2018 Civil Law Preweek BEDA PDF

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PRE-WEEK NOTES
CIVIL LAW
I
J
2018 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Over-all Chairperson Kates Jastin E. Aguilar
Chairperson for Academics Christine P. Monderin
Chairperson for Hotel Operations Cheska Arla C. Agrupis
Vice Chairfor Operations Mara Clara M. Estrella
Vice Chair for Secretariat Mary Cyriell C. Sumanqui
Vice Chairfor Fina nce Artlyn Gem G. Seftoran
Vice Chair for Audi t. Zaire Xandra M. Reyes
Vice Chairfor Electronic Data Processing Asmenah M. Barambangan
Vice Chairfor Logistics Martin Alec N. Bautista
Vice Chair for Membership Marvie L. Pagcaliwangan
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LAYOUT AND CONTENT EDITORS

Jordan N. Chavez Jecko G. Bello
Roger P. Cuare ma Christopher Lawrence C. Ferriols
Joelle Mae J. Garcia Jean Claudette L. Galvez
Marie Anna Karla M. Regencia Agatha Josephine V. Matabuena
. Jeremy M. Mercader
Dentzen S. Villegas
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW ADMINISTRATION

..... Dean Atty. Virgilio B. Jara.
Vice Dean Atty. Marciano G. Delson
Prefect of Student Affairs Atty. Risel G. Castillo-Taleon
Ad ministrati ve Officer Atty. Francesca Lourdes M. Seftga
Legal Aid Bureau Director . Atty. Peter-Joey B. Usita
· 2018 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS CORE GROUP
OVERALL Carmelo R. Aguilar Jr., Ma. Angelica B. de Leon, Joseph Nicholas R. Serrano ACADEMICS Jecko G.
Bello, Christopher Lawrence C. Ferriols, Jean Claudette L. Galvez, Agatha Josephine V. Matabuena, Jeremy M.
Mernader, Dentzen S. Villegas HOTEL OPERATIONS Dohn Albert E. Arquilizan , Ronalyn A. Gacula, Ruth P.
Balladares: John Paul P. Bartolome, Hannah A. Caceres, Vincent Paul C. David, Lorenzo Thaddeus Ruel D.
Galandines, Tagma sther V. Garabiles, Carlo C. Saplan OPERATIONS Roi Christopher T. Dizon, Ursulaine Grace
C. Feliciano, Ferdinand Elbert D. Jomilla Jr., Lydia Marie I. Mirabel, Ma. Lourdes M. Santos SECRETARIAT Ellaine
Anne L. Bernardino, Jessica Sharla G. Bustamante, Jhelsea Louise B. Dimaano, Doane Kevin P. Jacinto, Graham
Edison G. Ragsac FINANCE Jenica A. Aquino, Colleen F. Dilla , Lex Angelo A.Rosario, Kathrina Grace C. Sanchez,
Meriwila R. Tulayan AUDIT Ma. Conslada "V. Ben, Arra Olmaya J. Badangan , Guenavere J. Hao, Lorelie M.
Santos, Apollo Julius S. Sta. Maria ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING Jordan N. Chavez, Roger P. Cuaresma , Joelle
Mae J. Garcia, Made Anna Karla M. Regencia LOGISTICS Daniel Philip V. Bamachea, Jose Emmanuel I. Cabel,
Sophia Victoria E. Mina, Fatima Miana ]. Rodriguez, Hanz Darryl D. Tiu MEMBERSHIP Eric Winson F. Cea,
Agatha Loren S. Edillor, Mark Benedict S. Francisco , Antonio C. Manaligod N , Justine Renee C. Sison ·
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CIVIL LAW
Subject Chair CZARINA MAYBELLYNE V. PACIS
Assistant Subject Chair LORETO PLACIDO RUDOV E. BERNARDEZ
Electronic Data Processing RONIFELLE L. BARRIOS
SUBJECT HEADS
Persons and Family Relations THERESE ANJELICA M. BUERGO
Property . KRISTINE MAE A. CEDINO
Obligations and Contracts .JAMES BRYAN S. DEANG
c·HERISH KL\1 B. FERRER
Sales and Lease ALYSSA CHRISTINE C. DELA CRUZ
Partnership, Agency & Trusts }NA ANDREA D.-ALMODAL
Credit Transactions JOSHUA V. CONSTANTINO _
Succession SAMANTHA MARIE V. CONTRERAS
Land, Titles and Deed JULIA ANTOINETTE S. UNARCE
Torts and Damages JESHA AINA F. NOBLE
Conflict of Laws .MIKKAELA BENEDICT S. MONES
MEMBERS
FLORAVICK ANA B. ABAYA
CAMILLE S. BENEDICTO
JEMIMAH FAYE I. BISDA
ANDREA D. BRIONES
MARY CHERWYN L. CASTRO
'BEA PATRICIA G. DANGA_ZO
SARAH B..DE GUZMAN
LIANNE MAE D. ENRIQUEZ
RONALD A. FLORES
GIUSEPPE CHRISTIAN M. HUEVOS
KATRISHA ANALINE B. KOK
MARIA ANGELICA R. LOVERIA
MARC RUSSEL ANN P. LUBANGCO
IVAN CHRIS T. LUWRIAGA
CARMEL MA. TARA T. MEDIODIA
KEVIN CHRISTIAN A. PASION
KIM ALYSSA M. REALINO
FRANCES ANGELA V..SALVACION
MARIA BEATRIZ R VARONA
ERICA .C.·VISTA
ADVISERS
DEAN ED VINCENT S. ALBAN,O
ATfY. MANUEL L. CASINO
ATrY. NICASIO C. CABANEIRO
ATIT. JOSEPH FERDINAND M. DECHAVEZ
ATIT. EFREN VINCENT M. DIZON
ATTY. CHARLITO MARTIN R. MENDOZA
ATIT. FRANCESCA LOURDES M. SENGA
ATIT. ROWELL D. ILAGAN
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TH I S I S TH E I NT E LL E CTUAL PROPE RTY OF TH E

SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
2018 CENTRALIZE D BAR OPERATIONS .
TH E U NAUTH ORI ZE D COPYI N G, RIP RODU CTlON ,
"
MODI FI CATI ON , OR D I STRI BUT I ON OF ANY OF TH E
CONT E N TS - OF T.H I S BOO K I S STRI CTLY PROH I B ITE D.
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CIVIL LAW 2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS I

Eff ectivity of Laws
1. On September 30, 2016, AB Company filed for the period of July 1,"2014 to September 30, 2014 a claim for
refund/credit of input VAT with the CIR. The CIR disputed the claim, contending that since 2016 was a
-leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September, 30, 2016 was beyond the- two-year.
·period, which expired on September 29, 2016. He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code, hich provides
that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivent to 365 days. Is the contention of the CIR correct?
;.../ .
No, it is incorrect. In Commission of Internal ·Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Ihc., the Court. held that in
administrative claims, as between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent .to 365 ·days, and the
Adm·in-istrative Code of 1987, which states th;:tt a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must
prevail; being the more recnt law. Following the Administrative Code, therefore , the number of days is irrelevant.
Applying Section 31 of the Administrative ode to this case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit
for the period ofJuly 1, 2014 to September 30, 2014 expired on September 30, 2016. Hence, respondent's administrative
claim was timely filed (CIR v'. Aichi Forging Compqny, G.R. No. 184823, Oc;tober 6, 2010, Del Castillo,].).
2. . B married A tWice - initially under Islamic laws and. tradition on May 27, 1993·, and subsequently, in a
. civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge on June 2, 1993. Z and her son X filed a complaint ·with the .
RTC . for the declaration of nullity of m · n B and A- for being bigamous, alleging that B
·actually married Z on May - 1,· 1958 d that this marriage remained subsisting
when he married A in 199-3/, Mean ,. , . , s the SJraTi'a courts that have exclusive
jurisdiction over the case und:er P.D. No. lQ.83.,'.(>t tb. C:tlde of Musl,:Pirsonal Laws of the Philippines. A ·
likewise argues that B was already diypt.e(f ll,tt t4--M1:11.j.m,,Co<:f¢'by the time he married her. Decide.
'/ } ·- · ! ,!.
The marriage between B d A is':b mJus. Tlie M k ffeet only on February 4, 1977, and this law
cannot retroactively override the Ci h:::o&e (Wflich7al d C!j,fJain rights on the marriage of B and Z. The
qvil Code governs their pe.rsonal> us tsfric f tills ·n "'etfect at the time of the celebration of their
marriage . In view B's prior marriag1S)f hieh bsist lf ··arried A, . their subsequent bigamous and
therefore void ab initio (Llave v. Re J , \, '.' 0, :2'' :1?Del Castillo,].).
·.,_,_ · ',,. i\?,?Q I . ._
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3. H was married to W. Without any:]uiifi - ·- - e, ;,-. .;dJfiid H and left for the United States where
she _secured a decree of absolute dvbr ta;t r:";1fe,,gdf' .a'trfd - again. Is there a right now.for H to proceed
1
agamst her for moral damages on tft(gi; ul!-d tha,t ,) s are contrary to morals, good customs and
pµblic policy? · '.,7"'· . "(.·,,
Yes, H has a right to proceed against W for moral damages on the ground that the acts of the latter are contrary to
morals good customs, ahd public policy. In the similar case of Tenchavez v:
Escano, the Supreme Court held that the
at .ofthe wife in not complying with- her wifely duties, deserting her husband wiihout justifiable cause, and leaving
·· for the· US to secure a divorce decree, and finally getting marfied again are acts which constitute a willful infliction
.. ofinjury upon the husband 's feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy under Article
· 21 of the Civil Code, .for which Art·. 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages ( Tenchavez v. Escano, G.R. No.
. L- ·196?1, Jul y 26, 1966). ..
Persons
4. R donated Pl Million to the unborn child of his pregnant girlfriend, which she accepted. After six 6
· m011ths.of pregnancy, the fetus was born and baptized as X. However, X died 20 hours after birth. R sought
to recover the P 1Million. Is R entitled to recover? · ·
Yes, R is entitled to recover the Pl,000 ,000.00. The Civil Code considers a fetus a person for purposes favorable to it
provided it is born later in accordance with Article 41. Under Art. 41, to be considered born, the fetus that had an
intrauterine life of less than 7 rhonths should live for 24 hours from its complete delivery from the mother 's womb.
·Here , while the donation is favorable to the fetus, the donation did not take effect because the fetus was not born in
accordance with the Art. 41. Since x ·had an intrauterine life ofless than 7 months but did not live for 24 hours, she
was not ·considered born and, therefore , did not become a person . Not being a person , she has no juridical capacity
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2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL LA'W
to be a donee, hence, the donation to her did not take effect. The donation not being effective, the amount donated
may be recovered . To retain it will be unjust enrichment.
Marriage
5. M, a Filipino citizen, filed for divorce against her Japanese husband. The Japanese court which heard the
petition ruled favorably . and issued them a divorce decree. She now pleads for .the recognition and
enforcemen,t of the divorce decree and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil
registry. Will her petition prosper?
Yes; Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of a divorce "obtained by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry;''
The provision only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. The
purpose of paragraph 2, Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that .is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same
result. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction (Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24,
2ru . ·
6. During their marital union, C and his wife D acquired several real properties which C claimed pertained
to the conjugal partnership. Claimipg some erties,J, daughter of D from a previous marriage,
disputes the validity of C nd D's m f lack of m·arriage license. The marriage
contract contained an uneq-9.j.')ocal d ,,., . ,, . . . e_ COJ'\va.P'l itself that no marriage license
was exhibited to the soleninU:"iDg offi.cer at ther tiJV tof Druriage. The tt}aJ. court upheld the validity of the
marriage, ruling that their- m¥riage ;x .
·.,..:cnt:ri> bh.i.g- pu,.Wic
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ment, enjoys the presumption. ' of
regularity in· its execution an:·\ :,coclusiy .a.s to the ac 9f ,arriage. Is the ruling of the trial _ court
correct? · ''k ,..
·<: -:.: . \ v-· .
No . The presumption of regularity'does nit:hoJli a
on its face has established that no iblr.' iagt licehse w
on the ground of absence of m a ?lici
apparent on the marriage contract, o Jh
no such marriage license was issued>'vthe
on the marriage contract itself, there" , .ot
was celebratedithout a valid marriag ·.·· ·C,en
2016, Covered Case). "(:::. / u, ,,,/
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Proving ps ychologica [ incapacity: In Santos vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019; January 4, 1995), psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Faniily Code must be characterized by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability . In Republic vs. Court of Appeas (G.R. No. 108763; February 13, 1997) or the Molina case, the burden of
proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner. What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party 's psychological condition. The complete . facts must allege the physical manifestations
as indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage (Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No.
203284, November 14, 2016).
Molina Guidelines:
a. Plaintiff has burden of proof;
b. Root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
i. Medically or clinically identified;
ii. Alleged in the complaint;
iii. Sufficiently proven by experts; and
iv. Clearly explained in the decision. '
c. Incapacity. must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of marriage;
d. Incapacity must be permanent or incurable; -
e. Illness is grave enough to bring about disability to assume essential marital obligatfons;
f. Marital obligations refer to Art. 68-71, 220,221 and 225 of the FAMILY CODE;
g. Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines while
not controlling should be given great respect ; and ·
2 ,I 2018 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

' CIVIL LAW
h. Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear for the state
(Republic v. Molina, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997).
2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES
7. T and R got married and had two children. R however became jealous of everyone who talked to Maria
Teresa and treated Mara Teresa like a sex slave. T filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage,
presenting Dr. L, a clinical psychologist, who, however, had no chance to personally conduct a thorough
study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological condition. Will the action still prosper?
Yes, the action will still prosper. The non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay
or invalidate the findings of t-he examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since the totality of the behavior of one
spous·e during the cohabitation and marriage is 'generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. The
Molina doctrine does not require a physician to examine a person and declare him/her to be psychologically
incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence presented establishes the party's psychological condition.
Dr. L's testimony, as corroborated by T, may sufficiently prove that R suffered from psychological incapacity (de la
Fuente v. de la Fuente, G.R. No. 188400, M arch 8, 2017, Covered Case). .
8. J, a seaman by profession, is married to N, a domestic helper. They lived together as husband and wife
only for a month, as they parted ways for separate destinations abroad. For three months since their
departure, .respondent did not receive any communication from N and had no idea about her whereabouts,
even from her parents, relatives, and friends. Because of these, he had presumed that his wife was already
dead and filed a petition for declaration of her presumptive death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code- in order to contract a second marria · tion prosper? ·
No, the action will not prosp ·r ;:j failed to . ;,• ;: nded l;>lief that his absent wife was .dead. One
of the four essential requisites 13i.the judicial '<l,edqr?-tqn·:'!>t Pte.su ptive"db {fi:under Article 41 of the Family Code
is that the present spouse has a wep::.foimpq ept;Hpat:, tp:e a P- e, is d7ad. Mere absence of the spouse even for
such period required by the law, or lack of,ne .vs...th p,,tee -isf till alive, failure to communicate by the
absentee spouse or invocation of tne:gene:t_al pr ump1!: ' e urt r the Civil Code would not suffice. Article
41 places upon the present spouse the burdeh df•prn , ionql-and more stringent requirement of "well-
founded belief' which can only be }!{s<;{iared tipori a ' of ii"oper and honest-to-goodness ir1quiries and
efforts to ascertain not only the abs . t:. pouse'srwher tefonportantly, that the absent spouse is either
still alive or is already dead (Repub{ :t: a
. i.m*
/ rziG., . : O, 2016, Del Castillo,].).
"eq
, tent. i.- conti.nue d to 1i·ve wi.th J c1or 2 years.
9. The day aft:e.r J and M got marn.e d}.. he .

ll.f
·x . ' S
"('. _.,,P • A ( •. ?
Is M now estopped_ from filing an aiiii(l.\m n ... ,,.ag "'s.tJ?.. t·
. ;:;;.r; ..,,..,;'-; (t 1 ·>:.." >
No, M is not estopped from filing an annulffiefi'f1t"lse,Tagal;ps Jori the ground of his impotence, because she learned
of his impotence after the celebration of the mafrlage arid."hot before. Physical incapacity to consummate is a valid
ground for the annulment of marriage if such incapacity was existing at the time of the marriage , continues and
appears to be incurable. (Art. 45. (5), Family Code). The marriage may be annulled on this ground within five years
fro.m its celebration (Art. 47 (5), Family Code). ·
Legal Separation
10. X a married man, had an adulterous relation with Y. In one of the trysts, X's- wife, Z, caught them in
flagrante. Armed with a gun, Z shot X in a fit of extreme jealousy, nearly killing him. Four (4) years after
the incident, X filed an action for legal separation against Z on the ground that she attempted to kill him.
Decide.
The action should be dismissed on the ground of mutual guilt of the parties. The Philippine Constitution protects
marriage as an inviolable.social institution (Art. XV, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution) . An action for legal separation involves
public interest and no such decree should be issued if any legal obstacle thereto appears on record .. This is in line
with the policy that in case of doubt, the court shall uphold the validity and sanctity of marriage (Brown v. Yambao,
· G.R. No. L-10699, October 18, 1957).
11. After they got married, Y discovered that X was having an affair with another woman. But Y decided to
give it a try and lived wi!h him for two (2) years. After two (2) years, Y filed an action for legal separation
on the ground of X's sexual infidelity. Will the action prosper?
201 8 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I3
2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES
Although the action for legal separation has not yet prescribed , the prescriptive period being 5 years, if X's affair
with another woman was ended when Y decided to live with him again, Y's action will not prosper on account of
'
CIVIL LAW
condonation (Art, 56 (1), Family Code). However, if such affair is still continuing, Y's action would prosper because
the action will surely be within five (5) years from the commission of the latest act of sexual infidelity . Every act of
sexual liaison is a ground for legal separation.
Property Relations
12. Z filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against spouses A and B, the parcel being claimed
by- A and B as part of their conjugal property. The court ruled in favor of Z _and a writ of demolition was
subsequently issued in his behalf. The spouses filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals,
but the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by the husband B. The CA dismissed the
petition, ruling that since the property was conjugal, both spouses should have signed the certificate of
non-forum shopping. Is the dismissal correct?
No, the case should not have been dismissed . Unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both
spouse is required , joint management or administration does not require that the husband and the wife always act
together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court
in proper cases as a provided under Article 124 of tlie Family Code. The husband alone could, therefore, file the
petition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property without being joined by his wife
(Docena vs. Lapesura , C.R. No. 140153, March 28, 2001i
13. X and Y, after 10 years o( 1happy al agreement whereby they shall divide,
share and share alike, all o( ir conj the l; :effect of such agreement?
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The agreement is void. According tpArticle ,)3:1 pf,f:h,.:Farnj;}y ;C:::'.9;,)n thf absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separatioh'9f pqpe,tyJJeiw: - , _,, ' - . ' "' ring tl:i marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order." This principle decl s-,as f oid Wd no xtrJ 9icial agreement, during n:arriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partneisl1jil or !p f ,;th;lrbpol y o(JJ:>r operty between husband and wife.
l'. \f;j. \; : { ' J,
14. As finance officer of K and Co;;-y ar\-ang¢d a ·?.9n from the bank for the corporation .
However, he was required by the::\; ;, ;, -· -· · _ . S\)/ fy Agreement to secure the repayment
of the loan. The corporation faiil fo ,'f$Q,;#/e ba1(>obtained a judgment against it and V,
jointly ad severally. To enforce_\f.1!! :
! F?fif ,lJyJed on a farm owned by the cpnjugal
partnership of V and his wife E. fS'J)ieJe .., 9 (V/;<7
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The levy is not proper , there being no sfi " ,,urery; p::rent executed by the husband redounded to the
benefit of the family. An obligation confra t'fl?Y the husb,# one is chargeable against the conjugal partnership
only when it was contracted for the benefit o£tlie;; '.ty en tbe obligation was contracted on behalf of the family
business the law presumes that such obligatioti'/ ill ;e'tloµnd to the benefit of the family. However , when the
obligation was to guarantee the debt of a third,party; as in the problem , the obligation is presumed for the benefit of
the third party, not the family. Hence, for the obligation under the surety agreement to be chargeable against the -
partnership it must be proven that the family was benefited and that the benefit was a direct result of such agreement
(Ayala Investment v. Ching, C.R. No. 118305, February 12, 1998).
15. A purchased from a company a brand new Nissan Exalta using conjugal funds. A bought the car for the
use of his wife, B and so, A registered the car _ in B's name. Is the Nissan Exalta conjugal or exclusive?
- Although the car was acquired for the use of B and was registered in her name, the money invested for its_purchase
came froPI conjugal funds. The car having been acquired during marriage and at the expense of the common fund is,
tqus, conjugal. In the case of Joaquina vs. Reyes (C.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004), the Court held that the fact that the
property was bought during the marriage rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. Moreover, it was established
that the payment came from- conjugal funds.
16. Spouses H and W bought a fishpond from X for P480,000 payable in three equal installments. The first
installment was paid with funds belonging exclusively to W, while the second and third installments were
paid with funds which they had borrowed from Y. In securing the loan from Y, the couple used as security
several parcels of lad belonging exclusively to W. What is the status of the fishpond? -
The fishpond is partly paraphernal and partly- conjugal. The amount borrowed by H and W from Y is conjugal in
character, while it is true that the security is paraphe:mal, that does not affect the status of the amoun borrowed. In
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2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES
· securing the loan, the spouses were acting for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and not for the benefit of either
of them. Since 1/ 3 of the purchase price was paid with paraphernal funds and 2/3 were paid with conjugal funds,
applying the provisions of Articles 109(4) and 117(1} of the Family Code, the 1/3 of the property is paraphemal and ·
2/3 is conjugal (Castillo, Jr. v. Pasco, G.R. No. L-16857, M ay 29, 1964). · ·
In 1989_, .A,. then a widwer 40 years of age, cohabited with B, a widow 30 years of age. While living
together, they acquired froi:n their combined earnings a parcel of riceland. After A and B separated, A
liv.ed together with C, a maiden 16 years of age. While living together, A was a salaried employee and . C
kept house for A and did full-time household chores for him. During their cohabitation, a pcel of -
·coconut land was acquired by A from his savings. After living together for one year, A and C separated.
A then met and married D, a single woman 26 years of age. During the marriage of A and D, D bought a
. mango orchard O\Jt of her own personal earnings. .
- a; - Who would own the riceland, and what property regime governs the ownership? Explain.
b. Who would own the coconut land, and what property regie governs the ownership? Explain. ·
c. Who would own the mango orchard, and what property regime governs the owners-hip? Explain.
a. - A and B are the co-owners of the riceland. The regime is that of co-ownership under-Article 147 of the Family
Code. However, after A's marriage to D, the half interest of A in the riceland will then become absolute
community property of A and D. ·
b. A is the exclusive owner of the coconut land, applying Article 148 of the Family Code. The regime is a
sole/single proprietorship. However, afi e to D, the coconut land of A will then become absolute
community property"_of A and D. - .
"'-,·-., ·- /'
A A
c. A and D are the co-owne'rs!The regin} is,, t4¢ i:Y@hJt¢..CommunitY,$irProperty (FAMILY CODE, Articles. 75,
90 and 91). · "' ,/ · · ' t '
·'\
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Beneficiaries ·of a Family home \{ 1
; .
. ,:.-·.-_-.. ·;·;rr :--·.

The beneficiaries of a fly home ,?:_ '
a. The husband and wife, or an uifrtgrr
b. Their parents, ascendants, de·,. 'I d
illegitimate, who are living in tfi)
(Art. J.S4, PC.) ,· ""' "'{
:...·.=&..:>i / . - - . ':Mry·,.-,,..
. A contends that he should be deemea i4Jng in tht(f - hme because his stay in the U.S. is merely
temporary. He asserts that the person sfayi jirtt!!j_fc}tlse is his overseer and that whenever his wife, B,
visited the Philippines, she stayed in the fanl.ily lioihe: Does the contention have merit?
The law explicitly provides that ..o.. ccupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by "any' of its
beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is "actual is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something
merely possible, or to something which is presumptive_ or constructive. Actual occupaney, however, need not
specifically be by the owne"r of the house. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated by
Article 154 of the Family Code. Maids d overseers are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Co.de.
- · To secure a loan, spouses A and B executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house
and lot. When they failed to pay the indebtedne'ss, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of
the Real Estate Mortgage and at the sale the creditors' son and his wife won as the highest bidders. Spouses
A and B refused to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property. They argued that the mortgage
cannot be foreclosed as the house was the family home and exempt from execution sale. Is the contention
correct? ·
No. As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forcd sale, or attachment. However, Article 155 (3) of the
· Family Code allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on th premises before or after
such constitution." While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim
for exemption should be setup and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to
do so would estop the party from claiming the exemption later ( Spouses Fortaleza v. Spouses Lapitan, G.R. No. 178288;
August 15, 2012,.Del Castillo,]). .
2018 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I5

I
2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL LAW
Legitimacy, Paternity and Filiation
21. H and W have been married for 20 years without children. Desirous to have a baby, they consulted Dr. Z,
a prominent medical specialist on human fertility. He advised W to undergo artificial insemination. It
was found that H's sperm count was inadequate to induce pregnancy. Hence, the couple looked for a
willing do nor. A, the brother of H, readily consented to donate his sperm. After a series of test, A's sperm
was medkally introduced into W's ovary. She became pregnant and months later, gave birth to a baby
boy, named J. ·
a. Who is the father of J?
b. What are the requirements, if any, in order for H to establish his paternity over J?
a. A is the biological father of J being the source of the sperm. A is the legal father of J because there was
neither consent nor ratification to the artificial insemination ..Under the law, children conceived by artificial
insemination are legitimate children of the spouses, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified the
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by both of them before .the birth of the (:hild
(FAMILY CODE, Artick 164).
b. The following are the requirements for H to establish his paternity over J:
i. The artificial insemination has been authorized or ratified by the spouses in a written instrument
executed and signed by them before the birth of the child; and
ii. The written instrument is recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the
child (FAMILY CODE, Article 1
,.
Rules a$ to signature in prj,y t hand owledgg filiation:

a. Where the private hanq¥ftten instreJ:tb,Js { ;n,,piece of e-vi flce submitted to prove filiation, there
should be strict compliance,\}'ith thej fequirmenHhat the1$e mu$f be signed by the acknowiedging parent ;
and ' J >. ''.r:,·. - '···'. ._,
L ?' • *' \· t -t:;.7
h· "
.
·
.
¢ •
b. Where the private hand r4tn qistrulllent i )tjb;her relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim ori IJ.ia o liet:f . 0 :: ye been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as h .., /mJreJ.y cpcl::b h t pfl:r,.er evidence (Dela Cruz v. Garcia, G.R. No.
177728, July 31, 2009). " . r 5f .>'
<r.7
22. H and W are husband and wife. ari )if e, W conceived and gave birth to a
baby boy. Blood tests made at the ous of his wife's fidelity, indicate that
the child could not have been his - o iJtsterile. Can this establish physical
impossibility bf access between ff :a;_ .\:)IY iY.s of the 300 days imniediately
preceding the birth of the child? -::Str /) .
..,,(."" "
No , sterility is not synonymous with impotenc '· / .,.,. (,, e-· bility to procreate , while impotency is the physical
inability to copulate . Consequently, it cannot est b1ish 'tne,p,pysical impossibility of access between husband and
wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days immediately preceding the birth of the child (M enciano vs. San Jose,
G.R. No. L-1967, M ay 28, 1951).
23. Suppose that in the above problem, H can prove that he is sterile. Can this establish physical impossibility
of access between H and W during the first 120 days of the 300 days immediately preceding the birth of
ilie c ·
No, sterility is not synonymous with impotency. Sterility is the ability to procreate, while impotency is the physical
inability to copulate. Consequently, it cannot establish the physical impossibility of access between husband and wife
during the first 120 days of the 300 days immediately preceding the birth of the child (Menciano vs. San Jose, G.R. No.
L-1967, M au 28, 1951). · ·
24. Suppose that in the above problem, H was suffering from the last stages of tuberculosis. Will this establish
a ground·for impugnation of the legitimacy of the child?
Tuberculosis, even_ in its last stages, is _not the kind of serious illness of the - husband that will establish physical
impossibility of access. Experience shows that tuberculosis, even in its most crucial stage, does not prevent sexual
intercourse. Hence, this could not be considered as a ground for the impugnation of the legitimacy of the child ( Anda[
vs. Macaraig, G.R. No. L-2474, M ay 30, 1951).

