e.
Due Process and Eminent Domain Digested Cases
CASE #1
SolGen vs Ayala Land
CASE #2
Ortega vs City of Cebu
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari filed by petitioners Ciriaco and Arminda
Ortega (Spouses Ortega) in G.R. Nos. 181562-63 and
petitioner City of Cebu (Cebu City) in G.R. Nos.
181583-84 assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in the similarly consolidated petitions
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80187 and CA-G.R. SP No.
00147, respectively.
The facts, summarized by the CA, follow.
Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega x x x are the
registered owners of a parcel of land known as Lot No.
310-B, situated in Hipodromo, Cebu City, with an area
of 5,712 square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 113311, issued by the Register
of Deeds of the City of Cebu.
One-half of the above described land is occupied by
squatters. On September 24, 1990, [the Spouses
Ortega] filed an ejectment case against the squatters
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Cebu City, which rendered decision in favor of [the
spouses Ortega]. The case eventually reached the
Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the
MTCC. The decision of the MTCC became final and
executory, and a writ of execution was issued on
February 1, 1994.
On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
[Cebu City] enacted City Ordinance No. 1519, giving
authority to the City Mayor to expropriate one-half
(1/2) portion (2,856 square meters) of [the spouses
Ortegas] land (which is occupied by the squatters),
and appropriating for that purpose the amount of
P3,284,400.00 or at the price of ONE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P1,150.00) per square meter.
The amount will be charged against Account No. 8-93-
310, Continuing Appropriation, Account No. 101-
8918-334, repurchase of lots for various projects. The
value of the land was determined by the Cebu City
Appraisal Committee in Resolution No. 19, series of
1994, dated April 15, 1994.
Pursuant to said ordinance, [Cebu City] filed a
Complaint for Eminent Domain [before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City] against [the
spouses Ortega], docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
16577.
On March 13, 1998, the [RTC] issued an order
declaring that [Cebu City] has the lawful right to take
the property subject of the instant case, for public use
or purpose described in the complaint upon payment
of just compensation.
Based on the recommendation of the appointed
Commissioners (one of whom was the City Assessor of
[Cebu City], the [RTC] issued another Order dated
May 21, 1999, fixing the value of the land subject to
expropriation at ELEVEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P11,000.00) per square meter and ordering [Cebu
City] to pay [Spouses Ortega] the sum of THIRTY ONE
MILLION AND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P31,416,000.00) as just compensation for the
expropriated portion of Lot No. 310-B.
The Decision of the [RTC] became final and executory
because of [Cebu Citys] failure to perfect an appeal on
time, and a Writ of Execution was issued on
September 17, 1999 to enforce the courts judgment.
Upon motion of [the Spouses Ortega], the [RTC]
issued an Order dated March 11, 2002, quoted as
follows:
Reading of the aforestated resolution shows that the
City Council of Cebu approved Ordinance No. 1519
appropriating the sum of P3,284,400.00 for payment
of the subject lot chargeable to Account No. 101-
8918-334.
In view thereof, the above-mentioned sum is now
subject for execution or garnishment for the same is
no longer exempt from execution.
[Cebu City] filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay
Execution, Modification of Judgment and Withdrawal
of the Case, contending that the price set by the [RTC]
as just compensation to be paid to [the Spouses
Ortega] is way beyond the reach of its intended
beneficiaries for its socialized housing program. The
motion was denied by the [RTC]. [Cebu Citys] Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
By virtue of the Order of the [RTC], dated July 2, 2003,
x x x Sheriff Benigno B. Reas[,] Jr. served a Notice of
Garnishment to Philippine Postal Bank, P. del Rosario
and Junquera Branch Cebu City, garnishing [Cebu
Citys] bank deposit therein.
 e. Due Process and Eminent Domain Digested Cases
Hence, [Cebu City] filed the instant Petition for
Certiorari before [the CA] (CA-G.R. SP NO. 80187).
