Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
135-174
I
The Noakhali riot which began on 10 October 1946 is generally
studied as a reaction to the Calcutta killings of 16 August 1946.
But it had certain characterstics which make it imperative to
study it differently. What made the Noakhali riot so distinct was
the recourse taken to Islam, and its location in the entire episode
-an aspect yet to be carefully studied. A close perusal of the acts
of violence shows how efforts to legitimise these acts were
attempted by taking recourse to Islam. This differentiates it from
all other stages and forms of communal violence, where the
point of contention stemmed from religious difference but
religion was never the instrument to legitimise acts of violence.
In Noakhali, religion not only constituted the identity of a
particular community which was attacked violently, but religion
itself was attacked. And this was effected through the process of
forcible conversion.
H.S. Suhrawardy, the Chief Minister, while answering the
question of Dhirendra Nath Dutt on the floor of the Bengal
Legislative Assembly, provided the figure of 9,895 cases of forcible
conversion in Tippera, while that for Noakhali was not known
'but (which) ran into thousands' . 11 This submission came from
Communalism, t~ Noakhali riot and Gandhi 139
the Ministry which had uptil now constantly maintained that
the situation was not as grave as it was made out to be by the
Hindu press and Hindu propaganda. The Star of Inaia clearly
expressed the Government stand:
The reports appearing in the Hindu Press about mass conver-
sion of Hindus have hardly any foundation. There have been
cases, however, of Hindus going to Muslims out of sheer panic
and offering to become Muslims. In almost all cases, the
Muslims assured them they would be protected whether they
remained Hindus or not.'2
This was made more explicit by a Muslim League legislator
from Noakhali, Mujibur Rahman, who, responding to the Chief
Ministerial statement, asked the latter whether he was aware of
the fact that 'the majority of the Hindu population gave up their
religion out of fear' . 13 In all these cases, though deliberate
attempts at conversion were denied by giving agency to the
Hindus themselves, the argument brought out the. fact that it was
a state of fear or panic which would have forced the Hindus to
give up their religion and accept Islam voluntarily. While
Suhrawardy gave the figure of 9,895 converts in Tippera, he was
already in possession of Simpson's report which had estimated
the number of conversions in the three police s41tions of Farid-
ganj, Chandpur and Hajiganj to be around 22,550 or 22,560, and
the entire Hindu population of three villages, i.e., Gupti, Bachtali
and Gobindpur of Faridganj Police Station.•• As regards Hindus
volunteering to become Muslims, the term 'voluntary act' when
qualified by the community's fear of destruction of their posses-
sions and lives, meant something altogether different. Men
with property were threatened; men without property were also
intimidated. Fear stalked these villages. S.C. Ghosh, S. Ghosh
and Bhatta of Karpara wrote, 'On the 12th these miscreants
planned to attack our house, one of the biggest houses with popu-
lation of about 250 ... In order to save our lives and properties ...
agreed to their proposal of conversion to Islam which they
advanced as a condition precedent to our protection.' 15 The
zamindar of Panchgaon Lakshmi Mazumdar stated:
On 12th morning I called in some leading Muslim gentle-
men for help and advice, notably Gholam Kibria (Latu Mia of
Bhaor, our Union Board President (U. No. 12), Nure Rahman
(dismissed sub inspector of Police) and other people. They
140 RAKESH BATABYAL
II
III
The Noakhali riot, and its countrywide repercussion, soon vttt-
ated the communal situation in the country. 75 At this juncture,
Gandhi decided to come to Bengal and visit the riot affected
areas of Noakhali and Tippera. 76 Gandhi's presence introduced a
new dynamic into the entire discourse on the question of
communal ideology/riots.77 This dynamic was transported to the
realm of politics, especially that which contained a steady
undertone of violence as manifested by the communal riots. His
presence provides the backdrop to the study of the situation that
prevailed in Bengal during those fateful days and how this
situation reshaped men and their minds. 'Men create violence,
but violence recreates them.'
Gandhi had already seen in the Calcutta riots the potential for
greater, -'escalated violence-probably on the scale of a civil war.