25. Establishing Illegitimate Filiation.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, Illegitimate childFen may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children as provided under Article 172, i.e. by any of the -following:
a. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
b. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private and handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
a. The open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child; or
b. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws
The action must be brought in the same period specified in Art. 173, except when the action is based on the second -
paragraph of Art. 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
26. Rights of Illegitimate Children
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children:

a. Shall use the surname of their mother; ·
b. Shall be under parental authority of the mother;
c. Shall be entitled to support in conformity with the Family Code; and
d. Shall be entitled to a legitime whih Yi of the legitime of a legitimate child.
NOTE: Illegitimate children m:ay pse the eir filjatioh has been expressly recognized by
the father through the record 'of piTth appearJ:p.g,;}. t_, th FJ.!il:r gister, or-, n·admission in a public document or _
private handwritten instrument is made , by the}father (R.tl. ¥ 9 . 5._ ?t. n j\c _tf allowing Illegitimate children to use the
Surname of their Father). Moreoverfthe'sc::-categor-i.ca.JJ; ar t:Jl t ,QSiJQ.er the father nor the mother is granted
_ by law with the right to dictate Ii urname ;of an · ' &>:w hilJRp.ther, the right to decide belongs to an
illegitimate child himself or hersel(Herc{it)s·;1? s ine .he' illegitimate children's choice of surname
(Grande vs. Antonio , G.R. No. 206248;- FeJmrg.ry 1, 2-();1 - -- :-·
. <l t 'f ( '"if -
27. The evidence shows that L, singf ,th\ ! , __ n liitem of 2, M and ). Claiming that K was
the father of her two sons, L pr p.t ii,lg-,gJcn. bfary evidence: certificate of live birth
_ _ ;a('_ce
identifying K a the father; apti:sJn lf_ _i}ih!{h ,hlf_ f: N_ >states that his father is K; photographs
?f K.ten dumg the baptism o ·;t;n @..k fod.\ j _;iken at the house of L. Are J and M the
illeg1trmate _£hildren of K? ,_ "'\/ ·\ • <'' ,'•ti · 7 ·
A: ·:Y:.C-1 ·/- t·.· . ir ./·
No, they are not the illegitimate children af? ct}L. Birth cert,.i9: e"'not signed by the alleged father therein indicated
is not competent evidence of paternity ( BerCil :Systtmf!:G.R: No. 57257, March 5, 1984). Since the records do not
show that K had a hand in the preparation of saifriertifi afe, the certificate of live birth of J and M is not competent
evidence on the issue of their paternity .
The baptismal certificate has scant evidentiary value. While a baptismal certificate may be considered public
document, they can only serve as evidence of administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are
ot necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity (Macandang
v. CA, G.R. No. L-49542, September 12, 1980). The photographs showing the presence K in M's baptism and photos
taken at the house of L are likewise inconclusive to prove paternity, as held in Fernadez v. CA (G.R. No 108366,
February 16, 1994). ·
28. W, X, Y all claimed to be children of the late A, who left properties in the possession of her legitimate
daughter Z. Upon the death of A, petitioners W, X, and Y filed for judicial partition of the properties
before RTC, arguing that during A's lifetime, A acknowledged all of them as her children directly,
continuously, spontaneously, and without concealment, and that in the absence of any record of birth in
the civil _ register, filiation may be established on admission of filiation in a public or handwritten
document. Will their petition prosper? ·
No. Any action seeking to prove filiation sought under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code must
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. After the death of a putative parent, the Family Code provides
that the person seeking to establish illegitimate filiation must present either a record of birth appearing in the civil
' register , or a final judgment , or an admission oflegitimate filiation. Thus, after A's death, petitioners could no longer
I I7
2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

be allowed to introduce evidence of open and continuous illegitimate filiation to A (Ara v. Pizarro, G.R. No. 187273,
February 15, 2017, Covered Case).
29. The brothers S and R, claiming recognition as the illegitimate children of Q, presented two public
documents: (1) a notarized document jointly executed by Q and T formally recognizing the plaintiffs as
their children; and (2) a document solely executed by Q denominated as Acknowledgement of
Children. These documents were signed with a thumb mark, allegedly by Q. Z, Q's niece and informally
adopted child, contended that the documents were spurious, having been signed merely by thumbprint.
May filiation be established?
Yes. Under the Family Code, the legitimate filiation of a child may be established, among others, by an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private hahciwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
The same requirement applies in establishing the filiation of illegitimate children. Here, although only Q's thumb
mark appears in the notarized document, a thumb mark has been repeatedly considered by the Court as a valid mode
of signature. Moreover, a notarized document is a public document and as such it enjoys the presumption of
regularity which can only be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence. It serves as a prima faCie evidence of
the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. The bare
allegations of the Z cannot qualify as clar and convincing evidence to overturn such presumption (Zoleta-San
Agustin v. Sales, G.R. No. 189289, August 31, 2016, Covered Case).
30. A and B, man and woinan not related to each other, both single and of age, had an illicit relation. A child
C was born out of that relation. Subse ried X. Notwithstanding the marriage, A and B
continued their illicit relation, and t "Id D was born to them. After the death of
X, A married B. What is th··lgal stat '
. .:\ . .. . . .. · \'/<·,
Accordin g to Articles 177 and 178 of th Ffiirp.py Cqd, children q9rn .9utsicje wedlock of parents , who, at the time of
the conception of the former , were\rot disciuilif.Lh ;·iiW: · · ediinent t,b marry each other may be legitimated. c
falls within the purview of this defi ition!and as sue - i>•;:J;;; ted .JJppn the marriage of A and B. D, however,
who was conceived at a time wheri '.1?if th"' 'vras ied (6 X, is an illegitimate child who cannot be
legitimated. Adulterous children C-??fp IJ.ev ro..haye l;>e tlieJk:w to be equated to the status of <i
legitimate child in view of the public policy inv'6Jy:ed Vi pr servi y O.f):warriage and preventing .the proliferation of
illegitimate issues (De Santos v. Ange7t-;, ,G.''. · . . 12: }f!. S).
- -- /, '$'1f )/o:
31. P, a former Fiijpina who became a'ri f n e1i" '1 0 .. er her marriage to an American husband,
would like to adopt in the Philippirii;·;j in "!h·"'lier u . and, one of her minor brothers. Assuming
that all the required consents . have'?ti. !!i obtailleJ,'.-S, Id . the contemplated joint . adoption in the
Philippines prosper? Explain. · , .·-.-·rt;;r1: ; ::.-·: .. · ·· ·
P and her American husband can jointly adopt a minor brother of P because she and her hsband are both qualified
to adopt. P, as a former Filipino citizen, can adopt her minor brother under Sec. 7(b)(i) of RA. No. 8552 (Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998). The alien husband can now adopt under S.ec. 7(b) of R.A. No; 8552. The Supreme Court has
held in several case that when husband and wife are required to adopt jointly, each one of them must be qualified
to adopt in his or her own right. (Republic vs. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994). However, the American husband
must comply with the requirements of the law including the residency requirement of 3 years. Otherwise, the
adoption will not be allowed.
32. A, an adopted person, died intestate, survived by the adopter X, and his natural parents, F and M. His
entire estate consists of several parcels valued at P400,000, which he had acquired by ·gratuitous title
during his lifetime from X. Distribute the estate. .
Under Article 190(2) of the Family Code, the entire estate, although conisting of properties acquired by A during his
lifetime from X by gratuitous title, shall be divided as follows: Yz to be inherited by F and M, and the other half by X.
Effects of Adoption
a. As to parental authority: Severance of legal ties _between the biological parents and the adoptee, which shall
be vested in the adopters except if the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
b. As to legitimacy: The adoptee shall be considered as a legitimate child of the adopter/s for all intents and
purposes; and
8 I 201 8 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

c. As to succession : In legal or intestate succession, the adoptee and the adopter/s shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However , if there is a will, the rules on testamentary
succession shall be followed (RA 8552, Secs. 16, 17, and 18).
Distinctions b_etween Domestic Adoption and Inter-Country Adoption in the Philippines
IR-OQN1:R¥ AD<?PTON
,;:, ' ·'-' (RA 8043) '- :. . ::: :" . .
a. Any Filipino citizen; An alien or Filipino citizen permanently residing

b. Any alien possessing the same qualifications for abroad [Sec. 9]
Filipino nationals; ·
The ardian with res ect to the ward [Sec. 7]
Filipino Citizen a. At least 27 years of age and at least 16 years older

a. Legal age; than the child tobe adopted, at the time of
b. Of good moral character; application, unless the adopter is the parent by
c, Not convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of
d. Emotionally and psychologically capable' of caring such parent;
.for children ; and b. If married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the
e. At least 16 years older than the adoptee , adoption;
Exception: When the adopter is t as the capacity to act and assume all rights and
parent of the adoptee;-'- o,:i; . is the nsibilities of parental authority under his
adoptee's parent [Sec. 7(a}f.{, nal laws\.>< '
I. ·\. .• \ ,
. Gl.l1Undrgm):e9fu' » appropriate counseling from an
7
Alien ·" . ;.. JicC.f tlit , JUnselor in his/her country; .

a. Same as qualifications of Filipirio citizenSl"'--·""·'<'.,.,.. conVicted of a crime involving moral
b. His/her country has diplomt· relali ons firith itucit :,
Republic of the Philippines ; .. '·. r"'· i ; · dopt under s/her national law;
c. ·Has been living in the Philipl1h1es dt l s# a '. p,,s1t10n to proVIde the proper care and
continuous years prior to filgtof_ ad lica.\ion p ·and to give the necessary moral values and
maintains such residence unt.!J.'; op z·, -. ar[! · ( o all his children, including the child to
entered ; "'--·t« . Tu ' lv};; l/e ad<i . ted· · ·
d. Has been certified by his/her
office or any appropriate gove¥\ 11f9piat .' , '· . gf' 1 · .;,fo phold the basic rights
"d under Philippine laws and of the the
chilqU.N.
as
·
he/sh@. has legal capacity to ·, 'ft,.., G;Q eil.tion on the Rights of the Child
country; .. _;: i ·<>9'!1tes from a country with whom the Philippines
e. His/her government allows the adopte - - ifJ.h ,., f . . ..,·as diplomatic relation.s . .
country as his/her adopted child. ,,or"'!Jtt.fP , , J. Possesses all the qualifications and none of the
/ , "· disqualifications provided herein and in other
II. applicable Philippine laws. [Sec. 9]
NOTE: Residency and certification of qualification may
be waived if:
a. Forn:ier Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or
affinity; or ·
b. One who seeks to adopt legitimate child of his/her ·
Filtpio spouse; or
c. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks
to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative
within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity
of the Filipino s ouse. [Sec. 7(b)]
a. Any person below 18 years of age who has been be the subject of
administratively or judicially declared available for
adoption ;
b. The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the I.
other spouse; Legally-free child° means a child who . has been
c. An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter voluntarily or . involuntarily committed to the .
to im rove his/her status to that of le itimac ;
I
! ,
j
2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I9

d. A person of legal age if, prior to adoption, said Department, in accordance with the Child and Youth
person has been consistently considered and Welfare Code. [Sec. 3(f)]
treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since
minority;
e. A child whose adoption has been previously
rescinded; or
f. A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s)has
died: provided that no proceedings shall be initiated
within 6 months from time of death of said parents.
[Sec. 8]
Grounds for rescission of adoption
Upon the petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over 18 years of
age bQt is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following
grounds committed by the adopter(s):
a. Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling;
b. Attempt on the life of the adoptee;
c. sexual assault or violence; and
d. abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption , being in the best interest of the chil ubject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the
adopter(s) may disinherit the,. d. ptee for ·19 of the Civil Code (RA 8552, Sec. 19).
. :- 1{h
,-: \. Effects q tfcJsfili).[()ff. doption , :
" - t..... t.;,} L. .. . •w .{ <',
a. Parental authority of the a1\tee 'f-biologicaL owQior

_;r .
the legal custody of the DSV.lD shall be
restored if the adoptee is - niflor 6)1 inca - ,.•-•.·.
b. Reciprocal rights and oblig f9ps of }t:' d,\)p do:af to each other shall be extinguished .
c. Cancellation (by court orq ,f'--:qf t e-- aiv,ertde f oirfh 'of the adoptee and restoration of his/her
original birth certificate. ·. · f <:j:::.·
d. Succession rights shall rev . it n/l\fu -Only as of the date of judgment of judicial
rescission. Vested rights ac'?.i - i§10i;i_-·, =@I be respected.
A n
Support comprises everything indispensttffH . . ·c{_s\w· 'g;' clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation , in keeping with the fih J;. - - atnily (FAMILY CODE, Article 194)
Education - includes schooling r training for soi'rie'/ rfs's_ton, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority
Transportation - includes expenses in going to school, or to and from the place of work
The following are obliged to support each other:

1. Spouses ' «J
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants
3. ·Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood.
6. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether full or half blood, except only when the need for
support of the brotper or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence
(FAMILY CODE, Articles 195-196)
Parental Authority
Special Parental Authority
Special parental authority is exercised by:

a. The school,. administrators, and teachers, or
b. The individual, entity or institution engaged in child care while the child is under their supervision,
instruction, and custody. (FAMILY CODE, Article 218)

Liability for damages

a. Those given special parental authority. principally liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
b. . Parents, judicial guardians, or the persons exercising substitute authority: subsidiarily liable.
c. There must be finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
cased (St. M ary 's Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002).
Grounds for the suspension and deprivation of parental authority

a. Conviction of the- parent/ person · exercising the same of a crime which comes with the penalty of civil
interdiction
b. By the court, if the person .exercising the same
i. Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
ii. Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
111. Compels the child to beg; or .
iv. Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts oflasciviousness (FAMILY CODE, Article 231)
c. Person exercising parental authority ha subjected the child or allowed the child to be subjected to sexual abuse
(results in permane!J.t depriyaton of parental authority) (FAMILY CODE, Article 232) .
33. During n enrolment campaign conducted by the students in a school in Dipolog City, some high school
students boarded a jeep owned by V, driven by S who is a minor. While on bo<l!"d the bus, the steering
wheel suddenly detached, the accident resulting in the death of one of the students. Is the school liable?
Under Art. 218 of the Family "C ' ope, those uthority and responsibility shall be principally
and solidarily liable for dam!,gt '.!f cause the unwancipated minor while under their
supervision , instruction , or custqf The parms,, yd!<;j ftf dians or tl;l persons exercising substitute parental
authority over said minor shall be ybstdj j!yf b 5.£!f Fc;_ ,Jp>; b$" Jfa. l , there must be a finding that the act or
omission consid.ered as negligent : thf_,_pi:oximat ._ injµ :Here, The school cannot be held liable
because the accident was not sho fo t1e du'1to t f - ·· ::..$chool but rather the detachment of the
£_
steering wheel guide of the jeep . (Si:t/vf r};s .'e et(iy a,-, o. 143363, February 6, 2002).
- :. --l>':. \ [,)Uvse of
\: /) - =Tc.=..._;
34. Emelit Basilio Gan was born iri\. -- "'6,

1
o
mother. Emelita Basilio Gan's biH ert
Basilio Gan filed a Petition for co"r , o
certificate t.o "Emelita Basilio Gari'< ., . . )e c
in her school records from elemenia)j{q p, dent records, marriage contract, and other
government records. The RTC granfe4: 1 J". • on.!T
:J.! ' :ipublic of the Philippines appealed alleging
that ,Emelita Basilio Gan, who is an ine ,. ,;. _ d:-'failed to adduce evidence that she was duly
recognized by her father, which would have::allowedJl.. r to use the surname of her father. Emelita Basilio
Gan maintains that she only sought to have her name indicated in her birth certificate changed to avoid
confusion as regards to her personal records. Was she- able to prove that she was acknowledged by her
father? - ·
No. The fact that she has been using .the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her records is not sufficient or proper . -
justification to allow her petition. She was born in 1956, which was prior to the enactment and effectivity of the
Family Code. Article 366 and 368 of the then Civff Code shall apply and the said provisions do not give an illegitimate
child or a natural child not acknowledged by the father the option to use the surname of the father. If, at the time of
the petitioner's .birth, either of her parents had an impediment to marry the other, she may only bear the surname of
her mother pursuant to Article 368 of tpe Civil Code. Otherwise, she may use the surname of her father provided
that she was acknowledged by her father. However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show
I that she was indeed duly acknowledged by his father. The petitioner's evidence consisted only 9f her birth certificate
signed by her mother , school records, employment records, marriage contract, certificate of baptism , and other
government records. Thus, assuming that 'she is a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could
J ·still :riot insist on using her father's surname. It was, thus, a blatant error on the part of the RTC to have allowed the
petitioner to change her name from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita BasilioGan" ( Emelita Basilio Gan vs. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 207147, September 14, 2016, Covered Case). ·
t
i
l.
f.'
2018 SAN BEDA ENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 11

Absence
Stages of Absence
There are three (3) stages of absence. They are:

a. Provisional absence:
When a person _ disappears from his domicile , his wherea·bouts being unknown, without leaving an agenfto
administer his property (Article 381, C.Zvil Code)
b. Declared absence:
Whei:i a perso? disappears from his domicile, and two (2) years have elapse without any news about him
or since the receipt of the last news, or five (5) years have elapsed in case he left a person to administer his
property. (Article 834, Civil Code)
- c. Presumptive death:
When the absent is presumed dead". (Articles 390 and 391, Civil Code)
CONFLICT OF LAWS
35. What is the docrine of processual presumptiqn? .
Otherwise known as Presumed Identity Appi:oach . When the proper foreign law has not been properly proved, the
court of the forum may presume that said oreign law is the same as the law of the forum which said court can now app]y
(SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on Conflict of Laws (2004), . 1
36. Give at least two reasons Jii{ . a court - . nover a conflict of laws case.
-: :..-. - ..:·{ . ·,
.r- ·kr .)><:..
. ..;:,.
a. Theory of Comity \'. . r
The application of foreig.n '.l gal s,y.stim$ ,,,c fori,gn element is proper , otherwise, the non-
application would constituk,)!1 ci!sregif d of eignty. or lack of comity towards other States
(PARAS, Philippine Confliti' las 1996);'jJ. .ff! , """"
. \ -i? \ {:; Il £
b. Vested Rights Theory .,:- t;;1
Courts enforce not the foreigfjja1
Thus, rights acquired in on ,c() ' t
will not apply the foreign I .ut
International Law (1995), p. 7 \
..... ,.•.. -.,<;;•..{ i "' ;_ t· 7
c. . Local Law Theory ···.....>·\,.-.".
·Y ,) ·._::-.... M
,.-, -·.,l
1 \ ·*r/fo""-'"
.......v . .
This involvs the approprition of ge,. " . )J !te

f the frm and transfrming it into a doestic
rule. A foreign law is applied because:o u:P. : a ;<oy applymg a surular rule, reqmres us to do so, as if the
foreign law has bec.ome part of our owr(inte_ rnal'of..,domestic law (SEMPIO-DIY, Conflict, supra at 20).
d. Theory of Justice (Caver's Principles of Preference)

The thesis of Prof. David F. Cavers' arficle entitled "A Critique of the Conflict of Laws Problem " was that
choice of law should be determined by "considertions of justice and social expediency" and should not be
the result of echanical application of the rule or principle of selection ( COQUIA & AGUILING-
PANGALANGAN, Conflict of Laws: Cases M aterials and Comments (2000) p. 66).
e. Harmony of Laws Theory

Identical or similar problems should be given·id,entical or similar solutions, thus resulting in harmony of
laws. The application of the same or similar solution prevents the bad practice of forum shopping (SEMPJO-
DIY, Conflict, supra at 20). ·
37. A citizen of state X wants to apply for Philippine naturalization. In state X, he is already considered of
maj.or age, being 19 years old. Philippine naturalization laws explicitly state that he must be 21 years old
in order to be naturalized. At the age of 19, may he already file his petition to be a Filipino citizen?
yes, provided that at the time of the hearing of the petition he is already 21 years old. Ifat the said time he is not yet
21 years of age, the hearing of the petition will hav to be postponed, notwithstanding the fact that in his own
country, he has already reached the age of majority (PARAS, Conflict, supra at 226).
12 I 201 8 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

CIVIL LA.W 2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES
38. A, an American citizen, and B, a Filipino, were married in Manila. They had a daughter _named X. In 1999,
A and B we're divorced in the U.S. in 2002, when. X was just 6 years old, they executed in Manila an
Agreement for the joint custody of X. Is the Agreement valid and enforceable in the Philippines?
No, the Agreement contravenes Philippine law. For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement , the Philippine law
serves as default param ter to test the validity of the Agreement. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for
spouses separated in fact or in law, under par. 2 of Art. 213 of the Family Code, states that no child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother (Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010).
39. What is meant by "renvoi"? Is it the same as the_ thery of "transmission"?
Renvoi is a procedure whereby a jural matter presented is referred by the Conflict of laws rules of the forum to a
foreign state, the Conflict of laws rule of which in turn refers the matter back to the law of the forum (remission) or
a third state (transmission) (COQUIA, Conflict, supra at 102). The law is beip.g referred back and forth from the forum
law to the law of domicile of the foreign party \vhich involves a conflict of laws rule, pointing back to the forum law
as applicable law (AGPALO, Conflict, supra at 38). Transmission is not the same as· renvoi. Renvoi involves two (2)
laws while transmission involves three (3) laws (PARAS, Conflict, supra at 215).
40. Q: A 'and B went to California to get married. However, thirty minutes before the start of the ceremony,
B was informed that his presence was requested by the President of the company where he works fpr as
soon as possible. Believing that he was about to be promoted, ·he left the ceremony to catch the earliest
flight back to the Philippines and asked h. r, C, who happens to be living and employed in
the same area in Californi ? t,p be his · h A._ The State of California lows a proxy
to stand in another's weddi).fgtWill th .:r in thj.sju:risdiction?
<"- .- - ,;, l. f<ti CF L1/'.''? '"',/<::"'
Yes. Where permitted by the law ofthe ;p!as,:yh:z:.s e '.ErPX!J?- ic;jpatflln the marriage ceremony, the marriage
is entitled to recognition in coun aclper-.ing,,,tQ.J ·· _ tion4j 1JJe, at least- insofar as formal validity is
concerned. This rule is intended tli1Jf(>teq the .}fife Mf!!O:.JJIY, Conflict, supra at 77).
._.l·· . . ! rM ."if >
1-------------------------------- --iiiiiJ!ooo """"'"-i-!.....!--ii --------------------------------------.
. <)' , r#f . t1b

Jb , ,
\_,'-1; ?
.
41. Manila Petroleum Co. owned an :\J?,. r ' " ·o ti n facility off the coast of Manila. The
facility was located on a floating" -'tfo e o o.o 4fili metal, upon which was permanently
attached te hevy. equiment for fh
platform likewise contamed a garden- -e.
tff..._ pe Jf f;na
living quarters of the crew. The floating
e tre ft!ants and flowers were planted. The platform
was tethere<;I to a ship, the MV 101, whicK , ,. <$'cfto the seabed.
a. Is the platform movable or immovablt!. prop fy?
b. Are the equipment and living quarters movable or immovable property? .
c. re the. trees, plants and flowers immovable or movable proper ? ( 2007 Bat)
a. The platform is an immovable property under Article 415 (9) of the Civil Code which ptovides that "docks
I and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on
a river , lake or coast." Since the floating platform is a petroleum operation facility, it is intended to remain
I b.
. permanently where_ it is situated, even if it is tethered to a ship which is anchored to the seabed.
The equipment ·and living quarters of the crew are immovable property under Article 415 (3) <?f the Civil
Code, classifies as an immovable "everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way
that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration·of the object". Both the ·
equipment and the living quarters are permanently attached to the platform which is also an immovable .""
The equipment can also be classified as an immovable property under Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code
because such equipment are "machinery , receptacles , instruments or implements intended by the owner of
the tenement for an industry or wdrks which may be carried on in·a building or on a piece of land and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works". It is logically, assumed that the petroleum
industry may be carried on' in a building or on a piece of land and the platform is analogous to a building.
c. The trees, plants and flowers planted in the garden atea of the platform are immovable property under Art.
415 (2) of the Civil Code which classifies as an immovable property "trees', plants and growing fruits, while
2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS j 13

they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an immovable, the petroleum operation facility ( Civil
Law: Questions Asked M ore tan Once (QuAM TO, University of Santo Tomas, Faculty of Civil Law, 2017).
Ownership
42. A is the registered owners of Lot A and adjoining the same was the lot owned by the C.A filed an action
to quiet title and to recover possession, claiming that C had extended his possession up to the former's
property. To support his action, he presented an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, a Free Patent Certificate,
a Transfer of Certificate of Title, and tax declarations. C, on the other hand, presented a deed of sale and
several tax declarations in the name of his predecessors-in-interest. However, based on the survey by the
geodetic engineer, it was discovered that C's deed of sale and tax declarations covered a different property
(Lot B). Decide. ·
A's certificate of title cannot be defeated by the deed of sale and tax declarations presented by the spouses Belen. A
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. As against an array of proof consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which
are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covei.:ed therein, an original certificate of title indicates
true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises (Spouses Alacantara vs Spouses Belen,
G.R. No. 200204, April 25, 2017, Covered Case). ·
Accession
43. Apdres is a riparian owne\7 .o( a parce rid, however, has gradually diminished ill
area due to the current of tl!¥t.. ver, w ;,,,.. Mari }'?· /the opposite bank has gradually
increased in area by 200-sqtf:ineters. S.t."itl\J E -, f ..-
a. Who has the better rig'1t,_, 9vq- tp;?,09-=; f (l ·jp eef:Clfifl th;afhas been added to Mario's registe1·ed
land, Mario or Andres':\::'!'' .. '·' · ..... "" .,,, ,,,., " .... ,., - ' \<,it { ·
b. May-a third person acq:. sair 2 :. Q_ r escription?
a. Mario has a better right ov·• 2 4" .,

457 of the New Civil Code ' ' ' · h j,rovif es th
t • -by reason ofaccretion pursua.'lt to Article
f,iands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they all · . Jhe current of the waters''. Andres can no
longer claim ownership of \ ort , ch was gradually and naturally eroded due
to the current of the river, - t ,fr-law.
b. . Yes, a tbjrd party may acqu ; 1>1 -s ;meter increase in area. In Grande vs CA (G.R. L-
17652, June 30, 1962) and Jagufi ingt·,, . . r"94 8 · .Pch 4, 1991} the Court ruled that if the riparian owner
fls o assert his cl th
even accretion to the land titled u "'; ,
-
cj./
e ma · 1' - Bthe averse poss ssion of third parties , as .indeed
em must itself be registered.
44. C Co. sold to A Lot A with a fair market value of Pl,200,000and lter, the adjacent lot, Lot B with a fair
market value of Pl,SOO,OOOto B.A, relying in good faith in the representations made by C Co.'s sales
represen,tative, constructed a house on his land which was later discovered to be in fact Lot B. A spent Pl,
000,000 on his house. As their lawyer, advise A and B on their rights and obligations under the given
cirumstanc s, and the recourses and options .open to them to protect their interests.
A is a builder in good faith because before constructing the house, he relied on the i_nformation given by C Co.'s
agent who is presumed to know the identity of the lot purchased by the Dela Cr'uz spouses (Pleasantville v. CA, G.R.
No.' 79688, February 1, 1996). On the other hand, B is a landowner in good faith because nothing was shown that the
building ws done with .his knowledge and without opposition on.their part (Art. 453).
The owner of the land on which anything has been.built, sown or planted in good faith shall have the right: (1) to
appropriate as his own the works after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or (2) to oblige
the one who built to pay the price of the land. However, the builder cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building . In such case, he shall pay reaonable rent if the owner of the land does
not choose to appropriate the building or tr.ees after proper indemnity (Art; 448). The hous_e constructed increased
. the value of the lot. As such, should B decide to appropriate the house, A is entitled to the right of retention pending
reimbursement of the expenses they incurred or the increase in value which the thing may hve acquired by reason
of the improvement (Art. 546) (Depra Dumlao, G.R. No. L 57348, May 16, 1985; Technogas Phils. v. CA, G.R. No. 108894,
February 10, 1997). -

