THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

LIBRARY

GIFT
FROM: August E. Schanzc

Col Ret

Call Number ?ftV

F L Form 887 (Rev) 22 Oct 52

TJSACGSC—P9-0798—T—25M—30 Sep 68
EIGHTH U . S . ARMY

IN

JAPAN

30 Auqust, 1945 — I May, 1946

•XT.

EIGHTH U. S. ARMY
IN

JAPAN

30 AUGUST 194)5 — 1 MAY 1946

Printed by Eighth U. 8. Army Printing Plant

(Boonjudo Printing Works)
19 4 6
Douglas Mac Arthur

General of the Army

Robert L. Eichelberger

Lieutenant General

Commanding General

Eighth United States Army

No Army of this war has achieved

greater glory and distinction
than the Eighth/'- ­

/
 0 * "* rTn
:>0 AUGUST 1045 — 1 MAY 1946

, only eight months after the cessation of hostilities, American occupation personnel
may travel throughout Japan casually and unarmed, mingling with a bustling, cooperative
Japanese populace that almost universally shows great respect for, but little fear of or resent­
ment toward, the American conquerors. This fact is a profound tribute to the American
soldier in Japan ; to army organization, planning, leadership, discipline, and esprit de corps.
Secretary of War Patterson crystalized the thought when, speaking of Lt. General Robert
L. Eichelberger's Eighth Army, he said, " . . . the most striking impression of all, is the im­
pression made by the troops. Everywhere their conduct is exemplary. . . they are the best
representatives the American nation could have... It is an Army capable of carrying out the
difficult duties of occupation, an Army the American nation is proud of."
Last summer General Douglas MacArthur had chosen the Eighth Army to make the
main thrust at Japan. He had assigned ib the leading role in Operation Coronet. Sixth
Army was to set up the play with Operation Olympic which was to secure airbases on Kyushu
late in October. Then early in 1946 the Eighth with three corps and ten divisions was to
apply the crusher with an assault on Tokyo Plain—the heart of Japan.
Abruptly the schedule was changed. On 6 August the atomic bomb was dropped on
Hiroshima. Two days later Russia plunged into the war as she catapulted her army deep
into Manchuria. By 10 August the Japanese had had enough—it was announced publicly that
the Japanese government would sue for peace. Eighth Army was given the mission of taking
over Northern Honshu and Hokkaido. Here was the opportunity for the Eighth to show
what it could do. The team was in fine shape—ready for action. As far back as June,
General Eichelberger had directed his staff to begin planning for the eventuality which
suddenly had become a fact. Weeks of tentative planning now must be completed in detail
and implemented in a matter of days. On the following afternoon, 11 August, the Amphi­
bious Eighth presented a plan to the corps commanders which alerted them for quick action.
On the same day, the crack 11th Airborne Division was alerted and directed to move
immediately by air from Lu;:on to Okinawa. In four short days the division completed the
800-mile move.
By 18 August two possible specific invasion plans were ready for submission to the
Commanding Generals of XI and XIV Corps. One called for a strong amphibious landing
in the Tokyo-Yokohama area by X I Corps composed of the veteran 1st Cavalry, Americal,
and 43rd Divisions and the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team; the other, for an
airborne operation involving the 11th Airborne and the 27th Divisions flying to the Tokyo area,
followed by X I Corps amphibious landings on the shores of Tokyo Bay.
After two days of Tokyo via Berne to Washington negotiations, the Japanese capitulated
on 15 August. An advance echelon of the Eighth Army staff was flown to Okinawa to be
prepared for any eventuality. They arrived on 19 August. Following conferences in Manila
between Japanese emissaries and members of General Mar-Arthur's staff, the concept of the
operation was changed entirely. The new plans were predicated upon the full cooperation of
the Japanese. The enemy forces would be disarmed under their own supervision and the
Allied occupation would be a progressive one following demobilization in specified areas. In
contrast to the original concept, the new plan was designed to avoid possible incidents which
might result in renewed conflict. !N"o seizures of disarmaments were to be accomplished by
Allied personnel
A small reconnaissance party including Colonel Dunne, the Eighth Army Engineer,
landed at Atsugi Airfield, 20 miles southwest of Tokyo, on the morning of 28 August. The
primary mission of this intrepid group was to determine the condition of the airfield and
