SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. Y ASUELA, PETITIONER, HON. FRANK E.

LOBRIGO,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 3, LEGAZPI CITY,
ALBAY, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 226679 | 2017-08-15

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition[1] is the constitutionality of Section
23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002,"[2] which provides:

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining.[3]

The facts are not in dispute.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586
for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs).
The Information alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16-1G containing 0.084 [gram]
of white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement,[5] praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a
plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a
penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity
of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2)
the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal
branches of the government.

In its Comment or Opposition[6] dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial
of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be
justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea
bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition[7]dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that
it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the
intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with
the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is
left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:

The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed,
plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule
118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea
bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.

Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference
in criminal cases.

The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the
law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus
only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed.
However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with
possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez,
G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case
manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165
in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the
offender.

Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis
for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as
unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on
the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.

While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever
warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the
Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to
declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that
such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this
judicial station.[8]

Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order[9]dated July 26,
2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:

I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA
BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT

ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF
PROCEDURE.

III.

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165
AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.[10]

We grant the petition.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends
that the petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the
grounds that:

(1) the Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party;

(2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally;
and

(3) the proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory relief before this Court
or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition
fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review because:

(1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury;

(2) there is no actual case or controversy; and

(3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.

On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless,
without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to
make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full
and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed
technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn
duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its
obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications.[11]

Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues
of substantial and transcendental importance are present.[12] We have acknowledged that
the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and
"harrowing" proportions,[13] and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and
spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of
thousands especially our young citizens.[14] At the same time, We have equally noted that
"as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently,
if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by
the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers,
may be unjustly accused and convicted."[15]Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace
that has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its
sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate,
the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users.[16]

Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical
matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement
that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance.[17] When public interest
requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional
issue.[18]

x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of
procedure as a necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v.
Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz.:

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend
or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which
this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints
of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be
applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.[19]

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution

Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.[20] In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,[21] then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Reynato S. Puna traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and
highlighted its evolution and development.

x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence,
for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will
lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of
justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it
enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it
appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of
Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to
the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have
the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface.
In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme
Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953
which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after
July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck
down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the
disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court
during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this
Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less
certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may
do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its
function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It
is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of
Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For
the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section
5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

x x x x

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights."

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence
of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the
integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among
others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII
provides:

xxx

"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x[22]

Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)[23] further elucidated:

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5
(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

x x x x

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its
rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly
subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power
of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-
making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and
more independent judiciary."

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the
Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule making powers should be shared
with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National
Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence
of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later,
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead,
after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with
the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was
reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's
proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement
the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn,
Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby
leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional
participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration
was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their
inherent powers."

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. x x x.[24]

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court.[25] The other branches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.[26] Viewed from this
perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the
exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto[27] - Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as
provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.[28] - The

Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule
14 of the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees;[29] Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Han.
Judge Cabato-Cortes;[30] In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from
Payment of Filing/Docket Fees;[31] and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al.[32] -
Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from
the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)[33] - The first paragraph of Section

14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, Is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule
58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of
the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority
to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of Our institutional independence.[34]

Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July
1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:

SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court
and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint or information.

When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was
retained under Rule 118 (Pleas). Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on
January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section
2, Rule 116 provided:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended
party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)

As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during
pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:

SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the
following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)

The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was
retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added,
stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the
offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."

When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998") was enacted,[35] Section 2, Rule 118 of
the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining
and other matters[36] that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered
during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan.

Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules[37] are quoted
below:

RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent
of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty
to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment
but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense
after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information
is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

RULE 118 (Pre-trial):

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by

the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or
circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a
lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is
limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish,
increase or modify the latter.[38] "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtain redress for their invasions."[39] Fabian v. Hon. Desierto[40] laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which
are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those
which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and
substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is
frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if
a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and
jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may
be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.[41]

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates

substantive rights. For example, in People v. Lacson,[42] Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation qualifying
the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or
as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the
State to prosecute the accused.[43] Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one
year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may
appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal
interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases
with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial
rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the
time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with
the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the
Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a
manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal
justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating
the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion
of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival
thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There
were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes
beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the
lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused
despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal
proceedings.