CIVIL LAW 201 8 PRE-WEEK NOTES
45. Spouses Cruz are Canadian residents, they owned a titled lot in Alabang. After the wedding day of their
- only son, the spouses out of parental love invited the newly wed couple to occupy the ancestral home
located in the lot. In a letter, the couple was refrained from constructing any improvements thereon since
the lot was to be sold. The house_ constructed therein was demolished and the couple,.s dream house was
built in its place. Out of pique, the spouses demanded them to vacate the premises contending that since
the couple occupied the lot by mere tolerance, they were necessarily bound by an implied promise to
vacate it upon demand. The couple claimed that·they are builders in good faith, even if they are not the
O\yners of the fand they built -their house therein with the consent of the owner. Are the couple considered
as builders in good faith under its expanded definition?
No, the couple are builders in- bad faith. Under the expanded definition, a builder in good faith is one who has
constructed improvements on the land of another with the consent of the owner. Hence, the structures were built in
good faith, even though the builders knew they were constructing the improvement on land owned by another.
However, in this case, one crucial factor that warrants a departure from the above-cited ruling is the presence of
evidence that the spouses through a letter prohibited the couple from building their own structure on the property .
Hence, the couple are builders in bad faith for despite the prohibition, they continued their construction activities
upon the .property (Spouses Aquino v. Spouses Eusebio, G.R. No. 182754, June 29, 2015, Covered Case).
QUieting of Title ·
46. Certain parcels of land were expropriated by the NHA and placed under its development project. Lot 1
was awarded to spouses A and B under a C .. ontract to Sell and Lot 2 was sold to C. ¥ter the
spouses died, the heirs of,:.nouses ex · . ettlement · Among Heirs and adjudicated
ownership over ·Lots 1and · favor . ·k '"'-"' vered,_t.1,! t E, claiming to be heirs of A and
B, had executed a Separate E t.(ajudicial -ttl_ mn of<BS,tate and V.aiver of Rights and Sale, and a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of F:. hel}? ge.1 !!.f Engj et ! ts of.Jhe heirs and demolishing structures
built tereon. The hir then s¥futed an!ln · · of i ; Do the heirs possess the right to file
an acton for the qmetmg of titrk:J I J:,,.
No, the heirs do not possess t ri r !},,
requisites must concur: (1) the pl v _ :ff o coqplain
t(in tif
f or an action to quiet title to prosper , two
al !-'an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and be · · . cf*::proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fa . . ite,ijifrima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy. Petitioners failed to prese - c,rtif1. -gem from the proper government agency or
NRA which would show that A and · ,· Vekd ci' ers or beneficiaries of Lots 1and 2, or that the
heirs are qmtiified successors or bene :. "V l e ,, at * ;t program, taking over A's rights after his ·
death. Proof of heirship alone does nof s If! ,,o.Ff3.Uut " · '.Mtablish the required legal or _equitable interest
in the subject proper-ties , the action to qufe t 1" hould b '• ,, ea (M ananquil V. Moico, G.R. No. 180076, November
21, 2012, Del Castillo,]) >"' · .,,-
Co-ownership
47. Spouses A and B owned a piece of land. Later on, they died and they were survived by their children C and
D. C got married to E and D got married to F. C filed an action of partition of ·estate against D and F. The
RTC dismissed the case.. on the ground of prescription · On
appeal, the CA allowed partition by reckoning .
a different prescriptive period from F's execution of Affidavit of Ownership of Land. C argues that F, not
being a co-owner inthe estate of A and B, cannot effect a repudiation of co-ownership. Decide oh the case.
For ·prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. In order that the title may prescribe in favor
of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed uneqµivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the ·
other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. F's marriage to a co-owner does not make .him.
a co-owner of the property. Thus, prescription did not run adversely against C at all, and his right to seek a partition
of the property . has not been lost in accordarice with Article 494 0f Civil Code. Therefore, the ruling of the CA is
affirmed but modified . Prescription cannot run against respondent as the co-ownership was never 'repudiated the in
first place (Ining, et. al. v. Vega, C.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013, Del Castillo,].).
Possession
48. A filed a complaint for forcible entry against the heirs of B. A claimed that he is the registered owner of
a parcel of land where heirs of B constructed a house without A's consent. In their defense, the heirs of B
2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 15

contend that the area claimed by A is actually theirs, it being part of the land registered in their names.
The MTC discovered that the properties of the parties overlapped each other. and after a judicious
examination, ruled that A had prior possession of the sanie, .entitling him a better right over the subject
property against the heirs of B. The heirs of B contest the decision of the MTC, saying that the case
actually involved a boundary dispute which is beyond the coverage of an action for forcible entry. Decide.
· An action for forcible entry is not the pr.oper remedy. Settled is the rule that a boundary dispute, as in this case, can
only be. resolv:ed in the context of an accion reivindicatoria, and not in an ejectment case. ,
It is clear that this case deals not with the right to possess the .property. This is apparent from the fact that the
properti.es being claimed by both parties are covered by separate certificates of title and overlapped each other. Stated
differently, both parties lay claim to that property on the basis of their certificates of title, both of which cover the
contested land (Heirs of Johnny A.oas v. Juliet As-II, G.R. No. 219558; Octob.er 19, 2016, Del Castillo,]).
49. The brothers L and D were casino players at Q Hotel and Casino owned and operated by SBL. After a night
of playing and losing, they tried to encash their casino chips worth $6,000 but were confiscated by SBL
security officers. SBL claimed to be the lawful owner of the subject chips allegedly stolen by its employee,
who handed it to the brothers for encashmen at the casino.·In their defense, L and D argued that their
elder brother gave them those chips who received the same from his Chinese customer. Hence, the
·brothers filed against SBL a suit to recover a sum of money with damages. SBL prayed for its dismissal
claiming that the circumstantial evidence itpresented sufficiently rebut the legal presumption u_der Art.
559 of the Civil Code. Decide. -
"
The legal presumption under -t.S59 of t ·n poss,esion of personal property is the fawful
&
owner of the same stands in thfa §'se. Though ;:s,¥ ip:q; cs .? ; :P;f!Ol co-nstituteJegal tender , there _is no 'law prohibitir.g
. heir use or trade outsie the casjn .,-qe:<t ;?J? -'.\Y?- d p9t hw, .par;ted iththe chips if t 1eir correspondi?g value
m. legal tender, goodwill, or other\¥: -se, 'Y-as ,UQJ ,,,r,e letur7f o,r exchange. Given that the chips were
considered to have been exchangedJ&Yi;th \heir prres se1ti!tiye value , it is with more reson that SBL
must prove convincingly and persua'\iVel)i that ',lbe,,ch ted were indeed stolen. Having failed to do so, it
acted arbitrarily in confiscating t - n, W:itho ay - gend Resorts and Casinos, Inc. vs. Bernard
Fernandez, G.R. No. 193426, Septembe ., , 2@14, el C
f
50. Spouses X and Y bought a subdivi _ ,,,.4J -;s·1lo
l':!J;teublic highway only througb _Rizal Road.
They had beesing the road for'filli)ty- ) yea11f unt IBNQI Corp. bought the property on which it
was located. NCI Corp. fenced the pr e- ·, ,
-•d"dfr,Jpj..\uatters, but allowed passage thereto from 6
A.M. to 6 P.M. daily. The spouses offer¢, · ' y the ptl!f$p. of the road for the proposed right of way but
NCI Corp. refused. The spouses were force ,, ,,, '.i!i'lief before the court asking for a permanent right
of way. NCI Corp. filed a motion to .dismis >contendj;yg that it has plans to erect permanent structures
therein, hence, the spouses should seek a right of way from their other neighboring estates instead. It also
«;ontended that the spouses are at fault for failing to secure a right of way from their seller, hence, must
bear the inconvenience of their isolation.
a. Can Spouses X and Y demand a right of way? Explain.
b. Are the contentions of NCI .Co_rp. valid? Explain. ·
a. . Yes, the Spouses X and .y can demand a right of way. To be entitled to an easement of right of way undr
Articles 649 and 650 -of the Civil Code, the following requisites should be met: (1) An immovable is
surrmnded by other immovable belonging to other persons, and is without adequate outlet to' a public
.J:iighway; (2) Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable; (3) The isolation of
the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and (4) The proposed easement of right of way is established at
the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
of the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. All the requisites are present in this case.
The spouses' property was landlocked without their fault, yet they were willing to pay a reasonable value
to NCI Corp. for the proposed right of way that was the shortest and least prejudicial outlet to the public
road.
b. No, the contentions of NCI are not valid. The spouses cannot be blamed for the isolation as they have been
using Rizal Road for 25 years. The existence pf the easement was known to NCI Corp. who must respect the
same, although their transfer certificates of title did not mention any burden or easement. It is an established
principle that ac,tual notice or knowledge is as binding as registration. Likewise, NCI Corp.'s contention as
16 I 2018 .SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

to its future plans to erect permanent structures on the appointed right of way cannot be accepted. To allow
l\ this would be tantamount to rewarding malice, cunning, ·and bad faith. Unlike the spouses' neighboring
estates that were not sizeable enough to accommodate a road, NCI Corp.'s land is large enough that a
I
j .
.! reduction thereof for a road right of way would hardly-be felt by it (Naga Centrum, Inc. vs. Spouses Orzales,
No. 203576, September 14, 2016 Del Castillo,]).
G.R.
'tI 51. X and Y are co-owners of a ht in Rizal. Their Jot was djoined by a subdivision owned and developed by
·I ABC Corp. which has a direct access to the public highway. After finding the existence of all the requisites
of the compulsory right of way, the court granted X and Y's complaint for easement. It then fixed the
indemnity in the amount of P500,000 fter finding that the right of way granted pertained only to. Road
Lo_t 50 where the fence separating the X and Y's property from ABC Corp.'s subdivision was loc·ated.
Unsatisfied, ABC Corp. questioned the indemnity contending that the measurement of the land
comprising ·a right of way should be the entire distance of the dominant estate to the public highway. Is ·
the contention of ABC Corp. correct? Explain.
Yes, because if it were other\vise, the dominant estate would be forbidden from accessing the other road lots leading.
to and from the highway. The purpose of the right of way is for one to have.access to the highway. In this case, the
right of way granted to petitioners affected several road lots within respondent's subdivision.· Accordingly, as
provided under Art. 649 of the Civil·Code, petitioners must pay the indemnity consisting of the value of the entirety
of the land to .be used for the easement. In any case, should the right of way no longer be necessary because the ·
owner of the dominant estate has joined it to an·other abutting on a public highway, and the servient estate demands
that the easement° ·be extinguished, the value o · received by the servient estat by way of indemnity
shall be returned in full to e,.,dominan . ity must be computed according to the area
!,
covering the distance from th 0,·····¥
qwninant _;... . ...,, y (De <}:zman, as substituted by her heirs Olga
I · .· .'c '1'<.
C. Barbaso, Lolita de Guzman, et: a:/.;<vs. Filinvest:if;J;veJoR,1P:11t_1G,rirp., .R. No. '{91710, January 14, 2015 Del Castillo,]).
¥ ··..> - --'" · L..:........ c:·c· r.. r... r- :_ ,·\ c,(
5 :...p · _'t=
·,· -,\·· ': ·"·....,....,",..:, .,,..Don -!

\_-·.; i - t,.·i .
f J ;: --.
< •...
pr4tr,,.
·
v/ '- i.........
52. . To support the government's u+i oc{d Dacilan donated parcels ofland in La Union
to the Republic of the Philippin s}:Jhe\dntion o Ui, - following conditions: (1) the land shall
be used solely for the establi.sll!.·./. 1 . o thefcattl atign;'and (2) the land shall not be used for
any other purpose, except with:;.. ?f gr · .. he'-.J;r9:nors or their heirs. By virtue of the
devolution of powers and funct101$S,:,,of
passage of R.A. No. 7160, Provliir pf .· · - d
w
the local government units after the
Jperation of the breeding station and
ef:to
·constructed therein La Union HdsJJ,. - -...-tu\e( :acion to revoke the donations claiming
that pursu.1.mt ·to the· devolution pi: ' e . statidk·had ceased operations and that the land
had been abandoned. Will the actioii ,_ .,gde .. 1\\i > ·
· ,, os,p,eD r1Q? :j
No, the action will not prosper. In devolution, the national government confers power and authority, and transfers
to the various local government units the records, equipment, and other assets and personne1 of national agencies
and offices to·perform the corresponding devolved powers, functions and responsibilities (Sec. 17, RA. No. 7160).
While the breeding station may haye been transferred to the Province of La Union as a result of devolution , it
remained as such, and _coninued to function as a breeding station. The purpose for which the donations were made
remained and was carried out. Since the deeds of donation did not specifically prohibit the subsequent transfer of the
donated lands by the donee', the heirs should bear in mind that contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns ·
and heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or b¥ stipulation or by provision oflaw (Art. 1311; Civil Code). Thus, as a general rule, rights and obligations
derived from -contract are transmissible (Republic of the Philippines vs. DaCZan, et al., C.R. No. 197115, M arch 23, 2015
Del Castillo,]).
f
!
Prescription
53. X allowed his in-laws A 411d B to stay on a portion of theil- lot together with their respective families. They
wete allowed to' erect their houses, intro.duce improvements, and plant trees thereon :When A and B died,
their children Y and Z took possession of certain portions- of the lot and . enjoyed the same tolerance by
their first eousins. When X di,ed, ·his ·only son C inherited the property and likewise tolerated his first
·cousins' occupation. However, Y and Z began to expand their occupation and sold portions thereof. C filed
a complaint to recover ownership and possession against his cousins' Y and Z. In- their answer, Y and Z
alleged that they were in possession of·a public land publicly, peacefully, exclusively, and in the concept
of owners for. more than 30 years, thus, they acquire the subject property by ·--virtue of ·acquisitive
- prescription. Decide.
20 i8 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 17

2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL LAW,
Y and Z have not acquired the property by prescription . Possession, in order to ripen into ownership, must be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful , and uninterrupted . Possession not in the concept of owner, such as the one
claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription , unless the juridical relation is first
expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character
executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription .
Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long performed , do not start the
running of the period of acquisitive prescription. Hence, the 30-year period necessary for the operation of acquisitive
prescription had yet to be attained (Lamsis vs. Semon Dong-E, G.R No. 173021, October 20, 2010, Del Castillo,]).
. ·, I o_B_L_IG
_A
__
, T_
IO
_N
_S A_
N_D_C
_O
__T_
RAC_T_s
Sources of Obligations
54. A and B opened a joint account with X Bank. On another date, A accompanied C, a Taiwanese, for the
latter's opening of a savings account on the same bank. Later, X issued a "Hold Out" order against A and
· B's accounts, accusing A and an unidentified woman as responsible for the unauthorized and fraudulent
withdrawal from C's dollar account. A and B then filed a complaint against X for breach of obligation and · ·
damages, alleging that they were unable to withdraw because their accounts are under "Hold Out" status.
X anchors its right to withhold deposits on the Application and Agreement for Deposit Account where it
provided that the Bank is authorized to withhold as security for any and all obligations with the Bank, all
' moriies,- properties or securities of the De . X be held liable for holding out the accounts of
A and B?
:!'{l; ., . :' .}:
YES. The petitioner was guilty 'of1 J'each of co&l:,J'q\,_lq[ ti <t {iitor. he ;:Hp}cf'Out".clause applies only if there is a
5
valid and existing obligation arisf t rQ[9.{!IIY .9ttJ!f ? otf;ces rs>f pligatic;>p enumerated in Article 11s7 of the Civil
Code, to wit: law, contracts, quasi.,. fl\ras "delict," . In t11fs. ase, X failed to show that A and B have
an obligation to it under any law :c·ontrac , qui-co r qusi-delict. Considering that A and B are not
liable under any of the five sourcef 49bhgaoitrter ba fs
·for X to issue the "Hold Out" order.. Thus,
X is guilty of breach of contract "{h.t!f;. it nj!ifiabl ele. e ·A and B's deposits despite demand. (The
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Compltl'/· : na qtace Yuf' To, G.R. No. 183204; January 13, 2014)
. . - . .· ( > ? "? .
55. A, ,local water utility, promulg ! J _srih#t tirore a water district entity may impoe
production assessment on the pr :-' - cti t, hS' 'must be, among others, a fiding that
the production of ground water i J r' u - "tlfe , te..Pdistrict entity's financial condition and
s imp. ig it ground wter sou - ,.. "· s Me_? of Agreeent (?A) for the propo ed
rmpos1hon. However, despite B not..s1 . . M, .t\ t ommended the rmpos1hon of the production
1
fees_ plus interest for appropriations"«t Jr · ·tho -"\< ?. Iliit. Is the imposition of the production fees
proper? ·-,,:, °'· "' ·
NO. A has no right to impose the production assessment against B. While A had drafted a MOA on the _ impositi n
of prodµction assessment fees upon deepwell owners/users and provided copies thereof to them, including B, the ·
MOA was not supported by any resolution duly promulgated and approved by A's Board of Directors or by any
finding that there were injurious effects of B's deepwell operation upon the financial condition of A. B did not execute
the MOA. Unlike a MOA which creates c;ontractual obligations, faithful compliance with the requirements of the
Rules creates binding obligations arising from law. In the absence of the requisite board resolution, A cannot legally
impose any production assessment fees upon B (Stm Francisco Inn v. San Pablo City Water District., G.R. No. 204639;
February 15, 2017; (;_overed Ca$e). · ·
Nature and Effects of Obligations ·
56. A and B 'entered into an Energy Conversion Agreement, which provides that B will design, build and
operate ·a Power Station. The nominal capacity allowed under the Agreement is 50 megawatts. B installed
an additional engine thereby increasing capacity to 55 megawatts. A refused to pay for the additional five
(5)-megawatt contracted capacity because it allegedly came from an additional sixth engine. A contends
flJ..rther. that the Agreement clarly provides for only five (5) engines as comprising the Power Station. Is
A obliged to py B for the additional capacity? ·
YES:A contract .is the law between parties. Absent any showing that its provisions are contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy, it should be enforced to the letter. Contracts cannot be altered for the benefit
of one party and to the detriment of another. Therefore, although it is clear that B is given an allowance up to a
i
18 201 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
maximum of 55 megawatts, it is not specified in the Agreement that the additional five (5)-megawatt contracted
capacity must be produced only froi:n the original five (5) generating units. This omission therefore binds A (National
Power Corporation v. Southern Philippines Power Corporation, G.R. No. 219627. July 4, 2016; Covered Case).
KINDS OF OBLIGATIONS
Pure and Conditional Obligations
57. A approved the commen ement of the third round of bidding for_ the sale of the 153.lMW N aga Power
Plant (NPPC). Power Corporation (BPC} and C submitted their rspective bids for the project. C won the
bid. However, it was subject to BPC's non-exercise of its Right to Top. On the assumption that BPC validly
exercised its Right to Top, A executed the Land Lease Agreement (LLA) and Assets Purchse Agreement
(APA) in BPC's favor, cancelling C's Notice of Award. The Right to Top_ and the resultant agreements from
its.exercise, however, were subsequently nullified by the court. Should the Notice of Award be reinstated
in favor of J2 since BPC's Right to Top was declared null and void?
YES, the Notice of Award should be reinstated. Under Art.·1185 of the Civil Code, if an obligation is conditioned on
the non-:-occurrence of a particular event at a determinate time, that obligation arises (a) at the lapse of the indicated
time, or (b) if it has become evident that the. event cannot occur. A's obligation to award the contract in C's favor
was dependent on the non-occurrence of an event: BPC's legal and valid exercise of its Right to Top. It has become
apparent, however, that such event will never occur. BPC ca.'.1. never legally and validly invoke its Right to Top in
view of its nullity. The condition, therefore,. is lied with by operation of law (Osmefia III v. PSALM,
Ledes'!1a, SPC Power Corporatj- and The - ·.·.No. 212686, October 05, 2016; Covered Case).
-- ;'·:ij,{/. ' ,- ·. . ,;:/ .
58. Are the following obligation\Aa.li,,d, why, ah- d i.f•,. th •. . y" .·:•u
.,. e.tvalid, when - ,s".the obligation demandable in each.
case? . ji (_ _i \.... i,,.. {:.. ,. ---1 {..._,
a. If the debtor promis_es tQ.1 y ¥- s.oo.n.a.h
b. If the debtor promises tq!pay " hen fl;te li
c. If the debtor promses t?
·- ,
g,y
hti f.te e
i I
d. If the debtor promises to eay i£ his S<>nJ

VALID. When• the debtor bm'
;: ,, \ · ·
if
a. <;<-
to be one with a period (C '
I
I and then the obligation wilf '
'· I 1197). \
b.
c. V/\LID. It is a conditional obligation, the ,acquisition of right depends upon the happening of the event which
constitutes the condition or when the debtor becomes a lawyer. Thus, when the debtor becomes a law)rer,
that is the time that the obligation will be demandable (CIVIL CODE, Article 1181).
d. VALID. It is a resolutory condition. The condition that some event will not happen at a determinate time,
such as the death of the son ofcancer within one year, shall render the obligation effective from the moment
the time indicated has elapsed, or if it has beGome evident that the event cannot occur (CIVIL CODE, Article
1185). . .
Obligations with a period
59. A written acknowledgment was drafted acknowledging that a fishing-vessel owned by A is now in th
possession of B. The written acknowledgement states that the documents pertaining to the sale and
agreement -of payments between A and B are to follow. The agreed price for the vessel is Eight.Hundred
Thousand Pesos Only (P800,000.00). After a year, A files a collection suit against B for the unpaid purchase
price. May B be compelled to pay?
NO. There cquld not haye been any1breach of obligation because on the date the action was filed, the alleged maturity
date for the payment of the balance had not yet arrived. In rder that respondents could have a valid cause of action, ··
it is essential that there must have been a stjpulated period within which the payment would have become due and
demandable. If the parties themselves could not come into agreement , the courts may be asked to fix the period of
j
I 19
j
2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
the obligation , under Article 1197 of the Civil Code. The respondents did not avail of such relief prior to the filing of
the instant Complaint; thus, the action should fail owing to its obvious prematurity (Spouses Edtada v. Spouses Ramos,
G.R. No. 154413, August 31, 2005).
60. X a!ld Y entered into a milling contract whereby X agreed that the sugarcane which Y will produce will
be milled by X for a period of thirty years. It was stipulated that in case of a fortuitous event, the contract
shall he deemed suspended during s.aid term. Y failed to eliver sugarcane to X for 6 years, 4 years during
the war ad 2 years when his mill was being .rebuilt. lay Y be compelled to deliver sugar cane to X for 6
more years after the expiration of 30 years to make up for what Y failed to deliver?
No. The. stipulation does not mean that the happeing of a fortuitous event stop the running of the period agreed
upon. It- only relieves the _ parties from- the fulfillment of their respective obligations during that time. X, not being
entitled to demand from Y the performance of the latter's part of the contract which was impossible at the time it
became due, cannot later on demand its fulfillment. The prayer of X, if granted, would in effect be an extension of
the term of the contract entered into by them (Victorias Planters vs. Victorias M illing Co., G.R. No. L-6648, July 25,
1955).
Alternative Obligations
61. D, owner of a business supplying s-crap paper·s, cartons, and other raw materials; delivered scrap papers
to APP Company. D- and APP agreed that A.PP would either pay D the value of the raw materials or deliver
him their finish prod1:1cts of equivalent value. D alleged that he received a post-dated checkfrom _APP but
when he deposited the check, it was dishor ing drawn against a closed account. On the same
day, APP and a certain E e_ec.uted a M , '.-< emselves to deliver the finished product to
E and his company MCC. p' d, the MO.;., f ligation, to P through Novation or did the
obligation remain to be altetll: tlve? . . F* r
The obligation between D and AFP,:;,was q.n alternativ - li t!pn..,_whereby APP, after receiving the raw materials
from D, would either pay him the prie of the ra-vv matefip·;'. $\)'Ff". >;tH altefuative , deliver to him the finished products
?f equivalent value . When APP ten9 re a hc" <nes p,Wtial.payment for the scrap papers , they exercised
their option to pay the price . D's redipt ot;the c. ec;k i guent ct of depo·siting it constituted his notice of
APP's option to pay. Tliis choice - also ho\:\tn by '.'.]the.· OA, which wa s executed on the same day.
The MOA declared in clear terms ( a}tpe ·· Sh: ecl r,oducts would be to a third person, thereby
extinguihing the option to deliver': !'ff.ynt· - ' , ql/val1 talue to D (Arco Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. v.
Dan . T. L zm, G.R. No. 206806, June 25,: , 1"). . .r:.\ "';} l ., ,f :'.
\ / A. -- , .!·if:/
\ ob it. a
. '" . .<: /;.. . .. Ob1i afi-O'ns
J•'"/ '. . ;,j"
62. A Contract to Sell was executed by an<i; tw en A ancr!}J ltlie seller, and C, as the buyer. Despite the full
payment, . A and B failed to execute a De'ed cd 4:2\;B'S"fl!fit'SI on the subject property. C demanded from A
the execution of the Deed of Sale and the delivery c)f tlJe Transfe.r Certificate of Title. C filed a complaint
for rescission of the contract to sell, refund of payment and damages against A and B before the HLURB.
A argued that it could not be faulted for the delay in the delivery of the title due to force majeure. B
countered that it was not the owner and devel<?.Per_ of the property and that A alone was the seller. May A
and B be held solidarily liable for damages?
. YES. Solidary obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of the creditors
is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation froin any or all of the debtors. Article 1207 does not
presume solidar)r liability unless: (1) the obligation expressly so states; or (2) the law or nature requires solidarity.
Here, the nature of the obligation of A and B under the subject C:onract to sell was solidary. In the said contract, A
. and B were expressly referred to as the "SELLER" while C was referred to as the "BUYER." Indeed, the contract to sell ·
.did not state "SELLERS" but "SELLER." This could only mean that A and B were considered as one seller in the
.contract (APP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFPRSBS) v. Sanvictores, G.R. No. 207586; August 17, 2016;
Covered Case). . -
Obligations with a Penal Clause
63. The inhabitants of Barrio XYZ raised a sum of 16,000 to erect a chapel for their patron saint and placed
the sum in the hands of four trutees. The trustees entered into a contract with the father of A in order to
circumvent the prohibition on government employees engaging in outside work. P12,0QO was paid leaving
P4,000 to be paid at the completion of the chapel. As a penalty, it was agreed that if either party should
fail to comply with any of its conditions or stipulations, such party should pay the other by way of
20 I 2018 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

I CIVIL LAW 2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES
Ii
indemnity the sum of P4,000. The chapel faied to meet the specifications of the four trustees. May the
I· trustees refuse to pay the remaining P4,000 _ o set off the penalty agreed ·up?n?
i
NO. The chapel is used for the purpose for which it was intended, thus, the trustees are not entitled to confiscate the
· sum of P4,000 which is yet unpaid upon the purchase price and at the same time to claim the stipulated damages.
.The result is that the penalty as provided in the penal clause of the contract must be set off against that portion of
! the contract price which has been retained in the hands of the trustees, with the result that neither party can recover
i
.I
- 1
nything of te·other (.Navarro v. M allari, C.R. No. 20586, October 13, 1923).
6. F Land, Inc. awarded · to PEC developme_nt of its residential subdivisions. Both agreed that liquidated
damages of PlS,000 per day shall be paid by. PEC in case of delay. F claimed that PEC failed to complete
the works and claims for damages. PEC, on the other hand, contended that their work stopped due to
failure of the petitioner to pay for certain portion. The total amount due to PEC was computed to ·be
I
l.
P3,990,000.00. Is ·the penalty of PlS,000 per day of delay binding upon mutual agreement of the parties?
I
I NO. There is no quesion that the penalty of PlS,000 .00 per day of delay was mutually agreed upon by the parties
and that the same is sanctioned by law. A penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume greater liability in case
of breach. As a "general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the freedom of the parties to agree .on such terms and
conditions as they see fit as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Nevertheiess, courts may equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the contract in two instances: (1) if the principal
obligation has ·been partly or irregularly complied; and (2) even if there has been no compliance if the penalty is
iniquitous·or unconscionable m accordance wi · · of the Civil Code. A penalty interest of PlS,000.00 per
day of delay as liquidated daµia,ges or P3, 3 penalty of the P12,470,000.00 contract price)
I is unconscionable (Filinvest {q /]nc. v. . o. 138WJ -5eptember 20, 2005).
! ' ,,(\ t\J r: ,.- . .+:
65. Spouses A and B executed in f yor of Jlcµ\k 3.p.rQn;tj.sso:cy; mtes seeured by a real estate mortgage over ·
petitioner's parcel ofland. Part Qf the.te'rill:iol.. ····· -"' ' " .an ge ment for petitioners to pay solidarily
penalty charges equivalent to ·1.l16 0£!13 p r da antti.unt due should they default-. The Sps.
failed to pay and C:: Bank fed)\Jodtp a t'fo . oer:.Th_e RTC held s nconscionable the
penalty charges stipulated m t'1! s\and \ ret'b1 · tQ nily 13 on the prmc1pal loan for every
1
month of default. Was the com fioh of fhe p R._i(; ·proper?
. "-< '.:f 7
YES. The surcharge or penaity part::ik <j · q · t-s d \ges under Article 2227 of the Civil Code, and
is sparate and distinct from intere Xm q "§,
'*>?J gu s ay not at liberty ignore the feedom of the
parties to agree on such terms and con 9fis e .:tip1at palty , nevertheless , may he eqmtably reduced
if it's iniquiWus or unconscionable. (S/£o hJ Cora;p'h Q tS.y;v. China Banking Corporation, C.R. No. 215954.
August 1, 2016; Covered Case). \. ;, ; _.,,..;#· ,, /\.)· . /
.,..---A - ( - '.- A.1(1_ '.· h;; _._:'. .
.... - ·-..., .
66. CCC, -a corporation engaged in the busin s . ifo<t:rff'ilig..cement, obtained the services of ABB and BBC
to repair its Kiln Drive Motor. CCC and ABB enterechnto a contract for the repair of Kiln Drive Motor
with a term that a penalty of oe half of one percent of the total cost or P987.25 per day of delay. Due to
the repeated failure of ABB to repair the Kiln Drive Motor, CCC filed complaint for sum of money and
I . damages against respondent ..Whethr or not CCC is entitled to penalties.
,.
l YES. The ·penalty clause takes the place of indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non -
I
I. compliance with the obligation, unless there is·a stipulation to.the contrary. CCC is entitled to penalties since under
Ar.t . 1226 .of the Civil Code, the penalty clause takes the place of indemnity for damages and the
in case of non-compliance with the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
payment
In this case,of interests
since there
f is no stipulatjon to the ·contrary , the penalty in the amount of P987 ,25 per day of delay covers all other damages.
(Continental Cement Corporation vs Asea Brown Boveri GR No. 171660, October-1 7, 2011)
J
EXTINGUISHMENT OF OBLIGATIONS
Payment or Performartce
67. Constante and Corazon authorized Artigo to act as real estate broker in the sale of four lots for the amount
of P23,000,000, 53.of which will be given to the latter as commission. Atigo then entered into a contract
of sale with TI Corp. over two of the four lots for the price of P7,050,000. After the sale was consummated,
Artigo received from Constante and Corazon P48,893. Howeve.r, feeling aggrieved because his total
commission should be P352,500.00 which is 53 of the agreed price of the two lots, he sued Constante and
Corazon. Citing Art. 1235 of the Civil Code, Constante and Corazo contends that Artigo's inaction as well
2018 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 21

