The Party Who Secures the Opinion of a Third Doctor doctor, unless the seafarer signifies his intent
eafarer signifies his intent to submit the disputed
Under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard
Employment Contract, when the seafarer sustains a work-related illness
or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work should
be determined by the company-designated physician.
However, if the doctor appointed by the seafarer makes a finding
contrary to that of the assessment of the company-designated
physician, a third doctor might be agreed upon jointly by the employer
and the seafarer, and the third doctor’s decision would be final and
binding on both parties.
The non-observance of the requirement to have the conflicting
assessments determined by a third doctor would mean that the
assessment of the company-designated physician prevails.
The Supreme Court denied the seafarer’s claim for disability benefits in
this case.
According to the Court, the need for the third doctor’s evaluation of
the seafarer arose after his personal doctor declared him unfit for
seafaring duties. The seafarer could not initiate his claim for disability
solely on the basis of the declaration of his personal doctor. He should
have instead set in motion the process of submitting himself to
assessment by the third doctor by first serving the notice of his intent to
do so on the employer.
The Court stressed that there was no other way to validate the claim of
the seafarer but this. Without the notice of intent to refer the seafarer’s
case to the third doctor, the employer could not itself initiate the
referral.
Unless the seafarer served the notice of his intent, he could not then
validly insist on an assessment different from that made by the
company-designated physician. This outcome, which accorded with
the procedure expressly set in the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract, was unavoidable for
him.
The employer can insist on the disability rating of its company-
designated physician even against a contrary opinion by another
assessment to a third doctor. The duty to secure the opinion of a third
doctor belongs to the employee asking for disability benefits. Said
employee must actively or expressly request for it.
Further reading:
 Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Alferos, G.R. No. 216795, [April 1,
2019]
 The Law on Labor Standards 418-425 (2016).
 Labor Law Review [The Fundamentals] 148-158 (2018).
 Agrarian Law and Social Legislation 235-257 (2018).
Extent of Disability vs. Determination of Fitness for Sea Duty
If there is a claim for total and permanent disability benefits by a
seafarer, the following rules shall govern:
 The company-designated physician must issue a final medical
assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of
120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
 If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment
within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then
the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total;
 If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment
within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g.,
seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was
uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment
shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to
prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient
justification to extend the period; and
 If the company-designated physician still fails to give his
assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the
seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless
of any justification.
The extent of the disability (whether total or partial) of the seafarer is
determined, not by the number of days that he could not work, but by
the disability grading the doctor recognizes based on his resulting
incapacity to work and earn his wages.
However, the determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is the
province of the company-designated physician, subject to the periods
prescribed by law.
Further reading:
  Intermodal Shipping, Inc. v. Escalona, G.R. No. 243380 (Notice),
[April 1, 2019]
 The Law on Labor Standards 418-425 (2016).
 Labor Law Review [The Fundamentals] 148-158 (2018).
 Agrarian Law and Social Legislation 235-257 (2018).
Secular View of Morality
At the time of her indefinite suspension from employment in 2006, the
employee was the Human Resource Officer of Brent Hospital and
Colleges, Inc. (Brent), an educational and medical institution of the
Episcopal Church of the Philippines.
The cause of suspension was the employee’s Unprofessionalism and
Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy.
It appears that the employee became pregnant out of wedlock, and
Brent imposed the suspension until such time that she marries her
boyfriend in accordance with law.
The employee then filed a complaint for unfair labor practice,
constructive dismissal, non-payment of wages and damages with a
prayer for reinstatement.
The labor tribunals upheld the employee’s dismissal as one attended
with just cause.
The just cause consisted in her engaging in premarital sexual relations
with her boyfriend, resulting in her becoming pregnant out of wedlock.
The labor tribunals deemed said act to be immoral, which was
punishable by dismissal under Brent’s rules and which likewise
constituted serious misconduct under Article 297 (a) of the Labor Code
of the Philippines.1 For the labor tribunals, since the employee was
Brent’s Human Resource Officer in charge of implementing its rules
against immoral conduct, she should have been the epitome of proper
conduct.
The Supreme Court declared that the dismissal of the employee here
was illegal.
Immorality as a Just Cause for Termination of Employment
The Supreme Court ruled that the employee’s premarital relations with
her boyfriend and the resulting pregnancy out of wedlock did not
constitute immorality, and thus could not be a just cause for termination
of her employment.
The Court noted that immorality was punishable under Brent’s policies
by dismissal for the first offense.
