse would not be recognized
even if based on grounds similar to Articles
35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In
filing for divorce based on these grounds,
the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of
invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount
to insisting that he or she should be
governed with whatever law he or she
chooses. The dissent's comment that
Manalo should be "reminded that all is not
lost, for she may still pray for the
severance of her marital ties before the
RTC in accordance with the mechanisms
now existing under the Family Code" is
anything but comforting. For the guidance
of the bench and the bar, it would have
been better if the dissent discussed in
detail what these "mechanisms" are and
how they specifically apply in Manalo's
case as well as those who are similarly
situated. If the dissent refers to a petition
for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will
automatically grant the same. Besides,
such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and
protracted. All to the prejudice of
our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal
interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners,
opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate
practice of Filipinos marrying foreign
nationals or initiating divorce proceedings
against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and
unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty
generalization as no data whatsoever was
shown to support what he intends to
prove. Second, We adhere to the
presumption of good faith in this
jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it
is disputably presumed (i.e., satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other
evidence) that a person is innocent of
crime or wrong,57 that a person intends
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts,58 that a person takes ordinary care of
his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted
from a belief that the thing acquiesced in
was conformable to the law and fact,60 that
a man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the
law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to
easily attribute any illegal, irregular or
immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino
just because he or she opted to marry a
foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is
presumed that interracial unions are
entered into out of genuine love and
affection, rather than prompted by pure
lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice
of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more
forbearing and conservative in nature and
that they are more often the victims or at
the losing end of mixed marriages.
And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the
motive behind a Filipino's decision to
marry an alien national. In one case, it
was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are
varied and complex. The State does not
and cannot dictate on the kind of life that
a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the
realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions. The
right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live
together or live apart, to have children or
no children, to love one another or not,
and so on. Thus, marriages entered into
for other purposes, limited or otherwise,
such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites,
are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not
the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may
validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that
marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the
State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to
be a general prohibition on divorce
because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon, in response to a question by
Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, was categorical about this insanity.68 When the Philippines was spouses, a child is born to them by in d. The consent of either
point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows: liberated and the Commonwealth vitro or a similar procedure or when the party was obtained by
Government was restored, it ceased to wife bears a child after being a victim of force, intimidation or
have force and effect and Act No. 2710 rape; undue influence,
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, i. Attempt by the respondent against the unless the same
that Commissioner Bernas be recognized. upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. life of the petitioner, a common child or a having disappeared or
386 or the New Civil Code, an absolute child of the petitioner; and ceased, such party
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, j. Abandonment of petitioner by thereafter freely
Commissioner Bernas is recognized. whether here or abroad, is no longer respondent without justifiable cause for cohabited with the
recognized.70 more than one (1) year. other as husband and
wife;
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am e. Either party was
not sure if it has been categorically Through the years, there has been When the spouses are legally separated by physically incapable of
answered. I refer specifically to the constant clamor from various sectors of judicial decree for more than two (2) consummating the
proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this the Philippine society to re-institute years, either or both spouses can petition marriage with the
to be understood as a prohibition of a absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the proper court for an absolute divorce other and such
general law on divorce? His intention is to the current 17th Congress, House Bill based on said judicial decree of legal incapacity continues
make this a prohibition so that the (H.B.) Nos. 116,711062,72 238073 and separation. or appears to be
legislature cannot pass a divorce law. 602774 were filed in the House of incurable; and
Representatives. In substitution of these f. Either party was
bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act 1. Grounds for annulment of marriage
under Article 45 of the Family Code, afflicted with a
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, that Instituting Absolute Divorce and
restated as follows: sexually transmissible
was not primarily my intention. My Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" infection found to be
intention was primarily to encourage the or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was serious or appears to
social institution of marriage, but not submitted by the House Committee on a. The party in whose be incurable.
necessarily discourage divorce. But now Population and Family Relations on behalf it is sought to
that he mentioned the issue of divorce, my February 28, 2018. It was approved on have the marriage
personal opinion is to discourage it, Mr. March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with annulled was eighteen Provided, That the grounds mentioned in
Presiding Officer. 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 (18) years of age or b, e and f existed either at the time of the
abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds for over but below marriage or supervening after the
a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as twenty-one (21), and marriage.
FR. BERNAS. No. my question is more
follows: the marriage was
categorical. Does this carry the meaning of
prohibiting a divorce law? solemnized without 1. When the spouses
1. The grounds for legal separation the consent of the have been separated
under Article 55 of the Family parents, guardian or in fact for at least five
MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding Officer. person having
Code, modified or amended, as (5) years at the time
follows: substitute parental the petition for
authority over the absolute divorce is
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
party, in that order, filed, and
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive unless after attaining reconciliation is highly
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not conduct directed against the petitioner, a the age of twenty-one improbable;
new in our country. Effective March 11, common child, or a child of the petitioner; (21), such party freely 2. Psychological
1917, Philippine courts could grant an b. Physical violence or moral pressure to cohabited with the incapacity of either
absolute divorce on the grounds of compel the petitioner to change religious other and both lived spouse as provided for
adultery on the part of the wife or or political affiliation; together as husband in Article 36 of the
concubinage on the part of the husband by c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or or wife; Family Code, whether
virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine induce the petitioner, a common child, or a b. either party was of or not the incapacity
Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, child of the petitioner, to engage in unsound mind, unless was present at the
pursuant to the authority conferred upon prostitution, or connivance in such such party after time of the celebration
him by the Commander-in-Chief of the corruption or inducement; coming to reason, of the marriage or
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines d. Final judgment sentencing the freely cohabited with later;
and with the approval of the latter, the respondent to imprisonment of more than the other as husband 3. When one of the
Chairman of the Philippine Executive six (6) years, even if pardoned; and wife; spouses undergoes a
Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or c. The consent of either gender reassignment
("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act chronic gambling of the respondent; party was obtained by surgery or transitions
No. 2710 and provided eleven grounds for f. Homosexuality of the respondent; fraud, unless such from one sex to
absolute divorce, such as intentional or g. Contracting by the respondent of a party afterwards with another, the other
unjustified desertion continuously for at subsequent bigamous marriage, whether full knowledge of the spouse is entitled to
least one year prior to the filing of the in the Philippines or abroad; facts constituting the petition for absolute
action, slander by deed or gross insult by h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having fraud, freely cohabited divorce with the
one spouse against the other to such an a child with another person other than with the other as transgender or
extent as to make further living together one's spouse during the marriage, except husband and wife; transsexual as
impracticable, and a spouse's incurable when upon the mutual agreement of the
 respondent, or vice-
versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital
differences and
conflicts which have
resulted in the total
breakdown of the
marriage beyond
repair, despite earnest
and repeated efforts
at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos
led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on
absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to
our customs, morals, and traditions that
has looked upon marriage and family as an
institution and their nature of permanence,
inviolability, and solidarity. However, none
of our laws should be based on any
religious law, doctrine, or teaching;
otherwise, the separation of Church and
State will be violated.75
In the same breath that the establishment
clause restricts what the government can
do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do. They can
neither cause the government to adopt
their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do
so, in simple terms, would cause the State
to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither
impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry nor can
it demand that the nation follow its beliefs,
even if it sincerely believes that they are
good for the country.77 While marriage is
considered a sacrament, it has civil and
legal consequences which are governed by
the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect,
bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that
the State has a legitimate right and
interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as
an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State, should not be read
in total isolation but must be harmonized
with other constitutional provisions. Aside
from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total
development.79 It is also obligated to
defend, among others, the right of children
to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their
development.80 To Our mind, the State
cannot effectively enforce these obligations
if We limit the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. It is not
amiss to point that the women and
children are almost always the helpless
victims of all forms of domestic abuse and
violence. In fact, among the notable
legislation passed in order to minimize, if
not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No.
6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and
similar practices), R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004"), R.A. No. 9710
("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No.
10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012"), and
R.A. No. 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in
protecting and strengthening the Filipino
family as a basic autonomous social
institution, the Court must not lose sight of
the constitutional mandate to value the
dignity of every human person, guarantee
full respect for human rights, and ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 would do more harm than good. If We
disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and
obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and
still require him or her to first avail of the
existing "mechanisms" under the Family
Code, any subsequent relationship that he
or she would enter in the meantime shall
be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out
of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer
the stigma of being branded as
illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a
few of the adverse consequences, not only
to the parent but also to the child, if We
are to hold a restrictive interpretation of
the subject provision. The irony is that the
principle of inviolability of marriage under
Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and
against unions not formalized by marriage,
but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to
families formed according to indigenous
customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to
the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and
information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from
all over the world, mixed marriages have
become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is
recognized that not all marriages are made
in heaven and that imperfect humans
more often than not create imperfect
unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the
unfortunate reality for some is that the
attainment of the individual's full human
potential and self-fulfillment is not found
and achieved in the context of a marriage.
Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the
quantity of existing marriages and, at the
same time, brush aside the truth that
some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being
a mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive
of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it.84 In
reiterating that the Filipino spouse should
not be discriminated against in his or her
own country if the ends of justice are to be
served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we
test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal
rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent
of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way
as to cause injustice as this is never within
the legislative intent. An indispensable part
of that intent, in fact, for we presume the
good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not
independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally
valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in
a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are
not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What
we do instead is find a balance between
the word and the will, that justice may be
done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do
not and must not unfeelingly apply the law
as it is worded, yielding like robots to the
literal command without regard to its
cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to
err by sticking too closely to the words of a
law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes
again, "where these words import a policy
that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian
defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his
due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrant, we interpret the law in a
way that will render justice, presuming
that it was the intention of the lawmaker,
to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results
or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter
of the law.87 A statute may, therefore, be
extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot
yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and
enforce the divorce decree rendered by the
Japanese court and to cancel the entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before
Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree will not
suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first
be proven.90 Before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. The
decree purports to be a written act or
record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on
the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA
noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit
before the court a quo the 1) Decision of
the Japanese Court allowing the divorce;
2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by
the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by
Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the
Rules of Court, these documents
sufficiently prove the subject Divorce
Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained
to recognize the Japanese Court's
judgment decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly
object, as in this case, the divorce decree
is rendered admissible as a written act of
the foreign court.94 As it appears, the
existence of the divorce decree was not
denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached
nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law,
albeit an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce
must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the
"party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. x x x The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon
the subject should be resolved in the
negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo,
the burden of proving the pertinent
Japanese law validating it, as well as her
former husband's capacity to remarry, fall
squarely upon her. Japanese laws on
persons and family relations are not
among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED. The September
18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN
PART. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,* Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr.,
and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., concur. See separate opinion.
Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., join
the dissent of J. Caguioa.
Caguioa, J., see dissenting opinion.
Sereno, C.J., on leave.
Jardeleza, J., no
part. ______________________________
___________________
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J.
GARCIA-RECIO,, Petitioner, v.REDERICK
A. RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may
be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the
divorce decree and the governing personal
law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national
law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision 1 and
the March 24, 1999 Order 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28,
in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the
marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January
12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved
and both parties can now remarry under
existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties.3cräläwvirtualibräry
The assailed Order denied reconsideration
of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married
to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. 4 They
lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an
Australian citizen, as shown by a
Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued
by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner
-- a Filipina -- and respondent were
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady
of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City. 7 In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as single
and Filipino. 8cräläwvirtualibräry
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While
the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in
Australia. 9cräläwvirtualibräry
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage 10 in the court a quo, on the
ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly
had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married her on January 12, 1994. She
claimed that she learned of respondents
marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as
far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution. 11He contended
that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a
divorce decree obtained in Australia in
1989; 12thus, he was legally capacitated to
marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after
the couples wedding and while the suit for
the declaration of nullity was pending --
respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken
down. 13cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the
Complaint be dismissed on the ground that
it stated no cause of action. 14 The Office
of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent. 15 The court marked and
admitted the documentary evidence of
both parties. 16 After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for
resolution. 17cräläwvirtualibräry
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the
assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage
dissolved on the ground that the divorce
issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed
the marriage ended, but not on the basis
of any defect in an essential element of
the marriage; that is, respondents alleged
lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree
obtained by respondent. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus,
there was no more marital union to nullify
or annul.
