commentary
Across the LOC:
A Political Conundrum
Luv Puri
The spotlight has turned on the
state and people-led violence in
Indian-administered Jammu and
Kashmir. Across the Line of
Control there are other issues. An
analysis of the political and
institutional conditions in
Pakistan-administered Jammu
and Kashmir shows that
Pakistan’s federal government
keeps the region under strict
control and people lack political
freedoms. The governments of
both India and Pakistan need to
strengthen democracy in the
regions under their control since
it is only through fulfilment of the
democratic aspirations of the
people that a viable solution
will emerge.
Luv Puri (luvpuri@gmail.com) is a political
journalist who writes on Kashmir.
10
I
n January 2009, Sardar Attique Khan,
the then prime minister of Pakistan-
administered Jammu and Kashmir
(PAJK), blamed the loss of his majority in
the legislative assembly on the Pakistani
state and remarked that democracy has
been slaughtered. More than a year later,
Attique Khan is back again as the prime
minister of the region and it is now the
turn of Farooq Haider, the just deposed
prime minister of PAJK, to give vent to his
anger against the federal government.
Haider, in his recent statement, accused
the Pakistan Peoples Party-led federal
government of uniting with his political
rivals in the state, which resulted in his
resignation. Like on previous occasions,
the prime minister apparently lost his
majority in the legislative assembly. This
is the third time in the last four years that
the sitting prime minister has lost his
majority in the assembly.
While the Indian side of Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K) has hogged international
attention because of the youth unrest and
the reckless handling of the situation by the
administration, the events across the Line
of Control (LoC), are of major political
significance, but have largely been ignored.
In fact, there is a paucity of scholarship and
information available about the political,
ethnic and economic aspects of PAJK. The
understanding of each part of the entire
state of J&K is necessary to comprehend
the issue in its entirety and to initiate a
process of negotiations between India
and Pakistan, which is based on prag­
matism and rooted in the ground realities
of the contested region.
PAJK has a population of approximately
three million which comprises one-third
of the erstwhile princely state of J&K. For
years, some sections of the Pakistani elite
have marketed PAJK as a model for the
entire region of J&K and left no opportunity
to compare it with the political conditions
october 30, 2010  vol xlv no 44  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly
on the Indian side. PAJK, known as “Azad
Jammu and Kashmir” in Pakistan, has its
own supreme court, high court, flag and
legislative assembly comprising 49 mem-
bers, of whom 41 are directly elected and
eight are nominated by the government –
one each from technocrats, scholars, and
overseas PAJK nationals and five women.
The head of the government in PAJK is
known as the prime minister and the head
of the state is designed as the president.
Even the PAJK politicians have left no stone
unturned to describe the importance of
the region for the Kashmir issue. In Janu-
ary 2006, Sardar Abdul Qayuum Khan,
the former president of PAJK and the
father of the recently reinstated ­Attique
Khan, told this author in Muzaffarabad
that his party’s (Muslim Con­ference)
struggle would continue till the Indian
side of J&K got the same degree of political
freedom as he enjoyed in his own region.
The sudden political upheavals in the
region and the ire of the aggrieved groups
against the alleged intervention of the
federal government present an altogether
different picture to the portrait drawn by
the Pakistani elites. These are a conse-
quence of the region’s peculiar political
history and institutional structure. A cul-
ture of institutionalised patronage has
characterised the six-decade old relation-
ship of PAJK’s political elite with the Paki-
stani state. An objective study of the polit-
ical history and the institutional structure
of the region will explain this relation-
ship. In 1949, the Muslim Conference, one
of the political outfits in the princely state,
was recognised as the permanent repre-
sentative of PAJK, with powers to strike
agreements with the sovereign country of
Pakistan. This was seen as a political re-
ward for the Muslim Conference, a politi-
cal outfit that had supported J&K’s acces-
sion to Pakistan at its July 1947 executive
body session at Srinagar.
In the political system that existed from
1947 to the 1960s in PAJK, the person at the
helm of the Muslim Conference was nomi-
nated the president of PAJK. The first major
constitutional change came in 1970 when
the system of adult franchise was adopted
and a democratic set-up was ­introduced in
PAJK, through the Azad Jammu and Kashmir

Act, 1970. For the first time, the members
of the legislative assembly, as well as the
president, were elected on the basis of
adult franchise. The presidential system
of government continued for about four
years till, in 1974, the parliamentary sys-
tem was introduced in PAJK, under the
1974 Azad Jammu and Kashmir interim
constitution. Omitting “interim” would have
implied that Pakistan had accepted the line
of control as the international border.