However, the Court also clarified that the determination of whether a
conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process:
First, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
conduct; and
Second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the
prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers
moral and respectable.
1) In this case, the Court found that the surrounding facts leading
to the employee’s dismissal were as follows:
 she was employed as a human resources officer in an
educational and medical institution of the Episcopal Church of
the Philippines;
 she and her boyfriend at that time were both single; and
 they engaged in premarital sexual relations, which resulted into
pregnancy.
2) The labor tribunals characterized these as constituting
disgraceful or immoral conduct and sweepingly concluded that
as Human Resource Officer, the employee should have been
the epitome of proper conduct and her indiscretion “surely
scandalized the Brent community.”
According to the Court, the foregoing circumstances, however, did not
readily equate to disgraceful and immoral conduct:
2A) Brent’s Policy Manual and Employee’s Manual of Policies did not
define what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as a
ground for disciplinary action.
Instead, Brent erroneously relied on the standard dictionary definition of
fornication as a form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that
the employee’s acts fell under such classification, thus constituting
immorality.
2B)Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which
an act should be gauged — it is public and secular, not religious.
Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral should be
made in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct, which, refer
to proscribed conduct because they are detrimental to conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society.
The fact that a particular act does not conform to the traditional moral
views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify
such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and
secular standards.
2C)More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish
that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is
considered disgraceful or immoral.
The employee and her boyfriend were both single and had no legal
impediment to marry at the time she committed the alleged immoral
conduct. In fact, they eventually married on April 15, 2008.
The labor tribunals’ respective conclusion that the employee’s
indiscretion scandalized the Brent community was speculative, at most,
and there was no proof adduced by Brent to support such sweeping
conclusion.
Even Brent admitted that it came to know of the employee’s “situation”
only when her pregnancy became manifest.
2D) Brent also conceded that at the time the employee and her
boyfriend were just carrying on their relationship, there was no
knowledge or evidence by Brent that they were engaged also in
premarital sex. This only showed that the employee did not flaunt her
premarital relations with her boyfriend and it was not carried on under
scandalous or disgraceful circumstances.
2E)Brent, likewise, could not resort to the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools2because premarital sexual relations between two
consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and,
consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a
purely public and secular view of morality, did not amount to a
disgraceful or immoral conduct under the said manual.
The Court ruled that the totality of the circumstances of this case did
not justify the conclusion that the employee committed acts of
immorality.
According to the Court there is no law which penalizes an unmarried
mother by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual
sexual activity between two unmarried persons; that neither does such
situation contravene any fundamental state policy enshrined in the
Constitution.
The fact that Brent is a sectarian institution does not automatically
subject the employee to its religious standard of morality absent an
express statement in its manual of personnel policy and regulations,
prescribing such religious standard as gauge as these regulations
create the obligation on both the employee and the employer to
abide by the same.
Marriage as a Condition for Reinstatement
The Court noted that Brent imposed on the employee the condition
that she subsequently contract marriage with her then boyfriend for her
to be reinstated.
According to Brent, this was “in consonance with the policy against
encouraging illicit or common-law relations that would subvert the
sacrament of marriage.”
The Court did not agree.
The doctrine of management prerogative gives an employer the right
to “regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects
of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods,
the time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer of
employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of
employees.”
Statutory law is, however, replete with legislation protecting labor and
promoting equal opportunity in employment.
No less than the 1987 Constitution3 mandates that the “State shall afford
full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.”
The Labor Code of the Philippines, meanwhile, provides:
Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to
stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of her marriage.
With particular regard to women, the Magna Carta of
Women4 protects women against discrimination in all matters relating
to marriage and family relations, including the right to choose freely a
spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent.
Weighed against these safeguards, the Court found that Brent’s
condition was coercive, oppressive and discriminatory.
Said the Court:
There is no rhyme or reason for it. It forces the employee to marry for
economic reasons and deprives her of the freedom to choose her
status, which is a privilege that inheres in her as an intangible and
inalienable right.
The Court acknowledged that while a marriage or no-marriage
qualification may be justified as a “bona fide occupational
qualification,” Brent must have proven two factors necessitating its
imposition, viz.:
 that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the
essential operation of the job involved; and
 that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially
all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job.
The Court, however, found that Brent had not shown the presence of of
these factors. Thus, it did not uphold the validity of said condition.
Further reading:
 Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc., G.R. No.