establish operational facilities.
At daybreak on 80 August, having spanned more than 800 miles of ocean, the first
wary paratroopers of the 11th Airborne Division deplaned at Atsugi Airfield to initiate an
operation which, in its own way, was one of the greatest military gambles of all time. This
small group of daring men were landing in a hostile country where they were outnumbered
in a ratio of thousands to one by over 4,000.000 men still under arms in Japan. In view
of the doubtful temper of these Japanese troops, General Eichelberger flew in early on the
first day to assume command on the spot and to check preparations for the arrival of the
Supreme Commander. A short time after General Eichelberger had landed, General Mac-
Arthur arrived in his C-54, " Bataan." The atmosphere was electric with history in the
making as General Mae Arthur and General Eichelberger stepped into an automobile to speed
to the new Headquarters in Yokohama. The road from Atsugi to Yokohama was lined on
both sides with armed Japanese soldiers many with their backs to the passing convoy—a
mark of respect reserved previously for the Imperial family. The Japanese government had
placed a cordon of troops around the airfield and along the road with the specific mission of
furnishing complete security for the invading forces. Everywhere women and children shyly
ran into hiding, but the men and boys saluted and bowed at the approach of the paratroopers.
There was no sign of disturbance or Japanese resistance. The reception seemed like a
chimerical fantasy to the combat-hardened men. Throughout that first day, huge transports
landed at Atsugi Airfield at the rate of almost one every three minutes. By the end of the
day, 4,200 troops in 12o j)lanes had completed the move.
Shortly after the first planes had landed, a patrol from the 188th Paraglider Infantry
sped from Atsugi to the Y'okosuka Naval Base to make contact with the 4th Marine Regi­
mental Cambat Team, which had come under Eighth Army control that morning upon land­
ing amphibiously on. the shores of Tokyo Bay.
After being delayed by a typhoon, during the next week the 1st Cavalry Division, the
112th Cavalry Combat Team, and the XI Corps Headquarters arrived in Tokyo Bay. The
Americal Division arrived in Yokohama on 8 September. Occupation of Tokyo had been
delayed several days to allow the Japanese to disarm their troops within the city. But now
as the Americal was debarking in Yokohama the 1st Cavalry moved into Tokyo. The American
Flag that flew over the Capitol in Washington on the day of Pearl Harbor was carried to
the American Embassy in Tokyo and there in an impressive ceremony General Ma< Arthur
said, " General Eichelberger, have our country's flag unfurled and in the Tokyo sun let it
wave in its full glory as a symbol of hope for the oppressed and as a harbinger of victory
for the right."
In the next five weeks XIV Corps, IX Corps, the 27th, 43d, 97th, 81st; 77th Divisions
and 158th Regimental Combat Team took up occupation posts in Japan. Through it all
General Eichelberger toured his units impressing upon the troops the paramount importance
of dress, conduct, discipline, and military courtesy—instilling them with the thought that
they were the representatives of the United States of America.
The Eighth Army had accomplished its initial mission—to bring troops into Japan and
occupy strategic area—but that was not by any means the whole job. While the advance
echelon was still on Okinawa, "• mercy teams " were organized to expedite and speed the re­
lease of the thousands of suffering Allied prisoners in Japanese stockades. These teams were
rushed into Yokohama on 30 August with the advance airborne echelon of Eighth Army
Headquarters. They quickly established contact with the Swiss and Swedish legation, the Inter­
national Red Cross, the United States Navy, and the Japanese Liaison Office. The evacuation
machine was primed and put into motion. As a result United States planes were swooping
over Japanese prison camps the very same day to drop food and supplies. Some of the teams
rushed into the interior to seize camp records for later use in the War Crimes trials, lest
they be destroyed by recalcitrant camp commanders. In view of the fact that the advance
elements of the Sixth Army did not arrive in Japan until 6 w-eeks later these teams covered
all of Japan to alleviate the suffering of the emaciated prisoners. Allied prisoners were be­
ing released and processed for evacuation at the rate of 1,000 per day. In the liberation of