There has been little difference between
the democratic leadership of Pakistan and
the military dispensations as both have
continued the tradition of ordering arbitrary
executive changes in the region. In 1990,
PAJK Prime Minister Mumtaz Rathore was
“escorted” to Islamabad in a helicopter
and forced to sign a letter of resignation
by the Nawaz Sharif government.
Contradictions
There are visible contradictions between
the Pakistani and PAJK constitutions. For
instance, article 257 of the Pakistani con-
stitution holds that the “people of Jammu
and Kashmir will define their relationship
with Pakistan after obtaining freedom”.
Under section 5 (2) (vii) of the PAJK Leg-
islative Assembly Election Ordinance,
1970, “a person will be disqualified for
propagating any opinion or action in any
manner prejudicial to the ideology of
Pakistan, the ideology of state’s accession
to Pakistan or the sovereignty and inte­
grity of Pakistan”. On the contrary, part 2
of section 7 of the 1974 PAJK constitution
says that “no person or political party in
Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be per-
mitted to propagate against or take part
in activities prejudicial or detrimental to
the ideology of the state’s accession to
Pakistan”. Thus without signing an affidavit
of allegiance to Jammu and Kashmir’s
accession to Pakistan, nobody is allowed to
take part in the PAJK legislative assembly
elections. The Amanullah Khan-led Jammu
and Kashmir Liberation Front and the
All Parties Nationalist Alliance (APNA) es-
pousing an independent state for Jammu
and Kashmir have not been allowed to
participate in several elections because
they refused to sign the affidavit.
The Pakistani government has the
power to dismiss any PAJK government.
Article 53 of the PAJK constitution gives
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   october 30, 2010  vol xlv no 44
the federal government the power to dis-
miss an elected government. This power
has been exercised twice since 1974. The
provision to dismiss any elected provincial
authority by the federal government is
part of the emergency provisions of Paki-
stan’s constitution. Therefore, the federal
government enjoys the same emergency
powers over PAJK like any ­other province
of Pakistan, just as the PAJK legislative as-
sembly lacks the authority to legislate on
some subjects.
The oath of office for the appointment
of important posts like prime minister,
president or speaker in PAJK contravenes
the claim that PAJK is an independent
country. For instance, the oath of office for
the president of PAJK reads: “As President
of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, I will be
loyal to the country and the cause of
­accession of the state of Jammu and
­Kashmir to Pakistan...”.
PAJK definitely lacks the powers vested
in an independent country but in addition
it is at a disadvantage compared to other
provinces of Pakistan. For instance, the
Council of Common Interest, a constitu-
tional body empowered to resolve inter-
provincial conflicts in Pakistan, cannot
settle disputes between PAJK and any other
province of Pakistan, since PAJK is not a
province. Therefore in any dispute, the
balance invariably tilts towards Pakistan
and its “provinces”.
Interestingly, the recently deposed
prime minister, Farooq Haider, had asked
for the abolition of the Azad Jammu and
Kashmir Council. According to him “it is
an unconstitutional body”. Post-1974, a
new institutional bond between the Paki-
stan government and PAJK was created in
the form of this council. The council is a
constitutional body established under sec-
tion 21 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Interim Constitution Act, 1974. It has ­seven
members from the Pakistani government,
including the prime minister, who is also
chairman of the council, federal minister
for Kashmir affairs and five members of
the Pakistan national assembly nominated
by the prime minister. ­Other members of
the council include the prime minister of
PAJK who is vice-chairman and six mem-
bers from PAJK elected by PAJK legislators.
Any decision can only be approved by the
council if there is a majority.
commentary
The council has its office in one of the
posh areas of Islamabad and has acquired
the de facto power of resource allocation
to PAJK, both from federal as well as pro-
vincial sources. Election to this council has
become important for Kashmiri politicians
as it provides an opportunity to PAJK
members to come closer to the Pakistan
establishment and is more of a platform to
rise up their career ladder. For instance, in
January 2006 the election to the Kashmir
council became a launching pad for the
political career of Farooq Sikandar, the
son of then prime minister of PAJK, Sardar
Sikandar Khan.