187417, February 24, 2016.
 The Law on Labor Relations 438-442 (2015).
 Labor Law Review (The Fundamentals) 424-425 (2018).
 Agrarian Law and Social Legislation 311-325 (2018).
The Goal of Adequate and Sustained Agricultural Production
San Juan was a tenant to a 6,000-square meter parcel of land owned
by Abella, and located at Balatas, Naga City, Camarines Sur (Balatas
property). The portion was covered by Certificate of Land Transfer No.
843 (159301) issued on 18 October 1973.
On 28 January 1981, San Juan and Abella entered into an agreement
whereby the Balatas property will be exchanged with a 6,000-square
meter agricultural lot situated at San Rafael, Cararayan, Naga City
(Cararayan property). The parties agreed that in addition to the
Cararayan property, San Juan shall receive from Abella a certain
amount as disturbance compensation and a 120-square meter home
lot situated at Balatas, Naga City.
The Department of Agrarian Reform approved the said agreement.
The controversy started when San Juan filed a complaint against Abella
praying that she be declared the absolute and lawful owner of the
Balatas property.
San Juan’s Claims
 The agreement is void as it contravened the prohibition on
transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27.
 Applying said law, the title to the Balatas property could not
have been acquired by Abella, since its transfer ought to have
 been limited only to the government or the grantee’s heirs by
way of succession.
 The Department of Agrarian Reform’s approval of the
agreement was of no moment.
Abella’s Arguments
 The agreement, being a mere relocation agreement, did not
violate nor contravene the true spirit of Presidential Decree No.
27 and other agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations.
 The Department of Agrarian Reform, the agency tasked to
implement Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws,
rules and regulations relative to the disputed land, approved
the agreement. Abella posits that this fact must be accorded
great weight by the courts.
 San Juan did not surrender the Balatas property to Abella as
contemplated under Presidential Decree No. 27. Instead, San
Juan received in return the Cararayan property.
The Supreme Court did not agree with Abella.
The Agreement was void for contravening Presidential Decree No. 27.
Presidential Decree No. 27 provides for only two exceptions to the
prohibition on transfer, namely,
 transfer by hereditary succession; and
 transfer to the Government.
Sales or transfers of lands made in violation of Presidential Decree No.
271 in favor of persons other than the Government by other legal means
or to the farmer’s successor by hereditary succession are null and void.
The prohibition even extends to the surrender of the land to the former
landowner. The sales or transfers are void ab initio, being contrary to law
and public policy under Article 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which states that “acts executed against the provisions of mandatory
or prohibiting laws shall be void.”
The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the heirs of other
qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the Government to
develop generations of farmers to attain its avowed goal to have an
adequate and sustained agricultural production. With certitude, such
objective will not see the light of day if lands covered by agrarian reform
can easily be converted for non-agricultural purposes.
In the present case, the Court found that the agreement Abella and
San Juan stipulated that the Cararayan property will be placed under
Operation Land Transfer and that a new Certificate of Land Transfer
shall be issued in the name of San Juan. The parties also agreed that
after the execution of the Agreement, San Juan shall vacate the
Balatas property and deliver its possession to Abella.
Furthermore the Court took notice of a certain Deed of Donation of
Land Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 dated 1 July 1981 which
provided that “for and in consideration of the [landowner-donor’s]
generosity and in exchange of the [tenant-tiller donee’s] [farm lot] at
Balatas, City of Naga, the [landowner-donor] do hereby transfer and
convey to the [tenant-tiller-donee], by way of [donation] the parcel of
land above-described.”
The intended exchange of properties by the parties as expressed in the
agreement and deed entailed transfer of all the rights and interests of
San Juan over the Balatas property to Abella.
According to the Court, it is the kind of transfer contemplated by and
prohibited by law.
Thus, the argument of Abella that the agreement was merely a
relocation agreement, or one for the exchange or swapping of
properties between him and San Juan, and not a transfer or
conveyance under Presidential Decree No. 27, has no merit. The Court
said that a relocation, exchange or swap of a property is a transfer of
property. They cannot excuse themselves from the prohibition by a
mere play on words.
The Court added that the fact that there was an approval from the
Department of Agrarian Reform did not validate the agreement. A
transfer of lands under Presidential Decree No. 27 other than to
successors by hereditary succession and the Government is void. A void
or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from the
beginning, as if it has never been entered into, and which cannot be
validated either by time or ratification. No form of validation can make
the void agreement legal.