as failure to protest estops him from recovering more than what was actually paid him. Was the
contention of Constante and Corazon correct?
NO. Artigo's acceptance of partial payment of his commission neither amounts to a waiver of the balance nor puts
him in estoppel. This is the import of Art. 1235 which was explained in this wise: "The word accept, as used in Art.
1235 of the Civil Code, means to take as satisfadory or sufficient , or agree to an incomplete or irregular performance .
Hence, the mere receipt of a partial payment is not equivalent to the required _ acceptance of performance as would
extinguish the whole obligation." There is thus a dear distinction between acceptance and mere receipt. In this case,
it is evident that Artigo merely received the partial paym,ent without waiving the balance (De Castro v. Court of .
Appeals, G.R. No. 115838, July 18, 2002).
68. LSW deposited with ABC a money market placement. Thereafter, a person claiming to be LSW instructed
an officer of ABC to pre-terminate the money market placement, issue a check representing the proceeds,
and give the same to S, who in turn deposited the check to FCC's account. Is the obligation of ABC to pay
LSW extinguished?
. No. Payment made by the debtor to a wrong party does not extinguish the obligation as to the creditor;if there is no
fault or negligence which can be imputed to the la.tter. Evn when the debtor acted in utmost good faith and by
mistake as to the person of his creditor, or through error indued by the fraud of a third person, the payment to one
whc:ds not in fac.t his crecFtor, or·authorized to receive such payment, is void, except as provided in Article 1241.
Such payment does not prejudice the creditor, and accrual of interest is not suspended by it (Allied Banking Corp. v.
Lim Sio Wan, G.R. No. 133179, M arch.27; 2008).
69. Peiiarroyo through Valenj ,t!ntered Qi . - · )h Pap.a over a parcel of land. After paying
.,. '""- · ' ·· ...,
the amount of PS,000 as earve$f money, Pf fltir1oyo,:C\Il<J .Valencia issued a check for the payment of the
balance. However, Papa did not..present the check fO:f 'payment for·more than 10 years. Did the delivery
of the check produced the effect\of paimeni:t, :...;·· · ·,,..,,·,,...,.,:, ·f -
. , . . < :.:; ii . Yz<',.,;MfM;; 1< • '
YES. While it is true that the deliver f a hed:prpd of ri ent only when it is cashed, pursuant to Art.
1249 of the Civil Code, the ruf is>otlterWise if\t ejcl,c;ed by the creditor's unreasonable delay in
presentment. The acceptance of a ch# irrl,pliesr dti Wigence in presenting it for payment, and if
he from whom it is received sustamslro'i? s , . ge9ce/iJ m be held to operate as actual payment of
the debt or obligatibn for which it - .tft :ve enoza anfl Co. Inc., G.R. No. 105188, January 23, 1998).
\·- "":?/ --. rJ > {;'", .
., ,-l_,, -
70. De Leon arid his spouse obtained ' ' l Clf w · ,,"fo \J! ;development of Delta Homes. To secure
the loan, the_ spguses executed a fe: sta gage_ of 1ttproperty, and executed a Contract to Sell
:with Enriqez over the house and fo J! _,J.::t(<;t ( ed on its loan obligation. he bank, instead
of foreclosmg the real estate mortgagej".'apd to a da :Jn :payment. Unknown to Enriquez, among the
properties assigned to the bank was the-h tl e;jl)t"'·of Lot 4. Enriquez then filed a complaint against
DELTA and the bank alleging that DELTA v.iofated.th¢ terms ofits License to Sell. Did the dacion enpago
extinguish the loan obligation, such that DELTA has no more obligations to the bank?
YES. Like in all contracts, the intention of the parties to the dation ·in payment is paramount and controlljng. The
contractual intention determines whether the property subject of the dation will be considered as the full equivalent
of the deht and will therefore serve as full satisfaction for the debt. The dation in payment extinguishes the obligation
to the extent of the value of the thing delivered , either as agreed upon .by the parties or as may be proved , unless the
parties by agreement, express or implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation, in
which case the obligation is totally extinguished. (Luzon Development Bank v. Enriquez, GR Nos. 168646 and 168666,
January 12, 2011) ·
71. C leased a three-story commercial building to PNB for a period of 5 years. Upon expiration of the lease,
. PNB continued occupying the· property on a month-to-mo th basis. C filed a complaint against PNB,
alleging that the latter failed to pay its monthly rentals. In its defense, PNB claimed that it applied the
rental proceeds as payment . for .C's outstanding loan which became due and demandable. As for the other
monthly rentals, PNB explained that it received a demand letter from a certain X who clainied to be the
new owner of the leased property and requested that the rentals be paid directly to him until PNB decides
to yacate the premises or a new lease contract with C is executed. PNB thus·-deposited the rentals in a
separate non-drawing savings account for the benefit of the rightful party. Was there a proper
consignme_nt done by PNB to make it not liable to pay interest <Iue to delay?

NO. Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor
cannot accept or refuses to accept payment. For consignation to be valid, the debtor must comply with the
requirements under the law. PNB's deposit of the subject monthly rentals in a non-drawing savings account is not
the consignation contemplated by law, becaus.e it did not place the same at the disposal of the court. Consignation is
necessarily judicial ; it is .not allowed in venues other than the courts. Consequently, PNB's obligation.to pay rent for
the period of January 16, 2005 up to March 23, 2006 ·remained subsisting, as the deposit of the rentals cannot be
considered to have the effect of payment (Philippine Natio al Bank v. Lilibeth S. Chan, G.R. No. 206037, M arch 13, 2017;
De Castillo,].).
72. Sps. C purchased a parcel of land from Kalikasan Homes, owned/developed by AFPMBAI, to be paid from
the proceeds of the PAG-IBIG loan extended to the former by the Rural Bank. AFPBAI executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale and caused the transfer of the land title to Sps. C's names but the PAG-IBIG loan facility
did not push through. Meanwhile, AFPMBAI made several demands against the Sps. C to pay the price.
The Sps. C are confused as to whom the Rural Barik through PDIC or AFPMBAI tender of payment should
be made, filed a complaint for cortsignation of loan payment before the RTC. Is the complaint filed by the
Sps C before the RTC against AFPMBAI make out a case for consignation?
YES. Under Article 1256 of the Civil Code, the <l:ebtor shall be released from responsil1ility by the consignation of the
thing or sum due, without need of prior tender of payment , when the creditor is absent or unknown , or when he is
incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it is due, or when two or more persons claim the same right to
collect, or when the title to the obligation has been lost. The allegations in the complaint prese·nt a situation where
the- creditor is unknown , or that two or more e · · · to possess the same right to collect from petitioners. ·
Petitioners are ready to pay the loan in f cµmstances , they do not know which of the two
should receive full payment ftthe purch . , . er of payment must validly be made (Spouses
Cacayorin v. Armed Forces and PolJ ce M utual B_er_eftt fo ss?c q_iqn, In ., G.R. N?_ .171298, April 15, 2013). ·
\ {>··., ... ·· ' ::· .,; " ?" ,: ...... i
\· .I: s , f. ih,T.F.fu '· ·

,_.-iy:·; ;; . .t
73. ABF and its employees enterecf ipt :£ c(>H ve agrJ ment whereby ABF would provide its
e.QJ.ployees with work on Sunday a,nd}h.at \.j'n£ih o_ otk on Sundays is available through no
fault of the employees, they shaiM
·.'(""-»';
b_ .j en·.t titl •d to th 'ffi ,wages as though they had worked that
day. Subsequently, the governm nt/ n · " _ 1(t¥e.':Opening of any commercial, industral or
agricultural enterprise on Sund · , -7; $ et,h d'payment of the Sunday wages despite
the p·rohibition? .Jj,) :):;'; / <" ,'?
·
No, when the law prohibiting the ope-fi ·/)of
$1Jf; /-J/ :\ al:establishments
ial anhnd
f;r;;·;
on Sunday was .enforced, the
performance of the prestation .became imp ssi . >,,,tltfe}pJ>,1d_ffer 'is relieved from complying with its agreement
to pay laborers Sunday wages (Asia Bed Pa t:J1 { f Nationa flle,}j, d7Kapok Industries Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-9126 ,
.• .
January 31, 1?57). ·· · ,.,.,.,., ,..r .,,.""""'."' . ..,,.,,,, ..},#
•' ' "' · " 11e " " " "··, ·,
74. A sold a portion of his interest in a car to B. It was agreed upon that a stated portion of the purchase price
should be applied to the cost of installing a new air conditioning system. The car was lost in an earthquake
be.fore the air conditioning system was purchased. Thus, installing the air-conditioning system became
impossible. ls B released from the obligation to pay s'a much of the purchase price as was to be applied to
the installation of the air co.nditoning system?
No.. The obligation to pay the balance independently of the purpose for which it was intended to be. used continues
to subsist notwithstanding the fact that it has become impossible to use it in the particular way that was intended
(Millan v. Olabarrieta, G.R. No. 21087, February 23, 1924). It should be noted here that payment has not become
impossible ; it is merely the act to be performed after the payment that has become impossible. Thus, the obligation
or prestation (to pay) remains. ·
75. A obtained crop loans from B. To secure payments, A executed a chattel.mortgage over the standing crops.
Subsequently, the crops were destroyed due to a fortuitous event. Is the borroer·. still liable for the loan
despite the loss causd by a fortuitous event?
YES, the borrower is still liable, for his obligation was not to deliver determinate things (th crops) but to deliver a
generic thing (money). The amount of money representing the value of the crops, with interest, cannot be said to
have been lost, for the account can s_till be paid from sources other than the mortgaged crops. The obligation of the
appellant was not to deliver a determinate thing namely, the crops. to be harvested from his land, or the value of the
crops that would be harvested from his land. Rather, his obligation was to pay a generic thing, the amount of money
201 8 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 23

representing the total sum of the 5 loans, with interest. The chattel mortgage on the crops growing on appellant's
land simply stood as a security for the fulfillment of appellant 's obligation covered by the five promissor y notes, and
the loss of the crops did not extinguish his obligation to pay, because the account could still be paid from other
sources aside from the mortgaged crops (Republic vs. Grijaldo, G.R. No. L-20240, December 31, 1965).
76. E leased from R the latter's certificates of convenience covering certain transportation lines. The lease
contract was approved by the (defunct) Public Service Commission. Subsequently, E filed with the
Commission petition for authority to suspend the operation on the lines on the ground of alleged high
prices of spare parts and gasoline, and the reduction of its dollar allocations. Are the causes alleged by E
for the suspension of the opeation on the Jines leased sufficient ground to release E from liability or at
least to a redction of the rentals payable by it?
.NO. Performapce is not excused by subsequent inability to perform and by unforeseen difficulties, by unusual or
unexpected expenses, by failure of a party to avail himself of the benefits to be had under the contract, by weather
conditions, by financial stringency, or by stagnation of business. Neither is performance excused by the fact that the
contract turns out to be hard and improvident, unprofitable or impracticable, ill-advised, or even foolish, or less
profitabe, or unexpectedly burdensome (Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. M anabat, G.R. No. L-23546, August 29, 1974).
-
Condonation or Remission of Debt
77. D executed a promissory note for PS00.00 in favor of C. Later, C died. D contends that he did not borrow
from C but that the latter acted as interme · in the loan for D fro:in F, C's friend, and that after
·he was notified of the death of C; he ·ti:!!.,;,,'.;; efL''"''!'- #, '¥'':'.''".:" , .., ;_.,. p;iyment of the PS00.00 loan, offering at the
same time to pay the balanc:.iJt a fe{if1y>1JtiFF'hlf de,JlilD_u_p.derstand that he was condoning the debt.
Upon the facts, is the alleged remission sufficiep.tly-est,ablishe 'd?
NO. D was the sole witness who testified about iC(At :f s;Iitr ..}vas not presented to confirm it. The promissory
note evidencing the debt was never: •
returhed
'>. • .
by s,F to
·
·:ox J!lJlek
':'" -> ,.·h: t· j::: -:7''.""" ·
··-- ¥;" · .
repesentative
Y- ·
. The partial payment of P200.00
made by D belies the alleged condon a,tion.•Moreover , ,f,tJ'it,S, -t missi<?P. were true, it would benefit only the estate
of C and. not D.The act of gene-rosit - of F must have ,. -'-';" "'"' )J.s his,, friend C whose death bereaved him, or the
family of the latter. D had no relation-pf friendship wi '1 • -ermosg ys. M edina, [CA] 44 O.G. 4429; De Leon, 2010,
p .367) > f:::.
t f _·
78. A conjugal two-story building, o;J <l by'
1A
in favor of certain tenants, but the contra
y
'" "
< "' ):. '.,_,,. - 1
-....Ji{.1Je Iiv] separately from each other, was le·ased
" · -·- .
e" tiptifated that the rents would be paid to the husband
_. J/f "' Mt'.f'· - f
" $ : ·...4$...... I ·
alone. The wif.e sued for part of sailJ;tent '" , he c9ur¢. CJ.f the trial, a compromise was agreed upon
between the spouses to the effect thaf lhe w" e - ,!)»J,d,p"ay te:imsband P35,000 in consideration of a waiver
made by the .husband to any right in sai){niP.perty an4t :n. accounting of the rentals the property would
earn. The compromise was then approved - y Jli!ouh. Does the waiver to this property dissolve the
conjugal partnership b_etween the spouses? ·
NO. The waiver applies only to the propert y mentioned in the agreement. With reference to all other conjugal
properties, as well as future properties , the conjugal partnership still remains (Puzon v. Gaerlan, G.R. No. L-19571 ,
December 31, 1965)
Confusion or Merger
79. ABC Corp. borrowed P104,000 from DEF Corp. Subsequently thereafter, the president of ABC Corp.
became the president of DEF Corp. and the majority members of ABC Corp. became the majority members
DEF Corp. Is there a merger of creditor and debtor under Art. 1276.of the Civil Code?
NO. There cannot be a merger of creditor and debtor under Article 1276 of the Civil Code although a majority of the
members of the boards of the two organizations parties to the contract are the same persons, if the said entities keep
their own identities and activities (Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa M anila Railroad Co. v. Credit Union/ G.R. No.
L-14332, M ay 20, 1960) ··
80. A ·and B were co-owners of a piece of property worth Pl,000,000. For some repairs thereon, B paid
P200,000. Because they were co-owners, A had to share in said expenses, and so A owed B Pl00,000. A sold
his share in the property to C and B also sold his share in the property to C. Later B brought this action
to recover ·Pt00,000 from A. A claimed that since C is now the owner of the property, C owes himself, and
therefore said merger had extinguished his debt to B. Should A pay B?
24 I 201_8 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

·Yes. ·Mere transfer to a third person of rights belonging to both the debtor and the creditor BUT not the credit as
against the debt does not result in merger. The rights of creditor and debtor are not merged in one same person by
the fact that the things pertaining to said creditor and debtor which were the subject of the obligation were
transferred to him where said transfer did not include, among the_ rights and obligations transferred , the credit that
the er.editor had against the dbtor. There is no merger of the rights of debtor and creditor in this case (Testate Estate
of M ota vs. Serra, G.R. No. L-22825, February 14, 1925).
81. C held a mortgage c'redit, in which the property mortgaged was the Steamship Yusingco. This vessel was
sold in execution to satisfy a judgment in favor of X. In the execution sale, C bid for and purchased the
vessel. Fro the proceeds of the sale, the judgment in favor of X was paid. C now seeks to recover what
had been paid to X, on the ground that its mortgage credit had preference over the judgment in favor of
X. What is the effect of the purchase by C of th:e vessel at public auction?
The obligations are extinguished by the merger of the rights of the creditor and debtor according to Article 1275 "The
obligation is extinguished from the time the characters of creditor and debtor are merged in the same person." After
the vessel had been sold in execution, the only right left fo C was to collect his mortgage credit from the purchaser
thereof at public auction, inasmuch as a mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property ·on which it is
. imposed whoever its possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for the security of which it was created. It
so happens, however, that C cannot take such step in this case, because he was the purchaser of the vessel at public
auction, and it was so with full knowledge that he had a mortgage credit on said vessel. Obligations are extinguished
by the merger of the rights of creditor and deb C's claim may not prosper (Yek Tong Lin Fire, etc. vs.
Yusingco, G.R. No. L-43608, Ju./ y ,?O, 1937).
' {_/ .
.
l· . ;· ., . -- .., L: :i :.
82. G maintained an account with '-P./N / Ba1nk
. ., L.a. t.er,,...
.. P k eitered into a contract of loan for the
amount of PS00,000. G made p3fiial )>ay-1*ents . sub eqently failed to pay. Thereafter, .G
discovered that PNBank applied te balance pf
........,_/' •.t .. )!( .: ;t
dintf balances of his account. Can PNBank
rightfully apply a deposit to the''<lebt of G? • ! Ij f .- .
. ·>:t,: \ ·
yes. The relation existing between a pos .
:+
\. '-'« f
···-it- ··
'<
• f ctdilbr and debtor. The general rule is adopted

- for this jurisdiction that·a bank has\ •·, , · t - l:i)"f P:e.s t i ' /$"'nands. for the payment of any indebtedness
to it on the part of the depositor (Gil .P (.Di.:or/e&B/ nk;,(jjR.;No. 43191, November 13, 1935).
· li;i;•) l . (",)f:> .
83. LCS is the owner of shares of stock...o: :A\i a Op' fi't 9f'. :io;ooo. Subsequently, LCS became indebted
• • ·· ' ,._\, :'" -' ·. ··,.j··-,j. . . '
to MCB mthe amount of P9, 105.t 7: QJ}l . Jp-epay_,,th tl.tbt, MCB compensated the amount of LCS s
indebtedness with the sum equivalerit il; e value of 'b.:?s' liares of stock of LCS. Was the compensation
proper? ···./ ., .·H,1t;WtstfF%V tt::·,,r
NO. The shares of stock of a banking corporatian ·do not c.qp.stitute an indebtedness thereof to the stockholder and,
therefore, the latter is not a creditor of the former for such shares. Moreover , A stockholder's indebtedness to a
banking corporation cannot be compensated with the amount of his shares in the same institution , there being no
relation of creditor and debtor with regard to such shares (Garcia v. Lim Chu Sing, G.R.No. 39427, February 24, 1934).
84. S, E ·and ·B, entered into a Contract of Lease with SPI for the use of SPI's building as premises for formers'
karaoke and restaurant business. SPI later sent a demand letter to S, E and B asking for full payment of
rentals. Receiving no payment, SPI filed a complaint for before the MeTC. The MeTC found SPI solely
responsible for repairing the structural defects of the leased premises for which S, E and B spent P125,000.
The.RTC on appeal modified the decision by ordering petitioners to pay SPI P95,000 instead of off-setting
the amount allegedly spent by petitioners for the repairs. Ca:ri the unpaid rentals be judicially
compensated against expenses by the lessee for repairs and structural defects?
NO. Compensation takes place only if both obligations are liquidated and emandable. The Civil Code provides that
compensation shall take place when the· following requisites are present: (1) Each one of the obligors be bound
principally and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other; (2) Both debts consist in a sum of money ,
or if the things due are consumable, they be of the sl:lme kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been
stated; (3) The two debts are due: (4) The debts are liquidated and demandable ; (5) Over neither of them be any
retention or controversy , commenced by third parties and communicated in due time to the debtor. A claim is
considered liquidated when the amount and time of payment is fixed. (Selwyn F. Lao and Edgar Manansala v. Special
. Plans, Inc., G.R No. 164791; June 29, 2010).
201 8 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 25

201 8 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL LAW ·
Novation
85. Jose subscribed 160 shares of stock, at par value, in a company whose authorized capital stock was
P300,000. At the time of the subscription, and without his knowledge and consent, the company increased
the capital stock to P600,000. Can the company compel Jose to pay for s3:d shares?
NO. Not having given his consent to said increase constitutes a novation by changing the principal conditions (Art.
129,1, Civil Code). Said increase in authorized capital stock diluted the expected ownership of the subscriber in the
corporation amounting to a change in the principal conditions of the agreement. Hence, he is not bound by the
contract thus novated and is relieved of the obligation contracted by him in the original contract, which became
extinguished as a consequence of said novation·(art. 1231, Civil Code); even if he made some partial payments , not
haying been informed of said increase at the time of having made them. (National Exchange Co., Ltd. v. Ramos, G.R.
No. 27850, December 24, 1927)
86.. A rented a house from B. In the contract of lease, the lessee A was given authority to assign the lease to
strangers. Because of this, A leased it to C. Is A released from his obligation towards the lessor B?
No. Under Art. 1292 of the Civil Code the only situation where a novation having the effect of extinguishing a prior
obligation will be implied, in the absence of express stipulation, is where the new and old obligations_are incompatible
in every respect. In the case under consideration, the new ol;>ligation assumed by the successive entities taking over
the lease was not at all incompatible with the continued liability of the original lessee (Rios V. Jacinto, G.R. No. 23893;
M arch 23, 1926)
0,_
87. D owes C Pl,000,000 . F, a fde,nd of D, a :"I "YH!pay what D owes you." C agrees.
Is there expromision so as tri'rFeve D 'of 4 ;: b\_jg t!o?,c. ;r._/-;,· :;;.
NO. The mere act hat the credit f eif ,,a,gJJ'A.( ? * i R 6t?' from a third person who hs-greed to
assume the obhgat10n, when ther lf- i:io <\greernent t · · " · ., - · "" bt()ff,S_.tiall be released from respons1b1lity, does
not constitute novation , and the cre;ditoricqll"f tin:e igat!f>.n against the original debtor. (,Vtagdalena
Estates, Inc. v. Rodrigue;z, G.R. No. L i4J 1, t;>e'cemb t 1 · 1''
·:t:·" ··- •• ,_ .-..... -; }';; ; '·-·J-/
. .,, " % > :f
88. E is a duly organized domestic lu/pr A · f tt9sacting with PBC. E, represented by V
took out a loan from PBC in the · · ' . n · gJaJ?l\l!:The parties entered into a compromise
agreement whereby V voluntai. «:,".;:;_{fyj / -':-A an.
with PBC. _Dnder the trms of the
compromise agreement, V would :: Y4fjtri)l a; ted 1n the promissory note with_ a caveat
that any failure. on his part to p' ent ,. ue t !d make the whole amount immediately
demandable. Are the petitioners es' ·ll:.fi t ' t"''t l.\ m.ce the parties entered into a compromise
1
. agreement, which was judicially appt < ) t - e ' ·:itt<I'the original loan agreement? .
..,,,.,,..,.., ·..,,_._-:.,,..,>
· NO. Under the Civil Code, novation is one of the,:;rrl-an;··tb ttinguish an obligation . This is done either by changing
the object or principal conditions, by substituting the person of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the
rights of the creditor. It is a relative extinguishment since a new obligation is created in lieu of the old obligation. For
there to be novation, it must be established that the old and new contracts are incompatible on all points, or that the
will to novate appear by express agreement of the parties or acts of equivalent import (Ever Electrical Manufactu.ring,
Inc., Vicente C. Go and George C. Go v. Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM ), represented by its Vice-President,
M r. Domingo S.·Aure, G.R. No. 187822-23. August 3, 2016; Covered Case).
CONTRACTS
Essential Requisites
89. X Corporation invited _companies engaged in construction to participate in the bidding of its building.
The Instruction to Bidders prepared by X expressly required a formal acceptance and a period within
which the winning bidder shall be notified in writing. Y Builders Corporation submitted a bid proposal
secured by bid bonds. In its proposal form, Y Builders bound and obliged itself to enter into a contract
with X within ten (10) days from the notice of the award. X accepted the proposal of Y but.it proposed that
Y adjust its bid from P12.9M to P13M. X sent Y a Notice to Proceed with construction pending execution
of the Construction Agreement. However, Y informed X that it can no longer undertake the said project.
In view of the unjust withdrawal of Y Builders, X retained the bid bond ad moved to claim damages. Was
t)lere a perfected contract?
26 I 2018 SAN BED CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

There was no perfected contract. Being consensual, a contract is perfected by mere consent. From the moment of a
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the object and the cause that would constitute the contract, consent
arises. However, the offer must be certain and the acceptance seasonable and absolute;·if qualified, the
acceptance would merely constitute a counter-offer. In the case at bar, the parties did not get past the negotiation
stage. At any time, either of the prospective contracting parties may stop the negotiation and withdraw the offer.
rhe Civil .Code provides that no contrar.t shall arise unless its acceptance is communicated to the offeror. That is, the
mere determination to accept the proposal of a bidder does not constitute a contract; that decision must be
communicated to the bidder . The Instruction to Bidders prepared by X itself expressly required (1) a formal .
acceptance and (2) a period within which such acceptance was to be made known to respondent. No accepta.'.1.ce was
cornrnuni ate.d to respondent; therefore , no ·consent was given. Without that express manifestation, as required by
the terms of ·its proposal, there was no contrac.t (The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Asset Builders
Corporation, G.R. No. 147410. February 5, 2004).
Kinds of Contracts
90. X purchased from Y various reinforcing steel bars covered by a total of 12 invoices. X made different
partial payments mi different dates leaving a balance for which Y sent two demand letters. Because no
payment was made, Y filed a complaint for a sum of money. Based on the invoices there is a specific
amount of interest of 243 per annum agreed upon. The court's decision based the interest rates on the
agreement in the invoice. Is the interest rate of 243 per annum indicated in the sales invoice a valid
contractual stipulation?
Yes, the interest r.ate of 243 per.annum · ke is a valid contractual stipulation. Under Art.
1306 of the Civil Code, "conti.hting parti . . · lationptslauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient , provided t{iey are not c;:on91.ry1 9il<\'Y mora1 , goqd ¥toms, public order, or public policy "
The sales invoices expressly stipulated ofinterest'anq
.... .i, ..•
t . ., 1'.. .,, ...,,...
attorney;s fees in case of overdue accounts and collection suits.
, ,,.,. "t\....,.f "',,. J :,., > ""•..,/. · • •• <5. 4(1 ; _...
They are in the nature of contra . of aqhesion. 'Ihe. t. h4SAlld tq t. ontracts of adhesion are as binding as
ordinary contracts. Those who adh }e'to the cop.tract j freeJo.-reject it entirely and if they adhere, they
give their consent (Asian Constructidp Pe elqpttzent C ·· CatJ-uiy Pacific Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 167942,
June 29, 2010). · - -..·t,- "1 t., \. ; Lj,, . 1
· t'>
i " \.i . "··· J ,.
91. X executed two (2) promissory·:: \ts \ aiit iDespite demands by the latter, there
t
remained unpaid balances on bot ,-P.,N. · 1':X;;, anlf ijled an action for recovery of the unpaid
balance, interest and penalty. X l s .:<s,t,HJ h ject ceck from her nice z as partal
payments for te purchase by th.}: . : ,,'Yt o. _. ·.:ef an_. _ _ _ ,,. :._'-t X red1scounted the subject checks -w-ith
Y Bank fol:,.which she was · requrre <:i\e Ns t#Se<;/payment thereof and, therefore, that PNs
wee.null and void for being simulai:f?';r\ e _ qu5 1f, PNs null and void for being simulated and
fictitious? ' (1Z -·.,/ i
(.· --· YfJi1$> / C::·_:,,
No. Based on Article 1345 of the Civil Code,, s.iri{tlJtio f - ,otracts is of two kinds, namely: (1) absolute; and (2)
relative. Simulation is absolute when there is color of contract but without any substance, the parties not intending
to be bound ·thereby. It is relative when the parties come to an agreement that they hide or conceal in the guise of
another contract. The burden of showing that a contract is simulated rests on the party impugning the contract:This
is bcause of the presumed validity of the contract. Without such proof, therefore, X's allegation that she had been
made to believe that the PNs would guaranty the rediscounted checks, not evidence of her primary and direct liability
under loan agreements, could not stand. Thus, X is liable under the PNs (Teresita I. Buenaventura v. Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company, (J.R. No 167082. August 3, 2016; Covered Case).
Object, Causes and Forms of Contracts
92. Spouses Y, as represented by their daughter C, through a SPA obtained from Atty. X, a loan secured .by a ·
REM by way of second mortgage over a TCT and a promissory note. C also executed an instrument
ntitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests over a Real Property, over which Atty. X then executed .
an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which he caused to be annotated to the back of the TCT. Because the
Spouses failed to settle their obligation, Atty. X filed a collection complaint against the Spouses Y and C.
The Spouses contended that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights which served as the basis for the adverse
claim was invalid and violative of Art. 1347 of the Civil Code. Is the waiver of hereditary rights in favor
of another heir executed by a future heir while the parents are still living is valid? ·
No, a waiver or hereditary rights by a future heir in favor of another while the parents are still living is not valid.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 1347, no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in