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates
in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He
is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire.

The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its
witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown
dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused
may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of
time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove
the crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may
disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage
of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew
the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued
the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the
accused; not for the accused only.[44]

Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[45] that Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of
the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does
not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an
existing right may be implemented.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the
convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused
to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment
of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the
judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or
modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of
the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance
of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.[46]

By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts[47] that the rules on plea bargaining was
introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea
bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and
"legitimate" component of the administration of justice.[48] Some of its salutary effects
include:

x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading
guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious his exposure is reduced, the
correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are
eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources
are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt
or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof.
(Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])

Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it
protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal
conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when
they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 u.s. 257, 261 [1971])

The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties
of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt,
and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges
and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the
risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting
completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval."[49] There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.[50] The
essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions
to avoid potential losses.[51]Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.[52]

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,[53] the rules on plea bargaining

neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to
implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
a disregard or infraction of them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the
prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should
a guilty plea be offered and accepted.[54] In any case, whether it be to the offense charged
or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it
constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail
(except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself.[55]

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed
by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he
prefers to go to trial.[56] Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party [57] and the
prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that
is necessarily included in the offense charged.[58] The reason for this is that the prosecutor
has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.[59]

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The

reasons for judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely
simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also
must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement
priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a
criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious
criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to
examine the decision whether to prosecute."[60]

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow
the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether
to allow the accused to make such plea.[61] Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that
a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be
allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.[62]

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case.[63] As regards plea bargaining during the
pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse
thereof.[64] "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates
the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.[65]

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or
after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged.[66] The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in
allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less
than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment
whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his
change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served.[67] The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the
prosecution's evidence.[68] Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the
judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular. [69]

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates the equal protection clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt
any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in
toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition
against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petttton for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of

Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
OPHELIA HERNAN, Petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBA YAN, Respondent.

Present:
SERENO, CJ,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
DEL CASTILLO,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA, **
CAGUIOA,
MAR TIRES ***
TIJAM,
REYES and
GESMUNDO, ** JJ.
G.R. No. 217874 | 2017-12-05

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution 1 dated February 2, 2015 and
Decision2 dated November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division which affirmed,
with modification, the Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 7, Baguio City convicting petitioner of the crime of malversation of public funds
in Criminal Case No. 15722-R.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC), Cordillera Administrative Region(CAR) in Baguio City wherein
she served as an accounting clerk. In September 1984, she was promoted to the position
of Supervising Fiscal Clerk by virtue of which she was designated as cashier,
disbursement and collection officer. 3As such, petitioner received cash and other
collections from customers and clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll foes,
and special message fees. The collections she received were deposited at the bank
account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.4

On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the Commission on Audit
(COA), conducted a cash examination of the accounts handled by petitioner as instructed
by her superior, Sherelyn Narag. As a result, Lopez came across deposit slips dated
September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of P11,300.00 and
P81,348.20, rcspectively. 5 Upon close scrutiny, she noticed that said deposit slips did not
bear a stamp of receipt by the LBP nor was it machine validated. Suspicious about what
she found, she and Narag verified all the reports and other documents turned-over to
them by petitioner.6 On the basis of said findings, Narag sent a letter to the LBP to confirm
the remittances made by petitioner. After adding all the deposits made and upon checking
with the teller's blotter, Nadelline Orallo, the resident auditor of LBP, found that no
deposits were made by petitioner for the account of DOTC on September 19, 1996 for
the amount of P11,300.00 and November 29, 1996 for the amount of P81,340.20.7

Thereafter, the LBP's officer-in-charge, Rebecca R. Sanchez, instructed the bank's teller,
Catalina Ngaosi, to conduct their own independent inquiry. It was discovered that on
September 19, 1996, the only deposit in favor of the DOTC was that made by its Ifugao
office in the Lagawe branch of the LBP.8 This prompted Lopez to write to petit10ner
informing her that the two (2) aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the bank.
The auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the P81,348.20 remittance but
not for the P11,300.00. Dissatisfied with petitioner's explanation as to the whereabouts
of the said remittance, Narag reported the matter to the COA Regional Director who, in
turn wrote to the LBP for confirmation. The LBP then denied receiving any P11,300.00
deposit on September 19, 1996 from petitioner for the account of the DOTC. 9 Thus, the
COA demanded that she pay the said amount. Petitioner, however, refused.
Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for malversation of public funds against
petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon which, after due investigation,
recommended her indictment for the loss of P11,300.00.10 Accordingly, petitioner was
charged before the RTC of Baguio City in an Information, the accusatory portion of which
reads:

That on or about September 16, 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Disbursing Officer of the
Department of Transportation and Communications, Baguio City, and as such an
accountable officer, entrusted with and responsible for the amount of P11,300.00 which
accused received and collected for the DOTC, and intended for deposit under the account
of DOTC with the Land Bank of the Philippines-Baguio City, by reason of her position,
while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her position, did
then and there, wilfully, feloniously, and unlawfully misappropriate or consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, permit other persons to take such amount of P11,300.00 to
the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 11

Upon arraignment on July 31, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Hence, trial on the merits ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of two (2) COA auditors,
namely, Maria Lopez and Sherelyn Narag as well as three (3) LBP employees, namely,
Rebecca Sanchez, Catalina Ngaosi, and Nadelline Orallo. 12 In response, the defense
presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized as follows:

On September 19, 1996, petitioner and her supervisor, Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP
Baguio branch and personally deposited the exact amount of P11,300.00 with
accomplished deposit slips in six (6) copies. 13 Since there were many clients who came
ahead of her, she decided to go with her usual arrangement of leaving the money with
the teller and telling her that she would just come back to retrieve the deposit slip. Thus,
she handed the money to Teller No. 2, whom she identified as Catalina Ngaosi. Upon her
return at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, she retrieved four (4) copies of the deposit
slip from Ngaosi. She noticed that the same had no acknowledgment mark on it. Being
contented with the initials of the teller on the deposit slips, she returned to her office and
kept them in her vault. It was only during the cash count conducted by auditor Lopez
when she found out that the said amount was not remitted to the account of the LBP.
When demand was made on her to return the amount, she requested that she be allowed
to pay only after investigation of a complaint of Estafa that she would file with the National
Bureau of Investigation against some personnel of the bank, particularly Catalina
Ngaosi. 14 The complaint, however, was eventually dismissed. 15

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered convicting

accused Ophelia Hernan of Malversation and hereby sentences her, after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day
of prision mayor medium period, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days of
prision mayor as maximum period to reclusion temporal maximum period, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of P 11,300.00.

Accused Ophelia Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification.

Likewise, accused Ophelia Hernan is hereby ordered to pay back to the government the
amount of P11,300.00 plus legal interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum to be
computed from the date of the filing of the Information up to the time the same is actually
paid.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED. 16

Erroneously, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed her
conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its
decision on the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is
the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitioner occupying a
position lower than Salary Grade 27. 17Petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Leticia Gutierrez
Hayes-Allen, then appealed the case to the Sandiganbayan. In a Decision dated
November 13, 2009, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's judgment of conviction but
modified the penalty imposed, the dispositive pmiion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the modifications that the indeterminate penalty to be imposed on the accused
should be from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months,
and 21 days of pr is ion mayor as maximum, together with the accessory penalties under
Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and that interest of only 6% shall be imposed on
the amount of P11,300.00 to be restored by the accused.

SO ORDERED. 18

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 21, 2009 alleging that
during the trial before the RTC, her counsel was unable to elicit many facts which would
show her innocence. Said counsel principally failed to present certain witnesses and
documents that would supposedly acquit her from the crime charged. The
Sandiganbayan, however, denied the motion in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010 on
the ground that evidence not formally offered before the court below cannot be
considered on appeal. 19

On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration became
final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. 20 On July 26,
2013, petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Meshack Macwes, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen
the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution. 21 In a
Resolution22 dated December 4, 2013, however, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion
and directed the execution of the judgment of conviction. It noted the absence of the
following requisites for the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening must be before finality
of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or
upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order
intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or
further evidence should be terminated within thirty (30) days from the issuance of the
order.23

Unfazed, petitioner filed on January 9, 2014 a Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for
Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment praying
for a reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan' s recent Resolution, that the case be
reopened for further reception of evidence, and the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated
June 26, 2013. 24 In a Resolution dated February 2, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the
petition for lack of merit. According to the said court, the motion is clearly a third motion
for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Court. Also, the
grounds raised therein were merely a rehash of those raised in the two previous motions.
The claims that the accused could not contact her counsel on whom she merely relied on
for appropriate remedies to be filed on her behalf, and that she has additional evidence
to present, were already thoroughly discussed in the August 31, 2010 and December 4,
2013 Resolutions. Moreover, the cases relied upon by petitioner are not on point.25
On May 14, 2015, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:

I.

THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN WAS FILED OUT OF TIME CONSIDERING TI-IE
EXTRAORDINARY AND EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CASE.

II.

THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE
EVIDENCE INTENDED TO BE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER SHOULD HER MOTTON FOR
REOPENING BE GRANTED, WAS PASSED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT.

III.

THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PRONOUNCING
THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN AND THE PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY
PETITIONER ARE CONSIDERED AS THE SECOND AND THIRD MOTIONS TO THE DENIAL
OF THE DECISION.

Petitioner posits that her counsel, Atty. Hayes-Allen, never received the August 31, 2010
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying her Motion for Reconsideration. This is because
notice thereof was erroneously sent to said counsel's previous office at Poblacion, La
Trinidad, Benguet, despite the fact that it was specifically indicated in the Motion for
Reconsideration that the new office is at the Public Attorney's Office of Tayug,
Pangasinan, following her counsel's appointment as public attorney. Thus, since her
counsel was not properly notified of the subject resolution, the entry of judgment is
premature. 26 In support of her assertion, she cites Our ruling in People v.
Chavez, 27wherein We held that an entry of judgment without receipt of the resolution is
premature.

Petitioner also claims that during trial, she could not obtain the necessary evidence for
her defense due to the fact that the odds were against her. Because of this, she asks the
Court to relax the strict application of the rules and consider remanding the case to the
lower court for further reception of evidence. 28 In particular, petitioner seeks the
reception of an affidavit of a certain John L. Ziganay, an accountant at the Depaiiment of
Science and Technology (DOST), who previously worked at the DOTC and COA, as well
as two (2) deposit slips. According to petitioner, these pieces of evidence would show
that the P11,300.00 deposited at the Lagawe branch of the LBP was actually the deposit
made by petitioner and not by a certain Lanie Cabacungan, as the prosecution suggests.
This is because the P11,300.00 deposit made by Cabacungan consists of two (2) different
amounts, which, if proper accounting procedure is followed, shall be recorded in the bank
statement as two (2) separate amounts and not their total sum of P11,300.00.29 Thus,
the Sandiganbayan's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen the case is capricious,
despotic, and whimsical since the admission of her additional evidence will prevent a
miscarriage.
Finally, petitioner denies the Sandiganbayan's ruling that her motion to reopen and
petition for reconsideration are considered as a second and third motion for
reconsideration, and are thus, prohibited pleadings. This is because the additional
evidence she seeks to introduce were not available during the trial of her case.

The petition is devoid of merit.

At the outset, the Court notes that as pointed out by respondent Office of the Special
Prosecutor, petitioner's resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is an improper remedy. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies
available, a party aggrieved by a court order, resolution or decision must first correctly
identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends to assail. 30 It bears
stressing that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 31 If the Order or Resolution sought to be assailed is in the nature of a final order,
the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.32 Petitioner, in the instant case, seeks to assail the
Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated December 4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 wherein
said court denied her motion to reopen the malversation case against her. Said
resolutions are clearly final orders that dispose the proceedings completely. The instant
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is, therefore, improper.