Further reading:
 Abella v. Heirs of San Juan, G.R. No. 182629, February 24, 2016.
 Agrarian Law and Social Legislation 100 and 189-190 (2018).
My Reliance on the Disputable Presumption of Work-relatedness is Sufficient
Fred Olsen Cruise Lines, Ltd., through its local agent Bahia Shipping
Services, Inc., hired the seafarer in 2008 to work as a casino attendant.
After working with said employer on two occasions in 2008 to 2009, the
seafarer re-boarded the M/S Braemer on 1 August 2009 to work as a
senior casino attendant.
In February 2010, the seafarer experienced profuse and consistent
bleeding, extreme dizziness, and difficulty in breathing. She went to the
ship’s clinic and was given medication. The next day, she experienced
severe headache. She again went to the ship’s clinic and was
prescribed a different medication. She claims that since her headache
worsened after taking the said medication, she stopped taking the
same.
The bleeding of the seafarer intensified. She was later advised by the
ship’s physician to rest. However, her condition did not improve, so she
was taken to a clinic in Barbados. A transvaginal ultrasound conducted
on the seafarer revealed that she had two ovarian cysts. She returned
to the ship and was assigned to perform light duties.
On 20 March 2010, the seafarer was medically repatriated to the
Philippines.
On 22 March 2010, the seafarer was placed under the care of the
company-designated physician (an obstetrician-gynecologist). Said
physician found that the seafarer had “Abnormal Uterine Bleeding
Secondary to an Adenomyosis with Adenomyoma.” The seafarer
underwent endometrial dilatation and curettage as part of her
treatment.
The company-designated physician was unable to declare the fitness
of the seafarer for work by the end of the 120-day period from medical
repatriation on 10 March 2010. However, the said physician was able to
declare that the seafarer’s fitness to resume sea duties within the 240-
day period from said repatriation.
On 8 September 2010, the seafarer filed a complaint to claim
permanent disability benefits based on the collective bargaining
agreement she signed.
Although the Office of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Relations Commission ruled in favor of the seafarer, the Court of
Appeals reversed the award. The Court of Appeals found that the
seafarer failed to provide substantial evidence to prove her allegation
that her illness was work-related. Said court gave greater weight to the
findings of the company-designated physician, holding that the latter
had acquired detailed knowledge and was familiar with the seafarer’s
medical condition.
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
It stated that the seafarer should fulfill the following requisites for a grant
of her claim for disability benefits, to wit:
(1) She suffered an illness;
(2) She suffered this illness during the term of her employment contract;
(3) She complied with the procedures prescribed under Section 20 (B)
of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency Standard
Employment Contract;1
(4) Her illness is one of the occupational diseases within the Standard
Employment Contract,2 or her illness or injury is otherwise work-
related;3 and
(5) She complied with the four conditions enumerated under Section
32-A4 of the Standard Employment Contract for an occupational
disease, or a disputably-presumed work-related disease, to be
compensable.
In the present case, the first four requisites appear to have been met.
In February 2010, the seafarer experienced bleeding during her
employment on board the M/S Braemer. The seafarer was medically
repatriated to the Philippines and was able to visit the company-
designated physician. Said physician thereafter diagnosed the seafarer
as suffering from adenomyoma.
Although adenomyoma is not included in the list of occupational
diseases under the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract, the said contract,
nevertheless, provides that those illnesses not listed therein are
disputably presumed as work-related.
However, it appears that the seafarer was unable to
the fifth requisite.
The Court clarified that while the law recognizes that an illness may be
disputably presumed to be work-related, the seafarer must still show a
reasonable connection between the nature of work onboard the vessel
and the contracted or aggravated illness. The seafarer cannot argue
that he does not have the burden to prove that his illness was work-
related because it is disputably presumed by law. The seafarer cannot
simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in
Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract.
In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this
provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury
has rendered him permanently or partially disabled. It must also be
shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer’s illness
or injury and the work for which he had been contracted. According to
the Court, concomitant with this presumption is the burden placed upon
the seafarer to present substantial evidence that his work conditions
caused the disease, or at least increased the risk of contracting the
same. Only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal
relation, is required to establish compensability of illnesses not included
in the list of occupational diseases.
In the present case, the Court found no substantial evidence
establishing the relation between the seafarer’s work and the illness she
contracted.
The Court also noted that there was no showing that the seafarer’s
adenomyoma was pre-existing, thus it was not able to determine
whether the adenomyoma was aggravated by the nature of her
employment.