all prisoners in camps in Honshu, Hokkaido, and Shikoku in only 18 days, Eighth Army was
weeks ahead of the most optimistic pre-occupation time estimates for the enterprise. In all,.
Eighth Army recovered and evacuated 23,985 persons.
The primary Eighth Army mission in Japan was to insure "' that Japan conrply with
the terms agreed on in the instrument of surrender and contained in all directives issued to-
the Japanese by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. "
By order of the Supreme Commander, the Japanese General Staff was abolished soon
after our arrival and in a month and one half almost all of the 4,000,000 men of the Japanese
Army and Navy who had been stationed in Japan were demobilized. G-2 reports repeated
 the message, "No disorders, no opposition, cooperation continues," with almost dull uniformity
while the people of the world looked on amazed as they witnessed the most rapid and fric­
tionless demobilization of all time.
The orders of General MacArthur followed rapidly. War criminals, including Tojo,
were taken into custody. The treacherous Black Dragon Society and secret police were dis­
solved. Political prisoners were released. Woman's suffrage was promulgated. A free press
was established. The educational system was revised. All legislation controlling freedom of
speech, press, and religion was abrogated.
As remarkable as was the success of the demobilization and disarmament of the Japa­
nese armed forces, the task would have been incomplete unless accompanied by an equally
exhaustive program designed to dispose of Japanese arms and other war material. The burden
of the task was placed on the Japanese—they were ordered to collect all the impedimenta
of war and assemble them at such jdaces as directed by local commanders. Eighth Army
troops accepted the material and then searched the area thoroughly to insure that all equip­
ment had been surrendered and that all stationary military installations had been rendered in­
operative. All Japanese ammunition, bulk explosives, and other loaded equipment found were
destroyed, except for material retained for technical intelligence or other specified purposes.
This was accomplished by dumping at sea, controlled detonation, or burning. To date 683,000
long tons of ammunition have been disposed of.
Eighth Army Military Government swung into action to achieve one of the principal
objectives of the occupation—to supervise the execution of the directives of the Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers. This involved the shifting of a whole country from totali­
tarian feudalism to representative democracy. With Military Government units at key points
throughout all Japan, Eighth Army has been able to keep its hand on the pulse of the country.
The sudden early end of the war found most of the personnel trained specifically for governing
Japan still in the United States. The efficient and economical use of the personnel available
and their ability to attain an unusual degree of cooperation from the Japanese served to over­
come this handicap at the beginning. The rapid flow of trained personnel from the States
made possible a complete and efficient organization of Military Government by the third month
of the occupation. The Eighth Army policy hay been based on the fact that the Japanese
people are responsible for their own condition and that they must work out their own salvation
in rebuilding their economy and achieving self government. This was not a passive attitude.
Manufacturing, industry, agriculture, mining, fishing, commerce and trade, and other phases of
the economic life of the people have been studied and analyzed ; action was supervised and
expedited with the end in view of making the people self-sufficient as rapidly as possible. Health
standards have been raised considerably to prevent the spread of epidemics. Public welfare,
rationing systems, and price control have been made more efficient. It might be simple to tell
the Japanese what to do and force them to do it, but self-government and economic self-sufficiency
must be developed by the people themselves. Therefore, Military Government has placed the
responsibility for reform on the Japanese, while making certain that obstacles to the achieve­
ment are removed and that both the spirit and the letter of the directives are carried out
in full.
By the 18th of December the Eighth Army military tribunals had begun the arduous
task of bringing suspected Japanese war criminals to justice. Already four military commis­
sions have tried approximately 25 cases involving about 50 suspected war criminals. Before
the trials are complete it is expected that over 500 suspected war criminals will have been
tried in Eighth Army Courts. Penalties given by the courts have been severe, but both the
Japanese and world press have attested to the fairness and justice with which the trials have
been conducted.
Between six and seven million displaced persons of Asiatic origin had to be either
brought back to Japan or sent to other countries. The responsibility for repatriation was
placed on the Japanese Government, but Eighth Army must completely supervise the process.
Repatriaton began in October 1945 and is at present in full swing. In the eight pores where
repatriates are processed under the supervision of Eighth Army personnel, there is a flow of
approximately 11,000 repatriates out of Japan and 80,000 into the country each week. There
are still 600,000 foreign nationals in Japan to be repatriated. 3,800,000 Japanese await return
to their homeland.
On 31 December, with the inactivation of Six Army imminent, Eighth Army took over
all the ground forces in the homeland of Japan with her 70,000,000 population.
In order to keep up this hectic pace, Eighth Army has had to maintain military
efficiency and morale at a high level. If the effectiveness of the troops degenerated, little
could be accomplished. Of prime importance was the redeployment program. The 4od
Division, after scarcely three weeks in Japan, had already transferred out all their low-point
personnel, had received 5,000 high point men from the 1st Cavalry Division as well as men
from other units and were boarding ships for the United States. Plans for demobilization of
large numbers of men required an organization which would process the returning veterans
quickly, efficiently, and correctly. The 4th Replacement Depot was assigned the task. The
Depot performed its mission commendably. As an example of efficient redeployment, the last
elements of the 27th Division arrived in Japan on the 14th of September. By the 21st of
the month, one week later, the first readjustees Were moved to the replacement depot. By
November the depot was handling 25,000 men per month. To date 380,000 men have passed
through the depot on their way home.
Because of the large turnover it was increasingly important to classify, screen, and give
specialist instruction to all new arrivals from the United States. " On-the-job" training,
surveys of skills, and care in assigning men of inactivated units kept working units in action.
With this rapid redeployment of troops, the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces,
under Lieutenant General Northcott, lent an air of true international cooperation as they took up
posts in Southern Japan with one British Indian Division and two independent brigades—one from
Australia and one from New Zealand. These forces were placed under the operational control
of the Eighth Army.
Surmounting numerous obstacles, by January the Army Education Program of Eighth
Army was functioning smoothly with 73 schools in action; a total enrollment of close to 15,000
students were attending 207 different courses. Colonel Spauldiug, Chief of War Department
Information and Education Division, after a two week tour of Eighth Army schools wrote. "I
returned to Washington with the feeling that you have given the educational program a kind
of drive and direction from headquarters level which it has needed and judging from the results
which have already been apparent, will go a long way toward assuring its success,"
To augment the schools and training program throughout Eighth Army an extensive
athletic and recreation program was organized. Among the more spectacular events were the
Thanksgiving Day Rocleo and the New Year's Day football championship game, each of which
drew over 50,000 soldier fans from all over the Eighth Army area. Recreation hotels, where
the men spend " a week in heaven," were opened. Post Exchanges were organized te purchase sou­
venirs at fair cost and make them available to the men at reasonable prices.
The Eighth Army recruiting program was begun early in October, when plans were
made for recruiting approximately 20 per cent of the command into the Regular Army.
Recruiting officers were appointed, spot announcements telling of the advantages of the Regular
Army career were made on radio station WVTR, posters were displayed, booklets were dis­
tributed, "Stars and Stripes" joined the campaign. To date 21,800 men in the Eighth Army
have enlisted.

C-iafttft cr+rmij <=>np»lu /Utc-Dleni in Japan

Organization for Occupation.

Prior to the capitulation of Japan the Sixth Army had been designated to carry out
the Olympic Operation on the island of Kyushu and the Eighth Army to carry out the
Coronet Operation in the Tokyo area of Honshu. To carry out service command functions
for these two operations, ASCOM O had been activated for Sixth Army and USASCOM
C for Eighth Army. With the capitulation of Japan these two armies and their service
command headquarters were designated to perform the occupation, the Eighth Army being
assigned that portion of Honshu north of a line drawn roughly across Honshu just south of
Yokohama, and the island of Hokkaido, and the Sixth Army being assigned that portion of
Honshu south of this line and the islands of Kyushu and Shikoku. In collaboration with
their assigned corps and divisions, hasty plans were formulated in the Philippine Islands to
to curry out the occupation as prescribed in the Downfall Plan.

Initial Movement to Japan.

To the Eighth Army was assigned the initial operation effort, beginning with airborne
movements to Atsugi Airfield near Tokyo. The 11th Airborne and 27th Infantry Divisions
were flown in from Okinawa, carrying with them 10 D/S of Classes I, II, I I I and IV, and
and two units of fire, Class 5. The waterborne movements, which followed immediately^
carried with them 30 D/S of Classes I, II and IV less Engineer construction materials, 15
D/S of Class I I I and IIIA, 3 U/F for combat troops and 1 U/F for service troops. The
follow-up supply for the airborne elements was effected by flying in 1-1/3 D/S each day,
starting on D/7, and continuing until the waterborne supplies became available. Because of
the peaceful reception of the occupying forces no supply problems developed and none of the
planned emergency airdrops was required.

External Supply Plan.

At the time that the occupation began supplies were enroute from the Zone of the
Interior to the Philippine Islands to equip the divisions which were to be mounted out from
the planned Olympic Operation. These ships were loaded with equipment and supplies
for combat operations and, because they were to be discharged in the Philippine Islands and
there issued to divisions, there was no particular cargo plan carried out when they were loaded
from the Zone of the Interior. Because of the short time element, the follow-up supplies for
the occupation necessarily had to come from these already loaded ships which were in or en-
route to the Philippines and from supplies on hand in Philippine bases. A hurried resupply
shipping plan was arrived at which provided the requirements of the occupation forces but at
the same time made necessary the shipment to and discharge in the occupation area of thou­
sands of tons of equipment and supplies which were not required. Also because of the short
time element, the normal 120 days' order and shipping time could not be met for later
resupply and the decision was made to accomplish resupply until 1 January 1946 by ordering
from the Zone of the Interior standard loaded type ships Vhich had been planned for the
Olympic Operation. It was also decided that AFWESPAC would be responsible for
automatic resupply of the occupation area until 1 March 1946, placing requisitions on the
Zone of the Interior to cover that period between 1 January and 1 March 1946. Effective
with the supplies to start arriving on 1 March 1946 the occupation armies were made
responsible for placing requisitions, first through AFWESPAC in order to utilize Pacific
Theater excesses, and, effective 1 May 1946, direct on San Francisco Port of Embarkation*

Internal Supply Plan.

To support its zone of responsibility Eighth Army established Yokohama as its chief
supply base and, in view of the efficiency of the Japanese railway system, required only a
small subsidiary base at Otaru on the island of Hokkaido j)lus division railheads to accomplish
its supply mission. The Sixth Army, however, established bases at Nagoya, Xure, Fukuoka,
and Sasebo. Later, on 1 March 1946, under Eighth Army, another base was established at Kobe
after that port was cleared of mines. In both instances the accompanying service command
headquarters were assigned the mission of the logistical support of the occupation forces.
After a peaceful occupation permitted and the rapid reduction of the occupation forces
demanded the consolidation of units and effort, a decision was made to inactivate Sixth Army
Headquarters and ASCOM O effective 1 January 1946, and to close out as many supply
bases as possible. The bases at Kure, Nagoya, Fukuoka, and Otaru were closed over a period
of time and at present only railheads exist at Sasebo, Fukuoka, and Otaru for the support
of units in their areas. The Army divisions also have division railheads but the main supply
bases are and will be at Yokohama and Kobe, from which points the railheds will be supplied.

Initial Occujmtion Activities.

1. Initial effort in each area was directed to opening the port facilities to permit
immediate resupply.
2. The return of released prisoners of war and other repatriates required special
attention to their medical cure, feeding, and clothing for their return trip.
3. The allocation of warehouses, office buildings, billets, and other facilities required
the establishment of a special allocations board to permit logical and planned assignment.
4. The major initial effort of the corps and divisions was directed to taking over,
collecting, storing, guarding, and disposing of captured enemy equipment and supplies. Items
of warfare have been destroyed, ammunition being dumped at sea by the Japanese under
Army supervision. Certain military items were collected for souvenirs for the troops or for
return to the United States as war memorials. All non-military and certain demilitarized
items of equipment and supply have been returned to the Japanese Government for civiliau
use.
5. The Japanese railway system was placed under military supervision and so organized
as to carry out all functions required by the occupation forces, but to disturb the require­
ments of the civilian economy as little as possible.
6. As soon as the essential items of resupply had been discharged, attention was con­
centrated on screening of cargo in harbor and enroute to avoid as far as possible discharging
cargo which would not be required. Ships were turned around without discharge, and selective
discharge and backloading were carried out wherever possible.

Later Major Activities.

1. Attention was given immediately to the acute problems of supply made evident by
the early approach of cold weather. Heating units, woolen clothing for all troops, and an
adequate supply of coal from Japanese sources required constant follow-up before adequate
amounts were on hand.
2. An intensive program was initiated, and is continuing, to accomplish the maximum
recovery of American and Allied remains and their interment in centralized mausoleums and
cemeteries.

8
 3. The rapid inactivation of divisions and other unit9 required by the demobilization
program added a tremendous load to the supply depots and was made possible only by adopting
a plan of storage on rail cars. By this plan units were permitted to load their equipment for
turn-in at the rate required to meet their inactivation dates and regardless of the rate at
which these cars could be unloaded by the receiving depots. From a peak of 12,000 loaded
rail cars this backlog has been decreased to a backlog of 6,000 as of 28 April 1946.
4. In order to facilitate this turn-in of equipment and to raise the standards of
packaging, both civilian packing and crating experts and military packing and crating teams
were secured from the Zone of the Interior. These experts and teams have worked with
both the units and the depots, and the turn-in program is now well under control.
5. With the establishment of the so-called " Disposition Level" of 80 June 1949 a
continuing program was initiated for the determination of excesses of supplies and equipment
in the occupation area. Until 1 May 1946 these excesses have been reported to AFWESPAC
but after 1 May 1946 they will be declared as surpluses direct to the Foreign Liquidation
Commission.
6. As directed by higher headquarters, the Eighth Army became entirely responsible
for the external logistic support of its own area and of United States-occupied Korea as of
15 April 1946. The necessary directives and methods of procedure have been prepared and
direct supply relationship with San Francisco Port of Embarkation has now been established.
7. Direct initial supply support was rendered the British Commonwealth Occupation
Forces upon their arrival at Kure, continuing until their own resupply permitted them to be
self sufficient. However, they will be provided indefinitely with Class III and IIIA supplies
from United States military sources. Their taking over of the southern end of Honshu and
of Shikoku is proceeding smoothly from a supply standpoint.
8. As a further consolidation of effort and personnel, Headquarters USASCOM C was
inactivated on 1 March 1946 and its major supply functions taken over by Headquarters Eighth
Army. A small headquarters, Yokohama Base, was established to supervise the port and certain
depot activities in the immediate Yokohama area. Similar limited functions are being carried
out by Headquarters, Kobe Base.
9. The import-export program, as directed by SCAP to further the Japanese civilian
economy, has necessarily involved military logistic plans in the demands made on port, railway,
and warehousing facilities. No difficulty is anticipated in carrying out this program and no
interference with military activities has been encountered to date.
10. The most recent major project requiring careful attention is the provision of
housing for the dependents of the occupation forces. Whereas this responsibility has been
given to the Japanese Government, a program of close supervision and follow-up has been
established to assure its successful accomplishment.
11. The War Department directive that directed formal property accountability be
initiated on 1 April 1946 required the preparation of appropriate instructions to all elements
of the occupation forces. This program was successfully established by the target date.