18
Hence, this Petition.
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for
our consideration:
1 conformity to the foreign law allowing
The trial court gravely erred in finding that
the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
the respondent ipso facto terminated his
first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second
marriage with the petitioner.
2 decree, like any other foreign judgment,
The failure of the respondent, who is now
a naturalized Australian, to present a
certificate of legal capacity to marry
constitutes absence of a substantial
requisite voiding the petitioners marriage
to the respondent
3 Petitioner adds that, based on the first
The trial court seriously erred in the
application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in
this case.
4
The trial court patently and grievously
erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35,
40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the
applicable provisions in this case.
5 courts cannot grant it. 21 A marriage
The trial court gravely erred in between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
pronouncing that the divorce decree even by a divorce obtained abroad,
obtained by the respondent in because of Articles 15 22 and 17 23 of the
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties Civil Code. 24 In mixed marriages involving
to remarry, without first securing a a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 25 of
recognition of the judgment granting the the Family Code allows the former to
divorce decree before our contract a subsequent marriage in case
courts.19cräläwvirtualibräry the divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. 26 A divorce obtained abroad by a
The Petition raises five issues, but for couple, who are both aliens, may be
purposes of this Decision, we shall recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) consistent with their respective national
whether the divorce between respondent laws. 27cräläwvirtualibräry
and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be
legally capacitated to marry petitioner. A comparison between marriage and
Because of our ruling on these two, there divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
is no more necessity to take up the rest. concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized
The Courts Ruling in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national
law. 28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce
The Petition is partly meritorious.
decree can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove the
First Issue: divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
it. 29 Presentation solely of the divorce
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent
decree is insufficient.
and Editha Samson
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner assails the trial courts
recognition of the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson. Petitioner insists that before a divorce
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng decree can be admitted in evidence, it
Gee, 20petitioner argues that the divorce must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52
may be given recognition in this of the Family Code. These articles read as
jurisdiction only upon proof of the follows:
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged
divorce decree itself. She adds that ART. 11. Where a marriage license is
respondent miserably failed to establish required, each of the contracting parties
these elements. shall file separately a sworn application for
such license with the proper local civil
registrar which shall specify the following:
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are xxx
governed by the law of the place where
they were celebrated (the lex loci
(5) If previously married, how, when and
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires
where the previous marriage was dissolved
the presentation of the foreign law to show or annulled;
the conformity of the marriage in question
to the legal requirements of the place
where the marriage was performed. xxx
At the outset, we lay the following basic ART. 13. In case either of the contracting
legal principles as the take-off points for parties has been previously married, the
our discussion. Philippine law does not applicant shall be required to
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting
parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish,
instead of the birth or baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the
death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of the absolute divorce,
or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous
marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of
absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, and the delivery of the
childrens presumptive legitimes shall be
recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property; otherwise, the
same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues
that the Australian divorce decree is a
public document -- a written official act of
an Australian family court. Therefore, it
requires no further proof of its authenticity
and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself.
Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. 31 The
decree purports to be a written act or
record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign
country.32cräläwvirtualibräry
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on
the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested 33 by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal
of his office. 34cräläwvirtualibräry
The divorce decree between respondent
and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian
family court. 35 However, appearance is
not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when
the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility,
but only to the fact that it had not been
registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court ruled
that it was admissible, subject to
petitioners qualification. 37 Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight
by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to
object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney,
Australia. 38cräläwvirtualibräry
Compliance with the quoted articles (11,
13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in
1992. 39 Naturalization is the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from
the protective cloak of their former states,
don the attires of their adoptive countries.
By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines
and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to
prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign
judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived
and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is
allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus,
judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of
proof lies with the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an
action. 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations
of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations
in their answer when they introduce new
matters. 42 Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden
of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. 43 Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws
are not among those matters that judges
are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. 44 The power of judicial
notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity
to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the
insufficient proof of the divorce,
respondent was legally incapacitated to
marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes
that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian
divorce decree, which was validly admitted
in evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian
law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In
its strict legal sense, divorcemeans the
legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces
are of different types. The two basic ones
are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates
the marriage, while the second suspends it
and leaves the bond in full force. 45 There
is no showing in the case at bar which type
of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree -- a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in
effect the same as a separation from bed
and board, although an absolute divorce
may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is
effected. 46cräläwvirtualibräry
Even after the divorce becomes absolute,
the court may under some foreign statutes
and practices, still restrict remarriage.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage
may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty
party in a divorce which was granted on
the ground of adultery may be prohibited
from marrying again. The court may allow
a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior. 47cräläwvirtualibräry
On its face, the herein Australian divorce
decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries
again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits
the offence of bigamy.48cräläwvirtualibräry
This quotation bolsters our contention that
the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we
find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondents capacity to remarry despite
the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that
the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as
to his civil status based on Section 48,
Rule 39 49 of the Rules of Court, for the
simple reason that no proof has been
presented on the legal effects of the
divorce decree obtained under Australian
laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal
Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of
legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Family Code was not submitted together
with the application for a marriage license.
According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to
remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to
contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of respondent,
had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to
marry on the part of the alien applicant for
a marriage license. 50cräläwvirtualibräry
As it is, however, there is absolutely no
evidence that proves respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner. A review of
the records before this Court shows that
only the following exhibits were presented
before the lower court: (1) for petitioner:
(a) Exhibit A Complaint; 51 (b) Exhibit B
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick
A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J.
Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; 52 (c)
Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D.
Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in
Malabon, Metro Manila; 53 (d) Exhibit D
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan
City Certification that no information of
annulment between Rederick A. Recio and
Editha D. Samson was in its
records; 54 and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recio; 55 (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -
- Amended Answer; 56 (b) Exhibit 2 Family
Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recio; 58 (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court
of Australia Certificate; 59 and Exhibit 5 --
Statutory Declaration of the Legal
Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and
Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995. 60cräläwvirtualibräry
Based on the above records, we cannot
conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January
12, 1994. We agree with petitioners
contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity
to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the
Australian personal law governing his
status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to
declare her marriage to respondent null
and void on the ground of bigamy. After
all, it may turn out that under Australian
law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to
the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioners legal capacity to
marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the
court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties marriage on the ground of bigamy,
there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1,
1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE , in the interest of orderly
procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence
which conclusively show respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in
that, of declaring the parties marriage void
on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug,
and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur .
______________________________
______________________________
______
.R. No. L-19671 November 29,
1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, Plaintiff-
Appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-
appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-
appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal
questions, from the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case
No. R-4177, denying the claim of the
plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez,
for legal separation and one million pesos
in damages against his wife and parents-
in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente,
Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed
"Escaño," respectively.2chanrobles virtual
law library
The facts, supported by the evidence of
record, are the following:chanrobles virtual
law library
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24
February 1948 in the University of San
Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then
enrolled as a second year student of
commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of
age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish
ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"),
exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer,
ex-army officer and of undistinguished
stock, without the knowledge of her
parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt.
Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan
Alburo in the said city. The marriage was
the culmination of a previous love affair
and was duly registered with the local civil
register.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her,
before the marriage, indicate that the
couple were deeply in love. Together with
a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker
and go-between, they had planned out
their marital future whereby Pacita would
be the governess of their first-born; they
started saving money in a piggy bank. A
few weeks before their secret marriage,
their engagement was broken; Vicenta
returned the engagement ring and
accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her
love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for
his return, and they reconciled. This time
they planned to get married and then
elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta
had brought some of her clothes to the
room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall,
which was their usual trysting
place.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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Although planned for the midnight
following their marriage, the elopement
did not, however, materialize because
when Vicente went back to her classes
after the marriage, her mother, who got
wind of the intended nuptials, was already
waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was
taken home where she admitted that she
had already married Pastor. Mamerto and
Mena Escaño were surprised, because
Pastor never asked for the hand of
Vicente, and were disgusted because of
the great scandal that the clandestine
marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III,
pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the
Escaño spouses sought priestly advice.
Father Reynes suggested a recelebration
to validate what he believed to be an
invalid marriage, from the standpoint of
the Church, due to the lack of authority
from the Archbishop or the parish priest
for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the
marriage. The recelebration did not take
place, because on 26 February 1948
Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid,
whose name he claims he does not
remember, a letter purportedly coming
from San Carlos college students and
disclosing an amorous relationship
between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita
Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her
father, and thereafter would not agree to a
new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that
day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona.
Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with
her parents while Pastor returned to his
job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948
(Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her
husband's welfare, was not as endearing
as her previous letters when their love was
aflame.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of
a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew
it. She fondly accepted her being called a
"jellyfish." She was not prevented by her
parents from communicating with Pastor
(Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became
less frequent as the days passed. As of
June, 1948 the newlyweds were already
estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had
gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to
escape from the scandal that her marriage
stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer
filed for her a petition, drafted by then
Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her
marriage. She did not sign the petition
(Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed
without prejudice because of her non-
appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-
4").chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On 24 June 1950, without informing her
husband, she applied for a passport,
indicating in her application that she was
single, that her purpose was to study, and
she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that
she intended to return after two years. The
application was approved, and she left for
the United States. On 22 August 1950, she
filed a verified complaint for divorce
against the herein plaintiff in the Second
Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada in and for the County of Washoe,
on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character." On 21 October 1950,
a decree of divorce, "final and absolute",
was issued in open court by the said
tribunal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a
petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to
annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor
(Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954,
Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her
marriage (Exh. "D"-
2).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married
an American, Russell Leo Moran, in
Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten
children. She acquired American
citizenship on 8 August
1958.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had
initiated the proceedings at bar by a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956,
against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he
charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections,
and against the Roman Catholic Church,
for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage,
and asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed
a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present
husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her
parents denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter's acts, and
counterclaimed for moral
damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
The appealed judgment did not decree a
legal separation, but freed the plaintiff
from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife. It
allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto
Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees
against the plaintiff-appellant, to the
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff
resorted directly to this
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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The appellant ascribes, as errors of the
trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not
holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable
for damages and in dismissing the
complaint;.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr
obles virtual law library
2. In not holding the defendant parents
Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña
Mena Escaño liable for
damages;.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr
obles virtual law library
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and
requiring him to pay the damages to the
defendant parents on their counterclaims;
and.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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4. In dismissing the complaint and in
denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-
appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the
defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were
validly married to each other, from the
standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both
parties were then above the age of
majority, and otherwise qualified; and
both consented to the marriage, which was
performed by a Catholic priest (army
chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown
that said priest was not duly authorized
under civil law to solemnize
marriages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr
obles virtual law library
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical
authorization from the parish priest and
the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is
irrelevant in our civil law, not only because
of the separation of Church and State but
also because Act 3613 of the Philippine
Legislature (which was the marriage law in
force at the time) expressly provided that -
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential
requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and
consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing
officer was thus only a formal requirement,
and, therefore, not essential to give the
marriage civil effects,3 and this is
emphasized by section 27 of said marriage
act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal
requirements. No marriage shall be
declared invalid because of the absence of
one or several of the formal requirements
of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good
faith that the person who solemnized the
marriage was actually empowered to do
so, and that the marriage was perfectly
legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the
marriage (and hence the validity of their
marriage) will be presumed until the
contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee
Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note
here that in the case at bar, doubts as to
the authority of the solemnizing priest
arose only after the marriage, when
Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes
and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the
very act of Vicenta in abandoning her
original action for annulment and
subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff
was valid and
binding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that
when she contracted the marriage she was
under the undue influence of Pacita Noel,
whom she charges to have been in
conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even
granting, for argument's sake, the truth of
that contention, and assuming that
Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud
and undue influence, such vices did not
render her marriage ab initio void, but
merely voidable, and the marriage
remained valid until annulled by a
competent civil court. This was never
done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for
annulment in the Court of First Instance of
Misamis was dismissed for non-
prosecution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychan
robles virtual law library
It is equally clear from the record that the
valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez
and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting
and undissolved under Philippine law,
notwithstanding the decree of absolute
divorce that the wife sought and obtained
on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character." At
the time the divorce decree was issued,
Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still
a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386),
already in force at the time, expressly
provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or
to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon the citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in
force, does not admit absolute
divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in
fact does not even use that term, to
further emphasize its restrictive policy on
the matter, in contrast to the preceding
legislation that admitted absolute divorce
on grounds of adultery of the wife or
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710).
Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code
only provides for legal separation (Title IV,
Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that
case, it expressly prescribes that "the
marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art.
106, subpar.
1).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
For the Philippine courts to recognize and
give recognition or effect to a foreign
decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino
citizens could be a patent violation of the
declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of
Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes
the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, policy and good
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this
jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees
would, in effect, give rise to an irritating
and scandalous discrimination in favor of
wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those
members of our polity whose means do
not permit them to sojourn abroad and
obtain absolute divorces outside the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr
obles virtual law library
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that
appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have
appeared in the Nevada divorce court.
Primarily because the policy of our law
cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and
additionally, because the mere appearance
of a non-resident consort cannot confer
jurisdiction where the court originally had
none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil.
579).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
From the preceding facts and
considerations, there flows as a necessary
consequence that in this jurisdiction
Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as
valid; for her previous union to plaintiff
Tenchavez must be declared to be existent
and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that
her refusal to perform her wifely duties,
and her denial of consortium and her
desertion of her husband constitute in law
a wrong caused through her fault, for
which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art.
2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge
of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging
immorality against the husband constitute,
contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation
with Russell Leo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her
husband" from the standpoint of Philippine
Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation
under our law, on the basis of adultery"
(Revised Penal Code, Art.
333).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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The foregoing conclusions as to the
untoward effect of a marriage after an
invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court
on the subject, particularly those that were
rendered under our laws prior to the
approval of the absolute divorce act (Act
2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a
matter of legal history, our statutes did not
recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917,
when Act 2710 became effective; and the
present Civil Code of the Philippines, in
disregarding absolute divorces, in effect
merely reverted to the policies on the
subject prevailing before Act 2710. The
rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of
1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned,
are now, fully applicable. Of these, the
decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855,
is of particular interest. Said this Court in
that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court
must be ignored, it results that the
marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro,
celebrated in London in 1905, could not
legalize their relations; and the
circumstance that they afterwards passed
for husband and wife in Switzerland until
her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very
children to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected.
The right to inherit is limited to legitimate,
legitimated and acknowledged natural
children. The children of adulterous
relations are wholly excluded. The word
"descendants" as used in Article 941 of the
Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include
illegitimates born of adulterous relations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional
rights of the children, begotten from
Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the
invalid divorce, are not involved in the
case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for
the proposition that such union is
adulterous in this jurisdiction, and,
therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent
consort of the first marriage, that stands
undissolved in Philippine law. In not so
declaring, the trial court committed
error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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True it is that our ruling gives rise to
anomalous situations where the status of a
person (whether divorced or not) would
depend on the territory where the question
arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new
in the Philippines, and the answer to them
was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58
Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws
in the Philippine Islands are well known to
the members of the Legislature. It is the
duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of
divorce as written by Legislature if they
are constitutional. Courts have no right to
say that such laws are too strict or too
liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is,
therefore,
sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge
that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto
Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena
Escaño, alienated the affections of their
daughter and influenced her conduct
toward her husband are not supported by
credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor
Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity
toward him strikes us to be merely
conjecture and exaggeration, and are
belied by Pastor's own letters written
before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-
Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp.
270-274). In these letters he expressly
apologized to the defendants for
"misjudging them" and for the "great
unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive
blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery
and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted
to the Escaño house to visit and court
Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to
prove that he would not have been
accepted to marry Vicente had he openly
asked for her hand, as good manners and
breeding demanded. Even after learning of
the clandestine marriage, and despite their
shock at such unexpected event, the
parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged
that the marriage be recelebrated in strict
conformity with the canons of their religion
upon advice that the previous one was
canonically defective. If no recelebration of
the marriage ceremony was had it was not
due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his
wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to
proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño
did not seek to compel or induce their
daughter to assent to the recelebration but
respected her decision, or that they abided
by her resolve, does not constitute in law
an alienation of affections. Neither does
the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her
money while she was in the United States;
for it was natural that they should not wish
their daughter to live in penury even if
they did not concur in her decision to
divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-
132).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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There is no evidence that the parents of
Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided
and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she
appears to have acted independently, and
being of age, she was entitled to judge
what was best for her and ask that her
decisions be respected. Her parents, in so
doing, certainly cannot be charged with
alienation of affections in the absence of
malice or unworthy motives, which have
not been shown, good faith being always
presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or
Kin. - The law distinguishes between the
right of a parent to interest himself in the
marital affairs of his child and the absence
of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in
such affairs. However, such distinction
between the liability of parents and that of
strangers is only in regard to what will
justify interference. A parent isliable for
alienation of affections resulting from his
own malicious conduct, as where he
wrongfully entices his son or daughter to
leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable
unless he acts maliciously, without
justification and from unworthy motives.
He is not liable where he acts and advises
his child in good faith with respect to his
child's marital relations in the interest of
his child as he sees it, the marriage of his
child not terminating his right and liberty
to interest himself in, and be extremely
solicitous for, his child's welfare and
happiness, even where his conduct and
advice suggest or result in the separation
of the spouses or the obtaining of a
divorce or annulment, or where he acts
under mistake or misinformation, or where
his advice or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been held that
the parent is liable for consequences
resulting from recklessness. He may in
good faith take his child into his home and
afford him or her protection and support,
so long as he has not maliciously enticed
his child away, or does not maliciously
entice or cause him or her to stay away,
from his or her spouse. This rule has more
frequently been applied in the case of
advice given to a married daughter, but it
is equally applicable in the case of advice
given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging
Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted
efforts and pressured her to seek
annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling
them to recover damages. While this suit
may not have been impelled by actual
malice, the charges were certainly reckless
in the face of the proven facts and
circumstances. Court actions are not
established for parties to give vent to their
prejudices or
spleen.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
In the assessment of the moral damages
recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez
from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is
proper to take into account, against his
patently unreasonable claim for a million
pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage
was celebrated in secret, and its failure
was not characterized by publicity or
undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b)
that the parties never lived together; and
(c) that there is evidence that appellant
had originally agreed to the annulment of
the marriage, although such a promise
was legally invalid, being against public
policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While
appellant is unable to remarry under our
law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that
appellant entered into voluntarily and with
open eyes rather than of her divorce and
her second marriage. All told, we are of
the opinion that appellant should recover
P25,000 only by way of moral damages
and attorney's
fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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With regard to the P45,000 damages
awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto
Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court
below, we opine that the same are
excessive. While the filing of this
unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them
anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or
otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits
having become a common occurrence in
present society. What is important, and
has been correctly established in the
decision of the court below, is that said
defendants were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable
affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the
damages awarded to P5,000
only.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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Summing up, the Court rules:chanrobles
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(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep.
Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as
valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by
the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to
validity in the country;chanrobles virtual
law library
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife
and her co-habitation with a person other
than the lawful husband entitle the latter
to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;chanrobles
virtual law library
(3) That the desertion and securing of an
invalid divorce decree by one consort
entitles the other to recover
damages;chanrobles virtual law library
(4) That an action for alienation of
affections against the parents of one
consort does not lie in the absence of proof
of malice or unworthy motives on their
part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is
hereby modified as follows;chanrobles
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(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor
Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
separation from defendant Vicenta F.
Escaño;chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta
Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys' fees;chanrobles
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(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez
to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and
the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena
Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and
attorneys'
fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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Neither party to recover
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
__________________________________
__________________________________
_ acknowledged that he and petitioner had
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, Petitioner,
vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as
Presiding Judge of Branch CX,
Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD
UPTON Respondents.chanrobles virtual
law library
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and
Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van
Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984,
in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her
Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal
Order,
respectively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
The basic background facts are that
petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines
while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the
marriage, they established their residence
in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the
parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-
married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van
Dorn.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent
filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case
No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that
private respondent be declared with right
to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had
"no community property" as of June 11,
1982. The Court below denied the Motion
to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the
ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
The denial is now the subject of this
certiorari
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
Generally, the denial of a Motion to
Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and
is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to
question the propriety of an interlocutory
order of the trial Court. However, when a
grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted
capriciously and whimsically, then it
devolves upon this Court in a certiorari
proceeding to exercise its supervisory
authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of
time to go ahead with the
proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition
filed in this case within the exception, and
we have given it due
course.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl
es virtual law library
For resolution is the effect of the foreign
divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan
robles virtual law library
Petitioner contends that respondent is
estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court
that they had no community of property;
that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that
respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr
obles virtual law library
For his part, respondent avers that the
Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada
Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot,
especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha
nrobles virtual law library
For the resolution of this case, it is not
necessary to determine whether the
property relations between petitioner and
private respondent, after their marriage,
were upon absolute or relative community
property, upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the
parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl
es virtual law library
The Nevada District Court, which decreed
the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before
the Court during the trial of the case. It
also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No.
381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,
authorized his attorneys in the divorce
case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in
the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community
obligations. 3As explicitly stated in the
Power of Attorney he executed in favor of
the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W.
Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in
the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
You are hereby authorized to accept
service of Summons, to file an Answer,
appear on my behalf and do an things
necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the
following: chanrobles virtual law library
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the
ground of
incompatibility.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary c
hanrobles virtual law library
2. That there is no community of property
to be adjudicated by the
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
3. 'I'hat there are no community
obligations to be adjudicated by the
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx 4chanrobles virtual law library
There can be no question as to the validity
of that Nevada divorce in any of the States
of the United States. The decree is binding
on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce
is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction,
the same being contrary to local law and
public
policy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. 6 In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of
the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of
divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie
when thus severed as to one party, ceases
to bind either. A husband without a wife,
or a wife without a husband, is unknown to
the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty. that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he
is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
To maintain, as private respondent does,
that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are
to be
served.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl
es virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and
respondent Judge is hereby ordered to
dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case
No. 1075-P of his
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
Without
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova,
Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ.,
concur.
__________________________________
_____________________________
[G.R. NO. 162894 : February 26, 2008]
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL,
INC., Petitioner, v. STOCKTON W.
ROUZIE, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks the
reversal of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67001 and the dismissal of the civil case
filed by respondent against petitioner with
the trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the
following antecedents appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services,
Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the State of
Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an
American citizen, entered into a contract
whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of
services in several government projects in
the Philippines for an agreed remuneration
of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March
1992, respondent secured a service
contract with the Republic of the
Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the
dredging of rivers affected by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before
the Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit
against BMSI and Rust International, Inc.
(RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G.
Browning for alleged nonpayment of
commissions, illegal termination and
breach of employment contract.4 On 28
September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C.
Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering
BMSI and RUST to pay respondent's
money claims.5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the
NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and dismissed respondent's
complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case
to this Court but was dismissed in a
Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The
Resolution became final and executory on
09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a
resident of La Union, instituted an action
for damages before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The
Complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case No.
1192-BG, named as defendants herein
petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as
well as BMSI and RUST, the two
corporations impleaded in the earlier labor
case. The complaint essentially reiterated
the allegations in the labor case that BMSI
verbally employed respondent to negotiate
the sale of services in government projects
and that respondent was not paid the
commissions due him from the Pinatubo
dredging project which he secured on
behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred
that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner
itself had combined and functioned as one
company.
In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that
contrary to respondent's claim, it was a
foreign corporation duly licensed to do
business in the Philippines and denied
entering into any arrangement with
respondent or paying the latter any sum of
money. Petitioner also denied combining
with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of
assuming the alleged obligation of the said
companies.9 Petitioner also referred to the
NLRC decision which disclosed that per the
written agreement between respondent
and BMSI and RUST, denominated as
"Special Sales Representative Agreement,"
the rights and obligations of the parties
shall be governed by the laws of the State
of Connecticut.10 Petitioner sought the
dismissal of the complaint on grounds of
failure to state a cause of action and forum
non conveniensand prayed for damages by
way of compulsory counterclaim.11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing
Based on Affirmative Defenses and for
Summary Judgment12seeking the dismissal
of the complaint on grounds of forum non
conveniens and failure to state a cause of
action. Respondent opposed the same.