'We are not yet in the midst of a civil war', he said, 'but we are
nearing it. At present we are playing at it.'78 In fact, it appears
that Gandhi took a close personal interest in the affairs of
Bengal, especially the violence there. ' 9 It was the news of
violence in Noakhali and Tippera that prompted him to come to
Bengal. 'Why and why only Noakhali whereas rioting had
been taking place in Ahmedabad, Bombay or for that ma.tter in
the neighboring Bihar', was the question repeatedly asked of
him. This question was important as it not only suggests the
significance that Gandhi attached to the Noakhali riot but also
provokes us to probe deeper into the ramifications of Gandhi's
visit to the riot affected areas. so
As we have outlined, Noakhali riot was qualitatively different
from the earlier communal riots including the Calcutta killings
of August 1946 which immediately preceded it.8 1 The difference
lay in its transformation of a communal discourse as a politics
based on religion, to one in which violence was sanctified by
150 RAKESH 8ATA8YAL
religion. Gandhi had realized this more than any one else. It
was evident from the pattern of violence that there had occurred
a total rupture of an essentially peasant society, and the entrench-
ment of communal ideology in that social milieu . Gandhi, an
astute reader of the peasant psyche, appeared to perceive the effects
such a rupture could engender. Noakhali, therefore, became
important not just because it demonstrated an intensity of
violence, but also the power of ideology, i.e., communalism.
Gandhi, in fact, was practical enough to see the writing on the
wall. In September 1944 itself, he sensed the increased hold of
Jinnah on the Muslim masses, and therefore, while writing to
Jinnah he acknowledged the latter's hold over them. His
meeting with Jinnah was basically an acceptance of this fact.
Aware of the significance of 'symbols', he wanted to attack the
idea of 'two nations' and thereby, attack the ideological basis of
Pakistan, i.e., communalism. He was prepared to accept any kind
of Partition as long as it was not based on this theory. He wrote
to Jinnah that he could already see its operation.82 Noakhali
presented for Gandhi the first field demonstration of this theory
in its intense and most frightening form. Gandhi's visit to
Noakhali, therefore, had a combating element to it as he tried to
counter the ideological underpinnings of the riot. 'In any war',
he said, ' brutalities were bound to take place; war is a brutal
thing' . 11 ~ Once this was accepted by Gandhi, he started looking
beyond the violence and the violations taking place there. He
was, as suggested by a close aide in Noakhali, not very concerned
about the casualties or the extent of material damage. Instead he
concentrated on 'discovering the political intentions working
behind the move and the way of combating them successfully'.84
The spread and the intensity of the violations convinced him
that the war was to be a long drawn one and that he would have
a personal stake in it. While it was 'the cry of outraged woman-
hood' which brought him to Bengal,S!I he was equally aghast at
the religious intolerance shown by the local populace. This
further convinced him that his place was in Noakhali. He took it
upon himself to combat the operati9J1 of the 'two nation-theory'
whils.- also delegitimising violence of its apparent religious
sanctions. Therefore, Noakhali was mad e the battle-field on
which he sought to uphold his poli'tical as well as personal credo.
This attitude of combating the war brought out a novel form of
experience in its train- significantly entitled 'Gandhi's Noa-
khali experiment'. In this experiment, Gandhi's principles
Communalism, the Noakhali riot and Gandhi 151
were at stake. 'My own doctrine', Gandhi said to N.C. Chatter-
jee, 'was failing. I don 't want to die a failure ' .t~ 6
Did he possess any coherent strategy when he landed in
Noakhali? From the very beginning, he was quite apprehensive
of his plan of action in Noakhali. Even enroute, he did not know
what he was going to do there. He invoked God as the only one
who knew what he could do. 8 7 The only thing he was certain of
was that his presence in Noakhali was n ecessary.'11~ He grappled
in the darkness and told N.K. Bose, his secretary during those
days, that he might have to stay on there for several years.119
While he was fighting this uncertainty vis-a-vis the Noakhali
situation, there erupted in Bihar ghastly communal riots. Hindu
crowds began slaughtering Muslims in order to avenge the
rumored massacre of people of their community by the latter in
Noakhali. 911
Gandhi's position became very delicate as the Bihar riot
boomeranged on his peace- mission in Noakhali. The number of
casualties in the Bihar riots was much more than those in Noa-
khali. Therefore, the Muslim League Ministry in Bengal,
which fr-om the very beginning had been trying to minimize its
own responsibility in the entire episode, now asked him t<> shift
his attention to Bihar. The details of the Bihar riot were exagge-
rated and made the center of projection. 9 1 Thus, communal dis-
course whether Hindu or Muslim, justified, and thereby,
validated itself and the other.