During the pendency of x x x CA-G.R. SP NO. 80187,
[Cebu City] filed before the [RTC] a Motion to
Dissolve, Quash or Recall the Writ of Garnishment,
contending that Account No. 101-8918-334
mentioned in Ordinance No. 1519 is not actually an
existing bank account and that the garnishment of
[Cebu Citys] bank account with Philippine Postal Bank
was illegal, because government funds and properties
may not be seized under writ of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgment, on obvious
reason of public policy. The [RTC] issued an Order
dated March 8, 2004, denying said motion. [Cebu
Citys] Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.
[The Spouses Ortega] filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Direct the New Manager of Philippine Postal Bank to
Release to the Sheriff the Garnished Amount, which
was granted by the [RTC]. [Cebu City] filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, [Cebu City] filed another Petition for Certiorari
(CA-G.R. SP NO. 00147) [with the Court of Appeals].
Ruling on the petitions for certiorari, the CA disposed
of the cases, to wit:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered,
the instant Petitions for Certiorari are hereby
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the [RTC]
[Assailed Orders dated March 11, 2002 and July 2,
2003, respectively, in CA-G.R SP NO. 80187] are
hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE insofar as they
denied [Cebu Citys] Motion to Stay Execution, but
they are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as they denied
[Cebu Citys] Motion to Modify Judgment and
Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings.
Furthermore, the assailed Orders of the [RTC dated
March 8, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 00147] are hereby
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Let the Decision of the
[RTC] be executed in a manner prescribed by
applicable law and jurisprudence. SO ORDERED.
Hence, these consolidated appeals by petitioners
Cebu City and the Spouses Ortega positing the
following issues:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs denial
of Cebu Citys Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment
and to be Allowed to Withdraw from the
Expropriation Proceedings.
2. Whether the deposit of Cebu City with the
Philippine Postal Bank, appropriated for a different
purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be
subject to garnishment as payment for the
expropriated lot covered by City Ordinance No. 1519.
We deny both petitions.
On the first issue, the CA did not err in affirming the
RTCs Order that the expropriation case had long been
final and executory. Consequently, both the Order of
expropriation and the Order fixing just compensation
by the RTC can no longer be modified. In short, Cebu
City cannot withdraw from the expropriation
proceedings.
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on
Expropriation provides:
SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and
the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate the property are overruled, or when no
party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the
court may issue an order of expropriation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated, for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as
of the date of the taking of the property or the filing
of the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the
property may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the
court from determining the just compensation to be
paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall
not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the
proceeding except on such terms as the court deems
just and equitable.
Plainly, from the aforequoted provision,
expropriation proceedings speak of two (2) stages,
i.e.:
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. This ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, of condemnation [or order of
expropriation] declaring that the plaintiff has the
lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint; and
 e. Due Process and Eminent Domain Digested Cases
2. Determination by the court of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.
We held in the recent case of Republic v. Phil-Ville
Development and Housing Corporation that:
[A]n order of expropriation denotes the end of the
first stage of expropriation. Its end then paves the
way for the second stage: the determination of just
compensation, and, ultimately, payment. An order of
expropriation puts an end to any ambiguity regarding
the right of the petitioner to condemn the
respondents properties. Because an order of
expropriation merely determines the authority to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not hinge
on the payment of just compensation. After all, there
would be no point in determining just compensation
if, in the first place, the plaintiffs right to expropriate
the property was not first clearly established.
Conversely, as is evident from the foregoing, an
order by the trial court fixing just compensation does
not affect a prior order of expropriation. As applied
to the case at bar, Cebu City can no longer ask for
modification of the judgment, much less, withdraw its
complaint, after it failed to appeal even the first stage
of the expropriation proceedings.
Cebu City is adamant, however, that it should be
allowed to withdraw its complaint as the just
compensation fixed by the RTC is too high, and the
intended expropriation of the Spouses Ortegas
property is dependent on whether Cebu City would
have sufficient funds to pay for the same.
