PEOPLE vs.

CERILLA

FACTS:

Joemarie Cerilla allegedly shot Alexander Parreo multiple times. Before Parreo died, he repeatedly told
his daughter Michelle that it was Joemarie who shot him. SPO3 Dequito was able to ask Alexander who
shot him to which he answered Pato. Pato is an alias by which appellant is known.

Appellant interposed alibi as his main defense. He claimed that Alexander, together with his daughter
and Sendin, had gone to his house on 24 April 1998 at around 6:00 p.m. where they were welcomed and
offered snacks. They were having a conversation when a blackout occurred. Alexander then asked
permission to leave. After the visitors had left, appellant ordered his stepdaughter Franlin to buy candle
at the store across their house. Appellant and Madoline posted themselves at their doorway holding a
flashlight to light Franlins path. Upon Franlins return to the house, appellant heard an explosion and he
immediately closed the door. Later, the policemen went to his house and told him that he was a suspect
in the shooting of Alexander and was then brought to the police station.

RTC found Cerilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court regarded the victims dying declaration
as the most telling evidence pointing to appellant as the assailant. The trial court ruled that appellants
alibi and denial could not prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses.

CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution’s testimony is credible.

HELD:

Yes, the testimony is credible due to the presentation of the victim’s dying declaration.

As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is
evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending
death would make a careless and false accusation. It is thus admissible to provide the identity of the
accused and the deceased, to show the cause of death of the deceased, and the circumstances under
which the assault was made upon him. The reasons for its admissibility is necessity and trustworthiness.
Necessity, because the declarants death renders it impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often
happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; allowing it, therefore, prevents a
failure of justice. And trustworthiness, because the declaration is made in extremity, when the party is
at the point of death and when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the
most powerful considerations to speak the truth. The law considers the point of death as a situation so
solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in
court.
PEOPLE vs. BERNAL

FACTS:

Two men arrived, approached Bienvenido Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was Payat. When he
said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him not
to run because they were policemen and because he had an atraso or a score to settle with them. They
then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the
latters mother of the abduction. The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain
Salito Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernals wife Naty and this
was the motive behind the formers kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.

The defense of Bernal asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police, and hence, was
never kidnapped.

RTC ruled Theodore Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping.

Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses allegedly
illusory testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a declaration against interest that is admissible

HELD:

A certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in January 1991,
Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernals wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even
gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty not to do it again
because she (was) a married woman. Undoubtedly, his wifes infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to
contemplate revenge. Openda, Jr.s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernals
wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:

Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made
so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made
the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3)
that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his
aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to
be true.

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to
Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime,
is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own
detriment.

TANDOG vs. MACAPAGAL

FACTS:

Petitioners claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the land since time immemorial. They trace their rights to
Casimiro Policarpio, unmarried, who died in 1945.

When petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the property, they found that portions
of the land have been occupied by spouses Alfonso and Marina Calderon and Renato Macapagal,
respondents. According to petitioners, spouses Calderon used falsified documents to justify their
possession of 20,116 square meters of the land which they sold to the government. This led to
petitioners’ filing for a complaint to quieting of title.

Respondent Marina Calderon, in her answer, specifically denied petitioners’ allegations in their
complaint. She alleged that she and her husband bought their property in 1958 and, since then, have
been in possession of the same.

RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling, saying that the testimonies presented are on the
whole hearsay and unreliable as to the existence and right of the amorphous Casimero Policarpio and
the hereditary link between him and the appellants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners’ testimonial evidence is admissible

HELD:

The Court ruled that it is not admissible.

It is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. Petitioners failed to do so. Parenthetically, they did
not present any evidence to prove that Casimiro Policarpio "existed" and that he is their predecessor-in-
interest. Their testimonies can not be considered declarations about pedigree. In order that pedigree
may be proved by acts or declarations of relatives under Section 39 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, it is
necessary that (a) the actor or declarant is dead or unable to testify; (b) the act or declaration is made
by a person related to the subject by birth or marriage; (c) the relationship between the declarant or the
actor and the subject is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration; and (d) the act or
declaration was made ante litem motam, or prior to the controversy.

GRAVADOR vs. MAMIGO

FACTS:

Petitioner Pedro Gravador, principal of Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental,
was advised of his separation from service on the ground that reached the compulsory age of 65. A few
days later, respondent Eutiquio Mamigo was designated teacher-in-charge of the said elementary
school.