The Muslim League Government did not like Gandhi's visit to
Noakhali as it felt that world attention would get focused on the
active collaboration of the League workers with the rioters. It,
therefore, exerted pressure through propaganda and personal
insinuation against Gandhi.92 Even people holding responsible
positions attacked Gandhi, asking him to leave Noakhali, and
attend to the Bihar situation. Hamiduddin Chaudhury, a Parlia-
mentary Secretary of the Muslim League Ministry, wh<> had
visited Noakhali with Gandhi and initially condemned the
atrocities there, issued a statement to the Press that Gandhi was
in Noakhali 'only to focus attention of the world on the happen-
ings there and to magnify the issue' .93
Synchronizing with statements of this sort was the behaviour
of the local Muslim League workers. They began to harass
Gandhi as well as the relief workers in order that they perforce
leave the place. Members of the Feni sub-division of the Muslim
152 RAKESH 8ATA8YAL
REFERENCES
power of the community was a point repeatedly stressed by the Hindu communal
discourse while on the other hand the colonial attempts of classifying tribes
a nd other groups separately from the Hindus also added to the already
circulating apprehensions that the colonial authorities were out to crush the
Hindus politically by reducing them to an extreme minority. This factor became
further complicated with the demand of Pakistan as a separate homeland for
the Muslim majority. The demand was, to a great extent, based on the demo-
graphic argument. This made the 1941 Census a bitterly contested operation.
(See 'Hindus and the Census', Amrita Baz.ar Patrilla, Calcutta, 18 Jan. 1941, p. 9;
'Coming Census', ibid., 3 Feb. 1941, p. 6). To the Hindu Mahasabha demand for
an 'impartial Cen sus enumeration' the Muslim League and even the Chief
Minitter, Huq, made statements which had a communal tinge. They added to
the communal propaganda which made the 'census' of 1941 a symbol and an
arena of political contestation.
On the other hand. the Muslim communal perception was abo significantly
influenced by the question of population. The argument in the forties in favour
of Pakistan was quite often an argument based on the demographic conside-
ration. For example, Casey reported his conversation with Nazimuddin in these
terms: "I asked him about Pakistan. He said h e was j ust on the point of writing
to Jinnah telling ... they want Bengal (less Burdwan Division), Assam, a
subdivision of Bihar....This would give them 58% Muslim in place of 51% ....Ht
says that Muslims art mtn'e virile than the Hindus and {n-eed faster." Entry on 5th
September 1944, Personal Diary, !Udlard G. Casey Papers, Reel No. 1, p. 58.
Forcible conversion, forcible marriages and mass exodus from the place
brought these issues to the debate on comparative population growth.
30. Hindwtan Standard, Cal., 7 November 1946, p . 4.
31. PBLA., Vol. LXXVII, No. 3, 1947, First Session, p. 323.
32. E. S. Simpson to Additional Secretary. up. cit., pp. 52-.53.
33. See Miss Muriel Lester's Repon on Noakhali, Hindustan Standard.. Cal., 8
Nov. 1946, pp. 1-2.
'Calcutta observes NoakhaJi Women's Day, Dec 1', ibid., 29 Nov. 1946, p. 1.
34. A reaction of a follower of Gandhi provides a clue to the kind of emotion
and frustration that was generated by the aspects of the Noakhali riot:
Most urgent need now is to receive the nu mberless abducted women who
were entomed in Burkha and who for obvious reasons, could not be
approached by the Ministry.... It is intolerable that helpless women victims
of a cold blooded planned assault should suffer hou rly distress and that we
should be alive and still be unable to save th em.
Hindwtan SUJndmd, Calcu tta, 7 Nov,'l946, p. 3.
35. One eyewitness thought forced marriages were 'the shortest possible way
to make conversion a reality'. See Samar Guha and Ardhendu Bhattacharya,
'Versions of Eyewitness about Noakhali', op. cit., p . 28.
36. A substantial section of the Muslim population actively and tacitly
supported the conversions that were carried out. H. S. E. Stevens, Chief Secretary,
Governmen t of Bengal to the Secretary, Government of India, H01M Political. File
No. 18/10/46.
Most assailants were known to the victims. For example, the residents of
Sonaimuri village, P. 0 . Begumganj, provided the name and address of about 60
hooligans who wen· no• arn·strcl hv authoritir:\ b111 who had bt>c-n threatening
Communalism, the Noakhali riot and Gandhi 167
the villagers. The Inhabitants of Sonaimuri Village to the President, Indian
National Congress, MCC Papers, File No. CL-8/1946, pp. 381-83.
37. S. C. Ghosh, et al of Karpara, P. S. Ramganj. to the District Magistrate,
Noakhali, 31st October 1946, AJCC Papers, File No. C-53, pp. 37-41.
38. Bose, N. K., My Days ruith Gandhi, Orient Longman, Delhi, 1974, p. 97
39. Motkm Rr/1ietv, Nov. 1946.
40. Noakhali riot is generally considered chronologically as well as
thematically a ' reaction' to, or an extension of the Calcutta killings. What I
have tried to argue in this study is that one should not premise itself on this
'reaction' aspect as it dilutes a number of other issues.