Even if We assume the propriety of petitioner's chosen action, the Court still cannot grant
the reliefs she prays for, specifically: (1) the reversal of the Sandiganbayan's December
4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 Resolutions denying her motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration; (2) the reopening of the case for further reception of evidence; and (3)
the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013. 33

First of all, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that since her counsel was not properly
notified of the August 31, 2010 Resolution as notice thereof was erroneously sent to her
old office address, the entry of judgment is premature. As the Court sees it, petitioner
has no one but herself to blame. Time and again, the Court has held that in the absence
of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the
order or resolution of a court upon the parties must be made at the last address of their
counsel on record. 34 It is the duty of the party and his counsel to device a system for the
receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the duty of the counsel to inform the court
officially of a change in his address. 35 If counsel moves to another address without
informing the court of that change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not
stay the finality of the decision. The court cannot be expected to take judicial notice of
the new address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain on its own whether or not
the counsel of record has been changed and who the new counsel could possibly be or
where he probably resides or holds office. 36

Here, it is undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to inform the court of the change in
her office address from Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet, to the Public Attorney's Office in
Tayug, Pangasinan. The fact that said new address was indicated in petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration does not suffice as "proper and adequate notice" to the court. As
previously stated, courts cannot be expected to take notice of every single time the
counsel of a party changes address. Besides, it must be noted that petitioner even
expressly admitted having received the subject resolution "sometime in September or
October 2010."37 Easily, she could have informed her counsel of the same. As respondent
posits, it is not as if petitioner had no knowledge of the whereabouts of her counsel
considering that at the time of the filing of her Motion for Reconsideration, said counsel
was already with the PAO. 38Moreover, the Court cannot permit petitioner's reliance on
the Chavez case because there, petitioner did not receive the resolution of the Court of
Appeals through no fault or negligence on his part.39 Here, however, petitioner's non-
receipt of the subject resolution was mainly attributable not only to her counsel's
negligence but hers, as well. Thus, the Court deems it necessary to remind litigants, who
are represented by counsel, that they should not expect that all they need to do is sit
back, relax and await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary
assistance to their counsel for what is at stake is their interest in the case. It is, therefore,
their responsibility to check the status of their case from time to time. 40

To recall, petitioner, on December 21, 2009, filed her Motion for Reconsideration seeking
a reversal of the Sandiganbayan's November 13, 2009 Decision which affirmed the RTC's
ruling convicting her of the crime of malversation. In a Resolution dated August 31, 2010,
the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Said resolution
became final in the absence of any pleading filed thereafter, and hence, was recorded in
the Book of Entries of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Subsequently, on July 12, 2013,
petitioner, through her new counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with
Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution, which was denied through the
Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated December 4, 2013.41 Undeterred, petitioner filed
her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the
Prayer for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014 which was likewise
denied in the Sandiganbayan's February 2, 2015 Resolution.

It seems, therefore, that petitioner waited almost an entire three (3) year period from
the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration to act upon the malversation case against
her through the filing of her urgent motion to reopen. In fact, her filing of said motion
may very well be prompted only by her realization that the case has finally concluded by
reason of the entry of judgment. Stated otherwise, the Court is under the impression that
had she not heard of the recording of the August 31, 2010 Resolution in the Book
of Entries of Judgments on June 26, 2013, petitioner would not even have inquired about
the status of her case. As respondent puts it, the urgent motion to reopen appears to
have been filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal via a petition for review
on certiorari before the Court.42On this inexcusable negligence alone, the Court finds
sufficient basis to deny the instant petition.

Second of all, petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her motion to reopen
the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical since the admission of her additional
evidence will prevent a miscarriage has no legal nor factual leg to stand on. Section 24,
Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence provide for the following requirements for the
reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of
conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3)
the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence
should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order. 43
But as the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite that the reopening
must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction already cripples the motion. The
records of the case clearly reveal that the August 31, 2010 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had already become final
and executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June
26, 2013. Moreover, petitioner's supposed predicament about her former counsel failing
to present witnesses and documents should have been advanced before the trial
court. 44It is the trial court, and neither the Sandiganbayan nor the Court, which receives
evidence and rules over exhibits formally offered. 45 Thus, it was, indeed, too late in the
day to advance additional allegations for petitioner had all the opportunity to do so in the
lower court. An appellate court will generally not disturb the trial court's assessment of
factual matters except only when it clearly overlooked certain facts or where the evidence
fails to substantiate the lower court's findings or when the disputed decision is based on
a misapprehension of facts. 46

Ultimately, it bears stressing that the Court does not find that the Sandiganbayan acted
in a capricious, despotic, or whimsical manner when it denied petitioner's motion to
reopen especially in view of the fact that the rulings it seeks to refute are legally sound
and appropriately based on the evidences presented by the parties. On this score, the
elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control
of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property
were public funds or prope1iy for which he was accountable; and (4) that he appropriated,
took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a public
officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds to personal uses. 47

