I.

Whether or not a motion to quash on the ground of violation of speedy

disposition of cases is tenable.

1. The fundamental law guarantees that “all persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies”.1
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all
proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice 2

2. It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of cases should be
understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical
3
reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. Jurisprudence dictates that
when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time was allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.4

3. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that a case for an violation of Section 8 of Republic
Act 6713 was filed in 2010 by a concerned citizen against the respondent before the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman to the Visayas (Ombudsman-Visayas) for the
alleged non-filing of his Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SALN) for the years
2009-2010. In 2011, the Ombudsman-Visayas found probable cause to charge the
respondent for violation of Section 8 of RA 6713 for the non-filing of his SALN.
However, the respondent, through his former counsel, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. It was only in 2016, that the Office of the Ombudsman- Central
Office issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. A period of 5 years
had already elapsed without the respondent being brought to trial.

1
Section 16, Article 3, The 1987 Constitution to the Republic of the Philippines

2
Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 723, 732.

3
Enriquez v. Office of the Ombudsman
4
Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila
 4. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that the
preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3,
5
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Under the Rules of Court, no complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the
prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city or the Ombudsman or his
6
deputy. The above-cited provisions readily reveal that there is no complete
resolution of a case under preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman approves
the investigating officer’s recommendation to either file or dismiss the complaint.
Therefore in the case at bar, the preliminary investigation was not terminated in 2011
upon the resolution of the resolution by the graft prosecutor finding probable cause to
charge the accused with the violation of Section 8 of RA 6713 but upon the 2016
resolution of the Ombudsman Central Office denying the motion for reconsideration
and approving the resolution of the graft prosecutor. It took a period of 5 years for the
termination of the preliminary investigation.

5. It is only correct for the respondent to claim that his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of cases was violated due to an inordinate delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation. Although the violation of the right to speedy disposition of
cases is not one of those textually enumerated in the grounds for a Motion to Quash
under Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the decisions
promulgated by the Supreme Court in the cases People of the Philippines vs
Honorable Sandiganbayan, First and Third Division, et al. 7and People of the
Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, Second Division et al 8 affirms that where there is an
an inordinate delay in resolving and terminating the preliminary investigation, the
prosecution is deemed ousted of authority to file the information and the quashing
thereof and the consequent dismissal of the case is in order. The Rules of Court

5
Section 4, Rule II of the Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990
6
Section 3, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
7
GR No. 188165
8
GR No. 189063
 provide that lack of authority by an officer to file an information is one of the grounds
upon which an information may be validly quashed. 9 In the present case, the delay in
the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman for
five years was unjustified and without cause. Thus divesting them of any authority to
file the information. Therefore, a motion to quash is proper on the ground that the
officer had no authority to file the information.

II. Whether or not a motion to quash is still proper notwithstanding the fact the
accused had already been arraigned.

1. The Rules of Court provides that the accused may move to quash the complaint
10
or information at any time before entering his plea. However due to the
prevailing circumstances, the respondent is qualified to avail of the exceptions
set forth in Section 9 of the Rule 117.11

2. Due to the inordinate delay caused by the Ombudsman to resolve and terminate
the preliminary investigation, it is deemed that the prosecutionn is divested of
authority to file the information. The filing of the information is necessary to
confer jurisdiction over the court of the subject-matter of the case as well as for
the judicial determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest in order
for the court to validly acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Therefore, being want of authority to file the information, we argue that there
was no information filed before any court of competent jurisdiction. This defect

9 Sec. 3(d) Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

10 Section 1, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

11 Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to
allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. (8)
 in the information cannot be corrected by amendment as contemplated by Section
4 of Rule 117.12

3. Section 9 of the Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that the failure of the accused to move for the quashal of the complaint or
information during the period allowed by law is deemed a waiver of all
objections except when one of the objections is based on the ground that the
court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged (subject-matter jurisdiction). In
the case at bar, the authority of the prosecution to file the information was
removed due to the violation of the respondent’s constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of cases arising from the inordinate delay in the resolution and
termination of the preliminary investigation. Thus, without such authority, the
information filed by the prosecution is void and does not confer to the court
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case. In a plethora of cases decided by
the Supreme Court, jurisdiction is defined as the authority of the court to hear
and determine cases filed before it. Wanting of such jurisdiction, the motion to
quash is proper as it qualifies under the exceptions provided for by the Rules.

12
Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information. — If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. (4a)