Gravador wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that the
date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901.

The controversy on the petitioner's date of birth arose as a result of the conflicting records of the
Division of Schools of Negros Oriental. On the one hand the pre-war records show his date of birth to be
November 26, 1897. These records consist of two Insular Teachers Cards and one Employee's Record
Card. It is on the basis of these records that the Superintendent of Schools determined the petitioner's
age to be 66 years, 8 months and 22 days on August 15, 1964.

On the other hand, the post-war records, consisting of an Elementary Teacher's Report Card, an
Employee's Record Card, and an Employee's Record of Qualifications, state that the petitioner was born
on Dec. 11, 1901. These are the records on which the petitioner bases his claim.

The problem is aggravated by two uncontroverted facts, namely, that the records of the church where
the petitioner was baptized were destroyed by fire, and that the municipal civil register contains no
record of the petitioner's birth.

Gravador eventually filed this suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental. He asked the court to adjudge him entitled to the office of principal of the
Sta. Catalina Elementary School and to order payment to him of not only his back salaries but also
damages in the total amount of P52,400. Named as respondents were Eutiquio Mamigo, the District
Supervisor, the Superintendent of Schools, the Director of Public Schools and the Secretary of Education.

The trial court concluded that the petitioner was born on December 11, 1901 accordingly granted his
petition. Immediate execution was ordered, as a result of which the petitioner was reinstated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gravador’s birthdate is on Dec. 11, 1901 and not November 26, 1897.

HELD:

The Court ruled that Gravador’s birthdate is on Dec. 11, 1901.

The import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother, contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral
case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Made
ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree
within the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of
family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.

TECSON ET AL. vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter
"FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines
under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated
his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his
place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F.
Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being
an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on
two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ.

On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January
2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,

ISSUE:

Whether or not FPJ is related to Allan F. Poe.

HELD:

Yes, FPJ is related to Allan F. Poe.

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be
deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The
Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have
preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence
could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from
being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to
testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person
whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and
(e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children
(including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family

JISON vs. CA

FACTS:

Monina alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison. At the end of 1945,
however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of
Francisco’s daughter. As a result, Monina was born in Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family.
Monina further alleged that Francisco gave her support and spent for her education, such that she
obtained a Master's degree, became a CPA and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of
Francisco's refusal to expressly recognize her, Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate
status and that Francisco support and treat her as such.

Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period
specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of
her whereabouts since then. Further, he never recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, as his
illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, Francisco contended that MONINA had no right or
cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He
thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the
complaint.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Monina Jison is the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the latter's
own acts and those of his family

HELD:

SC affirmed the decision of CA in recognizing Monina as illegitimate daughter of Francisco.

The letters were not admissible to prove pedigree, but it may be admitted to prove her allegation that
Francisco’s relatives recognized her as the latter’s daughter. While it is true that the authenticity of the
letters were not contested, these were not admissible to prove pedigree because (1) the relatives of the
Petitioner were not shown to be dead or unable to testify and (2) the relationship between Monina and
theauthors of these letters were not shown by any document other than the letters. Under Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the relatives who were purported to be theauthors of the said letters
must take the witness stand for the evidence to be admitted. But even if they were presented as
witnesses, the letters cannot be admitted. Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that “Entries
in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like may be
received as evidence of pedigree.” The letters were not within the scope of “and the like” because they
were not private documents constituting family possessions.The Court affirmed the Decision of the
Court of Appeals and concluded,based on the other evidence, that Monina is an illegitimate daughter of
Francisco

PEOPLE vs. NER

FACTS:

While he was in his apartment at No. 2036-C Anacleto Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, on May 17, 1964, at
about 10:00 p.m., Jose de Leon (nicknamed Boy) was shot and sustained several wounds in different
parts of the body, as a consequence of which, he died soon thereafter.

Later, the corresponding information for murder was filed against Roberto Ner y Feliciano (nicknamed
“Bobby” and “Pirate”), who allegedly killed Jose de Leon "conspiring and confederating with two (2)
others, whose true names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown", although the complaint filed
with the office of the City Fiscal of Manila named Valentino Villanueva and Jose Lopena as the persons
who had thus assisted Ner in the commission of the crime. After due trial, under a plea of not guilty, the
lower court convicted and sentenced Ner as above stated. Thereupon, Ner moved for a new trial, upon
the ground of newly discovered evidence, but the motion was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Roberto Ner is guilty of the crime

HELD:

The Court held Ner to be guilty.