As duly found by the trial court, and affinned by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner's defense
that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the
subject P11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where
the money went failed to overcome the presumption of law. For one, Paraiso was never
presented to corroborate her version. For another, when questioned about the subject
deposit, not only did petitioner fail to make the same readily available, she also could not
satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of malversation, all that is
necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public
funds, that she did not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made,
and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so. 48 Thus, even if it is
assumed that it was somebody else who misappropriated the said amount, petitioner
may still be held liable for malversation. The Comi quotes, with approval, the trial court's
ruling, viz.:

Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the amount of P11,300.00
and the corresponding deposit slip with the Bank Teller Ngaosi and she came
back to retrieve the deposit slip later, is to be believed and then it came out that
the said P11,300.00 was not credited to the account of DOTC with the Land Bank
and was in fact missing, still accused Hernan should be convicted of
malversation because in this latter situation she permits through her
inexcusable negligence another person to take the money. And this is still
malversation under Article 217.49

Said ruling was, in fact, duly reiterated by the Sandiganbayan in its Decision, thus:

Shifting our gaze to the possibility that it was the bank teller Catalina Ngaosi who
misappropriated the amount and should therefore be held liable, as the accused would
want to portray, the Court doubts the tenability of that position. As consistently ruled by
jurisprudence, a public officer may be held liable for malversation even if he does not use
public property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit, but consents to the
taking thereof by another person, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
such taking. The accused, by her negligence, simply created the opportunity for
the misappropriation. Even her justification that her deposits which were not
machine-validated were nonetheless acknowledged by the bank cannot fortify
her defense. On the contrary, it all the more emphasizes her propensity for
negligence each time that she accepted deposit slips which were not
machinevalidated, her only proof of receipt of her deposits. 50

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan's finding that
petitioner's motion to reopen and petition for reconsideration are practically second and
third motions for reconsideration from its Decision dated November 13, 2009. Under the
rules, the motions are already prohibited pleadings under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules
of Court due to the fact that the grounds raised in the petition for reconsideration are
merely a rehash of those raised in the two (2) previous motions filed before it. These
grounds were already thoroughly discussed by the Sandiganbayan in its subject
resolutions. Hence, as duly noted by the Sandiganbayan, in the law of pleading, courts
are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance, not to be misled by a false
or wrong name given to a pleading because the title thereof is not controlling and the
court should be guided by its averments. 51 Thus, the fact that the pleadings filed by
petitioner are entitled Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and ivith
Prayer to Stay Execution and Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry
of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment does not exempt
them from the application of the rules on prohibited pleadings.

Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the

fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final
on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice
to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. 52 None of the exceptions
is present in this case.

Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory
and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of
the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the
"life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to
frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice
that this Court should write finis to this litigation. 53
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary to reopen the
instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan,
not for further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to
modify the penalty imposed by said court. The general rule is that a judgment that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or
law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest comi of
the land. 54 When, however, circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en bane and give due
regard to such exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of
immutability. The same is in line with Section 3(c),55 Rule II of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court, which provides that cases raising novel questions of law are acted upon
by the Court en bane. To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951
entitled An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on which a
Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for the
Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal Code" as Amended which
accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an example of
such exceptional circumstance. Section 40 of said Act provides:

SEC. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act. No. 1060, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:

ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any

public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation
or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of pnswn correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation docs not exceed Forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00).

xxxx

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to
the total value of the property embezzled.

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a novel situation wherein
the judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and
executory and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage
of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner's sentence be modified respecting
the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to
the accused, 56 she may even apply for probation, 57 as long as she does not possess any
ground for disqualification,58 in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707
entitled An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation
Law of 1976," As Amended. allowing an accused to apply for probation in the event that
she is sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than six (6)
years when a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed
or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable
penalty. 59

Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a
possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the
instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan,
which imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as
maximum. Instead, since the amount involved herein is Pl 1,300.00, which does not
exceed P40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years. The Court, however, takes note of the presence
of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated by the Sandiganbayan
in favor of petitioner. 60 Hence, taking into consideration the absence of any aggravating
circumstance and the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance, the range of the
penalty that must be imposed as the maximum term should be prision correccional
medium to prision correccional maximum in its minimum period, or from two (2) years,
four (4) months, and one (1) day, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20)
days, in accordance with Article 6461 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the range of the minimum term that should be imposed upon petitioners is anywhere
within the period of arresto mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum with a
range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days
prision correccional, as maximum.