We cannot subscribe to Cebu Citys ridiculous
contention.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the
determination of just compensation is a judicial
prerogative. In Export Processing Zone Authority v.
Dulay, we declared:
The determination of just compensation in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation
of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order
can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the just-ness of the
decreed compensation.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which
eliminates the courts discretion to appoint
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise
would be to undermine the very purpose why this
Court exists in the first place.
Likewise, in the recent cases of National Power
Corporation v. dela Cruz and Forfom Development
Corporation v. Philippine National Railways, we
emphasized the primacy of judicial prerogative in the
ascertainment of just compensation as aided by the
appointed commissioners, to wit:
Though the ascertainment of just compensation is a
judicial prerogative, the appointment of
commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the
property sought to be taken is a mandatory
requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true
that the findings of commissioners may be
disregarded and the trial court may substitute its
own estimate of the value, it may only do so for valid
reasons; that is, where the commissioners have
applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to
them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount
allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.
Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a
substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all.
As regards the second issue raised by the Spouses
Ortega, we quote with favor the CAs disquisition
thereon, to wit:
While the claim of [the Spouses Ortega] against
[Cebu City] is valid, the [RTC] cannot, by itself, order
the City Council of [Cebu City] to enact an
appropriation ordinance in order to satisfy its
judgment.
The proper remedy of [the Spouses Ortega] is to file a
mandamus case against [Cebu City] in order to
compel its Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact an
appropriation ordinance for the satisfaction of [the
Spouses Ortegas] claim. This remedy is provided in the
case of Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals,
which provides:
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private
respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse.
Where a municipality fails or refuses, without
justifiable reason[s], to effect payment of a final
money judgment rendered against it, the claimant
may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to
compel the enactment and approval of the necessary
 e. Due Process and Eminent Domain Digested Cases

appropriation ordinance and the corresponding The foregoing rules find application in the case at bar.
disbursement of municipal funds therefor. While the Sangguniang Panglungsod of petitioner
enacted Ordinance No. 1519 appropriating the sum of
The Sangguniang Panglungsod of [Cebu City] enacted P3,284,400.00 for payment of just compensation for
Ordinance No. 1519, appropriating the sum of the expropriated land, such ordinance cannot be
P3,284,400.00 for payment of just compensation for considered as a source of authority for the [RTC] to
the expropriated land, chargeable to Account No. 101- garnish [Cebu Citys] bank account with Philippine
8918-334. Postal Bank, which was already appropriated for
another purpose. [Cebu Citys] account with Philippine
Pursuant to such ordinance, the [RTC] issued an order
Postal Bank was not specifically opened for the
dated March 11, 2002, which was the basis for the
payment of just compensation nor was it specifically
issuance of the Writ of Garnishment, garnishing [Cebu
appropriated by Ordinance No. 1519 for such
Citys] bank account with Philippine Postal Bank.
purpose. Said account, therefore, is exempt from
However, Philippine Postal Bank issued a Certification garnishment.
dated February 7, 2005, certifying that Account No. 8-
Since the [RTC] has no authority to garnish [Cebu
93-310 (Continuing Account) and Account No. 101-
Citys] other bank accounts in order to satisfy its
8918-334 intended for purchase of lot for various
judgment, consequently, it has no authority to order
projects are not bank account numbers with
the release of [Cebu Citys] other deposits with
Philippine Postal Bank.
Philippine Postal Bank x x x.
It is a settled rule that government funds and
Even assuming that Cebu City Ordinance No. 1519
properties may not be seized under writs of
actually appropriated the amount of P3,284,400.00
execution or garnishment to satisfy judgments,
for payment of just compensation ─ thus, within the
based on obvious consideration of public policy.
reach of a writ of garnishment issued by the trial court
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
─ there remains the inescapable fact that the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
Philippine Postal Bank account referred to in the
functions and public services rendered by the State
ordinance does not actually exist, as certified to by
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
the Bank. Accordingly, no writ of garnishment may be
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
validly issued against such non-existent account with
specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Philippine Postal Bank. This circumstance translates to
In Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, where a situation where there is no valid appropriation
the Municipality of Makati enacted an ordinance ordinance.