The Court acknowledged the seafarer’s arguments that her illness is the
result of her “constantly walking upward and downward on board the
vessel carrying loads” and that she “acquired her illness on board the
employer’s vessel during the term of her employment as a casino
attendant.” However, the Court found that the seafarer did not discuss
the duties of a casino attendant. She failed to show the causation
between walking, carrying heavy loads, and adenomyoma. She
merely asserted that since her illness developed while she was on board
the vessel, it was work-related.
fulfill
The Court accordingly ruled that it had no means to determine whether
the illness of the seafarer was work-related or work-aggravated, since
the latter did not describe the nature of her employment as a casino
attendant.
In view of the seafarer’s failure to fulfill the requisites of compensability,
the Court ruled against the grant of the seafarer’s claim for disability
benefits.
Further reading:
 Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 206758, February
17, 2016.
 The Law on Labor Standards 59-105 (2016).
 Labor Law Review [The Fundamentals] 148-158 (2018).
 Agrarian Law and Social Legislation 235-257 (2018).
Seafarer’s Work-related Death During Employment
On 24 April 2002, the seafarer was hired as a messman on board the
M/T Umm Al Lulu by the employer, Abu Dhabi National Tanker
Company, through its local manning agency, C.F. Sharp Crew
Management, Inc. The seafarer and the employer signed a ten-month
contract of employment, which was approved by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration on 9 May 2002.
Before embarkation, the seafarer underwent a pre-employment
medical examination and was declared physically fit to work. He then
boarded the M/T Umm Al Lulu on 20 May 2002.
The seafarer was repatriated in Manila on 16 March 2003. The next day,
17 March 2003, he went to a medical clinic in Kawit, Cavite where he
was examined by his personal doctor who then diagnosed him with
“Essential Hypertension.” Said doctor advised the seafarer to take the
prescribed medication and rest for a week.
On 19 March 2003, the seafarer died. The certificate of death stated
the causes for his death, thus:
Immediate cause: Irreversible Shock
Antecedent cause: Acute Myocardial Infarction
Underlying cause: Hypertensive Heart Disease
The seafarer’s legal heirs filed a complaint against the employer for the
recovery of death compensation benefits and of burial and children’s
allowances.
Employer’s Contentions:
The employer contended that the seafarer’s death was not
compensable based on the following reasons:
1) The death of the seafarer did not occur during the term of his
employment.
A seafarer’s term of employment commences from his actual
departure from the airport or seaport in the point of hire and ceases
upon completion of his period of contractual service, signing-off, and
arrival at the point of hire.
The seafarer’s ten-month contract was about to expire on 20 March
2003 when he was safely repatriated without any medical condition a
few days earlier, on 16 March 2003, as he was already in a convenient
port. In other words, the seafarer finished his employment contract
upon signing off from M/T Umm Al Lulu and arriving in Manila, his point
of hire, on 16 March 2003.
Thus, the seafarer’s death on 19 March 2003 could not have been
compensable because it happened beyond the term of his contract.
2) The seafarer’s death was not work-related.
As a messman, the seafarer’s duties were limited to assisting the chief
cook in food preparation. Said duties could not have contributed to his
demise or increased the risk of acquiring the illness which caused his
death, for there was no showing that the seafarer was subjected to any
unusual strain or required to perform any strenuous activity that could
have triggered a heart attack.
3) The seafarer failed to disclose his ailment during his pre-employment
medical examination.
Hypertensive heart disease takes years to develop and most probably
the seafarer was already suffering from said disease even before the
start of his employment contract. However, the seafarer failed to
disclose his ailment during his pre-employment medical examination.
This fact barred the seafarer’s heirs from receiving death benefits on the
ground of concealment of a pre-existing illness.
4) The seafarer likewise failed to submit himself to a mandatory post-
employment medical examination within three working days from his
disembarkation.
The Court’s Ruling:
The Supreme Court disagreed with the contentions of the employer and
ruled that the seafarer’s heirs were entitled to the benefits they claimed.