2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL, LAW '
cases expressly authorized by law. For the contract to be considered one for a future (inheritance) the following
requisites must concur: (1) That the succession has not yet been opened; (2) That the object of the contract forms
part of the inheritance and (3) That the promisor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is
purely hereditary in nature·. At the time of execution of C's waiver, succession -to either of her parent 's properties
have not yet opened since both of them are still living. Hence, the Waiver of Hereditary Rights is invalid and may
not serve as the basis for an adverse claim (Atty. Pedro Ferrer v. Spouses Alfredo and Imelda Diaz, Reina Comandante,
and Spouses Bienvenido and Elizabeth Pangan, G.R. No. 165300; April 23, 2010). ·
93. S and B ent.ered into a contract of sale of a parcel of land. The sale is embodied only in a private document
and ·not in a public instrument because it was not acknowledged before a notary public as required by law.
Is the sale valid? ·
Yes, the sale is valid and binding only as between the parties and not against third persons without notice until the
sale is registered in the Registry of Property. As between the parties, the form is not indispensable. B has the right to
compel S to put the contract in a public instrument so that it can be registered to affect third persons , even in the
absence of an express agreement between them to that effect. Inasmuch as the contract is both valid and enforceable,
the execution of a public instrument becomes a mere matter of form and convenience (Spouses Pontigon ·v. Heirs of
M eliton Sanchez, G.R. No. 221513, December 5, 2016).
Reformation of Instruments
94. In 1968, ABC Corporation entered into a co e of a parcel of land with X for a period of twenty
(20) years. The lease was etended for · · e leased premises to Spouses Y and Z. A.BC
questioned the sale alleging'. lat it ha . . led t; ivil case seeking the reformation
of the expired contract of le S: /On the grlJ.IJ tt!1 : S\: . er madv iitly omitted to incorporate in the
contract of lease, the verbal agremnt bt;wet;11t!t.. PilTt e, ,t}it in e event X leases or .sells the lot after
the expiration of the lease, ABC'!J:.s tie._ rjghtJ,o · ; ·hef '?ffer. X and Spouses Y and Z contended
tat ABC is guilty of lache.s for i1ot qrilig,ng t fon;_tion of _the lease contract within the
prescriptive period of ten (10) y·e¥s fr9m··i<S- ee e atfon already precribe?
. ..:l:. l{ ' \ /
The right of reformation is necessarily , an invaSion
{5
o
· .,
th¢:ffparol evidence rule since, when a writing is
1
reformed
. , the result is that. an oral "' 1fJ
r·' . m
. ·(: ::·:· _v· : - .!{• ad:J!gally
t :J
-· ---,teffective. The prescriptive period for
• •
op . ' !J ie nt is ten (10) years under Article 1144. In

actions based upon a written contractJapd of:: mstt:R
the case at_ br , ABC ha·te (10) ydi j m ·Af 1J f J ,eii tract ofleas was executed , to fie an actio
for reformation. Sadly, it did so only.f1'5p .-s·_ er <;:>Cause of action accrued, hence, its cause of
action has becora.e _ stale, hence , time 2b ed ( Rose. pf Bep'tr/v: :Honorable Mateo M. Leanda , G.R. No. 128991,
April 12, 2000). k.\i ··' , ·P / ,·:;,,>/.. ./
! acts
95. X failed in paying his monthly rentals to Y which caued him to vacate the premise. Y took possession of
X's articles and equipment found in the rented unit and it instituted a complaint for a s-um of money. The
trial court held x liable for unpaid rentals but deducted from the amount the value of the confiscated
items. Y asserted that under their lease contract, failur of the lessee to clear the rented premises "shall
give rise to LESSOR's right to dispose of the same in a private sale and to apply the proceds thereof first
to the back rentals xxx". Y claimed that the value of the items it had retained should not have been
deducted from the unpaid rentals, as it does not have the obligation to sell the same. Should the value of
the confiscated properties be deducted from the_lessee's liability under the contract?
NO , the value of the confiscated properties should not be deducted . Contracts have . the force of law between the
parties and the same is binding as between the parties except when the terms are ambiguous, the literal meaning of
a contract 's stipulation is controlling. The courts cannot enforce the contract contrary to its express terms; otherwise,
it would trample the rights of the parties to stipulate ·the terms of their agreement. Literally applying the provisions
of contract, Y merely had the right or authority to sell the articles in the leased premises and apply the proceeds
lhereof to X's liabilities . It neither mandated Y to sell the san1e nor authorized it to appropriate them and offset their
value against the outstanding liabilities. Y's options were to either enforce the security and sell the articles or claim
the principal obligation and return the articles (PASDA, Inc. v. Dimliyacyac, Sr., G.R. No. 220479; August 17, 2016;
Covered Case). ,·

96. X was the original registered owner of 2 parcels of agricultural land (the A and the B Property). The A
property is tenanted by Y and Z. X mortgaged both parcels of land to C Bank to secure certain loans. Upon
their failure to pay the loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to C Bank. X bought
back one of their lots from_ C Bank. Meanwhile, A Bank executed a 'Separate Deeq of Land Transfer over
the A Property in favor of the Y and Z. X filed a complaint for the cancellation of the Y and Z's Certificate
of Land Ownership. Y and Z, however, insisted that they bought the A property as farmer-beneficiaries
thereof. Are the respondents the owner of the A property by virtue of the buy-back as documented by the
Deed of Sale _which allegedly corresponds to the A property? · ·
No. In case of doubt as to the intention of the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the contracting
parties shall be considered :After the execution of the Deed of Sale, X did not exercise acts of ownership that could
show that he indeed knew and believed that he repurchased the A property. The A property remained in the
possession of the Y and Z, who occupied and tilled the same without any objection from X (Salun-at M arquez and
Nestor Dela Cruz v. Eloisa Espejo, et al, G.R No. 168387, August 25, 2010).
Rescissible Contracts
97. Oil May 29, 1997, X Co. entered into a Joint Venture Agreement OVA) with Sps. Y. Under the JVA, Sps. Y
agreed for X Co. to construct on their 3 parcels ofland; ten (10) high-end single _detached residential units. -
On June. 9, 1997, X Co. entered into a Contract to Sell with Mr. A over a condominium unit without the
conformity of Sps. Y. Out of the purchase pr ice , half of it was paid through a "swapping arrangement,"
wereby Mr. A. conveyed to X Co. a hou. e t¥ *' t ,.. i< ? !share. Despite ull pyment of.the contract
price, X Co. was unable to complete Uµit'·SJ in yiola.tmn - ts contrctual stipulation to fimsh the same
within twelve (12) months from the dt 6f:i·;'li 'Jlf:f tlie' . _:. ding permit. Is the "swapping agreement"
between Mr. A and X Co. made in fraud of...... creditors?
..
· · ·
NO, the "swapping agreement " bee.en · A and ;,- £·:is,.yn, ,8 . ade ip fraud of creditors. Contracts in fraud of
creditors are those executed with th inteJ:ition to prejtfd i{e: n"F ghts ofrcreditors. In determining whether or not a
certain conveying contract is fraudulent , what ·comes tg• mwd fif s the: question of whether the conveyance was a
bo:qa fide transaction or a trick and cqntriv nce "f0 Q'eC;f:. ;'.';.ff$; • . he fa,cts herein did not show that the swapping
II
arrangement" was a fraudulent conye·¥ c6. or aihick ce t1defeat creditor rights. It is upon the creditors
to show the existence of fraud, and: ,absel - · ·· en ., _ 11 b presumed that the "swapping arrangement"
was a bona fide transaction .freely en f f · . ;· :X) \;:m, : >and therefore, valid and binding ( Buenviaje
v. Sps. Salonga, Jebson Hold zngs Corp?Cit!,(J n B.._ lfl_p·/ 162¥;1 9ctober 05, 2016; Covered Case). .
>\\, . c t1;P
98. X Co. is a domestic cororation, .who ; 9 r()lling in .i\fis owned by the A family. Y Co., on the other
hand, is also. a domestic corporation, aUeg-e ly/ow- c("b'y B. X Co. allegedly sold its shares of common
stock in C Bank, to Y Co. The shares of common sfod< in C Bank are part of the sequestered properties
that were allegedly illegally amassed by B during the twenty-year reign of former President Ferdinand
Marcos. According to X Co., the shares were obtained by Y through fraud and acts contrary to law, morals,
good customs and public policy. Such being the case, their acquisition is either voidable or void or
unenforceable. Is the sale void, voidable, or unenforceable?
. Voidable. Article 139Q provides that the following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have
been no damage to the contracting parties:(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence· intimidation,
undue i.nfluence, or fraud." Thus, contracts where consent is given through fraud, are voidable or annullable. These
are not void ab initio since voidable or anullable .contracts are existent, _valid, and binding, although they can ·be
annulled because of want of capacity or the vitiated consent of one of the parties. However, before such annulment,
they are considered effective and obligatory between parties (First Philippine Holding Corporation v. Trans Middle East'
Equities Inc., G.R. No. 179505, December 4, 2009),
Unenforceable Contracts
99. In order to reduce inheritance tax, X made it appear that he sold some of his lands to his children. X
executed a Deed of Sale in favor of his son Y, covering six parcels of land. Since the sales were only made
for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, X continued to own,·possess and enjoy
the lands and their produce. X's heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the
lands that were covered by the Deed of Sale. A, Y's eldest son; representing th Heirs of Y, signed the Deed
of Extra-J_udicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. After Y's death, believing that the six parcls of land
2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 1 29

201 8 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL LAW '
belonged·to their late father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Herrs of
Y sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of X. Is the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition valid?
No, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not valid. What is involved in the case at bench though is not C's incapacity
to give consent to the contract, but rather his lack of authority to do so. Articles 1403 0), 1404, and 1317 of the Civil
Code find application to the circumstances prevailing in this case. A contract entered into in the name of another by
one who has no authority or legal representation , or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable , unless
it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the
other contracting party. The deed of extrajudicial parition and sale is an unenforceable or, more specifically , an
unauthorized contract under Articles 1403(1) and 1317. ·
Therefore, A's failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs t6 sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf
did not result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the
contract valid but unenforceable against A's co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority (Heirs of
Policronio M. Ureta, Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, G.R. No. 165748, September 14, 2011).
100. X donated a parcel of land to his stepdaughter Y, subject to the condition that she may not sell, transfer
or · cede the same for twenty years. Shortly thereafter, he died. Because she needed money for medical
expenses, Y sold the land to A. The following year, Y died, leaving as her sole heir a son by the name of B.
When B learned that the land which he expected to inherit had been sold, he filed an action against the
latter for annulment of the sale, on the ground that it violated the restriction imposed by X. If you were
the Judge, how will you rule this case? Ex 1 . stion 1996).
I will not grant the petition ftJ nulmen «·-- <, ,,ring tqe action for annulment of the sale to A.
Only an aggrieved party to th C:qpfract may hr;ipg 'tjie· oit.ipn,f9r a rtulmedffliereof (Art. 1397, Civil Code). While B
is an heir and successor-in-interestr ofl*xp.9thq. (..(ir:t. 1.11J ?_ Cjv!sCoqe),·l?. has no personality to annul the contract.
Both are not aggrieved parties on acJ;9unt 9£.tlicli.o .n" · · · · · ·-· · · · e cotlion of, or restriction on, their ownership
imposed by the donation. Only thd>1qnol or IV he · the ;p rsonality to bring an action to revoke a
donation for violation of a condit10A{ther
., •.. . ,, l
of'
·
'
o ,;a,'
r
. ' !•
es on' (qJarrido
..,;r-·
vs Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 101262
September 14, 1994). Since B is neitne'f.!P.e 1 • Qnor. nor or,: Fi has no personality to bring the action for
annulment
- :..:\ .
;1 ' ;. ': Jr·-: '.
c : ::
101. X is the re!?istered ower of a pc :o !?- IJ f ..,,M #i "s' long been _interested in the property,
succeedd ID persuading X t s :•· o 4 f f tq ;purchase price of P600,0<>?- and that X
would give Y up to 25 days Ithitf h h · un Y , 1d tat the?' shoul_d seal their agreement
thr?ugh a case bf Jack Daniels Bfac 9d ul " ? :Y whic he rmmediaely handed to X and
which the latter accepted. x learnea o Y-1'? y,er, z,,\y ",)Vas offermg P800,000 ID ready cash for the
land. When Z confirmed that he coiiiSg'.yj_in cash - NQn>'as X could get the documentation ready, X
decided to withdraw his offer to Y. Y objectetlla:rgciiilg:lliat they have a firm and binding agreement
because he has an option to buy that is duly:' upport-4 by a duly accepted valuable consideration. Can X
claiJn that whatever they might have agreed upon cannot be enforced because any agreement relating to
the sale of real property must be supported by evidence in writing and they never reduced their agreement
to writing?
No. X's claim has no legal basis. The contract at issue is the option contract, notthe contract of sale for the real
property. Therefore , Art. 1403 does not apply. The Statute of Frauds covers an agreement for the sale of real property
or of an interest therein. Such agreement is unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum,
thereof, be in writing, (Art. 1403 (e), Civil Code). Here, Y and X merely entered into an Option Contract, which refers
to a unilateral promise to buy or sell, which need not be in writing to be enforceable (Sanchez v. Rigas, G.R. No. L-
25494, June 14, 1972, citing Atkins, Kroll and Co. Inc. v. Cua Hian Tek and Southwestern Sugar & M olasses Co. v. Atlantic
Gulf & Pacific Co.)
Alternative Answer:
No. Mr. S's claim has no legal basis. The contract of sale has already been partially executed which takes it outside
the ambit of the Statute of Frauds is applicable only to executory contracts, not to contracts that are totally or partially
performed (Carbonnel v. Poncio, G.R. No. L-11231, M ay 12, 1958).
Void Contracts
102. X entered into a Margin Account Agreement with Y providing that the client's collateral should not fall
belo the 103 of the marginal amo.unt, otherwise a margin caH would he . initiated and an additional

collateral would be collected to cover at least 203 of the margin limit. G, as X's agent, signed the agreement
and required the latter to issue postdated checks as security for any liability he may incur as agent. X
issued the checks on the condition that the same will not be deposited. X's account failed to meet the
required margin rate and Y, instead of issuing a margin call, deposited the postdated checks tQ cover the
deficit with the consent of G. X instituted a complaint against Y and G before the· SEC. SEC declared the
transactions entered into by the parties void due to G's lack of license·as required by law, and directed Y
to !!fund the total value of the 26 postdated checks and the initial collateral. Is the order of restitution,
as consequence of the declaration- of nullity of the. contract, proper? ·
Yes, the refund of the ·amounts invested by X is a· necessary consequence of the nullity of the Marginal Account
a
executed between Y and G. Well-:-settled is the rule that the declaratiori of nullity of contract which is void ab initio
operates to restore things to the state and condition in which they were found before its execution, as enunciated
under the Civil Code. In the case, the Marginal Account which created X's obligation to pay Y the initial collateral
and to issue the postdated checks was declared void due to the lack of license by X's agent, G as required by law. Y
has the obligation to return the amount as it no longer has any right to keep them (B.H. Chua Securities, Corp. v.
Johnston Sia-Uy and SEC, G.R. No. 202485, February 22, 2017; Covered Case).
NATURA
. L OBLIGATIONS.
103. X filed against Y a complaint praying for a 203 Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955. X admit that
Y are not under legal duty to give such bonus but that they had only ask that such bonus be given 'to them -
because it is a moral obligation of Y to giv · the oourt a quo understands that it has no power
to compel a party to comply with a m · ourt order the performance of giving such
bonus? :( ' f' -- "'
... 1:·: /' r: 1 _ ! o. f,7. n,.,,.

@.. 6t :
"
No . .Article 1423 of the New CiviLli ode'-_ ta.-§J .?t e!?g fq sLi9 f\C: vil:9'r)1:1atural. "Civil obligations are a right of
action to: compel their performanc atuµU ,1'>hligatio · .basft r,f positive law but on equity and natural
law, do not grant a right of actim(t < pfc/r. ce tlJ.eir pe yoluntary fulfillmeµt by the obligor , they
authori the retention of what h s\b en d iV: re· r §n thereof". It is thus readily seen that an
element of naturaJ. obligation befor : t( eLf±o&ftib is'y:b:intary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly,
retention can be ordered but only aft< ,hete ha bee rfo · . ance. But here there has been no voluntary
performance (Primitivo Ansay v. Th' rd n ' . llelopment Company, et al, G.R. No. L-13667,
April 29, 1960). \, . \'-. · ·
\"'' 7
104. X filed its A:nnual Income TaX Re f e t";JA lf.., 998. The Bffi s".rved upon respondent 3
Notices of Presentation of Recoi:dS. j . . , . , · 1o . ply; the BIR thus issued a Subpoena Duces
Tecm: The X's accountant, xecuted ers o tlteJ ·. n:s.e of Pres·cription successively. BIR issued a
Prehmmary Assessment Notice for the tax.a ,Jf 9. . agamst X, and subsequently ordered the latter
to pay. Believing that the government's right to asse) taxes had prescribed, X filed petition for review
with the CTA, which canceled the assessment notices for having been issued beyond the prescriptive
period. Is X estopped from claiming the defense of prescription for having executed the waivers of said
defense?
N.-The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on, and has its origin in, equity which, broadly defined, is justice accrding
to natural law and right. As such, the doctrine of estoppel cannot give :validity to an act that is prohibited by law or
one that is against public policy . It should be resorted to solely as a means of preventing injustice and should not be
. permitted to defeat the administration of the law, or to accomplish a wrong or secure an undue advantage, or to
extend beyond them requirements of the transaction·s in which they originate. The·doctrine of esfoppel carinot be
applied in this case as an exception to the statute of limitations on the assessment of taxes considering·that there is
a detailed procedure for the proper execution of the waiver , which the BIR must strictly follow ( Commissioner of ·
Internal Revenue v. Kudos Metal Corporation, G.R. No. 178087, May 5, 2010).
SALES
105. In their written contract, X and·Y agreed that a deed of sale shall be executed by X in favor of Y upon the
latter's full payment purchase price amounting to P500,000. This property .is co-owned between them. Y
.was only able to pay P250,000.00. Meanwhile, X's shares in rental income was being collected by Y due to
the alleged transfer of the X's share by virtue of the contract to sell. X filt:d a complaint against
2018 SAN SEDA CEN1RALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 31

2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL LAW ·
respondents praying for an accounting of all transactions, delivery of his share in the rents, and damages.
Can the case prosper?
The contract entered into by X and Y was a contract to sell. The stipulation t_o execute a deed of sale upon full
payment of the purchase price is a unique and distinguishing characteristic of a contract t sell and shows the
vendor's intention to reserve the title until full payment of the purchase price. There being no transfer ·of ownership
over X's share in the building u,nder the contract to sell for non-payment fo full of the price, Y cannot claim the
shares of X in the rental income (Nicola.s Diego vs Rodolfo Diego, GR No. 179665, February 20, 2013, Dl Castillo,].).
106. X offered to purchase a parcel ofland with improvements from Y..They negotiated through their agents,
but the latter were unable to negtiate. Hence, X sent a letter accompanied by a check issued for Pl00,000
to serve as earnest m.oney, made payable to Y. Eventually, the check was deposite(f and the funds were
credited to Y's banJ<: account. Y did not take any action, prompting X to file a case. Y contends that it
cannot be said that it gave its consent to any transaction with X or to the payment made by the latter. It
further claimed that the letter and check constituted a mere offer which required petitioner's acceptance
in order o give rise to a perfected sale. Is the sale perfected?
No. Where there is merely ari offer by one party wihotit acceptance of the other, there is no contract. The _ sending
of the letter and check constituted a mere reiteration of its original offer which was already rejected previously. As
contemplated under Art. 1482 of the Civil Code, there must first be a perfected contract of sale before earnest money
_ can be givn. Where the parties merely exchanged offer and counter-offers, no contract is perfected since they did
not yet give their consent to such offers. Earn,e lies to a perfected sale (First Realty Optima v. Securiton
Security Services, Inc., G.R. No 199648, Jan
... : ,_ : '
107. X, 15, inherited a house ad '."it. Because p,e, 1l1l ·o- study in an 1 lusive- school, she sold her house
and lot by signing a Deed of Sal a11;d tiy;n;Lqg .Q,'\f er 1pqsssiQ,¥-,Pf t4 same to the buyer. When the buyer
discovered she was still a minor e ijr,onlitSd,,t.'--- - · .. ' th{p ed of Sale when she turns 18. When
X turned 23 and was already w_ rking, sh. wa tJ:se and return - the buyer's money to
recover her house and lot. Was 'tit¢ sal co:dtract e orNa.Iid? Can X still recover the property?
-: ·:·_ l
t;} 11 _{j ·- -i:' - '-
The contract f sale was voida.ble on_ grpun that · off ying consnt at the te of the eecuton of
the sale. (Article 1390 and Article l !'P}-X c _ _ e tQ. ouse umt because if a contract is v01dable
on the ground of nority, the acti'o'i1J9. t\,b w 1 f tli4jfou.r (4) years from attainment of the age of
majority . Since X was alread 23 ye t6Jd.' · , ,, Jy - pbed_ because she should have filed it before
she reached the age of 22 (Article 139l;}(i'lil ·,
' . .... \:·'), ; ,..._>! - ,
--. _,'l.f<t_ ---- • .II' ' ---...,, I /
108. In June 1965, 25 trading entities (Sell l)Wl ·=·;J a5F t:.\h-e redrying plant of ABC Corp. at Agoo, La
Union in accordance with the regufafi . '.: and pro J:{ =«>f XYZ Corp. While waiting inspection and
, grading, the hipments were totally destfoy'!..9> &fC:-1t· was established that ABC Corp. is an agent of
XYZ Cor.p. and that the latter directs, sugfvises ·an,d controls th former in regulating the tobacco
shipments. Moreover, once the shipments are received from the sellers, they are under the control and
authority of ABC Corp. Is XYZ Corp. liable to the sellers for the loss of tobacco shipments? -
Yes. At the time of the loss, there was already a perfected contract of sale. This is in in keeping with Art. 1475 on the
Civil Code which decl_ares that the contract of sale is perfected at tQ.e moment there is a meeting of the minds upon
the thing which is the object of the contract an,d upon the price. Moreover , there was already a delivery of the
shipments (Philippine Virginia Tobacco Adm. vs. De Los Angeles, G.R. No. L-27829, August 19, 1988)._ -
109. X purchased a set of Supreme Court Reports Annotated from ABC Company for a total price of P5,000
which, in addition to the cost of freight of P500, makes a total of PS,500. X made a partial payment of
P2,500, leaving a balance of P3,000. The contract provides that the loss or. damage after delivery shall be
borne by the buyer. After the books were delivered, a fire broke out in the office of X destroying all his
documents including the SCRA. As X failed to pay the remaining balance, the company demanded
payment of the installments due, and having failed to pay the same, it commenced aCtion in the trial an
court for the recovery of the obligation. Will the case prosper? .
Yes. The ownership of the books purchased on installmen were retairied by the seller, although they have already
been delivered to the buyer , under the condition that ownership thereof will be transferred to the buyer upon his full
.purchase price. It was held that despite the loss of the books in a fire, the risk ofloss would be borne by the buyer
although he was not the owner yet, not nly because such was agreed merely to secure the performance by the buyer
of his obligation , but also because in the very contract itself, it was agreed that loss or damage to the books after
/

delivery to the buyer.shall be borne by the buyer (Lawyer's Cooperative Publishing Company vs. Tabora, G.R. No. L-
21263, April 30, 1965).
110. A bought a bike from B by issuing a postdated check in full payment therefor. Before the check matured;
A sold the bike to X who later sold it to Y. Upon presentment of payment; the check issued by A was
dishonored because he had already closed his account before he issued his check. B then sued to recover
the bike from Y alleging that she had been unlawfully deprived of it by reason of A's deception. Will the
suit prosper?
The suit will not prosper because B was not unlawfully depr-ived of the car although she was unlawfully deprived of
the price. The perfection of the sale and the delivery of the car was e.nc;mgh to allow A to have a right of ownership
over the car; which can be lawfully transferred to X. Art. 559 applies only to a person who is in possession in good
faith of the property, and not to the owner thereof. X, in the problem, was the owner, and, hence, Y acquired the title
to the car. Non-payment of the price in - a contract of sale does not render ineffective .the obligation to deliver. The
obligation to deliver a thing is different from the obligation to pay its price (EDCA Publishing Co. v. Santos, G.R. No.
80298, April 26, 1990). .
111. X lost illa civil case in a final judgment which resulted to the execution of his properties. When the sheriff
was about to levy the two parcels of land that belongs to hlm, it was discovered tha,t he already transferred
the same by a deed of sale to his children, A and B. The deeds of sale were purportedly executed way
before the judgment. However, the same was registered only a few months before the ·conclusion of the
case:What is the status of the sales made t ? ·
It is void. In -Sps. Santiago vs._·<EA, the Co;,,.