The defense insists that the testimony of Patrolman Tiong concerning his conversation with Angelina
Viray should be disregarded as hearsay, for Angelina did not take the witness stand. Said conversation
took place in Boy's apartment, on May 17, 1964, between 10:09 and 10:30 p.m., or immediately after
the occurrence, and referred to the circumstances surrounding the same. At that time, Angelina had
not, as yet, fully recovered from the effects of the assassination of her common-law husband,
practically, if not actually, before her own eyes. In fact, she was not only crying; she had, also, been
repeatedly saying, almost hysterically, that Boy had been shot by "Pirate". Tiong's testimony about the
statements then made by her, before she could deliberated on the events that had transpired a few
minutes before, was properly admitted under Sec. 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to
which:

... Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of the
RES GESTAE. ...

Indeed, it has been held:

... that declarations which are the natural emanations or outgrowths of the act or occurrence in
litigation, although not precisely concurrent in point of time, if they were yet voluntarily and
spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they
illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of
design or deliberation, must, upon the clearest principles of justice, be admissible as part of the act or
transaction itself.

It is true that, in saying that Boy had been shot by Pirate, Angelina did not explain to Patrolman Tiong
whether or not she had seen the latter in the act of firing, although she said so in an affidavit made by
her in the City Fiscal's office. Her story to Patrolman Tiong indicated, however, that she had seen
appellant and Boy talking in the living room of his apartment, shortly before the shooting, and that,
accordingly, she had personal knowledge of appellant's presence at the scene of the occurrence.

The fact that Angelina's statement to Tiong was part of her narration, prompted by his questions about
the details of the occurrence, does not detract from the spontaneity of her statement. All that is
required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made under the
influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he had time to
think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without
any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate
attending circumstances
PEOPLE vs. SANCHEZ

FACTS:

Danilo Sanchez was charged for the crime of arson, to which he pleaded as not guilty, so trial
commenced.

The lone eyewitness, Mr. Elpidio Nepuscua, could no longer be presented because he died on 13
December 1982. He, however, signed a statement on 24 November 1982 before an investigator of the
Integrated National Police of Aguilar, Pangasinan wherein he implicated the accused as the person who
burned the house.

According to Julieta Nepuscia, widow of Elpidio, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1982,
her husband arrived at the house of Filomena and related to her that "on that evening of November 22,
1982, there were four (4) persons who went near our house and they were carrying with them rice
stalks or hay and then one of them called out, saying "Tatay, tatay, bangon kayo ta ansakit so eges nen
nanay, iyacar tayo ed hospital", which means, "Father, father wake up because my mother is suffering
from stomach (sic) ache and we will rush her to the hospital." He further told her that on that same
evening, Danilo Sanchez went up to the balcony of their house carrying with him one (1) bundle of rice
hay which he then set on fire thus causing the burning of their house.

Trial court ruled to convict Sanchez for the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sanchez is guilty of the crime of arson

HELD:

The Court ruled to acquit Sanchez.

The so-called statement uttered by Elpidio Nepuscua to his wife Julieta at about 4:00 o'clock in the
morning of 23 November 1982, or four (4) hours after the burning, implicating accused, should not have
been admitted as part of the res gestae.

Section 42 of Rule 130 provides:

Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately

prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res
gestae.

In the light of the foregoing principle on res gestae and the settled jurisprudence thereon, The Court
finds the questioned statement of Elpidio Nepuscua to his wife to be lacking in spontaneity and to have
been given after he had the luxury of time to concoct a story or fabricate an account.
PEOPLE vs. AMACA

FACTS:

An Information was filed against Edelciano Amaca for the crime of murder for killing Wilson Vergara.