On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsels, and such
other officers of the law are hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of RA No.
10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case.
Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases where the imposable penalties
of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon
things, malicious mischief, malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is
dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof, have been reduced, as
in the case at hand, taking into consideration the presence of existing circumstances
attending its commission. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent
legislation shall find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time
when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already
begun. The accused, in these applicable instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of the
new law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already
begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already accomplishes the term of
the modified sentence. In the latter case, moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice
and expediency, further directs the appropriate filing of an action before the Court that
seeks the reopening of the case rather than an original petition filed for a similar purpose.

Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant
amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court
shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective
of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be
imposed.
Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for
Women are hereby ordered to determine if there are accused serving final sentences
similarly situated as the accused in this particular case and if there are, to coordinate and
communicate with the Public Attorney's Office and the latter, to represent and file the
necessary pleading before this Court in behalf of these convicted accused in light of this
Court's pronouncement; (2) For those cases where the accused are undergoing
preventive imprisonment, either the cases against them are nonbailable or cannot put up
the bail in view of the penalties imposable under the old law, their respective counsels
are hereby ordered to file the necessary pleading before the proper courts, whether
undergoing trial in the RTC or undergoing appeal in the appellate courts and apply for
bail, for their provisional liberty; (3) For those cases where the accused are undergoing
preventive imprisonment pending trial or appeal, their respective counsels are hereby
ordered to file the necessary pleading if the accused have already served the minimum
sentence of the crime charged against them based on the penalties imposable under the
new law, R.A. No. 10951, for their immediate release in accordance with A.M. No. 12-11-
2-SC or the Guidelines For Decongesting Holding Jails By Enforcing The Rights Of Accused
Persons To Bail And To Speedy Trial; 62 and (4) Lastly, all courts, including appellate
courts, are hereby ordered to give priority to those cases covered by R.A. No. 10951 to
avoid any prolonged imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolution

dated February 2, 2015 and Decision dated November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan
2nd Division are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum term,
to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as
maximum term.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Comi Administrator (OCA) for
dissemination to the First and Second Level courts, and also to the Presiding Justices of
the appellate courts, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public
Attorney's Office, Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the National Penitentiary
and Correctional Institution for Women, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information, guidance, and appropriate action.

Likewise, let the Office of the President, the Senate of the Philippines, and the House of
Representatives, be furnished copies of this Decision for their information.

SO ORDERED.
IN RE: CORRECTION/ADJUSTMENT OF PENALTY PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 10951, IN RELATION TO HERNAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN.

SAMUEL SAGANIB y LUTONG, Petitioner.

Present:
CARPIO,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA,
CAGUIOA,
TIJAM,
A. REYES, JR.,
GESMUNDO, and
J. REYES, JR., JJ.
G.R. No. 240347 | 2018-08-14

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

RESOLUTION

TIJAM, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Release, 1 praying for the immediate release of Samuel Saganib
y Lutong (petitioner) pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 2 and
this Court's ruling in Hernan v. Sandiganbayan. 3

The Facts

Petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code for pretending to be a lawyer, a certain "Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling"
that will help private complainants to facilitate the release of their friend from jail for
P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. Despite receipt of the said amount, however, the prisoner
was never released and worse, he died in jail. 4 The dispositive portion of the
Decision5 dated January 28, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch
3 in Criminal Case No. 27487-R, reads:

WHEREFORE, [petitioner] is hereby FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,

for the crime of Estafa, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
from FIVE (5) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to NINE (9) YEARS
of prision mayor as maximum, at the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP), Muntinlupa City,
Metro Manila, and to indemnify private complainant Ruben Iglesias the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as Actual Damages, with legal interest from
January 2007, until the amount is fully paid; Moral Damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) each to private complainants Nenita Catabay, and Ruben Iglesias; and
Exemplary Damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) each to the said private
complainants, plus costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

The RTC Decision became final and executory on February 12, 2012 per the said court's
Entry of Judgment7 dated February 20, 2012.