This body is the key institution that
shapes the economic policy of the region.
Its powers are absolute. Article 35 of the
PAJK constitution states: “…a bill passed
by the council shall not require the assent
of the President, PAJK and shall upon its
authentication by the Chairman of the
Council become law and be called an Act
of the Council”.
This means that the council is empow-
ered to legislate on some subjects without
the direct involvement of the PAJK legisla-
tive assembly. Article 34 of the PAJK con-
stitution states that the validity of any
proceedings in the council, the assembly
or a joint-sitting shall not be questioned in
any court. The status of the council is at
par with that of a legislative body. Besides
key subjects like citizenship, defence, and
foreign affairs which are the immediate
responsibility of the Pakistan government,
52 subjects pertaining to PAJK are under
the preview of this Azad Jammu and
Kashmir council.
The subjects under the jurisdiction of
the council indicate the domination of
the Islamabad-based council over PAJK’s
­affairs. Even the laws regarding the issue
of granting nationality or state subject
­(essential document) are governed by the
available at
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Ph: 44-45508212/13
11
commentary

council. All the important sources of
revenue mobilisation come under the
federal list. The overriding powers of
the council deprive PAJK’s executive of
the powers to make independent decision
in terms of development and industrial
plans. As the council exercises excessive
of financial control over various affairs of
the territory, the budget formulation by
PAJK is an exercise lacking any scope of
initiative on the part of the elected PAJK
legislature. Before the formation of this
council, the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs
of Pakistan was responsible for PAJK’s
administrative affairs. The creation of
council merely institutionalised the role
of the Pakistani establishment in the
governance of PAJK.
The institutional domination of Pakistan’s
federal government over PAJK has often led
to inter-turf battles and crisis-like situations.
In May 2010, the Prime Minister PAJK
Farooq Haider opposed the appointment
of the region’s police chief, of the rank of
inspector general, by the federal government
without any consultation with him. The
prime minister also opposed the recall
of the chief secretary without similar con-
sultations. The tight institutional control
over PAJK by Pakistan’s federal govern-
ment has often led to serious crisis and
riven PAJK’s polity.
In April 2010, the PAJK supreme court
started functioning with two chief justices,
one each back by the prime minister and
the president of PAJK, respectively! This
trouble started when PAJK’s prime minister
dismissed the sitting chief justice of the
PAJK supreme court, Riaz Akhtar Chaud-
hry, on the charge that he had acted in
contravention of the PAJK constitution. He
appointed a new chief justice while the
president was away in Europe. The presi-
dent, on his return, reinstated the dis-
missed chief justice, thus triggering off a
constitutional crisis in the region.
The PAJK prime minister’s action was
compared to the political misadventure
by the former Pakistan president Pervez
Musharraf, when he dismissed the serving
Pakistan chief justice in 2007 and replaced
supreme court judges with those amiable
to him. As the Dawn argued in its editorial,
Pakistan’s former prime minister Shaukat
Aziz, as head of the Azad ­Jammu and
Kashmir council, and the ­intelligence
agencies had a role in making these judi-
cial appointments which led to the crisis.
The matter was resolved after the active
mediation of the present prime minister of
Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gilani, also in his
capacity as chairman of this same Azad
Jammu and Kashmir council, since this
body also has the final say on ­judicial
appointments in PAJK.
The post-1990 phase has opened up
space for new political players in the
region with the assertion of Jat and
Rajput leadership in southern parts of
PAJK. This is in sharp contrast to the
earlier political monopoly of the Sudhans
and Abbasi caste groups in the central
regions of PAJK. These social changes
will have an impact on the ­region’s politi-
cal competition which will witness greater

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12 october 30, 2010  vol xlv no 44  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly

demands for demo­cratisation and respect
for auto­nomy of the region’s institutions
by the federal government.