During trial, Bernardo Mangubat, member of the Philippine National Police of Canlaon City, testified that
as a police investigator one of his companions in the force fetched him from his residence at about 7:00
in the evening of October 1, 1990, and informed him of a shooting incident, where the victim was at the
clinic of Dr. Cardenas, which was near his residence. Upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, he saw
the victim already on board a Ford Fiera pick up ready for transport to the hospital. He inquired from the
victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query
why he was shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to
his condition, the victim said that he was about to die. (TSN, p. 22, March 4, 1992) Upon being asked,
the victim identified himself as Nelson (sic) Vergara. He was able to reduce into writing the declaration
of victim Vergara, and have the latter affixed (sic) his thumbmark with the use of his own blood in the
presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor. (Exh. C)

Trial court ruled to convict Amaca for the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ante mortem declaration be admitted

HELD:

The ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence when considered as part of the res gestae,
another recognized exception to the hearsay rule provided specifically under Rule 130, Section 36 of the
Rules of Court. The requisites for the admissibility of statements as part of the res gestae are: (a) the
statement is spontaneous; (b) it is made immediately before, during or after a startling occurrence; and
(c) it relates to the circumstances of such occurrence.[27] These requirements are obviously fulfilled in
the present case where the statement, subject of this discussion, was made immediately after the
shooting incident and, more important, the victim had no time to fabricate.

An ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence as a dying declaration and as part of the res
gestae. This dual admissibility is not redundant and has the advantage of ensuring the statements
appreciation by courts, particularly where the absence of one or more elements in one of the said
exceptions may be raised in issue. In this manner, the identification of the culprit is assured.
PEOPLE vs. MANHUYOD

FACTS:

A complaint for rape was filed by Yolanda Manhuyod, accused’s wife and mother of the offended party,
Relanne S. Manhuyod against Restitutio Manhuyod Jr. The victim was 17 years old at that time and she
was subjected to medical examination, which confirms that the crime was indeed consummated.
accused, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Relanne and Yolanda had executed a Joint
Affidavit of Desistance, declaring that they lost interest in the further prosecution of the [case] as the
case arose out of a family conflict which was [already] patched up; thus the prosecution declared that
without the testimonies of the complainants, the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court denied his Motion to Dismiss since the affidavit of desistance was made after the filing of the
information. Both Yolanda and Relanne failed to appear both in the Pre Trial and the Trial proper.
Relanne and Yolanda had left for Cebu probably to elude arrest after having learned from both the print
and broadcast media that the court had ordered their arrest for being cited in contempt.

The following exhibits were offered: (1) A, the complaint sheet accomplished and filed by Yolanda with
the NBI, CEVRO; (2) B, the sworn statement of Yolanda given before Atty. Tomarong and subscribed and
sworn to before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995; (3) C, the sworn statement of Relanne given before Atty.
Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995; and (4) D, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Refe. Accused objected to the
admission of Exhibits A, B and C on the ground that they were hearsay, and to Exhibit D on the ground
that the medical certificate was not conclusive as to the commission of rape. Court ruled that the
evidence constitute[d] part of the res gestae, an exception to the hearsay rule. The Court ruled that
Restituto Manhuyod Jr. is guilty of rape

ISSUE:

Whether or not presented evidence constituted part of res gestae and is sufficient basis for his
conviction

HELD:

The Court ruled that it is not part of res gestae.

There are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to
contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediate attending circumstances.

It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical. The following factors are then
considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been
made spontaneously, viz., (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and
the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the
declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the
occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the sttement
itself.

Tested against the foregoing requisites to admit statements as part of the res gestae and factors to test
the spontaneity of the statements, we do not hesitate to rule that the sworn statement of Relanne
(Exhibit "C") fails to qualify as part of the res gestae for these reasons: (1) it was executed only on 8 June
1995, or thirty-six (36) days after the alleged rape on 3 May 1995, providing her more than sufficient
time to concoct or contrive a falsehood; (2) it was made after she had resolved to file a case for rape
against her father, a decision which required much deliberation and would cause her obvious pain as the
filing would expose her to public humiliation and shame, bring dishonor to her family and visit upon her
father the penalty of death; (3) she gave the statement after three critical intervening events had
occurred, viz., her pregnancy, filing the complaint sheet and her being referred to the NBI medico-legal
officer for examination; and (4) it was made far from the place where the principal event — the alleged
rape — was committed, i.e., the latter took place in the De la Paz, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, while the
statement was made in Dipolog City, at the sub-office of the NBI, and any map of Zamboanga del Norte
will show that Tampilisan and Dipolog City do not even adjoin each other.