41. Emphasis on this aspect will dilute the fact that a substantial proportion of
the MusHm population, barring some noble exceptions, was under the spell of
communal ideology. By pinning the blame on the party or a person, we, in fact,
tend to overlook the hegemonic presence of communal ideology.
42. 'Chittagong residents passed a restless day' on the Direct Action Day, A
letter from Chittagong to Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, S. P. Mookf!Tjee Papers,
Subject File No. 151, p. lll. Chittagong, according to Lt. Gen. Tuker, was equally
tense. See Tuker, F., While Memory Serves, Cassell and Company, London, 1.950,
pp. 170-71, 607.
43. Tuker wrote:
Ghulam Sarwar's gang was estimated to be about one thousand, a certain
number of ex-army personal were reported to be adherents. The main gang
had split into smaller gangs of one hundred and fifty to two hundred and
these had been working in conformity with an obviously worked out plan.
Tuker, F., op. cit., p. 174.
44. In most cases people were attacked by inhabitants of their village. The
maulvi who converted people was often a local, and the hooligans who were also
of the same village were supported by crowds coming to attack from outside.
Thus, we need to correct the understanding of this riot put forth by the
authorities, that it was "activity apparently organised of a body of hooligans who
have exploited existing communal situations". Burrows to Wave ll, Mansergh,
N., (ed.) , op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 98. See also Government of India, Home Political, File
No. 5/ 55/ 46.
~some held, as so often they do hold that the rioters were men", wrote the
adjutant of the l/3rd Gurkha regiment. "who had come in from outside.
That is not so they were local inhabitants who worked up to a pitch of frenzy
by such agitators as Ghulam Sarwar.. .. " See Tuker, F., op. cit., p. 618.
45. See;..L akshmi Babu's statement, 'Versions of Eyewitness about Noakhali',
op. cit., pp. 64--68.
4fi. Ibid.
47. Police officials as well as the local Government Qfficials acted in a highly
communal manner. The house of Lakshmi Majumdar, Zamindar of
Panchgaon, was looted in the presence of the Superintendent of Police. See R.
Gupta to P. D. Mahyn, ibid.., p. 55.
The Secretary, Noakhali District Congress Committee, gave an account of the
situation prevailing there prior to the rioting:
In some cases the officers have been poisoned with communalism. The
Hindu officers are apathetic and studious, cautious not to incur the displeasure
of the other community and for rh<' 111altt'r of that the Muslims.... Govern-
168 RAKESH BATABYAL
ment and almost all Muhammendan officers are inclined . towards the
Muslim League and do not hesitate to condone the aggressive acts of the
Muslim hooligans by helping suppression of evidence against them
submitting false reports. 'Noakhali Situation', op. cit., pp. 97-99.
Lt. Gen Tuker wrote:
. .. Lists of these men took an inordinate time for the local police to
prepare.... Informers were very loath to come forward with evidence. Until
such time as the goondas were rounded up it .wa!! certain that if the soldiers
left the area trouble would at once break out again.
Tuker, F., op. cit., p. 178.
48. Lakshmi Majumdar's_statement, 'Versions of Eyewitness about Noakhali',
op. dL , pp. 6W8.
49. R. Gupta stated, "These people residing so dose to the thana are in such a
state of terror still that they are reluctant to talk about what they have suffered as
a result of looting.... The Quarters of the Hindu Constables (yards from the
thana) were gutted." R Gupta to P. D. Martyn, 'Versions of Eyewitness about
Noakhali' , op. cit., p . 54. These instances show not only communalisation but
also the confidence of communal elements by the time they actually resorted to
violence.
50. Therefore, the total communalisation of Noakhali Muslims shows that at
any particular juncture even a factor like communalism could be come an
overdetermined one. When the peasants of Noakhali attacked the Hindus, it
was not as peasants that they attacked the latter but as Muslims. Communalism
is a significant explanatory category in this context.
51. Hunter. W. W., Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol. VI, p. 24.
52. Ibid. Also see, Webster, East Bengal and Assam District Gauturs, Noakhali,
Pioneer Press, Allahabad, 1911 , p. 39. "Vast majority of the Shekh (Muslim
cultivators) and lower sections of the community are descended from the
aboriginal races of the district. • Ibid.
53. Kaviraj, Narahari, Wahabi and Farau Rebels of Benga~ People' s Publishing
House, New Delhi, 1982, p. 62. See, District Census Report, Noakhali, 1961,
Government of Pakistan Press, Karachi, 1962, (hereafter, District Census Report,
Noakhali ) , pp. 1-25.