appropriating certain sum of money as payment for
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 181562-63 and
the land the municipality expropriated, chargeable to
181583-84 are hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 deposited in PNB
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 80187 and 00147
Buendia Branch, the Supreme Court held that the trial
is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
court has no authority to garnish the Municipalitys
ORDERED.
other bank account (Account No. S/A 263-530850-7)
in order to cover the deficiency in Account No. S/A
265-537154-3, even if both accounts are in the same
branch of the PNB. In said case, the Supreme Court CASE #3
held:
G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 576
Absent any showing that the municipal council of
Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO vs. JOVITO M. LUIS
its public funds an amount corresponding to the
FACTS:
balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4,
1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in The City of Pasig had taken the parcel of land of Luis
Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under and used the same as municipal road now known as
execution may be validly effected on the public funds Sandoval Avenue. After 16 years, Mayor Eusebio
of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263- informed Luis that Pasig City cannot pay him more
530850-7. than the amount set by the Appraisal Committee.
Thereafter, Luis filed an action for reconveyance.
 e. Due Process and Eminent Domain Digested Cases
Mayor Eusebio contended that Luis’ action for just
compensation for the property taken for public use is
already barred by prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether Luis’ action to claim just compensation for
the property taken for public use is already barred by
prescription.
HELD:
NO. Where private property is taken by the
government for public use without first acquiring
title either through expropriation or negotiated sale,
the owner’s action to recover the land or the value
thereof does not prescribe.
The failure for a long time of the owner to question
the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a
property that the government had taken constitutes
a waiver of his right to gain back possession.
CASE #4
City of Iloilo vs Contreras-Besana
FACTS:
 On September 18, 1981, City of Iloilo filed a
complaint for eminent domain against Elpidio
Javellana and Southern Negros Development
Bank (as mortgagee). It sought to expropriate
two parcels of land registered in Javellana’s
name to be used as a school site for Lapaz
High School. City of Iloilo alleged that the
Subject Property declared to have a value of
P60.00 per square meter or a total value of
P43,560.
 Javellana admitted ownership of the Subject
Property but denied petitioner’s public
purpose because there was already an
existing school site for Lapaz High School. He
also claimed that the true fair market value of
the property was no less than P220 per
square meter.
 City of Iloilo filed a Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Possession, alleging that it had
deposited the amount of P40,000.00 with the
Philippine National Bank-Iloilo Branch.
Petitioner claimed that it was entitled to the
immediate possession of the Subject
Property, citing Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1533, after it had deposited an
amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of
compensation.
 Javellana filed an Opposition to the Motion for
the Issuance of Writ of Possession citing the
same grounds he raised in his Answer – that
the city already had a vast tract of land where
its existing school site was located, and the
deposit of a mere 10% of the Subject
Property’s tax valuation was grossly
inadequate.
 On May 17, 1983, the trial court issued an
Order which granted petitioner’s Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession and authorized
the petitioner to take immediate possession
of the Subject Property. The Subject Property
was used as the site for Lapaz National High
School.
 Sixteen years later, on April 17, 2000,
Javellana filed an Ex Parte
Motion/Manifestation, where he alleged that
when he finally sought to withdraw
the P40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the
petitioner, he discovered that no such deposit
was ever made. This was supported by PNB.
He demanded his just compensation as well
as interest.
 City of Iloilo could not present any evidence to
prove that they payment was made to
Javellana.
 Javellana filed a Complaint against petitioner
for Recovery of Possession, Fixing and
Recovery of Rental and Damages. He alleges
that since he was not compensated,
petitioner’s possession was illegal and he was
entitled to recovery of possession of his lots.
He prayed that petitioner be ordered to
vacate the Subject Property and pay rentals
amounting to P15,000.00 per month together
with moral, exemplary, and actual damages,
as well as attorney’s fees.