Pending the resolution of the omnibus
motion, the deposition of Walter Browning
was taken before the Philippine Consulate
General in Chicago.13
In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000,
the RTC denied petitioner's omnibus
motion. The trial court held that the factual
allegations in the complaint, assuming the
same to be admitted, were sufficient for
the trial court to render a valid judgment
thereon. It also ruled that the principle
of forum non conveniens was inapplicable
because the trial court could enforce
judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines.15
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration16 of the order, which
17
motion was opposed by respondent. In
an Order dated 31 July 2001,18 the trial
court denied petitioner's motion. Thus, it
filed a Rule 65 Petition19 with the Court of
Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari and a writ of injunction to set
aside the twin orders of the trial court
dated 13 September 2000 and 31 July
2001 and to enjoin the trial court from
conducting further proceedings.20
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed Decision 21 denying
the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
It also denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in the assailed Resolution
issued on 10 March 2004.22
The appellate court held that although the
trial court should not have confined itself
to the allegations in the complaint and
should have also considered
evidence aliunde in resolving petitioner's
omnibus motion, it found the evidence
presented by petitioner, that is, the
deposition of Walter Browning, insufficient
for purposes of determining whether the
complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The appellate court also stated that it
could not rule one way or the other on the
issue of whether the corporations,
including petitioner, named as defendants
in the case had indeed merged together
based solely on the evidence presented by
respondent. Thus, it held that the issue
should be threshed out during
trial.23 Moreover, the appellate court
deferred to the discretion of the trial court
when the latter decided not to desist from
assuming jurisdiction on the ground of the
inapplicability of the principle of forum non
conveniens.
Hence, this petition raising the following
issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE
24
GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.
Incidentally, respondent failed to file a
comment despite repeated notices. The
Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel on
record for respondent, manifested that the
lawyer handling the case, Atty. Rogelio
Karagdag, had severed relations with the
law firm even before the filing of the
instant petition and that it could no longer
find the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or
of respondent despite diligent efforts. In a
Resolution25dated 20 November 2006, the
Court resolved to dispense with the filing
of a comment.
The instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written
contract between respondent and BMSI
included a valid choice of law clause, that
is, that the contract shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut. It
also mentions the presence of foreign
elements in the dispute - namely, the
parties and witnesses involved are
American corporations and citizens and the
evidence to be presented is located outside
the Philippines - that renders our local
courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner
theorizes that the foreign elements of the
dispute necessitate the immediate
application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura, the 26
Court outlined three consecutive phases
involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-
of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction,
choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the
instances27 where the Court held that the
local judicial machinery was adequate to
resolve controversies with a foreign
element, the following requisites had to be
proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one
to which the parties may conveniently
resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as
to the law and the facts; and (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have the
power to enforce its decision.28
On the matter of jurisdiction over a
conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is
filed in a Philippine court and where the
court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the parties and the res, it may or
can proceed to try the case even if the
rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience
of the parties point to a foreign forum.
This is an exercise of sovereign
prerogative of the country where the case
29
is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law30 and by the
material allegations in the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein.31 Civil
Case No. 1192-BG is an action for
damages arising from an alleged breach of
contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the
action and the amount of damages prayed
are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon
the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner (as party defendant) was
acquired by its voluntary appearance in
court.32
That the subject contract included a
stipulation that the same shall be
governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut does not suggest that the
Philippine courts, or any other foreign
tribunal for that matter, are precluded
from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction
and choice of law are two distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it
is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the
merits of the case is fair to both
parties.33 The choice of law stipulation will
become relevant only when the
substantive issues of the instant case
develop, that is, after hearing on the
merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws
cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most
"convenient" or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioner's
averments of the foreign elements in the
instant case are not sufficient to oust the
trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a
case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly
considered as a matter of defense. While it
is within the discretion of the trial court to
abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this
ground, it should do so only after vital
facts are established, to determine
whether special circumstances require the
court's desistance.35
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
trial court, the Court of Appeals respected
its conclusion that it can assume
jurisdiction over the dispute
notwithstanding its foreign elements. In
the same manner, the Court defers to the
sound discretion of the lower courts
because their findings are binding on this
Court.
Petitioner also contends that the complaint
in Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed to state a
cause of action against petitioner. Failure
to state a cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of allegation in the
pleading.36 As a general rule, the
elementary test for failure to state a cause
of action is whether the complaint alleges
facts which if true would justify the relief
demanded.37
The complaint alleged that petitioner had
combined with BMSI and RUST to function
as one company. Petitioner contends that
the deposition of Walter Browning rebutted
this allegation. On this score, the
resolution of the Court of Appeals is
instructive, thus:
x x x Our examination of the deposition of
Mr. Walter Browning as well as other
documents produced in the hearing shows
that these evidence aliunde are not quite
sufficient for us to mete a ruling that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action.
Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not
substantial, convincing and conclusive
proofs that Raytheon Engineers and
Constructors, Inc. (REC) assumed the
warranty obligations of defendant Rust
International in the Makar Port Project in
General Santos City, after Rust
International ceased to exist after being
absorbed by REC. Other documents
already submitted in evidence are likewise
meager to preponderantly conclude that
Raytheon International, Inc., Rust
International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine
Service, Inc. have combined into one
company, so much so that Raytheon
International, Inc., the surviving company
(if at all) may be held liable for the
obligation of BMSI to respondent Rouzie
for unpaid commissions. Neither these
documents clearly speak otherwise.38
As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, the question of whether
petitioner, BMSI and RUST merged
together requires the presentation of
further evidence, which only a full-blown
trial on the merits can afford.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari is DENIED.The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
______________________________
G.R. No. 120077. October 13, 2000.]
THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND
MANILA HOTEL INTL.
LTD., Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ARBITER
CEFERINA J. DIOSANA AND MARCELO
G. SANTOS, Respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a petition
for certiorari 1 to annul the following
orders of the National Labor Relations
Commission (hereinafter referred to as
"NLRC") for having been issued without or
with excess jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion: 2 at
(1) Order of May 31, 1993. 3 Reversing
and setting aside its earlier resolution of
August 28, 1992. 4 The questioned order
declared that the NLRC, not the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration
(hereinafter referred to as "POEA"), had
jurisdiction over private respondent’s
complaint;
(2) Decision of December 15, 1994. 5
Directing petitioners to jointly and
severally pay private respondent twelve
thousand and six hundred dollars (US$
12,600.00) representing salaries for the
unexpired portion of his contract; three
thousand six hundred dollars
(US$3,600.00) as extra four months salary
for the two (2) year period of his contract,
three thousand six hundred dollars
(US$3,600.00) as "14th month pay" or a
total of nineteen thousand and eight
hundred dollars (US$19,800.00) or its
peso equivalent and attorney’s fees
amounting to ten percent (10%) of the
total award; and
(3) Order of March 30, 1995. 6 Denying
the motion for reconsideration of the
petitioners.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In May, 1988, private respondent Marcelo
Santos (hereinafter referred to as
"Santos") was an overseas worker
employed as a printer at the Mazoon
Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman.
Subsequently, in June 1988, he was
directly hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing,
People’s Republic of China and later
terminated due to retrenchment.
Petitioners are the Manila Hotel
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
"MHC") and the Manila Hotel International
Company, Limited (hereinafter referred to
as "MHICL").
When the case was filed in 1990, MHC was
still a government-owned and controlled
corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines.
MHICL is a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of Hong Kong. 7
MHC is an "incorporator" of MHICL, owning
50% of its capital stock. 8 Press.
By virtue of a "management agreement" 9
with the Palace Hotel (Wang Fu Company
Limited), MHICL 10 trained the personnel
and staff of the Palace Hotel at Beijing,
China.
Now the facts.
During his employment with the Mazoon
Printing Press in the Sultanate of Oman,
respondent Santos received a letter dated
May 2, 1988 from Mr. Gerhard R. Shmidt,
General Manager, Palace Hotel, Beijing,
China. Mr. Schmidt informed respondent
Santos that he was recommended by one
Nestor Buenio, a friend of his.
Mr. Shmidt offered respondent Santos the
same position as printer, but with a higher
monthly salary and increased benefits. The
position was slated to open on October 1,
1988. 11
On May 8, 1988, respondent Santos wrote
to Mr. Shmidt and signified his acceptance
of the offer.
On May 19, 1988, the Palace Hotel
Manager, Mr. Hans J. Henk mailed a ready
to sign employment contract to respondent
Santos. Mr. Henk advised respondent
Santos that if the contract was acceptable,
to return the same to Mr. Henk in Manila,
together with his passport and two
additional pictures for his visa to
China.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On May 30, 1988, respondent Santos
resigned from the Mazoon Printing Press,
effective June 30, 1988, under the pretext
that he was needed at home to help with
the family’s piggery and poultry business.
On June 4, 1988, respondent Santos wrote
the Palace Hotel and acknowledged Mr.
Henk’s letter. Respondent Santos enclosed
four (4) signed copies of the employment
contract (dated June 4, 1988) and notified
them that he was going to arrive in Manila
during the first week of July 1988.
The employment contract of June 4, 1988
stated that his employment would
commence September 1, 1988 for a period
of two years. 12 It provided for a monthly
salary of nine hundred dollars
(US$900.00) net of taxes, payable
fourteen (14) times a year. 13
On June 30, 1988, respondent Santos was
deemed resigned from the Mazoon Printing
On July 1, 1988, respondent Santos
arrived in Manila.
On November 5, 1988, respondent Santos
left for Beijing, China. He started to work
the Palace Hotel. 14
Subsequently, respondent Santos signed
an amended "employment agreement"
with the Palace Hotel, effective November
5, 1988. In the contract, Mr. Shmidt
represented the Palace Hotel. The Vice
President (Operations and Development)
of petitioner MHICL Miguel D. Cergueda
signed the employment agreement under
the word "noted" . Palace Hotel is still not operational and
From June 8 to 29, 1989, respondent
Santos was in the Philippines on vacation
leave. He returned to China and
reassumed his post on July 17,
1989.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On July 22, 1989, Mr. Shmidt’s Executive
Secretary, a certain Joanna suggested in a
handwritten note that respondent Santos
be given one (1) month notice of his
release from employment.
On August 10, 1989, the Palace Hotel
informed respondent Santos by letter
signed by Mr. Shmidt that his employment
at the Palace Hotel print shop would be
terminated due to business reverses
brought about by the political upheaval in
China. 15 We quote the letter: 16
"After the unfortunate happenings in China
and especially Beijing (referring to
Tiannamen Square incidents), our business
has been severely affected. To reduce
expenses, we will not open/operate
printshop for the time being.
"We sincerely regret that a decision like
this has to be made, but rest assured this
does in no way reflect your past
performance which we found up to our
expectations."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Should a turnaround in the business
happen, we will contact you directly and
give you priority on future
assignment."cralaw virtua1aw library
On September 5, 1989, the Palace Hotel
terminated the employment of respondent
Santos and paid all benefits due him,
including his plane fare back to the
Philippines.
On October 3, 1989, respondent Santos
was repatriated to the Philippines.
On October 24, 1989, respondent Santos,
through his lawyer, Atty. Ednave wrote Mr.
Shmidt, demanding full compensation
pursuant to the employment agreement.
On November 11, 1989, Mr. Shmidt
replied, to wit: 17
His service with the Palace Hotel, Beijing
was not abruptly terminated but we
followed the one-month notice clause and
Mr. Santos received all benefits due him.
"For your information the Print Shop at the
with a low business outlook, retrenchment
in various departments of the hotel is
going on which is a normal management
practice to control costs.
"When going through the latest
performance ratings, please also be "WHEREFORE, let the appealed Decision
advised that his performance was below be, as it is hereby, declared null and void
average and a Chinese National who is for want of jurisdiction. Complainant is
doing his job now shows a better hereby enjoined to file his complaint with
approach. the POEA.