,· . '
-e 'e"' ur ·«·-·"_ :petitiop..r,s;to take exclusive possession of the
""W ·- - -
property allegedly sold to them, 'or in the alternapve ,":1'9 - pU.c,t rentals fr.d!I:f the alleged vendor is contrary to the
principle of ownership and a tlear badge 0f i:r;naticm tht renders the whole transaction void. In the case at bar,
. the failure of the A and B to explain;;the dela'.y inohtafu.u.ig4_ _ :strijon qffoe parcels of land, and the continued stay
of the X in the subject lands can only- lead to the corit"''-" '.'. ·"he cqnyeyances were made only sometime just
before their actual registration and -'th?t the,crresp of :A;bsolute Sale were antedated. The sale was
therefore simulated to defraud the r ditofsi(Sp[ Ga a,iJ/R.: No. 175994, December 8, 2009).
' . ' - "\ ;,. :t f ::f.:J
112. · S sold a parcel ofland·to B for P7Q090 . . ·.· . ed',C)f;absolute sale. Upon failure of B to pay.
the purchase pric;e: S filed a corii}>t;J.nt:
balance. Was the sale made merel . ·- '· ), · <'J1
£ v-· -
i"iontbl,f obtr"adt, on the ground of B's failure to pay the
... .
.!"· ;4.:: 7* \
.''· . : .,r (i--7: .
No , the saleas already consummated':.<ev01 stipq_lltiotf!pa1)'ownership in the thing shall not pass to the
purchaser until he has fully paid the p'ric "1 9:.. . _ ,.in"1he d_ij.9g.shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon
2
actual or constructive delivery of the thmg L .venif t :t> U,se price has not yet been fully paid. The failure of
the buyer to make good the price does not ,· in :ta 'caus tne<oWnership to revest to the seller unless the bilateral
contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved pursl!ant to·ATcle 1191 of the Civil Code. Non-payment only creates a
right to demand the fulfillment of the obligation or to rescind the contract (Balatbat vs. CA, G.R. No. 1094i0, August
28, 1996). -
113. X entered into an agreement with Y which provided, among others, X agreed to transfer his land to Y only
upon full payment of the price of P 900,000.00 by March 2001. All ill all, as of November 2001, Y .made a
total. pa,yment of P 345,ooo:oo. In December 2001, the Y offered to pay the 'remaining amount of P
555,000.00 but X refused because the property was no longer for sale. It appears that before December
2001, X had already. sold the land to Z. Who amongst Y and Z has a better right to the land?
. ' . \
Z has a better right. While it appears that there is a double sale, Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply in the .
instant case. Sjnce failure to pay the price in full in a contract to sell renders the same ineffective and without force .
and effect, then there is no sale to speak of. In a contract to sell, there being no sale yet of the property, a third person
buying the same property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the full payment of the purchase
price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith. There is no double sale in such case (ps. Domingo v. Sps.
Man;zano, G.R No. 201883, November 16, 2016, Del Castillo,].).
114. X bought a condominium unit from ABC Corp. for a price of 20 Million pesos, with the following terms
of payment-- 5 Million down payment and the balance payable in 60 equal monthly installments with
annual 123 interest. Under their Deed of Conditional Sale, the parties have agreed that failure of the
vendee to pay three successive monthly installments shall rescind the contract automatically without
necessary judicial action. X paid ·religiously for 40 months, however, on the 4pt and 4znd month, X failed

20_1 8 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL LAW
to pay. X tried to tender her payment on the 53rd month, but ABC Corp refused to receive the payment.
Thereafter, the corporation notified X, through a letter, about the automatic rescission of their Deed of
Conditional Sale and demanded to vacate the condominium unit. Can ABC Corp. rescind the contract?
The instant case calls for the application of the Maceda Law (RA 6552) which mandates that the vendor or seller on
installment may not rescind the contract without giving the vendee or buyer a 30-day grace period within which to
satisfy his delinquency in payment for every one year of installment payments (Sec. 3, RA 9552). Also, the said law
requires the vend.or to serve a 30-day notice of cancellation or rescission of the contract to the. vendee. Here, ABC
Corp.'s refusal of the 43rd payment i improper, for X is clearly entitled to a grace period, and her tender of payment
was well within the said period. Moreover, the corporation's notice to X was likewise defective for the same was not
notarized which is :required under the Maceda Law (Sec. 5, RA 65?2). Hence, ABC Corp. cannot rescind the subject
contract.
115. Q: X was a grantee of the subject property part of the National Housing Authority's (NHA) Bagong Bari-io
Project. The land grant was subject to a mortgage and a proviso proscribing any transfer or encumbrance
thereof within five years from the date of release of the mortgage. As the issuance of the original TCT
was conditioned upon her full payment of the mortgage loan, the NHA only gave X a photocopy of the
same. Despite her unpaid installments to the NHA and a clear viQlation of the express_ proviso, X and Y
initially executed mortgage contracts but novated the same by a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject
land. NHA now wants to take back the land from Y. Can the case prosper?
For both a sale and a mortgage to be valid, it is im the vendor is the·owner of the property sold; otherwise,
each of the contracts are voicLunder the p .· · n habet. Moreover, when the law refers to title,
it contemplates ownership w h is mer: . . . · % cate tb·title, and not the ownership of the
certificate itself. Placing . pars1\6,f and un . .l .l ,CJ. the Torref\sJ):stem does not man that ownership
thereof can no longer be d1sputea:([Vicolµs v;M qngl'!p;. Q;R.;;; Nq. 2_QW71J, August 1, 2016, Del Castillo,].).
" .··!... ·.., ' ;:.; .¥ ........ ••,..,. '>." ·-·""'" ,,. ..:.- - ,. <.... ', ·-$?:·,'
<:. 1. <,;, _ .ri. L 0 ·:t:,·,
· · · >·""
•· /i J
' ' ft
r'.:..h.· ·...: .:
"- r.,_ _
.
116. ·A and B executed a contract of le w ctrei,¥ t\ 1 s·j;jx :Leyte for 5 years. However, oii the 3rd
year, without fault on the part f Hi lhhoue w deJtr'Oyed by Typhoon Yolanda. Thereafter,
A constructed a rtew house on tfi. ¥ b · j , • . fjlities. B now claims that she is entitled
to the possession and enjoyrnen'i ::fh : hoi .;:for the remaining _ period of 2 years of
their original contr.act of lease bli J wo , , o B's'" ands. Is B entitled to possess the house
'. by way of substitution of the objec f le
. "' /\
No. Notwithstan1iing lack of fault on B . , ratt
newly constructed property on the simple1-Jl 7J. ' , $it. 1655 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case,
which states that if the thing leased is totJ'ly:· ;,·,, "_, f-af'ortuitous event, the contract of lease is extinguished .
Further, there was no ·cleq.r evidence of any expfess or ilnp1,.ied renewal of the original contract, which could have
been the lessor 's source of right to claim or demand repossession of the subject property.
117. A leased his residential house with a driveway to B for 10 years. In their contract, there was no stipulation
as to the improvements introduced in the property. During the course of the contract, B built a garage
right next to the same house and on the same lot. subject of the lease. Upon terinination of the lease
contract, A now claims superior ·right over the garage without need of any payment. Decide. ·
Considering the nature and primary use of the subject leased property, the garage is deemed as a useful improvement
that is suitable to the purpose intended by the lease and pursuant to Art. 1678 of the Civil Code, the lessor may retain
useful improvements after the expiration or termination of the contract, provided he pays Yz of its value a,t the time
of acquisition. ... ,
.
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP & -TRUST
118. Can two corporations organize a general partnership under the Civil Code of the Philippines?
No. A corporation is managed by its board of directors. If the corporation were to become a partner, co-partners
would have the- power to make the corporation party to transactions .in an irregular manner since the partners are
not agents subject to the control of the Board of Directors. But a corporation may enter into a Joint venture with
34 I 201 8 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATtONS

CIVIL LAW . 2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES
another corporation as long as the nature of the venture is in line wi:th the business authorized by its charter (Thdson
& Co., Inc. v. Bolano, 95 Phil. 106).
119. A partnership was formed orally, more than P500 was contributed in cash. Now then, under the last
paragraph of Art. 1358, contracts "where he amount involved exceeds P500, such contract must appear
in writing, even a private one." Should the oral partnership formed be considered- valid? ·
Yes, because Art. 1358 applies only for the purpose of convenience and not for validity or enforceability. Being valid,
the contract can be put in writing upon the demand of any of the parties (Art. 1357, Civil Code).
120. Distinguish co-ownership from partnership.
- Co-ownership is distinguished from an ordinary partnership in tfie following ways:
As to creation: Whereas co-ownership may be created by law, contract, succession, fortuitous event, or occupancy,
partnership is always created by contract. . .
As to purpose: Whereas the purpose of co-ownership is the common enjoyment of the thing or right owned in
common, the purpose of a partnership is o obtain profits.
As to personality: Whereas a co-ownership has no juridical personality which is separate and distinct from that of
the owners, a partnership has. · . · -
As. to duration: Whereas an agreement not to divide the community property for more than ten years is not allowed
by law such an agreement would be perfect! v · · se of partnerships. This is so, because under the law,
there is no limitation upon ti\. g,uration o ,
As to power of members: Whreas a c epres titJhe co-ownership unless there is an
agreement to that effect , a pait_(bas the pqer ttg eP :e.,sent the partnei .Y{pi unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary -'.; .-- ,,.., ! ! r- r- i J' ., 4 r . '.°1' / .!
7
• '1.i • ".,. y _,,.Y ...;.< ?....-.- -.,.,; ""

tio..,.,.. f"' li, ·v J ..... .:.,,._
As to effect of disposition of '·Sh es:rILa-.,cQ:;Q. ·.'. ·s (sJj:ar,e to a third person, the latter becomes
automatically a co-owner, but if a p¥11er Jransf rs hi ird;'plton, the latter does not become a partner,
unless a?r d upon by all of the p rs. i
As to d1v1s1on of profits: Where,e_'l!l co-uwnr&
r1n. : f'"/' -.
of Jtte/benefits and charges is fixed by law, m a
.
partnership the division of profits arl).os/es m 1y be a -- ment of the partners.
As to effect of death: Whereas th'b .le th · . . . ffe -- :g.pon the existence of the co-ownership, the
death of a partner shall result in. th !{s.fe:ol ' - - ;;-Jl)p. ,5 , ? .

< ' .I ( ,,..:1 '
.• . 1 , '-.
121. A, ' C, and D were partners. A ass1gri d · - . e p , . rship to his son S. S now wanted to join
in the man ement of the enterpnse { Cl. (\ _)partnership necessarily dissolved?
. ":::-,i<01 . ; / (\'·'· ;7 . .
No, the.mere assignment did not dissolv tft' m. This is _,(1 ·f;l if B, C and D did not allow S to participate in the
1
firm's business conduct. After all, S did nOt..:."e / : . ,''- . ·er:"'He was a mere assignee (entitled to collect only
whatever profits his father A could have collected . X ffia. go to the same court (or any other court possessed of
jurisdiction) and ask that A's interest in the partnership be "charged" (attached, or levied upon) for the payment to
him (X) of whatever has not yet been paid him with interest thereon. ·
NOTE: While a partner's interest in the partnership (his share in the profits or surplus) may be charged or levied
upon, his interest in a specific firm property cannot, as a rule, be attached] (Article 1811 (2), C_ivil Code). · ·
122. What is a charging order? .

A charging order is a judgment secured by a creditor subjecting the inerest of the debtorp<µtner in the partnership .
By virtue of the charging order, any amount or portion thereof which the partnership would otherwise pay to the
debtor-partner should instead be given to the judgment creditor. This remedy is, however, without prejudice to the
preferred rights of partnership creditors under Article 1827. It means that the claims of partnership creditors must ·
be atisfied first before the separate creditors of the partners )can be paid out of the interest charged (Article 1839 (8),
Article 1814, Civil Code). ,
123. A, B, and C were partners, the first one being an industrial partner. During the first year operation, the of
firm mde a profit of P3 million. During the second year, a loss of Pl.5 million was sustained.' Thus, the
net profit for the two years of operation was only Pl.5 million. In the articles . of partnership it was
stipulated that A, the industrial partner would get 1/3 of the profits, but would not participate in the
losses.
a. Is the stipulation valid? Why?
b. How much will A get: 1/3 of P3 million or 1/3 of Pl.5 million? Why?

201 8 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL LAW
a. The stipulation is valid, for eve-n the law itself exempts the industrial partner from losses. In the absence of
stipulation, the share of each partner in the profits and losses shall be in proportion to what they may have
contributed, but the industrial partner shall not be liable for the losses (Article 1797, Civil Code).
b. A will get only 1/3 of Pl.5 million , the net profit and not 1/3 of P3 million. While it is true that he _does not
share in the losses; this only means that he will not share in the net losses. It is understood that he share in
the losses insofar as these can be accommodated in the profits. It . is but fair to compute all the various
transactions in determining the net profits or losses ( G.R. No. L-12371 Criado·v Gutierrez Hermanos, GR No.
L-12371, March 23, 1918).
. .
124.· The plaintiff sued a ptnership composed of five (5) general partners' for.payment of a promissory note.
Later, the plaintiff fi led a motion to dismiss the case against one of the partners. The motion was granted.
If the defendants lose the case, how much will each of the four remaining defendants pay - 1/5 or 1/4 of
the debt?
Each of the four will pay 1/5 of the debt. Under Art. 1816 of the Civil Code, the partners are liable "pro rat.a," meaning
"joint" (as distinguished from solidary). Originally, each of the five (5) partners was liable for 1/5. The discharge from
the complaint of one of them did not mean that said discharged defendant is no longer a partner. So each of the
remaining four should pay ·l/5. They must not be·made liable for the share of the fifth partner. When plaintiff moved
to dismiss the complaint against said fifth partner, it was merely condonig or remitting his individual liability to
tl}.e plaintiff. Said condonation or remission will not benefit the other "joint" debtors or partners.
125. A, B, and C formed a part:q rhip spe :"' f contracting with the government to San
·Juanico bridge. After the c'<>)npltion g - , . , ,. s were urned over by the partners to the
government and the partner flip was dissy .d..Jf lt \1.P.}l{ier th. of
terials subsequently sued A for the ·
collection of indebtedness to hitp_ A m,y- t , '.fllss:th,e c:qi.plaint _a.gainst him on the ground that ABC
Partnership is liable for the debf.Will th,,4;0PJ.pl . . .lie? l ·'
:·. t,. ;. n >-': -t
Yes, because despite the dissolution ·of tlk pattnrs rsh:ip i not terntinated but continues until the
winding up of partnership affairs is coµipJetdl bis h e in the relation of the partners caused by
any partner _ ceasing to be associat¥_<lt drryi); on (AttJ. 1-828, Civil Code). Winding up is the actual
process of settling the partnership bu"s}riess · , orl. _drthe partnership is terminated when all the
.P artnen:hip affairs are completed . «
·
: ::
:
.·
ll< .
.
; , . ,',',. j_l.;l:. f_t....),.JJ ·-' -jw.,..·•,.
126. X. transferred his two (2) parce/ d

year after thtransfer, petitioners'\'( o/e
!j: Je
aMe thm to build their residence. One
esoai<nt{ts'"dividing the proceeds amoug themselves,
treating the same as capital gains and".ciyµtg pr '.. .- r..-incC? b,therefor. In April 2017, the Commissioner
of BIR required t.he petitioners to.pif:: , gl rat·- () - ax. The Conunissioer's theory is that they
formed an unregistered partnership or JOin"'·3 ttf'€, which theory was sustamed by the CTA. I the
decision proper? Why? ·,., , -
No. There was no partnership. To regard the petitioners as having formed an unregistered partnership would result
in oppressive taxation . Their original purpose was to divide the lots for residential purposes, but they were compelled
to resell. Art. 1769 (3) provides that "The sharing of gross returns does not itself establish a partnership, whether or
not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interst in any property from which the returns are
derived. There must be an unmistakable intention to.form a partnership or joint venture.
127. x and y entered into a contract of partnership where they intended to operate a fishpond, riot to engage
· in a fishpond business Is there a need to comply with the requirement that an inventory be attached to
the public instrument? Why? · .
No. While it is true that Art. 1773 provides that a contr.act of partnership is void, whenever immovable property is
contributed thereto, if an inventory of the said property is not made, signed by the parties, and at.tached to the public
instrument ; however , in this case, the purpose of the partnership is operation of a fishpond. Since there is no real
' l
right involved or the fishpond itself was not contributed, the requirement that an inventory signed by the parties
I must be attached to the contract need not be complied with.
l
i
128. Give the concept and requisites of agent by necessity.
It is a situation by virtue of the existence of an emergency, the authority of an agent is correspondingly enlarged in
orcier to cope up with the exigencies of the moment.
\
I
' ; . 36 I 2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATiONS
j.
Its requisites are:

a. . The existence of emergency
b. The inability of the agnt to communicate with the principal
c. The exercise of additional authority for the principal's own protection
d. The adoption of fairly anci legal means; and .
e. Cec:ising of authority at the moment of the emergency no longer demands the same (Strong vs. Repide, G.R.
No. 2101; November 8, 1906). . .
129. When may an act of an agent be binding upon the principal even if he acted beyond the scope of his
authority.? Explain. -
Under Arts. 1898 and 1910 of the ivil Code, an agent's act even if done beyond _ the scope of his authority, may bind
the principal if he ratifies them, whether expressly or tacitly. It must be stresed though that only the principal, and
not the agent, can ratify unauthorized .acts, which the pr.incipal must have knowledge of. The principal must have
full knowledge at the time of ratification of all material facts and circumstances relating to the unauthorized act of
the person who assumed to act as agent.
130. When may an agent sue in his own name? .Explain.
An agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without joining the principal when the following elements
concur: (a) the agent acted in his own name dilling the transaction; (2) the agent acted for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal; (3) the transaction did not · I o erty of the undisclosed principal . Art. 1883 provides .
that if an agent acts in his O\\[n 1?-ame, the , ;.,,,;_, ";;, <;:tion against the persons with whom the agent
has contracted; neither have suc)l persons igfiltr' ,; "" ch cas_ iy1tie agent is the one directly bound in
favor of the person with whom he has contract ./ as-:;.f t,h;Jransaction V{:_ere his own except when the contract
involves things belonging to the popcip -·!he_:.P[C\, iorl,.Rf qu , le s,q be understood to be without prejudice
to the actions between the principal:and tJ;ie agenL" :; omin.lf.Star Travel and Tours, Inc. G.R. No. 186305,
July 22, 2015). " : ' - :
- - - :. . i -.. "'''? ',t: /
131. X constituted Y as his agent to n-Jis l d,_,b1tN 99,jhvithout registring the contact, X sold
the land to A. On February 1, 1992-;.,Y §old f he 1 o i: stered the deed of sale and obtained a
title. A discovered the sale and \.i'Ust - '. an1 4'..$ked for recoriveyance. Will the action
prosper? ':-'' :: (
.,._, , / j ,·,..
No. Under Art. 1916 of th Civil C? n -..;.}tac egard to th_e same thing, one of the_m with
the agent and the other with the prmt1 { cont¥tcts... ,&; compahble with each other, that of pnor date
shall be preferred without prejudice tb .tlie:.Pro , .,SA)c PF&'Uc.ldjl544. Under Article 1544, whoever registers the
document first in good faith, he being a o\1 £ ?od faitl( !l£ r:value, has a preferred right, In this case, B can be
presumed to be a buyer in good faith and for -vaJu-@
;89 ffce'tfne:a:C:tion for reconveyance will not prosper.
//_,· /I' ""-..... ' "·· ;
132. May laches constitute a bar to enforce an (a) express trust; (b) implied trust?
a. The express trust disables the trustee from acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to 'his
management or custody, at least while he does not openly repudiate the trust and make such repudiation
. known to the beneficiary.
b. In implied trust, the rule is that laches constitutes a bar to actions to enforce the trust a.Ild no·repudiation is
required, unless there is a concealment of the facts giving rise to the trust (Sotto vs. Teves, G.R. No. L..:.38018,
- Octqber 31, '1978). This presupposes that all of the elements of laches are present. ·
133. What is the concept of trust de son tort?
A trust de son tot (constructive trust) is a form of implied trust created by equity to meet the demands of justice.
There is a constructive trust when a property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it, is by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the bene_fit of the person from whom the property come$
(CIVIL CODE, Art. 1456) ·

134. Distinguish Resulting Trust from Constructive Trust.
·, . . Constructive Trust
The intent of the parties to create a trust is presumed or The trust is created irrespective of or even contrary to
implied by law from the nature of their transaction the intention of the parties to promote justice , frustrat_e
· · fraud, and to revent unjust enrichment .
The 10-year prescriptive period shall be counted from The 10-year prescriptive period shall be counted from
the time re udiation is made known to the beneficiar the time the construdive trust arises
135. What is the Trust Pursuit Rule?
Equity will pursue the property that is wrongfully converted. by the fiduciary, or otherwise compel restitution to the
beneficiary. A trust will follow the property through all changes in its state and form even into the hands of a
transferee other than a bona fide purchaser for value, provided its product or proceeds are capable of identification
(Estate of Margarita Cabacungan v. MarilouLa igo, G.R. No. 175073, August 15, 2011)
136. Can a Trustee claim title over the property held in trust by acquisitive prescription?
\;Vhether the trust is express or implied, as a general rule, the trustee canot acquire absolute ownership over the
trust by acquisitive prescription. However the right of the beneficiary , and (2) such act of
repudiation is brought to the owledge o he evidence thereon is clear and conclusive , he
may be able to acquire absolut!fwpershi . . . e . rus . . ) after it fapse of the period fixed by law (ten
year s from the time the repudiat!o.p is made kiioflrf''tb ffie:'.beneficiary in cas¢'s'of express or resulting trust while ten
years from the constructive trust,a#ses)(.J'ij..¢$_trt.Usl:f es miistJ:>e..stfictly complied with only in . express trusts (Sotto
vs. Teves, G.R. No. L-38018, Octobe:A.31, 19r1.'8imp ·· ._ ere is.,cf ,dear implication that the ordinary rules
regarding acquisitive prescription f app cabl i · :-l .
:.<f :'! i r·t:rf"'"J ·,:;
.---------------------------------!"'!l""',,... .... -i-.....-- -
.
----------------------------------...
137. X obtained '1,_loan from Bank Y f., t1Ji ...JP /tixecuted with varying interest rateS of
203 to 303 per interest period. ,-- all,$.glng'' ?'he tried to religiously 'comply with ·his
obligation ut the ex?rbitant inere 3:tff, p ·· rite1 - t6 do so. The interest rates were lat.er on
decl.ared void .but the curt reqmred X:'{ '!, f¢.re.st at the rate of 123 per aru:ium. X objected
X
statmg that smce the mterest rates have'- be £ch\reil v01d, he should not be held liable to pay any
interest. Can X be held liable to pay interest1 If so, what rate of interest should be imposed?
Yes, X can be held liable for interest. It is clear from the contract of loan between X and Bank Y that X, as a borrower ,
agreed to the payment of interest for his obligation . The stipulation requiring payment of interest on the loaned
amount remains valid and binding . Hence, he is still liable to pay interest based on the legal rate prescribed by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Note·: Pursuant to Circular No . 799, series of 2013 of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and in case of Dario Nacar v.
Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr. (G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013), effective 1July ?013? the rate of interest for
the loan or forbearce of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the a.bsence of an
express contract as to such rate of.interest , shall be six percent (63) per annum. Previously, the legal rate was set at
twelve percent (123) per annum.
138. X lent P350,000.00 without any security to respondent Y Co. The loan, with no specified maturity date,
carried a 63 monthly interest. As Y Co. failed to pay despite repeated demands, X filed a Complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money with Damages against Y Co. and its president before the MeTC. X alleged that
the president, tricked him into parting-with his money without the loan transaction being reduced into
writing. Respondents acknowledged the loan as a corporate. debt and claimed that the failure to pay the
same was due to economic crisis. They further argiied that X cannot enforce the. 63 monthly interest for
being unconscionable . and shocking to the morals. Is the lack of written stipulation to pay interest
disallows the creditor from charging the same?
38 I 201 8 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

Yes, the lack of a written stipulation to pay interest on the loaned amount disallows a creditor from charging
monetary interest. Under Ar:ticle 1956 of the Civil Code, no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated
in writing. Jurisprudence on the matter also holds that for interest to be due and payable, two conditions must concur:
a) express stipulation for the payment of interest; and b) the agreement to pay interest is reduced in writing (Tan v.
Valdehueza, GR No. L-38745, August 6, 1975). Here, it is undisputed that the parties did not put down in writing their
agreement. Thus, no interest is due. The collection of interest without any stipulation in writlng is prohibited by law.
Payment of respondent of interest does not make the stipulation on an unconscionable interest valid. Estoppel cannot
give validity to an act thatis prohibited by law or - me that is against public policy (Rolando C. De La Paz vs. L & J
Development Company, G.R. No. 183360; September 8, ,2014; Del Castillo,J).
DEPOSIT
139. A entered into contract with B to purchase a parcel of land. They agreed that the title will pass upon full
payment of the price and meanwhile the certificate of title would be deposited in a safety deposit box of
X Bank. When A and B rented from X Bank they signed a stipulation that X Bank is not a depositary of
the contents of the safety deposit box therefore not liable for such and has neither control .nor possession
of the same. X Bank gave 2 different keys to A and _ B,. and it retained·another. The safety deposit box
would not be opened without the 3 keys. Consequently, C wanted to purchase the land from A which
prompted A and B to _open the safety deposit box. However, when.A, B and employee of X Bank opened
the safety deposit bank, the certificate of title cannot be found. . ,
a. Is the contract of A, B, and X Bank, that of a lease?
b. Is the stipulation void?
a. NO. It is not a contr ;.bf, leae n . as a },\tts;,ia1kind of deposit. The consensus of

authority is that the r"eJlt!onship be J! . B }jB is _j)f bailor and bailee under a bailmerit
contract for hire and mu .' i-. fk{(4 _ gIJr!n ;J ftrif})i}. e;rd op-'e!!.!·Corp v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90027,
M arch 3 1993). ':..- / ; . '. ..
, ' J. • n - t:J:; ·
b. The stipulatin made by ''( i pe .e"f ty depost box is located wihir.1 .the. b.
It has possession and contro xer'.tlle sd o ufi9-fl exemptmg the bank from liability 1s v01d
for.being contr o puh l9. -µ · ·c · Art 11 0 i - de provides that "every person obliged to
dehver sm;nething 1s guil tfra d--. r!fanY manner contr_avene the tenor of the
obligation', is liable for darlia - " r, pthl cme .a person from liability due to fraud or
negligence is void ( CA Agr 1 st
1
;o.R. No. 90027, M arch 3, 1993).
140. D stays at Z Ho. el whe he is iii. < es. - In

_ !)to befriended him and convinced him to
. / . 7 .
transfer from XYZ to ABC Hotel wit · ·',i;. ate f . , :.:J>ooking at ABC Hotel. D rented the hotel's
1
safety deposit box and he signed an .""- · ng th ,, Hotel would not be liable for loss of guest's
belongings contained in the safety deposit., <f ·;;... : · ty deposit box can be opened through the use of
2 keys simultaneously; one is given to the g11€st antl!,e other is in custody of the hotel management. He
deposited $2,500 dollars and a diamond necklace in the said safety deposit box before he went to Hong
Kong for a business trip. After two days he returned to the hotel and found out that he lost $500_ dollars
a.nd the diamond necklace. Upo_n reporting to the management of the s.aid lost, F, a hotel employee who
had cstoy over the master key of the management, confirmed that she helped E opened the safety .
deposit box several times. Is the hotel liable for the lost effects of D? -
Yes. There are two keys :required to open the· safety deposit boxes of ABC Hotel. One key is assigned to the guest
and the other remains in the possession of the management. The guest alone cannot open the safety deposit box
without the assistance of the management or its employees. With all the more reason that access to safety deposit
box should be denied if the one requesting to open the same is a stranger. F, who had custody of the master key of
the management, admitted 'that she helped E to open the keys in several occasions yet the management. failed to ·
notify D of the incident and waited for him to discover the taltj.ng before they disclosed the. matter to him. ABC Hotel
should be held responsible for the_ damage suffered by D by reason of its employee's negligence. Under Art. 2180 of
the New Civil Code, owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for the damages
caused by their employees i:µ the service of the ·branches in which" the latter are employed or on occasibn of their
functions. ( YHT Realty Corp.v. Court ?f Appea_ls, ·c.R. No 126780, February 17, 2005)
2018 SA BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 39

2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL LAV'/
GUARANTY/SURETYSHIP
Distinguish surety from guaranty.
Liability depends on an independent agreement to pay ,. · Surety assumes liability as regular party to the
the obli ation if rimar - debtor fails to do so. · undertakin .
Guarantor is secondarily liable; Surety is primarily liable.

Collateral undertakin . He is an ori inal romisor .
r::--:-:r:-:=-"==-,,.----.,---,,,-,====
r i>,:1.;,"'./i)\j;;;;,,&,t.(r;:f:;®e<9f P ·:meA ;:.<.:r-J\) ;
Guarantor bfuds himself to pay if the principal - Surety undertakes to pay if the principal
CANNOT PAY. DOES NOT PAY.
Insurer of the debt.
Surety cannot avail of the benefit of excussion

division_ in case creditor roceeds a ainst him. and division.
Oft disc1arged by the -itt{ · f1dulgfri f'"te -:- . fr f§Carged · - f!lere indlgence of the creditor or
L - creditor or want of no e ,of defauft"t £! ·J : ,:0, - by want of notice of default _ _
(DE LEON, Credit Transactions, 20 }(>;' 296 29B?- t_ } ;::i t /
-
- ,} , r=·'"""-"' z-,= _ -J.,

141. A, as seller, ntred int a Pucfe "-&!![e b1!_Y fr,' for the sale and delivery of various
telecommurucahons eqmpment all.Jd s ft el:, f t incfodes an arbitration clause. To ensure
prompt payment, B obtained uc;: s s\ietjtb'on A_ - h'iiled to pay the shipments made by A.
Aggrieved, A filed a case agains#: £p " beore t cc;) rjrom the surety bond and at the same
time, ptaying the award for l& i i.ii er, a q- '.- _n,iay demand the enforcement of the
arbitration dause contained in t{J.e.. t :rin
/ 1":'av t eii_ 1'te'A and B.
'-· "' ditj I ,fl '/
-NO, a sur y cannot demand the enfotc crnt i,mb/cl The eJcistence of a suretyship agreement does
not give the sty the right to interv Jn h al ciitract-,r,,/o?can an arbitration clause between the buyer
and the seller be invoked by a non-parliWi '-: ,_ m ty.- ff t:utPB cannot invoke in its favor the arbitration
clause in the Purchase Agreement , becau ;,l.3..$ n<;?,t a "P ' ,rty-36 that contract. An arbitration agreement being
contractual in nature , if js binding only on -rthe,1('lres:·thtreto, as well as their assigns and heirs (Gilat Satellite
Networks, Ltd . v. United Coconut Planters Bank ot£eral Ins ti;<l nce Co. Inc., C.R. No. 189563, December 7, 2016; Covered
Case).
142. Spouses A and B contracted with C Co. for the construction of a building. To guarantee compliance, the
latter posted performance bonds issued by X Insurance Co. and Y Assurance Corporation. As C Co. failed
to complete the. project, spouses A and B filed an action against the X Insurance Co. in the RTC, to enforce
its liability- under the p'erformance bond. X Insurance Co. moved to(dismiss the com.plaint for failure to
implead the prinCipal, C Co. and for disregard of the arbitration clause contained in the construction
agreement executed by spouses A and B- with C Co. Whether the X Insurance Co is solidarily liable with
the principal-debtor. - -
Yes, the X .Insurance Co., as surety, is solidarily liable with the principal-debtor . A contract of suretyshlp is an
I
I-I agreement whereby a party, called the surety, guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or
l obligor, of an obligation or undertaking in favor of a third party, called · the obligee. A surety's liability is joint and
several, limited to the amount of the bond. and determined strictly by the terms of contract of suretyship in relation
to the principal contract between the. obligor and the obligee.In the case at bar, Xlnsurance Co. acted as surety of C
I Co. under the performance bor:id it issued in favor of respondents lo secure the completion of the construction project.
Thus, petitioner is solidarily liable with the principal-debtor (The M anila Insurance Company, Inc: vs. Spouses Roberto
and Aida Amurao, C.R. No. 179628; January 16, 2013; De Castillo,].).
40 I 18 SAN BEDA CtNIRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

PLEDGE .
143. AA Corp. (AA), BB Inc:(BB), and CC Corp. (CC) executed a contract which stated the terms and conditions
for the purchase and acquisition by BB from AA of 20 million shares of stock of CC. Under this contract,
BB agreed to pay AA in instalments, and BB shall execute a pledge agreement in favor of AA as security
for the price of the shares. It also provided for a provision on automatic reversion of the shares to CC in
case BB defaults. As such,_ BB executed a pledge in favor of AA Three years, AA informed BB that it has
defaulted on its payments and demanded it to settle its unpaid amortizations or else the automatic
reversion will apply. AA clahns that the provision in the contract providing for the autmatic reversion
of the shares is null and void for being a pactum i:ommissoriu·m. Is the contention correct? -
YES, ther.e is pactum commissorium . The elements of pactum commissorium need not concur in one contract. The
agreement of the parties may be embodied in only one contract or
in two or more separate writings. In case of the
latter, the writings of the parties should- be read and interpreted together in such a way as to render their intention
effective: Both elements of pactum commissori1:' m are present in the instant case: (1) By virtue of the Pledge
Agreement , BB pledged its CC shares of stock in favor of AA as security for the fulfilment of the former's obligations
under the contract and the Pledge Agreement itself; and (2) There is automatic appropriation as under the contract,
in the event of default by BB, title to the CC shares of stock shall ipso facto revert from BB _to AA without need of
demand. Although executed in separate written instnments;the contract and the pledge agrement are integral to
one another. More importantly, the Court, in determining the existence of pactum commissorium, had focused more
on the evident intention f the parties; rather than the formal or written form (Philnic<! Industrial Corp. v. Privatization
and M anagement Office, G.R. No. 199420, August 2Z
/.;;{ ; ) :=...,,..,.,, 'I'

144. Philippine Veterans Bank ·'tv terans B)",w;.. .!, <.![ll'Quses AB , a) an. As security thereof, Sps. AB
executed a Real Estate Mortgag <RF¥'J -- f ?f of::Ye - ,,I, \1}a"over a real property situated in the
Municipality of Paraftaq e and.\[egist r_e_d._in:.th tit,i9Ji r Mr. A. Sps. AB failed to pay their
obligation to Veterans Bank. Vet¢ran§ B ext or J<?sed the property and emerged as the
highest bidder at the foeclosur e an.4 -s;s sp!_!qing Certificate of Sale which was duly
· registeed. The spouses failed r : e. m he :nipe a d _to vacate and surrndr.possession of
the subject propercy to Veteran·)ia,P.k Spsy AB s,,i3Iik'_s power to extraJudic1ally foreclose
extrajudicial foreclosure was a p
on mortgages. Whether or n · e · · · . . n!df!gagee-bank f '
of ·Article-
fohibited under the property through
2088 of the Civil
Code .. ..
m.&
tl-'i J . /_ , ., ·
. ' ) . ' · '-.. /
. \'' JI' / , "'\'/f:.7 .