 City of Iloilo argued that Javellana could no
longer bring an action for recovery since the
Subject Property was already taken for public
use. Rather, private respondent could only
demand for the payment of just
compensation. The legality of possession of
property should be determined in the eminent
domain case and not in a separate action for
recovery of possession (but later on the two
cases were consolidated).
 A commission was created to determine the
just compensation due to Javellana.
RTC issued the following orders, which overturned
its May 17, 1983 decision:
 e. Due Process and Eminent Domain Digested Cases

 First Assailed Order: This order nullified the following:

issuance of writ of possession over the subject
property. City of Iloilo is ordered to
immediately deposit with the PNB the 10% of
the just compensation after Commission shall
have rendered its report and have
determined the value of the property not at
the time it was condemned but at the time
the complaint was filed in court.
 Second Assailed Order: This is an amendment
of the First Order. It maintained the First
Order except that the reckoning point for just
compensation was not the “time this order
was issued,” which is June 15, 2004.
o City of Iloilo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration claiming that there
was no legal basis for the issuance of
the Second Assailed Order.
o Javellana opposition: They were
interlocutory in character, there were
always subject to modification and
revision by the court anytime.
 Third Assailed Order: This order denied City
of Iloilo’s Motion for Reconsideration and
upholds the Second Assailed Order. In the
interest of justice, the Court said that it can
amend their decision because there was no
deposit made by petitioner. The just
compensation must be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint is true if
there was a deposit.
 Recommendation of the Commission:
Value per
Reckoning
square Fair Market Value Basis
Point
meter
o (1) the trial court gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in overturning the
Order dated May 17, 1983, which was
already a final order; and
o (2) just compensation for the
expropriation should be based on the
Subject Property’s fair market value
either at the time of taking or filing of
the complaint.
 Javellana’s counter-arguments:
o (1) there was no error of jurisdiction
correctible by certiorari; and
o (2) that the Assailed Orders were
interlocutory orders that were subject
to amendment and nullification at the
discretion of the court.
ISSUE1:
Does an order of expropriation become final?
HELD/RATIO1: YES, trial court gravely erred in
nullifying the May 17, 1983 Order (through the First,
Second, and Third Assailed Orders).
Expropriation proceedings have two stages:
1) FIRST PHASE: ends with an order of dismissal
or a determination that the property is to be
acquired for public purpose.
2) SECOND PHASE: consists of the determination
of just compensation. It ends with an order
fixing the amount to be paid to the
landowner.

An order of condemnation or dismissal is final,

1981 - at
the time based on three or more resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff
recorded sales
P110.00/sq
the P79,860.00 of similar types of landhas
in theproperly
vicinity in and legally exercised its power of
m
complaint the same year
was filed
eminent domain. It may have been appealable but
Javellana did not bother to file an appeal from May
17, 1983 Order. Thus, it became final and no longer
1981 – at Appraisal by Southern
subjectNegros
to review.
the time Development Bank based on market
P686.81/sq
the P498,625.22 value, zonal value, appraised value of
m
complaint other banks, recent ISSUE2:
selling price of
was filed neighboring lots
What is the correct reckoning point for the
determination of just compensation?
P3,500.00/s Appraisal by the City Appraisal
2002 P2,541,000.00
qm Committee, Office of the City Assessor
HELD/RATIO2: The date when the expropriation
complaint was filed – on September 18, 1981.
P4,200.00/s Private Appraisal Report (Atty. Roberto
2004 P3,049,200.00
qm Cal Catolico dated AprilBased
6, 2004)on jurisprudence,
just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the taking, which
 In this case, City of Iloilo is claiming the usually coincides with the commencement of the
 e. Due Process and Eminent Domain Digested Cases
expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of
the action precedes entry into the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of
the filing of the complaint.