"In closing, when Mr. Santos received the "SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
letter of notice, he hardly showed up for
work but still enjoyed free On September 18, 1992, respondent
accommodation/laundry/meals up to the Santos moved for reconsideration of the
day of his departure."cralaw virtua1aw afore-quoted resolution. He argued that
library the case was not cognizable by the POEA
as he was not an "overseas contract
On February 20, 1990, respondent Santos worker." 21
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
the Arbitration Branch, National Capital On May 31, 1993, the NLRC granted the
Region, National Labor Relations motion and reversed itself. The NLRC
Commission (NLRC). He prayed for an directed Labor Arbiter Emerson Tumanon
award of nineteen thousand nine hundred to hear the case on the question of
and twenty three dollars (US$19,923.00) whether private respondent was
as actual damages, forty thousand pesos retrenched or dismissed. 22
(P40,000.00) as exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees equivalent to 20% of the On January 13, 1994, Labor Arbiter
damages prayed for. The complaint named Tumanon completed the proceedings
MHC, MHICL, the Palace Hotel and Mr. based on the testimonial and documentary
Shmidt as respondents.chanrob1es virtua1 evidence presented to and heard by him.
1aw 1ibrary 23
The Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt were not Subsequently, Labor Arbiter Tumanon was
served with summons and neither re-assigned as trial Arbiter of the National
participated in the proceedings before the Capital Region, Arbitration Branch, and the
Labor Arbiter. 18 case was transferred to Labor Arbiter Jose
G. de Vera. 24
On June 27, 1991, Labor Arbiter Ceferina
J. Diosana, decided the case against On November 25, 1994, Labor Arbiter de
petitioners, thus: 19 Vera submitted his report. 25 He found
that respondent Santos was illegally
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby dismissed from employment and
rendered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph recommended that he be paid actual
damages equivalent to his salaries for the
"1. directing all the respondents to pay unexpired portion of his contract. 26
complainant jointly and severally;
On December 15, 1994, the NLRC ruled in
"a) $20,820 US dollars or its equivalent in favor of private respondent, to wit: 27
Philippine currency as unearned salaries;
"WHEREFORE, finding that the report and
"b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; recommendations of Arbiter de Vera are
supported by substantial evidence,
"c) P40,000.00 as exemplary damages; judgment is hereby rendered, directing the
and respondents to jointly and severally pay
complainant the following computed
"d) Ten (10) percent of the total award as contractual benefits: (1) US$12,600.00 as
attorney’s fees. salaries for the unexpired portion of the
parties’ contract; (2) US$3,600.00 as
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library extra four (4) months salary for the two
(2) years period (sic) of the parties’
On July 23, 1991, petitioners appealed to contract; (3) US$3,600.00 as "14th month
the NLRC, arguing that the POEA, not the pay" for the aforesaid two (2) years
NLRC had jurisdiction over the case. contract stipulated by the parties or a total
of US$19,800.00 or its peso equivalent,
On August 28, 1992, the NLRC plus (4) attorney’s fees of 10% of
promulgated a resolution, stating: 20 complainant’s total award.
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
On February 2, 1995, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration arguing that
Labor Arbiter de Vera’s recommendation
had no basis in law and in fact. 28
On March 30, 1995, the NLRC denied the
motion for reconsideration. 29
Hence, this petition. 30
On October 9, 1995, petitioners filed with
this Court an urgent motion for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction and a
motion for the annulment of the entry of
judgment of the NLRC dated July 31,
1995. 31
On November 20, 1995, the Court denied
petitioner’s urgent motion. The Court
required respondents to file their
respective comments, without giving due
course to the petition. 32
On March 8, 1996, the Solicitor General
filed a manifestation stating that after
going over the petition and its annexes,
they can not defend and sustain the
position taken by the NLRC in its assailed
decision and orders. The Solicitor General
prayed that he be excused from filing a
comment on behalf of the NLRC 33
On April 30,1996, private respondent
Santos filed his comment. 34
On June 26, 1996, the Court granted the
manifestation of the Solicitor General and
required the NLRC to file its own comment
to the petition. 35
On January 7, 1997, the NLRC filed its
comment.
The petition is meritorious.
I. Forum Non-Conveniens
The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient
forum.
We note that the main aspects of the case
transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and
the case involves purely foreign elements.
The only link that the Philippines has with
the case is that respondent Santos is a
Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and
MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all
cases involving our citizens can be tried
here.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The employment contract. — Respondent
Santos was hired directly by the Palace
Hotel, a foreign employer, through
correspondence sent to the Sultanate of
Oman, where respondent Santos was then
employed. He was hired without the
intervention of the POEA or any authorized
recruitment agency of the government. 36
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a
Philippine court or agency may assume
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to
do so provided: (1) that the Philippine
court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to; (2) that the
Philippine court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has
or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision. 37 The conditions are unavailing
in the case at bar.
Not Convenient. — We fail to see how the
NLRC is a convenient forum given that all
the incidents of the case — from the time
of recruitment, to employment to dismissal
occurred outside the Philippines. The
inconvenience is compounded by the fact
that the proper defendants, the Palace
Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the
Philippines. Neither .are they "doing
business in the Philippines." Likewise, the
main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk
are non-residents of the Philippines.
No power to determine applicable law. —
Neither can an intelligent decision be made
as to the law governing the employment
contract as such was perfected in foreign
soil. This calls to fore the application of the
principle of lex loci contractus (the law of
the place where the contract was made).
38
The employment contract was not
perfected in the Philippines. Respondent
Santos signified his acceptance by writing
a letter while he was in the Republic of
Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace
Hotel in the People’s Republic of China.
No power to determine the facts. —
Neither can the NLRC determine the facts
surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as
all acts complained of took place in Beijing,
People’s Republic of China. The NLRC was
not in a position to determine whether the
Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely
affected operations of the Palace Hotel as
to justify respondent Santos’
retrenchment.
Principle of effectiveness, no power to
execute decision. — Even assuming that a
proper decision could be reached by the
NLRC, such would not have any binding
effect against the employer, the Palace
Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation
incorporated under the laws of China and
was not even served with summons.
Jurisdiction over its person was not
acquired.
This is not to say that Philippine courts and
agencies have no power to solve
controversies involving foreign employers.
Neither are we saying that we do not have
power over an employment contract
executed in a foreign country. If Santos
were an "overseas contract worker", a
Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not
the NLRC, would protect him. 39 He is not
an "overseas contract worker" a fact which
he admits with conviction. 40
Even assuming that the NLRC was the
proper forum, even on the merits, the
NLRC’s decision cannot be sustained.
II. MHC Not Liable
Even if we assume two things: (1) that the
NLRC had jurisdiction over the case, and
(2) that MHICL was liable for Santos’
retrenchment, still MHC, as a separate and
distinct juridical entity cannot be held
liable.
True, MHC is an incorporator of MHICL and
owns fifty percent (50%) of its capital
stock. However, this is not enough to
pierce the veil of corporate fiction between
MHICL and MHC.
Piercing the veil of corporate entity is an
equitable remedy. It is resorted to when
the corporate fiction is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud or defend a crime. 41 It is done only
when a corporation is a mere alter ego or
business conduit of a person or another
corporation.
In Traders Royal Bank v. Court of Appeals,
42 we held that "the mere ownership by a
single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital
stock of a corporation is not of itself a
sufficient reason for disregarding the
fiction of separate corporate
personalities."cralaw virtua1aw library
The tests in determining whether the
corporate veil may be pierced are: First,
the defendant must have control or
complete domination of the other
corporation’s finances, policy and business
practices with regard to the transaction Second, and more importantly, there was
attacked. There must be proof that the no existing employer-employee
other corporation had no separate mind, relationship between Santos and MHICL. In
will or existence with respect the act determining the existence of an employer-
complained of. Second, control must be employee relationship, the following
used by the defendant to commit fraud or elements are considered: 51
wrong. Third, the aforesaid control or
breach of duty must be the proximate "(1) the selection and engagement of the
cause of the injury or loss complained of. employee;
The absence of any of the elements
prevents the piercing of the corporate veil. "(2) the payment of wages;
43
"(3) the power to dismiss; and
It is basic that a corporation has a
personality separate and distinct from "(4) the power to control employee’s
those composing it as well as from that of conduct."cralaw virtua1aw library
any other legal entity to which it may be
related. 44 Clear and convincing evidence MHICL did not have and did not exercise
is needed to pierce the veil of corporate any of the aforementioned powers. It did
fiction. 45 In this case, we find no not select respondent Santos as an
evidence to show that MHICL and MHC are employee for the Palace Hotel. He was
one and the same entity.chanrob1es referred to the Palace Hotel by his friend,
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary Nestor Buenio. MHICL did not engage
respondent Santos to work. The terms of
III. MHICL not Liable employment were negotiated and finalized
through correspondence between
Respondent Santos predicates MHICL’s respondent Santos, Mr. Schmidt and Mr.
liability on the fact that MHICL "signed" his Henk, who were officers and
employment contract with the Palace representatives of the Palace Hotel and not
Hotel. This fact fails to persuade us. MHICL. Neither did respondent Santos
adduce any proof that MHICL had the
First, we note that the Vice President power to control his conduct. Finally, it
(Operations and Development) of MHICL, was the Palace Hotel, through Mr. Schmidt
Miguel D. Cergueda signed the and not MHICL that terminated respondent
employment contract as a mere witness. Santos’ services.
He merely signed under the word "noted" .
Neither is there evidence to suggest that
When one "notes" a contract, one is not MHICL was a "labor-only contractor." 52
expressing his agreement or approval, as a There is no proof that MHICL "supplied"
party would. 46 In Sichangco v. Board of respondent Santos or even referred him
Commissioners of Immigration, 47 the for employment to the Palace Hotel.
Court recognized that the term "noted"
means that the person so noting has Likewise, there is no evidence to show that
merely taken cognizance of the existence the Palace Hotel and MHICL are one and
of an act or declaration, without exercising the same entity. The fact that the Palace
a judicious deliberation or rendering a Hotel is a member of the "Manila Hotel
decision on the matter. Group" is not enough to pierce the
corporate veil between MHICL and the
Mr. Cergueda merely signed the Palace Hotel.
"witnessing part" of the document. The
"witnessing part" of the document is that IV. Grave Abuse of Discretion
which, "in a deed or other formal
instrument is that part which comes after Considering that the NLRC was forum non-
the recitals, or where there are no recitals, conveniens and considering further that no
after the parties (Emphasis ours)." 48 As employer-employee relationship existed
opposed to a party to a contract, a witness between MHICL, MHC and respondent
is simply one who, "being present, Santos, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana
personally sees or perceives a thing; a clearly had no jurisdiction over
beholder, a spectator, or eyewitness." 49 respondent’s claim in NLRC NCR Case No.
One who "notes" something just makes a 00-02-01058-90.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
"brief written statement" 50 a 1ibrary
memorandum or observation.
Labor Arbiters have exclusive and original
jurisdiction only over the following: 53
"1. Unfair labor practice cases;
"2. Termination disputes;
"3. If accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement, those cases that workers
may file involving wages, rates of pay,
hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
"4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary
and other forms of damages arising from
employer-employee relations;
"5 Cases arising from any violation of
Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving legality of strikes and
lockouts; and
"6. Except claims for Employees
Compensation, Social Security, Medicare
and maternity benefits, all other claims,
arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
regardless of whether accompanied with a
claim for reinstatement."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In all these cases, an employer-employee
relationship is an indispensable
jurisdictional requirement.
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the
NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code
is limited to disputes arising from an
employer-employee relationship which can
be resolved by reference to the Labor
Code, or other labor statutes, or their
collective bargaining agreements. 54
"To determine which body has jurisdiction
over the present controversy, we rely on
the sound judicial principle that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by law
and is determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted therein." 55
The lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
was obvious from the allegations of the
complaint. His failure to dismiss the case
amounts to grave abuse of discretion. 56
V. The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS
the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the
orders and resolutions of the National
Labor Relations Commission dated May 31,
1993, December 15, 1994 and March 30,
1995 in NLRC NCR CA No. 002101-91
(NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01058-90).
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, Pardo
and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
__________________________________
________________________
G.R. NO. 149177 : November 23,
2007]
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON
ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,
LTD., Petitioners, v. MINORU
KITAMURA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the April 18, 2001
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 60827, and the July 25,
2001 Resolution2denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon
Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd.
(Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm
providing technical and management
support in the infrastructure projects of
foreign governments,3 entered into an
Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA)
with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a
Japanese national permanently residing in
the Philippines.4 The agreement provides
that respondent was to extend professional
services to Nippon for a year starting on
April 1, 1999.5 Nippon then assigned
respondent to work as the project
manager of the Southern Tagalog Access
Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines,
following the company's consultancy
contract with the Philippine Government.6
When the STAR Project was near
completion, the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged the
consultancy services of Nippon, on January
28, 2000, this time for the detailed
engineering and construction supervision
of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement
(BBRI) Project.7 Respondent was named as
the project manager in the contract's
Appendix 3.1.8
On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro
Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for
its International Division, informed
respondent that the company had no more
intention of automatically renewing his
ICA. His services would be engaged by the
company only up to the substantial
completion of the STAR Project on March
31, 2000, just in time for the ICA's
expiry.9
Threatened with impending
unemployment, respondent, through his
lawyer, requested a negotiation conference
and demanded that he be assigned to the
BBRI project. Nippon insisted that
respondent's contract was for a fixed term
that had already expired, and refused to
negotiate for the renewal of the ICA.10
As he was not able to generate a positive
response from the petitioners, respondent
consequently initiated on June 1, 2000
Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific
performance and damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.11
For their part, petitioners, contending that
the ICA had been perfected in Japan and
executed by and between Japanese
nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. They asserted that
the claim for improper pre-termination of
respondent's ICA could only be heard and
ventilated in the proper courts of Japan
following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus.12
In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the
DPWH approved Nippon's request for the
replacement of Kitamura by a certain Y.
Kotake as project manager of the BBRI
Project.13
On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our
ruling in Insular Government v.
Frank14 that matters connected with the
performance of contracts are regulated by
the law prevailing at the place of
performance,15 denied the motion to
dismiss.16 The trial court subsequently
denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration,17 prompting them to file
with the appellate court, on August 14,
2000, their first Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 [docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 60205].18 On August 23,
2000, the CA resolved to dismiss the
petition on procedural grounds'for lack of
statement of material dates and for
insufficient verification and certification
against forum shopping.19 An Entry of
Judgment was later issued by the appellate
court on September 20, 2000.20
Aggrieved by this development, petitioners
filed with the CA, on September 19, 2000,
still within the reglementary period,
a secondPetition for Certiorari under Rule
65 already stating therein the material
dates and attaching thereto the proper
verification and certification. This second
petition, which substantially raised the
same issues as those in the first, was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827.21
Ruling on the merits of the second
petition, the appellate court rendered the
assailed April 18, 2001 Decision 22 finding
no grave abuse of discretion in the trial
court's denial of the motion to dismiss. The
CA ruled, among others, that the principle
of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable
to the case, because nowhere in the
pleadings was the validity of the written
agreement put in issue. The CA thus
declared that the trial court was correct in
applying instead the principle of lex loci
solutionis.23
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the CA in the
assailed July 25, 2001 Resolution. 24
Remaining steadfast in their stance despite
the series of denials, petitioners instituted
the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari25imputing the following errors
to the appellate court:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
TRIAL COURT VALIDLY EXERCISED
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT
CONTROVERSY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE CONTRACT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS ENTERED INTO
BY AND BETWEEN TWO JAPANESE
NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN THE
JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND EXECUTED IN
TOKYO, JAPAN.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN OVERLOOKING THE
NEED TO REVIEW OUR ADHERENCE TO
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI
SOLUTIONIS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENT[S] IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAWS.26
The pivotal question that this Court is
called upon to resolve is whether the
subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine
courts in civil cases for specific
performance and damages involving
contracts executed outside the country by
foreign nationals may be assailed on the
principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex
contractus, the "state of the most
significant relationship rule," or forum non
conveniens.
However, before ruling on this issue, we
must first dispose of the procedural
matters raised by the respondent.
Kitamura contends that the finality of the
appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 60205 has already barred the filing of
the second petition docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 60827 (fundamentally raising the
same issues as those in the first one) and
the instant Petition for Review thereof.
We do not agree. When the CA dismissed
CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 on account of the
petition's defective certification of non-
forum shopping, it was a dismissal without
prejudice.27 The same holds true in the
CA's dismissal of the said case due to
defects in the formal requirement of
verification28 and in the other requirement
in Rule 46 of the Rules of Court on the
statement of the material dates.29 The
dismissal being without prejudice,
petitioners can re-file the petition, or file a
second petition attaching thereto the
appropriate verification and certification as
they, in fact did and stating therein the
material dates, within the prescribed
period30 in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said
Rules.31
The dismissal of a case without prejudice
signifies the absence of a decision on the
merits and leaves the parties free to
litigate the matter in a subsequent action
as though the dismissed action had not
been commenced. In other words, the
termination of a case not on the merits
does not bar another action involving the
same parties, on the same subject matter
and theory.32
Necessarily, because the said dismissal is
without prejudice and has no res
judicataeffect, and even if petitioners still
indicated in the verification and
certification of the
second certiorari petition that the first had
already been dismissed on procedural
grounds,33 petitioners are no longer
required by the Rules to indicate in their
certification of non-forum shopping in the
instant Petition for Review of the
second certioraripetition, the status of the
aforesaid first petition before the CA. In
any case, an omission in the certificate of
non-forum shopping about any event that
will not constitute res judicata and litis
pendentia, as in the present case, is not a
fatal defect. It will not warrant the
dismissal and nullification of the entire
proceedings, considering that the evils
sought to be prevented by the said
certificate are no longer present.34
The Court also finds no merit in
respondent's contention that petitioner
Hasegawa is only authorized to verify and
certify, on behalf of Nippon,
the certiorari petition filed with the CA and
not the instant petition. True, the
Authorization35 dated September 4, 2000,
which is attached to the
second certiorari petition and which is also
attached to the instant Petition for Review,
is limited in scope its wordings indicate
that Hasegawa is given the authority to
sign for and act on behalf of the company
only in the petition filed with the appellate
court, and that authority cannot extend to
the instant Petition for Review .36 In a
plethora of cases, however, this Court has
liberally applied the Rules or even
suspended its application whenever a
satisfactory explanation and a subsequent
fulfillment of the requirements have been
made.37 Given that petitioners herein
sufficiently explained their misgivings on
this point and appended to their Reply38 an
updated Authorization39 for Hasegawa to
act on behalf of the company in the instant
petition, the Court finds the same as
sufficient compliance with the Rules.
However, the Court cannot extend the
same liberal treatment to the defect in the
verification and certification. As
respondent pointed out, and to which we
agree, Hasegawa is truly not authorized to
act on behalf of Nippon in this case. The
aforesaid September 4, 2000 Authorization
and even the subsequent August 17, 2001
Authorization were issued only by Nippon's
president and chief executive officer, not
by the company's board of directors. In
not a few cases, we have ruled that
corporate powers are exercised by the
board of directors; thus, no person, not
even its officers, can bind the corporation,
in the absence of authority from the
board.40Considering that Hasegawa
verified and certified the petition only on
his behalf and not on behalf of the other
petitioner, the petition has to be denied
pursuant to Loquias v. Office of the
Ombudsman.41 Substantial compliance will
not suffice in a matter that demands strict
observance of the Rules.42 While technical
rules of procedure are designed not to
frustrate the ends of justice, nonetheless,
they are intended to effect the proper and
orderly disposition of cases and effectively
prevent the clogging of court dockets.43
Further, the Court has observed that
petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65
petition to question the trial court's denial
of their motion to dismiss. It is a well-
established rule that an order denying a
motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and
cannot be the subject of the extraordinary
Petition for Certiorari or mandamus. The
appropriate recourse is to file an answer
and to interpose as defenses the
objections raised in the motion, to proceed
to trial, and, in case of an adverse
decision, to elevate the entire case by
appeal in due course.44 While there are
recognized exceptions to this
rule,45 petitioners' case does not fall
among them.
This brings us to the discussion of the
substantive issue of the case.
Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an
inconvenient forum, petitioners question
its jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil
case for specific performance and damages
filed by the respondent. The ICA subject of
the litigation was entered into and
perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese
nationals, and written wholly in the
Japanese language. Thus, petitioners posit
that local courts have no substantial
relationship to the parties46following the
[state of the] most significant relationship
rule in Private International Law.47
The Court notes that petitioners adopted
an additional but different theory when
they elevated the case to the appellate
court. In the Motion to Dismiss48 filed with
the trial court, petitioners never contended
that the RTC is an inconvenient forum.
They merely argued that the applicable law
which will determine the validity or
invalidity of respondent's claim is that of
Japan, following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus.49 While
not abandoning this stance in their petition
before the appellate court, petitioners
on certiorari significantly invoked the
defense of forum non conveniens.50 On
Petition for Review before this Court,
petitioners dropped their other arguments,
maintained the forum non
conveniens defense, and introduced their
new argument that the applicable principle
is the [state of the] most significant
relationship rule.51
Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined
to deny this petition merely on the basis of
the change in theory, as explained
in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of
Iloilo.52 We only pointed out petitioners'
inconstancy in their arguments to
emphasize their incorrect assertion of
conflict of laws principles.
To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of
conflicts problems, three consecutive
phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of
law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Corresponding to these phases
are the following questions: (1) Where can
or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which
law will the court apply? and (3) Where
can the resulting judgment be enforced?53
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law
are two distinct concepts.54Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of
law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to
both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a
state constitutional authority to apply
forum law. While jurisdiction and the
choice of the lex fori will often coincide,
the "minimum contacts" for one do not
always provide the necessary "significant
contacts" for the other.55 The question of
whether the law of a state can be applied
to a transaction is different from the
question of whether the courts of that
state have jurisdiction to enter a
judgment.56
In this case, only the first phase is at issue
jurisdiction.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects.
For a court to validly exercise its power to
adjudicate a controversy, it must have
jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the
petitioner, over the defendant or the
respondent, over the subject matter, over
the issues of the case and, in cases
involving property, over the res or the
thing which is the subject of the
litigation.57In assailing the trial court's
jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually
referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which establishes and
organizes the court. It is given only by law
and in the manner prescribed by law.58 It
is further determined by the allegations of
the complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted therein.59 To succeed in its
motion for the dismissal of an action for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the claim,60 the movant must show that
the court or tribunal cannot act on the
matter submitted to it because no law
grants it the power to adjudicate the
claims.61
In the instant case, petitioners, in their
motion to dismiss, do not claim that the
trial court is not properly vested by law
with jurisdiction to hear the subject
controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-
0264 for specific performance and
damages is one not capable of pecuniary
estimation and is properly cognizable by
the RTC of Lipa City.62 What they rather
raise as grounds to question subject
matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex
loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and
the "state of the most significant
relationship rule."
The Court finds the invocation of these
grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of
the place of the ceremony"63or the law of
the place where a contract is made.64 The
doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci
contractus means the "law of the place
where a contract is executed or to be
performed."65 It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the
contract66 and it may pertain to the law
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or
the law intended by them either expressly
or implicitly.67 Under the "state of the most
significant relationship rule," to ascertain
what state law to apply to a dispute, the
court should determine which state has the
most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties. In a case
involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made,
was negotiated, was to be performed, and
the domicile, place of business, or place of
incorporation of the parties.68 This rule
takes into account several contacts and
evaluates them according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular
issue to be resolved.69
Since these three principles in conflict of
laws make reference to the law applicable
to a dispute, they are rules proper for the
second phase, the choice of law.70 They
determine which state's law is to be
applied in resolving the substantive issues
of a conflicts problem.71 Necessarily, as the
only issue in this case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not
only inapplicable but also not yet called
for.
Further, petitioners' premature invocation
of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the
fact that they have not yet pointed out any
conflict between the laws of Japan and
ours. Before determining which law should
apply, first there should exist a conflict of
laws situation requiring the application of
the conflict of laws rules.72 Also, when the
law of a foreign country is invoked to
provide the proper rules for the solution of
a case, the existence of such law must be
pleaded and proved.73
It should be noted that when a conflicts
case, one involving a foreign element, is
brought before a court or administrative
agency, there are three alternatives open
to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss
the case, either because of lack of
jurisdiction or refusal to assume
jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume
jurisdiction over the case and apply the
internal law of the forum; or (3) assume
jurisdiction over the case and take into
account or apply the law of some other
State or States.74The court's power to hear
cases and controversies is derived from
the Constitution and the laws. While it may
choose to recognize laws of foreign
nations, the court is not limited by foreign
sovereign law short of treaties or other
formal agreements, even in matters
regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.75
Neither can the other ground raised, forum
non conveniens,76 be used to deprive the
trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it
is not a proper basis for a motion to
dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court does not include it as a
ground.77 Second, whether a suit should
be entertained or dismissed on the basis of
the said doctrine depends largely upon the
facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court.78 In this case, the RTC decided
to assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety
of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination; hence,
this conflicts principle is more properly
considered a matter of defense.79
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law
with the power to entertain and hear the
civil case filed by respondent and the
grounds raised by petitioners to assail that
jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and
appellate courts correctly denied the
petitioners' motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
__________________________________
____
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, Petitioner, v. MARIA
PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI
MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
107, Quezon City, through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on a pure question of law.