No. There nothing in Section 18 of . .>No. c c, b5Hit e,rpreted to mean that Veterans Bank is limited to
judicial foreclosures only, or that it 't !iqt,., e.J.£tof t ,' · J>hefits provided under Act No . 3135, as amended ,
allowing extrajudicial foreclosures.. .,_-:; ;,.i .. i f': ./
/
,/ d''
Since Veterans Bank did not have the power , upotl"the petlµoners' default, to automatically acquire or appropriate
the mortgaged property for itself;there is no pactumcommissorium . Ori the contrary, the Veterans Bank resorted to
extrajudicial foreclosure and was issued a Certificate of Sale by the sheriff as proof of its purchase of the subject
property during the foreclosure sale (Sps. Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 168523; March 9, 2011; Del
Casti_llo,].).
MORTGAGE
145. Spouses AB mortgaged Lot 13521 to PNB as security for a series ofloans. For failure to pay, PNB foreclosed
the Lot 13521 nd title was transferred to PNB. C filed a complaint and averred that Antonio could not
validly mortgage the entire Lot 13521 to PNB as a portion thereof belongs to him. C also that PNB is not
an innocent mortgagee/purchaser for value because prior to the execution and registration of PNB's deed ·
of sale with the Register of Deeds, the bank had prior notice that the disputed lot is subject of itigation.
PNB argued that it is a mortgagee and a buyer in good faith since at the time of the mortgage; Spouses
AB's certificate of title was "clean" and "devoid of adverse annotations." Whether PNB, a bank, is an.
innocent purchaser/mortgagee for vah1e?
No. A banking institution is expected to exercise due .diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The
ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and
indl.spensable part of its operations. It is undisputed that the 2.5002 -hectare portion of the mortgaged -property has
been adjudged in favor of Ciriaco's predecessor-in-interest. Hence, PNB has the burden of evidence that it acted in
good faith (Philippine National Bank vs. Ciriqco Jumamoy G.R. No. 169901, August 3, 2011; Del Castillo,].).

146. Spouses AB obtained a first loan from PN and secured the obligation by constituting a REM on their
parcel of land situated in City A. On another date, Spouses AB obtained a second loan from PNB in a
differerit ·branch and constitilted a real estate mortgage over their residential lot situated in City B. It is
noted that the mortgage contracts contained the identical dragnet clause provisions. Spouses AB made
partial payments on the second loan. Spouses AB demanded the release of the mortgage over the property
in City B. However, the mortgage could not be released because the first loan had not yet been fully paid
and hence, PNB foreclosed the mortgage over the property in City A. PNB applied for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage on the property in City B for it appeared notwithstanding the foreclosure the
loan was not yet fully paid, The PNB based this on the dragnet clauses, contending that the mortgag over
the City B property covers not only the second but also the first loan. Whether or not the dragnet clause
contained in the first mortgage contract could authorize the foreclosure of the property under the
mrtgage to secure a second loan despite the full payment of the second loan?
No. In order for dragnet clauses to secure future and other loans, the loans thereby secured must be sufficiently
described in the mortgage contract. Considering that the agricultural loan had been pre-existing when the mortgage
was constituted on the property in City B, it would have been easy for PNB to have expressly incorporated the
reference to such agricultural loan in the mortgage contract covering the commercial loan. But PNB did not. Being
the party that had pr'epared the contract of mortgage, its failure to do so should be construed that it did not at all
contemplate the earlier loan when it entered into 'the subsequent mortgage (PNB v. Heirs of Alonda y, G.R. No. 171865,
October 12, 2016; Del Castillo,].).
147. A obtained a loan of P600;,Q Q:OO fro , , , . . '«e by a ,Kqsulatan which provides that the
latter shall have the right to ffi fruits of !J pJ>jE!:l.e 4 owned by, 'for six (6} years or until the loan is .
fully paid. After the death of'_A , his;·h, i,rs : le<l·a.
• ., . ,,,
Qo. pla
•J ,....,,,.,,.,.
j.......... ..... .,, .,
-
!lt {9r : , ¢eovery
L.J< ;a, \..:" ;a:
- :,(.,.....,. .{
of Possession, Declaration of
Nullity of the Kasulatan and I) _ age ""with.l!_-r.a · · of rf !iminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against petifi'tlrirs. Are t4e h le o.'the possession of the property?
• '·f:·'
-:L--", - i ·r ..*l ! "
<,;
NO . As a contract of antichresis: (} cr ditotfw4ll
'-'11?•.'.'.- • •
n :.q the debtor's real property given as security;
(b sch credito!will apply te fn'¥ttkf th. s d pr in f t owed by the debtor , if y, then to the
ii pnnc1pal amount; (c) e ced1tor r
and (4) should the obligation be d ·
e :--. .i rtY- f -the dbtr ha totally paid ':hat heowes ;
t1' h1s aJrtiahcally extmgmshed proceeding from the
[' accessory character of the agreemen ,.'1\'e Ian g of the Kasulatan 'leaves no doubt that the
loan was secured by the fruits of the ' "·· ol 1 o ed:-lfi,.A . The document specifically authorizes the
silin?s B,C,D'-to receiv the fi:nts oKE ..
his €sP. m
n/4 '!Je
LoT_ .cii obligation t_o apply thei_n as ayment to
prc1pal loan fr .a penod of six (6) ye . /i L . ti fii,} ,,.B,C,D are entitled to retam enjoyment of the
subject land until the debt has been totally---.:i)::,,.r' · - s. Rey t . '.,S, _.l. ieirs of Malance, et. al., G.R. No. 219071, August 24,
»
2016; Covered Case). , ..--: ,, ...--
CONCURRENCE AND PREFERENCE
In the liquidation plan, will the civil code provisions on concurrence and preference of credits apply?
I
1· ,.
Yes. Tqe Liquidation Plan and its Implementation shall ensure that the concurrence and preference of credits as
jI enumerated in the.Civil Code of the Philippines and other relevant laws shall be observed, unless a preferred creditor
I
1·, voluntai-ily waives his preferred right (R.A. No. 10142, Sec. 133).
In the Liquidation Plan of a Corporation on rehabilitation under RA No. 10142 or Financial Rehabilitation
ii {lnd Inolvency Act (FRIA}, which credit should be preferred? ·
,I'
I• Credits for services renderec by empoyees or laborers to the d_ebtor shall enjoy first preference under Article 2244 of
the Civil Code, unless the claims constitute legal liens under Article 2241 and 2242 thereof or unless a preferred
"
'1
·f.
creditor voluntarily waives his preferred rights (Section· 133 of FRIA)
I
GENERAL BANKING ACT of 2000 (R.A. 8791)
!
148. When is the redemption period for natural persons on foreclosure of mortgage involving banks?
·The mortgagor or debtor, who is a natural person, whose real property has been sold for the full or partial payment
i.
I .•
of his obligation shall have the right within one (1) year after .the sale of the real estate, to redeem the property. The
I

one-year redemption period should be _counted from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale with the
Register of Deeds ( SUNDIANG AQUINO, Reviewer on Commercial Law (2016), p. 339}'.
149. Is the rule the same for juridical persons?
No. A juridical person, whose property has been sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure shall have the right to
redeem the property but not after the registration _ of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the proper Register of
Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after foreclosure , whichever is earlier (R.A. No. 8791,
Sec. 47, Par. 2).
150. Who shall take possession of the foreclosed property?
The purchaser at the auction sale concerned whether in a judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure shall have the right to
enter upon and take full possession of such property immediately after the date of the confirmation of the auction
sale and administer the same in accordance with law (R.A. No. 8791, Sec. 47, Par. 1).
151. Is th':filing of a bond necessary to enjoin or restrain the conduct of foreclosure proceedings?
Any petition in court to enjoin or restrain the conduct - of foreclosure proceedings instituted pursuant to Section 47,
RA. 8791 shall be given due course only upon filing of the petitioner of a bond in an amount fixed by the court
conditioned that he will pay all the damages which the bank may suffer by the enjoining or the restraint of the
foreclosure proceeding (R.A. 8791, Sec. 47, Par. 1).
152.
The heirs have an interest in the prs - ;ati

/
death, the heirs start to own the ptu"· y,
165554, July 26, 2010; Del Castillo,].)-: "'
'\ ' . /).,
""""' '.;.;' . ,/ }
153. What is the importance of distinghl ,

hand? ·- -.·
"'·· '""'-'...... ·'
In cases of preterition (Art. 854), it to.tally annri'f(the i titution of heir , but the de.vises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious,
In cases of imperfect or defective disinheritance (Art. 918), it partially annuls the institution of heirs only insofar
as it may prejudice the person disinherited, but the devises and legacies shall be valid to such extent as will not impair
the legitime, and .
In cases of after-acquired properties (Art. 793), property acquired during the interval between the execution of the
will and the death of the testator are .not, as a rule, included among the properties disposed of, unless it should
expressly appear in the will itself that such was the intention of the testator. This only logically applies to legatees
and devisees, and not to the institution of heirs because in the latter Art. 776 and 781 states that inheritance of a
person includes all the property and the transmissible rights and obligations of a person existing at the time of his
&h '
2018 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 1 43

201 8 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL L_p..W
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
154. What are the formalities of a will?
COMMON FORMALfl1Es ··
HOLOGRAPHIC W:ILL
a. It must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by a. It must be entirely written ,
the testator's_ name written by some other person in his presence, and dated, and signed by the
by his express direction, hand of the testator
b. Attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the himself
presence of the testator and of one another. b. It is subject to no other
c. Testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the form, and may be made in
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each or out of the Philippines ,
and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the and need not be witnessed
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each page.
d. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the
v.ill is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of · witnesses, and
that the latter witness.e,d)md signe hereof in
the·presence of the te! r - d of ·. . . . : '.'. <
e. Every will must be ackrio J.edged befoftt i\,rj.\Qtaftrp(iplk by the testator
and the witnesses . The no pu_ bJjq _sJ1ajJ:)JQ.!b£: eql}_i:fc:;d. t9 reta,ih a
co of the will, or file anot:4i: wih the,. ffiGe;; ,t,Q_;\C?lm'1£,:pf Coqh. .
SPECIAi; C.AsES'
a. If the testator be deaf, or a dt!af:·mnt '11r.rru ' . '>;' t teaci 'the will, if able to do so; othenvise , he shall
designate two persons to re f;an Mr4fnlrhi . s9 e practicable manner, the contents thereof.
b. If the testator is blind, the '\\ j)>sh - be read t Or,icf , . y one of the subscribing witnesses, and
a ain, b the not ublic oe·, . re 1. 1,§;- C
..-"- ,;:>+,-
le'"ed.
-ii---"''""1'---- ----'
- - > t')'.' '-, •·
$¥ rson,., ntally unsound to execute a will?
"./.f.,,,·7
r&t%. . /./.ff 1-_( iF · -
No. The law p:r.;esumes that the testat }'. ... , ( n d aJ,;4'the .ti\lft'O:f the execution of the will and the burden to
prove otherwise lies on the oppositor (B<f -'.'° ;''<- fj if!j489, April 11; 2012; Del Castillo,].).
' -- / "'. 4;a ra::;:;,,<:'.···>
156. Joint Wills
Joint wills are those which contain in one instrument the will of two or more persons jointly signed by them, either
for their reciprocal benefit ot for the benefit of a third person (Art. 818).
Those execufed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the Philippines , even though they may be
authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed (Art. 819).
157. Probate of Wills

It is a special poceeding to establish the validity of a will; refers to the allowance of a will. The following are grounds
for disallowance : ·
a. Formalities required by law have not been complied with
b. Testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution ;
c. Will was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear or threats; ·
d. Will was procured by undue and. improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some
other person; ·
e. SignatUre of the testator was procured by fraud ; and
f. Testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of
affixing his signature there. (CIVIL CODE, Art. 839).
44 I 201 8 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

]. CIVIL LAW 2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES
158. Alicia executed a will and instituted Bebong, her common-law spouse, to receive all of her estate in the
amount of 12 million. Alicia then died and was survived by her illegitimate grandmother and two sisters,
Cindy and Divine. Is there preterition? Dist.r;ibute the estate according to your answer.
Preterition is the omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct 1ine, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator ( CIVIL CODE, Art. 854). The compulsory heirs: (1)
legitimate children apd descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) in default of such,
legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants; the concurring
compulsory heirs are the surviving spouse and illegitimate child or children.(CWJL CODE, Art. 886) Here,·Alicia is
survived by her illegitimate grandmother and two sisters who are all not her compulsory heirs. Hence, there is no
preterition. The whole estate amounting to 12 million shall be given to Bebo!lg.
159. Rica and Hercules were married and had a child, Lito. Rica died leaving a will, one provision of which
gave a parcel of land to Lito. Due to an accident, Lito died and the parcel of land was passed to Hercules
by way of Intestate succession. Sam, Lito's maternal grandfather, knowing that the parcel of land was a
reservable property in his favor, sold the parcel of land to George. Hercules also sold the parcel of land to
Eva. Sam had a heart attack and eventually died. George and Eva both claim the property, who between ·
them is the rightful owner?
Eva is the rightful owner. Article 891 provides that the ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquire · n of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong,t?!he line fr · e.
- \ /. . - -· _, \../ :·
In this case, Sam was a supposecl,r,eservatariocTh Qnly, req11is tes f r the .p'l.§.sing of the title from the reservista to
the re_servatario are: (1) death of the ieservsta,; q.-S2)..,th f<lct th, t tP. rese:rvista had survived the reservatario (Cano
v. Director of Lands, et al., L-10701-, J riuary .J6,J 95.Q)_. S·l? eceaf q. Hercules, he did not acquire rights over
the property and could not sell it. He/cule beca;me th ""' 't property without the obligation to transfer it to
the reservatario. Thus, his sale of t :propFrt)rto·'.Eya _ -.t
. ,, J> \ . '. ( ;; .
160. Alice married Bong and they ha!.f:wo cJilld.fen 1 C \J¢ 'Alice disinherited Bong, her husband,
for having attempted against thf··.} ol",g · · · . # . , rr,.'Afice died with and gave her friend Rio a
. ,,
legacy of P400,000 , The hereditary- .sJat ,9.9Q'..:'.l-VaS the@sinheritance valid? Distribute the estate
accordingly. -:::: , ·; ;f r<f
'} (.' /' ' . ,
' '<:'·J . c : if <
No. Bongas invalidly disinherited r6 \ e ffid7nt c4 ( the disinheritance. Under Article 921, there
could be a valid disinheritance if the spori Jws .,,,on'\iict,ed t"fan attempt against the life of the testator , his or
her descendants, or ascendants . Here, tli •.i;o conv\9'j,6 d the attempt against life was not made against
Alice's descendants or ascendants, but to her rbio t":>Fto e , Bong shall still receive his share.
-
Article 888 provides that the legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and mother. Carlo and Danielle are entitled to P450 ,000 of the estate which shall be divided
between them. Thus, each of .them shall receive P225,000. Bong, the husbap.d, shall receive P225,000 which is
equivalent to the share of one legitimate child as provided under Article 897. The remaining P225,000 shall be given
to Rio as legacy.
161. H, a widower, married M after H's first wife passed away due to a heart disease. During their marriage, A,
H's son from his first marriage, had an affair with M. H found out about the said affair after M and A
were caught by H's brother X. Will A and M be automatically disinherited by reason of unworthiness?
No, disinheritance by reason of unworthiness affects only the party who is convicted of adultery or concubinage
with the testator's _spouse. In the case at hand, only A may be disinherited by reason of unworthiness provided that
A should first be convicted of Adultery with H's spouse, M (Art. 1032 par. 5). Conviction of the crime of adultery or
concubinage is therefore necessary for A to be automatically disinherited by reason of unworthiness and is only
applicable to A.
Note: M, the 2nd wife, can still be disinheritd·but it must be done expressly by H in a will under the ground oi
,giving cause for legal separation (Art 916, Art. 921 par.5). ·
201 8' SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 4t

162. Evelyn made a will instituting her mother, Rose, as the sole heir of her estate and disinheriting her father,
John, for having attempted against her virtue. In the same will, Evelyn forgave her father for such act.
Evelyn died without any issue. John seeks to receive his part of the estate ·claiming that she has been
forgiven by Evelyn in the will thus, revoking the disinheritance. Can John receive any part from the
estate?
No. John cannot receive any part from the estate for he has been validly disinherited by Evelyn. Article 920 (1)
provides that a parent or ascendant can be disinherited on the ground of atteIJlpt against the virtue of the testator. A
disinheritance can only be revoked by subsequent reconciliation between the testator and the disinherited heir and
by _the making of a new will making the disinherited heir an instituted heir.( CIVIL CODE, Art. 922) Reconciliation is
the mutual restoration of feelings to the status quo. A pardon given by the testator in the very same will wherein he
provides for the disinheritance is ·not equivalent to reconciliation; there only is a sort of moral force or spiritual
influence which forgives in the name of morality . Nor was there a new will made in the present case. Therefore,
John's disinheritance is still valid and he cannot receive any part from the estate.
163. Grace made a will instituting her children, Alex and Tricia, and her friends, Mina and Aiko as heirs and
Delma as substitute heir of Mina and Aiko. In 1991, Delma died, leaving Dexter his son. Grace died but
both Mina and Aiko were incapacitated to inherit. Dexter claims that he should receive the shares of Mina
and Aiko. Distribute the estate of 1,000,000. · ·
Alex d Tricia shall receive P250 ,000 each as their legitime from the half of the estate or PS00 ,000 which is to be
divided between them, s provided under Articl shall also receive P250 ,000 each from the free portion of
PS00,000, to be equally divid .q ,etween t "" ·· e no other person is qualified to inherit.
..,,, ! ,
·'·· A,. \
Article 856 provides: A voluntatj:perr who di s;l? fn , .#e tlJ¢:.tf ttor trcinsmits ;nothing to his heirs. A compulsory heir ·
who clies before the testator, a person incanac!tated to succeed, an one who renounces the inherit ance, shall transmit
no right to his own heirs except in Gp. s ·e;(pre l¥.,i)r -· ·4.ed.fo"r.in.th1s C e.
< (> i ;
Mina and Aiko are incapacitated · \ti;,, therefoter om_ ·9ace. Delma predeceased Grace therefore ,
Dexter cannot claim from Grace's es't;lt. : , ' ' .;;
°'<.' '\ .'. , r
164. Hubby died leaving as his heirs:
,........,_ it./ »
ms ' , ·iIt!-parents, Wifey, his wife, and Baby, his
f</j.:; -
illegitimate daughter. The net estate)s "}·,: ... I ::I_· _,' .

a. If Hubby left a will givi' "--'/Jtl J!e'il1ie - legAcy of Pl00,000, how will the estate be
distributed? Explain. ,•. t.ft:,j":J>/ . :..//;>
b. If Hubby left a will institii _# .:g/hi lsorythei,rs/;ind gave Behie 'a legacy of Pl00,000, how
will the estate be distribute<I? f;*l>J, . ...,,;;:··..-· , · · );t
. --.. ,, } :,, . . . . . L::o';:J::....
a. Since the compulsory heirs were pretentea .-meSfkte succession ensues. Therefore, the share of Momsy and
Popsy will be 1/2 of the estate or Pl ,000,QOO, while te other halfof the estate shall be divided between Wifey
and Baby or PS00 ,000 each. (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1000) Hence, in this case, Wifey, whose share in case of
intestacy is bigger than her legitime, must bear the reduction in order to satisfy the legacy of Beshie.
Therefore, the net estate shall be distributed as follows:

Momsy and Popsy P1,ooo;ooo or PS00,000 each
Wifey PSOO;OOO less the legacy of Pl00,000 = P400,000
Baby PS00,000
Beshie Pl00,000
Net Estate P2,000,000
b. In case of partial intestacy or mixed succession, the testamentary disposition shall be given effect first. The
balance of the free portion after deducting the testarpentary disposition shall be given to the intestate heir.
The intestate heir who should have received the free portion under intestacy shall bear any reduction due
, to the testameJ?.ta ry disposition (Tolentino, Civil Code Vol. III).
In this case, the legitime of Momsy and Popsy is 1/2 of the estate or Pl ,000,000, the legitime of Wifey is 1/8
of the estate or P250 ,000, while the legitime of Baby is 1/4 of the estate or PS00,000 (CIVIL CODE, Art. 899)
!
I
I
I" 46 I 2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED SAR OPERATIONS
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• CIVIL LAW 2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES
165. A designated his children X, Y, and Z as his universal heir in his. will. It was stated that X is entitled to 1/4
of the free portion, 1/4 would be given to Y and 1/2 to Z. Unfortunately, X predeceased A when the plane
where . X was a passenger crashed landed in the Pacific Ocean. Due to grief A, had a heart attack and
subsequently died leaving an estate of P240,000. What will happen to X's share if X is survived by his
children Xl and X2? How shall the estate be distributed?
The children of X, Xl and X2, shall be entitled to X's legitime by right of representation (CNIL CODE, Art. 972) while
X's share in the free portion shall accrue to Y and Z by right of accretion (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1021). Xl and X2 shall
divide_ the legitime of X equally. Y and Z shall divide X's in proportion to their share in the institution which in this
case will be 1:2. ( CNIL. CODE, Art.1019) The distribution will be. as follows:
y 40,000 as compulsory _ heir

30,0.00 as voluntary heir
10,000 by right of accretion
z 40,000 as compulsory heir .
· 60,000 as voluntary heir
20,000 by right of accretion
Xl 20,000 by right of represent3tion
X2 · 20,000 by right of representation
TOTAL . P240,000 Net Estate
166. T while on his deathbed called for hi fessed to him and asked the latter to bless
him as he nears the end o® \ life. T ,:,. . . · ograp ·,will bequeathing to his children
the following shares: 1/2 of \; state to Aj; -''\,o - l.{lother 1/4 fo't:Under our law, will A be able to
-9.:C
inhent anything from T? _' \ , r ·
-. -..+ v
Yes, what is being prevented is tl rti ;;" q;.,A testator (CIVIL CODE, Ari . 1021). Such
undue influence cannot affect the '-1 Wm& f r:t. f-i a tb_ :bJ.µi by law by virtue of being the testator's
compulsory heir to which .the testa i!)in\elf crbt t:; .
Therefore, A will still be able to inh s\ ·: iii' fy heir but he is disqualifed to inherit from
the free portion of T's estate for beiil li,e p I ·,! t coM.ession. (CIVIL CODE, Art . 1027 (1))
- .
167.
'
''.,.
a.
Legitimate children or descendants ''<),:· Legitimate children or descendants
b.
Legitimate parents or ascendants b. Illegitimate children or ascendants
c.
Illegitimate children or ascendants c. Illegitimate parents or ascendants
. ' d.
Surviving spouse · d. Surviving spouse
e.
Brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces e. Brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces
f.
Other collateral relatives within the 5th degree f. State
State
(JURADO, Succession, supra at 401-402)
168. John is the legitimate son of Berna. When John turned two years old, he was adopted by Cornelio. Two
years later, however, Cornelio diedin an accident. In 2008,John died childless and unmarried. There being
no other relatives, Berna filed a claim against the estate of John, alleging that she is the biological mother
and the sole remaining beneficiary of John. Will Berna's claim prosper?
Yes, Berna's claim will prosper. When Cornelio died, John was still a minor, at about four ye_ars of age. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents (Bartolome v.
Social Security System, G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014). Further, Art. 190 of the Family Code, which repealed Art.
984 of the Civil Code, provides that when only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, the ordinary rules of
legal or intestate succession shall apply. Therefore, Berna, ·the biological mother, retain her rights of succession to
the estate of her child who was the subject of adoption. . ·
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2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL L4.W
169. Don Bernard has three legitimate children: Jojo, Koko, and Lala; and one illegitimate son, Momo. Koko
has one legitimate daughter, Karla. Lala has two legitimate children, Leo and Lea. Koko and Lala both
predeceased Don Bernard. Don Bernard and Jojo perished together at the same time in a plane accident.
They both left substantial estates in intestacy. Don Bernard left an estate in the amount of Pl,500,000,
while Jojo left an estate in the amount of Pl,000,000. Distribute the estate of (a) Don Berriard and (b) Jojo.
Do they inherit in their own right, by accretion or by right of representation? (c) If Koko, Lala and Momo
repudiated their shares .in the estate of Don Bernard: how will his estate be distributed? Explain your
answers.
a. Under Art. 888, the legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother. Art. 983 provides that if illegitimate children survive with legitimate
children, the shares of the former shall be one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate children or
descendants. Under Art. 981, should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
In this case, the net estate must be divided among Karla, Leo, Lea, and Momo in the proportion of 2: 1:1:1.
Momo shall inherit in his own right, while Karla, Leo and Lea shall inherit by right of representation .
Therefore, the shares of the heirs shall be' as follows:

Karla P600,000
Leo P300,000
Lea P300,000
Momo P.201000
Net Estate Pl fi.(>;Q,000 r' j: .
b. Under Art. I 003, if th: 1\:.e n\' Ei l'E. a ;...!hilJegit children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall sti ed t9..the..Juti+e . eceasd:'Art. 1006 provides that should brothers
an sisters of the full blod. j JVile to9 ther aniflers of the_ half blood, the former shll be
entitled to a share double tlfat of the>1atteJJ. I ed Ul Art. 1005 that should brothers and sisters
survive together with nepl[ f ian hiet: s )v drtof the decedent's brothers and sisters of the
full blood, the former shall\ ritil er cppita, p;. r. pes.
·· •·
In this case, the net estate 'rnlfs ,
b
.·,,g,, /
, Leq!,i;.ea, and Momo in the proportior. of 2:1:1:1.
Momo shall inherit per capfi4tvpl h ' ·, . - . erit per stirpes.
\°',ti")
Tliere(9re, the shares of the ffil: ;
Karla P400,000 4-. ( . : •
Leo P200 000 <:';f.JJr, ., .
Lea P200:000 "'- -:;;:;;fm,14*i!itfiJ:(W1!fttiZ::::;·;'z: :( •·
//
Momo P200,000
Net Estate Pl,000,000
c. If all of Don Bernard's children repudiated their shares in his estate, the nearest descendants, Karla, Leo, and
·'Lea, shall be his intestate heirs. Under Art. 969, if the inheritance should be repudiated by the nearest relative,
should!here be one only, or by all the nearest relatives called by law to succeed, should there be several,
those of the following degree shall inherit in their own right and cannot represent the person or persons
repudiating the inheritance. ·
In this case, the net estate must be divided in equal proportion among Karla, Leo and Lea. Each of them shall
receive 1/3 of the estate or PS00,000 each. They shall inherit in their own right and not by right of
representation .
.PROVISIONS COMMON TO TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION
170. Acceptance of Inheritance.
Acceptance may be made expressly or tacitly; ·

a. Express - one made in a public or private document .
b. Tacit - one resulting from acts by which the intention to accept is necessarily implied or which would
have no right to do except in the capacity of an heir (Art. 1049, Civil Code)

! CIVIL LAW
The law presumes that acceptance has been made tacitly :