Javellana claims that the reckoning date should be in
2004 because of the "clear injustice to the private
respondent who all these years has been deprived of
the beneficial use of his properties." Javellana also
slept on his rights for over 18 years and did not bother
to check with the PNB if a deposit was actually made
by the petitioner. Evidently, from his inaction in failing
to withdraw or even verify the amounts purportedly
deposited, private respondent not only accepted the
valuation made by the petitioner, but also was not
interested enough to pursue the expropriation case
until the end. As such, private respondent may not
recover possession of the Subject Property, but is
entitled to just compensation.
However, the City of Iloilo should be held liable for
damages for taking private respondent’s property
without payment of just compensation. It is high time
that private respondent be paid what was due him
after almost 30 years.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is granted. Orders of RTC are
annulled and set aside
The Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 32 is
DIRECTED to immediately determine the just
compensation due to private respondent Elpidio T.
Javellana based on the fair market value of the
Subject Property at the time Civil Case No. 14052 was
filed, or on September 18, 1981 with interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time
of filing until full payment is made.
The City of Iloilo is ORDERED to pay private
respondent the amount of P200,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
CASE #5
Republic vs Mangotara
CASE #6
G.R. No. 185091 August 8, 2010
Republic of the Philippines vs Mendoza
SECOND DIVISION
x -------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of filing an ejectment
suit against the Government for its failure to acquire
ownership of a privately owned property that it had
long used as a school site and to pay just
compensation for it.
The Facts and the Case
Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school
operated by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (the
Republic) through the Department of Education. PPS
has been using 1,149 square meters of land in Lipa
City, Batangas since 1957 for its school. But the
property, a portion of Lots 1923 and 1925, were
registered in the name of respondents Primo and
Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas) under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) T-11410.
On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923
and 1925 to be consolidated and subdivided into four
lots, as follows:
Lot 1 – 292 square meters in favor of Claudia
Dimayuga
Lot 2 – 292 square meters in favor of the Mendozas
Lot 3 – 543 square meters in favor of Gervacio
Ronquillo; and
Lot 4 – 1,149 square meters in favor of the City
Government of Lipa
As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds
partially cancelled TCT T-11410 and issued new titles
for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo,
respectively. Lot 2 remained in the name of the
Mendozas but no new title was issued in the name of
the City Government of Lipa for Lot 4. Meantime,
PPS remained in possession of the property.
The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in
the name of the City Government of Lipa, the
Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the
school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and
subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been
tax-declared in the name of the City Government and
PPS built significant, permanent improvements on the
 e. Due Process and Eminent Domain Digested Cases
same. These improvements had also been tax-
declared.
The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that
although PPS sought permission from them to use the
property as a school site, they never relinquished
their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupy the
property since they had no need for it at that time.
Thus, it has remained registered in their name under
the original title, TCT T-11410, which had only been
partially cancelled.
On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS,
demanding that it vacate the disputed property.
When PPS declined to do so, on January 12, 1999 the
Mendozas filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-
99 against PPS for unlawful detainer with application
for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction.
On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision,
dismissing the complaint on ground of the Republic’s
immunity from suit. The Mendozas appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City which ruled that
the Republic’s consent was not necessary since the
action before the MTCC was not against it.
In light of the RTC’s decision, the Mendozas filed with
the MTCC a motion to render judgment in the case
before it. The MTCC denied the motion, however,
saying that jurisdiction over the case had passed to
the RTC upon appeal. Later, the RTC remanded the
case back to the MTCC, which then dismissed the case
for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the
Mendozas once again appealed to the RTC in Civil
Case 2001-0236.
On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the
Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the property. It
held that the Mendozas had the better right of
possession since they were its registered owners.
PPS, on the other hand, could not produce any
document to prove the transfer of ownership of the
land in its favor. PPS moved for reconsideration, but
the RTC denied it.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision to the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds
that: (1) the Mendozas were barred by laches from
recovering possession of the school lot; (2) sufficient
evidence showed that the Mendozas relinquished
ownership of the subject lot to the City Government
of Lipa City for use as school; and (3) Lot 4, Pcs-5019
has long been declared in the name of the City
Government since 1957 for taxation purposes.