The petition assails the Order1 dated 31
January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No.
Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2
March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the
petition for “Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)” based on improper venue and
the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru
Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a
Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese,
Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they
were able to reestablish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground
of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki
filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
“Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage).” Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4)
and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of
the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition,
the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing
the case from its active civil docket.7 The
RTC cited the following provisions of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC):cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
x x x x
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed
in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior
to the date of filing, or in the case of a
non-resident respondent, where he may be
found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further
explanation, that the petition was in “gross
violation” of the above provisions. The trial
court based its dismissal on Section 5(4)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides
that “[f]ailure to comply with any of the
preceding requirements may be a ground
for immediate dismissal of the
petition.”8 Apparently, the RTC took the
view that only “the husband or the wife,”
in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can
file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be
reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil
actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for
recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which “seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular fact,”9 and
not a civil action which is “for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.” 10 In
other words, the petition in the RTC sought
to establish (1) the status and concomitant
rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband
and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition
of the Japanese Family Court judgment
declaring the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara as void on the ground of
bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore
entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that “a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.” To apply Section
2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted
to sue. In the words of Fujiki, “[i]t is not,
of course, difficult to realize that the party
interested in having a bigamous marriage
declared a nullity would be the husband in
the prior, pre-existing marriage.”14 Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Rule 108 is the “procedural
implementation” of the Civil Register Law
(Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413
of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law
imposes a duty on the “successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree
of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or
annulled marriage was
solemnized.”17Section 2 of Rule 108
provides that entries in the civil registry
relating to “marriages,” “judgments of
annulments of marriage” and “judgments
declaring marriages void from the
beginning” are subject to cancellation or
correction.18 The petition in the RTC
sought (among others) to annotate the
judgment of the Japanese Family Court on
the certificate of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the
RTC also asserted that the trial court
“gravely erred” when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper
venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the
concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss
a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held
that the “trial court cannot pre-empt the
defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu
proprio dismissing the case.”20 Moreover,
petitioner alleged that the trial court
should not have “immediately dismissed”
the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC because he substantially
complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to
deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC
stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies
because the petitioner, in effect, prays for
a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its
two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue
under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a
“third person”22 in the proceeding because
he “is not the husband in the decree of
divorce issued by the Japanese Family
Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x.”23 On the other hand,
the RTC did not explain its ground of
impropriety of venue. It only said that
“[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue)
x x x as a ground for dismissal of this
case[,] it should be taken together with
the other ground cited by the Court x x x
which is Sec. 2(a) x x x.”24
The RTC further justified its motu
proprio dismissal of the petition based
on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The
Court in Braza ruled that “[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under
Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages x x x.”26 Braza emphasized that
the “validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by
the proper party, and not through a
collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x.”27
The RTC considered the petition as a
collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial
court held that this is a “jurisdictional
ground” to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and
certification against forum shopping of the
petition was not authenticated as required
under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC. Hence, this also warranted the
“immediate dismissal” of the petition under
the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the
Office of the Solicitor General and the
Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required
respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review.30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the
Solicitor General. Instead of a comment,
the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the
petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
“pronouncement that the petitioner failed
to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
x x x be set aside” and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General
argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the
first marriage, is an injured party who can
sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The
Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
Court explained:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be
expected to take action if he or she had
only discovered during the connubial
period that the marriage was bigamous,
and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the
bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in
such circumstance, the “injured spouse”
who should be given a legal remedy is the
one in a subsisting previous marriage. The
latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of
all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of
the spouse and the disregard of the prior
marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the
petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that “[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular
fact.”37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign
divorce decree, in the present case the
Japanese Family Court judgment also
affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino
citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule
108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure
to record “[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of
persons” in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other
words, “[t]he law requires the entry in the
civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences upon a
person’s legal capacity and status x x
x.”38 The Japanese Family Court judgment
directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be
proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued
that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108,
citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal
v. Bayadog40 which declared that “[t]he
validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked.”41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent
letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of
violence on Marinay.44On the other hand,
Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything
she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal
issues:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage “does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.”48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment
as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence
and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an
official publication or (2) a certification or
copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country
such as Japan, the certification may be
made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in
Japan and authenticated by the seal of
office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies
to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court
and the parties should follow its
provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition,51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public
53 54
prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the
trial55 and the judgment of the trial
court.56 This is absurd because it will
litigate the case anew. It will defeat the
purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is “to limit repetitive litigation on
claims and issues.”57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the
case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Rañada,58 this Court explained that “[i]f
every judgment of a foreign court were
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original
cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation.”59
A foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment
is not automatic. To extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that “[l]aws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.” This is the rule
of lex nationalii in private international
law. Thus, the Philippine State may
require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a
foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction
relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment
declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court provides that a foreign judgment or
final order against a person creates a
“presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors
in interest by a subsequent title.”
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court
states that “the judgment or final order
may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.” Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments.
Courts are not allowed to delve into the
merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven
in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled
on grounds external to its merits, i.e. ,
“want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.” The rule on limited review
embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well
as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng
Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64Divorce involves the dissolution
of a marriage, but the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While
the Philippines does not have a divorce
law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen
to remarry when his or her foreign spouse
obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow
Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void
from the beginning under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of
the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign
judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court provides that “[a]
special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life
which are recorded by the State pursuant
to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage,66 which the
State has an interest in recording. As
noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v.
Sto. Tomas this Court declared that “[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact.” 67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any
person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition
to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to
file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the
entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of
the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has
a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that
he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in
limited instances68) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his
property interests that arise by operation
of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in
marriage include the right to be supported
“in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family”70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive
rights protected by the Constitution,72 but
a spouse’s right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized
under Title III (“Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife”) of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
“diminish, increase, or modify” the
substantive right of the spouse to maintain
the integrity of his marriage.74 In any
case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC preserves this substantive right by
limiting the personality to sue to the
husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section
2(a) states that “[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife”75—it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code, bigamous marriages are void
from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage under
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which
declares bigamous marriages void from
the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen
has an interest in the prosecution and
prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a
criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the
wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior
spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing
crimes, he is also personally interested in
the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his
marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly
an injured party and is therefore interested
in the judgment of the suit.79Juliano-
Llave ruled that the prior spouse “is clearly
the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior
spouse.”80 Being a real party in interest,
the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order
to declare a bigamous marriage void. For
this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare
as a fact that such judgment is effective in
the Philippines. Once established, there
should be no more impediment to cancel
the entry of the bigamous marriage in the
civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this
Court held that a “trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages” in a
special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.81 Thus, the “validity of
marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in
a direct action” to nullify the
marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of
foreign judgment as a collateral attack on
the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does
not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the
spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses,85 and the investigation of
the public prosecutor to determine
collusion.86 A direct action for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
“where the corresponding civil registry is
located.”87 In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition
for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of
a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an
action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law.
The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can
R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
“[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.” In Republic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph
of Article 26 which is “to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse”89 under the laws of his
or her country. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only
a corrective measure to address the
anomaly that results from a marriage
between a Filipino, whose laws do not
allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose
laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists
in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry under the laws of his or her
country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of
the foreign divorce decree, which is
already effective in the country where it
was rendered. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v.
Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino
spouse “should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.”91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family
Code applies in a marriage between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage
on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to
declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
applies because the foreign spouse, after
the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under
the laws of his or her country. If the
foreign judgment is not recognized in the
Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated—the foreign spouse can
remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where
the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic
public policy. A critical difference between
the case of a foreign divorce decree and a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for
the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy as expressed
in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Filipino spouse has the option to undergo
full trial by filing a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage,
without prejudice to a criminal prosecution
for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments,
Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case
was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the “family rights and
duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is
a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of
a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the
Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only
determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding
public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove
an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule
39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already “presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties.”
Upon recognition of the foreign judgment,
this right becomes conclusive and the
judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the
civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is a subsequent event that establishes a
new status, right and fact92 that needs to
be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise,
there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is not a ground for extinction of criminal
liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
“[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philippine archipelago.”
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is
inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the
need to address the questions on venue
and the contents and form of the petition
under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon
City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with
this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
__________________________________
__________________________________
______
G. R. No. 142820 - June 20, 2003
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, Petitioner,
vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ,
HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-
SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati
RTC, Branch 149, Respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
At the core of the present controversy are
issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion
allegedly committed by public respondent
and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional
trial court, in matters that spring from a
divorce decree obtained abroad by
petitioner.
In this special civil action for certiorari,
petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated
September 30, 1999 of public respondent
Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding
Judge of Makati Regional Trial
Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-
1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage,
and (b) the order3 dated March 31, 2000
denying his motion for reconsideration.
The assailed orders partially set aside the
trial courts order dismissing Civil Case No.
96-1389, for the purpose of resolving
issues relating to the property settlement
of the spouses and the custody of their
children.
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German
citizen and resident of Germany, married
private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981
in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine on November 18, 1981 and
October 25, 1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent
filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,6 but it
was denied by the trial court in its
order7 dated May 28, 1997.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but was also denied in
an order8dated August 13, 1997. On
September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the
appellate court denied the petition and
remanded the case to the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of
divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on
December 16, 1997.
The decree provides in part:
[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-
Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled
through Judge van Buiren of the Court of
First Instance on the basis of the oral
proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
The marriage of the Parties contracted on
11 December 1980 before the Civil
Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby
dissolved.
The parental custody for the children
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25
October 1987
is granted to the father.
The litigation expenses shall be assumed
by the Parties.9
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a
Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999
on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action or suit as a decree of divorce had
already been promulgated dissolving the
marriage of petitioner and private
respondent.
On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga
issued an order granting petitioners
motion to dismiss. Private respondent filed
a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a
prayer that the case proceed for the
purpose of determining the issues of
custody of children and the distribution of
the properties between petitioner and
private respondent.
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed
by the petitioner on the ground that there
is nothing to be done anymore in the
instant case as the marital tie between
petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent
Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already
been severed by the decree of divorce
promulgated by the Court of First Instance
of Hamburg, Germany on December 16,
1997 and in view of the fact that said
decree of divorce had already been
recognized by the RTC in its order of July
14, 1999, through the implementation of
the mandate of Article 26 of the Family
Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine
law.
On September 30, 1999, respondent judge
issued the assailed order partially setting
aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the
purpose of tackling the issues of property
relations of the spouses as well as support
and custody of their children. The
pertinent portion of said order provides:
Acting on the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Order dated July
14, 1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel
which was opposed by respondent and
considering that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code was included
as an amendment thru Executive Order
227, to avoid the absurd situation of a
Filipino as being still married to his or her
alien spouse though the latter is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse because
he/she had obtained a divorce abroad
which is recognized by his/her national
law, and considering further the effects of
the termination of the marriage under
Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of
the same Code, which include the
dissolution of the property relations of the
spouses, and the support and custody of
their children, the Order dismissing this
case is partially set aside with respect to
these matters which may be ventilated in
this Court.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner filed a timely motion for
reconsideration on October 19, 1999,
which was denied by respondent judge in
an order dated March 31, 2000.12
Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of
the trial court and grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent judge.