54. Rasul, Khaled Masuke, Noakhalir Loksahitye Lok jiboner Parichay (Reflection
of Folk life in the Folk literature of Noakhali) , Bangia Academy, Dhaka,
1992, p. 27.
55. Illid., pp. 27-28.
56. District Census Repor1, Noakhali, 1961, pp. 1-21. Keramat Ali, it appears from
all sources, was representing the Wahabi opinion in the r egion. See also
Kaviraj, Narahari, op. dt.. , pp. 101-102.
57. Rasul, Khaled Masuke, op. cit. , p. 26.
58. Ibid.; also see, Kaviraj, Narahari, op. cit., pp. 63-66, 100.
59. Kaviraj, Narahari, op. ciL, p. 99.
60. Ahmed, Rafiuddin, The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906: A Qp.est for Identity, OUP,
Delhi, l981, pp. 37-38.
61. Ibid., pp. 37-38.
62. l!Jid., pp. 58-59.
63. Apart from the normal religious symbols, visitors often came across some
novel experiences in Noakhali. An Assistant Settlement Officer, himself a
Communalism, the Noakhali riot and Gandhi 169
Muslim, experienced a new facet of Noakhali life. uNot once but several times",
writes W. H. Thomspon , uhe had instances in which two venerable
M1,1hammedans in their own village before all their acquaintances had sworn
the exact opposite on the Koran~. W. H. Thompson, op. cit., p. 29.
64. District Census Report, Noakhali, 1961, p. I-21.
65. Rasul, Khaled Masuke, op. cit., pp. 26-28.
66. Hashmi, Taz ul-Islam, Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia: The Communalisation of
Class Politics in East Bengal 1920-1947, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992, pp. 192-3;
252-53.
67. A comparative study of the crime rate of different districts of pre-partition
Bengal will also be a valuable aid to analyse the agrarian structure, levels of
violence, etc. Such a study for an earlier period brings out the fact that Noakhali,
indeed, had a lower rate of crime and even political violence, in comparison
with most of the other districts in the Province. See Khan, · Bazlur Rahman,
Politics in Bengal, 1927-36, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1987, Appendices.
68. For a treatment of Wahabi and Farazi movements in Bengal, see,
Kaviraj, Narahari, op.cit.
69. See, Gellner, Ernest, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, Routledge and
Kegan Paul, London, 1992, for an interesting discussion along this line.
70. Mallick, Azizur Rahman, British Policy and the Muslims in Bengal(1757-
I856), Rajshahi University, Dacca, 1961. ·
71. Khan, Muinuddin Ahmad, History of the Faraidi Movement in Bengal (1818-
1906), University of Karachi, Karachi, 1965.
72. A History of the Freedom Movement (1707-1947), 4 Vols., Pakistan Historical
Society, Karachi, 1960.
73. The Noakhali riot, according to this line of enquiry, would represent the
conjuncture of the Muslim attack on Hindus because the latter had prevented the
U nity of Islam in , the shape of Pakistan. The fallacy of this treatment becomes
apparent in the context of the Noakhali riot of 1946, because, in the month of
October 1946, it was not the 'religious agenda' of Ghulam Sarwar which was the
determining factor but the overdetermination of communalism.
Ghulam Sarwar, who had been fighting the League, at this point, accepted
the agenda of the Muslim League, i.e., Communalism. What gave the riot its
character was definitely the fact that it was the surrender of the religious
leaders and their fundamentalist and revivalist positions to the communal
agenda of the League. Thus, the Noakhali riot is a pointer to the situation when
religious fundamentalism surrenders before communalism or gets mixed with
it and provides justificaton for the latter's violence. Simultaneously, the riot
cannot be studied through the framework of 'religious History' or 'History of
Islam', as it would do injustice to the historical context and at the same time
would uncritically accept the idea of the inevitability of cultural r.Q?iflict expressed
most unhistorically by the conservatives like Samuel Huntington. In 'The Clash
of Civilisation?' he writes, urhe fault line between civilisations will be the
battle line of the future .... The most important conflict of the future will occur
along the cultural fault line separating these civilisations from one another.~
Huntington, Samuel P .. urhe Clash of Civilisation?" Foreign Affairs, 72: 3, 1993,
PP· 22-49.
74. Rahman, Hossainur, Hindu Muslim Relations in Bengal, 1905-1947. Study in
Cultural Confrontation, Nachiketa Publication, Bombay, 1974, p. 97. It is, therefore,
170 RAKESH BATABYAL