Per his Prison Record, 8 petitioner already has two (2) years, seven (7) months, and six
(6) days time served with earned good conduct time allowance as of June 6, 2018.

Meanwhile, R.A. No. 10951 was promulgated on August 29, 2017, which provides under
Article 315, paragraph 3 that estafa, involving an amount of over P40,000.00 but not
exceeding P1,200,000.00 shall be punishable by arresto mayor in the maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period.

Applying, thus, the Indeterminate Sentence Law and invoking our ruling in Hernan,
allowing for the re-opening of an already terminated case and the recall of an Entry of
Judgment for purposes of modifying/reducing the penalty to be served, petitioner comes
before this Court averring that he is entitled to have his sentence modified in accordance
with R.A. No. 10951 and be released immediately from confinement in view of the
aforesaid circumstances.

The Issue

Is petitioner entitled to the relief prayed for?

Ruling of the Court

While the petitioner correctly invoked R.A. No. 10951 for the modification of his sentence,
in the recent case of In Re: Correction/Adjustment of Penalty pursuant to R.A. No. 10951
in Relation to Hernan v. Sandiganbayan - Rolando Elbanbuena y Marfil, 9 this Court,
however, ruled that the determination of whether the petitioner is entitled to immediate
release would necessarily involve ascertaining, among others, the actual length of time
actually served and whether good conduct time allowance should actually be allowed,
and thus should be better undertaken by the trial court, which is relatively more equipped
to make findings of both fact and law. In the said case, the Court also had the occasion
to issue Guidelines considering the anticipated influx of similar petitions, in the interest
of justice and efficiency, which states:
I. Scope.

These guidelines shall govern the procedure for actions seeking (1) the modification,
based on the amendments introduced by R[.]A[.] No. 10951, of penalties imposed by
final judgments; and, (2) the immediate release of the petitioner-convict on account of
full service of the penalty/penalties, as modified.

II. Who may file.

The Public Attorney's Office, the concerned inmate, or his/her counsel/representative,

may file the petition.

III. Where to file.

The petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction
over the locality where the petitioner-convict is confined. The case shall be raffled and
referred to the branch to which it is assigned within three (3) days from the filing of the
petition.

IV. Pleadings.

(A) Pleadings allowed - The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the petition and the
comment from the OSG. No motions for extension of time, or other dilatory motions for
postponement shall be allowed. The petition must contain a certified true copy of the
Decision sought to be modified and, where applicable, the mittimus and/or a certification
from the Bureau of Corrections as to the length of the sentence already served by
petitioner-convict.

(B) Verification. - The petition must be in writing and verified by the petitioner-convict
himself.

V. Comment by the OSG.

Within ten (10) days from notice, the OSG shall file its comment to the petition.

VI. Effect offailure to file comment.

Should the OSG fail to file the comment within the period provided, the court, motu
propio, or upon motion of the petitioner-convict, shall render judgment as may be
warranted.

VII. Judgment of the court.

To avoid any prolonged imprisonment, the court shall promulgate judgment no later than
ten (10) calendar days after the lapse of the period to file comment. The judgment shall
set forth the following:

a. penalty/penalties imposable in accordance with R[.]A[.] No. 10951;

b. Where proper, the length of time the petitioner-convict has been in confinement (and
whether time allowance for good conduct should be allowed); and

c. Whether the petitioner-convict is entitled to immediate release due to complete service

of his sentence/s, as modified in accordance with R[.]A[.] No. 10951.

The judgment of the court shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to the filing
before the Supreme Court of a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court where there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

VIII. Applicability of the regular rules.

The Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided in a suppletory capacity
insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 28, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3 in Criminal Case No. 27487-R is
hereby REMANDED to the said court for the determination of: (1) the proper penalty in
accordance with Republic Act No. 10951; and (2) whether petitioner Samuel Saganib y
Lutong is entitled to immediate release on account of full service of his sentence, as
modified.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to the First and Second Level Courts, as well as to the Presiding Justices
of the appellate courts, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public
Attorney's Office, Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the National Penitentiary
and Correctional Institution for Women, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information, guidance, and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.