1. When the heir sells, donates, or assigns his right to a stranger, or to his co-heirs, or to any of
them; ·
2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES
ii. when the heir renounces it even though gratuitously for the benefit of one or more heirs;
iii. when renunciation is in favour of all heirs, indiscriminately for consideration (Art. 1050, Civil
Code)
171. T, the Testator has 2 sons, A. and B. A has 2 children, X and Y. On March 6, 2016, T was involved in a
vehicular accident which led to his death. During a drinking session between the 2 brothers, A verbally
told B that he is repudiating his share in their Father's estate. Thereafter A died on Oct 8, 2016 due to
cardiac arrest. A's children, X and Y now claims for their Father's share in T's testate, with B opposing
their claim stating that A has already repudiated his share in T's estate. Can X and Y validly claim A's
inheritance even ter the latter's repudiation?
Yes, for repudiation to be valid it must be written in a public or authentic instrument , or in a petition to the court
which has jurisdiction over the testate or intestate proceeding (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1051). In the case at hand since the
repudiation of A's share was done verbally, it cannot be considered as a valid repudiation. In cases where an heir dies
prior to accepting or repudiating properly his inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his heirs ( CNIL CODE,
Art. 1053). Therfore, A's share in the estate of T shall b,e transmitted to his heirs, X and Y.
172. D, a ,:vealthy businessman, durii:ig his lifetime donate the following amounts to the following people: 1)
A car worth PlM to his Son, A after the la , the medic3.l. board exam; 2) A house & Lot worth
Pl.SM as a wedding gift tq !s daugh '>< nd 3) A Rolex watch worth 250,000 to his
best friend F oriF's soth birt ?-Y·. D's h .. · .;,,;z4 orated pe stress and fatigue. D succumbed
to his illness leaving a net es,tte of P6.M. H: sh d th estate be distributed if in his will, D instituted
as his sole heirs S (D's spouse), ' an,d 13' n gv a legacy pf P&S0,000 to his best friend F.
.--. ': ,.. . . ,. ' .
First, the value of the properties sub\ect o th¢ net estate in the following manner: (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 1061) \ "t
.. ....._
NET ESTATE
Car to A
H&L to B (half, Art. 1066)
Rolex Watch to F
TOTAL \, ·o I \ '1//7
.. \ : \. . ,J'7 . YI'· ,.· _
The legitime of A and B will be half of P8AA\Q.iy lf a<?!iglthein and S. (CWIL CODE, Art . 888)The surviving
spouse 11 get an ai:nount equivent to t?· L, ;. !t, ch is P2M.. (CWIL COT?E, Art . 87)Th alue of the
properties they received as donation that is subJl ct td':'.lil.f at10n shall be subtracted to their respective leg1hmes (CIVIL
C()_DE; Art . 1073) in the following manner : / ·' ·. . "·,
Legitime of A 2,000,000
(Value of Car) (1,000,000)
Total 1,000,000
Legitime of B 2,000,000
(Half the value of the H&L) (750,000)
1,250,000
Legitime of S 2,000,000
(equal to legitime of 1 child)
The remaining P2M woul then be considered as a disposable free portion and it is here where the donations to
strangers subject to collation will be charged: ·
Disposable Free Portion 2,000,000

(Rolex Watch to F} (250 000)
(Devise to F) (250 000)
Remaining Disposable Free Portion 1,500,000
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2018 PRE-WEEK NOTES CIVIL Ll;.W
The remaining Pl.SM of the free portion will then be distributed to the voluntary heirs S, A, and B equally since
under the law heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts.
Thus, the estate shall be partitioned in the following manner :

To S, Surviving Spouse P2,000,000 as compulsory heir
PS00,000 as voluntary heir
To A, Son Pl,000 ,000 as compulsory heir

PS00 ,000 as voluntary heir
To B; Daughter. Pl,250,000 as compulsory heir

PS00,000 as v_oluntary heir
To F, Best Friend P250,000 as legatee
Net Estate P6,000,000
I LAND, TITLES AND DEEDS
173. Can a foreign national ap.Ry/or regis .,., eel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the.:K ippine , has cpmplied
.) ,
with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA; 1:41)? c· ;:- :: t .t\ ..,;·
For the purpose of transfer and/ or ·:eaqui iti ;;,,- ia.-p . . .,rns,JAtntiaJJand, it is not significant whether private
respondents are no longer Filipin O-- itiz,ens at tij.e time1'· tfi.tfi' ed qt registered the parcels of land in question .
What is important is that privat ·-ff.espopdeni ';i· er attir4l-born citizens of the Philippines , and as
transferees of a private land, they uld agply (9r reg cor:dance with the mandate of Section 8, Article
XII of the Constitution. Considering 'fht phvat resp aBl#- to prove the requisite period and character
of possession of their predecessors;. :Ji;iter .·. . . ,, , i ts/ t eir application for registration of title must
perforce be approved (Republic vs. CA:p d ·:J:f9·· {J 89Pfl, :ii.gust 24, 1994).
> . ·;, ,, /,
-llldef
< ' t:·: l , : '
ff'
o£M'oti:ens Title'
-Ji -
' ::'¥)\ -- "lr "'C'il'-··

174. A purchased;·parcel of land from co wµers .d B{ancf 1hg-'Regi ter of Deeds issued a certificate of title
in the former's name. Meanwhile, 0 ri{i(1- a,{j>etition fo_r.,, lc
'o
' nstitution of his alleged title over the subject
property, claiming that the original copy· s41\estrojf-a in .the fire that gutted the City register of Deeds.
In the present petition, the heirs of 0 contend that the.,.,existence of O's title ngates the conclusiveness of
A's title and that the older title should enjoy presumptive conclusiveness of ownership and indefeasibility
of title. A argued that the principle of indefeasibility of titles applies only to an existing valid title to the
litigated property. Is the contention of O's heirs correct?
No. The mere existence of O's earlier title does not negate the conclusiveness of A's title. The principle that the
earlier title over a subsequent one applies when there are two apparently valid titles over a single property . The
existence of the earlier valid title renders the subsequent title void because a single property cannot be registered
twice. Since the heirs of 0 allege that they have title which was issued earlier than A's, it was their burden to prove
. the alleged existence and priority of their title. A mere allegation of an earlier title will not suffice. Therefore, the
allegation of an earlier title of 0 fails to negate the conclusiveness and indefeasibility of A's title over the s:ubject
property. (Oliveros v San M iguel Corporation, et al, G.R No. 173531, February 1, 2012, Del Castillo,].)
Non-Registrable Properties
175. Q: Proclamation no. ·123 was issued by the President classifying 1,000 hectares of land in Taguig City as a
recreational park. Included in the said property was the land of X and Y, who lobbied for the exclusion of
their land on the ground that their father, M, acquired the property through acquisitive prescription. This
resulted to the exclusion of the subject parcel of land and its immediate sale to X and Y through sales
. patent by the DENR. The Republic of the Philippines filed a case for reversion and cancellation of
respondents' titles. It argued that the sales patent are null artd void because they were issued against the
express mandate of Proc. 123 classifying the land as recreational park and thus, non-registrable.

a. Enumerate the non-registrable properties under the Torrens system.

b. Is the con·ention by the Republic correct? ·
a. The non-registrable properties under the Torrens system are:

i. Properties of the Public Dominion ( M artinez v. CA, GR. No. L-31721, Apr. 29, 1974)
ii. Forest Lands (Alvarez v.· PICOP Resourc s, Inc, G.R. No. 162243, Dec. 3,-2009)
iii. Inalienable lands of the public domain; (Chavez v. Publlc Estates Authority, G.R No. 133250, July 9,
2000)
iv. Military installations, civil and quasi-public lands; (Republic v. M arcos, G.R. No. L-32941, July 31, 1973)
and
v. All lands not classified as alienable and disposable.
b. Yes. The vested rights acquired through prescription by X and Y over the disputed parcels of land cannot
prevail against Proc. 168 classifyig the same as inalienable land of the public domain. Sec. 83 of CA 141
empowers the president to designate, by proclamation , any tract of land of the public domain as reservations
for the use of the government of the Philippines or any of its branches . The sales patent over the lot is null
and void, for at the time the sales patents were applied for and granted, the land has already lost its alienable
and disposable character. It was set aside and was being utilized pursuant to Proc. 123 as recreat ona) park.
Herice, the right of X and Y's right by acquisitive prescription ' cannot prevail over the govrnment' s
ownership (Republic of the Phi ippines v AFP Retirement and Separations Bene.fits System, c:R. No. 180463, Jan.
16, 2013, Del Castillo,].).
176. CC, a -philanthropist, estaQJished an o n island in Palawan He claimed that since

1962, he has been in posses !S'Pi of abo ch he,, th the help of the natives, cleared
and developed for agriculttU_:"'l;,purposes tg/J}Pj> q_ l1{-!trSJ)rphanagtr. AJ) equently, Proclamation 586 was
issued wherein 2,000 hectare( f t eJ.e.i'Lc\::'!S !! '!! /roµ.r ·a1e or settlement and reserved for
Goverm.nent use, subjet .to P?v ri ht.s*',if..th e S? _to General .argued. hat CC failed to
prove his clear and positive rign - ·.over.
. / Ii
the 50-ha
;i
slanii:.which
fJJ: //
he cla.uns, as it was contended
that even before the pro.clamav.:1,!!t e: . . :t·Jhe inalienable public domain· which
cannot be the proper. sub1ectJ of . v;ate.'· p(>ss sf ).m c1t(>f"·creneral correct?
. """"-.
. J
1 .... o·
....
/1
f.°' ..,..,,..-
Yes. Pursuant to the regalian doctr . · .o belong to the state. Hence, all lands not
appearing to be clearly under private · !.., efo fo the stat_e. To prove that _land is alienable,
the existence of a positive act of the . . e den proclamatlon or an executive order, among
others, declaring the land as alienabl la ' . d.In this case, there is no proof showing that
the land occpied by CC has b.een dee , : 1llie d di,, ·os"' · ' ,. the time he starte occupying it. Being such,
it cannot be appropriated and therefore,no;J Su : · . s ss" Ol)'.-- . . er the Civil Code. His possession of the subject
area, even if the same be in the concept o . r, canno eany legal effect since the land cannot be lawfully -
possessed in the first place (Republic of the"'" 1 , • . z, .R. 197472, Sept. 7, '2015, Del Castillo,].).
// / """""'-.. .
(J/ '.... .}
't Requisites and Proof of Registration
177. Mr. A filed an application for original registration over a parcel ofland which he purchased from Mr B.
He legd in his application that he purchased the propertY, in 1997, and that Mr. B was already in
possession of the property since 1930. The court approved the registration and directed the Register of
Deeds to cause the registration f the properties in the name of Mr. A. However, the Republic moved for
the reconsideration of the decision. It alleged that. the ubject parcel of land was declared alienable and
dispQable in 1984, and thus, the possession ·of Mr. B should be excluded from the computation of the
period ·of ..possession. Hence, Mr. A's predecessor-ll:i.-interest; and his possession, cannot ripen into
ownership.
a. What are the requirements for registration under PD 1529?
b. Is the contention of the Republic tenable?
- a. . The following are the requirements for registration under PD 1529:

i. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application;
ii. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious;
iii. The posse'ssion and occupaion must be under bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership ;
iv. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and
v. The property subject of the application must be alienable and disposable l;ind _ of the public domain
(Malabanan v Republic, G.R. No. 179987, Sept. 3, 2013)
2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 5I

(
b. . No. Under the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) a petition for original registration may be applied by
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open.. continuous, exclusive
· and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The law imposes no requirement that land should
have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land as early as June 12, 1945. What is important in
computing the period of possession is that the land has already been declared alienable and disposable at the
time of the application for registration. Upon satisfaction of the said requirement, the computation of the
period may include the pe.::-iod of adverse possession , prior to the declaration that land is alienable and
disposable (APP Retirem ent and Separation Benefits System v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. no. 180086, July
2,. 2014).
Volnntary Dealings
Exception _to. the Mirror Doctrine
178. AA was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Leyte granted under a homestead patent granted in
1953. In 1960, AA sold a portion of the property to BB. Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, AA
gave BB the owner's copy of the Land title. The transfer, however, was not recorded in the Register of
Deeds. Subsequently, BB sold a portion of the·property to CC and also delivered the original certificate of
title to him. The transfer was also not recorded. AA sold the whple property to DD, but failed to deliver
the title as the same was already with CC. AA filed a petition seeking the issuance of a new owner's
duplicate copy of the origirial certificate of t. · was granted by the RTC. He caused the same to be
registered in the .name of J:?D. AfteitW "' ,_yiplaint for quieting of title, recovery of
possession of real . prope ty<_ and dalJJJl ' ' __·;,ifiis ans,w"er; the latter contended that his
,,
predecessor, BB, bought the lot_ fh good faitf !E.t£ has i'bettr ght over DD. The latter meanwhile
invoked that since he was able tp regit(f r th a,l, lie )la. · better right.
a. What is the Mirror Doctrlne'F . · · ·.• , ,. ' · - .. · '· , ,·
b. Who has the better rightl{ov-.er the prope · f:
'·r. J ·. •
-
(;,::
- - /,
@
· f: -- .,-¥:qz
t ,
stercli- land may safely rely on the correctness of
.
a. The Mirror Doctrine state t a, a pe_rson

the certificate of title and the.Jaw will qot in ged {ii_m to go behind the certificate .to determine
the condition of the properfy se t' . 1 ' ctw.$tch may later invalidate or diminish his right
to the 1and. '·..\.- ... .·I ,·
.. ',Ji ·
b. cc has the better right over ,ffie pro
the fir buyer and DD as the :t nd. c;gri}zd pf ple that a person dealing on a registered land
. need not go beyond its certific ( · qf Ibis··' .OWY;Y r -"is subject to th rule that where there are
circumstances which would a par y';_-qJt1 ard an<l-e m€f him to investigate or inspect the property being
sold to him, it is expected that he sliotira·fi9. ,e"fifo tne· nature of the possession of the occupants thereip.
This is true specifically when the vendor is not irt p9ssession of the property. In this case, the possession of
CC of the land and the improvements already built therein should have put DD on guard on the status of
AA's ownership. As DD cannot be considered to be a buyer in good faith, he cannot lean on the
indefeasibility of the TCT, as the defense of indefeasibility of a torrens title does not extei:id to transferees
who .take the certificate of title .in bad faith ( Vallido v. Pono, G.R 200173, April 15, 2013).
. .
Involuntary Dealings
179. Sps A and B agreed Jo sell a parcel of land in Antipolo to Sps C and D on installment basis and .evidenced
by a Contract to Sell. Subsequently, C and D caused ·an ·annotation of an adverse claim based on the said
contrac't to sell. Upon payment of the full purchase price, A and B executed a Deed of Sale and the same
was registered ·a year after. Meanwhile, X filed a collection of sum of money against A. The court ruled
in favor X and moved for a writ of execution before the court. Pursuant to the order of execution, a levy
of execution was issued. The sheriff presented said notice of levy before the Registr of Deeds and the
same was annotated on the TCT, 3 months after the annotation of the adverse claim between ofSps C and
D. the notice oflevy was carried over to the new .title of C and D, which the latter demanded to be removed.
With this, C and D filed a complaint against X. Meanwhile, the latter averred that the notice of levy
annotated ceases to be valid 30 days thereafter. Hence, the annotation of the adverse claim by C and D
had already lost its legal effect 30 days after its registration.
a. IS the 30-day period of validity of an adverse claim under P.D 1529·mandatory?
b. Is . the adverse claim of Sps C and D still effective when the notice of levy in favor of X was
annotated, thus, charging the lattr of knowledge qf a pre-existing interest over the land?
. .

•
a. No. While Sec. 70 of PD 1529 provides that an adverse claim shall be effective for a period of 30 days from
the date of registration , the provision must be read in relation to the sentence following it, which reads that
after the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified
petition therefor by the party in interest. To interpret the effectivity of the adverse claim as absolute and
without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the
remedy of an inscription of the adverse claim, as a measure designed ·to protect the interest of a person over
a piece of real property where the registration is not prov_ided for in Act 496 and as a warning to third parties
. that a party is claiming an interest than the registered owner thereof.
b. Yes. The adverse claim of Sps C and D is still effective at the time the notice of levy was annotated on the
certificate. It is held that the notice of adverse clai_m remains valid even after the lapse of the 30-day period ,
for as · 1ong as there is no yet petition for cancellation of the notice of advers claim. Consequently , X is
charged with the knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon execution was encumbered by an
interest the same or as better than that of the registered owner thereof (Sps. Sanojas v. CA, G.R. No. 102377,
July 5, 1996).
Dealings with Unregistered Land
180. An unregistered lot was subject of an unnotarized Deed of Sale between the seller, A, and the·buyer, B.
Ten years thereafter the sale, the same lot was the subject of the notarized Deed of Absouie Sale between
A and C. B filed an action for quieting. of title. against C claiming_ that the latter bought the land in bad
faith. However, C averred that the sale to B . void as there was no consent from A's wife, and
that they acquired the prqp,rty in g &%$ - · he· court applied Art · 1544 iii holding that
although C was first to regiser the s .- - · . :..:;: bad fth. Hence, the sale in favor of B
should be upheld as he was 'd:l Iirst to tatrJ?? S- · ! ,<>f the. lot in 'good faith. Is the ruling of the court
correct? ;
% c-
- <::.;-;y t, :.. · <:.::<

181. Spouses ABC withdrew US$ 1,000:00 in US$ -,100 ua'tes.·:from their dollar account at BPO bank in Manila.
While i Bangkok; they had exchanged five US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only four had been accepted. The
fifth was confiscated for being fake. Using the remaining bills, the spouses boght jewelry. The next day,
theyhad been confronted by the shop owner who shouted "you Filipinos, you are all cheaters!" Their bills
turned out to be counterfeit. The BSP had certified that the four US$100 bills ere near perfect genuine
notes. BPO bank stressed that they could not absolutely guarantee the genuineness of each and every
foreign currency note that passed through its system. Is the respondent ·bank liable for damages?
No. -Although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the counterfeit US dollar
bills, the respondent, by virtue of its. having observed the proper protocols and procedure in handling the US dollar
bills involved, did not violate any legal duty towards them. Being neither guilty of negligence nor remiss in its
exercise of the degree bf diligence .required by law or the nature of its obligation as a banking institution, the latter
was .not liable for damages. Given the situation being one of damnum absque injuria, they could not be compensated
_ for he dartiage sustained. In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore , the injured person alone bears the
consequnces- because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that does not amount to a legal
injury or wrong (Sps. Carbonell vs. M etropolitan Bank and Trust Company, C.R. No. 178467, April26 , 2017; Covered
Case). -' · ·
182. A and B acquired housing units in a subdivision. After 2 years, cracks started to appear on the floor and
walls of theil- houses. A and B requested the _developer to take remedial action. Despite the construction
of a retaining wall, the condit_ion of their housing 'units worsened. They asked the developer to shoulder
the repairs but it denied, explaining that the structural defects could have been caused by the earthquake
2-018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 53

JI
and the improvements introduced to the units that overloaded the foundation of the original structures.
May the developer be held: liable for the damage sustained by the structures?
Yes. Considering the nature of the damage sustained by the structures, the developer is still liable under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. Under the said doctrine, expert testimony may be dispensed with to sustain an allegation, of
negligence if the following requisites obtain: a) the event is of a kLr1d which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent; b) the_ cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and c) the injury
suffered must not have been due to any voluntary act.ion or contribution on the part of the person injured. There
being no contributory fault on the part of A and B, there can be no other conclusion except that it was the fault of ·
the developer for not properly compacting the _soil, which used to be an old creek. The developer's argument that the
damage could have been sustained because of the 1990 earthque was not substantiated. Records show that the
petitioners had raised their concern:s as 'early as 1988 - before the earthquake occurred in 1990 (Geromo vs La Paz
Housing And Development Corporation, G.R. No. 211175, January 18, 2017; Covered Case).
183. While crossing the railroad track, a PNR train suddenly turned up and rammed the jeepney driven by X,
resulting to his death. At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad
crossing. The "Stop, Look and Listen" signage was poorly maintained. The "Stop" signage was already
facld while the "Listen" signage was partly blocked by another signboard. PNR argued that the driver
started bowing his horn to warn motorists of the approaching train when •t was 400 meters away from
the crossing. However, at 10 meters away, X suddenly crossed the tracks. The driver immediately stepped
on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney but it did not instantly come to a complete stop. .
a. Is PNR Corporation liable?
b. . May contributory ·ne!?,ligenc Ii · driver?
'<\", '•J,"' • , ,, .
.. n . - ,,,t>v.;./ .
a. Yes, PNR is liable. PNR feJf short of ttr, }:lj geJS
,I E 6f ted of it, , g- into consideration the nature of its
business, t? forestall any;4DJ: "X 9;\ £ ·E li3fa¥<;t q; stNl ety :ailroad bars to prevent motorsts
from cro smg the tracksm.· -?r ...g - hnWfl m. Aside rori:i the absenc of a crossing
bar, the Sto, Look ad t }t' 51gna ms_ a, )P?oly mamta ed, hene, maequ.ate to
ert the pubhc of .the rme:n
r g ge,1r/; re g d,_ e go?d condition, t_Just a dilap1.dated
'Stop,. Look and Listen" s1&;!1 ·11n.eer ct:Jo t · .µblc. It is - the repons1bihty of the railroad
companY. to use reasonabl e tC? keep the ·:rking order. Failure to do so would be an
indication of negligeQce (Phi ·!fl. in · . pd . :JYh vs. Vizcara, G.R. No. 190022, February 15,
2012; Covered Case). .,,. ,;' . J._ .' . t: 'r..).,, ·
b. There was no contributory rle"'q$

Ie j. {" 7
lP driver. Contributory Qegligence is conduct
on the..part of the injured p q; sa e ; s-IJio the harm he has suffered, which falls below
t?e standard hich he is requtt 1o f. \ .·. ··. . . P-"".lii .o.\ , ' .otection. The driver, reiying on his faculties of
sight and hearmg , had no reason - ; 1 1pate the1 - - . Oing danger. He proceeded to cross the track ad,
all of a sudden, his jeepney was rai:fuite y raiii' eing operated by the petitioners. Even then, the
circumstances before the collision ne@'te' the ilni?µtation of contributory negligence on the part of the
respondents. What clearly appears is that the accident would not have happend had the petitioners installed
reliable and adequate safety devices along the crossing to ensure the safety of all t,hose who may utilize the
same (Philippine National Railways Corporation vs. Vizcara, supra). .
184. L, lessor, sent a ritten notice to R, lessee, demanding the return of the leased commercial space. R later
. filed a case of foi;-cible entry against L. While the case was pending, SBS Bank purchased the subject
property from L and demolished the tiuilding. Thus, R also impleaded SBS Bank to the case and the latter
was eventually ordered to pay nominal damages. Is the award of nominal damages forcible entry for
proper? · ·
No. Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages may be awarded to a -plaintiff whose right has been
violated or invaded by the defendant , for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying
th plaintiff for any loss suffered. Nominal damages are not for indemnification ofloss suffered but for the vindkation
or recognition of a right violated or invaded. SBS Bank, as a mere purcha er or transferee of the subject property, did
not violate R's right. This is notwithstanding the fact that the sale between SBS Bank and L took place while the
forcible entry case was still pending. L, in this case, was still the registered owner who may _transfer his title at -any
time (0.ne Network Rural Bank , Inc. v. Barie, G. R. No. 193684, M arch 5, 2014; Del Castillo,].). ·
- 185. . P constructed a fence which . lies adj.acent to R's building. R opposes the construction contending that it
wo'1ld .destroy the walls of their shop. To fish evidence against P, R installed on th_eir building two
stationary video surveillance cameras directly focusing on petitioners' property and took pictures of the

on-going construction. P moved for the removal of the cameras, invoking their right to privacy under Art.
26(1) of the Civil Code. Does Art. 26(1) of the Civil Code cover business offices where the public are
excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter?
Yes. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another 's residence," under Art. 26(1) covers places, locations, or even
situations which an inqividual considers as private . The reasonableness of a person 's expectation of privacy depends
on ·a two-part test , to wit: (1) whether , by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy ; and (2)
this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. By constructing a fence around his property , P have
reasonable expectation of privacy in his business office (Sps. Hing v.· Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013; Del
Castillo,].).
186. A. B and C, as co-owners of a parcel of land, executed in favor of D and E a SPA authorizing them to obtain
a lo_ using their properties as collateral. D and E did procure a loan but they later learned that the SPA
was terminated a day before the loan's approval. They assailed the revocation. The SC decided that the
revocation of agency was indeed made in bad faith However, it omitted the award of exemplary damages
in favor of D and E. Will the revocation of agency made in bad faith entitle the agents to a claim of
exemplary damages?
No. Art. 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed "by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate , liquidated or compensatory damages." They are, however,
not recoverable as a matter of right. They are awarded only ifthe guilty party acted in .a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner (Ching v. Ba G . 177086, December 5, 2012; Del Castillo,].).
187. V was convicted of murde . t#, additi . ,,, ies, s ordered to pay the heirs of the
I
deceased for loss of earnings.:,of the victii:fL .The ba:_sjstof 'the a ard to'the heirs was the tesitmony of the
widow who did not present prdpf tla:t,'1e, clc,ee<lw,as, eg b}'ow the prescribed minimun wage. Is
the award proper? -, · ·· · .., · ,,,. ·· ,,. ' ... · ' " ·. f
-./ r· -_(_:,
No . Damage·s for loss of earning cap icy a1'·b('. rtyar o in tances : 1) the victim was self-employed and
receiving less than the minimum \V'age u\idh 1the:k d"11 ·documentary evidence is available in the
decedent's line of business; and, 2)'th;deJ,ease<J was a y.wage worker and receiving less than the
minimum wage. Actual ·damages, tit e rect ' . .. b 'J.apable of proof , but must actually be proved
with a reasonable degree of certa:_n 1;'71 C 'si lY,;relJ. tJ .1l''speculaton, conjcture or esswork in
determining the fact and amount of '· { ,,ge '(, / GS J Gt . q/ 2:_()2708, Aprzl 13, 2015, De! Castillo,].). .
,_,,,, p ( , 'fl-7
188. Must a caus.al connection exist be , :,lf ht rec,,t 1ve/ 4:the violation of the traffic regulation for
the legal presumption of negligend t(-' · 4,,,. A. '1.
'C,"' "
' ,#! dJ
Yes. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code,, fE. e . J·presiH tp''fuii" of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap , a
person was violating any traffic regulation. Ho 6er, , t'usal connect ion must exist between the injury received
and the violation of the traffic regulation . It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or
- in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence , is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause
of the injury. Negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in
establishing liability for damages. The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the
logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny
relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions
in law, while convenient , are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact (Tison vs Sps. Pomasn, G.R. No.
173180, August 24, 2011; Covered Case).

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,-·

LAYOUT AND CONTENT EDITORS

SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW ADMINISTRATION

· 2018 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS CORE GROUP

Assistant Subject Chair LORETO PLACIDO RUDOV E. BERNARDEZ

Electronic Data Processing RONIFELLE L. BARRIOS

TH I S I S TH E I NT E LL E CTUAL PROPE RTY OF TH E

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS I

2018 SAN,BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 11

2 ,I 2018 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

9. The day aft:e.r J and M got marn.e d}.. he .

4 I 2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

. ,:.-·.-_-.. ·;·;rr :--·.

2018 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I5

Legitimacy, Paternity and Filiation

Rules a$ to signature in prj,y t hand owledgg filiation:

6 I 2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

25. Establishing Illegitimate Filiation.

26. Rights of Illegitimate Children

Under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children:

2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

8 I 201 8 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

Distinctions b_etween Domestic Adoption and Inter-Country Adoption in the Philippines

a. Any Filipino citizen; An alien or Filipino citizen permanently residing

Filipino Citizen a. At least 27 years of age and at least 16 years older

Alien ·" . ;.. JicC.f tlit , JUnselor in his/her country; .

2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I9

Grounds for rescission of adoption

a. Parental authority of the a1\tee 'f-biologicaL owQior

The following are obliged to support each other:

Special Parental Authority

Special parental authority is exercised by:

10 I 2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

Liability for damages

Grounds for the suspension and deprivation of parental authority

34. Emelit Basilio Gan was born iri\. -- "'6,

2018 SAN BEDA ENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 11

There are three (3) stages of absence. They are:

35. What is the docrine of processual presumptiqn? .

This involvs the approprition of ge,. " . )J !te

d. Theory of Justice (Caver's Principles of Preference)

e. Harmony of Laws Theory

12 I 201 8 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

39. What is meant by "renvoi"? Is it the same as the_ thery of "transmission"?

. <)' , r#f . t1b

2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS j 13

a. Mario has a better right ov·• 2 4" .,

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16 I 2018 .SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

·,· -,\·· ': ·"·....,....,",..:, .,,..Don -!

20 i8 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 17

Nature and Effects of Obligations ·

Pure and Conditional Obligations

d. If the debtor promises to eay i£ his S<>nJ

Obligations with a period

Obligations with a Penal Clause

20 I 2018 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

2018 SAN SEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS I 21

22 I 2018 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

\· .I: s , f. ih,T.F.fu '· ·

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24 I 201_8 SAN BEDA CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS