Industrial HSE

Safety
Management
in Small and
Medium Sized
Enterprises (SMEs)
The Interface of Safety and
Security
Series Editor
George Boustras
Director
Centre of Excellence in Risk and Decision Science (CERIDES),
European University Cyprus
Safety Management in Small and Medium Sized

Enterprises (SMEs),
George Boustras and Frank W. Guldenmund
Safety
Management
in Small and
Medium Sized
Enterprises (SMEs)
Edited by
George Boustras and
Frank W. Guldenmund
CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Boustras, George, editor. | Guldenmund, Frank W., editor.

Title: Safety management in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) /
edited by George Boustras and Frank W. Guldenmund.
Description: Boca Raton : CRC Press, [2018] | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017014978| ISBN 9781498744720 (hardback : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9781315151847 (ebook)
Subjects: | MESH: Safety Management | Small Business | Organizational Culture
Classification: LCC R859.7.S43 | NLM WA 485 | DDC 610.28/9--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017014978
Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at

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To Andriana for always being there for me, day and night.
My life would not have been the same without her dedication,
love and support. To Sofia-Diana and Filippos-Zenon because
they make my life beautiful. And to all good and bad times in
the past that have made my character. I am happy. I am lucky.
George Boustras
To Valérie and our own small and
sweet enterprise of life.
Frank W. Guldenmund
Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Editors xi
Contributors xiii
C h a p t e r 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
G E O RG E B O U S T RA S A N D F RA N K W. G U LD EN M U N D
C h a p t e r 2 R i s k A s s e s s m e n t : G e t t i n g the ‘B i g P i c t u r e ’ 5
M AT I LD E A. RO D RI G U ES, P ED RO A REZ ES
A N D C ELI NA P I N TO LE ÃO
C h a p t e r 3 S a f e t y M a n a g e m e n t 29
G E O RG E B O U S T RA S, AT H A NA S I O S
H A D J I M A N O LI S A N D C LE O VA RI A N O U - M I KELLI D O U
C h a p t e r 4 S a f e t y P e r f o r m a n c e i n a n SME
E n v i r o n m e n t 55
A N CA M U T U, F RA N K W. G U LD EN M U N D A N D
P I ET ER VA N G ELD ER
C h a p t e r 5 S a f e t y C l i m at e o f S m a l l - t o -M e d i u m
E n t e r p r i s e s 93
S T EP H A N I E C. PAY N E, M I N DY E. B ERG M A N,
NAT H A NA EL L. KEI S ER A N D X I AO H O N G X U
vii
viii Contents
C h a p t e r 6 C o m p e t e n c e s f o r a C u lt u r e
o f P r e v e n t i o n : C o n d i t i o n s f o r L e a r n i n g
a n d C h a n g e i n SME s 121
U LRI KE B O LL M A N N
C h a p t e r 7 M i c r o -SME s : A S p e c i a l C a s e 143
AT H A NA S I O S H A D J I M A N O LI S A N D G E O RG E
B O U S T RA S
C h a p t e r 8 M o n i t o r i n g a n d M o d i f y i n g a S a f e t y
M a n a g e m e n t S ys t e m 167
F RA N K W. G U LD EN M U N D A N D M ERLI J N M I KKERS
C h a p t e r 9 R i s k C o m m u n i c at i o n in SME s 197
N I C H O LA S PA RI S A N D JA N G U T T ELI N G
I n d e x 213
Acknowledgements
The making of this book has been a true labour of love and friendship.
First, George and Frank thank all contributing authors for their hard
work, their flexibility and their patience. It has been quite a long pro-
cess but we think it was really worth it.
Second, Frank thanks George for his great humour and patience.
When we both started this enterprise, the deadline seemed so far
away. But suddenly it isn’t. Nevertheless, we always strived to keep our
standards high, for us and for our authors. And we definitely think we
succeeded.
ix
Editors
George Boustras has a PhD in probabilistic fire risk assessment from

CFES at Kingston University London, London, United Kingdom. He
was appointed as honorary research fellow at CPSE at Imperial College
London, and he was KTP research fellow at FSEG at the University of
Greenwich. He is currently an associate professor at European University
Cyprus (EUC) and dean of the Ioannis Gregoriou School of Business
Administration. Dr. Boustras is the director of the Center for Risk,
Safety and the Environment (CERISE) of the EUC. He is representa-
tive of the Republic of Cyprus in the Socio-Economic Committee of
the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). He sits at the Management
Committee of Secure Societies – Protecting Freedom and Security of
Europe and its citizens of ‘HORIZON 2020’. He was recently appointed
by the President of the Republic in the Energy Strategy Council of the
Republic of Cyprus. He is associate editor of Safety Science (Elsevier) and
member of the editorial board of Fire Technology (Springer).
Frank W. Guldenmund studied psychology at Leiden University,

Leiden, the Netherlands and majored (with distinction) in both cognitive
psychology and methods and statistics. In February 1992, he joined
the Safety Science Group at Delft University of Technology (DUT)
primarily as a methodologist but later became a full staff member, join-
ing in the research and educational tasks of the Group. His research
xi
xii Editors
gradually became focused on modelling and assessing (the quality

of ) safety management systems. Within this context, his interest was
raised in the topic of safety culture, which he has been pondering since
the mid-1990s. In January 2010, he defended (with distinction) his
PhD thesis ‘Understanding and exploring safety culture’ at DUT. He
has been providing training and presentations on safety culture both
nationally and internationally for many years. In this capacity, he oper-
ates as trainer for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
their safety culture self-assessment programme.
Currently, he is on the board of the Dutch Society for Safety
Professionals (NVVK) and, in this capacity, responsible for embedding
(more) science into the work of safety professionals. He is editor of the
Society’s journal as well as associate editor of Safety Science.
Contributors
Pedro Arezes Frank W. Guldenmund

Department of Production and Safety Science & Security Group
Systems Delft University of Technology
University of Minho Delft, the Netherlands
Guimarães, Portugal
Mindy E. Bergman Jan Gutteling
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology of
Texas A&M University Conflict, Risk, and Safety
College Station, Texas University of Twente
Enschede, the Netherlands
Ulrike Bollmann
Staff Section International
Cooperation Athanasios Hadjimanolis
Institute for Work and Health Centre for Risk, Safety and the
(IAG) of the German Social Environment
Accident Insurance (DGUV) European University Cyprus
Dresden, Germany Egkomi, Cyprus
George Boustras
Centre for Risk, Safety and the Nathanael L. Keiser
Environment Department of Psychology
European University Cyprus Texas A&M University
Egkomi, Cyprus College Station, Texas
xiii
xiv Contributors
Celina Pinto Leão Matilde A. Rodrigues

Department of Production and School of Health
Systems Department of Environmental
University of Minho Health
Guimarães, Portugal Polytechnic Institute of Porto
Porto, Portugal
Merlijn Mikkers
Safety Science & Security Group
Delft University of Technology Pieter Van Gelder
Delft, the Netherlands Safety Science & Security Group
Delft University of Technology
Anca Mutu
Delft, the Netherlands
Safety Science & Security Group
Delft University of Technology
Delft, the Netherlands
Cleo Varianou-Mikellidou
Nicholas Paris Centre for Risk, Safety and the
Centre for Risk, Safety and the Environment
Environment European University Cyprus
European University Cyprus Egkomi, Cyprus
Egkomi, Cyprus
Stephanie C. Payne Xiaohong Xu

Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Texas A&M University Old Dominion University
College Station, Texas Norfolk, Virginia
1
Introduction
GEORGE BOUSTRAS
A N D F R A N K W. G U L D E N M U N D
This book aims to be the first practical guide for any small and medium
sized enterprise (SME) owner or manager to establishing a safe and
healthy work environment – indeed, an ‘owner’s manual’. At the same
time, the book is written mostly by academics, because the intent is
to provide a solid scientific basis to this aim. By including a number
of case studies and case examples we try to be of practical use to the
owner and/or manager.
Understandably, this has been a challenging job to coordinate, as
a number of people with different backgrounds and from different
countries have contributed to the book. It has taken longer than we
had initially anticipated, but we hope that the end result will be worth
the wait.
Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) is an important notion
which can function as a particular line of defence for both employees
and employers. OSH is based on a number of directives and pieces of
legislation that are partly grounded in studies and documents released
by the International Labour Organization (ILO). Different countries,
different legal systems and different cultures may differ in parts of
the legislation but all the general concepts are present. The editors
and contributors of this book try to present these core issues, taking
especially the legislation of the European Union (EU) as well as the
United States into account.
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth, both practical as well as theo-
retical introduction to risk assessment. Risk assessment is the main
(and sometimes the only) tool in the hands of the owner/manager
in order to identify the risk profile of his/her organization. Risk, by
default, possesses a degree of uncertainty and is defined by a number
1
2 SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN SMEs
of parameters that are not always easy to derive. A number of guides

on and examples of risk assessment(s) exist in the literature and on
the Internet, but it is important to realize that only a tailor-made risk
assessment that takes into account the local and organizational cul-
ture and other particularities will produce a good reference, which in
turn will lead to the provision of robust and effective risk management
options (RMOs).
Chapter 3 presents a framework for the management of OSH in
the workplace. A basic introduction to legislation is followed by prac-
tical examples as well as a theoretical context for how to make the nec-
essary arrangements for a safety management system. Emphasis is put
on the importance of the human element in this process. Participation
of employees in the safety decision-making process through the estab-
lishment of appropriate committees is a key notion in this chapter. The
commitment of management as expressed through the development
and adoption of a sound safety policy is the second important element.
Chapter 4 discusses the most important OSH standards applicable
to SMEs. SMEs need to comply with pertinent EU legislation and
small companies are often not aware of these. This chapter offers an
insight into this extensive and rather complex world. Furthermore, it
provides a clear overview of the practice of auditing, which is what
SMEs can do to see whether they actually comply to pertinent legisla-
tion. Audits identify strong as well as weak OHS areas and will offer
directions to improve the latter. SMEs can perhaps identify a few OSH
indicators themselves, which they can monitor to see whether their
OHS practices are up to standard. Chapter 4 provides clues for these.
Chapter 5 tackles the topic of safety climate. Safety climate refers to
the perception employees have of the overall priority of safety within
the organization. In essence, safety climate can provide another per-
formance indicator for safety; a relationship has been found between
measures for safety climate and, for instance, incidents and accidents.
Following a thorough theoretical discussion of the concept, also the
use and application of safety climate for SMEs is explained in this
chapter. A short safety climate questionnaire is provided in the c hapter
(Table 5.1).
Chapter 6 discusses new perspectives on safety training. This c hapter
first describes the concept of a culture of prevention and c larifies the
term competence at both an individual and organizational level. It goes
Introduction 3
on to analyze the meaning of safety competence and health compe-

tence, and discusses possible competences for a culture of preven-
tion and the conditions for change and learning in SMEs in the
future.
Chapter 7 focuses on micro-firms, a special case of SMEs. In con-
trast to the abundance of information with regard to, for example,
risk assessment, safety performance and various other aspects of safety,
there is a gap in knowledge regarding smaller firms that employ less
than 10 employees. Understandably, distinct roles of employers and
employees in smaller firms can be difficult to identify and differenti-
ate. The role of the manager is that of a role model as well as that of a
co-worker in many occasions. This chapter focuses on the presentation
and discussion of organizational factors as well as governmental and
organizational safety policies that define OSH in micro-firms. The
chapter ends with a number of practical recommendations.
Chapter 8 is concerned with monitoring and the modification of
a SMS. It is divided into two parts. In the first part, the investigation
of incidents (or accidents) is discussed. As explained in Chapter 4,
audits already provide useful information about the SMS’s func-
tioning. However, unplanned events such as incidents or accidents
also provide information about the system’s performance, for exam-
ple whether some risks have been overlooked or underestimated.
In the second part of the chapter, the modification of the SMS is
addressed, in particular, the modification of (safe) behaviour using
BBS (behaviour-based safety) programmes. Results of these and
incident/accident investigations can be used to modify the SMS.
Chapter 9, the final chapter of this book, focuses upon an important,
yet, on many occasions, neglected area in OSH, namely safety com-
munication. Successful safety policies and practices often go unno-
ticed or are misunderstood in the workplace. The aim of this chapter is
to present theoretical and practical aspects of safety communication in
the workplace. The authors start by presenting basic concepts such as
risk perception, awareness and communication. After that, risk com-
munication tools are explained and practical solutions are presented.
2
Risk Assessment
Getting the ‘Big Picture’
M AT I L D E A . R O D R I G U E S , P E D R O
A R E Z E S A N D C E L I N A P I N T O L E ÃO
Contents
2.1 Introduction 6
2.2 Risk Perception in SMEs 7
2.3 Risk Assessment 9
2.4 Hazard Identification Techniques 11
2.4.1 Checklist 13
2.4.2 Safety Audit 14
2.4.3 ‘What If ?’ Analysis 14
2.4.4 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 15
2.4.5 Hazard and Operability Study 15
2.5 Risk Assessment Methods 16
2.5.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodologies 16
2.5.2 Qualitative Risk Assessment Methodologies 17
2.5.2.1 BS 8800:2004 Simple Matrix Method 18
2.5.3 Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodologies 18
2.5.3.1 Methodology for an Initial Risk Assessment 19
2.5.3.2 Risk Assessment Approach for the
Furniture Industrial Sector 20
2.6 Acceptance Criteria 21
2.7 Final Remarks 24
References 25
5
2.1 Introduction
Over the years, several principles, theories, methods and approaches

have been developed to assess and manage risks in different fields
(see, e.g., Aven, 2016). One clear example of this is observed in the
industries with potential for major hazards or risk of disaster, on
which most of the literature has been focused and for which rigor-
ous and sophisticated techniques and methods have been proposed.
However, attention to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)
has only been seen more recently.
Nowadays, it is widely recognized that risk assessment and con-
trol are particularly challenging for SMEs. Limited (human, eco-
nomic and technological) resources, little knowledge about the
enterprise’s risks by the owner (referred later in this chapter as the
owner/manager) and deficiencies in organizational processes are
often highlighted as insurmountable obstacles to enterprises effec-
tively assessing and controlling their own risks ( Jensen et al., 2001;
Fabiano et al., 2004; Sørensen et al., 2007; Micheli and Cagno,
2008). An additional factor exacerbating the problem is the frequent
mismatch between the legal framework and SMEs’ needs. Despite
the fact that European legislation emphasizes the importance of
risk assessment and control to an effective safety management, it
seems that the legislation is oriented towards large enterprises, since
it does not always consider the context and particularities of SMEs
(Micheli and Cagno, 2008; Cagno et al., 2013).
In light of these challenges, it is not surprising that SMEs face
special problems in controlling their risks when compared to large
enterprises. This is particularly notable with regard to occupational
accidents (Sørensen et al., 2007). It is widely reported in the scientific
literature that, compared to larger enterprises, small companies usually
present higher accident rates and worse consequences (Fabiano et al.,
2004; Sørensen et al., 2007; EU-OSHA, 2009). Furthermore, large
enterprises were found to have better OSH management systems
and perform risk assessments of remarkably higher quality (Sørensen
et al., 2007).
Nonetheless, SMEs need to make efforts to carry out suit-
able assessments in order to establish a safe working environment.
However, as mentioned by Guido and Cagno (2008), the strategies
Risk Assessment 7
and methods developed specifically for large enterprises cannot be

directly transferred to SMEs without substantial adjustments. Indeed,
further efforts are still needed to assist SMEs with implementing a
practical and cost-effective way to assess their risks and set priorities.
This has been noted in scientific research into different risks, in which
SMEs’ specific risk assessment methods were proposed. Examples are
the general Occupational Safety & Health (OSH) risk assessment
approaches (e.g. Fera and Macchiaroli, 2010) and specific methods,
such as the ones applied to chemical risks (e.g. Balsat et al., 2003),
accident risks (e.g. Rodrigues et al., 2015c) and human error prob-
abilities (e.g. Mariyama and Ohtani, 2009).
Furthermore, and considering that this chapter is focused on the risk
assessment process, it should not be overlooked that SMEs are frequently
considered a single group of enterprises, as defined in the Commission
Recommendation 2003/361/EC (E.U. Commission, 2003), but they
may present several distinctive features that can make them unmatched
(Micheli and Cagno, 2010). For example, some SMEs may deal with
minor hazards, while others deal with greater hazards. Additionally, due
to the new hazardous materials classification used by the Seveso III
Directive (Directive 2012/18/EU [E.U. Directive, 2012]), several SMEs
are obliged to adopt a Safety Management System in accordance with
the Directive’s requirements (Bragatto et al., 2015). Nevertheless, this
chapter will not focus on the latter group of enterprises, although some
references to them will be made throughout the text.
In this chapter, several aspects of risk assessment in SMEs will
be analyzed. It intends to cover the problem of risk perception in
SMEs and its influence on risk assessment, as well as the principles
and methodologies applied in the risk assessment process. Different
techniques for hazard identification and methods for risk assess-
ment are presented. Finally, a discussion about acceptance criteria
and their inclusion in risk assessment methods is performed.
2.2 Risk Perception in SMEs
Conceptually, risk perception refers to a subjective assessment of the

likelihood of experiencing an injury caused by exposure to a risk factor
(Rundmo, 2000) and it is mediated by the characteristics of the situation,
surroundings and personal factors such as beliefs, values, experiences,
feelings and attitudes (Cameron and Raman, 2005; Ji et al., 2011).
In occupational settings, risk perception is also frequently noted as
being important for an effective safety management system (Parker
et al., 2007; Reinhold et al., 2015). It explains how owner/manag-
ers and employees perceive risk and their concerns towards risk and
potential consequences (Aven, 2016). Consequently, it is seen to have
an influence on safety training, risk communication, safety resources,
risk acceptability, risk assessment and risk c ontrol, and even on the
existence of a safety committee (Cameron and Raman, 2005; Parker
et al., 2007).
Misperceptions are frequently related to safety problems. Perceptions
of high risk, resulting from feelings of distrust, fear, powerlessness
and vulnerability (Cameron and Raman, 2005), are particularly criti-
cal for both OSH practitioners and owner/managers. They may cause
incorrect non-acceptance decisions, leading SMEs to spend their
scarce resources on risks that may not be a priority. Furthermore, high
risks may be incorrectly considered acceptable due to a more tolerant
approach towards those risks. This can have significant implications
for owner/managers’ attention to safety issues and workers’ risk behav-
iour. However, despite the importance of all kinds of misperceptions
in the risk assessment process, most of the existing literature on SMEs
focuses on the problem of underestimating risks. This is because lower
risk perceptions tend to make safety systems worse, and are considered
by some authors to be a safety outcome (Hadjimanolis et al., 2015).
In SMEs, risk perception tends to differ between owner/manag-
ers and employees, as shown by Rodrigues et al. (2015a) in a study of
SMEs in the furniture industrial sector. Owner/managers were seen
to underestimate risks, which may lead to a higher level of risk accep-
tance. Furthermore, Hasle et al. (2012) noted that owner/managers
tend to believe that risk in their own companies is under control due
to the low frequency of severe injuries and, consequently, they tend to
overestimate their own knowledge of the necessary control measures.
These misperceptions by owner/managers, in a safety context in which
they are the key figure, are particularly critical.
Usually, the owner/managers of SMEs are responsible for many
different management tasks, including OSH issues. In this frame-
work, their misperceptions may change the approach to risk assess-
ment and control. Examples are related to willingness to conduct
Risk Assessment 9
risk assessment, motivation to consult external resources when they

face technical issues, the way they manage priorities and the level of
commitment to safety (Hasle and Limborg, 2006; Cagno et al., 2011;
Hasle et al., 2012; Reinhold et al., 2015).
Risk perception was also found in previous studies to have a sig-
nificant impact on employees’ behaviour (Rundmo, 2000; Arezes
and Miguel, 2008; Ji et al., 2011; Rodrigues et al., 2015b). In a sim-
ple consideration, it is assumed that the lower the level of risk that
a person believes is present in a specific situation, the more unsafe
his/her behaviour will be. The influence of risk perception on the level
of risk acceptance can explain these outcomes. An inverse relationship
between risk perception and risk acceptance has been noted previ-
ously ( Ji et al., 2011; Rodrigues et al., 2015a), that is risks perceived
as lower are more likely to be accepted. In view of this, employees’ risk
perception should also be considered when risks are being assessed
and control measures designed.
2.3 Risk Assessment
First of all, the concept of risk assessment used in this chapter will
be explained in more detail because, while this concept appears in
several guidelines and technical manuals, different definitions can be
found. According to the standard ISO 31000:2009, risk assessment is
defined as the ‘overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and
risk evaluation’, which aims to help decision-makers to make informed
choices and to prioritize actions in order to reduce risks to an accept-
able level. Definitions from OHSAS 18001:2007 and BS 8800:2004
contain similar concepts, defining risk assessment as a process that
involves hazard identification and the evaluation of risks to health
and safety that arise from the identified hazards, taking into account
existing risk controls. In a different perspective, Cameron and Raman
(2005) describe risk assessment as a set of risk analysis and evaluation,
while risk identification emerges as a separate process. In this chapter,
risk assessment will be used in the same way as described in OHSAS
18001:2007 and BS 8800:2004.
Notwithstanding the importance of risk assessment for SMEs,
the overall process should be properly planned and organized to be
effective. Important decisions should be made regarding the scope of
analysis, the necessary level of detail and priority of analysis, the people
who should carry it out as well as the techniques and methodologies to
be used. This is an important step in the overall risk assessment process,
because when assessments are poorly planned, they cannot be prop-
erly developed and their impact on risk reduction will be minimal (BS
8800:2004).
Naturally, risk assessment should be planned according to enter-
prises’ risks and size, as well as available resources and skills. One of
the most important considerations to take into account is the role of
the owner/managers. While larger enterprises have in-house OSH
practitioners to organize and carry out risk assessments in greater
detail, in SMEs, and particularly in small and micro-enterprises,
owner/managers need to perform this process on their own or hire
external services to help them with technical issues. It is also particu-
larly critical to define the level of detail for the assessment and the
methodologies to be applied; only risks of higher magnitude should
be assessed in detail, using expensive, time-consuming methodologies.
It is also important to take into consideration the size and complex-
ity of the enterprise in the decision about which approach to adopt;
the enterprise can be assessed as a whole when dealing with small,
less complex enterprises, or each specific section and dangerous activ-
ity/process can be assessed separately. Finally, but certainly no less
important, the criteria for deciding whether risks are acceptable or
not should be defined, that is the criteria for deciding whether or not
planned or existing control measures are sufficient (see Section 2.5 for
an in-depth discussion on this issue).
It is also important to keep in mind that there is no simple recipe
for carrying out a risk assessment. There is a wide range of tools and
methodologies that can be used, which can make this process hard
and sometimes confusing for SMEs. Some of the available approaches
are general, while others are specific to particular risks. BS 8800:2004
states that risk assessment should cover all OSH hazards on an inte-
grated basis. According to this standard, when assessments are car-
ried out separately, ranking risk control priorities is more difficult and
unnecessary duplication can occur. However, assessments might need
to be carried out for particular hazards. Furthermore, approaches sim-
pler than those applied in large enterprises need be offered to SMEs
in order to motivate employers to assess risks effectively.
Risk Assessment 11
In the following sections, some techniques and methodologies for

hazard identification and risk assessment will be described. It should
be noted that, although several risk assessment methodologies pro-
posed for SMEs include integration of hazard identification, risk
analysis and evaluation, separate techniques will be described since
hazard identification is a critical step in this process.
2.4 Hazard Identification Techniques
Hazard identification is the process of finding, recognizing and under-

standing the existing hazards and corresponding risks that may arise
in the course of an enterprise’s activities. This is a critical step for safety
management, since no appropriate measure can be implemented to
avoid or control a hazard that has not been identified. Furthermore,
for some SMEs, acceptance decisions are directly made based on
the identified hazards through a qualitative approach (Direct Risk
Assessment, Section 2.5.2). Consequently, enterprises should select
and apply appropriate techniques, which should provide an appropri-
ate level of detail, and identify the hazards that relate to specific areas
and those covering all regular and non-regular activities, as well as
emergency circumstances (OHSAS 18001:2007).
There are many factors to consider when choosing a technique, as
mentioned above; however, special care should be taken with existing
information and data available. A large number of techniques for risk
identification can be found and applied (see in this respect, e.g., Gould
et al. (2000) and ISO 31000:2009). Each tool has strengths and weak-
nesses. Additionally, it is important to note that some of them have
similar objectives and when applied correctly should give compara-
ble results, while others have different purposes and should be used
complementarily if practicable (Gould et al., 2000; Harms-Ringdahl,
2013). In other cases, although some techniques are popular and fre-
quently reported in the literature, it is important to recognize that
some of them are too costly and complex to be applied in many SMEs.
Gould et al. (2000) summarize 38 hazard identification techniques,
which were identified through a literature review. In this report, advan-
tages and disadvantages of each tool were analysed and their applica-
bility to SMEs noted. Of the analyzed techniques, 20 were found not
to be applicable to SMEs. In relation to the other 19, Table 2.1 presents
Table 2.1 Summary of the Hazard Identification Techniques Applicable to SMEs

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROCESS LIFE APPLICABILITY TIME AND COST
TECHNIQUES CYCLE PHASE TO SMES REQUIREMENTS
Standards/Code Practice/ Concept/design Very applicable Quick and inexpensive
Literature Review
Checklists Any phase Very applicable Moderately quick and
expensive
Safety Audit Any phase Very applicable Time-consuming and
expensive
‘What If?’ Analysis Any phase Applicable Moderately quick and
expensive
HAZOP Any phase Slightly applicable Time-consuming and
expensive
Pre-HAZOP Design stage Slightly applicable Quick and inexpensive
Concept Hazard Analysis Concept Slightly applicable Moderately quick and
(CHA) expensive
Concept Safety Review Concept Slightly applicable Moderately quick and
expensive
Critical Examination of Design/operation Slightly applicable Moderately quick and
System Safety expensive
Preliminary Hazard Design/operation Slightly applicable Moderately quick and
Analysis (PHA) expensive
Inherent Hazard Analysis Design stage Slightly applicable Moderately quick and
expensive
Sneak Analysis Design/operation Slightly applicable Moderately quick and
expensive
Reliability Block Diagram Design/mods Slightly applicable Moderately quick and
expensive
Task Analysis Design/operation/ Slightly applicable Moderately quick and
mods expensive
Failure Mode and Effect Design/operation/ Slightly applicable Time-consuming and
Analysis (FMEA) mods expensive
Functional FMEA Design/operation/ Slightly applicable Time-consuming and
mods expensive
Maintenance and Design/operation/ Slightly applicable Time-consuming and
Operability Study (MOp) mods expensive
Maintenance Analysis Operation/mods Slightly applicable Time-consuming and
expensive
Human Reliability Analysis Operation/mods Slightly applicable Time-consuming and
expensive
Source: Adapted from Gould, J. et al., Review of hazard identification techniques, Health and
Safety Laboratory HSL/2005/58, Health and Safety Executive, Sheffield, UK, 2000.
Risk Assessment 13
a brief description of the degree of their applicability to SMEs, as well

as a reference to the time and cost requirements and the phase in the
process’ life cycle in which they are applied.
According to Gould et al. (2000) findings and summary presented in
Table 2.1, Standards/Code Practice/Literature Review, Checklists and
Safety Audits are very applicable to SMEs and the ‘What If?’ Analysis is
applicable. Some other well-documented techniques that are frequently
applied in industries with major hazards such as Preliminary Hazard
Analysis (PHA), Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) and Failure
Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) were considered
slightly applicable to SMEs, mostly because they are time consuming and
expensive and/or require a high level of expertise in order for them to
be applied. However, they should be considered whenever companies
deal with major hazards. Since it is not possible to address all the identi-
fied techniques in detail, some of the most popular ones will be briefly
described. Additionally, Standards/Code Practice/Literature Review is a
technique often incorporated into other hazard identification techniques,
such as Checklists, and for that reason it will not be further explored.
2.4.1 Checklist
The use of a checklist seems to be the most widely reported tool to be

applied in SMEs (Hasle and Limborg, 2006; Fera and Macchiaroli,
2010). In fact, it is the easiest technique for identifying hazards and
can be used at any stage of the life cycle of a process or system. Even
non-experts such as owner/managers can therefore use this technique,
ensuring that all common problems are identified.
It comprises a list of items that seek to identify any hazards, risks
and control failures by taking into account the requirements of stan-
dards, codes and facility or equipment experience (ISO 31010:2009).
Despite the importance of checklists for SMEs, significant limita-
tions should be noted (Gould et al., 2000; ISO 31010:2009), such as
the fact that the quality of the hazard identification process is highly
dependent on the experience of the people who develop the check-
list; if it is not complete, important hazards may not be identified.
Furthermore, the use of checklists tends to inhibit the evaluators’ imag-
ination and limits the analysis to problems that are evident and easy to
observe. Thus, in complex situations, other techniques are necessary.
2.4.2 Safety Audit
Safety audit is used by Gould et al. (2000) as having the same mean-
ing as safety inspections. This is a widely recognized way of identify-
ing hazards in SMEs (OSHA, 2005), in which an examination of all
work sites and tasks is performed to determine the existence of hazards.
During the audit, compliance with codes and legislation is analysed and
interviews and checklists are usually used to support the entire process.
It can be performed at different stages of the life cycle, but the
most common way in SMEs is a safety review through regular audits.
In this format, safety audits can make deep changes, while informal
analysis (walk-throughs of the plant) can be performed by inexperi-
enced personnel to identify lapses in safety procedures; an in-depth
review should be used to ensure that the operating and maintenance
procedures comply with the design intent and standards, which makes
the process time consuming and expensive.
2.4.3 ‘What If ?’ Analysis
The ‘What if ?’ analysis is a systematic team approach, in which a team

familiar with the process is prompted to identify hazards (Gould et al.,
2000; ISO 31010:2009). It was developed to be a simpler alternative
to HAZOP (see Section 2.4.5), as it is applied with a lower level of
detail. In fact, this technique is very simple and can therefore be easily
applied to any stage of a process.
To carry out a ‘What if ?’ analysis, the team is supplied with the nec-
essary information, such as a description and drawings of the process,
operating procedures, people involved, products used, and machine and
equipment specifications. Then the team poses a number of questions
that usually begin with ‘What if ’, in order to encourage the study team
to explore potential hazards. The results are often documented in a table
format that usually contains the ‘What if ’ question, the hazards identi-
fied, existing controls and possible recommendations, if applicable.
Because the object of analysis in SMEs is usually simple, two peo-
ple may be sufficient. However, as things become more complex, the
group size will need to be larger. Team members should be carefully
selected taking into account the company’s resources and the specific
nature of the project, but usually include operational and maintenance
personnel, engineers with specific skills and an OSH practitioner.
Risk Assessment 15
In some cases, enterprises may not have sufficient resources and an
external consultant may have to be hired for technical support.
The ‘What if ?’ analysis can be also used for risk analysis and
assessment, ranking the actions created in terms of priority (ISO
31010:2009). Because of that, it is not unusual to see this technique
classified as a qualitative or semi-quantitative risk assessment method.
2.4.4 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
PHA is a simple and inductive means for identifying potential haz-

ards (Gould et al., 2000; ISO 31010:2009). According to Harms-
Ringdahl (2013), it belongs to a subgroup of hazard identification
methods called ‘coarse analyses’. It provides preliminary information
about the hazards and corresponding risks that can be observed in a
specific project and, because in most cases detailed information on
risks is not necessary, little expertise is required to apply it.
This is an interesting technique to be applied during the design
phase, mainly when there is limited information/knowledge on design
details or operating procedures. However, it can also provide useful
results when applied to existing systems, particularly when it is dif-
ficult to use a more extensive technique (ISO 3010:2009).
2.4.5 Hazard and Operability Study
The HAZOP is one of the most popular hazard identification tech-

niques. It can be described as an inductive reasoning technique in
which hazards are identified by analyzing possible deviations from the
design or operating intent (ISO 31010:2009; Stamatis, 2014).
The methodology for the HAZOP is based on a qualitative proce-
dure in which a number of guide words are used in a structured and
systematic way to make it easier to identify potential deviations that
may occur in the design, process, procedure or system. Examples of
guide words are ‘no/not/none’, ‘more/less’, ‘too early/too late’, ‘part of ’,
‘reverse’, ‘other than’ and ‘as well as’.
The HAZOP technique is usually carried out by a multidisci-
plinary team composed of experts with appropriate skills and expertise
to identify potential deviations, their potential causes and the likely
consequences.
This technique was initially developed to analyze chemical process

systems. Nowadays, it is applied to a wide range of industrial systems,
processes and procedures, as well as in other fields that are not limited
to industrial processes, such as pharmaceutical risks, marine opera-
tions and environmental studies (Stamatis, 2014). However, because a
detailed analysis can be very time consuming, expensive and requires
experienced practitioners, the technique is only practicable in SMEs
with critical hazards or where the systems are too complex, for which
other techniques are seen to give insufficient results.
2.5 Risk Assessment Methods
Over the years, several risk assessment tools and methodologies have
been developed and made available to employers and OSH practitioners
to help them make informed choices about risk acceptance and control
measures. Nowadays, there is a broad range of methodologies for assess-
ing occupational risks, which are traditionally classified into three prin-
cipal groups: qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative. They differ
in relation to their aim, the resources needed (budget and expertise), data
requirements, ease of application, level of subjectivity and time invest-
ment (Khanzode et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2012; Harms-Ringdahl, 2013).
Despite the high number of risk assessment methodologies avail-
able, it has been seen in recent years that some of the existing ones are
too complex to manage or too simple and subjective, and are frequently
reported as inappropriate for SMEs (Fera and Macchiaroli, 2010). As a
consequence, some researchers have focused their efforts on develop-
ing new methods and procedures that are, according to the authors,
more suitable for application in these settings (see, e.g., Marhavilas and
Koulouriotis, 2008; Fera and Macchiaroli, 2010; Carrillo-Castrillo et al.,
2015; Rodrigues et al., 2015c). These approaches are mostly qualitative
and semi-quantitative. In view of this, the following subsections present
examples of both categories of methodologies; only a brief description
of methodologies related to quantitative risk assessment will be given.
2.5.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodologies
Quantitative risk assessment, frequently referred to as probabilis-

tic risk assessment, is based on the quantification of the risk level.
In these approaches, judgements about risk acceptance are performed
Risk Assessment 17
by comparing the estimated risk level with the quantitative accep-

tance criteria, which are usually presented as acceptance boundar-
ies. These methodologies are especially used in situations where the
consequences are severe and where the necessary resources to carry
out rigorous quantitative assessments are available, such as industrial
plants with major hazards (Harms-Ringdahl, 2013). In fact, although
these methodologies are more objective, they are difficult to apply
in SMEs and require a considerable investment of time and money,
mainly because of the data and level of expertise required to estimate
the risk level (Khanzode et al., 2012). Common examples are the
Bayesian approaches (Aven, 2016).
2.5.2 Qualitative Risk Assessment Methodologies
Qualitative methodologies have the advantage of requiring less infor-

mation, time and effort (Lee et al., 2012). Therefore, they are often
applied when the risks are low, the numerical data required are inad-
equate or unavailable, resources are limited and time available is
restricted. Indeed, these methodologies are frequently suggested as
being useful for SMEs. An example of this can be found in Spain,
where the National Institute for Safety and Health at Work (INSHT)
(www.insht.es) recommends a qualitative risk assessment methodol-
ogy based on BS 8800:2004 to be used at these companies (Carrillo-
Castrillo et al., 2015).
Different qualitative approaches can be applied in SMEs. Examples
include the direct risk evaluation technique, in which previously iden-
tified hazards are directly compared with a set of criteria for evaluation,
such as legal requirements, and decisions are only made about whether
they are acceptable or not (see Harms-Ringdahl [2013] for further
description); and qualitative methods to the analysis and evaluation
of the identified hazards, which are usually based on a risk index or
risk matrix as described, for example, in Marhavilas and Koulouriotis
(2008). In this chapter, the example of the method proposed by BS
8800:2004 will be given, since it is one the most popular approaches
for qualitative assessments.
Limitations to qualitative approaches are frequently related to
qualitative risk assessment methodologies, which are often linked to
a greater degree of personal judgement. Since the risk assessment is
performed without numeric values, decisions can be based on personal

judgements, that is they are based on the knowledge, perception and
experience of decision-makers (Hughes and Ferret, 2007; Papadakis
and Chalkidou, 2008; Sari et al., 2009). However, even consider-
ing these limitations, this kind of assessment may be sufficient for
several SMEs.
2.5.2.1 BS 8800:2004 Simple Matrix Method

BS 8800:2004 introduced a simple method for estimating risk levels
and deciding on their acceptability/tolerability, and it is widely used
in qualitative assessments in Europe. This method is based on a 4 × 3
risk matrix, in which risks are estimated by combining the likelihood
of harm expressed on a four-class scale (very unlikely to very likely)
and its expected severity expressed on a three-class scale (slight harm
to extreme harm). There are five risk level categories in this method
for different combinations of likelihood and severity, ranging from
very low risk to very high risk. Additionally, a simple evaluation of risk
acceptance is proposed, containing three categories (acceptable, toler-
able or unacceptable), which is to be applied according to the level of
risk found and enables a decision to be made on whether or not a risk
is acceptable and to define priorities for action.
2.5.3 Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodologies
Semi-quantitative methodologies have frequently been identified as

important for assessing occupational risks of accident in SMEs, par-
ticularly when the severity and likelihood cannot be specified exactly
using enterprises’ accident reports, and alternative approaches are sug-
gested (Rodrigues et al., 2015c). In practice, when these approaches
are used, the applied methods usually generate estimates for establish-
ing where the risk is likely to fall within the unacceptable, tolerable and
acceptable risk zones, usually by means of a risk matrix.
There is a growing stream of research focused on SMEs, in which
semi-quantitative approaches based on the use of aggregated data
from a specific industrial sector have been proposed. Examples can
be found in work by Jacinto and Silva (2010), Fera and Macchiaroli
(2010), Rodrigues et al. (2015c) and Carrillo-Castrillo et al. (2015).
Within this field, Fera and Macchiaroli (2010) note that in SMEs, in
Risk Assessment 19
spite of the usefulness of using accident reports at company level to

analyze particular features, the available data may suffer from under-
reporting and limited exposure, and some important hazards may not
be considered in the assessments. The use of the sector statistics may
therefore be useful for a complete analysis. In view of this, examples of
these approaches will be given in this chapter. The methodologies pro-
posed by Rodrigues et al. (2015c) and Carrillo-Castrillo et al. (2015)
have been chosen because they are based on a risk matrix, which is
more likely to be easier for a non-expert to understand.
2.5.3.1 Methodology for an Initial Risk Assessment

(Carrillo-Castrillo et al., 2015)
Carrillo-Castrillo et al. (2015) have provided a methodology for an
initial risk assessment based on the concepts of task and accident
mechanisms that allows SMEs to prioritize preventive activities more
objectively and its principle is straightforward. Assuming that SMEs
lack sufficient accident information at company level, public statistics
based on Eurostat (2013) can be used to ensure that risk assessment
takes into consideration frequency and severity, as previously noted
by Jacinto and Silva (2010). Furthermore, the authors believe that
this approach avoids the possibility of hazards that arose in p revious
accidents not being considered when the risks related to a specific
task are assessed.
First of all, data need to be gathered from the accident reports. From
these data, the following set of variables should be used according to
the ESAW-III methodology (Eurostat, 2013): workstation, working
environment, working process, specific physical activity, deviation and
mode of injury. Then the bow-tie diagram is applied as a qualitative
tool for identifying tasks and accident mechanisms. Relevant preven-
tion and protection barriers may be also represented in the bow-tie
diagram, although Carrillo-Castrillo et al. (2015) have only consid-
ered preventive barriers for each task. Then, the analysis is carried out
at task level. Since the working process is fixed, other variables under
analysis are used to define the task. After this step, an accident mecha-
nism is used to identify each central event of the bow tie, and it is
defined by the combination of deviation and mode of injury. Finally,
the likelihood of occurrence and severity of harm is defined and a
simple risk matrix used to estimate the risk level.
The estimation of the likelihood of occurrence is performed using the

frequency distribution of the accident mechanisms, whereas severity of
harm is estimated based on the statistical distribution of the severity
of the accident mechanisms within the same task.
The same scales from BS 8800:2004 were used to categorize the
likelihood and the severity of harm. For the first dimension, risks with a
relative prevalence of less than 0.05 are ranked as Highly unlikely, those
higher than 0.05 and less than 0.10 as Unlikely, those higher than
0.10 and less than 0.20 as Likely and those higher than 0.20 as Very
likely. To estimate the Severity of harm dimension, the mean (m) and
standard deviation (sd) of the proportions of severe accidents in each
task should be calculated. The rules for estimating them are: Slightly
harmful if the proportion of severe accidents for an accident mecha-
nism is less than m + sd, Moderately harmful if the proportion is within
the m + sd and m + 2sd interval and Extremely harmful if that propor-
tion is higher than m + 2sd or if there have been any fatal accidents.
2.5.3.2 Risk Assessment Approach for the Furniture Industrial Sector

(Rodrigues et al., 2015c)
Rodrigues et al. (2015c), while focusing on the problem of defining
risk acceptance criteria for occupational risks dealing with the spe-
cific case of the furniture sector, proposed a new approach to be used
in risk assessment in this sector. This approach was developed taking
into account the differences in size and safety performances of these
enterprises (Rodrigues et al., 2015b).
A simple risk matrix was proposed to assess the risks of the identi-
fied hazards and is presented in Table 2.2. The matrix presents the per-
centage of accident frequency and corresponding severity that refers
to more lost days than a given magnitude. Seven classes were defined
for severity and 12 for frequency of accidents. The rules for risk accep-
tance for each combination of frequency and severity categories were
defined considering the acceptance criteria found in the study to be
suitable for this sector of activity.
Using the proposed risk matrix, the aggregated data from the compa-
nies or the sector can be used to support decisions regarding the risk of
occupational accidents and respond to new approaches suggested in this
area in order to reduce subjectivity in decisions about risk, such as those
suggested by Jacinto and Silva (2010) and Carrillo-Castrillo et al. (2015).
Risk Assessment 21
Table 2.2 Risk Matrix with Specific Criteria for the Furniture Industrial Sector from
Rodrigues et al. (2015c)
SEVERITY
LOST WORKDAYS
FREQUENCY OF
ACCIDENTS (%) [0–3] [3–7] [7–21] [21–90] [90–180] ≥180 DEATH
[90–100] T U U U U U U
[80–90] T T U U U U U
[70–80] T T U U U U U
[60–70] A T U U U U U
[50–60] A T U U U U U
[40–50] A T T U U U U
[30–40] A A T U U U U
[20–30] A A T U U U U
[10–20] A A T U U U U
[5–10] A A A T U U U
[1–5] A A A T T U U
[0.5–1] A A A A A T U
Note: A, acceptable; T, tolerable; U, unacceptable.
An example of application was given by the authors using accident

records from one enterprise: ‘Consider a specific case of a company
that recorded 10 accidents in the last year. Eight of these accidents
resulted in 1 lost workday, one accident resulted in 16 lost workdays
and one accident resulted in 90 lost workdays. The most severe situa-
tion was related to unsafe behaviour, i.e. removing pieces that blocked
the machines by hand, without first stopping the machine. Because one
accident in this company corresponds to 10% of the total number of
accidents, from the matrix, 90 lost workdays belongs to the fifth sever-
ity category, where the risk is considered to be Unacceptable. Therefore,
risk reduction measures need to be applied’. However, despite the pre-
sented example, the authors also noted that sector accident data can be
used when no sufficient data exist at the enterprise level.
2.6 Acceptance Criteria
Acceptance criteria are terms of reference by which the significance of

risk is assessed (ISO 3100:2009). In the risk assessment process, they
are applied in the evaluation step, when the results of risk analysis
are compared with specific acceptance criteria in order to determine
whether or not a risk and/or its magnitude is acceptable; this thereby

supports decisions about the treatment of risk and setting priorities.
In the occupational safety domain, different criteria may be used.
They can be distinguished as either qualitative or quantitative and
may be set by a regulatory authority or by enterprises. Common quali-
tative criteria are spelled out or implied in legislation, guidance and
good practices (HSE, 2001; Harms-Ringdahl, 2013). These criteria
are highly important for SMEs, since several of these companies still
fail to meet legal and other requirements. In fact, this analysis should
be used as a first approach to risk, in which each of the identified haz-
ards can be directly classified as acceptable or unacceptable, thereby
performing a direct risk evaluation. Additionally, quantitative accep-
tance criteria are presented in terms of risk limits and are important in
semi-quantitative and quantitative risk assessment. These criteria are
also highly important for SMEs, where the risk matrix is the princi-
pal metric used and decisions about risk acceptance are supported by
quantitative criteria (Rodrigues et al., 2012).
Despite the importance of acceptance criteria, particularly regard-
ing the quantitative boundaries included in risk assessment meth-
odologies applied in SMEs, this issue is also seen as a problem for
decision-making (Rodrigues et al., 2014). Pre-defined acceptance
criteria are frequently used in semi-quantitative risk assessment meth-
ods (Rodrigues et al., 2012). However, these criteria may not always
be the most appropriate for all situations. For example, a risk may be
acceptable in the furniture industry but not acceptable in a service
company. Indeed, when semi-quantitative methodologies are devel-
oped or applied, explanations about the risk criteria used and about
who has determined them are not always presented (Harms-Ringdahl,
2013), which calls their appropriateness into question. Therefore, it is
important to understand how risk acceptance criteria can be defined,
adjusted to the companies’ reality and integrated into risk metrics.
In order to support this process, Rodrigues et al. (2015c) proposed a
model that they consider essential to define the practicable quantita-
tive acceptance criteria for occupational risks, which is summarized in
Figure 2.1.
In accordance with Figure 2.1, the first step is to determine which
criteria are important to establish. While industrial plants that deal
with major hazards usually define the risk criteria for individual and
Risk Assessment 23
Determine which criteria to develop
Determine the principles/philosophy for

establishing risk acceptance criteria
Analyze the historical accident data
Analyze the Select the risk metric

stakeholders’ views to be used
Define the
acceptance criteria
Safety performance Individual risk
Acceptance criteria adjusted to

the company
Safety Revalidate the risk

culture criteria
Figure 2.1 Flowchart of the steps of formulating risk acceptance criteria for occupational acci-
dent risks. (From Rodrigues, M.A. et al., Safety Sci., 80, 288, 2015c.)
societal risks, SMEs usually determine criteria to evaluate safety per-

formance and individual risks. After that, it is important to deter-
mine the principles/philosophy for establishing risk acceptance
criteria. Different principles and philosophies can be applied; however,
the authors suggest the use of the ‘as low as reasonably practicable’
(ALARP) principle. After these decisions have been made, the enter-
prise and/or sector accident databases should be analyzed. This infor-
mation makes it possible to understand how to determine the risk level
by selecting the risk metrics to be used. In fact, the metrics to be used
depend on defining consequences and likelihood, which is limited by
the accident dataset available. Furthermore, past accident statistics
allow the actual accident distribution to be understood. This analysis
is an important reference point to start defining acceptance thresholds

and boundaries because defining risk thresholds that are notably far
from this distribution may be unrealistic and/or impracticable. In the
proposed model, the inclusion of stakeholders’ judgements about risk
and their emotions is also seen as relevant, and therefore the analysis
of the risk level that most of them are willing to accept is also impor-
tant. Finally, the criteria must be aligned with the enterprise’s safety
culture. Therefore, the criteria must be adjusted to the companies’ fea-
tures and must be periodically revalidated and/or redefined.
2.7 Final Remarks
This chapter presented an analysis of risk assessment processes in

SMEs. The aim was not to explore all the approaches and method-
ologies that could be applied in these settings in detail, but rather to
give readers a perspective of the key limitations to this process and the
available alternatives to overcome it.
It was noted that risk assessment is not a straightforward process
for SMEs. Issues related to the scarcity of resources, deficiencies in
organizational processes and even the availability of reliable data to
support assessments were frequently highlighted in the text as impor-
tant limitations to this process. Furthermore, owner/managers were
seen as playing the key role and their own risk perceptions were noted
as important limitations. Therefore, to achieve effective results, owner/
managers need to be engaged in safety activities and see risk assess-
ment not as a bureaucratic obligation but as a process to help them
make informed choices about existing or potential risks.
In light of these challenges, different techniques and methodologies
for hazard identification and risk assessment were described, always
keeping in mind that different approaches may be applied according
to the enterprises’ risks and resources. SMEs that deal with minor
hazards and have limited resources should apply simple and low-cost
approaches. One example is the qualitative assessment, in which hazards
can be identified by applying a checklist and the risks can be assessed
by means of the risk matrix proposed by BS8800:2004. In other cases,
more complete and systematic approaches should be considered and
technical resources hired or consulted whenever needed.
Risk Assessment 25
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3
Safety Management
G E O R G E B O U S T R A S , AT H A N A S I O S
HADJIMANOLIS AND CLEO
VA R I A N O U - M I K E L L I D O U
Contents
3.1 Safety Legislation 30

3.2 Importance of SMEs in Economic Growth and the
Importance of Safety in SMEs 32
3.3 Setting up an Occupational Health and Safety
Management System for SMEs 35
3.4 The Role of the Manager in an SME 38
3.5 Importance of Safety Policy 40
3.6 Inclusion of Employees in Safety Decision-Making 41
3.7 Marketing of Safety to Visitors and (Sub)contractors 44
3.8 Combining Systems: Safety, Quality and Governance
Systems 47
3.9 Lead by Example: The Case of PPE 49
3.9.1 Personal Protective Equipment 49
References 52
The aim of this chapter is to lay out the foundation for effectively
dealing with the risks that have been uncovered with the use of risk
assessment. In other words, this chapter builds upon the results of the
previous chapter that presented ways of assessing the various risks.
Literature provides a number of examples and a number of techniques,
and at the same time focuses on paradigms that relate to large(r)
organizations, as they portray a much wider test-bed for the trial of
theoretical concepts, as well as provide a considerable population that
can account for a vast number of observations that can lead to the
development of new theoretical concepts.
29
So why is safety management needed? A quick answer would be

to say that this is a legal requirement! By law, in either the European
Union (EU) or the United States, the employer has to provide a healthy
and safe environment to its employees and visitors. Smaller organiza-
tions, smaller firms in the small and medium sized enterprises (SME)
category, tend to present a number of extra challenges. These challenges
are present due to financial, managerial and resource issues that smaller
organizations usually face.
It is common knowledge that safety is based upon four basic pillars:
the (initial) risk assessment, a (basic) cost-benefit analysis to iden-
tify viable solutions, (active) consultation within the workplace and a
(comprehensive) safety management plan to deal with the identified
risks in an efficient and economical way.
3.1 Safety Legislation
Safety management, as already stated, is a legal obligation of the

manager/owner towards his/her employees. In the EU, legislation, legal
acts and court decisions constitute the body of European Union Law.
A short form to express these is acquis communautaire. The acquis is the
body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the EU
Member States. The acquis communautaire is a very important concept
in the EU. It covers all treaties, EU legislation, international agreements,
standards, court verdicts, fundamental rights provisions and horizontal
principles in the treaties such as equality and non-discrimination.
The EU Labour Law (Acquis) prescribes the rights and obligations
of employers and workers at the workplace. It mainly covers two areas:
working conditions (including working time, part-time and fixed-term,
including posting of workers) and information and consultation of work-
ers (including collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings).
In particular, the EU Acquis on occupational safety and health (OSH)
is composed of the Framework Directive 89/391/EC (European Council
1989) and 23 related Directives that cover workplaces and/or risks to the
workers. The aim of the Framework Directive 89/391/EC is to introduce
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers
at work. It applies to all sectors of activity, both public and private, except
for specific public service activities, such as the armed forces, the police or
certain civil protection services. According to the Framework Directive,
Safety Management 31
it is the employer’s obligation to ensure the safety and health of workers

in every aspect related to work and they may not impose financial costs
to the workers to achieve this aim.
All of this is based on Article 153 of the Treaty of the Functioning
of the EU, which provides to the EU the authority to adopt directives
in this field (Official Journal of the European Union 2007). Article
153 of the Lisbon Treaty states that the Union shall support and com-
plement the activities of the Member States in the following fields:
• Improvement in particular of the working environment to
protect workers’ health and safety
• Working conditions
• Social security and social protection of workers
• Protection of workers where their employment contract is
terminated
• Information and consultation of workers
• Representation and collective defence of the interests of work-
ers and employers, including co-determination
• Conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally
residing in Union territory
• Integration of persons excluded from the labour market, with-
out prejudice to Article 166
• Equality between men and women with regard to labour mar-
ket opportunities and treatment at work
• Combating of social exclusion
• Modernization of social protection systems
It is clear, therefore, that there is a supportive political will and back-
ground. Member States adopt the directives mentioned earlier in
their National Legislation. Examples of related legislations are: the
Major Accidents Hazards Control (Seveso) (Directive 2012/18/EU),
the Free Movement of Goods – CE Marking for 23 categories of
products and REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and
Restriction of Chemicals) (Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006).
In the United States, the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) is the primary federal law, which governs occupational
health and safety (H&S) in the private sector and federal govern-
ment. It was enacted by Congress in 1970 and was signed by President
Nixon on 29 December 1970. Its main goal is to ensure that employers
provide employees with an environment free of H&S hazards. The Act

excludes the self-employed, family farms, workplaces covered by other
federal laws (such as mining, nuclear weapons manufacture, railroads
and airlines) and state and local governments.
Section 5 of the Act contains the ‘general duty clause’. The ‘general
duty clause’ requires employers to
• Maintain conditions or adopt practices reasonably necessary

and appropriate to protect workers on the job
• Be familiar with and comply with standards applicable to
their establishments
• Ensure that employees have and use personal protective equip-
ment when required for safety and health
OSHA has established regulations for when it may act under the ‘gen-
eral duty clause’. The criteria are as follows:
• There must be a hazard.

• The hazard must be a recognized hazard (e.g. the employer
knew or should have known about the hazard, the hazard is
obvious or the hazard is a recognized one within the industry).
• The hazard could cause or is likely to cause serious harm or
death.
• The hazard must be curable (OSHA does not recognize all
hazards as curable).
Other National Legislations also drive to the same conclusion: It is the

duty of the manager/owner to provide a healthy and safe environment.
3.2 Importance of SMEs in Economic Growth

and the Importance of Safety in SMEs
What is an SME? According to OECD (2005):

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are non-subsidiary, inde-
pendent firms, which employ less than a given number of employees. This
number varies across countries. The most frequent upper limit designat-
ing an SME is 250 employees, as in the European Union. However, some
countries set the limit at 200 employees, while the United States consid-
ers SMEs to include firms with fewer than 500 employees.
Small firms are those with fewer than 50 employees, while micro-
enterprises have at most 10, or in some cases 5, workers.
Financial assets are also used to define SMEs. In the European
Union, a new definition came into force on 1 January 2005 applying to
all Community acts and funding programmes as well as in the field of
State aid where SMEs can be granted higher intensity of national and
regional aid than large companies did. The new definition provides for
an increase in the financial ceilings: the turnover of medium-sized enter-
prises (50-249 employees) should not exceed EUR 50 million; that of
small enterprises (10-49 employees) should not exceed EUR 10 m illion
while that of micro firms (less than 10 employees) should not exceed
EUR 2 million. Alternatively, balance sheets for medium, small and
micro enterprises should not exceed EUR 43 million, EUR 10 million
and EUR 2 million, respectively.
In the EU, SMEs are a very important part of the economy, as they
represent around 99% of all enterprises and employ an increas-

ing number of persons (Airaksinen et al., 2015). According to U.S.
Census Bureau data (2012), there were 5.73 million employer firms in
the United States. Firms with fewer than 500 workers accounted for
99.7% of those businesses, and businesses with less than 20 workers
made up 89.6%. Add in the number of non-employer businesses –
there were 23.0 million in 2013 – then the share of U.S. businesses
with less than 20 workers increases to 97.9%.
It is widely reported in the literature that there is a higher risk of acci-
dents in SMEs. A report by EU-OSHA (2011) ‘acknowledges for the
“old” EU-15 member-states nearly 19 million SMEs, employing just
about 75 million people; these SMEs, per se, contribute to around 82%
of all occupational injuries, rising to about 90% of fatal accidents’. The
‘seriousness rate’ as defined by Cagno et al. (2013), that is the number
of days lost per accident is stable in the area of 45–50 days per accident.
Sedlatchek (2012) on behalf of EU-OSHA underlined the importance
of additional support to small companies. In particular, EU-OSHA
(Sedlatchek, 2012) focused on two important needs for small compa-
nies: awareness raising and the need for practical support tools. Sørensen
et al. (2007) carried out a detailed investigation to explore the relation-
ship between firm size and the level of occupational risk. The study
clearly identifies the special character and the increased occupational
risks appearing in micro-firms. Similarly, McVittie et al. (1997) con-

clude that construction-related H&S public policies should be targeted
towards SMEs rather than big enterprises. This study also relates firm
size with the level of occupational risk (defined as job-related hazard).
Hasle and Limborg (2006) refer to higher accident risks in small firms,
while at the same time the reasons are not clearly defined.
Employee relations in micro-firms are an under-researched area
(Matley, 1999). Matley (1999) in an authoritative study comprising of
thousands of SMEs (a large part of them micro-companies) reports
that the vast majority of decisions dealing with the various aspects of
human resources falls with the owner/manager. The expected poor per-
formance of small firms and especially of micro-firms among them –
regarding occupational accidents – is due to their limited resources
and, in several cases, inadequate OHS knowledge (Sørensen et al.,
2007). Very limited training (to less than 4% of micro-companies)
and human resource plans are reported by Matley (1999). Economic
pressure, especially during periods of economic crisis, encourages both
long hours of work and work intensification (Mayhew, 2000). Such
pressures are more intense in micro-firms, which are struggling for
their survival. Economic difficulties may also lead to considerable
delays in safety prevention strategies. Sedlatchek (2012) recognizes
two very important issues leading to an obscure view with regard to
H&S issues in micro-firms. While on paper, even the smallest estab-
lishments – in some countries – indicate high levels of H&S measures
and policies, in reality the management commitment (and hence the
support) is not genuine and results, simply, in a ‘lip service’ type of sup-
port. Managerial informality in micro-firms can often mean exploita-
tion of workers and poor work standards (Holliday, 1995).
Additional factors exacerbating safety problems in small firms include
their fierce competition for work. Firms which apply OHS regulations
may lose tenders if their prices for products or services are higher than
those which ignore OHS rules. Regulations are also designed with
permanent employees in larger workplaces in mind (e.g. ‘top-down’
strategies), not temporary personnel as usual in micro-firms, and are
therefore inappropriate for small firms. Due to the sheer number of
micro-firms, inspectorates may have insufficient resources to cope with
them and many firms are very infrequently inspected. There are also
relatively higher employment rates of higher risk profile groups.
Employment relations in small firms, and especially in micro-firms,

have the characteristic of informality (Matley, 1999). The special con-
ditions for dynamic interaction between employers and employees
in micro-firms have been recognized in the literature (Dejoy et al.,
2010). Of particular importance is the potential positive effect of this
family atmosphere on organizational commitment and compliance
to safety rules.
3.3 Setting up an Occupational Health and Safety

Management System for SMEs
OHSMS (Occupational, Health and Safety Management System)

should be considered as part of the management systems of any orga-
nization. It was first prepared by the Health and Safety Executive’s
(HSE) Accident Prevention Advisory in the United Kingdom in 1991
as a practical guide for directors, managers, H&S professionals, and
employee representatives who wanted to improve H&S in their orga-
nization (HSE, 1991).
A good H&S management system is the key element for the pre-
vention of occupational accidents. According to statistics, 2.3 million
incidents result to death each year and costs 2.8 trillion dollars globally
(ECOS, 2013). Work-related accidents and fatal accident rates were
found to be significantly reduced by implementing OHSMS (Yoon
et al., 2013). In addition, according to Santos et al. (2013), the main
benefits that companies have obtained by OHSMS are improvement
of working conditions, compliance with legislation, better internal
communication for workers about risks, reduction in cost of accidents
and occupational diseases, improvement of the company’s image and
many more.
Despite the obvious need to have an OHSMS, many organiza-
tions do not give H&S the priority it deserves. Most of the times
this might be due to its cost, lack of knowledge, lack of motivation
or limited staff resources (Haslam et al., 2016) – facts that mostly
occur in SMEs. In general, large companies are aware of the need
for OHSMS, but most of the SMEs are at an early stage in terms of
practical aspects such as H&S investment (Yoon et al., 2013). Safety
culture plays a vital role for the implementation and the effective-
ness of an OHSMS (Hale and Hovden, 1998; ILO, 2009). In 1993,
the Advisory Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installation (ACSNI),

which has investigated disasters such as the Chernobyl, the Kings
Cross fire and the Piper Alpha explosion, concluded that the break-
down of this OHSMS was caused by poor safety culture (HSC, 1993).
In order to develop an OHSMS, there is a four-step management
method – Plan, Do, Check, Act (PDCA) – which can be used to con-
trol the continual improvement of processes and products in business
(Figure 3.1). Each of these steps has been analysed as follows:
• Plan: An effective planning system for H&S requires the o peration
of a management system that can detect, eliminate and control
hazards. The planning phase always includes the d evelopment of
a policy statement. The preparation of an effective H&S policy is
a major step in the formulation of the H&S management system.
Risk
Planning profiling
Organizing
Policy
Plan Do
Implementing
your plan
Act Check
Learning Measuring
lessons performance
Investigating
Reviewing accidents/
performance incidents/near
misses
Figure 3.1 The Plan, Do, Check, Act management cycle. (From Hughes, P. and Ferrett, E.,
Introduction to Health and Safety at Work, 6th edn., Routledge, New York, 2016.)
The H&S policy includes the aims, objectives, targets, com-

mitment and responsibility of the organization. This phase also
includes the identification of hazards, the risk assessment and
emergency procedures and an organizational structure.
• Do: An essential part of the “do” stage is the risk assessment or
risk profiling which is used to identify potential hazards and
prioritize them in order to reduce risk. Risk should be elimi-
nated, minimized or the use of personal protective equipment
(PPE) must be in place.
This stage also implies the organizing of a good commu-
nication between all levels of organization, so employee par-
ticipation is needed. Safety representatives and/or a safety
committee must be in place (it depends on the number of
employees). The organizational structure of the previous phase
could be used here in order to define clear safety responsibili-
ties for each of the employees (including directors, managers,
supervisors, etc.). Each of them need to know what they are
responsible for in the day-to-day operations. An important
factor for the success of this stage is the development of a
positive safety culture in the organization.
All this information must be provided to all of the employees
along with an H&S training. This is a way to develop aware-
ness regarding specific hazards, control measures, and safe and
emergency procedures associated with their work positions.
• Check: This phase includes the checking or monitoring of
H&S performance. It may be active, reactive or a mixture of
both. There is an active monitoring when the organization is
taking measures before things go wrong using routine inspec-
tions, checklists, regular H&S committee meetings and feed-
back from trainings, making sure that standards and policies
are being implemented. On the other hand, reactive monitor-
ing relies on taking action after things go wrong by looking at
historical events to learn from mistakes. In order to achieve
that, organizations should keep records of the investigation of
occupational accidents, occupational incidents (near misses)
and occupational diseases. It is obvious that a mixture of the
aforementioned types of monitoring is the right combination
to gain a good monitoring procedure.
• Act: This final stage involves the reviewing of performance

or the audit, which must be undertaken by the management
of the organization. The aim of this stage is the continual
improvement of the OHSMS. The effectiveness of the cur-
rent OHSMS will be identified by assessing whether targets
have been met (from the previous stages). Any weaknesses of
any stage of the OHSMS should be outlined here and recom-
mendations should be made in order to improve the system.
The PDCA model is also used as a basis for Occupational Health and
Safety Assessment Series (OHSAS) 18001, which is a standard that
aims to manage and control occupational risks through a systematic
and structured approach (Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2011). Therefore,
the five core activities of OHSAS 18001 are policy, planning, imple-
mentation, checking and management review, which apply to the
PDCA approach. OHSAS18001 has a similar structure and can be
compatible with ISO9001 and ISO14001.
3.4 The Role of the Manager in an SME
Based on what was discussed, it becomes clear that a manager faces

a number of challenges. As the onus of providing a safe and healthy
environment rests on his/her shoulders, the manager is faced with an
additional challenge. The manager has to initiate a sequence of events:
• Risk assessment of the workplace and all work positions
• Consultation with all employees on the results of the risk
assessment
• Definition of risk management options and adoption of a
safety management system
The economic realities and staffing levels in an SME are not always
great. The smaller the organization – in many occasions – the bigger
are the obstacles. It is not always easy to simply appoint an internal
safety officer or hire the services of an external safety consultant. The
manager/owner will play a pivotal role undertaking the responsibilities
of trainer, motivator, and human resource officer among others.
Smaller companies tend to have informal employee/employer rela-
tions. In smaller organizations, the owner/manager and employees have
usually personal acquaintance, continuous exchange and close long-term

relationships. The long-term face-to-face contact leads to familiarity and
knowledge of the manager’s thoughts and reactions (Hasle et al., 2012).
The typical stereotype of the authoritative manager is not always valid.
The role of the manager becomes ‘diluted’ within this atmosphere as
employees tend to undertake extra responsibilities. It is important to keep
the formality of the manager’s role with regard to safety.
In smaller organizations, the role of the manager is compared to that
of a ‘role model’. The vast majority of decisions dealing with the various
aspects of human resources fall with the owner/manager. Responsibilities
and roles in safety management are undertaken by owners/managers or
the few other available managers who have many other duties and tasks to
perform. Owners/managers are therefore the key actors in safety manage-
ment in micro-firms and have personal and informal contacts with their
employees (Hasle et al., 2012). Feedback mechanisms and safety com-
munication for corrective actions should be easier in organizations with
a small number of people and an informal structure, but are frequently
missing due to indifference and ignorance (Champoux and Brun, 2001).
The use of incentives, awards and recognition to motivate employ-
ees to perform safely is an accepted feature of both organization
behaviour management and total quality management models (Hagan
et al., 2001). They can add interest to the hazard control programme
of an organization and enhance self-protection action on the part of
the workforce (Cohen et al., 1979). A well-designed reward system
should be characterized by high level of visibility in the organization,
offering recognition, which can help modify behaviour (Vredenburgh,
2002). This study also recognizes safety promotion policy as one of
the safety management practices and is assessed using items related to
counting safe conduct as a positive factor for promotion, rewards and
incentives for reporting hazards, creating awareness among workers
by programmes during safety week celebrations, healthy competition
among workers to report unsafe conditions or acts and supervisors
welcoming and encouraging workers to report safety matters.
Recruiting new personnel, who are predisposed to displaying safety
conscious attitude in their work is a management practice adopted
in many developed countries. Turner (1991), Eckhardt (1996) and
Vredenburgh (2002) found that the consideration of safety performance
in the selection of employees is a significant predictor of injury rates.
Discussions with top management people from industries revealed that

this practice is not followed in Indian industries due to reasons such
as high population and high percentage of unemployment. Hence, the
this management practice is not considered in this study.
3.5 Importance of Safety Policy
The first step to set a formal safety standard within the organization is
the adoption of a safety policy. A written OHS policy helps promote
an effective OHS program and a functioning SMS system. Such a
policy should be tailor-made according to the needs of your work-
place and should be regularly reviewed and updated. The aim of this
part of the book is to assist you in writing and applying a policy for
your workplace. This policy communicates a commitment to H&S. It
should be signed by the managing director or the owner to highlight
their and the organization’s commitment to H&S. The H&S policy
must include the following:
• Illustrate the involvement of senior management and repre-
sentatives in the preparation of the policy.
• Be absolutely relevant to workplace’s real needs, not adopted
from another workplace.
• Have a special standing among other organizational policies.
The policy statement should provide a clear indication of the com-
pany’s objectives and plans for OHS. The following issues should be
covered in the statement:
• Senior management’s commitment to the establishment of a
healthy and safe workplace and to the integration of health
and safety into all workplace activities
• The intention to respect safety and health legislation as a min-
imum standard rather than maximum
• Responsibility of all personnel in maintaining a safe workplace
• Accountability of all levels of management for carrying out
health and safety responsibilities
• Importance of consultation and cooperation between man-
agement and employees for effective implementation of policy
• Commitment to regular reviews of the policy and to monitor
its effectiveness
Accountability and responsibility should be of utmost importance in

the development of the policy:
• Responsibilities are clearly defined and assigned

• Methods of accountability are established
• Proper procedures and program activities are implemented
• Responsibilities for carrying out the policy objectives are
clearly communicated and understood within the workplace
The adopted policy must be effectively communicated:
• It must be clearly defined

• Backed-up by proper arrangements and put into practice
• Reflected in day-to-day attitudes and actions of people and
monitored
Examples of ways in which policy and responsibilities can be com-

municated include
• Induction training
• Policy and procedure manuals
• Health and safety committees (as requested by legislation)
• Job descriptions
• Notice board notices and reminders
• Safety talks and meetings
• Senior management membership in health and safety committee
• Demonstration of senior management commitment through
effective response and review to committee recommendation
inspection reports, accident investigations and health and safety
programme evaluations
3.6 Inclusion of Employees in Safety Decision-Making
Participation of all employees during the development of the safety

policy, after the assessment of risks and throughout the life of the
organization is of paramount importance. A prerequisite of the estab-
lishment of a sound safety culture in any organization is the own-
ership of the safety policy. As described earlier, it is the duty of the
top management of any organization to develop and communicate to
employees and visitors the safety policy of the organization. An effec-

tive policy must take into account the opinions and experiences of all
the employees. Consultation with all the employees in all stages should
be a continuous effort and should be done in established periods.
Legislators in order to assist this process have established specific
guidelines. Article 19 of the ILO Convention 155 (ILO, 1981) sets a
legislative framework that promotes workers and worker representa-
tives’ participation in decision-making in safety-related aspects within
the work environment. For instance, in Cyprus (Member of the EU
since 2004), the Department of Labour Inspection – the National com-
petent authority to enforce and regulate safety at work – has enacted
Regulation P.I. 134/97 (DLI, 1997). This regulation (all countries that
have ratified the ILO 155 should have similar regulations) provides
an appropriate framework for regulating participation of workers in
safety-related decision-making. Election and responsibilities of safety
representatives are as follows:
• The election procedure is organized by the employer or his/
her representative among the employees and in cooperation
with their representatives.
• The employer may request help of a labour inspector in cases
where specific difficulties appear.
• The duration of their service is 3 years.
• Every employee can be elected as a safety representative as
long as he/she is employed for more than 2 years in the work-
place or in a similar employment.
The following table describes the requirements for the establishment
of committees and the election of representatives:
NO. OF EMPLOYEES NO. OF SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES SAFETY COMMITTEE

2–9 1 No
10–19 2 Yes
20–49 3 Yes
For every extra 50 1 Yes
The duties and responsibilities of representatives include

• Regular participation at the meetings of the safety committee
• To accompany labour inspectors during his/her inspection
• The representatives of the trade unions may also accompany

the labour inspector further to consultation with the employer
• Bring for discussion at the safety committee any prob-
lem related to the conditions of safety and health at the
premises
• Suggest to the employer or his/her representative the estab-
lishment of measures for the prevention of accidents at work
and occupational diseases
• Advise other employees on matters related to health and safety
• Promote and safeguard the cooperation of all persons at the
premises for the application of measures and methods of safe
work as well as of ways of developing a safety culture
• Within a reasonable time period, after informing the employer,
they inform the Labour Inspectorate of problems related to
health and safety at the workplace
• Conduct periodical inspections, at least every 3 months
• In general, be the representative of all employees on all sub-
jects concerning safety and health at the premises
The members of a safety committee are
• The employer or his/her representative
• Safety representatives
• Safety Officer and Representative of the medical service in the
workplace, when they exist
Possible duties and responsibilities of the committee include (among
others)
• Regular meetings every 3 months (at least)
• Extraordinary meetings when required (in writing) by all safety
representatives or the employer, or after a serious work accident
in order to examine the facts and the reasons related to it
• Submits suggestions to the employer regarding safety measures
• Deals with every matter concerning the safety, health and wel-
fare of the employees as well as complaints concerning the
safety and welfare of employees
• Keeps records of meetings
• Examines the reports prepared by the Safety Officer, if there
is one
• Promotes and secures the cooperation of all at the workplace

concerning the implementation of safety measures as well as
the promotion of safety culture
• Participates in the preparation of safety rules concerning the
premises
• Takes care that employees are provided with the necessary
information and training on health and safety matters
• Cooperates with the medical services of the premises or the
first aid services if they exist
• Cooperates with the Inspector on every matter related to the
conditions of safety and health of the workers at the premises
3.7 Marketing of Safety to Visitors and (Sub)contractors
A major issue all organizations face is that of visitors. From a risk

perspective, the possibilities of a visitor or a subcontractor having an
accident or being trapped in a possible evacuation are higher than
those of a permanent employee. A person that goes to the same build-
ing day-in, day-out (a permanent employee) becomes familiar with
the various evacuation routes. This fact coupled with an active safety
management system multiplies those levels of safety within an orga-
nization. A visitor will rely on his/her mind map in the event of an
evacuation. A first-time visitor will rely on a memory map that can
recall only the route that was followed on the way in.
The management of any organization – as described – has to pro-
vide a safe and healthy environment to employees, visitors and sub-
contractors. So far, we have described the various ways of engaging
the employees of any organization in the safety effort. A strategy has
to be adopted for visitors and subcontractors as well. Little was found
in the safety literature on the question of effectiveness of visitor safety
instructions. Also, the effect of visitor instructions on safety aware-
ness and safety behaviour has not been examined yet. However, there
have been several studies that investigated strategies to promote cer-
tain behaviour, for instance in consumer behaviour studies. In addi-
tion, several studies have been performed on the effectiveness of safety
information and warning signs in a medical context, in traffic or in
food safety. These studies provide valuable insights into aspects of
effective information that may apply also to visitor safety instructions.
Firstly, a marketing strategy can be used to promote safety and safe

behaviour. The visitor information is not something the recipient is
searching for himself or herself; it is therefore something that may
need to be presented attractively; something that needs to be ‘mar-
keted’. Vecchio-Sadus and Griffiths (2004) combined marketing and
safety into a study that investigated whether safety culture could be
enhanced through marketing strategies. They used marketing theory
to explain the three main objectives when promoting certain behav-
iour (which, thus, is also safety behaviour): informing, persuading and
reminding. They emphasized that in promoting certain behaviour, it is
especially important to know and to address the target group and their
needs, which they label ‘customer focus’. The importance of customer
focus also applies to visitor safety instructions, since different informa-
tion may apply for visitors in comparison to contractors or employees.
Wogalter et al. (1987) mention four aspects of effective informa-
tion: it should be attention getting (meaning that it should stand out),
comprehensible, concise and durable. Many studies on traffic signs aim
to investigate what aspects increase sign comprehension. Ng and Chan
(2007) show, for instance, that symbols should be familiar, specific and
meaningful. Specificity and conciseness refer to rational aspects of com-
prehension. However, some unconscious aspects also influence warning
comprehension. Bazire and Tijus (2009) showed, for instance, that the
context in which a road sign is presented is also of importance, and
Crundall and Underwood (2001) investigated the priming function of
road signs. Crundall and Underwood (2001) showed that a road sign is
more likely to instigate an automatic response if the sign or its context
has been perceived before. Similar to the findings of Ng and Chan
(2007), this underlines that comprehension of warnings is improved by
familiarity. This implies that repetition of certain signs – for instance,
both in the instruction and on site – may increase comprehension.
Besides the previously mentioned aspects (attention getting, com-
prehensible and familiar, concise and durable) additional aspects are
listed by safety researchers Saarela et al. (1989), who concluded that
slogans which were specific, clear and relevant to local needs were
recalled best.
Subcontractors bring to the organization a number of possible new
risks. Subcontractors’ lack of safety ethics, in a few cases, is a reality
(Adnan et al., 2012). Legal arguments may arise in case of an accident.
Organizations should explore ways of making and quantifying safety

as a contractual obligation for the subcontractor. Nowadays, the major-
ity of construction contracts – given the multidisciplinarity of sub-
contractors – contain specific clauses that define the legal framework
as well as the rights and duties of all involved parties. In particular,
construction projects with a number of contractors and possibly their
own subcontractors tend to create a more complex view. Examples of
safety duties the main contractor may have are to
• Produce a site policy that includes procedures, guidance notes

and codes of practice. The policy should incorporate client
requirements, where appropriate, and be included in the con-
tract documents for the subcontractors.
• Ensure that subcontractors are briefed about anticipated
construction methods, site/designs, relevant hazards, precau-
tions, general site safety rules and conditions, and clear about
divisions of responsibility. In turn, the subcontractors should
inform the major contractor about possible hazards arising
from their own activities.
• Ensure that subcontractors have made plans to work safely,
have priced their bids accordingly and have the necessary
resources. Each subcontractor should produce a contract-
specific safety policy.
• Ensure that subcontractors produce detailed method statements
for high-risk activities to monitor the subcontractors’ perfor-
mance against the method statements and take action where
necessary. It is good practice to consider safety as the first item
on the agenda of the regular subcontractor progress meetings.
• Manage health and safety on site by coordinating activities,
ensuring that planned procedures are implemented and moni-
toring performance so that revised arrangements can be made
as necessary. The major contractor should ensure that they do
not become remote from day-to-day problems on site.
• Organize a joint safety committee operating on a site-wide
basis and involving representatives of management and opera-
tives from all subcontractors.
• Convene regular, safety meetings, attended by both the major
contractor’s staff and each subcontractor’s site management.
3.8 Combining Systems: Safety, Quality and Governance Systems
In a previous paragraph we discussed the fact that increasingly more

companies are integrating safety-related clauses in their contracts with
subcontractors. In other words, smaller and bigger organizations move
towards establishing an acceptable standard of safety.
Quality implies the identification of customer requirements, the
definition of objectives and indicators for their measurement, the
design of processes for achieving these objectives and the assignment
of resources required to carry out these processes. Quality also implies
the execution of processes according to their design, to measure pro-
cess performance and to establish a continuous improvement process
for preventing and correcting non-conformities.
Safety refers to the identification of process hazards, their causes
and potential consequences, risk estimation and evaluation, establish-
ment of actions for avoiding, preventing or reducing the probability of
their occurrence, as well as setting up contingency plans to mitigate
losses and damages in the case of the occurrence of risks.
Safety and quality are a lot alike; they share a number of common
characteristics:
• They are driven by management, often top-down.
• They focus on continuous improvement.
• Training procedures and standardized operating procedures
play an important part.
• Emphasis is on prevention rather than reaction.
Several processes can be used in both applications:
• Process documentation
• Improvement and standardization of processes
• Statistical process control
• Decision-making based on data, trends and evidence
The ISO 9000 series is an aggregation of international standards of
guidance in quality management. Since the primary publication in
1987, the standards have acquired global reputation and due to their
general nature, have a range of application fields in various branches of
industry (Celik, 2009). ISO 9001:2008 is the most recent standard; it
is characterized by a system of internal regulation and control within
the firm. The regulations that are also based on the ISO 9000 model
have been created to help businesses in the development of systems for

managing and preventing dangers for the workers.
On the other hand, the OHSAS 18001 provides a recognized pre-
scription useful to the construction of an effective H&S system at
work. The organizations that have been certified with the OHSAS
18001 can be more assured that they have not left out anything and
that they conform to all the rules and regulations for H&S at work.
Acceptable occupational health contributes to better public health
in general. OHS influences upon the improvement of productivity and
competitiveness of firms. As stated earlier, in the last few years, the cer-
tification of management of safety has become a necessary prerequisite
on the field of processing in order to remain competitive. H&S prob-
lems at work bear a high cost for social protection systems. It is there-
fore necessary to ensure acceptable working conditions for the workers
and to take care of their general well-being. Literature shows signifi-
cant correlation between the effects of safety in the establishment of a
wider quality standard in the workplace. Arocena et al. (2008) show that
occupational safety measures, the intensive use of quality management
tools and the empowerment of workers all help to reduce the number of
injuries. Over the last decade, the application of certification has spread
from the documentation of quality prototypes into fields of H&S at
the work place (Granerud and Rocha, 2011). Fernández-Muñiz et al.
(2007) state that in various fields there is an increased interest for the
culture of H&S as a means of increasing productivity and, at the same
time, decreasing industrial accidents, with a primary goal of offering
quality products as well as satisfying both workers and customers.
Αpplication of quality management schemes related to safety are emerg-
ing as a necessary component to any business’ strategy. In many occasions,
people who work in the field of safety management are simultaneously
members of quality management work groups. The compliance demands
of the OHSAS 18001 are similar to the ISO 9001 even though the first
is a standard of professional H&S management and the latter is a quality
management standard, respectively (Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2011).
An empirical proof of the relationship between quality and safety
is given by Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2011) in a 2003 study. The study
covered a number of potentially high-risk (chemical) firms and hun-
dreds of employees examined the perceptions of employees about six
safety management practices and their safety behaviour. The authors
compared safety management in organizations with OHSAS 18001,

ISO 9001 and those with no certification. OHSAS 18001 certified
organizations were found to have better safety management systems.
Another main finding was that organizations with no certifications
practice traditional safety management without success.
Safety is an attribute of quality; as well as it is also itself an objec-
tive of quality. Safety should be integrated into process management.
Therefore, when we refer to quality concept, safety is implicit.
3.9 Lead by Example: The Case of PPE
Boustras and Hadjimanolis (2015) with the collaboration of the

Department of Labour Inspection of the Republic of Cyprus collected
information from a relatively large number of micro-companies in a
National survey. Information from employees, employers and labour
inspectors was drawn. The aims of the survey were to examine the views
and perceptions of employees and owners/managers on safety issues of
micro-firms in Cyprus, to collect information on accidents and other
aspects of safety performance in micro-firms and to cross-check the
data with data collected from safety inspectors for the above firms.
Data were traced from employees, employers and labour inspec-
tors. This choice was made in order to safeguard the accuracy of the
reported results. This fact led to some interesting findings in relation to
the different opinions and/or views employers, employees and labour
inspectors can have about the same issue.
Figure 3.2 presents a comparison between the findings of the ques-
tion related to the willingness to use PPE. A big 97.2% of the work-
ers report that they are not willing to use PPE (e.g. goggles, gloves,
helmets). On the other hand, employers report by 70.4% (a lot & very
much) that their employees are willing to use.
3.9.1 Personal Protective Equipment
The same figure – for checking purposes – presents the opinion of the
labour inspectors regarding the availability of PPE in the (just) inspected
premises. According to their opinion, 80.2% (a lot & very much) pro-
vide the necessary PPE. This finding presents a paradox: PPE exists and
workers are not willing to use it. Literature shows a large number of
studies suggesting that this is a common finding. Although the survey
50
Employees Employers
Employees are willing to use personal protective equipment

I am willing to use the existing personal protective equipment Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
in my workplace (e.g. gloves, helmets, goggles, etc.) Percent
Valid Not at all 1 .3 .4 .4
100
A little 12 4.2 5.4 5.8
Average 53 18.4 23.8 29.6
80 A lot 109 37.8 48.9 78.5
Very much 48 16.7 21.5 100.0
Total 223 77.4 100.0
60 Missing system 65 22.6
Total 288 100.0
Percent
40
The organization you just inspected provides the
adequate personal protective equipment
20
0 60
Not at all A little
40
Percent
SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN SMEs
Labour 20
inspectors
0
Not at all A little Average A lot Very much
Figure 3.2 Comparison of data findings about the use of personal protective equipment.
instrument aimed at investigating the reasons behind this fact, there was
a wider hesitation to uncover these reasons. To the limited response in
this question, the vast majority reported that they did not want to use
the existing PPE as they felt uncomfortable with their use.
Figure 3.3 presents an analysis similar to Figure 3.2, focusing on general
protective measures (GPM) this time; 97.8% of the respondents (employ-
ees) reported that they did not want to use the existing GPM (e.g. venti-
lation); 97.8% of the employers report that they p rovide adequate GPM
and 76.9% of the labour inspectors confirm that (a lot & very much).
The mentioned real-life example aims to illustrate the importance
of the role of the manager in an SME. A successful owner/manager
would not only offer the appropriate PPE and GPM to all the work-
ers in order to satisfy the legal requirements, but in consultation with
the employees, would have (1) designed an appropriate change man-
agement scheme, while taking into account possible resistance and
I am willing to use the existing

Personal Protective Equipment
in my workplace If not why?
(e.g. gloves, helmets, goggles, etc.) 80
100
80 60
Percent
Percent
60 40
40
20
20
0 0
Not at all A little Personal Not needed Other
discomfort (please
from their use If not why? explain)
I am willing to use the existing
General Protective Measures
(e.g. ventillation) If not why?
100 40
80
30
60
Percent
Percent
20
40
10
20
0 0
Not at all A little Personal Not Not Other
discomfort needed provided by (please
from their use employer explain)
If not why?
Figure 3.3 Reasons for non-use of PPE and GPM.

accounting for the extra time change would need to be implemented,

(2) put in place a reporting mechanism to record the process of effec-
tive use of PPE and GPM and (3) put in place a reward scheme to
recognize the effective use of PPE and GPM.
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4
Safety Performance
i n a n SME E n v i r o n m e n t
A N C A M U T U, F R A N K W. G U L D E N M U N D
A N D P I E T E R VA N G E L D E R
Contents
4.1 International Standards and Codes 57

4.1.1 Understanding (Safety) Standards 57
4.1.2 OHS Standards 62
4.1.2.1 Pros – OHSAS 18001 64
4.1.2.2 Cons – OHSAS 18001 65
4.2 Setting Up an Auditing System 67
4.2.1 Audit 67
4.2.2 Auditor 68
4.2.3 Types of Audits 70
4.3 Auditing an OHS Management System 74
4.3.1 Policy 74
4.3.2 Planning and Implementing 76
4.3.2.1 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 76
4.3.2.2 Legal Requirements 77
4.3.2.3 Objectives and Programmes 78
4.3.3 Measuring Performance 78
4.3.4 Reviewing Performance 79
4.4 Concluding Remarks 81
4A Appendix 81
References 91
Taking care of business and also doing this in a safe way is often chal-
lenging for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). In order to
carry out the latter, the enterprise needs to ponder safety, develop a
vision and, ultimately, express this vision in a safety policy. Not only that,
the policy has to be implemented, which basically means that (some
sort of ) a safety management system has to be put in place, which has
55
to be monitored and maintained subsequently. Unfortunately, this is

often, however wrongly, seen as a ‘never-ending burden’ that ‘has noth-
ing to do’ with the purpose of the SME. Therefore, for most SMEs,
the occupational health and safety (OHS) aspects remain a largely
‘peripheral matter’ [1].
There are several reasons for this:
1. The limited size of the SME and therefore the human resources
available for safety implementation and safety-related tasks.
2. The financial aspects of the SME – also limited and usually
need to be shared between regular business costs, budgeted
business expansion costs and eventual safety implementation
(usually least to be considered).
3. The SME’s safety performance experience – most SMEs
(fortunately) don’t have much or even any experience with
incidents and the effects of safety incidents on their business.
Having or defining clear safety considerations is a ‘peripheral matter’
as the struggle to survive drives most SMEs to focus on product or
service delivery rather than on health and safety at work.
In Europe, SMEs are providing employment to nearly 50% of all
European workers [2], making therefore the management of OHS
at SMEs very important [3]. Despite that, there is little known
within SMEs about basic OHS management tools available for
them, OHS legislation, standards and guidance, OHS responsibili-
ties and/or OHS duties.
This chapter explains the role of international OHS standards in
the management of OHS, the main structure of OHS legislation in
Europe and the overall guidance available in managing OHS aspects.
This knowledge would enable an SME’s management to identify
any regulations it needs to comply with and make sensible decisions
about which particular regulations to follow when attempting to
manage OHS. Section 4.1 offers a deeper explanation of the OHS
standards available (OHSAS 18001 and ISO 45001) with their pos-
itive and negative aspects, and it proposes existing tools to be used in
order to diminish the negative aspects of these OHS standards. The
audit, the possible types of audits to be used at SMEs, the role of the
auditor and the selection of an auditor are all discussed with practi-
cal tips and tricks in Section 4.2. A clear understanding of the audit’s
S a f e t y P e r f o r m a n c e i n a n S ME E n v i r o n m e n t 57
role, the types of audits and the selection of the auditor is needed in
order to be able to conduct eventual OHS internal audits or to be
prepared for an external audit. Section 4.3 discusses the auditing of
a complete management system of OHS. In the appendixes to this
chapter, there are practical documents to be used for various OHS
management actions.
The chapter does not claim to be complete, and information given
in it is structured as general as possible, in order to address various
profiles of activities an SME might have. Where available, references
were made to sector-specific documents. These can be used as a practi-
cal starting point when addressing OHS management at SMEs.
4.1 International Standards and Codes

4.1.1 Understanding (Safety) Standards
In order to understand the roles of international standards and codes

in the context of safety and safety performance at SMEs one needs to
understand the actual role and (legal) status of standards.
For most SMEs, it is not overly clear what standards or codes they
need to comply with and to what extent compliance with standards is
needed. It usually comes as a surprise that an enterprise regardless of
its size needs to comply with a particular standard or code. Standards
and codes are not binding legal documents, and their character is vol-
untary rather than mandatory.
In Figure 4.1, an overview is given of the existent binding docu-
ments (grey-coloured cells) and non-binding documents in Europe
(white cells).
There are several instances when standards become binding legal
documents:
1. When a certain standard or code is stipulated in official docu-
ments such as building permits, operating licences, envi-
ronmental permits or other documents issued by an official
institution for a specific SME.
For example, when a new building is erected, in the building
permit (issued by local authorities) there can be clear refer-
ences to the minimum requirements of the thermal insula-
tion as given in a specific standard. In this case, even if the
Europe
Non-binding
Binding documents
documents
Recommendations
Regulations
Directives
Decisions
Opinions
Converted
to national Under
legislation conditions
International
National legislation
Regional
Standards
National
Acts
Guidelines
Point to
Decrees Technical
notes
Codes of
practice
Figure 4.1 Binding documents (grey) and non-binding documents in Europe (white).
standard itself is not binding, it becomes a binding document

imposed by local authorities. A particular standard or code
can be stipulated directly in the official document; by nam-
ing the exact standard or code to be used, or stipulated indi-
rectly when a product or service quality management system is
required (reference to ISO 9001) a safety management system
(reference to BSI OHSAS 18001), a food safety management
system (reference to ISO 22000) or various other management
systems.
2. When an SME signs a contractual agreement that requires
conformity to a particular standard (contractual requirement).
For example, construction works at a site owned or used by
governmental agencies will be appointed, in most European
countries, only to companies having a BSI OHSAS 18001 safety
management system in place. If the safety management system
is not a tender selection criterion but stipulated in the contract
as ‘required’, the BSI OHSAS 18001 standard becomes a bind-

ing document once a collaboration contract has been signed.
Other examples are products acquired from national funds that
are usually required to be produced by ISO 9001 certified com-
panies, i.e. conforming to a quality management system.
If there are no requirements in terms of standards or codes (directly
or indirectly) in any official documents issued by local authorities and
there are no contracts in place requiring a certain standard or code to
be used during the collaboration, officially there are no mandatory
standards that a specific SME needs to comply with.
When compliance with a certain standard is required, it is impor-
tant to select the right standard. The number of the standard is not
solely to be used when searching for a standard. There are several
other ‘characteristics’ that the ‘full name’ of a standard can have: ISO,
indicating that the standard is internationally recognized and valid;
EN, indicating that the standard is harmonized (accepted) across
the entire European Union; ABC, indicating the national standard-
ization body issuing the particular standard (for a complete list of
European national standardization bodies, see Appendix 4A.1); and
ACBDEFG, full name of the standard, the part (if the standard con-
tains several parts) and the date of publication. In Table 4.1, the name
of the ISO EN CYS 9001: 2015 Quality Management Systems –
Requirements standard is explained.
When searching for the BSI OHSAS 18001 using solely the num-
ber (18001) or wrongly assuming the international validity of this stan-
dard and adding ISO to the search, the resulted standard is ‘NPR-ISO/
IEC TR 18001:2004 - Information technology - Radio frequency
Table 4.1 Standard Nomenclature Explained

STANDARD’S NAME
Internationally valid ISO
European harmonized – EU accepted EN
National standardization body CYS
Number 9001
Name Quality Management Systems – Requirements
Part —
Published 2015
identification for item management - Application requirements profiles’

– a completely different standard from the BSI OHSAS 18001 – safety
management system. Therefore, using the correct information when
looking for a standard is essential for an appropriate result.
Tip: Review your permit(s) for building, operating or other types of

licences issued for your SME. Try to find any references to standards
or codes that your organization needs to comply with. Standards
are usually referred to by the name of the standardization body. Use
Appendix 4A.1 – National standardization bodies in the EU to
identify the standardization body or bodies in your country. Codes are
referred to usually by their full name or specific acronyms considered to
be known in a country.
The main question that remains after acknowledging that com-

pliance with standards or codes is voluntary is, ‘Why do enterprises
actually comply with such standards or codes?’
The main reason is because standards and codes are recognized
worldwide and accepted as technical specifications reflecting ‘good
engineering practice’, broader vision and multidisciplinary input. They
define requirements for products, production processes, services or test
methods in a manner that is agreed upon by the various market actors
involved (industry, engineering, academia) involving expertise in vari-
ous fields (engineering, safety, production) and in conformance with
the best technology available.
In practice for SMEs, standards and codes are tools facilitating prod-
uct market approval, allowing simplified agreements between stake-
holders, enhancing fair competitiveness, helping to demonstrate safety
implementation, supporting possible legal claims* and, most impor-
tantly, giving extensive and practical methods on how to comply with
(parts of ) legislation. They are ‘guidance documents’ that, if followed,
would allow the replication of a product, situation, method, test and
others proven (from experience and multidisciplinary input) as ‘safe’.
There are various so-called safety standards or safety codes, and they
all cover particular safety aspects. Below is a brief list of possible safety
* Compliance with a standard cannot confer immunity from legal obligations. Legal
obligations prevail over any standards in use.
‘groups’ covered by standards and codes. Please note that this is not an
exhaustive list and various other standards and codes can be added to it.
At the same time, various other safety ‘groups’ can be defined and created:
• Product safety standards and codes cover product safety and/
or certain risks with certain products – for example, ISO
11540:2014 Writing and marking instruments – Specification for
caps to reduce the risk of asphyxiation, IEC EN NEN 60204-
1:2005 Safety of machinery – Electrical equipment of machines –
Part 1: General requirements and many others and Practical
Rules applicable to pressure equipment.
• Installations safety standards and codes cover safety aspects
to be accounted for in various installations – for example,
NEN 3140:2015 Operation of electrical installations – Low
voltage; ISO EN NEN 13623:2009 Petroleum and natural
gas industries – Pipeline transportation systems; and Energy
Institute Model Code Of Safe Practice, Part 1 (IP1 2010
Electrical Safety Code).
• OHS standards and codes cover general OHS aspects – for
example, ISO 45001 Occupational health and safety manage-
ment systems – Requirements with guidance for use – draft
and Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems –
Requirements (officially BSI OHSAS 18001).
The main disadvantage of applying codes or standards comes from their
‘replication of a safe product, process, service or situation’ capability. That
means that the ‘safe product, process, service or situation’ was already
applied, tested or encountered, and therefore, following the exact prescrip-
tions of a standard or code limits the amount of innovation that could
have been applied otherwise. In the case of SMEs, known for their ‘inno-
vation capabilities’, some standards might turn out to be too ‘restrictive’.
At the same time, some valid and in-use standards or codes are not
fully updated to current technologies and capabilities. Following these
standards or codes could result in ‘outdated’ products or services that
would, in turn, impact the revenue of the SME or could result in non-
conformities with the actual legal framework in force. Other standards
or codes were withdrawn without publishing any other documents to
replace them, so following a certain ‘official guidance’ in such a situa-
tion is actually not possible.
Some standards are very specific for a particular sector or activity

and using them in a different context would not be possible or it would
not result in the expected safety level. With more than 20 million
SMEs in Europe [4] having various profiles of activity, a safety stan-
dard needs to be flexible enough to adapt and allow its application to
any profile of activity that the SME might have.
Therefore, before deciding to follow a standard or code of practice
for product safety, installation safety, occupational safety or any other
safety domain, one should briefly review the respective document and
check whether the document is not too restrictive in terms of innova-
tion, flexible enough to be applied to the SME and up to date or able
to be used without violating any legislation in force*.
4.1.2 OHS Standards
When it comes to occupational health and safety (OHS), a non-

restrictive standard that offers enough flexibility to allow its applica-
tion to any profile of activity that an SME might have (and that is,
thanks to the British Standards Institution [BSI], kept up to date)
is the BSI OHSAS 18001 – Occupational health and safety man-
agement systems – Requirements. Due to its general features and
applicability, BSI OHSAS 18001 became popular and internationally
recognized as the ‘tool’ and ‘guiding document’ for OHS.
Due to its popularity, there is an attempt to draft an International
Standard Organization (ISO) version of this standard – called ISO
45001. An update from the ISO published on their website and dating
November 2015 estimates that the ISO 45001 will be published at the
end of 2017 (Figure 4.2) [5].
Please also note that the ISO 45001 standard is not yet available
and not yet to be used, so the main safety management systems stan-
dard remains for the moment the BSI OHSAS 18001.
BSI OHSAS 18001 has a similar objective compared with all
other management systems – to ensure continuity in meeting certain
goals – in this case, OHS goals. It is not a restrictive (nor a prescriptive)
standard, and if one expects direct instructions on how to implement
* Compliance with a standard cannot confer immunity from legal obligations. Legal
obligations prevail over any standards in use.
ISO 45001 ISO 45001 expected
officially proposed publication
Committee stage II Inquiry stage II
Committee stage I Inquiry stage I
01/01/2014 01/01/2015 01/01/2016 01/01/2017
01/03/2013 01/12/2017
Figure 4.2 Timeline of ISO 45001. (Adapted from International Organization for Standardization, ISO 45001 – Occupational health and safety, ISO, Geneva, Switzerland,
2015, available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/iso45001, accessed on 1 July 2017.)
S a f e t y P e r f o r m a n c e i n a n S ME E n v i r o n m e n t
63
OHS aspects at a certain type of facility, this is definitely not the stan-
dard for that. It is a standard to be used in approaching OHS as a
long-term investment that continuously needs attention and strives for
continual improvement.
BSI OHSAS 18001 has been developed with the aid and input
of several European Notified Bodies (NoBos). It incorporates the
management review (as stated in ISO 9001 and ISO 14001) and the
plan–do–act–check system in a more detailed model, as shown in
Figure 4.3. The given model is recognized by NoBos, can be followed
by externals, and compliance with it can be certified.
4.1.2.1 Pros – OHSAS 18001

There are various reasons for implementing an OHS management
system according to BSI OHSAS 18001. Table 4.2 gives a summary
of the main reasons for (advantages of ) implementing a BSI OHSAS
18001 safety management system.
Policy
Management Planning
review
OHS
Checking and
Implementation
corrective actions
Figure 4.3 OHS management system model for the 18001 standard. (Adapted from British
Standard Institution, BSI OHSAS 18001 – Occupational health and safety management systems:
Requirements, p. 22, BSI, London, UK, 2007.)
Table 4.2 Advantages of a BSI OHSAS 18001 Safety Management System

ADVANTAGES
Gives structure to SMEs’ OHS management activities
Improves OHS performance – continuous monitoring and revision of OHS activities
Limits possible liabilities (clear demands in BSI OHSAS 18001 limit misunderstandings)
Ensures compliance (limited) to legislative requirements
Shows SMEs’ interest in OHS aspects – internal but also external
Allows the employer to outsource OHS tasks
Can complement an existing OHS management system
Not a prescriptive document
Not all these advantages will be discussed in detail here. Some of

these are very straightforward, and they don’t even need further expla-
nation. One particular advantage will be discussed, and that is also the
reason that makes this safety management system very interesting for
SMEs: the OHS outsourcing capability.
In Europe, ‘the employer has the duty to ensure the safety and
health of the workers in every aspect related to work’ [7]. The employer
is, in the case of an SME, the entrepreneur (the business owner) that is
also (legally) responsible for OHS. That comes besides his or her other
management responsibilities: finances, human resources, investment
and many others. The BSI OHSAS 18001 safety management sys-
tem is a tool that allows the employer (entrepreneur, business owner)
to delegate tasks that contribute to OHS management. The overall
OHS still remains the employer’s responsibility, but (s)he can delegate
tasks that contribute to the fulfilment of these obligations to (safety)
management representatives (or similar). It is a type of ‘outsourcing’ of
OHS tasks. The employer remains responsible for overall safety and
for the selection, instruction and supervision of the (safety) manage-
ment representatives [8], but (s)he delegates the OHS responsibilities
to his or her trusted employees.
4.1.2.2 Cons – OHSAS 18001

There are various reasons for not implementing an OHS management
system according to BSI OHSAS 18001. Table 4.3 gives an overview of
the main disadvantages of implementing BSI OHSAS 18001 at SMEs.
Not all disadvantages will be discussed here but one particular dis-
advantage (also named in the advantages table) will be addressed, and
Table 4.3 Disadvantages of a BSI OHSAS 18001 Safety Management System

DISADVANTAGES
BSI OHSAS 18001 certification can be expensive
Misses the ethical aspects of OHS management
Not suitable where production is heavily outsourced
Lacks clear performance indicators – for monitoring and steering purposes
Not suitable where no OHS knowledge is available
Not a prescriptive document
solutions for using this characteristic more as an advantage than a

disadvantage are provided.
BSI OHSAS 18001 is not a prescriptive document, and it is not
stating direct demands in terms of OHS. It allows each SME to
implement its own dedicated, practical, familiar OHS ‘rules’ in an
imposed framework. It leaves room for interpretations, the SME as
auditor being allowed to use their experience and knowledge under
the ‘umbrella’ of BSI OHSAS 18001. Due to its non-restrictive char-
acter, OHSAS 18001 is applicable to any activity that an SME might
have; due to its imposed framework, it provides a structure able to be
verified and certified.
Not being prescriptive, being flexible, leaving place for interpreta-
tions and supporting actions instead of providing rules can for some
SMEs be an impediment in setting up a safety management system.
SMEs lacking the confidence or the experience with OHS should not
aim for BSI OHSAS 18001 certification as their first encounter with
OHS. SMEs in such circumstances should get familiar with more
‘prescriptive’ documents, ‘tools’ and guidance before attempting to
create their own guidance and guiding rules. Some of these available
‘tools’ are ‘OHS catalogues’ available (in Dutch) in the Netherlands or
the Online Interactive Risk Assessment (OIRA) tool in Europe.
In the Netherlands, there are the so-called arbocatalogi – for an
overview of available ‘catalogues’, see Reference 9. These ‘catalogues’
use field experience and practitioners’ input in order to identify the
main risks of a certain occupation. These documents do not claim to
be complete and fit for all organizations, but they are a very good
starting point when trying to identify possible occupational risks.
In the European Union, the OIRA project (see Reference 10)
generalizes the Dutch model and presents it in an interactive manner
to the users. The OIRA tool, unlike its Dutch version, ‘communicates’
with the user in a question-and-answer interactive way, generating at
the end a custom-made template for the user to download and apply at
his or her facility as an action plan for future OHS actions. The OIRA
tool gives OHS tips and supports each question with an explanatory
document and/or legal text. It also allows the user to measure the risk
or to indicate the ‘priority’ of activities identified as ‘risky’. The priori-
ties given are to be found in the action plan in the order of the actions
to be taken.
It might be that other countries have their own OHS-supporting
tools. A scan of the locally available ‘tools’ is recommended. If none is
available, the OIRA tools and the Dutch ‘OHS catalogues’ can always
be used as a source of inspiration.
4.2 Setting Up an Auditing System

4.2.1 Audit
An audit is a systematic, independent and documented process for

obtaining ‘audit evidence’ and evaluating it objectively to determine
the extent to which ‘audit criteria’ are fulfilled [11]. It is a measure-
ment tool (system) meant to check whether a set of rules, policies,
procedures or requirements (generally named audit criteria) are met.
The audit criteria can be based on (1) (safety) legislation in force, usu-
ally named legal compliance audit; (2) on rules and policies as imposed
by branch associations, if the SME is a member of such an association
(these associations incorporate in their policies the legal requirements
in force, and they add branch specific safety requirements); or (3) on
SME-specific rules, as considered mandatory by a specific SME.
Based on the audit criteria or the set of rules, policies, procedures
or requirements used as references, a workable (or several) support-
ing document(s) needs to be created to support an auditor on-site
and to systemize the auditing process. These documents can be in the
form of a checklist, questionnaires, multiple-choice form or other,
similar types of support forms. They help the auditor in performing
the audit and not omitting items from the audit criteria. These docu-
ments do not replace the auditor’s experience or necessary competen-
cies (see Section 4.2.2), and they are not to be used as a ‘read and fill-in
document’ on site but solely as a supporting tool. For creating these
support documents, software such as Microsoft Office® (see example

[Excel®] of report in Appendix 4A.3) and iAuditor (free software; see
example of report in Appendix 4A.3) can be used. More important
than the software used is the auditor’s familiarity with confidence in
the type of supporting document it generates.
Obviously, an audit needs to be independent. This is frequently
interpreted wrongly, and the word ‘independent’ is confused with
the word ‘external’. ‘Independent’ does not necessarily mean that the
audit is external to the organization. In many cases, independence can
be demonstrated by the freedom from any involvement in the activ-
ity being audited. An independent audit can therefore be performed
by an internal entity (an SME employee) not directly involved in
the audited activity. For example, for an SME having an engineering
department and a production department, an audit performed by an
employee in the engineering department on the production depart-
ment can be an independent audit as long as the engineering depart-
ment’s employee is not involved in the activities of the production
department. The reason for this separation (independence) is needed
in order to avoid business blindness or to avoid doing the things in
another way than it should just ‘because it was always done like this’.
Independence in an audit is the only manner to obtain an objective
evaluation of the situation.
Results of an audit need to be documented, and records should be
kept. There are no requirements in terms of storage period for the
results of an audit, but with digital data storage nowadays, keeping
records for a minimum of 10 years is not an issue anymore. Keep in
mind that the more results records are stored, the easier to track trends
and changes and compare results.
4.2.2 Auditor
The auditor is the person conducting an audit. Confidence in the

auditing process and the ability to achieve its objectives depend on the
competence of the auditor(s). Competence in the case of an auditor
is a combination of personal skills and the ability to apply knowl-
edge and skills gained through education, work experience, training
and so on. The auditor should show a genuine interest in the activity
audited. Understanding the nature of the activity allows the auditor
to ask relevant questions for the audit criteria that would also support
the achievement of the goal of the audit. This interest should be mani-
fested in the planning phase of the audit as well as during the site visits
and documents revision. The auditor should be able to detect ambigu-
ity and be able to clarify situations without assuming facts. Take, for
example, the statement the long drill was boring. A possible meaning
can be that the amount of time that the drill was boring was long or that
a long drill was used for boring. The role of the auditor in a similar case
is to ask extra clarifications in order to record the correct action and
situation without making personal assumptions and jeopardizing the
truth. The auditor should be respectful, ethical, diplomatic and pos-
sessing good communication skills. At the same time, (s)he should be
willing to consider alternative ideas or points of view and be able to
effectively interact with others including audit team members and the
auditee’s personnel. Reference 12 gives an extensive list of personal
skills (see Appendix 4A.4) that an auditor (ideally) should possess.
The list is not restrictive – extra personal skills could be added to it,
and it is not compulsory – an auditor is not required to possess all
skills named therein. The most important personal skills remain the
ones mentioned here. When selecting an internal (to the enterprise)
auditor, one should strive to identify the person having most of the
named personal skills.
The required professional skills are specific to the activity audited.
The auditor should at least be familiar with the basic terminology used
in a specific branch of activity. (S)he should understand the p rocess (to
understand it, does not necessarily mean to be an expert in the process
being audited) and should have basic knowledge of OHS legislation in
force and applicable to certain processes and/or equipment. Acquiring
the necessary vocabulary for the audited activity can be a step in the
pre-auditing phase (for simple audited activities or for activities that
the auditor is familiar with), or it can require a specific education from
the auditor (when the audited activity requires in-depth knowledge).
A general auditor training is usually not necessary as professional
skills are job specific and they are not covered by auditor formation
trainings, whereas personal skills of the auditor is a matter of ‘to have
or have not’, as they are difficult to ‘train’. An auditor training could
be a solution when there is the intention to use the auditor for sev-
eral audits. For example, the auditor could audit the product quality
management system and the OHS management system. A more use-

ful training for an auditor is training in legal compliance or legisla-
tion and its implementation. As legislation is continuously changing,
it should be noticed that even after the completion of such training, a
(regular) refreshing training is recommended. The interval for provid-
ing this refreshing training should be flexible and in conformity with
the actual changes in legislation. Usually, news briefs from NoBos in
Europe indicate expected changes in the legislation. Signing up for
those news briefs could be a solution to keep up with changes (or
expected changes) in the legislation.
4.2.3 Types of Audits
Having the audit criteria defined and having the right person for the
job (auditor) are necessary to identify the possible types of audits to
be conducted – advantages and disadvantages for each type and what
exactly needs to be audited.
There are three main types of audits, and a summary of their main
advantages and disadvantages is provided below:
1.
Internal audits – first-party audits. Internal audits can be con-
ducted by the SME’s own personnel, and the audit criteria
can be based on any OHS rules or regulations* that the SME
might consider relevant for its activities. It can be performed
on a regular basis, as the costs associated with it are mini-
mal. Performing an internal audit before involving second or
third parties (externals) can pre-identify possible shortcom-
ings and save time and money with a pending external audit.
It is a very useful tool for internal OHS level evaluation and
can be used as an OHS monitoring tool (see also Chapter 8
for monitoring OHS). As it is conducted with the support of
internal resources – insiders familiar with the SME activities
– it tends to focus more on the ‘visible’ activities or work-
floor activities (such as processes on site, personal protective
equipment, etc.) and less on ‘non-visible’ activities or the back
* When the audit criteria is derived from legal requirements, standards or codes, meet-
ing the audit criteria results in ‘compliance’, and not meeting the audit criteria results
in ‘non-compliance’.
office activities (such as OHS policies, documentations, etc.).

This is a good approach for a short-term OHS approach, as
the ‘visible’ OHS risks are identified and most likely measures
to mitigate them are directly taken. However, it is less effec-
tive for a long-time approach if not combined with the ‘non-
visible’ part of the pertinent, sound OHS policies, clear OHS
training schedules and records and many others. In Appendix
4A.5, a SWOT analysis of the internal audit is given.
External audits – second-party audits.The external audits – second-
2.
party audits – are usually audits (or informally named ‘checks’)
performed by (SME) client(s) on their (SME) supplier(s) or
the other way around. In a more general sense, there are audits
performed by a party that has a certain degree of interest in the
other party. These audits have as audit criteria the contractual
agreements between the parties. They are rarely OHS focused,
as OHS, if already mentioned, represents a small part of the full
contractual agreements. These types of audits can be performed
even on suppliers having a certified OHS or product quality
management system, while they are based on custom-made
contractual agreements, which are not always the same as those
encountered in a certified management system. It is costless for
the supplier to have such an audit performed, but the results of
the audit can be kept for the client’s information only and might
not be disclosed to the supplier. At the same time, it might be
a one-sided interpretation of the contractual agreements and
not reflect the situation as it is. SMEs delivering products or
services should keep in mind that external second-party audits
(from their clients) are possible at all times. Particular OHS
aspects as stipulated in the contractual agreements should be
included in the SME’s OHS policy and OHS management
system. Poor scores after second-party audits could have conse-
quences for the supplying company from warnings to fines and
even termination of the contract.
Tip: Review your contractual agreement with your own cli-
ents and identify OHS contractual agreements. Even if not
mandatory, a certified BSI OHSAS 18001 management sys-
tem can be a contractual agreement.
3.
External audits – third-party audits. External audits – third-
party audits – are audits performed with the management
systems certification as scope. In the case of the OHS, a suc-
cessful third-party audit would need to result in an OHSAS
18001 certificate such as the one shown in Figure 4.4. Third-
party audits are performed by certification (notified) bodies (or
NoBos), and they have the advantage of being completely inde-
pendent, performed at the request of the SME, and therefore
are unbiased. Third-party audits are carried out by an auditor
having the required personal and professional skills, who is able
to attest conformity to an OHS management system. The cer-
tification body has another advantage for the SME – it brings
up-to-date knowledge in terms of legislation in force, eventual
modifications and the impact of this legislation on the SME.
Unfortunately, due to the increasing number of certification
bodies available, the prices for the certification processes grad-
ually decreased, reaching now minimal rates. This had a direct
impact on the time allocated to such an audit and implicitly
on the quality of the third-party audit. The OHS third-party
audits are performed nowadays with a minimum of allocated
resources, and they mainly focus on document control rather
than actual OHS implementation. The results of the audit are
very much dependent on the experience of the auditor and his
or her ability to select relevant OHS aspects to check during
the auditing process. For the SME going for the BSI OHSAS
18001 certification as a permit requirement, as a contractual
agreement or voluntarily, the selection of the certification body
should be based on experience (and quality) and not the price.
In Appendix 4A.6, SWOT – external – third-party audit, a
SWOT analysis of the external audit is given.
The general conclusion is that all these types of audits have advantages
and disadvantages. The ideal situation would result from a c ombination
of audit types – for example, a more frequent execution of the internal
OHS audit (incorporating also elements of the OHS as expected to be
encountered during a second-party audit) complemented by a yearly
external third-party audit.
Figure 4.4 OHSAS 18001 certificate – Dutch example – property of Lloyd’s Register Quality
Assurance – Netherlands.
4.3 Auditing an OHS Management System
Auditing an OHS management system is based on the characteristics

of an audit and the skills of an auditor as described in Section 4.2 and
applied to the OHS standards as described in Section 4.1.2.
In practice, it means that all elements of the OHS safety manage-
ment system (as defined in Reference 6) should be defined, imple-
mented and ‘audited’. The elements of the OHS management system
are summarized in Figure 4.5, and in the following text, each element
is briefly explained from the perspective of an OHSAS 18001 audit.
4.3.1 Policy
The OHS policy is a document that defines and authorizes the scope
of the OHS management system. It officially needs to be developed
by (or with the direct involvement of ) top management – in the case
of the SME most likely the entrepreneur and owner of the SME but
the involvement of all employees (in the form of feedback or surveys)
is recommended. It is a document ‘describing how you will manage
health and safety in your business’, and it ‘will let your staff and others
know about your commitment to health and safety’ [13]. An OHS
policy template, simple to use and very straightforward, is given in
Appendix 4A.7.
The policy needs to reflect management commitment to the pre-
vention of injury and ill health, continual improvement of OHS
management and performance, compliance to legislation and other
requirements to which the organization subscribes that relate to its
OHS hazards.
The practice following the policy can be summarized in five essen-
tial characteristics:
1. The actions as stated in the policy need to be implemented – for
example, if policy is to reduce the number of cuts, e mployees
should be provided training about the risks of cuts, training
about the benefits of using gloves and the usage of gloves should
be supervised.
2. Policy needs to be documented, although BSI OHSAS
18001 limits the number of documents ‘to be created’, the
OHS policy indeed needs to be documented; the OHS policy
Policy
Policy
improvement
Organizing
Planning and
Auditing
implementing
Measuring
performance
Reviewing
performance
Feedback loop
to improve
performance
Figure 4.5 Elements of the OHS management systems.
can be combined with a possible environmental or quality

policy, and these don’t need to be in separate documents.
3. Being up to date implies periodical revision even when ‘situa-
tion on site is unchanged’; avoid hiding behind the ‘nothing has
changed’ argument when updating your OHS policy. It might
be that the company remains the same but the legislation has
changed. The OHS policy still needs to be adapted accordingly.
4. Communicated to all that persons affected by it (personnel,

contractors, visitors).
5. Available on demand.
The objectives of the OHS policy need to follow the SMART model
as given in [14]: Specific – target a specific area for improvement.
Measurable – quantify or at least suggest an indicator of progress.
Assignable – specify who will do it. Realistic – state what results
can realistically be achieved, given available resources. Time-related –
specify when the result(s) can be achieved.
The lack of experience leads most SMEs to set up a policy unre-
alistic, unspecific and unachievable. Policy and OHS risk assessment
should be linked to each other. There is no need to reduce standing
hours in an office environment.
The OHS policy needs to consider the nature and scale of the
organization’s OHS risks. This is a variable that is not influenced by
the size of the enterprise. SMEs can have high OHS risks, while large
enterprises (LE) could have low OHS risks – it all depends on the
risks that can be encountered by a specific enterprise.
4.3.2 Planning and Implementing
Planning is in BSI OHSAS 18001 divided into hazard identification

and risk assessment, legal requirements, objectives and programmes.
4.3.2.1 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

There are various hazard identification and risk assessment techniques,
and each one of them can be used in a specific SME context. An SME
OHS manager can use any technique (s)he is familiar with or fan-
cies. More important than the technique, are the correct identification
of risks and the output of the risk assessment. The risk identification
should consider the following:
1. The size of the organization – think about particular risks that
are present only when the number of employees reaches a cer-
tain amount, for example, possible fire marshals that would
coordinate evacuation in case of fire.
2. The performed activities – consider both routine and non-routine
activities; for example, activities performed by contractors
and/or visitors and not directly related to the work flow, tempo-
rary changes.
3. Nature, complexity and significance of the uncontrolled
hazard – consider besides ‘technical risks’ also the ‘human
behaviour risks’.
Most SMEs (and not only these!) perform the risk assessment in order
to come up with a ‘required document’ and therefore miss the overall
role of this action. They do not focus on determining the OHS risks,
as they assume (wrongly or not) that the ‘risk controls’ implemented
on site are effective and used. At the same time, lack of experience and
lack of dedicated and trained personnel for performing the risk assess-
ment can lead to a ‘theoretical’ risk assessment that has no links with
the addressed site and its potential OHS risks.
Similar to the policy, the risk assessment should be updated peri-
odically. No situation exists that ‘no changes occurred’. A pregnancy
among one of the employees requires a new risk assessment to be per-
formed based on this ‘new situation’; the replacement of an installation
with a new one performing exactly the same job requires a new risk
assessment, as the introduced risks can be of a different nature; and
even more examples can be added. As a rule of thumb, at least a yearly
update of the risk assessment is necessary.
Most SMEs know their occupational risks. When risks are unknown
(start-up SMEs), ‘tools’ such as the Dutch OHS catalogues or OIRA
can be used – see also Section 4.1.2 and Appendix 4A.7.
4.3.2.2 Legal Requirements
Most SMEs are aware of the demand of a so-called legal register,
and they have such a document on-site. It is a super-sized document
containing all legislation applicable to the SME. It is a ‘collection’ of
legislation – not all the time updated – without any knowledge on
how this is related to the specific SME.
More interesting is that legislation can have a different interpreta-
tion in a different context; therefore, citing a legal text but missing the
interpretation is not of any value to the SME. The role of the legisla-
tion is to add value (knowledge from experience) to the SME. Certain
legal requirements are also safety related, as legislation was published
to prevent such incidents reoccurring.
The legal register should contain SME-specific regulations only,

that is, legislation related to all the assets of the SME (production or
non-production related), process of the SME, people involved in the
SME and environment (natural environment but also assets in the
work environment). The SMEs tend to focus on asset p roduction–
related legal requirements and tend to neglect the rest, that is,
essential elements such as fire safety aspects, OHS aspects and envi-
ronmental aspects are unjustifiably neglected. This can have major
consequences in terms of business continuity, insurance, liability and
many others.
4.3.2.3 Objectives and Programmes

Objectives should be in line with the OHS policy of the SME, and
it should include the commitment to continuous improvement.
Defining and agreeing on objectives requires management involve-
ment at all times. Where practicable, objectives should be SMART:
Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timed. In order to
be achievable, the objectives should clearly state the eventual legal
requirements, the technological options available (including costs) and
the operational requirements (including possible costs). A time frame
should be linked to the achievement of these objectives together with
one or more responsible persons for each objective. Objectives can
change in time and that is acceptable, though management approval is
required for every change in the objectives, and a justification for the
change needs to be kept available at all times.
4.3.3 Measuring Performance
BSI OHSAS 18001 requires (up-to-date) procedures in place for

measuring (monitoring) OHS performance. These procedures should
include proactive and reactive and qualitative and quantitative mea-
sures, as deemed appropriate. The SME should decide what to moni-
tor and how often monitoring will take place, based on a level of risk.
Legal requirements are also to be accounted for.
Quantitative and qualitative measurements need no further expla-
nation and the (pro)active and reactive measurements are explained
further below.
(Pro)active measurement – focuses on preventing the occurrence of

OHS incidents; the ‘measured’ parameters are also called leading indi-
cators. Table 4.4 gives an overview of the parameters to be monitored
for an (pro)active performance measurement.
Reactive measurement – focuses on OHS incidents that have
occurred; the ‘measured’ parameters are also called lagging indicators.
Table 4.5 gives an overview of the parameters to be monitored for a
reactive performance measurement.
4.3.4 Reviewing Performance
‘Top management shall review the organization’s OHS management

system, at planned intervals it determines, to ensure its continuing
suitability, adequacy and effectiveness’ [6].
Table 4.4 (Pro)active Performance Monitoring – Leading Parameters

LEADING OHS INDICATORS
Percentage of managers with adequate OHS training
Percentage of workers with adequate OHS training
Percentage of management meetings wherein OHS is addressed
Percentage of management workers
Meetings wherein OHS is addressed
Number of management visits to the shop floor where OHS is addressed
Percentage of business partners (suppliers, contractors, etc.) evaluated and selected on the
basis of their OHS
Performance on a widely accepted OHS certificate
Number of workplace inspections or scores of workplace inspection systems such as
ELMERI or TR observation
Frequency of (observed) (un)safe behaviours
Number of OHS audits performed
Percentage of OHS projects/activities that are finalized on time
Percentage of OHS suggestions or complaints where feedback is given to those reporting
within two weeks
Number of ‘precursors’ or ‘early warnings’ recognized that precede ‘serious safety problems’
Prevalence of certain health problems, for example, as outcomes of health checks or health
surveillance
Work Ability Index (predicting the likelihood of early retirement)
Safety climate (survey)
Source: Zwetsloot, G.I.J.M., Key performance indicators, OSH WIKI, 2014 [15].
Table 4.5 Reactive Performance Monitoring – Leading Parameters

LAGGING OHS INDICATORS
Injuries and work-related incidents
Lost time incident frequency (Rate)
Production days lost through sickness absence (% of total work days lost by sickness
absence; this can also be specified further, e.g. for short-term sickness and long term)
Incidents or near misses (including those with the potential to cause injury, ill health or loss)
Complaints about work that is carried out in unsafe or unhealthy conditions
Number of early retirements
Percentage of productive planned work days realized (i.e. 97% productive work days as
opposed to 3% sickness absence)
Number of hours worked (by the total work force) without lost time injury
Number of working days since the last accident
Employee satisfaction (survey)
Source: Zwetsloot, G.I.J.M., Key performance indicators, OSH WIKI, 2014 [15].
Revision of performance provides management the opportunity

to re-affirm its commitment to continuous improvement. The review
process must ensure that necessary information is collected to allow
evaluation by management. Top management may be defined in this
respect as those with sufficient authority to initiate and manage change
in the business and in the OHS management system, which may also
involve financial authority [16].
The review must meet a minimum of the defined inputs and out-
puts and is required to be documented.
This element of the Specification is asking from the organiza-
tion to take a step back from the system and determine if it is ade-
quate, suitable and effective... not just that it has been implemented!
Management Review, especially in an immature system, can be seen
as a ‘State of the Nation’ discussion that establishes those elements of
the system that are not yet fully implemented, and this would then
indicate that the organization is not yet ready for certification.
Demonstration of the defined inputs and outputs and their review
from a business perspective is crucial.
Often, the review is conducted by the management representative,
whereas the Specification is looking for top-level management par-
ticipation and the setting of objectives.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has provided an overview of OHS standards applicable

to SMEs. It reviewed these standards at a systems level (i.e. ISO,
BSI, OHSAS) as well as at a detailed, requirements level (i.e. what is
required of the SME to have in place).
In the near future, we might expect increased use of (automatically)
logged data of tools, machines, installations and so on, to inform self-
diagnosis and audits as well as assist in (re)evaluating risks. However,
human involvement in OHS management and auditing will always
be necessary to make final decisions and judgements, but these assist-
ing tools will support decision making, sharpen expert judgments and,
ultimately, increase SME OHS-performance.
4A Appendix
4A.1 National Standardization Bodies in the EU
COUNTRY ACRONYM NATIONAL STANDARDIZATION BODIES (FULL NAME)
Belgium NBN Bureau de normalisation
Bulgaria БИС Български институт за стандартизация
Czech Republic ÚNMZ Úřad pro technickou normalizaci, metrologii a státní
zkušebnictví
Denmark DS Fonden Dansk Standard
Germany DIN Deutsches Institut für Normung e.V.
Germany DKE Deutsche Kommission Elektrotechnik Elektronik
Informationstechnik im DIN und VDE
Estonia EVS Eesti Standardikeskus
Estonia TJA Tehnilise Järelevalve Amet
Ireland NSAI National Standards Authority of Ireland
Greece ΕΣΥΠ/ΕΛΟΤ Εθνικό Σύστημα Υποδομών Ποιότητας/Αυτοτελής
Λειτουργική Μονάδα Τυποποίησης ΕΛΟΤ
Spain AENOR Asociación Española de Normalización y Certificación
France AFNOR Association française de normalisation
Croatia HZN Hrvatski zavod za norme
Italy UNI Ente nazionale italiano di unificazione
Italy CEI Comitato elettrotecnico italiano
Cyprus CYS Κυπριακός Οργανισμός Τυποποίησης (Cyprus
Organisation for Standardisation)
(Continued )
COUNTRY ACRONYM NATIONAL STANDARDIZATION BODIES (FULL NAME)

Latvia LVS Latvijas standarts
Lithuania LST Lietuvos standartizacijos departamentas
Luxembourg ILNAS Institut luxembourgeois de normalisation, de l’accréditation,
de la sécurité et qualité des produits et services
Hungary MSZT Magyar Szabványügyi Testület
Malta MCCAA L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta għall-Kompetizzjoni u għall-Affarijiet
tal-Konsumatur
Netherlands NEN Stichting Nederlands Normalisatie-instituut
Netherlands NEC Stichting Nederlands Elektrotechnisch Comité
Austria ASI Austrian Standards Institute (Österreichisches
Normungsinstitut)
Austria OVE Österreichischer Verband für Elektrotechnik
Poland PKN Polski Komitet Normalizacyjny
Portugal IPQ Instituto Português da Qualidade
Romania ASRO Asociatia de Standardizare din România
Slovenia SIST Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo
Slovakia SÚTN Slovenský ústav technickej normalizácie
Finland SFS Suomen Standardisoimisliitto SFS ry
Finland SFS Finlands Standardiseringsförbund SFS rf
Finland FICORA Viestintävirasto
Finland FICORA Kommunikationsverket
Finland SESKO Suomen Sähköteknillinen Standardisoimisyhdistys SESKO ry
Finland SESKO Finlands Elektrotekniska Standardiseringsförening SESKO rf
Sweden SIS Swedish Standards Institute
Sweden SEK Svensk Elstandard
Sweden ITS Informationstekniska standardiseringen
United Kingdom BSI British Standards Institution
Note: Adapted from the list of national standardisation bodies pursuant to Article 27 of Regulation
(EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on European standardisa-
tion 2013/C 279/08.
4A.2 Example of an Audit Template Using Excel
AUDITOR’S FINDINGS AND

AUDIT QUESTIONS OBSERVATIONS LEGISLATION ROOT CAUSE RISK RECOMMENDATIONS ACTION PHOTOS
Yes No NA Detail any List applicable legislation/ Identify what Please detail any When
observations, regulation (if none, indicate the root recommended action is
findings and n/a). cause of actions to due, set
records the risk is. remediate an according
evidenced. identified risk. to risk
severity.
7.1 Is there an up-to-date risk N No up-to-date Assurance accident Management High Perform a risk <3 months NA
analysis covering all risk risk analysis – réforme (loi 2010) analysis covering
at the workplace (including covering all all risks at the
risks with special workers risks at the workplace. Ensure
if applicable)? workplace. up-to-date
If risk analysis is documents for
available and if every new
vibrations can situation,
represent a source of equipment and
risk activities at the
Special workers: workplace.
youth, pregnant
women, disabled
(Continued )
83
84

7.2 Does the risk analysis N See 7.1 Loi du 12 mai 2010 portant See 7.1 See See 7.1 See 7.1 NA
determine the protection réforme de l’assurance 7.1
measures to be taken to accident et modifiant: (1) le
reduce the impact of Code de la sécurité sociale;
frequency of the risk (2) la loi modifiée du 3 août
(including personal 1998 instituant des régimes
protective equipment)? de pension spéciaux pour les
If PPEs are to be fonctionnaires de l’Etat et
used, check if des communes ainsi que
employer is providing pour les agents de la Société
the PPEs to the nationale des chemins de fer
concerned workers. luxembourgeois; (3) la loi
7.3 Is there a designated worker NA modifiée du 26 mai 1954
for OHS aspects? (It can réglant les pensions des
also be an external fonctionnaires de l’Etat;
organization.) (4) le Code du travail; (5) la
loi modifiée du 18 avril 2008
concernant le renouvellement
du soutien au développement
rural; (6) la loi modifiée du 4
décembre 1967 concernant
l’impôt sur le revenu.
(Mémorial A - No 8, 27 mai
2010, pp. 1489–1507)
(Continued )
What is the exact Délégués à la sécurité
number of dedicated - modalités de formation
workers? What are (règlement grand-ducal
the trainings they 2004)
received?
7.4 Is there an emergency Y

response team on site?
Designated workers to be
members of the team.
What is the exact
number of dedicated
workers? What are the
trainings they
received? How often is
the training refreshed?
7.5 Are the workers exposed to N Loi du 31 juillet 2006 portant
fire risk informed of the introduction d’un Code du
risk and the measures Travail (Mémorial A
taken (or to be taken) for - No 149, 29 août 2006,
protection in case of fire? pp. 2527–2528)
Documented
workshops, trainings,
etc.
(Continued )
85
86

7.6 Is there an up-to-date list of Y
accidents at work?
All accidents resulting ETC.
in an incapacity of
work for 3 days or
more should be
recorded on that list.
7.7 Is every worker informed of N
general OHS risks and
particular risks related to
his or her position in the
company?
Check if informative
documents are
available.
4A.3 Example of an Audit Template Using iAuditor

QUESTION RESPONSE DETAILS
1. Management
1.1. Permits
1.1.1. Is there an environmental permit Available Permit in place, dating 03-2000. Permit
in place? given for three boilers and three CHP
units. New situation updated in 2009.
Appendix 1 Appendix 2
1.1.2. Is there an activity reporting a Not

request registered and approved? applicable
1.1.3. Is there a permit for the heat Not available No permits for the heat distribution
distribution network? network available during site visit.
1.2. Logbooks
1.2.1. Are logbooks generally accessible? Yes Logbooks available on site. An asset’s
Check five random logbooks if easily to general logbook is in place and up to
find on site. date.
4A.4 Personal Skills of an Auditor

PERSONAL SKILL EXPECTED BEHAVIOUR
— Ethical Fair, truthful, sincere, honest and discreet
— Open-minded Willing to consider alternative ideas or points of view
— Diplomatic Tactful in dealing with people
— Observant Actively observing physical surroundings and activities
— Perceptive Aware of and able to understand situations
— Versatile Able to readily adapt to different situations
— Tenacious Persistent and focused on achieving objectives
— Decisive Able to reach timely conclusions based on logical reasoning and
analysis
— Self-reliant Able to act and function independently while interacting effectively
with others
— Acting with fortitude Able to act responsibly and ethically even though these actions may
not always be popular and may sometimes result in disagreement or
confrontation
— Open to improvement Willing to learn from situations and striving for better audit results
— Culturally sensitive Observant and respectful to the culture of the auditee
— Collaborative Effectively interacting with others including audit team members and
the auditee’s personnel
Source: International Organization for Standardization, ISO 19011:2011 – Guidelines for auditing
management systems, p. 56, ISO, Geneva, Switzerland, 2011.
4A.5 SWOT – Internal Audit
Strengths Weaknesses
Can be used as preparation for external audit Company blindness
Communication can be very efficient Use old evaluation techniques
Auditor has the know-how if the audited party Under-reporting due to job security fear
Cheap – compared to external third-party audits
Opportunities Threats
Inside in the OHS aspects of the company Under-reporting when management mistakes
are involved
Possibility to directly act on findings Result manipulation (in the interest of the
audited party)
Colleagues might go easy on each other
4A.6 SWOT – External – Third-Party Audit
Strengths Weaknesses
Independent Lack of information about audited process
Transparent Lack of technical knowledge about audited process
Qualified auditor Expensive
Saving internal resources (personnel; time) Time consuming
Opportunities Threats
Certification Ethics of the auditor
Fresh vision Audited party decides what to show and not to show
Avoids ‘company blindness’
4A.7 OHS Policy (Example) and Risk Assessment (Example)

References
1. P. Hasle and H.J. Limborg, Guest editorial, International Journal of
Workplace Health Management, 4(2), 2011.
2. European Commission, Entrepreneurship and Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises (SMEs), 15 August 2016.
3. G.I.J.M. Zwetsloot, OSH Management in Small and Micro Enterprises,
OSH WIKI, 2014.
4. M. Dimitri Gagliardi, E. Glossop, C. Caliandro, M. Fritsch, G. Brtkova,
N.U. Bohn, D. Klitou, G. Avigdor, C. Marzocchi and R. Ramlogan,
A recovery on the Horizon? Annual report of European SMEs 2012/2013,
European Commission, Brussels, Belgium, 2013.
5. International Organization for Standardization, ISO 45001 –
Occupational health and safety, ISO, Geneva, Switzerland, 2015, avail-
able at: http://www.iso.org/iso/iso45001 (accessed on 1 July 2017).
6. British Standard Institution, BSI OHSAS 18001 – Occupational health
and safety management systems: Requirements, p. 22, BSI, London, UK,
2007.
7. European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, Council Directive
89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to
encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work,
EU-OSHA, Bilbao, Spain, 1989.
8. C. Brück, The role of legislation in occupational safety and health man-
agement, 3 July 2012, p. 5, EU-OSHA, Bilbao, Spain, 2012.
9. R. Hoevers, Overzicht arbocatalogi/arbocatalogus per branche of sector in
Nederland, available at: http://www.arbocatalogi.net/ (accessed on 1 July
2017).
10. European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, Online interactive risk
assessment – OiRA, EU-OSHA, Bilbao, Spain, available at: http://www.
oiraproject.eu/ (accessed on 1 July 2017).
11. International Organization for Standardization, ISO 9000:2015 –
Quality management systems: Fundamentals and vocabulary, ISO,
Geneva, Switzerland, 2015.
12. International Organization for Standardization, ISO 19011:2011 –
Guidelines for auditing management systems, p. 56, ISO, Geneva,
Switzerland, 2011.
13. Health and Safety Executive, Write a health and safety policy for your
business, 2014, available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/simple-health-safety/
write.htm (accessed on 1 July 2017).
14. P. F. Drucker, The Practice of Management, HarperCollins, New York,
2010.
15. G.I.J.M. Zwetsloot, Key performance indicators, OSH WIKI, 2014.
16. Lloyd’s Register Quality Assurance, Implementing an OHSMS – LRQA
guidance, LRQA, London, UK, available at: http://www.lrqa.co.uk/help-
and-support/Implementation-Articles/Health-Safety/ (accessed on 1 July
2017).
5
S a f e t y C l i m at e o f
S m a l l - to -M e d i u m
Enterprises
S T E P H A N I E C . PAY N E ,
M I N DY E . B E R G M A N ,
N AT H A N A E L L . K E I S E R A N D
X I AO H O N G X U
Contents
5.1 Organizational Culture and Organizational Climate 94

5.2 Safety Culture and Safety Climate 95
5.3 Safety Climate Level and Strength 97
5.4 Literature Review of Safety Climate Studies Conducted
in SMEs 97
5.5 Challenges in Predicting Unsafe Incidents 99
5.6 The Development of Safety Climate 100
5.7 Individual-Level Influences on Safety Climate 101
5.7.1 Attraction/Selection/Attrition Influences 102
5.7.2 Group-/Organizational-Level Influences on Safety
Climate 103
5.7.3 Leadership Influences 103
5.7.4 Socialization Influences 104
5.8 Organizational Characteristic Influences on Safety
Climate 105
5.9 Safety Climate Development in SMEs 106
5.10 Assessment of Safety Climate 107
5.11 Best Practices in Safety Climate Assessment 108
5.12 Levels of Analysis 110
5.13 Workplace Safety Interventions 111
5.14 Conclusion 114
References 114
93
This chapter reviews safety climate in organizations, particularly

small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs). Regardless of organizational
size, the concepts relevant to understanding safety climate remain
the same. However, the way that safety climate develops, is managed
and is affected by unsafe incidents may differ depending on organi-
zational size. This is important, because since the inception of the
research field 30 years ago (Zohar, 1980, 2010), the majority of safety
climate research has been conducted in and on large organizations.
Nevertheless, there is an extensive body of literature from which to
draw lessons learned about safety climate and apply to SMEs. Thus, in
this chapter we review important concepts like organizational culture,
organizational climate, safety culture and safety climate to set the con-
text for how to understand and interpret safety climate and its effect
on employee behaviour. Then, we review theory and evidence on the
development of organizational climate, antecedents and consequences
of safety climate, and research examining safety climate in SMEs.
Finally, we describe how to assess safety climate and workplace safety
interventions designed to improve safety climate. Our goals with this
chapter are both to inform practitioners and researchers in environ-
ment, health and safety management about the state-of-the-science in
safety climate and to encourage additional research on safety climate
in SMEs, so that these important and common enterprises are a larger
part of the conversation about safety and safety climate.
5.1 Organizational Culture and Organizational Climate
Organizational scientists have been studying organizational culture and

climate and its influence on workplace accidents for well over a half
century (e.g. Keenan, Kerr, & Sherman, 1951). Organizational cul-
ture has been defined as ‘a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the
group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and inter-
nal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and,
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive,
think, and feel in relation to those problems’ (Schein, 1992, p. 12). Thus,
organizational culture refers to employees’ normative beliefs and shared
behavioural expectations within an organization (Cooke & Szumal,
1993; Glisson & James, 2002). Notably, organizational culture is layered
(Hofstede, 1991; Schein, 1992), with shared behavioural expectations
SAFETY CLIMATE OF SMALL-TO-MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 95
and normative beliefs as an outer layer that is conscious to employees,

with values and assumptions as an inner layer that is less conscious to
employees (Rousseau, 1990; Schein, 1992).
Organizational climate is a related but distinct construct from orga-
nizational culture (Denison, 1996; Ostroff, Kinicki, & Muhammad,
2012; Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003). Organizational climate
is defined as employees’ shared perceptions of organizational policies,
procedures and practices (Reichers & Schneider, 1990; Schneider &
Reichers, 1983). Organizational climate provides information regarding
what behaviours are rewarded, supported and expected in the workplace
(O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996; Schneider & Reichers, 1983), suggesting
that climate is one layer of the broader organizational culture construct
(Ostroff et al., 2003). Because different domains of organizational life
have different policies, procedures and practices, organizations have
numerous climates, that is, there is not a singular organizational climate,
but many climates that are all ‘for’ something (e.g. safety, diversity, ser-
vice; Schneider & Reichers, 1983). Of all the various types of organi-
zational climates, safety climate is one of the most studied (Schneider,
Ehrhart, & Macey, 2013).
Consistent with the conceptualization of culture as a layered
construct differing in the extent to which employees are conscious
of them, organizational scholars advocate for assessing culture and
climate differently. Culture is determined phenomenologically and
qualitatively through observations and interviews, whereas climate
is assessed quantitatively through self-reports with a questionnaire
(Guldenmund, 2000).
5.2 Safety Culture and Safety Climate
The distinction between safety culture and safety climate parallels the
distinction between organizational culture and organizational climate.
Here we adopt Guldenmund’s (2000) definition of safety culture:
‘those aspects of the organizational culture which will impact on atti-
tudes and behaviour related to increasing or decreasing risk’ (p. 251).
Building on the general definition of organizational climate, we adopt
Zohar’s (2003a) definition of safety climate as employees’ shared per-
ceptions of policies, procedures and practices regarding workplace
safety.
Although a keyword search of the research literature reveals

more empirical studies of safety culture than safety climate, closer
inspection reveals that questionnaires have been the predominant
method for assessing ‘safety culture’ (Collins & Gadd, 2002; Griffin
& Curcuruto, 2016; Guldenmund, 2000, 2007). This is problematic
for safety culture research, because ‘[q]uestionnaires have not been
particularly successful in exposing the core of an organizational
safety culture’ (Guldenmund, 2007, p. 723). Thus, the research lit-
erature conveys much more about safety climate than safety culture
despite the fact that on the surface the literature appears to focus
on safety culture (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016; Guldenmund, 2007).
Correspondingly, for the remainder of the chapter, we refer to safety
climate when the original work used questionnaires or other quanti-
tative assessments, even when the original authors may have referred
to safety culture.
Safety climate is a robust predictor of workplace safety and employee
safety behaviour (Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur, 2010; Christian,
Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Nahrgang,
Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011; Payne, Bergman, Beus, Rodríguez, &
Henning, 2009; Zohar, 2003a). However, safety climate is not just a
leading indicator (i.e. predictor) of unsafe events but rather is also
a lagging (i.e. outcome) indicator of unsafe events (see Beus et al.,
2010, for a review). Employees perceive injuries and unsafe incidents
as indicators of the importance placed on safety in their organization
(Schneider & Reichers, 1983), so as more unsafe incidents accumulate,
safety climate is likely to deteriorate. Unsafe events may be particu-
larly influential to the future development of safety climate in SMEs,
because accidents presumably occur less often and are subsequently
better known, observed and impactful.
Most safety researchers conceptualize and operationalize safety cli-
mate as a multidimensional construct; however, researchers have not
come to consensus on all of the underlying factors or dimensions that
constitute the construct (Guldenmund, 2000). Yet there is consider-
able evidence that management commitment to safety is a key, if not
superordinate, component of safety climate (Beus, Muñoz, Arthur, &
Payne, 2013; Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Zohar, 2003a).
Beus et al. (2013), for example, found that the following dimensions
illuminate how management’s commitment to safety is manifested
in organizations: safety communication, co-worker safety practices,

safety training, employee involvement in safety, safety rewards, and
safety equipment and housekeeping.
5.3 Safety Climate Level and Strength
Climate level and strength are two important properties of safety cli-
mate. Conceptually, safety climate level refers to the average employee
perception of climate within the group. It can be interpreted in terms
of overall ‘goodness’ of safety climate for the group. Operationally,
safety climate level is simply the mathematical mean of individual
employee responses to the climate measure within the group (Chan,
1998; Schneider, Salvaggio, & Subirats, 2002). Climate strength refers
to the within-group variability of individual climate perceptions. The
less within-group variability, the more the agreement among the
employees within the group and the ‘stronger’ is the climate (Schneider
et al., 2002). Climate strength is operationalized as the within-group
standard deviation of all employee responses to the safety climate
items (Schneider et al., 2002). Some research has shown that the rela-
tionship between climate level and organizational outcomes is stron-
ger when climate strength is high than when climate strength is low
(Schneider et al., 2002), because a stronger climate is more influential
on individual’s behaviours – via normative social pressures – than a
weaker climate (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996). This suggests that safety
climate is more likely to reduce workplace injuries when employees
perceive the organizational environment the same way.
5.4 Literature Review of Safety Climate Studies Conducted in SMEs
As noted earlier, most of the published scientific literature on safety

climate was conducted in large enterprises. The majority of documen-
tation on the assessment of safety climate in SMEs is case studies. For
example, the Health and Safety Executive commissioned a report sum-
marizing six SME case studies that demonstrate the business benefit
of effective management of occupational health and safety (Antonelli,
Baker, McMahon, & Wright, 2006). These companies underwent a
variety of initiatives for a variety of reasons. For example, due to fairly
rapid growth (acquiring approximately one employee per month,
starting with approximately 40 employees), Cougar Automation Ltd.

undertook a complete overhaul and restructuring, including a compre-
hensive review of the health and safety systems, in an effort to change
the climate within Cougar. One of the biggest changes that occurred
was the Operations Director became responsible for health and safety.
Across all six companies described in the report, management believed
that improving health and safety was integral to business risk manage-
ment. Although these companies rarely systematically or comprehen-
sively tracked the costs and benefits of the initiatives, they reported
a number of benefits including maintaining reputation, meeting cli-
ent requirements, controlling insurance premium costs and reducing
absenteeism. Although only one of the companies sought to explicitly
change safety climate, many reported such a change as a result of their
efforts.
Another notable exception is a relatively recent survey of 30 SMEs
in India by Unnikrishnan, Iqbal, Singh and Nimkar (2015). They
found that safety management practices (which directly contribute to
safety climate) were inadequate in most SMEs. They attributed this
to market competitiveness, a drive for efficiency, less risk and strin-
gent laws. They also found financial constraints, a lack of awareness,
resistance to change and a lack of training to be the main barriers to
safety management practices. Interestingly, they found that the need
to remain competitive with other SMEs served as a very important
reason for implementing better safety practices which are likely to
result in a better safety climate.
Woo (2015) described an effort to implement a risk management
system in a small family-owned and operated flight school. This effort
was prompted in part by the loss of a highly regarded member of the
flight school community, demonstrating the potentially larger impact
that traumatic events like a fatality can have on an SME. Woo notes
that the successful implementation of a safety management system
is contingent on the organization having a favourable safety climate
(Stotlzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). All 18 staff members completed
a survey about the need for the safety management system. Results
revealed that even in an SME, there can be considerable disagree-
ment about safety-related perceptions and needs. That said, Woo
also noted that because the organization was so small, large portions,
if not all, of the staff could participate in climate changing tasks.
Woo concluded that collaborative, learning-oriented approaches to

developing and changing a safety climate that are advocated in the
literature (e.g. Wilson-Donnelly, Priest, Burke, & Salas, 2004) apply
equally well to SMEs and that the implementation of a safety man-
agement system contributes to the development and maintenance of
a strong safety climate.
5.5 Challenges in Predicting Unsafe Incidents
It is evident that safety climate affects workplace safety. However,

whereas these general relationships found in the scientific literature
provide excellent guidance for organizations as a whole, individual
organizations still need to assess their own safety climate and unsafe
events in order to determine their own safety status. This simple prop-
osition is more challenging than it appears, because of several chal-
lenges to assessment and prediction – especially the assessment and
prediction of unsafe events.
Fortunately, unsafe incidents are rare phenomena. Statistical analy-
ses and prediction models tend to assume that data are normally dis-
tributed. Because unsafe incidents are relatively rare, such data are
not normally distributed. The fact that these events are low base-rate
phenomena complicates our ability to explain and predict them. This
issue is even more challenging in an SME (compared to large orga-
nizations). First, because SMEs have fewer personnel, businesses and
physical resources, there should be fewer safety-related events overall.*
Second, the law of large numbers indicates that when there are fewer
events, there should be greater variability in the rate of events; this
makes prediction more difficult, because true changes (whether good
or bad) in incident rates will be harder to detect due to the natural
* Counting events is itself complicated (Bergman, Payne, Taylor, & Beus, 2014). Here,
we refer to fewer events overall (i.e. the count of events). However, rates of events can
also be considered (e.g. number of car accidents per miles driven; number of product
errors per 1000 products produced; number of product errors per 1000 employees).
Compared to large organizations, SMEs should have a smaller total number of unsafe
incidents because of their size, but they might have higher rates of unsafe incidents.
Information from the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (2003) indi-
cates that SMEs have higher rates of unsafe incidents (on average), although there are
multiple reasons that this occurs beyond the size of the organization.
variability in events over time. Finally, because unsafe incidents should

be fewer in total numbers, bigger events will have an even greater
impact on the workplace and on safety climate because they will not
occur against a ‘noisy’ background of unsafe incidents.
Another issue that complicates the prediction of unsafe incidents is
the phenomenon of under-reporting, or failure for employees to dis-
close unsafe events. Because under-reporting is so pervasive (Arthur
et al., 2005; Probst, Brubaker, & Barsotti, 2008), organizations may
need to take actions to ensure the most accurate incident data.
Several studies have found that employees in smaller companies are
more likely to under-report injuries than those in larger companies
(e.g. Leigh, Marcin, & Miller, 2004; Oleinick, Gluck, & Guire, 1995).
Under-reporting is likely to lessen the predictive validity of safety
climate. To complicate things further, there is an inverse relationship
between safety climate and under-reporting rates, such that higher
rates of under-reporting occur in organizations with poorer safety cli-
mate (Probst et al., 2008). Some actions that can be used to remedy
under-reporting include (1) allowing anonymous reports; (2) stream-
lining the reporting process so it is not onerous or time-consuming or
otherwise unintentionally punishing to the reporter’s time, effort and
personal resources; (3) using cues or prompts to remind reporters of
possible factors in the event (Probst, 2013).
5.6 The Development of Safety Climate
Ostroff et al. (2003) described a multi-level model of organizational

culture and climate and identified five complementary (not compet-
ing) perspectives on organizational climate formation: structuralist,
attraction–selection–attrition (ASA), social interaction, leadership
and immediate workgroup. The structuralist perspective was founded
on Lewin’s (1951) field theory, which suggests that organizational
characteristics lead to the development of shared perceptions such as
safety climate. Consequently, characteristics of an organization (e.g.
size, structure, centralization, hierarchical level) combine to influence
shared perceptions. The ASA framework (Schneider, 1987) suggests
that organizations are shaped by the attributes of individual employ-
ees; because people tend to like people like them (i.e. ‘birds of a feather
flock together’), new organizational members are selected based on
their similarity to current organizational members and those people

who do not fit in tend to leave (i.e. attrition). As a result, organi-
zations tend to become homogeneous over time. According to the
social interaction approach, climate develops from social exchanges
(e.g. communication and interaction) among employees. Next, the
leadership perspective states that leadership behaviours communi-
cate meaning and shared perceptions among workgroup members
(e.g. Rentsch, 1990; Schein, 1992). Finally, the immediate workgroup
also likely influences climate development through task characteristics,
workgroup structure, and common experiences (Marks, Zaccaro, &
Mathieu, 2000; Ostroff et al., 2003). The following section provides an
overview and application of these theoretical descriptions of climate
development, focusing on safety climate in SMEs. These descriptions
are organized into individual-level, group-level and organizational-
level influences on safety climate.
5.7 Individual-Level Influences on Safety Climate
Two main individual or person-related factors contribute to safety:

personality characteristics and job attitudes (Christian et al., 2009).
The most widely accepted conceptualization of personality and per-
sonality characteristics is the Big Five, which differentiates among five
factors: conscientiousness (orderly, responsible, dependable), agree-
ableness (good-natured, cooperative, trustful), extroversion (talkative,
assertive, energetic), openness to experience (intellectual, imaginative,
independent-minded) and emotional stability/neuroticism (calm, not
neurotic, not easily upset; John & Srivastava, 1999). Meta-analytic*
evidence supports the relationship between Big Five personality traits
and safety behaviour (Beus, Dhanani, & McCord, 2015). Beus et al.
(2015) noted that it is not the personality traits per se, but their rela-
tionships with higher-order goals of communion, status, autonomy
* Meta-analysis is a statistical procedure that quantitatively aggregates the results

of many studies on the same topic in an effort to calculate a population parameter
(e.g. rho (ρ) for a correlation). It includes corrections for factors such as sample size
in each study and the quality of the measures used. Meta-analytic results are widely
considered to be a better estimate of the relationships between variables than the rela-
tionships reported in any individual study because meta-analysis averages out and/or
corrects for errors in the individual studies (e.g. sampling) included therein.
and achievement associated with each personality trait that influ-

ence subsequent safety behaviour. Specifically, employees higher on
extroversion and openness to experience seek out goals of status and
autonomy, which undermine safe work behaviour. Those who are emo-
tionally unstable should likewise perform less safely, because they are
less likely to perform well under stress. However, highly conscientious
and agreeable individuals are more likely to behave safely because
those traits are associated with goals of harmony and getting along
with others. Beus et al. (2015) found that extroversion, agreeableness,
conscientiousness and neuroticism were correlates (albeit in some
cases small) of unsafe behaviour (ρ = .10, −.26, −.25, .13) and unsafe
events (injuries and property damage; ρ = .11, −.07, −.12, .06). Finally,
Beus et al. (2015) found that agreeableness, conscientiousness and
neuroticism were related to safety climate (ρ = .18, .11, −.18).
Fittingly, researchers have suggested that organizations, including
SMEs, can improve safety and safety climate by focusing on safe per-
sonalities in selection ( Jex, Swanson, & Grubb, 2013). The results from
Beus et al. suggest that agreeableness, conscientiousness and neuroticism
are particularly important to workplace safety, given their stronger rela-
tionships with unsafe behaviour, unsafe events and safety climate. Using
these personality traits in selection systems is very common in large
organizations with HR-managed selection processes ( Jex et al., 2013).
Additionally, such personality assessments are relatively common, easy
to use and administer, inexpensive and familiar enough to applicants
that they can complete them with little instruction.
5.7.1 Attraction/Selection/Attrition Influences
Schneider (1987) proposed that organizational founders originate the

overall goals and values of the organization, which in turn create the
initial organizational processes and structures. Further more, these
goals and values – and processes and structures – change only very
slowly over time because of the ASA processes. Briefly, ASA states
that people are attracted to a particular organization because of its
goals and values (as well as their skill set). Current members select
applicants who match the goals and values of the organization, which
reinforces their importance. People who do not fit in well – whether
because of suboptimal selection or individual changes over time – will
leave the organization (either via quitting or being fired), again rein-
forcing the organization’s goals and values.
The ASA framework suggests that organizational goals and sub-
sequent structure and processes concerning safety affect the type of
people organizations hire and the employees who stay. Consequently,
the individual characteristics of employees are key to the development of
safety behaviour and climate. An organizational structure that supports
safe behaviour is likely to attract individuals who are safety conscious.
As this process continues, individuals who have similar safety-related
characteristics (e.g. conscientiousness) will likely stay with an organiza-
tion that supports safety and those that have dissimilar characteristics
are likely to leave. Consequently, safety climate will develop based on
homogeneity in individual characteristics. However, if an organizational
structure does not support safety, this will likely perpetuate the attrac-
tion and selection of individuals who are not safety conscious.
5.7.2 Group-/Organizational-Level Influences on Safety Climate
In addition to individual characteristics, researchers have identified

group- and organizational-level characteristics that are important to
the development of safety climate (Ostroff et al., 2003). The struc-
turalist, social interaction, leadership and workgroup perspectives are
all based on the principle that climate development takes place out-
side the individual employee. Empirical evidence suggests that orga-
nization and group characteristics are integral in the development of
safety climate, with most research focused on leadership practices and
socialization.
5.7.3 Leadership Influences
Lewin, Lippitt and White’s (1939) assertion that ‘leaders create climate’
underscores how fundamental leadership is to climate development.
Dragoni (2005) describes the influence of leadership on climate as a
social learning process wherein group members observe and interact
with their manager in the process of interpreting their environment.
Subordinates often observe leader behaviour, which helps to inform
group members about the relative priorities and values of the leader and
organization (Ashforth, 1985; Zohar, 2003a,b, 2010). Safety climate
develops as employees observe and interact with their leaders; employees

develop shared perceptions based on common interactions with leader-
ship, including the messages conveyed and practices displayed (Zohar,
2010). Accordingly, numerous primary studies indicate that leadership
or supervisor practices are related to safety climate and a variety of
other safety-related behaviours and outcomes (e.g. Barling, Loughlin,
& Kelloway, 2002; González-Romá, Peiró, & Tordera, 2002; Zohar &
Luria, 2004). Meta-analytic evidence supports the positive relationship
between leadership and safety climate (ρ = .69; Nahrgang et al., 2011).
In SMEs, there are fewer leaders and fewer workgroups than in
larger enterprises. Thus, it is essential that every formal and informal
organizational leader model appropriate safety behaviours and atti-
tudes, as well as reward and support the safety behaviours and atti-
tudes expected among employees. There is no room in SMEs for a
‘bad’ group with poor safety climate to hide, and little opportunity for
another group to compensate for poor groups.
5.7.4 Socialization Influences
The social interaction perspective similarly proposes that safety cli-

mate emerges from communication and interaction among employ-
ees, including managers and other workgroup members (Ostroff et al.,
2003). Workgroups consist of ongoing events (i.e. social interactions),
activities and interaction cycles among group members (Hofmann &
Morgeson, 1999). That is, employees are inherently embedded in a social
environment, which requires them to interact with fellow employees
to carry out their work duties. Understandably, these common activi-
ties and interactions lead to the emergence of shared perceptions about
safety among workgroup members (Ostroff et al., 2003).
A social interaction perspective proposes that interactions between
employees are key determinants of shared perceptions about safety.
Research generally supports the idea that communication is integral to
workplace safety in general and to safety climate in particular. In fact,
Neal and Griffin (2004) argued that safety climate is a function of inter-
nal group processes (i.e. perceptions of communication, coopera-
tion and encouragement concerning safety). In their meta-analysis,
Christian et al. (2009) assessed internal group processes as an aspect of
safety climate and found that it was positively associated with safety
compliance (ρ = .48) and participation (ρ = .52), and negatively associ-

ated with accidents and injury rates (ρ = −.19). Another variable that
is similar to social interaction is social support, which refers to safety-
related advice and assistance individuals receive from their co-workers
(Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006; Nahrgang et al., 2011). Nahrgang et
al. (2011) found that safety climate was strongly related to social sup-
port (ρ = .80).
Researchers have also examined social interaction among group
members as related to climate using social-interaction rating scales and
social-network techniques (e.g. González-Romá et al., 2002; Zohar
& Tenne-Gazit, 2008). Results suggest that safety climate strength
is positively related to the frequency of social exchanges and com-
munication among group members (Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008).
Moreover, many descriptions of leadership identify communication as
a key aspect of leadership practices (Christian et al., 2009; Nahrgang
et al., 2011; Neal & Griffin, 2004).
Because SMEs are relatively small, there is greater opportunity for
higher density of interactions among employees (i.e. it is more likely
that employees will know a higher percentage of their peers). This is an
extraordinary opportunity to create a strong safety climate. However,
it is essential that the level of safety climate is high/good before trying
to strengthen safety climate, otherwise the climate will solidify around
a sub-par level of safety expectations. SMEs could identify safety
thought leaders and role models – not necessarily managers, but line
workers who are looked up to – to evangelize about the importance
of safety, the ways in which employees rely on each other to complete
work safely, and the hazards associated with unsafe practices. It is also
important to identify leaders within the organization who are not act-
ing safely because their influences on co-workers could be hazardous.
Supplying these leaders with extra training and encouraging them to
be the leaders to their peers could result in new safety benefits to the
workgroup and the organization.
5.8 Organizational Characteristic Influences on Safety Climate
According to the structuralist perspective, organizational character-

istics (e.g. size, structure, centralization, hierarchical level) influence
employees’ perceptions. For safety climate, this also includes the
safety-related policies, practices and procedures that organizations

implement ( Jex et al., 2013). Zohar (2010) described safety climate in
part based on internal consistency among policies, practices and pro-
cedures. Inconsistent or illogical policies are likely to have a negative
effect on safety climate. Likewise, safety climate can be improved by
ensuring that organizational policies and safety practices are consis-
tent with one another.
Additionally, a few researchers have examined how organizational
and workgroup characteristics relate to safety climate (Neal & Griffin,
2006; Wallace, Popp, & Mondore, 2006; Zohar & Luria, 2010).
However, most researchers treat these variables as tertiary, rather than
primary considerations to their studies. Workgroup size has received
more attention than organizational size as a correlate of safety climate,
but the results are mixed. Neal and Griffin (2006) used a longitudi-
nal design and found that workgroup size was positively related to
safety climate measured at the second survey administration (r = .20)
and negatively related to safety climate at the fourth administration,
3 years later (r = −.07). In contrast, Wallace et al. (2006) found that
safety climate was negatively related to group size (r = −.10). Zohar
and Luria (2010) included both organization and workgroup size in
their analyses, but they found that these variables did not exert a sig-
nificant main effect or interaction in their model.
5.9 Safety Climate Development in SMEs
There are a number of notable conclusions that can be made about

safety climate development in SMEs based on the previous review.
Perceptions of safety develop and are influenced by a variety of factors,
including the attributes of individual employees, socialization, commu-
nication, leadership practices, organizational characteristics and acci-
dents and injuries. Some of these factors may be more pronounced in
SMEs, compared to larger organizations that span numerous worksites
and employ a greater number of individuals. From a probability stand-
point, the number of accidents should be fewer in SMEs simply because
they employ fewer workers. As a result, when negative events do occur
they may be more observable and known by most employees and con-
sequently have a greater influence on perceptions of safety. In a similar
way, the attributes of individual employees (e.g. highly conscientious
or less emotionally stable) might also have a greater impact on safety

climate. In large organizations and particularly those that are multi-
national, the attributes of an individual employee are less influential
because they only interact with a select group and are a face in the
crowd. In contrast, SMEs employ fewer people, so employee attributes
are likely to have a greater influence through co-worker interactions.
Management practices are also likely to have a greater impact in SMEs,
because they are more easily observed and leaders have a chance to
interact more with lower-level employees. Top management in large
organizations are frequently located at the corporate headquarters
office, distal to the workers who work the closest to workplace hazards.
Thus, it is clear that there is no room for missteps in safety communica-
tion, leadership, processes or behaviour in SMEs.
5.10 Assessment of Safety Climate
Assessing safety climate is an important task for every company to

engage in, especially companies in which processes need to be com-
pleted with high reliability (Hofmann, Jacobs, & Landy, 1995; Roberts,
1990). Such assessments are necessary because not only can safety cli-
mate assessments predict workplace incidents (Bergman et al., 2014;
Beus et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009; Nahrgang et al., 2011), but
they also provide a different view of workplace safety than safety out-
comes or records, which can provide for strategic planning and man-
agement. Safety climate assessments can be used to forecast which
parts of an organization are at greater risk for incident, to determine
where additional training is needed and to identify where managerial
messages are either misunderstood or appear to be contradictory to
the conditions on the ground, among other uses.
Safety climate is usually assessed via employee questionnaires. This
is done because even though safety climate is the shared perceptions
of the prioritization of and support for safe operations in an organiza-
tion, it is still based in individual employee perceptions. Usually, safety
climate is then aggregated to a workgroup level, whether individual
workgroups (e.g. first shift in west building) or worksites (e.g. chemi-
cal plants). Aggregated scores are usually computed via the average
for the workgroup. However, individual-level (or psychological) safety
climate data can also be used to understand individual-level needs
Table 5.1 A Brief Safety Climate Measure

1. My supervisor is committed to improving safety.
2. My supervisor places a strong emphasis on workplace safety.
3. Safety issues are openly discussed between my supervisor and my workgroup.
4. My supervisor trains employees to be safe.
5. My co-workers are committed to safety improvement.
6. Unsafe conditions are promptly corrected in my work area.
7. My supervisor encourages employees to become involved in safety matters.
8. My supervisor praises safe work behaviour.
Source: Beus, J.M. et al., A multilevel construct validation of safety climate, in: L.A. Toombs (Ed.),
Proceedings of the Seventy-Third Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (CD),
Orlando, FL, ISSN: 1543-8643, 2013.
and concerns regarding workplace safety. There are numerous safety

climate measures in the safety literature (e.g. Zohar, 2000; Zohar &
Luria, 2005). An example measure appears in Table 5.1.
It is acceptable and often appropriate to create surveys that include
additional questions beyond safety climate (e.g. safety-related topics
like individual attitudes towards safety or individual risk tolerance;
topics not directly related to safety, such as satisfaction with a new
medical benefits programme); organizational stakeholders might
determine that a survey should cover several important topics in order
to minimize survey fatigue and maximize responding. However, it
needs to be clear – to the survey conveners if not the respondents –
what each question on the survey is supposed to represent because
when the survey is completed, the stakeholders need to know which
levers are important for changing the safety status of the organiza-
tion. This issue becomes especially important when additional safety-
related topics are included on the survey. Conflating safety climate
with other safety-related topics could lead the organization to invest
in the wrong resources. For example, the appropriate interventions
when a workgroup indicates an overall high level of individual risk
tolerance are likely to be different from the best interventions when a
workgroup indicates a low level of safety climate.
5.11 Best Practices in Safety Climate Assessment
There are a number of issues that need to be attended to in order to con-

duct a good safety climate assessment. First, employees must feel like
the survey is important. Providing time to complete the survey during
the paid workday helps emphasize the importance of the survey and
increases the likelihood that employees will participate. Second, partici-
pating employees must know that their responses will not cause employ-
ment problems if they have something negative to say; employees must
be assured – and it must be true – that their individual responses will
not be tracked to themselves and their supervisors will not be informed
of their individual responses. Anonymous responding processes
(e.g. removing tracking information in electronic surveys, using paper
and pencil surveys, using external vendors or academic–industry part-
nerships to conduct the survey) help with this latter issue. Ensuring
anonymity or confidentiality of responses becomes more difficult – and
more important – as organizational size decreases or as smaller units
within the organization are indicated via the survey instrument.
Additionally, the survey needs to be frequent. Our own research
(Bergman et al., 2014) demonstrates that the ability of safety climate
assessments to predict severe incidents (e.g. injuries meeting OSHA
recordable guidelines, damage to processes or property greater than
$10,000) is very high in the first month following the safety climate
assessment, but by the end of that quarter the ability to predict nearly
disappears. This is probably because (1) the organization responds to
serious incidents, changing conditions on the ground, (2) serious
incidents change individual perceptions of the climate, or (3) both.
Thus, frequent assessment – probably monthly – is needed to have a
strong safety climate assessment programme.
Because the assessment needs to be frequent, it also needs to be
short – on the order of 5 min (or less) to complete. However, the num-
ber of questions depends on the education and reading skills of the
employees being surveyed as well as the length and complexity of the
questions. It is difficult to state exactly the maximum survey length,
but 15 relatively short questions (e.g. How much do you agree with the
statement: My supervisor disciplines people who do not wear PPE?)
is a good target length. These characteristics of a good safety climate
assessment programme will also help encourage a higher response
rate. Although safety climate assessment needs to be frequent, having
it short and allowing paid time on the job to complete the assessment
should make it more likely that people will complete the assessment.
Additionally, communicating the importance of the assessment will
also encourage employees to complete the survey.
Further more, a climate of assessment needs to develop around

the safety climate assessment programme. That is, there needs to be a
sense that what the assessments are doing is important and that they
are not wasting valuable work time. Some ways to develop a climate
of assessment are
• Secure senior level buy-in and communication about the
assessment.
• Obtain buy-in from the front-line supervision.
• Encourage workers to complete the assessment.
• Provide feedback from the assessment (e.g. report the results)
as soon as possible.
• Highlight links between changes in the organization and the
survey. For example, when new equipment is purchased, indicate
that the investment in equipment was something that was clearly
needed based on responses in the safety climate assessment.
Most of these recommendations for creating a culture of assessment
focus on leadership actions in some way. The leadership of the organi-
zation needs to be clear that the safety climate assessment is an impor-
tant part of the toolkit for ensuring a safely operating organization.
This is done by giving support to the assessment (e.g. resources, time,
communication), following through on indications, and making the
results open and transparent.
5.12 Levels of Analysis
An often overlooked issue both in the safety climate research litera-

ture and in practice is the fact that safety climate is conceptualized as
a group-level phenomenon (Guldenmund, 2000; Zohar, 2003a). Thus,
in order to be true to theoretical conceptualization of climate as shared
perceptions, individual employee perceptions must be measured and
then aggregated (combined) to create a ‘higher-level’ construct.*
Typically, the focal unit of analysis is the workgroup level which is
* Average ratings of safety climate items at the individual employee level have been
referred to as psychological climate ( James & Jones, 1974). This assessment can still be
practically meaningful, as research has shown that this operationalization of climate
has significant relationships with workplace safety behaviour and injuries (Beus et al.,
2010; Nahrgang et al., 2011).
defined as a group of employees who report to the same supervisor.

As a result, within one organization, multiple ‘subclimates’ can exist
as a function of variability in how supervisors enforce formal organi-
zational policies and procedures, as well as enact informal practices.
Compared to a large organization, there are significantly fewer work-
groups in an SME. In fact, for micro-enterprises consisting of fewer
than 10 employees, the entire organization could be a single work-
group. As a result, there are likely to be fewer subclimates in an SME.
Practically, aggregating individual employee responses to the work-
group level requires some kind of unit-level identification informa-
tion for each respondent. In an SME, employees may be particularly
apprehensive about providing any kind of identification information
as even one response to a demographic item (e.g. sex) could reveal
their identity. Likewise, SME employees are likely to be hesitant to
respond to an identified survey in which each potential respondent
receives his/her own unique link.
5.13 Workplace Safety Interventions
Interventions aimed at improving workplace safety focus on both

individual and situational factors. Christian et al.’s (2009) meta-
analysis of workplace safety compared the effects of individual
difference variables and situational predictors as related to safety
outcomes. They found that those who are highly conscientious, not
prone to risk taking, and emotionally stable and believe they have
control over workplace outcomes (i.e. internal locus of control) are
less likely to be involved in unsafe incidents. Similarly, situational
considerations (e.g. safety climate, leadership) were also associated
with safety outcomes. Moreover, their results suggest that situational
factors are stronger predictors of outcomes compared to individual
factors like personality, which is theorized to be a more distal predic-
tor. Consequently, interventions aimed at improving situational fac-
tors may be more effective at reducing negative outcomes, compared
to interventions based on individual characteristics (e.g. selection
based on personality characteristics). However, the ease and rela-
tively low cost of selection-based interventions suggest that utility
and return on investment of these interventions is likely to be high.
Thus, we recommend pursuing both.
Workplace safety interventions include safety promotion and train-

ing, as well as interventions aimed at improving safety motivation.
Safety promotion interventions involve the use of persuasive messages
(e.g. posters, coffee mugs) to remind workers about the importance
of safety ( Jex et al., 2013; Rosén & Jansson, 2000). However, the
effectiveness of safety promotion practices is questionable when con-
sidering social psychological research concerning the importance of
specificity in persuasive messages ( Jex et al., 2013; Petty & Cacioppo,
2012). In other words, messages imploring people to work safely
are probably not as effective as messages imploring people to wear
their personal protective gear. Another type of intervention involves
improvement in safety training and in turn employees’ knowledge
about safety. Christian et al. (2009) found that safety knowledge was
a strong predictor of compliance with safety rules and expectations
(ρ = .60) and safety participation (i.e. going above and beyond basic
compliance by working to proactively improve safety and help others)
(ρ = .61). Consequently, improvement of training practices based on
greater safety knowledge may be a good avenue towards more safe
behaviour. A similar intervention involves improving employees’ moti-
vation to behave safely. Knowledge is one aspect of safety behaviour;
however, ultimately employees must be motivated to behave safely.
Researchers have successfully applied behavioural observation, feed-
back and goal-setting techniques to motivate safe behaviour (Komaki,
Heinzmann, & Lawson, 1980; Krause, Seymour, & Sloat, 1999).
Considering the consistent link between safety climate and behaviour
as well as outcomes, DeJoy (2005) noted that safety climate interven-
tions might be a very effective avenue at reducing accidents. However,
there are only a few empirical evaluations of interventions specifically
targeting safety climate. Most interventions to date consist of feedback
directed towards leadership based on their interactions with subordi-
nates (Zohar, 2002; Zohar & Luria, 2003). For example, Zohar (2002)
completed semi-structured interviews with employees about safety-
oriented episodes between their supervisors. Managers were then given
weekly feedback based on these interviews. The feedback intervention
led to a significant reduction in injury rates and improvement in safety
climate, whereas the control group remained unchanged. Zohar and
Luria (2003) also examined the effectiveness of a feedback intervention
based on safety-oriented exchanges. However, Zohar and Luria (2003)
expanded on Zohar (2002) by including top management and using

a questionnaire instead of interviews to collect feedback information.
Results across three large companies indicated that the feedback inter-
vention was effective at improving safety behaviour and safety climate.
Given the importance of leadership interaction with subordinates to
safety climate, a similar intervention is likely to be effective in an SME.
In 2003, the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work
published a technical report entitled ‘Improving Occupational Safety
and Health in SMEs: Examples of Effective Assistance’, in which
they identified 18 actions that have been taken by SMEs to improve
occupational safety and health. Among the examples provided was
an effort to integrate safety climate across the Province of Lucca, a
region in Italy. Within each of the approximately 80 companies, a
new position of safety training/information officer was created. This
person became the reference person to employees for all safety issues
and was responsible for identifying risks, training workers, facilitating
collaborations to resolve any safety issues and encouraging dialogue
within the company about safety. One hundred and fifteen officers
were trained, and 3000 sets of educational materials were distributed
to businesses. Another initiative reported in this report, taking place in
the United Kingdom, involved the transfer of knowledge about risks
and prevention between large and small enterprises.
A variety of conclusions can be made about safety interventions
in SMEs. Generally, previous research suggests that interventions
involving safety training, behavioural observation, goal setting, and
providing feedback to supervisors and lower-level employees are effec-
tive means of improving safety behaviour and reducing negative out-
comes. In some ways, the aforementioned characteristics of SMEs are
likely to make the implementation and tracking of safety interven-
tions easier. Considering SMEs employ fewer individuals compared to
larger organizations, managers can more easily observe the work of all
their employees. Additionally, supervisors and subordinates presum-
ably have a greater opportunity to interact, providing more avenues for
feedback from both sides. Finally, fewer individuals need to be trained
and tracking the effectiveness of safety training is likely to be easier
because negative events are more likely to be known and observed. On
the other hand, they are also likely to have a greater negative impact
on the safety climate, employees and organization as a whole.
5.14 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have reviewed important concepts like organiza-

tional culture, organizational climate, safety culture and safety climate.
We reviewed theory and evidence on the development of organiza-
tional climate, antecedents and consequences of safety climate, and
research examining safety climate in SMEs. Finally, we described
how to assess safety climate and some workplace safety interventions
designed to improve safety climate. We hope that this chapter is a
useful resource to SMEs seeking to measure and enhance their safety
climate.
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6
Competences for a
C u lt u r e o f P r e v e n t i o n
Conditions for Learning and Change in SMEs
ULRI KE BOLLMANN
Contents
6.1 Work Is Changing 122

6.2 Competence Instead of Qualification 123
6.3 Development of Competences 124
6.3.1 Safety Competence 126
6.3.2 Health Competence 127
6.4 Traditional Approach to Prevention versus Culture
of Prevention 129
6.5 Competences for the Transformation 130
6.5.1 Raise Awareness by a Campaign 131
6.5.2 How to Trigger Cultural Transformation within
a Company? 135
6.5.3 Conditions for the Development of a Culture
of Prevention in SMEs 136
References 138
Work is changing. Traditional approaches to prevention fall short.

A broader understanding of prevention and the cultural transformation
associated with it mean that there are new demands on companies and
their employees. People and organizations need competences for this
transformation; they must be empowered to create humane living and
working conditions.
This chapter first describes the concept of a culture of prevention and
clarifies the term competence at both individual and organizational levels.
It goes on to analyse the meaning of safety competence and health com-
petence, and discusses possible competences for a culture of prevention
and the conditions for change and learning in small and medium sized
121
enterprises (SMEs) in the future. Detailed consideration of concepts and

terms in this area is necessary because complaints about a lack of defini-
tion concerning concepts such as culture of prevention and safety culture
are ongoing (Guldenmund, 2010; Salminen, 2014; Zohar, 2010).
6.1 Work Is Changing
Globalization and digitalization are not only changing the world of

work, but also work itself. Work is losing itself in space and time; it
is becoming ‘volatile’, that is mobile, transitory (Eichendorf, 2016).
Thus, the boundary between working life and private life is becoming
increasingly diffuse; the result is a ‘delimitation’ of work. Due to digi-
talization, which began in the middle of the last century, we are cur-
rently experiencing a new phase of technological transformation. This
is characterized by the ‘fusing of technologies, that is the boundaries
between the physical, the digital and the biological spheres are becom-
ing blurred’ (Schwab, 2016), that is smart products are ‘revolutionizing’
our working and private lives.
The core of prevention work is no longer just about preventing
accidents and occupational diseases but also about the promotion
of physical and mental health. In addition to classic risk prevention,
workplace health promotion and workplace integration management
are becoming increasingly important. Furthermore, prevention is
developing into an approach that covers all phases of life. The impetus
for this holistic view of prevention came from the Ottawa Charter of
the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1986.
The term ‘culture of prevention’ describes both a broader under-
standing of prevention and a new level of quality for preventive action;
safety and health are integrated into all activities and thus, become a
self-evident, lived part of our professional and daily lives. A culture of
prevention is based not only on laws, guidelines, standards and rules
for safety and health but also on a common, collective appreciation of
safety and health, as well as taking into consideration what health and
safety personally mean for every individual. Thus, a culture of preven-
tion is based not only on the explicit (formal rules and shared values)
but also on the implicit, which we are often unaware of and is, there-
fore, even more effective (see Schein, 2004). The call for creating a
culture of prevention can be traced back to the European Community
C o m p e t e n c e s f o r a C u lt u r e o f P r e v e n t i o n 123
Strategy on Health and Safety at Work 2002–2006. The call for a cul-
ture of prevention to be implemented at national level across the globe
followed in 2008 at the XVIII World Congress on Safety and Health
at Work in Seoul, South Korea.
6.2 Competence Instead of Qualification
The term ‘competence’ in its current usage comes from the field of psy-
chology. Robert W. White introduced the term into the psychology of
motivation back in 1959. A year later, Noam Chomsky established the
concept of linguistic competence and the correlating distinction with
performance (Heckhausen, 1976). In the 1970s, the term ‘competence’
found its place in pedagogy. In vocational training and work sciences,
competence superseded qualification as a term in the last decade of
the twentieth century (Faulstich, 2015). This ‘competence-focused
revolution’ can also be attributed to the changed framework condi-
tions in the world of work (Sprafke, 2016). Since 2000, the term ‘com-
petence’ has been increasingly used, particularly in connection with
the Programme for International Student Assessment studies and
the measurability of competences has become a dominant issue. This
increasing use and narrowing of the term ‘competence’ culminated in
the OECD Skills Strategy of 2012, which states that competences
‘have become the global currency of the 21st century’ (OECD, 2012).
In terms of a culture of prevention, the term ‘competence’ is dis-
cussed in this chapter based on two meanings: competence in the
sense of abilities, skills and know-how, and competence in the sense
of ‘responsibility’ (Schaller, 2009). The older meaning of competence
as responsibility goes back to the concept of competence in public law
of the Roman Republic (Redecker, 1976 based on Ulpian, Digesta).
Since the 1990s, the first meaning has typically been divided into
four competence areas: technical, methodological, social and personal.
However, this at first seemingly clear schema has a tendency to ‘over-
flow’: ‘Nowadays, one speaks also of emotional, creative, moral and
even spiritual competences. Ultimately, you can put the word “compe-
tence” at the end of any activity’ (Faulstich, 2015; Weinert, 2001). As
a result, a large catalogue of competences has been emerging which is
supposed to express what someone should know and be able to do, as
well as how to measure these competences.
In the meaning of competence in the sense of responsibility, the

human and their actions are the focus. Here, competence is a social, if
not social-political, category. In addition to the competences of each
individual, competence here refers to ‘the granting of responsibility to
all in order to increase humanity’ (Schaller, 2009), to participate in the
design of our lives and our work.
In this second meaning, someone is competent when they strive
to ‘improve their circumstances’ and thus, the humanity of human
beings is reflected ‘in the humanity of the circumstances which they
have created and are responsible for’ (Schaller, 2009; cf. Comenius,
1966). This involves communication not as a form of ‘conflict’ but
rather as a participative exchange on a common matter and a ten-
dency towards symmetrical communication with mutual respect
(Schaller, 2009).
According to this understanding, considerate interaction with oth-
ers in the world is a requirement for any communication and any social
relationship (‘primordial sociality’ or ‘pre-communicative social rela-
tions’) (Meyer-Drawe, 1996, 2008; Schaller, 2009 – based on Edmund
Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schütz).
Competence refers here to the ‘transition from possibility to reality,
from competence to performance, from knowledge to human action’
(Schaller, 2009).
6.3 Development of Competences
Neither a culture of prevention nor a competence can be regarded

as material objects. There is ‘no such “thing” as a prevention culture’
(based on Antonsen, 2009) and competences are likewise not directly
observable: ‘Competences don’t lie around like tools in a box or pegs
on a board (in our case in the brain, as neurophysiology would assert).
Instead, they are generated situationally by the person who is acting’
(Faulstich, 2015).
Competences for a culture of prevention cannot be just depicted
in a catalogue of competences, but rather it is necessary to ask about
the conditions under which a person or an organization can develop
competences and act competently.
Moreover, competence is a basic human need. In addition to the
need to feel close to others, to belong (be part of something) and the
need for autonomy (feeling like your actions are self-determined),

humans have a continuous need to develop their own efficacy and
effectiveness in dealing with their environment (Deci and Ryan, 2000;
Lenartz, 2012). Which culture exists in a company, an organization or
a society depends mainly on whether, and to what extent, basic human
needs can be met or not.
Furthermore, competences develop as a result of learning. Here
again, there is a distinction between two meanings: between the idea
of learning as an unbroken accumulation of knowledge, and learning
as an experience (Meyer-Drawe, 2008).
Learning as an experience takes place as ‘relearning’ or even
‘unlearning’: in learning, the learner has an experience about the expe-
rience itself (Meyer-Drawe, 1996). Moreover, the learner takes the
position that it is not about knowledge but rather about the attitude
towards the thing, towards oneself and towards others (see Meyer-
Drawe, 2008; Petzelt, 1955).
Competences for a culture of prevention are based on learning as
an experience. Learning as an experience is an integral part of the cul-
tural transformation. In developing a culture of prevention, particular
importance is placed on informal learning and learning in the process
of working.
In addition to the development of individual competences, the
focus of attention for some time now has been on the activation and
development of competences in social systems. Organizational com-
petence is understood to be the ability of organizations to continu-
ally develop innovative products and services which are either aligned
to changing market requirements or contribute fresh impetus to the
market (Kremser and Schreyröög, 2016).
Organizational competences are the result of complex social-
interaction processes which build up into collective action patterns in
the sense of procedures. These action patterns are generally emergent;
that is without a core understanding of how and why this coordina-
tion works so well: ‘Organisational competence is far more embedded
in the actions of the organisation’s members and is, therefore, only
“remembered” in actions’ (Schreyögg and Eberl, 2015).
In addition to explicit knowledge, for example, technical and meth-
odological knowledge, it is also very important for the development of
organizational competence to have ‘tacit knowledge’ (Polanyi, 1985)
and narrative knowledge (Lyotard, 1986) (see Podgórski, 2010;

Schreyögg and Eberl, 2015).
In times of accelerated technological change, competences need
to be permanently flexible, as well as constantly renewed and further
developed. ‘Leaders need to make brave decisions instead of sticking
too long with strategies that were previously successful. Digitalization,
for example, means that certain business models simply no longer
work and companies must do entirely new things’ (Bollmann and
Franke, 2016 based on Michael Beilfuß). Of particular importance
here is whether a company or organization has ‘dynamic capabilities’
(Schreyögg and Eberl, 2015; initially Teece et al., 1997).
6.3.1 Safety Competence
A key element for the safety climate and safety culture in a company
are rules and regulations, as well as the employees’ attitude towards
these. In this context, a distinction can be made between two models: a
classical, rational top-down approach, which views rules as something
static and the infringement of rules as negative behaviour, and a bot-
tom-up approach, which perceives rules as dynamic, local and situated
constructions. In the first case, the employee is at the forefront and
is not allowed to make mistakes; in the second case, the employee is
considered to be an expert whose competence is to adapt to the diver-
sity of reality (Hale and Borys, 2013; based on Dekker, 2003). A good
error-learning culture, in which an error is not seen as a violation of
rules but rather a learning opportunity, is thus a prerequisite for the
development of safety competence. This competence cannot be sub-
stituted with a rule. On the contrary, it is rather the unwritten rules,
the tacit rules and motivations that we can comply with or violate
which make up the structure of organizational culture. The term ‘rou-
tines’ is used to describe these unwritten rules. Routines result from
experiences and repetition in a social context ‘in a way that is essen-
tially informal and not written down. They form […] the repository of
organisational memory, and as such are necessarily subject to change
as learning takes place’ (Hale and Borys, 2013 based on Becker, 2005).
A direct link can be made between organizational routines and
actions when faced with unpredictability and uncertainty. As opposed
to a model of rationally planned safety, Karl E. Weick developed an
approach towards ‘managing the unexpected’ based on James Reason’s

concept of ‘an informed safety culture’. According to Weick, man-
aging the unexpected means that people show ‘strong reactions to
weak signals’ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2010; see also Eichendorf and
Bollmann, 2014). The opportunity to learn and thus change is based
on proactive and often uncomfortable behaviour, on detecting errors
and taking them seriously.
Karl E. Weick also speaks in this context of ‘mindful management’.
In the style of the language philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976),
mindfulness here is understood as the ‘disposition towards mindful,
swift, cooperative and careful action’. This is associated with the expec-
tation that ‘greater mindfulness means that it is more likely that unex-
pected or safety critical situations can be dealt with’ (Giebel, 2012).
Implicit knowledge (tacit knowing) and mindfulness are necessary
‘to exercise discretion in applying any rules that are defined, so that
they are able to come up with adaptions, improvisations and exten-
sions of them to cope with the unexpected and unforeseen situations’
(Hale and Borys, 2013).
Hale and Borys connect the model of rationally planned safety
and the model of dynamic adaptation to the situational context in a
framework concept for managing rules with the following elements:
the continuous observation and adaptation of rules, the involvement
of the people who are to comply with the rules in the process of setting
the rules, and regular, explicit dialogue with management and experts.
Due to the current speed of change and the accompanying loss
of employee experience, thought is already being given to how the
relationship between organizational routines and their effect on the
dynamic of routines can be examined. For example, by forming clusters
of routines, rules can be adapted and reinvented even more dynami-
cally (Kremser and Schreyröög, 2016).
6.3.2 Health Competence
At the beginning of this millennium, the concept of health compe-

tence in the context of work and health was introduced in German-
speaking countries (Lenartz, 2012; Schweer and Krummreich, 2009;
Soellner et al., 2010). This concept is based on the term ‘health
literacy’, which the WHO newly defined some 10 years earlier.

The original concept of health literacy was restricted to cognitive

and social skills when dealing with health information. The new term
was broader: ‘Health literacy implies the achievement of a level of
knowledge, personal skills and confidence to take action to improve
personal and community health by changing personal lifestyles and
living conditions’ (Nutbeam, 1998).
On this basis, a structural model of health competence has been
developed in Germany in the last few years, which describes for the
first time which skills and abilities are important for physical and men-
tal health. The model distinguishes between basic health-related skills
(e.g. reading an instruction leaflet and being able to comply with a writ-
ten regulation) and advanced health-related abilities such as health-
related self-awareness (aware of one’s own feelings, needs and thoughts),
actively taking responsibility (consciously deciding on health-promoting
behaviour) and the ability to scrutinize health information.
The central element in this structural model is the ability to guide
one’s own health, together with the components of self-regulation and
self-control (Lenartz et al., 2014). Fundamental to this is the system-
theoretical notion of an autopoietic system, which can organize and
adapt to changing conditions autonomously. Of particular importance
when looking at health competence are self-determination theory
(Deci and Ryan, 2000) and Albert Bandura’s concept of self-efficacy
(Bandura, 1977). Mental health and well-being are dependent on the
extent to which autonomous, motivated behaviour is possible and also
on the person’s expectation, based on their own competences, that they
can successfully perform the desired action.
WHO also speaks of ‘empowerment for health’. Whereas empow-
erment was initially about ‘a process through which people gain greater
control over decisions and actions affecting their health’ (Nutbeam,
1998), today, empowerment is seen as a process ‘through which indi-
viduals and social groups are able to express their needs, present
their concerns, devise strategies for involvement in decision-making,
and achieve political, social and cultural action to meet those needs’
(Nutbeam ibid.; cf. Lenartz, 2012, based on Nutbeam, 2008).
Thus, health competence looks beyond the individual towards a
‘health-competent society whose goal is to empower its members to
promote health and thereby make a substantial contribution to well-

being and prosperity’ (Lenartz et al., 2014).
6.4 Traditional Approach to Prevention versus Culture of Prevention
At the centre of the traditional prevention approach is technology,

organization and occupational safety, and health management;
the human being is generally viewed as a risk factor. Traditional
prevention follows a functionalist, mechanistic paradigm which
turns safety and health into tools for a higher, mainly economic,
purpose.
At the centre of a culture of prevention are humans, namely in
their social relationships: the way people perceive themselves and
their fellow human beings; the pattern they follow to communicate
with other people and things; the values and personal core convic-
tions which guide their actions. This type of ‘humanized prevention’
(Bollmann and Franke, 2016, based on Hans-Horst Konkolewsky)
follows an interpretive paradigm and is interdisciplinary. It assumes
‘that cultural aspects and internal communication processes have a
major impact on how prevention is understood and implemented’
(Wiencke, 2016). Humanized prevention should be designed not
only from the perspective of experts but also from the perspective of
the people that are to be reached: ‘We need to revise our focus in pre-
vention and look at people and their needs’ (Konkolewsky, 2016). It
is no longer just about bringing prevention services to the people, but
first and foremost about understanding the person’s needs, thoughts
and actions in order to then develop, with the person, the appropri-
ate structures and services of prevention in terms of their living and
working environments.
In order to avoid a possible misunderstanding, it should be made
clear that humanized prevention is in no way opposed to technology.
Quite the contrary, it takes on the challenges created by the new phase
of technological transformation; prevention becomes an integral part
of the technological transformation. Our intelligence ensures that
safety and health are integrated into the development of every single
product from the very start (Teigeler, 2016) (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Comparison of Approaches: Traditional Prevention versus Humanized Prevention/

Culture of Prevention
HUMANIZED PREVENTION/CULTURE
TRADITIONAL PREVENTION OF PREVENTION
Safety and health are perceived as external Safety and health are perceived as dynamic
rules parts of everyday life
Routines as a fixed behavioural repertoire Routines are dynamic functional units: routines
as the ‘genes’ of an organization, as a ‘store
of knowledge’, as ‘organizational memory’
which is (only) activated by organizational
actions (evolutionary routines, based on
Nelson/Winter 1982) (Schreyögg and
Eberl, 2015)
Implementation of action guidelines, i.e. rules Networks, informal agreements, spontaneous
and procedures coordination
‘Doing things right’ ‘Doing the right things’
Reduce complexity (by writing rules and Solve complex problems by taking the
procedures and train them accordingly) complexity of social interaction within a
situational context into account; deal with
unexpected situations; dislike of simplification
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2010)
Errors are disruptions and must be eliminated Errors are learning opportunities
in order to make the system ‘perfect’
The focus of learning is on technical and The focus of learning is on social and personal
methodical competence competences
Expertise Take one’s own stand
Can Cannot (cannot stay silent anymore, cannot
stay idle, cannot do everything, cannot avoid
responsibility) (Schaller, 2009)
Know Not know, unlearn, relearn
Explicit knowledge Implicit knowledge or ’tacit knowing’ (Polanyi,
1985), narrative knowledge (Lyotard, 1986)
Discussion, debate (argue) Dialogue
Steer and control Mindfulness
6.5 Competences for the Transformation
The design of humane living and working conditions requires skills to

deal with the transformation. These competences cannot be ‘taught’ in
formal learning processes but rather must be acquired through one’s
own experiences (learning as an experience). In order for people and
organizations to be able to develop competences for the transforma-
tion, appropriate structural conditions in educational institutions and
workplaces must be created. These conditions should enable people to
experience a feeling of competence, to feel part of something and to

perceive their actions as autonomous (Table 6.2).
Learning as an experience can be made possible didactically when
educational institutions and enterprises create the necessary frame-
work for self-organized learning processes which are open to the liv-
ing and working environment of the learners (Rosenstiel, 2009).
Competence is developed primarily through implicit learning in
the process of work and the social environment (Rosenstiel, 2009).
One particular challenge of this is activating implicit knowledge (tacit
knowing), that is the knowledge or the ability which is not, or not fully,
verbalized or formalized (unwritten rules). This is particularly true
for each individual’s fundamental attitude towards safety and health,
which was shaped either in earlier life cycles or by ‘critical events’ in
their life cycle (Kriegesmann et al., 2005). Here it is important to help
raise learners’ awareness of implicit knowledge and implicit beliefs
(Rosenstiel, 2009).
6.5.1 Raise Awareness by a Campaign
In October 2017, the German Social Accident Insurance (DGUV) and

its members, the German social accident insurance institutions for trade
and industry and the public sector, are launching a prevention cam-
paign to establish a culture of prevention at company level. The strategic
concept of the campaign describes six fields of action to promote a cul-
ture of prevention in companies: integration of safety and health into
all activities; leadership; communication; participation; error-learning
culture; social climate/company climate (DGUV, 2015). At the centre
of the campaign is the human being in its social relationships. The main
idea of the campaign is that every employee can contribute to improv-
ing her (his) work and private life through small actions in her (his)
everyday life. Prior to the campaign being promoted in companies, the
current state of the six action fields had been determined within the
DGUV itself. A special analysis tool called the ‘CultureCheck’ was used
for this (Hessenmöller et al., 2016). Analysing the culture of prevention
within the umbrella organization DGUV before the official start of the
campaign was considered an important prerequisite for ensuring the
credibility of promoting cultural change in the member organizations
and at company level (Rahnfeld et al., 2016).
132
Table 6.2 Competences for Developing a Culture of Prevention

ACTION FIELD CONDITION METHOD/MEASURES COMPETENCE
Integration of safety and Safety and health are integrated into all of Monitoring; dynamic adaptation of rules and Ability to adapt rules and routines for
health into all activities the organization’s activities and processes routines; continual exchange over processes at safety and health to fit the situation
all levels of the organization
Leadership Management takes on responsibility for Work content is designed to encourage learning; Ability to learn in a self-organized way;
learning in the organization (Senge, 1997) learning spaces for self-organized learning are ability to innovate
created; employees are empowered
Employees and their needs are the focus Employees are appreciated for their worth and Ability to recognize and regulate one’s own
(experience of feeling competent, treated with respect; work–life balance; the needs (Albert Bandura)
closeness and belonging, autonomy) company as ‘family’; culture of trusta
Establishment of ‘take-care’ structures for Coaches for new employees; coaches for Ability to take responsibility and
employees managers (StartSAFE Programme, Singapore); self-commitment
alarm systems for addiction (legal and illegal
drugs, border line, etc.) or long-term
absenteeism; contact with employees with
long-term illnesses
Employees are treated fairly Employees are properly remunerated; treated Ability to tolerate and be fair
equally regardless of age, gender, ethnicity,
religion or health status
(Continued)
Table 6.2 (Continued) Competences for Developing a Culture of Prevention

Participation Employees have greater freedom to act Decisions in the company hierarchy are moved Ability to take on self-responsibility;
downwards; local autonomy (Senge, 2004) ability to self-motivate; self-initiative
Teamwork is institutionalized Working together on one thing, share experiences Ability to work in a team; keep an open
and learn together; project work; action learning mind to new things; ability to ask
(Reginald Revans) (cf. Kim et al., 2016) questions; critical thinking/reflection
Employees/learners are involved in Activation of implicit knowledge by involving Ability to take responsibility and be
developing rules, processes and products experiences, stories and rituals in the company; committed; trust in experience and
‘design thinking’ expertise; ability to innovate
Communication Transparent communication Approach people directly; fixed/regular Ability to communicate symmetrically
communication channels; decisions made are (Klaus Schaller); ability to ask questions
understandable; processes and problems are in the way of a humble inquiry (Schein,
systematically highlighted (e.g. via ‘idea 2013)
meetings’; Prüße et al., 2016)
Analysis of communication patterns in A regular and explicit dialogue is institutionalized Ability to (self) reflect and (self) criticize;
everyday company life (analysis of power mechanisms, intercultural ability to enter into dialogue;
differences, intergenerational differences) mindfulness
Critical reflection of core convictions Coaching; dialogue process Ability to develop new competences to act
(Continued)
C o m p e t e n c e s f o r a C u lt u r e o f P r e v e n t i o n
133
134
Table 6.2 (Continued) Competences for Developing a Culture of Prevention

Error culture (Dekker, Errors and crises are valued as learning Errors and crises are addressed openly and Ability to learn; ability to self-criticise
2005) opportunities worked on together
Culture of dealing fairly with errors is Accusations and penalties are done away with Ability to deal fairly with errors
established (‘Just Culture’)
Dealing with uncertainty and the Model of Mindful Management (Weick and Mindfulness, ability to (self) reflect;
‘unplannable’ Sutcliffe, 2010); ‘Planning’ for the unplannable flexibility
(Prüße et al., 2016)
Social climate/company A good social climate is actively Proactive teambuilding; company parties/outings; Teamwork; social focus
climate encouraged in the company internship; learning visits
There are opportunities for informal After-work BBQ (Prüße et al., 2016); Social focus
exchange communication corners; common spaces
a The category of trust and its ambivalence in the context of safety and health is of special importance for the development of a culture of prevention. The category trust is
currently analysed within a DGUV-KOSHA project on developing International Leading Indicators for a culture of prevention at enterprise and societal levels. For example, a
healthy balance between trust and mistrust is a prerequisite for a good error-learning culture within an enterprise (Hale and Borys, 2013). Conversely, empathizing with
superiors can contribute to a lack of safe and healthy behaviour (Wiencke, 2016).
Apart from the ‘CultureCheck’, a pre-campaign is carried out for the

members of the DGUV consisting of warm-up events for their labour
inspectors, supplemented by an e-learning tool and special workshops.
The aim is to enable campaign managers to develop their own attitude
towards the concept of a culture of prevention, to strengthen their
competences and to adapt their strategies to the challenge of promot-
ing cultural change.
In total, the new joint prevention campaign of the DGUV and its
members is concerned with not only providing the necessary informa-
tion regarding culture of prevention but also assisting and accompany-
ing the learning processes needed for a cultural transformation both
inside and outside the world of the social accident insurance institu-
tions (Bollmann and Otten, 2016).
6.5.2 How to Trigger Cultural Transformation within a Company?
A culture of prevention cannot be ‘implemented’ within a company.

Every company has its own corporate culture based on artefacts such
as a corporate design or a common language; shared values such as
transparency or respect; unspoken basic assumptions such as ‘employ-
ees must be controlled’ or ‘customers are difficult’; and unwritten rules
as don’ts. This corporate culture may not even be uniform across one
company but segmented into different subcultures.
To achieve an everyday work practice within a company that is
safe, healthy and happy requires learning as an experience. However,
because learning as an experience means first unlearning and relearn-
ing (Meyer-Drawe, 1996, 2008; Schein, 2009), every company has to
take into account resistance to change and the reason for it: ‘Resistance
to change applies especially to cultural assumptions because, once cul-
tural elements have stabilized in an organization, they provide mean-
ing, predictability, and security to its members’ (Schein, 2009).
Apart from natural curiosity to learn something new, experiencing
‘disconfirming forces’ can be a stimulus for change; for example, some-
thing unexpected happens that upsets some beliefs or assumptions.
A technological threat from digitalization and technological transfor-
mation may give the message to the employee: ‘unless you change, you
will be obsolete’. This ‘survival anxiety’ goes hand-in-hand with ‘learn-
ing anxiety’: ‘To realize that you may not be able to do it, or you may
be temporarily incompetent during the learning process’. The interac-

tion of these two anxieties creates the ‘complex dynamics of change’
(Schein, 2009, based on Lewin, 1947).
According to Edgar H. Schein, a manager has to take into account two
principles to get past resistance to change: (1) Survival anxiety must be
greater than learning anxiety and (2) Learning anxiety must be reduced
rather than survival anxiety increased. By implementing principle (2), the
manager can create a kind of ‘psychological safety’ for the employee and
enable him or her to abandon old behaviour and try learning something
new. A learning and working environment that ensures ‘psychological
safety’ is a prerequisite for the development of a culture of prevention.
6.5.3 Conditions for the Development of a Culture of Prevention in SMEs
SMEs are in a somewhat privileged position in terms of cultural ele-

ments. Relationships and interactions are closer between managers
and employees as well as between colleagues; processes are more infor-
mal; learning as an experience is highly valued; and the human and
their actions are the focus. Social and informal elements of safety and
health such as return-to-work interviews and visiting ill employees at
home are clearly more frequent in small companies than in big ones
(Amann, 2008).
Nevertheless, resistance to change is a basic problem and depends
more on the age of a company than on its size: A start-up may be
more open to cultural transformation, for example of the hierarchical
structure, than a traditional family business.
In general, SMEs seem to be less advanced in terms of integrating
safety and health into all activities of the firm (Borg, 2017). This is espe-
cially the case with regard to integrating health issues into their business.
Small companies implement far fewer health-related measures than
large companies (Amann, 2008, based on Gröben and Ulmer, 2004).
What is striking here is the paradox resulting from low implementation
of health measures despite widespread understanding of their benefits.
In addition to analysing effectiveness, it would be helpful to look at
internal and external obstacles to health measures (Amann, 2008).
Hortense Blazsin and Frank Guldenmund recently investigated
ambiguity in relation to safety in three organizational subgroups of a
major French gas distribution company. They found, for example, that
frontline supervisors believe that the Vision Zero strategy is ‘simul-

taneously necessary and too ambitious’. They also identified ‘distance’
as the common origin for the meaning of safety as constructed by
each group. It seems that all three groups share a relationship with
the safety culture projected by the organization rather than sharing a
safety culture themselves (Blazsin and Guldenmund, 2015).
In order to encourage the change and learning necessary for devel-
oping a culture of prevention in SMEs, the following conditions must
be taken into account:
1. Before you change your organization, change yourself: What
do you stand for? What does safety and health mean for you
personally? What are you really concerned about in your com-
pany? What is really important? Are you a role model for your
employees and colleagues? Do you perceive yourself as a safety
manager?
2. You are responsible for your own physical and mental health
and the health of your employees and colleagues: Are you con-
cerned about the lifestyle of your employees and colleagues?
Have you started health promotion or implemented a health-
management system within the company? Do you perceive
yourself as a health manager?
3. Focus on people: What do you know about the needs of your
employees and colleagues at work and in their private lives?
Are you empowering your people? Are your employees and
colleagues able to successfully perform their desired actions,
especially with regard to safety and health?
4. Focus on communication: How do the people in your company
interact with one another? Does regular and explicit dialogue
take place? How is the balance of power in your company? Do
people treat each other with mutual respect? Are you fair? Do
you offer opportunities for informal exchange?
5. Focus on learning and change: Do you take on responsibility
for learning in your company? How much do you invest in
learning for your employees and colleagues? Is there time and
space for learning in the process of working? Do you activate
and honour implicit knowledge? Do you perceive yourself as a
change manager?
6. Focus on innovation: When did you last do something

entirely new? Are the people involved in setting and monitor-
ing rules? How does your company deal with unpredictability
and uncertainty?
7. Focus on the paradox: Are you able to deal with ambiguity?
Do you take advantage of the multiplicity of realities in your
company? Do you reflect on how individuals and groups in
your company perceive safety and health? Do you know about
the patterns that people in your company use to see the mean-
ing of safe and healthy behaviour?
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7
M i c r o -SME s
A Special Case
AT H A N A S I O S H A D J I M A N O L I S
AND GEORGE BOUSTRAS
Contents
7.1 Introduction 144

7.1.1 Importance of Micro-Firms in the Economy
of the European Union and of the Major World
Economies 144
7.1.2 Definition of Micro-Firms (Advantages and
Disadvantages of an Employment Criterion) 144
7.1.3 Nature of Micro-Firms and Consequences 145
7.2 Theories and Research Regarding Safety in Micro-Firms 147
7.2.1 Theories 147
7.2.2 Empirical Research Results and Known Facts
about Safety Management in Small Firms
and Micro-Firms 148
7.2.3 The Special Role of Organizational Factors 152
7.2.4 Link between Safety Performance and Company
Performance 156
7.3 Government Safety Policy and Micro-Firms 157
7.4 Conclusions and Practical Recommendations 159
References 160
143
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Importance of Micro-Firms in the Economy of the
European Union and of the Major World Economies
Micro-firms are vitally important for the economy of most countries,

not only developing economies, but also advanced industrial econo-
mies, as shown by the relevant statistics. For example, ‘Ιn 2007, 89% of
firms in the United States (U.S.) had less than 20 employees and 79%
had less than 10’ (Cunningham et al., 2014). According to Eurostat
(2015), 29.2% (i.e. about 30%) of the EU employees work in micro-
enterprises (<10 employees), while about 20% are employed in small
firms (<50 employees). In other words, about half of the European
workforce is employed in micro- and small firms. The average contri-
bution for the period 2008–2013 of micro-firms to value added of the
euro area economy was 22% (ECB, 2013).
Micro-firms provide, therefore, employment and contribute to eco-
nomic growth (Zwetsloot, 2016). It has also to be noted that most
new firms start as small and frequently micro-firms. High entrepre-
neurship rates and creation of fast-growing new ventures are widely
accepted as a revitalizing force in economic growth.
7.1.2 Definition of Micro-Firms (Advantages

and Disadvantages of an Employment Criterion)
The criterion of employment is used in this chapter for the definition of

a micro-firm characterizing a firm with fewer than 10 employees (tak-
ing into account the full-time equivalent in case some employees are
part-time ones) (EU, 2005). According to the European Commission’s
definition, micro-enterprises are those with fewer than 10 employees
with a turnover or balance sheet total of less than €2 million, while
small enterprises are those enterprises with fewer than 50 employees
that have a turnover or balance sheet total of less than €10 million
(European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation of 6 May
2003 concerning the definition of micro-, small- and medium-sized
enterprises, 2003/361/EC’) (EFILWC, 2014). The differentiation of
micro-firms and self-employed people without employees is difficult,
if at all possible. There is a grey area between these two categories in
case self-employed people use employees on a temporary basis.
MICRO-SMEs 145
The employment criterion is far from ideal for the definition of

micro-firms, because it changes over relatively short time and is not
adequate for the description of their exact nature (Pinder et al., 2016).
It fulfils, however, the need for an easy and pragmatic operational defi-
nition to facilitate research of safety issues in micro-firms and it is a
widely used and acceptable definition.
7.1.3 Nature of Micro-Firms and Consequences
The size of an enterprise has an important impact on safety manage-

ment practices and the nature and extent of its resources and capa-
bilities (Sinclair and Cunningham, 2014). Small and micro-firms have
clear differences from large firms with over 250 employees on organi-
zational, management and control issues and are not small-scale copies
of them (MacEachen et al., 2008). There is a large diversity of micro-
firms and their risks differ by economic sector (some sectors can be
characterized as high-risk sectors, e.g. chemicals and machinery). These
problems of diversity, which are considered in more detail in Section
7.2, have a negative impact on the generalizability of research findings
in this category of firms. The current stage of a micro-enterprise life
cycle has also an influence on safety issues, since micro-firms may be in
different life-cycle stages and in general they have a shorter life cycle
than large firms. Surviving firms may accumulate more experience in
handling safety problems, but at the same time may be more conserva-
tive, and resistant to change and external safety intervention.
Concerns about the negative impact of safety investment on com-
petitiveness of the firm and perhaps the low frequency of accidents
make micro-firms reluctant in investing in safety equipment and mea-
sures (Pareso-Moscoso et al., 2013). Accidents in micro-firms have,
however, a significant overall social and economic impact due to the
large number of such firms. This is why action to prevent and reduce
accidents in micro-firms deserves special attention at both the enter-
prise and the government levels. The economics of health and safety in
micro-firms is considered in detail in Section 7.2.
Data derived from statistics of accidents and incidents are necessary
for their proper economic evaluation at an aggregate societal level in
order to establish the extent of the problem in micro-firms and arrive
at proper national policy decisions. A significant problem regarding
the quality of data is that in several countries a significant percentage

of micro-firms form part of the informal economy and do not appear
in government statistics. Another problem is that of under-reporting
of accidents by micro-firms, for reasons discussed subsequently (Probst
and Graso, 2011). The latter problem leads to a potentially misleading
picture of statistics that complicates the situation.
The category of micro-firms is worthy of consideration because their
characteristics make the type of safety management problems that they
face unique (Micheli and Cagno, 2010). Safety issues for micro-firms, as
different from those found in both larger firms and small and medium
sized enterprises (SMEs), deserve special attention (Legg et al., 2015).
Research on safety in micro- and small firms is among the priorities
of health and safety research policy for 2013–2020 (EASHW, 2013).
Many micro-firms are family firms and it is argued that family owner-
ship and relationships of family and business have a significant impact
on safety (Cunningham et al., 2014). The distinguishing characteristics
of micro-firms related to safety can be classified as social, organiza-
tional and economic ones, as shown in Table 7.1. These characteristics
and the influence of the nature of a family firm on safety are further
discussed in Section 7.2.
Table 7.1 Characteristics of Micro-Firms Influencing Safety

SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMIC
Close social relations and Direct employee control Limited physical, financial,
better psychosocial work human resources and lack of
environment resource slack
Unique social characteristics Informal management and Limited capabilities and
due to their size and undertaking of many managerial expertise
resources tasks by owner/manager
Employment of vulnerable Multitasking and lack of Economic vulnerability and
groups (young and old specialization of employees survival struggle
employees, immigrants, etc.)
Family atmosphere Limited managerial time and Short-term investment
time pressure horizon
Direct communication Relative lack of workers Small, local market
supervision
Limited networking with Lack of managerial skills Disproportionate bureaucratic
other firms burden imposed by changing
safety laws and regulations
Source: Authors (compiled from various literature sources, e.g. Cunningham et al., 2014; Hasle
and Limborg, 2006; Legg et al., 2015; and own experience).
MICRO-SMEs 147
Theories and empirical research results on safety in micro-firms

are presented in Section 7.2. Factors affecting safety and issues of
safety performance are also presented in the same section. Section 7.3
focuses on government safety policy and its impact on micro-firms,
and Section 7.4 presents the conclusions and some practical recom-
mendations for the improvement of safety conditions and the safety
performance of micro-firms.
7.2 Theories and Research Regarding Safety in Micro-Firms

7.2.1 Theories
There are several theories and models which have been used as frame-
works in safety management research. Since safety management is a
multidisciplinary area, they originate from different disciplines and
knowledge areas. The applicability of these theories in micro-firms is
an issue that has not been examined to a significant extent in the liter-
ature. They include models of accident causation (Hale and Glendon,
1987) and health promotion models like the demand support control
model (Karasek, 1979), the job demands-resources model (Bakker
and Demerouti, 2007; Bakker et al., 2003; Li et al., 2013), and the
local theory of work environment ( Jensen, 2002; Pandey et al., 2010).
Theories drawn from social psychology like Bandura’s social cogni-
tive theory (Bandura, 2001; Baranowski et al., 2002) and the social
identity theory (Terry et al., 2000) are also frequently mentioned in
the literature. The social cognitive theory of Bandura includes four key
constructs: environment, reinforcement, self-efficacy and situation.
In the case of safety performance, these determinants are, respectively,
safety conditions, safety policies and procedures (reinforcement),
safety self-efficacy (ability to solve safety problems) and perceptions
about how safety measures and procedures affect the ability to per-
form safely the work tasks (Parker et al., 2007).
The well-known theory of planned behaviour of Ajzen (1991) is
also used in some studies. The behavioural safety approach (Luria
et al., 2008) as expressed by these theories focuses on behavioural
change and its contribution to safety. These theories illustrate dif-
ferent aspects of the complex processes involved in safety manage-
ment, but further discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of
this chapter.
7.2.2 Empirical Research Results and Known Facts about Safety

Management in Small Firms and Micro-Firms
There is a growing literature on health and safety management in

small firms, but a quite limited one on micro-firms. Projection and
inference from small firm studies to micro-firms could be prob-
lematic, because small firms, especially those having more than 20
employees, tend to have a type of structure and elementary manage-
ment systems, which are missing in micro-firms (Micheli and Cagno,
2010; Wilkinson, 1999). The diversity of micro-firms makes empiri-
cal research difficult and there are problems of generalizability across
sectors and countries (Baldock et al., 2006). High-risk sectors like
chemicals, construction and machine shops face more critical safety
problems. Research is carried out usually with quantitative and less
frequently qualitative methods. Such research focuses, either on
macro-level factors like the socio-economic characteristics of firms
and sectors, and/or on micro-organizational (within the firm) factors
as determinants of safety outcomes (Simard and Marchand, 1995).
While some studies use observation or field experiments, frequently
studies are based on questionnaires and self-reported attitudes and
behaviours (e.g. Boustras et al., 2015). In the latter case, the valid-
ity of research results is, however, threatened by the social desirability
bias inherent in reported perceptions and actions of managers and
employees (MacEachen et al., 2008).
An issue that complicates research and policy decisions is the prob-
lem of under-reporting of accidents in micro-firms as mentioned in the
introductory section. There are large differences between micro-firms
in reporting work-related injuries (including accidents and fatalities),
but also occupational diseases and injury-related absences (Antonsson
et al., 2002). There are two aspects of under-reporting: on the one hand,
individual under-reporting (employees to the organization) and, on the
other hand, organizational under-reporting (micro-firm to authorities)
(Probst and Graso, 2011). The reasons for under-reporting are due to
lack of trust and fear of punishment at the individual level and suspi-
cion toward authorities at the level of the firm.
Micro-firms show important differences from other categories
of firms regarding the composition and characteristics of workforce
(Cunningham et al., 2014). These differences influence the social and
MICRO-SMEs 149
organizational workplace conditions and affect the safety perfor-

mance. Micro-firms tend to employ immigrants and part-time work-
ers. They also employ very young workers, but also older (beyond the
retirement age) and employees from disadvantaged groups (Lamm,
2014). Such worker groups usually can be employed at lower wages.
The gender composition of workforce, depending on the sector, could
also include larger percentages of women (Lee and Sobeck, 2012).
Finally, the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers is usually lower in this
category of firms.
The high percentage of immigrant workers increases the cultural
and ethnic diversity in the workplace. This diversity is not by itself a
negative factor but may lead to communication barriers (due to poor
knowledge of local language by immigrants) and tension. It has to
be noted that research on the relationship between the percentage
of immigrants in the workforce and the rate of accidents has pro-
duced mixed results. It seems, however, that immigrant workers tend
to face high risks of occupational hazard exposures and accidents
(Ahonen et al., 2007). The level of education of workers could be
lower for micro-firms (Parker et al., 2007). The work arrangements
in micro-firms characterized by high work intensity and shift work
may have a negative impact on work conditions and an increased
proneness to accidents. A probably higher percentage of repetitive
and monotonous work compared to larger firms could also increase
the rate of accidents (EASHW, 2013). Poor work conditions may be
accepted by employees as unavoidable fact ( Jensen, 2002). Attracting
and retaining experienced and capable employees is probably more
difficult for micro-firms, which cannot afford to offer the wages and
other benefits of larger firms. In addition, the high labour turnover
may affect the social dynamics of the workplace and safety awareness
and training.
Social, technological and economic changes and trends have an
impact on micro-firm safety conditions and have to be taken into
account. For example, the evolving demographic and other environ-
mental changes, such as the aging population in many European
countries, increases in immigrant workers and diversity in the work-
place, increase the safety challenges of micro-firms. The new trends for
part-time work and precarious employment have an adverse impact
on safety conditions. Subcontracting for larger firms could also mean
undertaking riskier work from them (MacEachen et al., 2010). The
pressure to produce versus the pressure to comply with safety rules,
which is higher in micro-firms due to survival considerations, becomes
critical in the current era of financial crisis in several economies. Safety
is then seen not as a necessary feature incorporated into the produc-
tion process, but rather a production constraint.
Safety performance is a key construct in safety research, but its
definition and measurement is problematic and controversial. Defining
safety performance presents special difficulties in the micro-firm. For
our purposes, a simple definition is used. It may be seen as the capa-
bility to comply with safety legislation and conform to legal require-
ments for documentation with a formalized system. Compliance
to safety legislation is then considered as an imperfect but practical
measure of safety performance. The use of accidents or incidents as a
safety performance criterion, as frequently used in quantitative s tudies
involving larger-sized firms, may not be appropriate for micro-firms
because of problems of under-reporting and other reasons (e.g. inad-
equate and unreliable statistical data).
Safety performance is influenced by a large number of factors
including technical, individual, social and organizational factors
(Cagno et al., 2014). These factors are briefly presented below and
then classified in Table 7.2 as barriers and facilitators together with
the expected safety outcomes.
Technical factors are those related with the production process and are
studied in safety engineering and design (Luria et al., 2008). Availability
of general and personal protection equipment (PPE) to employees
is important, but also their willingness to use such equipment on a
Table 7.2 Barriers and Facilitators of Safety Performance in Micro-Firms

BARRIERS FACILITATORS OUTCOMES
Lack of resources Social relations Safety performance
Limited knowledge Fast communication Compliance
Poor risk assessment Informal decision-making Productivity
Resistance to change External pressure for compliance Well-being and work–life balance
Conflicting objectives Ethical considerations Reduced number of accidents
Adverse work conditions Government safety inspection Reduced frequency of near
patterns and level of fines misses and incidents
Source: Authors (compiled from various literature sources, e.g. Mir and Feitelson, 2007; Masi
and Cagno, 2015; and own experience).
MICRO-SMEs 151
routine basis (Hadjimanolis et al., 2015; Rongo et al., 2004). One of the
major problems of micro-firms is that they have a low risk perception
of work hazards and a tendency of underrating risks as frequently also
happens in small firms (MacEachen et al., 2010). A shared representa-
tion of risks between workers and managers is often missing in this cat-
egory of firms, as it is also sometimes happening in larger firms as well
(Prussia et al., 2003). Technical factors are of lesser importance today
than in the past in large firms, due to automated machinery incorporat-
ing safety features and highly reliable technological systems. This is not
the case in several micro-firms with old technology machines, which
are not always properly maintained, and outdated control systems. Due
to the limited internal knowledge base of micro-firms and little use
of external safety consultants, risk assessment is frequently inadequate
or completely missing. Safety barriers and protecting systems are also
probably deficient in a large number of micro-firms.
Individual factors include age, education, experience, and tenure of
workers. For example, experienced (and usually older) workers may not
use PPE because they think that their experience in handling materi-
als and machinery will protect them. On the other hand, some stud-
ies suggest that young employees are more likely to have an accident in
the workplace, perhaps due to insufficient knowledge and skills or care-
less work practices (Lin et al., 2008). Education of workers is important
for their safety behaviour. One reason may be its relation to the level of
understanding of safety instructions and regulations.
Social factors include teamwork, ethnic origin, social characteris-
tics and dynamics of the workplace relations (Eakin and MacEachen,
1998). Social relations within groups in the workplace have a different
meaning than in other categories of firms where there are more work-
ers organized in differentiated task groups with designated supervisors
and without the continuous presence of the top manager.
Organizational factors referring to management, structure and
culture of the firm are of particular importance. They are interrelated
with the technical, individual and social factors mentioned earlier.
Organizational factors are difficult to distinguish from social ones; for
example, authority and power relations in the firm involve both social
and organizational aspects (Eakin et al., 2001). Organizational factors
are frequently considered in research studies and are discussed in the
following, separately in detail.
The factors discussed can be seen as barriers and facilitators of safety

performance and are summarized in Table 7.2. The barriers or internal
constraints include real resource barriers (physical, financial, etc.) and
perceptual barriers (beliefs and attitudes) (Masi and Cagno, 2015).
The latter are no less important for safety performance than the for-
mer. One of the problems in the study of barriers is their comple-
mentarity. This means that they interact and it is therefore difficult
to isolate their individual effect or to estimate and predict their over-
all effect. Another issue is that types and intensities of barriers differ
among micro-firms according to their sector and other characteristics
(Mir and Feitelson, 2007).
Facilitators, that is factors having a positive effect on safety perfor-
mance, take different forms. One of them is the external pressures for
compliance. External pressure could be social, government or market-
based (Mir and Feitelson, 2007). The latter could originate from con-
tracts with large firms stipulating safety measures among other terms
(Vickers et al., 2005). Other important facilitators include familiarity
and close social relations between managers and employees and the
peculiarity of the organizational factors like informal and fast decision-
making and informal face-to-face communication.
7.2.3 The Special Role of Organizational Factors
Champoux and Brun (2003) report that there is no safety structure

in firms with fewer than five employees. Organizational structure in
micro-firms is simple and informal. An implication of such an infor-
mal structure is the high frequency of contact between the owner and
employees. Similarly, strategic planning and management systems, for
example a quality management system or environmental management
system, are often missing or present in a simple and informal form.
The lack of professional management implies that there is no safety
management system and the safety policy, if at all present, is rarely
written or documented (Sørensen et al., 2007). Safety mechanisms
and safety barriers to prevent accidents are often in embryonic form.
The informal control aspects and the supposed family atmosphere
affect the level of trust between employees and management. The level
of trust is, however, also affected by the leadership style of the owner/
manager (O/M).
MICRO-SMEs 153
Safety climate and safety culture, as organizational factors within

an accident prevention philosophy, have been widely studied in larger
firms. Their extent of applicability in micro-firms has not been ade-
quately studied. Safety culture includes several dimensions like prior-
ity and status of safety in the firm. It refers to formal safety procedures
and informal practices and the underlying organizational values
(Clarke, 2011). Safety climate refers to observable safety compliance
and awareness of safety regulations. It is also related to worker atti-
tudes and values.
The literature refers to two major factors in the adoption of a
safety system: motivation, on the one hand, and capacity or com-
petence, on the other hand. These factors apply separately to O/Ms
and employees. Values (e.g. survival, independence, respect for
human life and welfare), attitudes and beliefs shape the sense of
social responsibility and moral obligations for O/Ms and influence
their intentions to implement safety measures (Brosseau and Li,
2005; Hasle et al., 2012; Lepoutre and Heene, 2006). The fear of
legal and economic consequences of accidents is an important alter-
native consideration.
Motivation of workers for safe behaviour can be attributed to self-
preservation (Zohar and Erev, 2007), but also to conformance to
referent group norms for maintenance of own and other group mem-
ber safety and health. With proper motivation, intentional safety
violations are reduced or eliminated and any remaining violations
are mostly unintentional. Positive motivation of workers, as already
mentioned, increases their willingness to use PPE. Apart from moti-
vation, however, the impact of physical (personal discomfort), social
and organizational factors may influence the use of PPE (Torp and
Moen, 2006).
Attitudes, beliefs and conceptions of safety issues may dif-
fer between managers and employees leading to differences in the
attribution of accidents. There is considerable research on the diver-
gent perspectives of employers versus those of employees on safety
responsibility in the literature of small firms (Parker et al., 2007).
The defensive stance and the blaming of employees’ mentality by
O/Ms is a convenient way to distance themselves from the safety
problems and deny their responsibility for causes of accidents (Hasle
et al., 2009). Another aspect of management avoidance of safety
issues concerns the use of the relatively low frequency of accidents in

micro-firms as an excuse and justification of the low priority set on
safety (Cagno et al., 2014).
The special role of the O/M in safety management in small firms
and especially micro-firms is widely recognized in the literature.
It is the dominant actor and has multiple responsibilities and manage-
rial tasks and is frequently the only manager in the firm (Hasle et al.,
2009). Demographic characteristics of O/M like age and education
play a significant role. Younger and more educated owners are more
likely to seek information and advice about health and safety issues
(Mir and Feitelson, 2007). The O/M tends frequently to have an
authoritarian leadership style with patriarchal management, especially
in family firms (Mussolino and Calabro, 2014).
The participatory approach to safety refers to the meaningful
engagement of the employees in decisions and processes related to
safety. Consultation, participation and representation of employees
have been found to contribute to the motivation of employees to com-
ply with safety rules in larger firms and SMEs (Parker et al., 2007).
While most research has taken a managerial approach, the worker
standpoint has been overlooked (Eakin, 2010). The latter refers to
research focusing on the interest of workers and their perceptions of
risk, accidents and injuries. From the point of view of the worker, fear
of job hazards, perceived aversive work conditions and work-related
health problems frequently lead to increased work absenteeism due to
dangers in the workplace (Biron and Bamberger, 2012). Institutional
aspects in the particular region or country like the adequacy of social
welfare, medical leave of absence, compensation for accidents and pri-
ority given by legislation to employee well-being are closely related
to workers’ perceptions and attitudes. More general work attitudes,
like job satisfaction and organizational commitment, and their link to
safety performance have been considered in research, but it is not clear
whether they are antecedents or consequences of safety performance
(Hadjimanolis et al., 2015).
Capacity or competence to apply safety measures depends on the
availability of easy to access and low-cost safety information and
knowledge. Easily accessible channels of information are critical for
all firms, but especially for micro-enterprises (Parker et al., 2014).
The safety information and knowledge sources for micro-firms are
MICRO-SMEs 155
relatively limited. The main sources of knowledge for health and safety
management form the suppliers, state agencies, consultants and trade
unions ( James et al., 2004). Another important source is the personal
and professional networks of O/Ms. Regarding suppliers, the informa-
tion provided on safety may be affected and biased by their interests
and the need to present a positive image of their products. While state
agencies are more reliable sources of information, small and micro-
firm owners may be reluctant to contact them suspecting that such an
inquiry may lead to inspection and fines.
Safety management as a practical activity has received a lot of
attention in both academic literature and publications of inspection
authorities or professional societies (Bragatto et al., 2015). In large
firms, authors propose integrated management systems (e.g. a combi-
nation of quality management, environmental management and safety
management). While the integration of management systems is an
engineering approach, behavioural scientists have proposed a human-
centred approach. DeJoy (2005), for example, has proposed an integra-
tive approach both culture- and behaviour-based.
The practical application of a safety system requires safety lead-
ership and management commitment, development of specific skills
for safety, and appropriate health and safety measures and techniques
according to the industry and the specific job hazards of the firm
(Bragatto et al., 2015). Low-cost tools like checklists and a simple
record-keeping system are also necessary measures. Delegation of
responsibility for health and safety to a trusted worker or even the
owners’ wife in family firms has advantages in case the O/M does not
have the time to deal with safety issues, but also disadvantages if work-
ers perceive such delegation as low priority given to safety (Martin and
Guarnieri, 2014).
Training has been identified as an important factor with a posi-
tive impact on safety performance in large and small firms (Walters,
2001). It can take the form of internal (within the firm) and external
training. In micro-firms, it is usually informal on-the-job training
and learning. The content of learning could include safety principles
and guidelines and the appropriate use of personal protective equip-
ment. Supervisors play an important role especially in internal train-
ing. The role of motivational barriers to training of employees has
received relatively little attention in small and micro-firm research.
Similarly, learning from incidents and failures as part of training for

avoiding similar mistakes (as well as failure to learn and reasons for it)
is also an issue worth of further investigation (Drupsteen and Hasle,
2014). The contribution of training goes beyond knowledge transfer
and ideally should have a positive impact on attitude and behav-
ioural change.
Internal communication (within the firm) about risks, safety mea-
sures and proper work practices has received a lot of attention in safety
and risk literature but is problematic in micro-firms. This may sound
as a paradox, taking into account the short communication channels
and the frequent and direct face-to-face contact (Brooks, 2008). The
problem lies in the lack of time, priority on production issues and less
concern for safety issues. Especially, the written forms of safety com-
munication are frequently missing.
While oral communication has its place, written forms of commu-
nication even in simple forms like safety signs in the workplace have
to take into account the peculiarities of micro-firms. Such peculiarities
are, for example, the low level of education and deficient knowledge
of local language by immigrant workers. Internal safety communica-
tion is related to safety training and to communication of inspection
authorities towards firms on safety issues.
7.2.4 Link between Safety Performance and Company Performance
Micro-firms in their struggle for survival take into serious consider-

ation the economic aspects of safety management. Investment in health
and safety is for them a low priority because of little or no short-term
benefit (Micheli and Cagno, 2008). Some authors have argued for the
business case of adopting safety measures, implying that investment in
safety makes sense in economic as well as ethical terms (Haefeli et al.,
2005; Haslam et al., 2010; Legg et al., 2014). The impact of accidents
at the level of the firm includes insurance costs, liabilities and costs of
litigation, and other legal costs as direct consequences (Shalini, 2009).
The disruption of activities of the firm and production process delays
and material damage could threaten the survival of the firm, while in
the long term, the increase in absenteeism, lower employee productiv-
ity, and negative company image and reputation have to be taken into
account (Drupsteen and Hasle, 2014).
MICRO-SMEs 157
While explicit and direct costs of injuries are easily determined, indi-
rect and implicit ones are frequently not easy to calculate and therefore
overseen. At the societal level, injury costs for the individual, human
costs, and societal treatment and welfare costs have to be taken into
account (Haslam et al., 2010). Safety and health are essential factors
for well-being in the workplace. The latter directly affects motivation
and a positive work climate and eventually employee productivity. An
issue affecting employee morale, but rarely considered in micro-firms,
is the assignment of modified work to injured workers for easier return
to work (Andersen et al., 2007). Even if the O/M is favourable to such
an arrangement, the fact is that many micro-firms cannot provide less
demanding work tasks to injured workers during their first weeks of
return (MacEachen et al., 2010). A detailed cost–benefit analysis for
proving the business case of investment in health and safety measures
is frequently beyond the capabilities of a micro-firm.
7.3 Government Safety Policy and Micro-Firms
Many countries have prepared their own national health and safety
policy adapted to their particular economic and social conditions.
European standards and regulations have been adopted by the
European Union countries and incorporated in their national health
and safety policies. Specific programmes and interventions are, how-
ever, decided at the country level. There is probably a considerable gap
between developed and developing countries in the design and appli-
cation of policies and programmes.
There is a hot debate especially in advanced countries like the
United States and the United Kingdom regarding the balance required
between legislation enforcement by the authorities, like inspection,
safety audits and risk assessments, on the one hand, and self-regulation
of firms, on the other hand (Baldock et al., 2006). For small firms and
especially micro-firms, detailed regulations and conformance require-
ments represent a significant burden, which could even threaten their
very survival. National safety policies do not usually take into account
the size of the firm at their design phase for the required records and
systems. Some countries have considered the possibility of providing
special grants for safety compliance. Special measures for small and
micro-firms are not used in most countries.
The implementation of safety policy is affected by the industrial

relations and the institutional context, which could have economic
and legal dimensions (Arocena and Nunez, 2010). The capacity and
efficiency of the regulation and inspection authorities determine the
inspection frequency and the compliance to regulations. In several
countries, due to the large number of micro-firms, the frequency of
safety inspections is low (Legg et al., 2009). The threat of prosecution
may affect the safety standards of firms, but much depends on the level
of fines levied by court decisions and whether fast justice procedures
connect violations and immediate punishment. The extent of union-
ization in the particular country and industrial sector and the role of
unions in safety issues may also have an impact on the implementation
of safety measures (Walters, 2001). The impact of economic conditions
on the implementation of safety measures and investment on safety
protection during periods of financial crisis has recently got attention
in the literature. It seems that micro-firms tend to neglect safety in
favour of production output and economic considerations for survival.
This discussion implies that social partners like government agen-
cies, employers and employees’ organizations (trade unions) have an
important role to play in the formulation and especially the imple-
mentation of national safety strategies (Antonsson et al., 2002). At the
level of the firm, safety decisions, participation in safety campaigns and
various intervention schemes and continuity in safety efforts are influ-
enced and constrained by the involvement of stakeholders (Kvorning
et al., 2015). For example, their trade federations have a special role in
both reaching micro-firms for safety campaigns and interventions and
persuading them to improve safety conditions.
The evaluation of interventions by safety authorities is a complex
issue since the effectiveness of interventions may take time to appear
and the attribution of any improvements to the specific scheme is dif-
ficult due to the many factors involved (Cagno et al., 2013; Hasle and
Limborg, 2006). The necessary funds for such evaluations are usu-
ally scarce or non-existent in most countries, except advanced ones
such as the United States, Canada and some Scandinavian countries.
Evaluation is probably even less frequent in the case of interventions
specifically tailored to the needs of micro-firms. The evaluation of
interventions is, however, essential for improvement of their design
and effectiveness (MacEachen et al., 2010).
MICRO-SMEs 159
7.4 Conclusions and Practical Recommendations
This chapter summarized the safety issues of particular concern for the
micro-firms. It has tried to show the importance of safety as a social
issue in this category of firms, which are economically and socially
significant in both advanced and developing countries.
The chapter highlighted the impact of size and special features of
micro-firms on safety problems and their management. The study of
safety in this category of firms is justified despite the difficulties raised
by their heterogeneity. Such research could also help safety authorities
to design specific regulations and interventions tailored to the needs
of micro-firms.
The aim for a healthy and safe workplace should also be applied in
the case of micro-firms. Initiating activities is the difficult first step
for a positive change in safety conditions. Micro-firms are suspicious
about authorities and their inspection and intervention activities. The
relations with inspection bodies are not, therefore, always favourable.
Safety authorities have to find ways to show micro-firms that their
primary aim is to help rather than punish them for safety violations.
Due to the large diversity of micro-firms, safety problems are differ-
ent and solutions may vary. Intervention should aim to help firms to
use their existing knowledge of their conditions in combination with
outside help for the choice of the proper solution for each case.
Some general guidelines for micro-firms would include as a first step
a risk assessment and setting priorities according to likelihood of haz-
ards ( Jorgensen et al., 2011). In a second step, the micro-firm should
proceed to the development or use of available and easy-to-understand
self-diagnostic tools and follow guidelines and action plans based on
self-diagnosis (Itani et al., 2006). In many cases, it is possible to find
low-cost and resource-sparing technical solutions to safety problems,
which are affordable to micro-firms (Walker and Tait, 2004).
As explained earlier, lack of awareness of the safety conditions is
a major issue; therefore, developing and monitoring relatively simple
safety indicators, for example a record of incidents and accidents and
the number of workdays lost due to workplace accidents, would lead to
better appreciation of the problems, feedback and continuous improve-
ment ( Jensen, 2002). Similarly, the use of safety signs in the workplace
is a constant reminder of the need to take safety precautions.
Encouraging safe behaviour in the workplace needs organiza-

tional change and development of a safety organizational culture,
which would leave behind blame and suspicion about safety problems
between employees and management and lead to cooperation and tol-
erance for mistakes (Burke et al., 2011). The establishment of safety
committees and appointment of safety representatives would contrib-
ute to that purpose (Walters, 2002). The O/M has a very important
part to play as a safety role model. Since overcoming inertia and resis-
tance to change includes motivation of employees, they will need posi-
tive reinforcement in their efforts.
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8
M o n i to r i n g a n d
Modifying a Safety
M a n a g e m e n t S ys t e m
F R A N K W. G U L D E N M U N D
AND MERLIJN MI KKERS
Contents

8.2 Incident Investigation in Small and Medium Sized
Enterprises: Introduction 169
8.2.1 History of Accident Investigation 169
8.2.2 Why Investigate Incidents and Accidents? 170
8.2.3 What Is the Use of Accident Investigations
for SMEs? 171
8.3 Who Investigates and How to Investigate? 173
8.3.1 Who Investigates? 173
8.3.2 Depth of an Investigation 174
8.4 Phases of an Investigation 174
8.4.1 Data Collection 175
8.4.2 Creating a Timeline 176
8.4.3 Analysis 176
8.4.4 Conclusions and Recommendations 177
8.4.5 Report 178
8.5 Incident Investigation Is an Iterative Process 178
8.5.1 Different Tools and Models 179
8.5.2 Incident Investigation Approach for SMEs 180
8.5.3 Human Error and Blame 180
8.6 Choosing a Safety Intervention Strategy 181
167
8.7 Behavioural Interventions 186

8.7.1 Behaviour-Based Safety 187
8.7.1.1 Introduction 187
8.7.1.2 Behaviour-Based Safety Programmes 188
8.8 Conclusion 195
References 196
8.1 Introduction
The basic structure of a company’s safety management system (SMS)

and its relation to the environment is depicted in Figure 8.1. The com-
pany runs its SMS based on societal demands (laws and regulations,
and so on) and the safety risks it has identified and learns from its
mishaps. The latter could signify risks that have not been identified or
have been underestimated. Large mishaps are usually reported to (and
investigated by) governmental agencies, which might result in adapta-
tions to the law or in new regulations, criteria and so on.
In this chapter, we will look at two components of this basic SMS:
(parts of ) the risk control system and the learning system. To start with
the latter, learning can take place through the investigation of incidents
or accidents or through carrying out audits. Audits are reviewed in
Chapter 4 of this book; the investigation of incidents is discussed in this
chapter. We will also take a brief look at how to choose a safety inter-
vention (strategy). A safety intervention might be an output of the
learning system as a result of an incident or audit. Furthermore, we
Society (laws and regulations, criteria,

requirements, benchmarks, etc.)
Safety management system

System
performance
Risk control
system Learning system
Figure 8.1 The main components of a basic safety management system.

MONITORING AND MODIFYING SMSs 169
will discuss one particular safety intervention in more detail, that is

behaviour-based safety (BBS). BBS is a quite common approach, when
(visible) safety behaviour has been pinpointed as an issue.
8.2 Incident Investigation in Small and

Medium Sized Enterprises: Introduction
8.2.1 History of Accident Investigation
At the beginning of the twentieth century, large accidents were rarely inves-
tigated, let alone small accidents or incidents. It was not common knowl-
edge that it is useful to investigate an accident and understand why that
accident could happen. It is useful to understand the causes of an accident,
because precautionary actions can be taken to prevent similar accidents
from happening in the future. In that time, people were only concerned
with the effects of and damage resulting from the accident. Although this
was not common knowledge at that time, it does not mean big accidents
(or disasters) were never investigated. A prime example is the first disaster
of Dutch national importance in the city of Leiden in 1807. On January
12, a ship with 37 tonnes of gun powder aboard exploded in the city cen-
tre. This resulted in a devastating scene: approximately 160 deadly victims,
2000 wounded and 218 houses completely destroyed. It was recently found
out that immediately after the disaster an investigation by the State was
started. The investigation’s prime aim was to find out who could be held
responsible for the explosion, but there was also a desire to understand the
causes of the accident. It turned out that a complex of causes led to the
disaster: bad luck, weather conditions, lack of control and supervision, lack
of regulation, small mistakes, malpractice and conflicting goals (rush to get
the powder to its destination). In response to this disaster, a new law was
introduced that forbade transportation of explosive goods through densely
populated areas. This law also contained regulations for using specific signs
(a white banner with the word ‘gunpowder’ on it), regulations for inform-
ing local authorities en route, the ship’s cargo hold had to be upholstered
with rugs and hides, and so on. In the end, a lot was learned from this
major disaster.
This example of an investigation was not common practice in those
days. It took another century to really shift attention after an accident
from effects to causes. In 1931, William Herbert Heinrich introduced his
‘domino theory’ – which is, actually, one of the first ‘safety models’ – calling
attention to causes of accidents. He visualized a cause-and-effect chain

leading to an accident and injury through dominoes falling one by one.
The five dominoes are
1. Social environment and ancestry
2. Fault of person
3. Unsafe act or mechanical or physical hazard (unsafe condition)
4. Accident
5. Injury
The first three dominoes represent the categories of causes of an acci-
dent. Despite later criticism on his work, especially when it comes to
the emphasis on individual workers instead of on hazard management
or a safe working environment, Heinrich’s work is generally seen as a
starting point of safety research. In the second half of the twentieth
century, more focus is put on organizational and management factors
that contribute to the occurrence of an accident. Since the 1970s, major
accidents are investigated more thoroughly, but awareness also increases
to investigate smaller accidents and incidents. In the 1980s, there was
much emphasis on technical causes and shortcomings in (internal) reg-
ulation. In the 1990s, attention focused on ‘management systems’, espe-
cially to manage the ‘learning loop’ (risk analysis and adjustments after
incidents). Gradually, safety culture came more in the spotlight of safety
management and incident investigations. The concept of safety culture
was introduced in investigations after major disasters in the 1980s (e.g.
the investigation after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster), but it became
especially popular in the first decade of the twenty-first century, together
with ‘human factors’. Nowadays, all these factors (technical issues, safety
management, safety culture and human factors) receive attention in
most investigations. Before we go deeper into ‘how to investigate’, we
explain what is the use is of incident investigation and why it is impor-
tant for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).
8.2.2 Why Investigate Incidents and Accidents?
First of all, what is the difference between safety incidents and acci-
dents? These terms are often used interchangeably, but is that also
correct? Incidents and accidents are usually described as ‘unplanned’
events in the past. In most definitions, the difference lies in the
(negative) effects of the event. Some organizations define incidents

as instances that could have led easily to negative consequences (like a
near miss), whereas accidents did lead to damage, for example to the
health of (a) person(s) or to material property. Other organizations
define incidents as events that lead to negative consequences, but with
a less severe impact. In the end, it does not really matter what the
definition is in your organization, but it is useful to define these terms
and avoid using these terms as synonyms. A clear distinction between
these terms can, for example, be useful for deciding on the depth of
the investigation (Section 8.3.2).
So why should an organization invest capacity and money in
investigating incidents and accidents? There are several reasons for this
(see also Box 8.1):
1. Learning (to prevent similar events in the future)
2. To find out who is responsible (and also to be able to blame
someone)
3. Compliance with internal and external regulations
4. Because of pressure of the outside world (e.g. from supervising
bodies, residents close to site where the incident happened,
media pressure)
8.2.3 What Is the Use of Accident Investigations for SMEs?
All kinds of companies conduct incident and accident investiga-

tions. But it will not surprise anyone that smaller companies carry
out investigations less frequently than large enterprises. On the one
hand, they usually have less incidents and accidents. On the other
hand, the organizational structure is often less well-equipped for this
kind of investigation. They generally do not have, for example, a safety
department (just one or maybe two employees who are responsible
for safety issues) as well as a full-blown SMS. This is unfortunate,
because opportunities to learn and improve operational activities from
a safety perspective are limited, but perhaps also from an efficiency or
effectivity perspective. Of course, conducting an investigation costs
capacity (and therefore money). Larger companies usually have larger
budgets for improving safety (and can hire external capacity to carry
out investigations), and budgets are more limited in SMEs. But it
is good to realize that continuous improvement of safety, especially
BOX 8.1 REASONS FOR INVESTIGATING

INCIDENTS OR ACCIDENTS
Learning is the most important reason to investigate an incident
or accident. If you really understand how the unwanted event
could happen, it provides an opportunity to introduce measures
to decrease the probability that a similar event will happen again
in the future. It will lead to continuous improvement of the level
of safety in an organization.
In practice, the reason for addressing responsibility is, next to
the reason of learning, an important motive to start an investi-
gation. This motive will not always be openly expressed, but in
many reports of investigations it will be found as a focus on (an)
individual(s) as a cause of the incident of accident. It will also
be found in individual measures taken after the investigation,
for example an official reprimand for someone involved in the
incident or accident. That the learning part can suffer because of
this strong focus on (an) individual(s), especially when it leads
to blaming an individual, will be addressed later in this chapter.
Compliance with internal or external regulations often is an
important driver to also conduct an investigation. There are two
reasons why this can play a role. The first one is that a safety
management system in an organization prescribes that incidents
and accidents are investigated. So, you have to comply with your
own safety management system. The second reason is to find out
with the investigation whether internal or external regulations
have been broken and to what extent this has played a role in the
incident or accident taken place.
Finally, external (governmental) agencies expect an organi-
zation to investigate an incident or accident. Although this is
probably not the best reason for an investigation, it happens in
practice. If this is the only reason to start an investigation, the
investigations most of the time will have limited added value,
because any intrinsic motivation is missing.
Summarizing, from a safety perspective the best reason to start
an investigation is because an organization wants to learn from what
happened and using that knowledge to improve their level of safety.
combined with general operational improvement, will save money in

the future; accidents are expensive. Incident and accident investiga-
tion is an important instrument for such improvement. In the next
paragraph, we will outline how to conduct an investigation.
8.3 Who Investigates and How to Investigate?
In this paragraph, we describe who investigates incidents and acci-

dents in an organization, how ‘deep’ your investigation should be,
which phases an investigation has and the different tools you can use
for an investigation.
8.3.1 Who Investigates?
In most SMEs, the ‘safety officer’ is involved in incident and accident

investigations. Safety officers, or other safety management staff, often
have (some) experience with investigation and probably have had some
kind of training in incident and accident investigation. So, it is logi-
cal and advisable to involve the safety officer and make her or him
responsible for the investigation. Furthermore, we think it is useful to
do an investigation with a small team, two persons can be enough. It is
helpful to be able to discuss findings during the investigation and team
members can challenge each other’s thoughts and ideas, if necessary.
Although not common, it is possible to include a person involved in
the incident in the team, if this person is emotionally capable of doing
that. This has the advantage that someone who really understands why
certain decisions have been made that led up to the incident can share
this information with the other team member(s). This can be differ-
ent than just interviewing that person. If he or she is a team member,
it allows them to ‘brainstorm’ with the other team member(s) about
subtle interactions in the system (between managers and workers, man
and machine or man and organization, e.g. the planning department)
and how that probably plays a role in the occurrence of an incident. The
disadvantage can be that the investigation probably will not be seen as
sufficiently ‘independent’. But in an organization where management
and operational workers really trust each other, this can have added
value. In SMEs, this required level of trust is perhaps more present
than in large enterprises.
8.3.2 Depth of an Investigation
Most organizations determine the depth of an investigation on

the severity of the consequences of an incident. So, the greater the
(potential) damage (e.g. in number of victims, severity of injuries or
financial consequences) the more factors are analysed and, in the end,
the more pages the report has. Severity of consequences often justifies
for management how much money or time is invested in an investi-
gation. In practice, this means that small incidents are registered and
only analysed for trends, small incidents are investigated limitedly and
incidents with large consequences are investigated deeply.
Although this is the way it is usually organized, this is not the only
possible approach. Another way is to estimate the learning potential of
an incident beforehand and if it is estimated that a lot can be learned
from the incident, a deep investigation can be started. The learning
potential can be decided on, for example, the complexity of the inci-
dent, how many persons, departments, organizations are directly or
indirectly involved, etc. This can mean that some incidents that have
had limited consequences are still investigated deeply.
8.4 Phases of an Investigation
When an organization is confronted with an incident or acci-

dent, it is (too) late to think about how this organization should
carry out an investigation. In other words, an organization should
be prepared for incident investigation. This means, investigators
should be ready for the task, it should be clear which incidents will
be investigated and which not, it should be clear who ‘orders’ the
investigation, and so on. It is recommended to write this down in
a procedure, preferably as part of an SMS. For further reading, see
the paper ‘Defining operational readiness to investigate’ (Kingston,
Frei, Koornneef, & Schallier, 2007).
And then the most awkward moment arrives that an incident of
accident happens in your organization. The consequences can be seri-
ous, like someone injured who has to visit the hospital, or the con-
sequences had the potential to be serious. A team is formed (or one
person is appointed as investigator) and then an investigation starts
and basically goes through the phases shown in Figure 8.2.
Data collection
Creating timeline
Incident/accident
Analysis: change,
(root) causes, barriers
Conclusions and
recommendations
Report
Phase 0 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Time
Figure 8.2 Phases of an incident or accident investigation.
8.4.1 Data Collection
It is important to start as soon as possible with gathering data about

the ‘incident scene’. It is also important to note that this does not have
to be the task of an investigator. This can, for example, be done by line
management. This task can mean taking photographs, identifying wit-
nesses (and probably get a first statement from them) and if possible
secure all kinds of recordings (audio, video, electronic data, machine
logs, etc.). This is the basis of every investigation. After this informa-
tion is gathered, other sources of information have to be consulted, for
example documents with work instructions, maintenance schedules,
relevant procedures and permits.
Another important source of information is derived from witnesses
and, of course, persons involved in the incident/accident through
interviewing. Interviews can yield a lot of information provided they
are executed well (see Box 8.2). If executed poorly, a lot of useful infor-
mation will remain uncovered and can harm the support of the results
of the investigation.
Be careful to archive all the collected data/information to help a
good start of the next phase, creating a timeline.
BOX 8.2 KEY RULES FOR A GOOD INTERVIEW

• Select a good location for the interview where you will
not be disturbed
• Interview with one or a maximum of two interviewers
• Interview one person at a time
• Introduce yourself in a proper manner
• Explain the purpose of the interview/investigation and
how his/her answers are used for the investigation
• Set the interviewee at ease
• Questions should mostly be ‘open’ and unbiased, or with
absence of prejudice
• Try to understand why people did what they did and not
what they did not do
• Keep in mind you want useful information to create
understanding and not want to blame someone
• Put down notes of the answers of the interviewee
• Thank the interviewee at the end of the interview and offer
feedback on the final result of the investigation
8.4.2 Creating a Timeline
To obtain an overview of what happened chronologically or sequentially,

it is useful to create a timeline. In a timeline, all events are shown that
are relevant in the run up to the incident. The timescale just before the
incident is very ‘dense’; this can be an event plotted every minute or even
second. The further back in time from the incident, the less dense the
timescale is (e.g. days or months). The timeline describes ‘what’ happened
at which time and not ‘why’ it happened. This is part of the next phase.
8.4.3 Analysis
With all the data gathered and with an overview in the form of a time-
line, the analysis phase starts. The aim of the analysis is to understand
why things happened the way they did or how could they happen. In
the timeline, all relevant events and actions are plotted. An easy way
to create understanding is to ask ‘why’ this could happen. For example,
an employee acted in a way that did not conform to a work instruc-

tion. The first answer on the why-question can be that most employees
in similar circumstances act in ways not conforming to that specific
instruction. This provides some insight but is not yet satisfying. So, why
don’t employees follow that instruction in such-and-such situations?
This can be the case because employees feel pressured to finish the job
in time and this is usually appreciated by management. Or the instruc-
tion does not match practice, and so on. If the instruction does not
match practice, it is useful to find out how instructions are developed;
for example, are operators involved in writing them? The answer to
this question leads to another question. So, the simplest method to
create understanding is by asking the obvious question ‘Why?’ In most
cases, asking ‘Why?’ five times is enough.
In many investigations, investigators want to reveal ‘underlying’
causes and often label these. In a later paragraph, different tools and
models are briefly described that can help with the analysis and what
kind of ‘labels’ are used for underlying causes. At the end of the analy-
sis, investigators should have the impression that they understand how
the incident could take place and what underlying causes played a role
in the occurrence of the incident.
8.4.4 Conclusions and Recommendations
Drawing conclusions is a challenging part of the investigation. A con-

clusion is not a summary of, for example, the analysis. A conclusion
gives ‘meaning’ to what the investigators found in the investigation.
What do they want the reader (often the management of the organi-
zation) to take away from the investigation? Good conclusions provide
a good basis for formulating recommendations. Of course, the investi-
gation is not a goal by itself; it is carried out because the organization
wants to learn from the incident. That is why recommendations are
formulated or possible measures for improvement are determined. The
formulation of recommendations or measures for improvement is not
necessarily a task of the investigators. However, if they are involved, at
least this should be done in close consultation with responsible man-
agement. The management knows what is feasible in the organization
and how things should be organized (see also Section 8.6 of this chap-
ter on safety interventions).
8.4.5 Report
Writing a report of an investigation is not different from writing a good

report in general. An investigation report is written for someone to
read (often for management but can also be written for operators) and
to inform them what investigators found during their investigation.
A good structure helps the reader to follow the argumentation of the
investigator and understand how they have come to certain conclu-
sions. In general, a proper report consists of the following:
1. Title and abstract

2. Introduction (information about why the investigation was
carried out, for whom, scope, methods used, etc.)
3. Description of the incident (the timeline can be used for this
paragraph)
4. Analysis
5. Conclusions
6. Recommendations (these are not always part of the investiga-
tion report)
Be aware that writing is a skill and the impact of the investigation

depends on how it is written down in the report, no matter how good
the investigation was in itself. So, take this task seriously or find assis-
tance for writing the report.
8.5 Incident Investigation Is an Iterative Process
It is good to notice that the phases of the investigation (see also

Figure 8.2) are not clearly separated from each other. Investigation
is an iterative process. It often happens that during the analy-
sis it becomes clear that information is missing. So, during this
phase the investigator goes back to data gathering and tries to
find the missing data or information. Also, one should not wait for
writing the report until the investigation is completely finished.
Writing things down helps with the analysis part, because it urges
the investigator to organize her or his thoughts and findings. The
phases just function as a guide through the investigation, but not
more than that!
8.5.1 Different Tools and Models
There are many tools developed to help the investigation of incidents or

accidents. The most simple and plain method is more or less described in
the previous paragraph, the ‘five-times-why-approach’ (see also the earlier
example of understanding why someone did not follow a work instruc-
tion). Asking ‘Why?’ five times will go most of the time deep enough to
understand underlying causes. Underlying causes in the end will lead to
the so-called ‘root causes’. The five-times-why-approach is a simple ver-
sion of ‘root-cause analysis’. A more refined method is the Tripod Beta
method. Following this method, investigators first describe ‘triplets’ that
consist of three elements: the object (a person or thing that can be harmed
or damaged), an ‘agent of change’ (e.g. an energy that can harm someone,
like gas under pressure) and the event (the change that happened because
the object and the agent of change interacted). To prevent this unplanned
interaction, organizations introduce barriers. In case of an incident, bar-
riers are broken, are missing or are inadequate. An example of a barrier
is the thickness of a pipe, so gas under pressure is controlled. This barrier
can fail, for example, due to corrosion. The next step in Tripod Beta is to
understand why these barriers failed. For example, because there was no
inspection scheme in place. In the end, all root causes are classified in
eleven ‘basic risk factors’ (labels): design, hardware, maintenance manage-
ment, housekeeping, error forcing conditions, procedures, training, com-
munication, incompatible goals, organization and defences. Although
there is some (scientific) debate whether these factors cover all problems
or possibilities, they can help, for example, to direct searching for measures
for improvement. For more information about Tripod Beta, consult the
book Controlling the Controllable (Groeneweg, 2002).
All root-cause analysis methods are in essence based on linear
action–reaction chains. An action leads to another (re)action, which
causes an event, and so on. They are based on a decomposition of a
system into events and ‘broken parts’ (e.g. failing barriers). A grow-
ing group of safety researchers, for instance Erik Hollnagel, argue that
this probably can be applied to ‘technical’ systems, but it is doubtful if
this way of thinking works for any ‘social system’ or complex ‘socio-
technical systems’. They argue that a system is more than the sum of the
parts and subtle interactions (which are possibly not deviating much
when they are viewed as an isolated interaction) can lead to an incident
or accident. For this new way of thinking, new models are developed,
such as the functional resonance analysis method (FRAM). We will
not elaborate on this model, but for further reading see the book by
Hollnagel (2012) about FRAM.
We like to stress that investigation methods or models are a tool and
an aid. Whatever model you choose, to simply fill a model with data
is never the aim. So, keep in mind that it is not a problem to use the
model in the way you want, as long as it helps you understand why this
particular incident could happen and to facilitate the learning process.
8.5.2 Incident Investigation Approach for SMEs
In essence, there is no difference between how SMEs might tackle an

investigation or a large company or a multinational. Of course, it is use-
ful to train one or two persons in an SME to conduct an investigation,
for example in using a specific method. But it is even more important
that these people have an open mind, can act independently and get
enough time to investigate an incident. The owner or managing direc-
tor should ensure that her or his investigator(s) can act independently.
This is a key factor for SMEs; if such commitment is expressed, it will
create great potential for learning. If the investigators do not receive
or perceive this commitment from the highest management level, the
investigation often will turn out as window dressing and opportunities
to learn are lost. In larger organizations, this also can be a problem, but
these organizations often have more counter-balances or feel more
pressure for proper investigations from governmental authorities.
8.5.3 Human Error and Blame
There is much literature on human error and how this leads to incidents.
This notion started already with safety pioneer William Heinrich, who
stated that 88% of all accidents are caused by ‘unsafe actions’ of persons.
There has been much (scientific) debate on this ratio, but this assumption
(or ‘myth’ as it is often qualified; see Manuele (2013)) has negative conse-
quences for a good incident investigation as well. This assumption leads
to an individual approach towards the investigation. If the investigation
concludes ‘human error’ caused the incident, the solution is to take this
individual out of the (production) process. But this does not make the
operation safer; there is probably a good chance that another operator
will make a similar mistake that can lead to another incident. The learn-
ing effect is therefore zero. It is good to keep in mind that ‘human error’
is a symptom for trouble deeper in the system and can be a starting point
of an investigation, but never the conclusion. For further reading about
human error, we suggest Dekker’s Field Guide to Human Error (2014).
Another negative side effect of this focus on individuals contributing
to an incident or accident is that it easily leads to blaming an individual
and punishing this person. ‘If someone could have prevented an incident,
he or she should be punished’, so the reasoning goes. However, almost
every person goes to work to do his or her job well. They work in circum-
stances with limited information, they improvise to get the job done, deal
with goal conflicts (e.g. between doing the job in time and safety) and so
on. Operators achieve good results with their flexibility and creativity. In
this process, they can make mistakes with adverse consequences, but most
of the time their decisions make organizations successful. Investigators,
for that reason, should focus on understanding why things happened as
they happened and why people acted the way they did but should stay
away from blaming operators. If interested in reading more about this
subject, we suggest the book Just Culture from Dekker (2016).
We will now turn our attention to safety interventions, which might
be one recommendation coming for an incident or accident investiga-
tion. After that, we will turn our attention to one specific safety inter-
vention, behaviour-based safety.
8.6 Choosing a Safety Intervention Strategy
One way of thinking about safety interventions is in terms of the

Hazard–Barrier–Target model (HBT model). This model derives from
the highly elaborate MORT methodology (Management Oversight
and Risk Tree), which can, for instance, be employed to carry out a
comprehensive incident or accident investigation. However, the HBT
model itself is simple but quite useful. Basically, the model describes
the ‘safe situation’. A hazard (a potential source of danger or harm)
poses a threat to a target (people, assets, the environment) but some
barrier (this can be a physical barrier but also a proper distance) pre-
vents the hazard from reaching the target (Figure 8.3).
The ‘barrier’ in this model is any measure, or series of measures,
that prevents the hazard from reaching and, hence, harming the target.
Hazard Barrier Target
Figure 8.3 The Hazard–Barrier–Target model (HBT model).
In some cases, this can be a physical barrier, in other cases it might be

instructions or devices that call attention to the hazard, for example a
warning light or sign. Put in other words, the word barrier is used here
as a metaphor and should not be interpreted in a strictly physical way.
Hazards are considered to be a ‘potential for harm or damage to
people, property, or the environment: Hazards include the character-
istics of things (e.g., equipment, technology, processes, dusts, fibres,
materials, and chemicals) and the actions or inactions of people’
(Manuele, 2013, p. 33). Hazards, and the risks resulting from these,
are the primary concern for safety professionals (Ibid.).
Regarding hazards, Haddon’s 10 strategies to tackle these can be
helpful. These 10 strategies are embraced by occupational hygienists but
are somewhat ignored by the safety community. Combining the HBT
model with Haddon’s strategies provides a powerful tool for choosing
safety interventions. Haddon’s basic strategy is to focus on the hazard
first and then gradually shift focus towards the target. For Haddon, the
cause of an injury is the transfer of an agent (like energy) from a source
to a host (people, animals, the environment, assets) and the aim is to
either eliminate, control, modify or mitigate the agent and its effects.
Haddon’s strategies can be subdivided into three phases (Box 8.3).
Haddon’s strategies are primarily aimed at (removing, limiting,
protecting) the energy source (hazard) and therefore the preven-
tion of injuries, rather than suppression or mitigation of the hazard’s
energy release. That is, Haddon looks for technical solutions first,
before human interventions come into play. This is sensible, because,
as stated above, with the introduction of humans, the issue of safety
becomes much more complex. Moreover, Haddon puts the burden of
safety not at the hazard–target interaction, for example man–machine
BOX 8.3 HADDON’S 10 STRATEGIES WITH

EXAMPLES OF THEIR APPLICATION
Pre-event
1. Prevent the existence of the agent, that is prevent the gen-

eration of thermal, kinetic, or electrical energy, or ion-
izing radiation
2. Prevent the release of the agent, that is prevent the dis-
charge of devices or electricity, the fall of objects, the
escape of gases or fluids, etc.
3. Separate the agent from the host to eliminate ‘intersections
of energy and susceptible structure’ (Haddon, 1995, p. 42),
that is separate hazard from target in space (e.g. separate
gangways) or time (e.g. remotely controlling devices)
4. Provide protection for the host, that is put a physical bar-
rier between hazard and target (e.g. doors, gates, walls,
covers, insulation, personal protection equipment (PPE))
Event
5. Minimize the amount of agent present, that is reduce the

amounts and concentrations of hazardous energy or sub-
stance present (height, weight, amount, size, etc. of hazard)
6. Control the pattern of release of the agent to minimize
damage, that is modify the rate (of spatial distribution) of
release of the hazardous energy from its source (e.g. slow-
ing the burning rate, reducing a slope, reducing speed)
7. Control the interaction between the agent and host to
minimize damage, that is ‘modify appropriately the con-
tact surface, subsurface, or basic structure, as in eliminat-
ing, rounding, and softening corners, edges, and points
with which people can, and therefore sooner or later do,
come in contact’ (Haddon, 1995, p. 42)
8. Increase the resilience of the host, that is improve or
strengthen the target’s resistance (e.g. through stricter
codes, training)
Post-event
1. Provide a rapid treatment response for host, that is
counter-continuation or extension of exposure of haz-
ard through rapid detection (warnings) and evaluation
of damage
2. Provide treatment and rehabilitation for the host, that is
provide quick emergency response to stabilize the expo-
sure to hazard
interface, but rather at the design of things, that is the deployment of

energy and its protection. While designing out human intervention is
often impossible or impractical, thinking about human behaviour in
relation to an energy source (hazard) at the design state is important.
The HBT model is also present in the so-called bowtie. Simply put, a
bowtie is a fault tree and an event tree combined (and turned sideways)
(de Ruijter & Guldenmund, 2016). On the left-hand side (the fault-tree
side), everything leading up to the central event is described, and on the
right-hand side (the event-tree side), all further developments after the
central event has occurred. The central event is defined as a ‘loss of control’
of the associated hazard. This means that for each hazard, a separate bow-
tie is developed. This development is similar to the building of fault trees
and event trees, with the exception that a bowtie only uses ‘OR-gates’.*
A bowtie depicts all pathways or scenarios associated with a particular
hazard and its loss of control. In each pathway, multiple barriers can be
positioned to prevent the scenario from developing further (Figure 8.4).
Barriers on the left-hand side are concerned with prevention, barriers on
the right-hand side with repression. Next to the HBT model, Haddon’s
philosophy regarding hazards can be recognized here as well.
Building bowties is a mandatory activity in high-hazard industries
but will be a useful exercise for most companies. By building bow-
ties, the most important scenarios for the company can be identified,
* Fault trees apply so-called Boolean logic. In practice, this means that events in the
tree can be the result of either one underlying cause, or a combination of causes. In
the first case, an OR-gate is applied, in the second an AND-gate. In the bowtie, only
OR-gates are used, which means that events in the tree only have one underlying
cause, not a combination of causes.
Hazard
Scenario
Scenario
Central
event
Barriers
Threats Consequences
Figure 8.4 Generic bowtie model.
along with the barriers that prevent those scenarios from occurring or
developing into significance. Being aware of these scenarios and the
associated barriers is compulsory knowledge for those managing haz-
ards and risks in the company, as well as those involved in prevention
or repression of the scenarios.*
* Bowties can be put to other uses as well. For instance, the scenarios making up the
bowtie and the barriers inserted into those can be used in an audit; this is sometimes
also called scenario-based auditing. The scenario in this approach is taken as a start-
ing point and the audit explores and evaluates how well the scenario is managed. Of
course, the audit should focus on major hazard scenarios, as these should definitely not
materialize into effect. Furthermore, it could be argued that safety management boils
down to ‘barrier management’. In this view, management should provide or ‘deliver’
sufficient controls (rules and procedures, norms, benchmarks, etc.) and resources (peo-
ple, money, time, etc.) to ensure barriers are functioning according to specification.
An audit in this case would be aimed at such ‘barrier management’ and its results
could be used to evaluate the quality of barriers and, ultimately, impact various risk
quantifications (Guldenmund, Hale, Goossens, Betten, & Duijm, 2006). Finally, most
safety-related behaviour could be framed as behaviour related to safety barriers. Again,
the bowtie and its scenarios can be used to increase safety awareness, making appar-
ent that actions do not stand on their own but fit into scenarios where one action has
consequences down the escalation path. It should be stressed, however, that standard
bowties provide a deterministic view of reality, whereas actual circumstances might
deviate significantly from how these have been captured in the bowtie.
There are multiple software packages commercially available to build bowties with,
of which BowtieXP is probably the most advanced. In the Netherlands, a software

package called ‘Storybuilder’ is freely available to explore occupational accidents.
Storybuilder is based on bowties and provides suggestions for barriers to reduce occu-
pational risk. Please consult the RIVM website (Dutch National Institute for Public
Health and the Environment) for further information on Storybuilder: http://www.
rivm.nl/en/Topics/S/Storybuilder.
Accident or incident investigations might uncover blind spots in the

company’s SMS, that is, risks that have been identified but underesti-
mated or have gone unnoticed completely. Obviously, such risks should
be (re-)evaluated by the risk control system, which is part of the SMS
(Figure 8.1). Furthermore, safety interventions, like interventions aimed at
(safe) behaviour (Section 8.7 ff.), also might result in new or additional pro-
cesses or procedures in the SMS. While the SMS is a formally described
system, it is not carved out in stone and needs to be updated frequently to
be an accurate reflection of, as well as provide support for, daily practices.
8.7 Behavioural Interventions
The impetus for an intervention might come from various sources,

for example from an audit, an incident investigation or the fact that
a particular critical performance indicator (CPI) does not meet some
predefined norm. Indeed, CPIs are not collected for their own sake
but are generally used to monitor the performance of a (safety) man-
agement system (see also Chapter 4, on a discussion and overview
of CPIs). When one or more indicators are not satisfactory or below
some norm, strategies can, or sometimes should, be developed to influ-
ence that indicator. That is, interventions should be carried out to steer
the CPI into a desirable direction. However, choosing an interven-
tion strategy is not always straightforward, especially when humans
are involved. Compared to technology, humans are highly adaptable.
While providing an evolutionary advantage for humans, in organiza-
tional settings with many competing demands, this adaptability might
not always result in the safest solution and/or safe behaviour.
Behavioural or behaviour interventions are quite often a custom-
ary or plausible answer to deviations of (safe) behaviour, for instance,
identified in the investigation of accidents or incidents. As pointed
out in that section, one should be careful in focusing on behaviour
of individuals only, ignoring the conditions under which the behav-
iour took place. As discussed previously, ignoring such conditions, one
might tackle symptoms instead of causes. Moreover, humans and their
behaviour should not be the single barrier between success and calam-
ity. However, humans will often be part of a (system of ) barrier(s).
Their role could be many, for example as an agent (activating a barrier),
as a maintenance worker closely following machine instructions, by
keeping a barrier intact by closing a door or gate, by donning PPE, by

walking between demarcations and so on.
One line of argument could be that much safety behaviour does
not require a lot of effort, either mentally or in terms of skills. Put in
other words, safety behaviour is not demanding in many instances; it is
something one simply has to do, to comply with. It could be that there
are other influences (emotional, social, situational, organizational) that
make the actual expression of the safety behaviour more difficult – the
behaviour itself might not be so. To influence many of such behav-
iours, a BBS programme could be a solution. The only requirement
these programmes have of the behaviour that has to be influenced
is that it is visible, countable and can be precisely described. This is
important, because vaguely described behaviour invites discussion
about its appropriateness, and this is undesirable in these programmes.
BBS programmes follow a series of steps, which will be outlined
further in the following.
8.7.1 Behaviour-Based Safety
8.7.1.1 Introduction
BBS programmes are rooted in two theoretical notions: the work of safety
pioneer William Herbert Heinrich and Behaviourism. To start with the
first, Heinrich proposed two ratios that have been embraced by the safety
community at large. The first pertains to the general cause of accidents.
According to Heinrich, 88% of the (his) accidents are caused by an ‘unsafe
act’, 10% by ‘mechanical error’ and 2% is unknown or undecided (so-
called acts of God). He based this ratio on thousands of accident reports.
Working for an insurance company, Heinrich had these reports at his dis-
posal. While much doubt has been cast on this ratio later on, it still serves
as an important justification to embark on a BBS programme. Another
model Heinrich added to the safety practitioner’s repertoire is his (in)
famous accident pyramid (or triangle). According to him, before a major
injury accident takes place, 29 minor accidents and 300 incidents with no
further injury will happen. Put in other words, for serious injury accidents
to happen, there is an accumulation in the amount of ‘accident energy’
that discharges at the 330th time into a serious injury. Although sound-
ing a bit ridiculous now, it also still functions as a justification to focus on
minor incidents, hereby keeping the serious ones out of the workplace.
As already stated, in recent years, Heinrich’s work has met fierce

criticism, especially from unions (e.g. Howe, 2000; Miozza & Wyld,
2002) and safety practitioners (e.g. Manuele, 2013, Chapter 10),
mainly because Heinrich’s focus on ‘unsafe acts’ takes the attention
away from working conditions and seems to put the blame on workers
rather than management putting their workers at risk. Nevertheless,
Heinrich’s reasoning does make sense in a way, that is using no-injury
incidents as a sort of warning sign and using these to uncover risks
that might have been underestimated or gone unidentified.
A second important cornerstone of BBS is Behaviourism.
Behaviourism is a field in psychology particularly concerned with learn-
ing. Generally, Behaviourism is divided into two subfields, classical
Behaviourism and radical Behaviourism, which follow each other up in
time. Classical Behaviourism is closely associated with the work of Ivan
Pavlov (1849–1936) (although he would not call himself a Behaviourist).
Pavlov managed to combine the sound of a bell (conditioned stimulus)
with the salivating of a dog (unconditioned stimulus) by combining the
sound of the bell with the offering of food. At some point, the dog
would salivate upon hearing the bell, without food being offered.
Radical Behaviourism has been largely developed by the American
Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904–1990) and is concerned with the
(experimental) scientific study of ‘spontaneous behaviour’, elicited by the
environment and moderated through the use of reinforcement. Radical
Behaviourism works with the so-called ABC-triplet: Antecedent,
Behaviour, Consequence. Spontaneous behaviour (B) is elicited by the
particular situation (A) a subject (person, animal) finds himself in and
is reinforced by a positive or negative consequence (C). The key word is
reinforcement and, according to Behaviourists, this can be either posi-
tive or negative (Skinner, 1974). An overview of relevant terms and their
application is provided in Figure 8.5. BBS is particularly concerned with
positive reinforcement, but also with positive punishment.
8.7.1.2 Behaviour-Based Safety Programmes

BBS programmes generally follow a series of steps that have to be
observed closely to be successful. Overall, the programme consists of
two phases: (1) design and implementation: (2) observation and feed-
back. The phases and steps therein are listed in Box 8.4 and are elabo-
rated further next.
Operant conditioning
Reinforcement
Punishment
Increasing behaviour
Decreasing behaviour
Positive Negative Positive Negative

Add attractive stimulus Add unattractive Remove attractive
following correct behaviour simulus following stimulus following
(incorrect) behaviour (incorrect) behaviour
Legend
Escape Active avoidance Positive – stimulus is present
Remove unattractive stimulus Correct behaviour prevents Negative – stimulus is absent
following correct behaviour unattractive stimulus Reinforcement – increases behaviour
Punishment – decreases behaviour
Escape – removes a stimulus
Avoidance – prevents a stimulus
Figure 8.5 The central terms in radical Behaviourism and their application.
BOX 8.4 PHASES AND STEPS

IN BBS PROGRAMME
Phase 1: Design and implementation
1. Assess organizational ‘readiness’
2. Support and commitment of management and workers
3. Provide BBS training
4. Select critical behaviour(s)
5. Determine baseline of critical behaviour(s)
Phase 2: Observation and feedback process
1. Carry out observations
2. Provide (initial) feedback
3. Setting goals for critical behaviour(s)
4. Adjust workplace, systems, methods
5. Track performance, monitor programme
6. Evaluate and adjust programme
Step 1.1: Establish organizational readiness

First of all, the organization should have regular issues
with safety behaviour that cannot be solved either technically
(other tools, equipment, installations, etc.) or organizationally
(other instructions, training, planning, supervision, etc.).
Furthermore, the organization should be prepared for the pro-

gramme (Health and Safety Executive, 2000):
1. Involvement of workforce and management from the pro-
gramme’s beginning, including a shared agreement about the
need of a BBS programme
2. The programme should fit the needs of the organization, its
management system and its local culture
3. A team of employees visit several other companies that have
carried out a BBS programme successfully to canvass their
experience
4. Select a steering team that will oversee the whole programme
5. All layers of the organization should be informed about
the purpose and goal of the programme and their role
therein
6. Involvement of sharp-end workers (workers in direct contact
with the primary process) in formulating goals and targets
7. Involvement of first-line supervisors and/or middle managers
as role models
Furthermore, it is important that the programme involves behav-
iours of all employees, not only those of the work floor.
Step 1.2: Support and commitment of management and shop floor
Both management and shop floor should own the programme.
It is crucial that the latter can influence choices made in the
programme to obtain their commitment and support. Also,

management’s support throughout the programme is essential
for its success.
Step 1.3: Training
A BBS programme requires two types of education and/
or training: (1) lectures on the background of the programme
(Behaviourism and reinforcement, learning); (2) training of
observational and communication skills; the latter for pro-
viding appropriate (positive, critical) feedback or when an
intervention is deemed necessary (see Step 2.2 below). Some
authors, for instance, McSween (2003), advocate a BBS train-
ing for all employees, whether they will carry out observations
or not.
Step 1.4: Select critical behaviour(s) or conditions

This is an important step in any BBS programme. According
to Geller, behavioural observations should be SOON (Geller,
2001, p. 139):
1.
Specific: clear, concise and unambiguous behavioural definition
Observable: visible behaviour that is both countable and
2.
recordable
3.
Objective: observations should leave no room for interpretations,
or attributions; they should pertain to ‘What’ and not ‘Why’
Naturalistic: observations of normal interaction in real-world
4.
activities
In choosing critical behaviours, one could refer to audit results
or outcomes of incident investigations. Also, CPIs might hint at
particular behaviours that could be included in the programme.
However, selecting inappropriate behaviours is not manda-
tory, that is one could also record correct behaviours. Moreover,
also conditions could be observed, as these are the antecedents
of (safety) behaviours. Examples of such conditions would be
housekeeping, clear emergency exits or passageways, the state of
dressing rooms, and so on.
Importantly, the observed behaviour(s) or conditions need
to be defined clearly and unambiguously, to prevent discus-
sion and confusion. Moreover, the behaviour(s) should be
displayed frequently, otherwise there is not much to observe
and tally.
Step 1.5: Determine baseline of critical behaviour(s)
The baseline is the stable starting point of the critical
behaviour(s)/condition(s) before the start of the intervention.
The baseline can be used as a benchmark.
Step 2.1: Carry out observations
When critical behaviour(s)/condition(s) have been
selected, they can be observed. Observations are tallied on the
critical behaviour checklist (CBC); both Geller (2001) and
McSween (2003) provide examples of such lists. CBCs usu-
ally have three columns: one to tally the ‘correct’ behaviours,
one for the ‘substandard’ behaviour and one for any remarks.
After a round of observations, the percentage correct critical

behaviours (or conditions) are calculated as follows:
Amount of correct behaviours

´100%
Amount of correct + incorrect behaviours

There has been some debate about whether observation

rounds should be announced beforehand or not. In the past,
observation rounds came unannounced, to ensure ‘natural’
behaviour. Nowadays, the recommendation is to announce
observation rounds at the beginning of the programme, to have
people get used to them. At later stages of the programme, one
could also try unannounced observation rounds and calculate
possible differences between the two. Another issue is whether
employees should consent to being observed. Again, the con-
sensus is that such consent should be granted first, before an
observation is made.
To ensure that the behaviours described on the CBCs are
unambiguous, it is advisable to carry out observations with
several people at the beginning of the programme and com-
pare notes afterwards. The overall agreement between observers
should exceed 80% to ensure enough inter-observer reliability
(Geller, 2001).
Step 2.2: Provide feedback
Providing feedback is one of the most important steps in a
BBS programme. To put it bluntly, the success or failure of such
a programme is highly dependent on this step. Feedback is pro-
vided when an observer reacts on the observed. Unfortunately,
this feedback is often critical in that the observer observes that
the observed is behaving incorrectly. Many times, substandard
behaviour is the impetus for feedback, rather than correct behav-
iour, which is unfortunate. People also like to be praised, and if
there is sufficient reason to do so, the observer should provide
such positive feedback.
Because giving feedback is so important, it should be given

due attention in Step 1.3, training. Feedback should be given
immediately, because when given afterwards, discussions about
the earlier observation could ensue.
Step 2.3: Setting goals for critical behaviour(s)
This step is, along with the previous step, highly important for
the success of a BBS programme. Establishing goals, also called
goal-setting, for correct behaviour(s) works motivating. In general,
when someone has set a goal that is achievable and does not con-
flict with other goals, there is a positive linear relationship between
the goal’s (degree of ) difficulty and task performance (Locke &
Latham, 2006). The framing of a goal is equally important as nega-
tively framed goals (e.g. zero accidents) do not encourage as much
as positively framed goals.
According to Geller (2001) and also others (e.g. Brown &
Barab, 2007), trying to keep the accident rate at zero mostly
works counter-productive. While accidents do happen any-
way, the workforce comes to feel powerless to do anything
about it. Moreover, frustration (and aggression) about acci-
dents that have happened might be directed solely at the vic-
tims, who ‘spoiled’ the party by getting an accident. At other
instances, while trying to keep the score at zero, accidents
that happen are simply covered up (Ibid.). Furthermore, just
pointing out ‘rotten apples’ could impact the morale, as well
as the attitudes and perceptions of the workforce, which
might have severe implications for the (organizational) cul-
ture for safety as well.
Step 2.4: Adjust workplace, systems, methods
Throughout the first rounds of observations, it could be noted
that there are various flawed antecedents (working conditions,
systems, work methods) that elicit incorrect behaviours. In that
case, these antecedents should be improved first.
Step 2.5: Track performance, monitor programme
At this step, the programme starts for real. To see whether the
goals set in a previous step are met, providing feedback about
the results of the observations is a necessary requirement. Such
194
1.2. Ensure support

Implementation of 1.1. Establish and commitment 1.3. Provide 1.4. Specify critical 1.5. Establish
BBS programme organizational from management BBS training behaviour(s) baseline of critical
readiness and workers behaviour(s)
2.5. Record
Observation and 2.6. Evaluate, adjust performance, 2.3. Goal setting 2.2. Provide (initial) 2.1. Carry out
feedback process programme monitor programme feedback observations
2.4. Adapt
workplace, systems,
methods
Figure 8.6 Overview of full BBS-programme. (From Health and Safety Executive, Behavioural Modification to Improve Safety: Literature Review, HSE Books,
Sudbury, Suffolk, UK, 2000.)

feedback is often given graphically, either per day (several times),

per week or per another time unit. Apart from the feedback on
performance, providing feedback is also a reward for performing,
for demonstrating the correct behaviour (or maintaining the cor-
rect conditions).
Step 2.6: Evaluate and adjust programme
During the BBS programme, various adjustments might be
required, for instance, in the CBCs, or in the announcement of
the observation rounds. When certain critical behaviours have
reached their target ratio, other behaviours might be selected for
observation, of course, in close collaboration with the observers
and the observed.
Steps 1.1 through 2.6 are depicted in Figure 8.6.
Carrying out a BBS programme is experienced work, and
one is strongly advised to call in expertise to provide support at
several steps. The books by Geller (2001) and McSween (2003),
mentioned previously, provide extensive overviews of BBS-
programmes, their content, requirements and pitfalls.
8.8 Conclusion
Monitoring an SMS hinges on several activities: carrying out regu-

lar audits (Chapter 4), investigating (potentially) serious incidents
or accidents and tracking CPIs. The output of any of these activities
might provide an impetus for a modification of the SMS or a safety
intervention.
The bowtie and Haddon’s 10 strategies provide guidance in choos-
ing an appropriate (safety) intervention. One important target for
interventions is behaviour. When this behaviour is visible, performed
frequently and is relatively easy to execute, BBS programmes provide
a useful approach to tackle substandard behaviours.
The results of accident or incident investigations as well as stan-
dards for safe behaviour resulting from BBS programmes can be used
to modify processes or procedures within the SMS. Although the
SMS is a formal system, it is also dynamic and needs to be updated
regularly to be of any practical use.
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9
R i s k C o m m u n i c at i o n
i n SME s
N I C H O L A S PA R I S A N D JA N G U T T E L I N G
Contents

9.2 Risk Perception, Awareness and Communication 198
9.3 Risk Communication Preambles 201
9.4 Risk Communication Tools 202
9.4.1 Printed Information Materials 203
9.4.2 Visual Representation of Risk 204
9.4.3 Face-to-Face Communication 204
9.4.4 Stakeholder Participation 205
9.4.5 News Media 206
9.4.6 E-Communication (Technology Assisted) 206
9.5 Role of the Safety Committee and Safety Representative
in Risk Communication 207
9.6 Limitations of Risk Communication 208
9.7 Way Forward 209
9.8 Conclusions 210
References 211
9.1 Introduction
In recent years, risk management has become a central issue for health
and safety in the workplace (e.g. Boyle, 2012; Quinlan et al., 2010).
Risk management comprises the whole process of risk identification,
estimation, evaluation, reduction and control. And for effective risk
management in the health and safety domain, c ommunication about
risk is recognized as an essential ingredient. Many definitions of
197
risk communication exist. In this chapter, we will use ‘the process of

exchanging information and a dialogue among interested parties or
stakeholders about the nature, magnitude, significance, or control of
a health and safety risk’ (based on Covello, 1992: p. 359; Palenchar,
2005). Interested parties or stakeholders in the context of occupa-
tional health and safety are not a single group but very diverse. First
and foremost, they are the workers and management in a small and
medium sized enterprise (SME), but we can also think about gov-
ernmental organizations, NGOs like labor unions or environmental
groups, or even members of the general public and the media/press.
We see risk communication as one of several policy instruments to
achieve risk management goals, with various target groups and a
different scope of the communication for each target group. When
the communication is with workers in an organization, this is called
internal communication; with the other groups it is labelled as exter-
nal communication.
In this chapter, we will first examine the interrelation between risk
perception, awareness and communication and how it has evolved in
recent decades. We will then probe into how to choose a top-down
or a bottom-up approach in the context of health and safety in the
workplace and suggest possible communication tools, examining their
application and limitations. Finally, we will examine the way forward,
as we get into the era of social media and real-time information.
9.2 Risk Perception, Awareness and Communication
Risk communication, as a field of interest, is closely related to risk percep-

tion or awareness. Risk perception or risk awareness is usually described
as an individual’s subjective assessment of risk characteristics such as the
severity of the risk in terms of negative consequences, the probability of
occurrence of these consequences and the individual’s personal vulner-
ability (e.g. Slovic, 2000). Risk perception has been widely studied since
1970, usually in the context of major man-made and natural hazards.
The analysis of risk perception or risk awareness in the context of occu-
pational health and safety is still in its infancy. A quick scan of recent
handbooks shows that it is not part of the subject index, where risk-
taking behavior is listed, and a quick and dirty digital scan of the avail-
able scholarly literature delivers very few hits (e.g. Bradshaw et al., 2001).
R I S K C O M M U N I C AT I O N I N S M E s 199
However, some more work has been done on the related area of safety
culture and climate (see also Chapter 5 in this book). Our assumption
is that risk communication may have a major positive impact on safety
culture and climate (see also Guldenmund, 2000).
Early studies in risk perception were aimed at finding explanations
for individual differences in risk perception and the determinants of
those differences. Among the determinants that were studied were
knowledge of the subject matter and personal control over the risk
(Slovic et al., 1982), individual information processing with heuristics
(see, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), social elements like trust in
others as adequate risk manager (e.g. government, experts or compa-
nies; e.g. Renn and Levine, 1991), the availability of information in the
journalistic media (e.g. Kuttschreuter et al., 2011) or the social media
(e.g. Terpstra et al., 2012), and cultural determinants (e.g. Kasperson
and Kasperson, 2005). More recently, the influence of affect (emo-
tional reactions) on risk perception and the processing of risk-related
information is studied (e.g. Visschers et al., 2012), and researchers
are active in trying to understand risk-information-seeking processes
(e.g. Ter Huurne and Gutteling, 2008; Yang et al., 2014).
Risk communication has long been based on the idea that, strictly top-
down, it is essential to teach the public to synchronize their perceptions
with expert opinions (Gurabardhi et al., 2004). However, studies indi-
cated that the effectiveness of these top-down approaches was relatively
low (with effectiveness being defined as meeting some preset goal in
terms of attitude change, behaviour change, increase in knowledge, etc.)
(e.g. Visschers et al., 2012). Due to the lack of empirical success, scholars
and practitioners have been studying new ways to get the job done, and
‘people-centred’ approaches were developed, which include, among oth-
ers, increased stakeholder participation (individuals and also their rep-
resentatives, and NGOs), responsibility shifts to the public (increasing
their resilience), greater transparency in risk/uncertainty communication
and social/institutional capacity building (Scolobig et al., 2015). In the
occupational health and safety domain, we can think of the use of safety
representatives or safety committees in this respect.
Human communication processes are complicated because they
involve the attribution of meaning, and social interaction. The concept
of meaning is two-sided. On the one hand, the symbolic meaning is
implemented (or ‘framed’) by the sender of the information, but the
receiver of the information also attributes an own meaning to the infor-

mation, which could be quite different from the sender’s intention. This
implies that communication can have both intended and unintended
effects on receivers. Communication usually is a dynamic process,
in which persons successively act as source and receiver, so attention
should be paid to the role of feedback and interaction. This adds the
social interaction aspect to the process and implies that existing social
relations are important to understand the success or failure of risk com-
munication (e.g. a trusting relationship may lead to effective communi-
cation, mistrust to a non-effective). Other aspects that will be relevant
for the attribution of meaning and thus for the effectiveness of the
communication are existing knowledge and prior experiences, belief
and value systems, emotions and the opinions of significant others.
In recent studies, attention has been devoted to the question why
people would be interested in having, receiving or seeking risk-related
information. The following were identified as motives: acquiring
knowledge, reducing risk or uncertainty or sharing or comparing infor-
mation with important others. Sharing and comparing is important for
acquiring social support, approval and respect, which seems relevant
in all sorts of situations: labour, family, friends and dealing with risk
(Griffin et al., 1999; Kahlor et al., 2006; Ter Huurne and Gutteling,
2008). When people perceive a gap between their perceived present
knowledge and the perceived level of needed knowledge, a psychologi-
cal motive called ‘information insufficiency’ is created. This will stimu-
late people to acquire additional risk-related information until the gap
disappears (e.g. Ter Huurne and Gutteling, 2008; Yang et al., 2014).
However, the opposite situation may exist too, namely that peo-
ple deny the risk and are not motivated to acquire new information
about it. Several socio-cognitive theories that are widely applied in
health and safety communication provide the insight that is needed
to understand this complicated process (e.g. Gore and Bracken, 2005;
Witte and Allen, 2000). The central assumption in these theories is the
concept of threat appraisal (or risk perception). A certain (increased)
level of threat appraisal is essential to motivate the population ‘at risk’
to take preventive measures to increase their safety. This level may be
reached by direct stimulation of ideas and notions (through the deliv-
ery of an advice how to act) or by stimulating the active searching of
(risk or prevention) information. Acceptance of the advice is based on
the individual’s threat appraisal and coping appraisal; that is the per-
ceived likelihood that the individual is able to successfully deal with
the risk. An irrelevant threat will be ignored, a relevant threat will suc-
cessively be appraised for potential individual coping (on indicators as
perceived self-efficacy ‘I believe I can cope adequately with the risk’ and
response efficacy ‘executing the advice will actually reduce or minimize
the risk’). When coping is seen as potentially successful, the individual
will adopt the risk-mitigating activity, otherwise fear control may lead
to denial of the fear (‘it is not going to happen to me’). These notions
also lead to the very important conclusion that for risk communication
to be successful, it has to have this mix of aspects that create awareness
for the risk, but it is a must at the same time to provide information or
advice on how the individual can cope with the risk, thereby increas-
ing the efficacy beliefs. When this last part is overlooked by the ‘risk
communicator’, risk denial or avoidance might be the result, and this
is a poor outcome of the communication process because it will not
motivate the individual to take preventive or mitigating actions.
9.3 Risk Communication Preambles
From the definition of SMEs, it stems that there is a variety of orga-

nizations falling within this category, some with more and some with
less capabilities to invest on risk communication. However, before
we even attempt to describe communication tools, it is important to
probe into which the target audience is, what is the required result of
communication, if the resources are available, what communication
tools are available and, finally, how the monitoring can be done. Boyle
(2012) recognizes the following steps for health and safety profession-
als to maintain effective communication.
Identify the target audience: The target audience is the group of
people whose attention is needed for the risk communication.
Communicating everything to everyone is a cover for ineffec-
tive communication. The target audience may be subdivided
into sub-groups, the needs of which may not coincide. For
example, communicating with office workers may differ mark-
edly from communicating with a floor labourer. This allows
for ‘tailor-made’ communication.
Identify what the target audience has to do: If, for example, a new
safety directive is in effect, the action must be tailored to the
needs of the different stakeholders, be they the top manage-
ment or labourers, and translated into steps to be taken, if the
implementation is to be effective.
If necessary, identify the resources required to implement actions:
Managers are not, in general, health and safety experts, so they
may need training or protective equipment for their depart-
ment. These needs must be assessed.
If possible, predict likely reactions and take pre-emptive action: The
health and safety professional may come in contact with the
top management or the finance department, as the case may
be, in order to assess the cost of the actions.
Decide on an appropriate medium for the communication: Various
media, oral, written or otherwise, may be utilized in order
to convey the designed messages. More information is given
later in this chapter.
Communicate using the chosen medium: This will require careful
delivery of the messages aiming at changing the attitude of
the audience.
Monitor the effects of the communication: This step may not necessarily
involve special methods and complex questionnaires. It may only
require careful examination of the effects of the action taken.
A tabled version of the seven-step procedure of Boyle is given in
Table 9.1, together with examples of action for each step.
As a last remark, the same procedure applies whether the audi-
ence is workers or managers (senior, middle or line). What differs is
the media that will be used in each case. Below is a list of the avail-
able media, their applicability and their limitations (Lundgren and
McMakin, 2009).
9.4 Risk Communication Tools
Risk communication tools that might be applied in SMEs include

printed information material, visual representation of risk, face-to-
face communication, stakeholders’ participation, news media and
e-communication (technology assisted).
Table 9.1 Boyle’s Seven-Step Process to Effective Communication, with Examples

of Action Required
DESCRIPTION OF THE STEP EXAMPLES OF ACTION REQUIRED
1 Identify the target audience Differentiate between floor managers and workers;
young and older recipients
2 Identify what the target audience Use protective uniforms or equipment; use safety
has to do procedures
3 Identify the resources required A sum in the yearly budget for printed material; a
suitable meeting place
4 Predict likely reactions Discuss if stakeholders will be angry for not being
consulted; if recipients are receptive
5 Decide on an appropriate Decide based on the advantages and limitations of
medium for the communication each method. Printed material for slow onset
situations, visual displays for quick
communication, etc.
6 Communicate using the chosen Be it printed material, visual display, Facebook, SMS,
medium etc.
7 Monitor the effects of the Observe reactions; distribute questionnaires; discuss
communication with safety committee
9.4.1 Printed Information Materials
Printed material will typically include text with illustrations. Examples

include brochures, booklets, pamphlets, newsletters, displays and tech-
nical reports. Such material may include a wealth of information,
depending on the message to be communicated. Information material
may find application in cases of audiences that are able to handle such
information. Also, for risks with a slow onset, that is they will take
some time to resolve. An added advantage is that such material may
be taken away for future reference. Of course, the distribution of such
material may be supplemented by electronic methods described later
in this chapter. Limitations include audiences that may not under-
stand the printed material, especially if it includes technical jargon,
or people that react will risk denial or avoidance. Also, the production
of such material may become expensive if it includes illustrations. Of
course, this limitation can be overcome if the material is uploaded
on the Internet; this latter method is further elaborated later in this
chapter. Furthermore, printed material may take some time to pre-
pare, especially if it has to be revised by different departments within
an SME. Printed material is a good idea to pretest, to see if the right
message is communicated, especially when it comes to the language
used, as the line between being overly technical and overly simplistic
may be fine. To sum up, this method can be exploited when the risk
to be communicated is either known or with a slow onset, because the
material is not generally readily available and will have to be gener-
ated for this sole purpose. Technical reports refer to personnel who are
in a position to understand technical terms and are not suitable for a
broader audience.
9.4.2 Visual Representation of Risk
If a visual representation of risk is overwhelming, compared to the

text message used, then this type of communication is categorized as
visual representation. Some examples are posters, displays, advertising,
DVDs and television. Visuals have a great advantage; they are memo-
rable and may increase risk awareness with representations that grab
the audience’s attention, although if they repeat for long, they may
lose their effectiveness and get to be ignored. Also, as they contain
the minimum of text, they can be fairly easily translated into differ-
ent languages, to suit different audiences. They are therefore suitable
when the message to be communicated and the expected change of
attitude are fairly simple. One limitation of visuals is that by their
very nature they can communicate only a small amount of informa-
tion and they are not suited if the audience has questions to answer.
Also, if they are transmitted through television or – indeed – live
streaming through the Internet, the message may be lost in commer-
cials. It is questionable whether traditional television is affordable for
individual SMEs, for communicating messages to stakeholders, due
to its generally high cost. As a medium, it can be more comfortably
used by trusts or chambers, local or national, of similar businesses.
Internet-based broadcasts are much more economical, though, and
can be used by individual SMEs.
9.4.3 Face-to-Face Communication
Examples include one-to-one discussions, presentation to groups of

stakeholders, video conferencing. It may involve a single speaker or
a speaker bureau. The setting may be educational, demonstrational,
video, interview or educational fair. Face-to-face communication has
the advantage that it is interactive by nature and the audience may ask
questions or make remarks. Also, opposing views may become appar-
ent and thus easier to solve. Furthermore, if the person or persons
that convey a message are credible, then the communication becomes
very effective. Finally, specific groups may be targeted to receive oral
messages, whereas written messages are much easier to be ignored.
Oral presentations have the limitation that the audience cannot take
away any material for future reference, unless the oral communica-
tion is given away on paper as well. On top of that, oral messages may
be more easily misunderstood compared to written ones and if the
person conveying the message is not credible or an expert on the sub-
ject the result may be disastrous. Finally, audiences may be too over-
whelmed or hostile to listen to the message and ask for clarifications.
It is important that the person or persons communicating the mes-
sages should be both experts in the field and also well prepared from
a public relations point of view, in order to be acceptable by both the
organization and the audience.
9.4.4 Stakeholder Participation
The difference with face-to-face communication is that stakeholder

participation is necessarily interactive. Examples include advisory
committees, focus groups, dispute resolution groups, community dia-
logue and formal hearings. The main advantage of stakeholder par-
ticipation is that the risk decision to be taken will probably be more
acceptable and lasting, as the stakeholders can participate in the pro-
cess. Therefore, the method can find application if the objective of
the organization is to increase chances that the risk decision will be
one that meets the needs of the audience addressed. Some managers
fear that if they hold stakeholders’ meetings they will lose control of
the situation. However, if the decision is taken without the consent
of the stakeholders and it does not meet their requirements, they will
react anyway and the organization will have to deal with an angry
audience. For this reason, stakeholder participation must be seen in
a broader context of a democratic dialogue leading to a more sus-
tainable implementation of the risk and safety message. In this way,
stakeholder participation also fits in the notions of creating and main-
taining a company safety culture (see also Chapter 5). A limitation of
the method is that it can work only if the risk communication effort
will occur over time. It is obvious that no dialogue can be done during
emergency situations; however, the participatory process may result in
better emergency messages too.
9.4.5 News Media
News media often involves television, radio, newspapers, maga-

zines and possibly the Internet, to communicate risk messages to
broad audiences. Television and radio are suitable to convey quickly
risk information in cases of emergencies, although they are gradu-
ally absorbed by the digital processes of the web. For example, pic-
tures and videos from the bombed Brussels’s Zaventem airport
and Maelbeek metro station, on 22 March 2016, were transmitted,
through smartphones, by survivors on the scene, before ending up
on the TV (BBC, 2016). A key limitation of these media is that
even a small amount of negative coverage can destroy the credibil-
ity and trust of the organization among its audience. Moreover, the
media itself controls the content and timing of the broadcast and not
the organization. Of course, this is not the case for paid advertise-
ments and other special cases. In order to exploit this media to its
full, productive relationships with media representatives are a must.
In such cases, relations and two-way communication can lead to a
more informed and solution-oriented coverage. Of course, those
who come in direct contact with media representatives should be
experts in the field and have good communication abilities, in order
to answer questions with credibility and accuracy.
9.4.6 E-Communication (Technology Assisted)
E-communication uses the computer or the smart phone/tablet to

communicate or discuss risk information. E-communication is basically
interactive and allows the audience to receive information and submit
queries or opinions. According to Lundgren and McMakin (2009):
Technology assisted communication has the advantage of being able to

disseminate an incredible amount of information, which each member of
the audience can tailor to their individual needs.
Table 9.2 Boyle’s Seven-Step Process Related to Application of Risk Communication Tools
COMMUNICATION
MEANS/BOYLE’S 7 STEPS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Printed information materials + + + −/+ Make educated + +
Visual representation of risk −/+ + + −/+ choice based on + +
Face-to-face communication + + + −/+ this table/chapter −/+ +
Stakeholder participation + + + −/+ + +
News media − + + − −/+ −/+
E-communication −/+ + + − −/+ −
−, Difficult; −/+, relatively difficult; +, relatively easy. Boyle’s (2012) seven-step process: 1 =
Identify target audience, 2 = Identify what target audience has to do, 3 = Identify resources required
to implement actions, 4 = Predict likely reactions and take pre-emptive action, 5 = Decide on appro-
priate medium for communication, 6 = Communicate using chosen medium, 7 = Monitor effects of
communication.
It encompasses the advantage of vivid visual means of communi-

cation and at the same time it can carry a wealth of information as
printed matter does. Thus, it is greatly versatile and can involve the
audience that other static methods cannot. In e-communication, the
material must be continually up-to-date, otherwise the audience will
lose its interest.
Table 9.1 presents Boyle’s seven-step process to effective communi-
cation, while Table 9.2 relates it to the application of risk communica-
tion tools.
9.5 Role of the Safety Committee and Safety

Representative in Risk Communication
The Safety Committee is comprised of a group of employees, repre-

sentative of the pool of employees, who assess the safety and well-
being of their associates within a climate of success of an organization,
should an SME be of a size to justify such a committee. According to
Quinlan et al. (2010), it is an effective way to improve safety behav-
iour and performance in the workplace and to encourage workers to
support the organization’s safety programme. The concept of a Safety
Committee is to regularly bring staff and management together in an
effort to communicate and to promote occupational safety and health
in the workplace. It is a cooperative effort to spot and remedy haz-
ards, reduce injuries and professional illnesses, prevent fatalities and
increase safety wakefulness. The Safety Committee within an SME
should be visible, open to suggestions and, generally, problem solving

for safety and health matters.
Within this framework, the role of the Safety Committee is impor-
tant for the success of the SME’s risk communication effort. A posi-
tive attitude on its part will increase absorption of risk information, as
it is, by definition, a trusted source. If the source is trusted, the message
will, most probably, be trusted as well, according to Löfstedt (2009).
Besides, it can encourage managers and employees to get actively
involved in the organization’s safety and health programme. Finally,
it can predict emerging or new risks that need to be communicated
to the employees. Finally, the Safety Committee can contribute to
the cultivation of safety culture within the organization, making the
employees more receptive of risk communication.
Again, an SME may or may not have a Safety Representative
(SR; sometimes called Safety Engineer), depending on its size and
the national laws that apply. The duties of an SR range from acci-
dent prevention to intervention and, finally, education (Quinlan
et al., 2010). As an organization company employee, the SR does
not deal with industry-wide safety policy, but local safety issues. The
SR acts as the company’s guide in complying with a multiplicity of
health and safety legislation and is the delegated authority of the
management.
In view of this, the role of the SR in risk communication is to moni-
tor that the information, intended for the employees that the SR is
responsible for, reaches its target. Beyond that, the SR is the person to
make audits and form an idea on the usefulness of risk communication
actions. Finally, it is the person who, by delegated authority, will report
back to the management as to the effectiveness of a risk communica-
tion programme.
9.6 Limitations of Risk Communication
In spite of several decades of theory developing, empirical (fact-

finding) research and practical experience with risk communication,
the final word is still not said, and there are no easy recipes for any risk
issue in which communication with stakeholders is seen as essential.
This is even more true for occupational health and safety issues, because
empirical risk communication studies in this domain are scarce.
An important issue that distinguishes risk communication from

other types of communication is its complexity. In many early
studies, the focus lay on presenting risk-related information in
formats that were familiar to risk assessors, mainly quantitative
information delivered in numbers, percentages of whatever. This
communication did not bring the expected clarity to the receivers
of that information, and thus no solution to the health and safety
problems they were experiencing. Later, the discussion evolved in
the direction of risk uncertainty and residual risk, which for many
people, not professionally active in the risk world, may be a con-
cept that is difficult to understand, and perhaps difficult to accept.
Residual risk is the risk level with all risk control measures opera-
tional. In spite of risk control measures (e.g. PPE like safety gog-
gles) being applied, still some risk remains. Although the residual
risk is small, it is not zero. The fundamental issue here is to assess
what is acceptable or tolerable as risk for all stakeholders (not only
for experts or governmental decision makers), and risk communi-
cators have a difficult task here.
9.7 Way Forward
The discussion on risk communication effectiveness has been r ambling

on for several decades now, about the fundamental choice for either
a bottom-up or a top-down approach to risk communication. In the
context of health and safety at work, perhaps, an either-or choice is
not (yet) very practical, because we assume that given certain circum-
stances bottom-up and top-down types of communication may have
their merits. The bottom-up, people-oriented or participatory approach
seems very suitable in SMEs that have a positive safety culture and
workers want to be informed about risks, or want to inform them-
selves to be able to fulfil their safety needs. The top-down approach
is perhaps better suited to emergency situations. Of course, additional
studies will have to bring more insight into this. Fortunately, in the
academic risk communication literature, one can observe now that
scholars increasingly are working on testing hypotheses and adding
to the overall notion of ‘what works, why and when’. Hopefully, the
knowledge base of effective risk communication practices in SMEs
will increase accordingly.
9.8 Conclusions
The subject of risk communication presents an inherent complexity as

it involves many human factors like perceptions or awareness and rela-
tional trust (Earle, 2010). This is especially true when it comes to the
risk management in matters of health and safety, in SMEs, for which
there is no sufficient field research available. The complexity is rein-
forced by the fact that risk communication involves the attribution of
meaning, and social interaction. This interaction involves a sender and
a receiver who may attribute their own meanings to the information
exchanged. Other features pertinent to communication are existing
knowledge, beliefs, value systems, experiences, emotions and the view
of opinion leaders.
Despite the complexity of the matter and the insufficiency of
research, the work of risk communication needs to be done. Therefore,
besides the theoretical background, in this chapter we summarized
some of the state-of-the-art methods of effective communication
available. In order to provide hands-on information, as is one of the
purposes of the handbook at hand, we presented an overview of the
available practical advice to the readers.
A word of caution is needed here too. Be aware that set risk com-
munication recipes do not exist. Every case has to be considered care-
fully as to its peculiarities and limitations. It must be stressed that
there are no ‘correct’ or ‘wrong’ approaches to the matters of health
and safety; every approach has its applicability and limitations. There
are two exceptions to this general rule: risk communication that does
not take the risk awareness or the risk concern of workers in SMEs
seriously is doomed to fail. And risk communication that only focuses
on creating risk awareness but does not improve the receiver’s coping
efficacy might lead to avoidance or denial, which is actually a few steps
in the wrong direction.
As an example, when a crisis has a slow onset, interactive methods of
communication may be adopted. When it comes to urgent or not yet
very-well-known matters, more top-down approaches can be accepted.
However, nothing excludes urgent cases to be approached through
bottom-up techniques, even within the time limitations imposed, if
the required outcome is a consensus on a matter. In other words, it is
not the approach that adapts to the available techniques but vice versa.
The above is especially true in our contemporary world, where the

social media take up a sizable part of communication. Social media
have the advantage of immediate interaction with a stimulus, even in
emergencies. For this reason, more research is required in this field,
which boils down to more democratic and direct ways of communica-
tion, increasing everybody’s health and safety in the workplace.
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Index
A O/M, role of, 153–154

social and economic
Acceptance criteria, 24 impact, 145
ALARP principle, 23 under-reporting, 146, 148
definition, 21 young employees, 151
occupational accident risks, 22–23 OHSMS, 35
pre-defined acceptance criteria, 22 organizational culture and climate,
quality criteria, 22 influence of, 94
quantitative acceptable criteria, 22 prevention campaign, 131, 135
risk acceptance, principles/ risk acceptance criteria, 22–23
philosophy for, 22–23 safety climate, 105–106, 112
Accidents, 6 semi-quantitative risk assessment, 18
BBS programme, 187, 193 under-reporting of, 148
definition of, 171 visitors/subcontractors, 44
EU-OSHA report, 33 Agreeableness, 101–102
frequency and severity, risk matrix, Arbocatalogi, 66
20–21 As low as reasonably practicable
initial risk assessment, 19–20 (ALARP) principle, 23
investigation, see Incident and Attraction–selection–attrition
accident investigation (ASA), 100–103
micro-firms, 34 Auditor
immigrant workers, 149 audit template, example of, 87
legal and economic competence, 68
consequences, 153 definition, 68
213
214 Index
personal skills, 69, 87 evaluation, 195

role of, 68–69 provide feedback, 192–193
training, 69–70 record performance, monitor
Audits, 56–57 programme, 193, 195
auditor, 68–70, 87 workplace, systems, methods,
criteria, 67 adjustment of, 193
definition, 67 radical behaviourism, 188–189
independent, 68 Big Five personality traits, 101–102
OHS management system Bowties, 184–185
external audits, 71–73, 88 British Standards Institution (BSI),
hazard identification and risk 62
assessment, 76–77, 90 BSI OHSAS 18001 standards,
internal–first-party audits, 58–59, 61
70–71, 88 advantages of, 64–65
legal requirements, 77–78 core activities of, 38
objectives and programmes, 78 disadvantages of, 65–66
performance, review of, 79–80 external audit, 71–73
policy, 74–76, 89 NoBos, 64
(pro)active performance objective, 62
measurement, 78–79 OHS management system
quantitative and qualitative model, 64
measurements, 78 BS 8800:2004 simple matrix
reactive performance method, 18
measurement, 78–80
support documents, 67–68 C
template, 83–87
CBC, see Critical behaviour checklist
B Classical behaviourism, 188
Competence
Bandura’s social cognitive theory, 147 of auditors, 68
Behavioural safety approach, 147 culture of prevention, 121–122,
Behaviour-based safety (BBS) 132–134
programme abilities, skills and know-how,
classical behaviourism, 188 sense of, 123
design and implementation, basic human need, 124–125
188–191, 194 cultural transformation within
Heinrich’s work, 187–188 company, 135–136
observation and feedback process, health competence, 127–129
188–189, 194 implicit knowledge, 127, 131
adjustments, 195 learning as an experience,
CBCs, 191–192 125, 131
critical behaviours, goal-setting organizational competence,
for, 193 125–126
Index 215
prevention campaign, 131, 135 in sense of responsibility,

safety competence, 126–127 123–124
in sense of responsibility, SMEs, conditions for
123–124 development in, 136–138
SMEs, conditions for explicit and implicit, 122
development in, 136–138 safety and health, 122
motivation, psychology of, 123 traditional vs. humanized
OECD Skills Strategy of prevention, 129–130
2012, 123
in pedagogy, 123 D
Programme for International
Student Assessment Demand support control model, 147
studies, 123 DGUV, see German Social Accident
Conscientiousness, 101–102 Insurance
Coping appraisal, 201 Domino theory, 169–170
Critical behaviour
baseline of, 191 E
goal-setting, 193
observation, 191–192 E-communication, 206–207
selection of, 191 Employees in safety decision-
Critical behaviour checklist (CBC), making, 2
191–192 Article 19 of ILO Convention, 42
Critical performance indicator employee participation in safety
(CPI), 186 policy, 41
CultureCheck, 131 safety committee
Culture of prevention duties and responsibilities of,
call for implementation, 43–44
122–123 establishment, requirements
competences for, 121–122, for, 42
132–134 members of, 43
abilities, skills and know-how, safety representative
sense of, 123 duties and responsibilities of,
basic human need, 124–125 42–43
cultural transformation within election of, 42
company, 135–136 Employment criterion, 144–145
health competence, 127–129 European Commission, 144
implicit knowledge, 127, 131 European Notified Bodies (NoBos),
learning as an experience, 64, 70
125, 131 European Union (EU), 1
organizational competence, Article 153 of Treaty of the
125–126 Functioning, 31
prevention campaign, 131, 135 economy, micro-firms, 144
safety competence, 126–127 EU Labour Law (Acquis), 30
216 Index
EU-OSHA, 33 identified through literature

European standards and review, 11
regulations, 157 PHA, 15
Framework Directive 89/391/EC, safety audit, 14
30–31 Standards/Code Practice/
national standardization bodies, Literature Review, 13
59–60, 81–82 ‘What if ?’ analysis, 14–15
OIRA project, 66–67 Health competence, 127–129
SMEs, 33 Health literacy, 127–128
External audits Human error, 180–181
second-party audits, 71
third-party audits, 72–73, 88 I
External communication, 198
Extroversion, 101–102 iAuditor, 68
Immediate workgroup, 101
F Immigrant workers, 149, 156
Implicit knowledge, 127, 131
Face-to-face communication, Incident and accident investigation, 3
204–205 behavioural interventions, see
Five-times-why-approach, 179 Behaviour-based safety
Functional resonance analysis programme
method (FRAM), 180 depth of, 174
history of, 169–170
G incidents and accidents, definition
of, 170–171
General protective measures (GPM), iterative process, 178
51–52 five-times-why-approach, 179
German Social Accident Insurance FRAM, 180
(DGUV), 131, 135 human error and blame,
180–181
H root-cause analysis
methods, 179
Hazard and Operability Study SMEs, 180
(HAZOP), 15–16 Tripod Beta method, 179
Hazard–barrier–target (HBT) model phases of, 174–175
bowtie, 184–185 analysis, 176–177
Haddon’s 10 strategies, 182–184 conclusions and
MORT methodology, 181 recommendations, 177
physical barrier, 182 data/information collection,
safe situation, 181 175–176
Hazard identification techniques, 12 interviews, rules for, 175–176
checklist, 13 report writing, 178
HAZOP, 15–16 timeline creation, 176
Index 217
reasons for, 171–172 incentives, awards and recognition

safety intervention strategy, to motivate employees, 39
see Hazard–barrier–target recruiting new personnel, 39
model reward system for recognition, 39
safety officers/safety management safety and healthy
staff, 173 environment, 38
use of, 171, 173 safety management, 39
Independent audit, 68 safety promotion policy, 39
Information insufficiency, 200 Meta-analysis, 101
Installations safety standards and Micro-firms, 1, 3
codes, 61 characteristics of, 145–146
Internal audits, 70–71, 88 definition, 144–145
Internal communication, 156, 198 economic growth, 144
International Labour Organization European Union economy, 144
(ILO), 1, 42 government safety policy,
International Standard Organization 157–158
(ISO) guidelines for, 159
ISO 9001, 59 safety management
ISO 45001 standard, 61–63 empirical research results, 148
International standards and codes, see employee relations, 34
Standards and codes employment relations, 35
integrated management
J systems, 155
internal communication, 156
Job demands-resources model, 147 managerial approach, 154
motivation of workers, 153
L organizational structure, 152
owner/manager, role of,
Leadership behaviours, 101, 103–104 152–155
Learning anxiety, 135–136 part-time work and precarious
Legal register, 77–78 employment, 149
Lisbon Treaty, 31 poor work conditions, 149
professional management, lack
M of, 152
safety climate and culture, 153
Major Accident Hazards Control, 31 safety committees,
Management Oversight and establishment of, 160
Risk Tree (MORT) safety information and
methodology, 181 knowledge sources,
Manager’s role in SMEs, 40 154–155
challenges, 38 safety issues concerns,
employee/employer relations, management avoidance of,
38–39 153–154
218 Index
safety performance, 150–152, quantitative and qualitative

156–157 measurements, 78
safety representatives, reactive performance
appointment of, 160 measurement, 78–80
theories, 147 BSI OHSAS 18001 standards,
training and learning, 155–156 58–59, 61
under-reporting of accidents, advantages of, 64–65
148 core activities of, 38
workforce, composition and disadvantages of, 65–66
characteristics of, 148–149 NoBos, 64
Microsoft Office®, 68 objective, 62
Motivation OHS management system
competence, 123 model, 64
of workers, 153 Dutch ‘OHS catalogues,’ 66–67
ISO 9001, 59
N ISO 45001 standard, 61–63
non-restrictive standard, 62
Neuroticism, 101–102 OIRA tools, 66–67
News media, 206 ‘peripheral matter,’ 56
regulations, 34
O Occupational Health and Safety
Management systems
Occupational accidents, see Accidents (OHSMS)
Occupational Health and Safety H&S management system, 35
Assessment Series OHSAS, 38
(OHSAS), 38; see also BSI PDCA management cycle,
OHSAS 18001 standards 36–38
Occupational health and safety safety culture, 35–36
(OHS) management Occupational Safety and Health Act
system, 1, 7 (OSHA)
audits EU-OSHA, 33
external audits, 71–73, 88 ‘general duty clause,’ 32
hazard identification and risk goal, 31–32
assessment, 76–77, 90 regulations, 32
internal–first-party audits, OECD Skills Strategy of 2012,
70–71, 88 123
legal requirements, 77–78 Online Interactive Risk Assessment
objectives and programmes, (OIRA), 66–67
78 Organizational climate, 95
performance, review of, 79–80 Organizational competence,
policy, 74–76, 89 125–126
(pro)active performance Organizational culture, 94–95
measurement, 78–79 Ottawa Charter, 122
Index 219
Owner/manager (O/M), 39; see also Risk assessment, 1, 3

Manager’s role in SMEs acceptance criteria, 21–24
micro-firms, safety management definition, 9
in, 152–155 enterprise, size and complexity
misperceptions, 8 of, 10
risk assessment, role in, 10 hazard identification techniques,
11–16
P owners/managers, role of, 10
qualitative risk assessment
Personality assessments, 101–102 BS 8800:2004 simple matrix
Personal protective equipment method, 18
(PPE), 49–52, 150–151, direct risk evaluation
153, 155 technique, 17
Plan, do, check, act (PDCA) limitations, 17–18
management cycle, 36–38 quantitative risk assessment,
Preliminary hazard analysis 16–17
(PHA), 15 as risk analysis and evaluation, 9
Prevention, 122; see also Culture of risk perception in SME, 7–9
prevention semi-quantitative methodologies
Product safety standards and accident, occupational risks
codes, 61 of, 18
Psychological safety, 136 furniture industrial sector, risk
matrix, 18–21
Q initial risk assessment, 19–20
Risk awareness, 198, 210
Qualitative risk assessment Risk communication
BS 8800:2004 simple matrix attribution of meaning, 199–200,
method, 18 210
direct risk evaluation Boyle’s seven-step process,
technique, 17 201–203
limitations, 17–18 definition, 198
Quantitative acceptable criteria, 22 external and internal
Quantitative risk assessment, 16–17 communication, 198
limitations of, 208–209
R ‘people-centred’ approaches,
199, 209
Radical behaviourism, 188–189 receiving/seeking risk-related
Registration, Evaluation, information, 200
Authorization and risk denial/avoidance, 201
Restriction of Chemicals risk perception/awareness,
(REACH), 31 198–199, 210
Residual risk, 209 safety committee, role of, 207–208
Risk acceptance, 9, 16 safety representative, role of, 208
220 Index
social interaction, 199–200, 210 literature review, 97–99

threat/coping appraisal, 200–201 management commitment,
tools 96–97
Boyle’s seven-step process, 207 micro-firms, 153
e-communication (technology as multidimensional construct, 96
assisted), 206–207 organizational characteristic
face-to-face communication, influences, 105–106
204–205 questionnaires, 96
news media, 206 risk communication, 199
printed information materials, social interaction approach, 101,
203–204 104–105
stakeholder participation, structuralist perspective, 100
205–206 unsafe events
visual representation, 204 assessment and prediction,
top-down approaches, 199, 209 challenges, 99–100
Risk management, 98, 197 indicators of, 96
Risk management options workplace safety interventions
(RMOs), 2 behavioural observation, 112
Risk perception, 198–199, 210 feedback intervention,
accident rates and worse 112–113
consequences, 6 individual and situational
definition, 7 factors, 111
in SMEs, 7–9 occupational safety and health,
Root-cause analysis, 179 113
safety promotion and training,
S 112
Safety committee, 37
Safety and quality, 47–49 duties and responsibilities of,
Safety audit, 14 43–44
Safety climate, 2 establishment, requirements
ASA framework, 100–103 for, 42
assessments, 107–110 members of, 43
Big Five personality traits, risk communication, role in,
101–102 207–208
climate level and strength, 97 Safety competence, 126–127
definition of, 95 Safety culture, 137
development in SMEs, 106–107 definition of, 95
group-/organizational-level incident and accident
influences, 103 investigation, 170
immediate workgroup, 101 micro-firms, 153
leadership perspective, 101, OHSMS, 35–36
103–104 questionnaires, 96
levels of analysis, 110–111 risk communication, 199, 208
Index 221
Safety legislation Safety representative (SR), 37

acquis communautaire, 30 duties and responsibilities of,
Article 153 of Lisbon Treaty, 31 42–43
Article 153 of Treaty of the election of, 42
Functioning of EU, 31 risk communication, role in, 208
EU Labour Law (Acquis), 30 Self-determination theory, 128
Framework Directive 89/391/EC, Self-employed people, 144
30–31 Semi-quantitative risk assessment
OSHA, 31–32 accident, occupational risks of, 18
Safety management system (SMS) furniture industrial sector, risk
behavioural interventions, see matrix, 18–21
Behaviour-based safety initial risk assessment, 19–20
programme Small and medium-sized enterprises
components of, 168 (SMEs), 1
incident and accident accident rates and worse
investigation consequences, 6
CPIs, 186 definition, 32
depth of, 174 in economic growth and safety
history of, 169–170 economic pressure during
incidents and accidents, crisis, 34
definition of, 170–171 EU-OSHA, 33
iterative process, 178–181 factors exacerbating safety
phases of, 174–178 problems in small firms, 34
reasons for, 171–172 firm size and level of
safety officers/safety occupational risk, 33
management staff, 173 important needs for small
use of, 171, 173 companies, 33
modification of, 3 risk of accidents, 33
safety intervention strategy, see employees in safety decision-
Hazard–barrier–target making, 41–44
model manager’s role in SME, 38–40
Safety performance micro-SMEs, see Micro-firms
international standards and codes, OHSMS, 35–38
see Standards and codes personal protective equipment,
micro-firms 49–52
barriers and facilitators, 150, 152 quality, safety and governance
company performance, systems, 47–49
156–157 risk assessment methods, see Risk
definition, 150 assessment
individual factors, 151 risk communication, see Risk
organizational factors, 151 communication
social factors, 151 risk perceptions for, 7–9
technical factors, 150–151 safety climate, see Safety climate
222 Index
safety legislation, 30–32 SWOT analysis

safety policy, importance, 40–41 external–third-party audit,
safe working environment, 72, 88
assessment for, 6 internal audit, 71, 88
visitors and (sub)contractors,
safety marketing to, 44–46 T
SMART model, 76
SMS, see Safety management system Technology assisted communication,
Social identity theory, 147 see E-communication
Social interaction, 101, 104–105, Threat appraisal, 200–201
199–200, 210 Tripod Beta method, 179
Social media, 211
Spontaneous behaviour, 188 U
Standards and codes
BSI OHSAS 18001 standards, Under-reporting, 100, 146, 148
58–59, 61
advantages of, 64–65 V
core activities of, 38
disadvantages of, 65–66 Visitors and (sub)contractors, safety
NoBos, 64 marketing
objective, 62 effective information, aspects
OHS management system of, 45
model, 64 objectives of marketing theory, 45
compliance with, 60 safety awareness and behaviour,
disadvantage of, 61–62 instructions on, 44
Dutch ‘OHS catalogues,’ safety duties of contractor, 46
66–67
European national W
standardization bodies,
59–60, 81–82 ‘What if ?’ analysis, 14–15
Europe, binding and non-binding Workplace safety interventions
documents in, 57–58 behavioural observation, 112
guidance documents, 60 feedback intervention, 112–113
ISO 9001, 59 individual and situational factors,
ISO 45001 standard, 61–63 111
nomenclature, 59–60 occupational safety and health,
OIRA tools, 66–67 113
safety ‘groups,’ 60–61 safety promotion and training,
Subcontractors, safety marketing, 112
44–46 World Health Organization
Survival anxiety, 135–136 (WHO), 122, 128

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Safety

Safety Management in Small and Medium Sized

© 2018 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

No claim to original U.S. Government works

Printed on acid-free paper

International Standard Book Number-13: 978-1-4987-4472-0 (Hardback)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Boustras, George, editor. | Guldenmund, Frank W., editor.

Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at

and the CRC Press Web site at

George Boustras has a PhD in probabilistic fire risk assessment from

Frank W. Guldenmund studied psychology at Leiden University,

gradually became focused on modelling and assessing (the quality

Pedro Arezes Frank W. Guldenmund

Celina Pinto Leão Matilde A. Rodrigues

Stephanie C. Payne Xiaohong Xu

of parameters that are not always easy to derive. A number of guides

on to analyze the meaning of safety competence and health compe-

Over the years, several principles, theories, methods and approaches

and methods developed specifically for large enterprises cannot be

2.2 Risk Perception in SMEs

Conceptually, risk perception refers to a subjective assessment of the

risk assessment, motivation to consult external resources when they

In the following sections, some techniques and methodologies for

2.4 Hazard Identification Techniques

Hazard identification is the process of finding, recognizing and under-

Table 2.1 Summary of the Hazard Identification Techniques Applicable to SMEs

a brief description of the degree of their applicability to SMEs, as well

The use of a checklist seems to be the most widely reported tool to be

The ‘What if ?’ analysis is a systematic team approach, in which a team

2.4.4 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)

PHA is a simple and inductive means for identifying potential haz-

2.4.5 Hazard and Operability Study

The HAZOP is one of the most popular hazard identification tech-

This technique was initially developed to analyze chemical process

2.5 Risk Assessment Methods

2.5.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodologies

Quantitative risk assessment, frequently referred to as probabilis-

by comparing the estimated risk level with the quantitative accep-

2.5.2 Qualitative Risk Assessment Methodologies

Qualitative methodologies have the advantage of requiring less infor-

performed without numeric values, decisions can be based on ­personal

2.5.2.1 BS 8800:2004 Simple Matrix Method

2.5.3 Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodologies

Semi-quantitative methodologies have frequently been identified as

spite of the usefulness of using accident reports at company level to

2.5.3.1 Methodology for an Initial Risk Assessment

The estimation of the likelihood of occurrence is performed using the

2.5.3.2 Risk Assessment Approach for the Furniture Industrial Sector

An example of application was given by the authors using accident

Acceptance criteria are terms of reference by which the significance of

whether or not a risk and/or its magnitude is acceptable; this thereby

Determine which criteria to develop

Determine the principles/philosophy for

Analyze the historical accident data

Analyze the Select the risk metric

Safety performance Individual risk

Acceptance criteria adjusted to

Safety Revalidate the risk

societal risks, SMEs usually determine criteria to evaluate safety per-

is an important reference point to start defining acceptance thresholds

This chapter presented an analysis of risk assessment processes in

3.1 Safety Legislation 30

So why is safety management needed? A quick answer would be

2.2 Risk Perception in SMEs

2.4 Hazard Identification Techniques

2.4.4 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)

2.4.5 Hazard and Operability Study

2.5 Risk Assessment Methods

2.5.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodologies

2.5.2 Qualitative Risk Assessment Methodologies

performed without numeric values, decisions can be based on personal

2.5.2.1 BS 8800:2004 Simple Matrix Method

2.5.3 Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodologies

2.5.3.1 Methodology for an Initial Risk Assessment

2.5.3.2 Risk Assessment Approach for the Furniture Industrial Sector

3.2 Importance of SMEs in Economic Growth

3.3 Setting up an Occupational Health and Safety

3.4 The Role of the Manager in an SME

usually personal acquaintance, continuous exchange and close long-term

3.5 Importance of Safety Policy

3.6 Inclusion of Employees in Safety Decision-Making

3.7 Marketing of Safety to Visitors and (Sub)contractors

3.8 Combining Systems: Safety, Quality and Governance Systems

3.9 Lead by Example: The Case of PPE

3.9.1 Personal Protective Equipment

4.1 International Standards and Codes

4.1.2.1 Pros – OHSAS 18001

4.1.2.2 Cons – OHSAS 18001

4.2 Setting Up an Auditing System