In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision. Upholding the Torrens
system, it emphasized the indefeasibility of the
Mendozas’ registered title and the imprescriptible
nature of their right to eject any person occupying
the property. The CA held that, this being the case,
the Republic’s possession of the property through PPS
should be deemed merely a tolerated one that could
not ripen into ownership.
The CA also rejected the Republic’s claim of ownership
since it presented no documentary evidence to prove
the transfer of the property in favor of the
government. Moreover, even assuming that the
Mendozas relinquished their right to the property in
1957 in the government’s favor, the latter never took
steps to have the title to the property issued in its
name or have its right as owner annotated on the
Mendozas’ title. The CA held that, by its omissions,
the Republic may be held in estoppel to claim that the
Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing its
action.
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the
Republic has taken recourse to this Court via petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The Issue Presented
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in
holding that the Mendozas were entitled to evict the
Republic from the subject property that it had used
for a public school.
The Court’s Ruling
A decree of registration is conclusive upon all
persons, including the Government of the Republic
and all its branches, whether or not mentioned by
name in the application for registration or its notice.
Indeed, title to the land, once registered, is
imprescriptible. No one may acquire it from the
registered owner by adverse, open, and notorious
possession. Thus, to a registered owner under the
Torrens system, the right to recover possession of
the registered property is equally imprescriptible
since possession is a mere consequence of
ownership.
Here, the existence and genuineness of the
Mendozas’ title over the property has not been
disputed. While the consolidation and subdivision
plan of Lots 1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149 square
 e. Due Process and Eminent Domain Digested Cases

meter lot had been designated to the City
Government, the Republic itself admits that no new
title was issued to it or to any of its subdivisions for
the portion that PPS had been occupying since 1957.
That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the
property and its improvements in its name cannot
defeat the Mendozas’ title. This Court has allowed
tax declarations to stand as proof of ownership only
in the absence of a certificate of title. Otherwise,
they have little evidentiary weight as proof of
ownership.
The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS
from the property that it had held as government
school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on
record shows that the Mendozas intended to cede the
property to the City Government of Lipa permanently.
In fact, they allowed the city to declare the property
in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought in
1962 to have the bigger lot subdivided into four, the
Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing 1,149 square
meters, for the City Government of Lipa. Under the
circumstances, it may be assumed that the Mendozas
agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the
government, whether to the City Government of Lipa
or to the Republic, way back but never got around to
do so and the Republic itself altogether forgot about
it. Consequently, the Republic should be deemed
entitled to possession pending the Mendozas’ formal
transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just
compensation.
taken without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery
of possession before the commencement of
expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the
property at the time of taking that is controlling.
Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to
evict the Republic from the land it had taken for
public use or to hear and adjudicate the Mendozas’
right to just compensation for it, the CA should have
ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer
dismissed without prejudice to their filing a proper
action for recovery of such compensation.
WHEREFORE, the Court partially GRANTS the petition,
REVERSES the February 26, 2008 decision and the
October 20, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. 96604, and ORDERS the dismissal of
respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza’s action for
eviction before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 without prejudice to
their filing an action for payment of just
compensation against the Republic of the Philippines
or, when appropriate, against the City of Lipa.

The Court holds that, where the owner agrees

voluntarily to the taking of his property by the
government for public use, he thereby waives his
right to the institution of a formal expropriation
proceeding covering such property. Further, as the
Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis, the failure for a
long time of the owner to question the lack of
expropriation proceedings covering a property that
the government had taken constitutes a waiver of
his right to gain back possession. The Mendozas’
remedy is an action for the payment of just
compensation, not ejectment.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the

Court affirmed the RTC’s power to award just
compensation even in the absence of a proper
expropriation proceeding. It held that the RTC can
determine just compensation based on the evidence
presented before it in an ordinary civil action for
recovery of possession of property or its value and
damages. As to the time when just compensation
should be fixed, it is settled that where property was