The issue of Jammu and Kashmir is one
of the most important causes of the conflict
between India and Pakistan since 1947. It
has shaped the domestic politics of both
countries and has been an important
element in the calculus of foreign policy
Vedanta Hymn: The Scion’s
Political Gambit
Suhit K Sen
Rahul Gandhi claimed that he
will represent the tribal people in
Delhi’s power corridors. It is good
that he has decided to raise the
issue of displacement and
dispossession of the people, their
lands and forests but Niyamgiri is
not just one exception. While
Vedanta has a terrible global
track record, to live up to his
promise the junior Gandhi will
have to question the entire
economic policy of his party’s
government which has foisted an
anti-democratic and deeply
inegalitarian strategy of
development on the people,
one which is drawing forth
widespread resistance.
Suhit K Sen (suhitsen@gmail.com) is at the
Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Kolkata.
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   october 30, 2010  vol xlv no 44
formulation on both sides. There is wisdom
in saying that the resolution of the Jammu
and Kashmir issue is a prerequisite to
shape a better future for both India and
Pakistan. The bottom-up approach is cru-
cial to take the process of resolution for-
ward and this includes the participation of
people of the state on either side of the
line of control in that process. For this
C
ongress General Secretary Rahul
Gandhi recently put in an appear-
ance at Lanjigarh, Orissa, to ex-
press solidarity with the Dongriya Kondh
tribal people who inhabit the immediate
environs of the forested Niyamgiri hills.
For the moment, the Kondhs have won a
reprieve, with the Union Ministry of
­Environment and Forests (MoEF) putting
on hold plans to mine the hills for bauxite.
During his visit, the younger Gandhi
a­ssured the tribal people that he would be
their voice in the national capital and
would take their demands to the union
government, even as he complimented
them on their fortitude and resistance.
While Gandhi has by and large made all
the right moves in an attempt to bolster
the alleged “inclusive development” of the
government, he must also train his sights
on the plight of other tribal communities,
especially those inhabiting forested,
m­ineral-rich tracts. There is, for instance,
some substance in the claim made by the
Biju Janata Dal government in Orissa with
reference to the Polavaram dam being built
in Andhra Pradesh. It will submerge tracts
of land in Orissa and elsewhere, displac-
ing tribal people. If the Congress a­llows
that issue to get entangled in partisan
politics, the younger Gandhi’s rhetoric will
be undermined. The two cases, Niyamgiri
and Polavaram, are not necessarily com-
mensurate and, in any case, one does not
justify the other.
To return to the Niyamgiri hills, MoEF
has now stalled the plans of Anil Agar­wal’s
commentary
purpose, the two countries have to take
steps to usher in a process of genuine de-
mocratisation, which includes decentrali-
sation of political and economic powers
on either side of the line of control to em-
power the people of the state to give them
a direct say to shape their own destiny.
This will, in turn, provide the grounds for
developing a viable solution.
Vedanta group, hatched in collusion with
officials of the Orissa government, to mine
the area and also encroach on more gov-
ernment and forest land to increase the
capa­city of its existing alumina plant there.
The decision came after a com­mittee ap-
pointed by the MoEF – the Saxena Com-
mittee – submitted a damning report on
the subversion of law and the dis­astrous
consequence the project would have both
on the ecosystem not only of ­Niyamgiri but
of a much larger region and on the liveli-
hoods and social fabric of the Dongriya
Kondh people.
The committee has drawn the ministry’s
attention, with regard to the eco­logical
dimension, to the fact that denuding
parts of the hill either for the mining it-
self or for building ancillary infrastruc-
ture – for instance, roads – will disrupt a
forest ecology that spans three districts
of the state. It is not just the denudation
of Niyamgiri that is the point at issue but
also the disruption of an animal corridor.
Open, unforested tracts in Niyamgiri pro-
vide pasture for animals like the elephant
and deer as they move from one forest
area to another in these three districts.
Perhaps of greater moment is the fact
that disturbing the ecological balance of
the region will cause the drying up of
many streams that feed the rivers in
the region, especially the Vamsadhara.
The damage to both floral and faunal bio-
diversity will be incalculable and most
likely ­irreversible.
A subsidiary point is that the bauxite
r­eserves in the Niyamgiri hills are not
very large and will be able to feed the
e­xpanded alumina plant that has been
proposed only for a few years. Even a con-
ventional cost-benefit calculus will show
that the venture is quixotic. That it is also
illegal, depredatory and inhumane is a
matter we will soon address.
13