He cites as grounds for his petition the
following:
1. Partially setting aside the order dated
July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case
is not allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.13
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by
her motion for Partial Reconsideration had
recognized and admitted the Divorce
Decision obtained by her ex-husband in
Hamburg, Germany.14
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by
the Honorable Court as there are no
conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for
Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce
petition, and the custody of the children
had already been awarded to Petitioner
Wolfgang Roehr.15
Pertinent in this case before us are the
following issues:
1. Whether or not respondent judge
gravely abused her discretion in issuing
her order dated September 30, 1999,
which partially modified her order dated
July 14, 1999; and
2. Whether or not respondent judge
gravely abused her discretion when she
assumed and retained jurisdiction over the
present case despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce
decree from a German court.
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that
the assailed order of respondent judge is
completely inconsistent with her previous
order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule
16, Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides:
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the
hearing, the court may dismiss the action
or claim, deny the motion, or order the
amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of
the motion for the reason that the ground
relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state
clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner avers that a courts action on a
motion is limited to dismissing the action
or claim, denying the motion, or ordering
the amendment of the pleading.
Private respondent, on her part, argues
that the RTC can validly reconsider its
order dated July 14, 1999 because it had
not yet attained finality, given the timely
filing of respondents motion for
reconsideration.
Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in
relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or
reconsideration.The trial court may set
aside the judgment or final order and
grant a new trial, upon such terms as may
be just, or may deny the motion. If the
court finds that excessive damages have
been awarded or that the judgment or
final order is contrary to the evidence or
law, it may amend such judgment or final
order accordingly.
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or
reconsideration.If the grounds for a motion
under this Rule appear to the court to
affect the issues as to only a part, or less
than all of the matters in controversy, or
only one, or less than all, of the parties to
it, the court may order a new trial or grant
reconsideration as to such issues if
severable without interfering with the
judgment or final order upon the rest.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a
judge can order a partial reconsideration of
a case that has not yet attained finality.
Considering that private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration within the
reglementary period, the trial court's
decision of July 14, 1999 can still be
modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of
Appeals,16 we held that the court could
modify or alter a judgment even after the
same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its
decision unjust and inequitable, as where
certain facts and circumstances justifying
or requiring such modification or alteration
transpired after the judgment has become
final and executory17and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice
or when supervening events warrant
it.18 In our view, there are even more
compelling reasons to do so when, as in
this case, judgment has not yet attained
finality.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims
that respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion when she partially set
aside her order dated July 14, 1999,
despite the fact that petitioner has already
obtained a divorce decree from the Court
of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany.
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of
Appeals,21 we consistently held that a
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may
be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. Relevant to
the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera,22 where this Court specifically
recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained by a German citizen in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany.
We held in Pilapilthat a foreign divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by
the German court dated December 16,
1997 has not been challenged by either of
the parties. In fact, save for the issue of
parental custody, even the trial court
recognized said decree to be valid and
binding, thereby endowing private
respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus,
the present controversy mainly relates to
the award of the custody of their two
children, Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained
by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the
legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care
and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.23 Before our
courts can give the effect of res judicata to
a foreign judgment, such as the award of
custody to petitioner by the German court,
it must be shown that the parties opposed
to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of
Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The
effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific
thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the
title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a
person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be
repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
It is essential that there should be an
opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to
actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as
such, is subject to proof to the contrary.24
In the present case, it cannot be said that
private respondent was given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of
the German court so that there is basis for
declaring that judgment as res
judicata with regard to the rights of
petitioner to have parental custody of their
two children. The proceedings in the
German court were summary. As to what
was the extent of private respondents
participation in the proceedings in the
German court, the records remain unclear.
The divorce decree itself states that
neither has she commented on the
proceedings25 nor has she given her
opinion to the Social Services
Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was
represented by two lawyers, private
respondent had no counsel to assist her in
said proceedings.27 More importantly, the
divorce judgment was issued to petitioner
by virtue of the German Civil Code
provision to the effect that when a couple
lived separately for three years, the
marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved.
The decree did not touch on the issue as to
who the offending spouse was. Absent any
finding that private respondent is unfit to
obtain custody of the children, the trial
court was correct in setting the issue for
hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education
mindful of the best interests of the
children. This is in consonance with the
provision in the Child and Youth Welfare
Code that the childs welfare is always the
paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody. 28
On the matter of property relations,
petitioner asserts that public respondent
exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction
when she claimed cognizance of the issue
concerning property relations between
petitioner and private respondent. Private
respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14
of her petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with
the RTC of Makati, subject of this case,
that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have
not acquired any conjugal or community
property nor have they incurred any debts
during their marriage."29 Herein petitioner
did not contest this averment. Basic is the
rule that a court shall grant relief
warranted by the allegations and the
proof.30 Given the factual admission by the
parties in their pleadings that there is no
property to be accounted for, respondent
judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in
this case to resolve a matter no longer
deemed in controversy.
In sum, we find that respondent judge
may proceed to determine the issue
regarding the custody of the two children
born of the union between petitioner and
private respondent. Private respondent
erred, however, in claiming cognizance to
settle the matter of property relations of
the parties, which is not at issue.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued
on September 30, 1999 and March 31,
2000 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that
the trial court has jurisdiction over the
issue between the parties as to who has
parental custody, including the care,
support and education of the children,
namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine
Roehr. Let the records of this case be
remanded promptly to the trial court for
continuation of appropriate proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.
__________________________________
__________________________________
__________
G.R. No. 140288 October 23,
2006
ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE.,
LTD., petitioner,
vs.
GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS,
INC., respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Challenged in the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari are the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated July 30, 1999
and its Resolution dated September 29,
1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51134 setting
aside the Orders dated October 30, 1998
and December 16, 1998 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 117, Pasay City
in Civil Case No. 98-1389.
St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd.,
petitioner, is a foreign corporation based in
Singapore. It is engaged in the
manufacture, repair, and maintenance of
airplanes and aircrafts. Grand International
Airways, Inc., respondent, is a domestic
corporation engaged in airline operations.
Sometime in January 1996, petitioner and
respondent executed an "Agreement for
the Maintenance and Modification of Airbus
A 300 B4-103 Aircraft Registration No. RP-
C8882" (First Agreement). Under this
stipulation, petitioner agreed to undertake
maintenance and modification works on
respondent's aircraft. The parties agreed
on the mode and manner of payment by
respondent of the contract price, including
interest in case of default. They also
agreed that the "construction, validity and
performance thereof" shall be governed by
the laws of Singapore. They further agreed
to submit any suit arising from their
agreement to the non-exclusive
jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.
At about the same time, or on January 12,
1996, the parties verbally agreed that
petitioner will repair and undertake
maintenance works on respondent's other
aircraft, Aircraft No. RP-C8881; and that
the works shall be based on a General
Terms of Agreement (GTA). The GTA
terms are similar to those of their First
Agreement.
Petitioner undertook the contracted works
and thereafter promptly delivered the
aircrafts to respondent. During the period
from March 1996 to October 1997,
petitioner billed respondent in the total
amount of US$303,731.67 or
S$452,560.18. But despite petitioner's
repeated demands, respondent failed to
pay, in violation of the terms agreed upon.
On December 12, 1997, petitioner filed
with the High Court of the Republic of
Singapore an action for the sum of
S$452,560.18, including interest and
costs, against respondent, docketed as
Suit No. 2101. Upon petitioner's motion,
the court issued a Writ of Summons to be
served extraterritorially or outside
Singapore upon respondent. The court
sought the assistance of the sheriff of
Pasay City to effect service of the
summons upon respondent. However,
despite receipt of summons, respondent
failed to answer the claim.
On February 17, 1998, on motion of
petitioner, the Singapore High Court
rendered a judgment by default against
respondent.
On August 4, 1998, petitioner filed with
the RTC, Branch 117, Pasay City, a Petition
for Enforcement of Judgment, docketed as
Civil Case No. 98-1389.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Petition on two grounds: (1) the Singapore
High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over
its person; and (2) the foreign judgment
sought to be enforced is void for having
been rendered in violation of its right to
due process.
On October 30, 1998, the RTC denied
respondent's motion to dismiss, holding
that "neither one of the two grounds (of
Grand) is among the grounds for a motion
to dismiss under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure."
Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the RTC
in its Order dated December 16, 1998.
On February 15, 1999, respondent filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari assailing the RTC Order denying
its motion to dismiss. Respondent alleged
that the extraterritorial service of
summons on its office in the Philippines is
defective and that the Singapore court did
not acquire jurisdiction over its person.
Thus, its judgment sought to be enforced
is void. Petitioner, in its comment, moved
to dismiss the petition for being
unmeritorious.
On July 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals
issued its Decision granting the petition
and setting aside the Orders dated October
30, 1998 and December 16, 1998 of the
RTC "without prejudice to the right of
private respondent to initiate another
proceeding before the proper court to
enforce its claim." It found:
In the case at bar, the complaint does not
involve the personal status of plaintiff, nor
any property in which the defendant has a
claim or interest, or which the private
respondent has attached but purely an
action for collection of debt. It is a
personal action as well as an action in
personam, not an action in rem or quasi in
rem. As a personal action, the service of
summons should be personal or
substituted, not extraterritorial, in order to
confer jurisdiction on the court.
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied on
September 29, 1999.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
The issues to be resolved are: (1) whether
the Singapore High Court has acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent
by the service of summons upon its office
in the Philippines; and (2) whether the
judgment by default in Suit No. 2101 by
the Singapore High Court is enforceable in
the Philippines.
Generally, in the absence of a special
contract, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country;
however, under the rules of comity, utility
and convenience, nations have established
a usage among civilized states by which
final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in
different countries.1 Certainly, the
Philippine legal system has long ago
accepted into its jurisprudence and
procedural rules the viability of an action
for enforcement of foreign judgment, as
well as the requisites for such valid
enforcement, as derived from
internationally accepted doctrines. 2
The conditions for the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment in our
legal system are contained in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, thus:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. –
The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order
upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order
against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors
in interest by a subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order
may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment
or order against a person is merely
presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties. It may be repelled,
among others, by want of jurisdiction of
the issuing authority or by want of notice
to the party against whom it is enforced. sheriff,7 his deputy or other proper court
The party attacking a foreign judgment officer either personally by handing a copy
has the burden of overcoming the thereof to the defendant8 or by substituted
presumption of its validity.3 service.9 In this case, the Writ of
Summons issued by the Singapore High
Court was served upon respondent at its
Respondent, in assailing the validity of the office located at Mercure Hotel (formerly
judgment sought to be enforced, contends Village Hotel), MIA Road, Pasay City. The
that the service of summons is void and Sheriff's Return shows that it was received
that the Singapore court did not acquire on May 2, 1998 by Joyce T. Austria,
jurisdiction over it. Secretary of the General Manager of
respondent company.10 But respondent
completely ignored the summons, hence, it
Generally, matters of remedy and
procedure such as those relating to the was declared in default.
service of process upon a defendant are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law Considering that the Writ of Summons was
of the forum,4 which in this case is the law served upon respondent in accordance
of Singapore. Here, petitioner moved for with our Rules, jurisdiction was acquired
leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ by the Singapore High Court over its
of Summons outside Singapore. In an person. Clearly, the judgment of default
Order dated December 24, 1997, the rendered by that court against respondent
Singapore High Court granted "leave to is valid.
serve a copy of the Writ of Summons on
the Defendant by a method of service
authorized by the law of the Philippines for WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
service of any originating process issued The challenged Decision and Resolution of
by the Philippines at ground floor, APMC the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
Building, 136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa 51134 are set aside.
Street, 1229 Makati City, or elsewhere in
the Philippines."5 This service of summons
outside Singapore is in accordance with The RTC, Branch 117, Pasay City is
Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court hereby DIRECTED to hear Civil Case No.
19966 of Singapore, which provides. 98-1389 with dispatch.
(2) Where in accordance with these Rules, SO ORDERED.
an originating process is to be served on a
defendant in any country with respect to
Puno, J., Chairperson, Corona, Azcuna,
which there does not subsist a Civil and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Procedure Convention providing for service
in that country of process of the High
Court, the originating process may be
served –
a) through the government of that
country, where that government is willing
to effect service;
b) through a Singapore Consular authority
in that country, except where service
through such an authority is contrary to
the law of the country; or
c) by a method of service authorized
by the law of that country for service
of any originating process issued by
that country.
In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party
is acquired by service of summons by the