PEOPLE vs. MANSUETO

FACTS:

Jacinto Pepito was shot to death by an unknown assailant, who escaped in a motorcycle driven by Oscar
Mansueto. Oscar Mansueto was then charged for the crime of murder.

CLEOFE, daughter of Jacinto, testified on the circumstances leading to the death of her father as already
narrated.[5] When asked whether she had a good look (at) the man who was driving the motorcycle,
CLEOFE said that she is familiar with his face because (she) often see(s) him. She further explained that
she had a good view of said driver for about five seconds as he and the gunman sped away. Besides, the
place where the driver waited for the gunman was illuminated by the light coming from a nearby
vulcanizing shop owned by one Arnold Hernandez. She then identified the driver of the motorcycle as
OSCAR, whom she claimed was the paramour of her mother, Moisesa Pepito.

OSCAR disavowed participation in the killing of Jacinto. On the date and time in question, OSCAR
claimed that he was at the poblacion of San Remegio, Cebu, which was about 90 kilometers away from
the locus criminis - Liloan, Cebu. OSCARs activities on the evening of 26 October 1991 started at 6:00
p.m. when he and Moisesa proceeded towards Alesnas carenderia. Along the way, they saw Patrolman
Tan sitting at the police outpost nearby. They had supper at the carinderia. At 7:30 p.m., while Alesna
and her husband left for church, OSCAR and Moisesa went to the second floor with Patrolman Andrino,
who was renting a space thereat, to view a Betamax film. Later, Alesna and her husband arrived and
joined the group. OSCAR and Moisesa left at around 11:00 p.m. Two days later or on 28 October 1991,
his brother informed OSCAR that he was a suspect in the killing of JACINTO. On 31 October 1991, OSCAR
went to the Liloan police station to attest to his presence at San Remegio, Cebu on the night of Jacintos
murder.
Trial court ruled to admit Cleofe’s testimony and convict Oscar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cleofe’s testimony should be admitted

HELD:

The Court ruled to admit Cleofe’s testimony.

Res Gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired
by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not testify and
provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies with the following
requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were
made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.

Since CLEOFE herself testified, there is absolutely no room for the application of the rule on res gestae.
Besides, subject matters not mentioned or are outside the statements or explanations given by the
declarant, in this case CLEOFE, obviously do not form part of the res gestae.

TALIDANO vs. FALCOM MARITIME & ALLIED SERVICES, INC.

FACTS:

Talidano was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. and was
assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven. His 1-year contract of employment commenced on 15 October 1996.
He claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always discriminated and maltreated the Filipino crew. This
prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the officer-in-charge of the International Transport
Federation (ITF) in London, a measure that allegedly was resented by the chief officer, which led to his
dismissal on 21 January 1997. But he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 27 October 1999.

Falcon Maritime countered that Talidano had voluntarily disembarked the vessel after having been
warned several times of dismissal from service for his incompetence, insubordination, disrespect and
insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an incident involving Talidano's incompetence, as proof,
it presented a copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date of incident, as well as a copy of the report of
crew discharge issued by the master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.

The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment favoring Falcon Maritime, but on appeal, the NLRC reversed the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The CA also dismissed the appeal based on technicality.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the fax messages constitute as res gestae

HELD:

The Court ruled that they do not constitute as res gestae.

Section 42 of Rule 130 40 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form part of the res gestae,
namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res gestae is the
startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the resgestae are the statements accompanying the
equivocal act. We find that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae.

To be admissible under the spontaneous statements, it is required that: (1) the principal act be a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or
devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances.

Assuming that Talidano's negligence — which allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its course — is
the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements contained in the fax messages were
made immediately after the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have been mentioned to determine if
these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the critical element of
spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the first kind.

Neither will the verbal acts apply, the requisites are: (1) the principal act to be characterized must be
equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must be material to the issue; (3) the statement must accompany the
equivocal act; and (4) the statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act.

Talidano’s alleged absence from watch duty is simply a harmless act or at least proved to be one.
Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is nevertheless not accompanied by any
statement more so by the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or time has
been mentioned to determine whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with the purported
equivocal act.

Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The matter of route encroachment
or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the fax messages, did not witness the
incident. He obtained such information only from the Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages
can be characterized as double hearsay.