Major Statistics.
1. Engineer Construction.
a. Eight airfield runways completed or under construction, four asphalt and four
concrete, ranging from 5,000 to 8,000 feet in length, and from 2 9 ^ to 1 0 0 ^ complete.
b. All troops adequately housed except for some units now moving to new locations.
c. 21 bulk petroleum installations constructed or rehabilitated, all but one 1 0 0 ^
complete.
d. 13 hospitals operating adequate to excellent facilities with 7,800 beds established.
e. Housing units just commencing construction, with an anticipated requirement of
8,000 units.
f. Difficulties : Japanese shortages of basic materials, especially iron and coal, and
Japanese inexperience in producing certain items.
2. Railway activity to 28 April 1946.
a. 940,000 personnel were hauled an average of 100 miles per trip, representing
only 1/2 of 1% of the Japanese passenger traffic for the same period.
b. Two million tons of freight were hauled an average of 100 miles, representing
only b% of the Japanese freight traffic for the same period.
3. Port activities to 26 April 1946.
a. Tonnages received :

Yokohama - 946,562 L/T

Nagoya - 147,450 L/T

Kobe - 58,103 L/T

b. 55,886 L/T outloaded to the United States.

4" Jajjanese military items :

a. Ammunition destroyed to date—683,000 L/T

b. Animnuition remaining—172,000 L/T
c. 4,600 airplanes destroyed.
5. Long tons of excesses remaining as of 15 April:

225

cws -
Engr - 10,100
Med 1,175
Ord 54,400
QM 3,800
Sig 7,500
Others — 0
Total - 78,200
6. Civilian food import program.

~. - in
 a. Under Army control as emergency reserve—94,500 L/T.
b. Total tonnage being imported or turned over to Japanese—845,400 L/T.
7. Graves Registration activity.
a. Approximately 3345 remains have been recovered.
b. 1017 graves now in Yokohama Cemetery.
c. 2315 cremated remains in USAF Mausoleum, of which 202 are American and
balance Allied nationals.
Much has been accomplished in the past eight months. The Japanese people have recently
experieneced their first free election An amazing 72 per cent of those eligible exercised their
franchise. They displayed astute judgment in choosing a middle of the road policy—rejecting
both the arch-conservatives and the extreme leftists. But the greatest lesson taught here in
Japan was conveyed through the demeanor, discipline, and conduct of our troops as summed
up by the Supreme Commander:
"I wish to pay tribute to magnificent conduct of the troops. With few exceptions, they
could well be taken as a model for all time as a conquering Army. Historians in later years,
when passions cool, can arraign their conduct."
"They could as easily—and understandably—have emulated the ruthlessness which their
enemy freely practiced when conditions were reversed—but their perfect balance between their
implacable firmness of duty on the one hand and resolute restraint from cruelness and brutality
on the other, hay taught a lesson to the Japanese civil population that is startling in its impact."
"Nothing has so tended to impress Japanese thought—not even the catastrojjhic fact of
military defeat itself. They have for the first time seen the free man's way of life in actual
action and it has stunned them to new thoughts and new ideas."

— n

 INIT4AL LOCATION
OF MAJOR COMBAT
UNITS IN EIGHTH
NORTH P A C I F I C O \C E A Ni
ARMY OCCUPATION
 LOCATION OF

NORTH P A C I F I C 0 \C E A N EIGHTH ARMY

MAJOR COMBAT UNTO
PROPOSED LOCATION
EIGHTH ARMY
MAJOR COMBAT ,
 DATE DUE (DA Pam 28-30}

DA FORM 1 8 8 1 , 1 JAN 5 7 * G P O : IMOOF—5S0I46

 COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY

VENWQRTH

3 1695 00273 5637

U. S. Army, Eighth
Army,
^ Eighth U. S. Army in
TITLE Japan, JO August
U56e 1 Hay I9k6.
DATE BORROWER'S NAME

9lf0

U56e
U. S. Array. Eighth Array.
Eighth U. S. Array in Japan, 30
August 1945-1 May 1946,

BOOKBINDIN
EIGHTH U. S. AEMY PE

iii (BOONJUDO PEINTi:

ijj