The Court noted the following provisions of Section 20 (A) of the 1996
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment
Contract, as these were applicable to the case:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH
1. In case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract, the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent
to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional
amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under
the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the
exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
xxx
4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result
of injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:
a. The employer shall pay the deceased’s beneficiary all outstanding
obligations due the seafarer under this Contract.
b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the
seafarer to the Philippines at employer’s expense except if the death
occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations do not
permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the
disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance
with the master’s best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall
communicate with the manning agency to advise for disposition of
seafarer’s remains.
c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine
currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars
(US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during
the time of payment. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court addressed the employer’s contentions, as follows:
1) Clarification of the phrase “work-related death of the seafarer, during
the term of his employment contract”
The Court found that Section 20 (A) (1) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract covered
cases wherein the seafarer’s death occurred “during the term of his
contract.” The Court also noted that the same phrase could be found
in Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract, only this more recent
version of the provision additionally required that the death be “work-
related.”
The Court acknowledged that although medical repatriation of the
seafarer at the point of hire strictly meant the termination of his
employment, heirs of a seafarer who has died after his medical
repatriation could still recover compensation and benefits.
Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court stated that medical
repatriation cases should be considered as an exception to Section 20
of the Standard Employment Contract.
1.1)
Accordingly, the phrase “work-related death of the seafarer, during the
term of his employment contract” under Part A (1) of the Standard
Employment Contract should not be strictly and literally construed to
mean that the seafarer’s work-related death should have precisely
occurred during the term of his employment.
Rather, it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness
which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the
term of his employment.
According to the Court, it is by this method of construction that undue
prejudice to the seafarer and his heirs may be obviated and the State
policy on labor protection be championed. For if the seafarer’s death
was brought about (whether fully or partially) by the work he had
harbored for his employer’s profit, then it is but proper that his demise
be compensated.
1.2)
It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth,
development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the seafarer or the
heirs to benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment
had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the
disease and in bringing about seafarer’s death.
1.3)
Even assuming that the ailment of the seafarer was contracted prior to
his employment, this still would not deprive him or his heirs of
compensation benefits. For what matters is that the work of the seafarer
had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the
disease and in bringing about his eventual death.
1.4)
Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the
seafarer be in perfect health at the time he contracted the disease. A
seafarer brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his
employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of
his seafarers, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of
liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the seafarer’s death for
which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the
seafarer is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said death,
independently of any pre-existing disease.
The Court concluded that medical repatriation is an exceptional
circumstance and allows the heirs of the seafarer who died after he
had been medically repatriated to recover the compensation and
benefits provided in Section 20 (A) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract .
The phrase “death of the seafarer during the term of his contract” in
Section 20 (A) (1) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract should not be strictly
and literally construed to mean that the seafarer’s death should have
occurred during the term of his employment; it is enough that the
seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually caused his
death occurred during the term of his employment.
2) Context of the illness that caused the seafarer’s death
According to the Court, for a seafarer’s death to be compensable
under the said contract, the illness leading to the eventual death of the
seafarer need not be shown to be work-related in order to be
compensable, but must be proven to have been contracted during the
term of the contract. Neither is it required that there be proof that the
working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease or
illness. An injury or accident is said to arise “in the course of
employment” when it takes place within the period of employment, at
a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is
fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
The Court ruled in favor of the seafarer’s heirs since the particular
circumstances in the present case revealed that the seafarer
contracted the illness which eventually caused his death during the
term of his contract or in the course of his employment.
3) Seafarer’s hypertension and/or heart disease easily detected by
standard/routine tests
The Court found that before the seafarer boarded M/T Umm Al Lulu on
20 May 2002, he underwent a pre-employment medical examination
and was declared fit to work. In this regard, the Court ruled that the
same negated the employer’s claim that the seafarer concealed a
pre-existing illness.
The Court acknowledged its declarations that the pre-employment
medical examination could not be relied upon to inform the employer/s
of a seafarer’s true state of health, and there were instances when the
pre-employment medical examination could not have divulged the
seafarer’s illness considering that the examinations were not
exploratory.
However, the Court noted that the seafarer’s hypertension and/or heart
disease could have been easily detected by standard/routine tests
included in the pre-employment medical examination, i.e., blood
pressure test, electrocardiogram, chest x-ray, and/or blood chemistry.
The Court added that even assuming that the ailment of the seafarer
was contracted prior to his employment on board the M/T Umm Al Lulu,
this could not be a drawback to the compensability of the disease.
The Court reiterated that it is not required that the employment be the
sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to
entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that
the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the
development of the disease and in bringing about his death.
Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the
seafarer must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he
contracted the disease. Every workingman brings with him to his
employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer
of the health of his seafarers, he takes them as he finds them and
assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the
seafarer’s death for which compensation is sought, the previous
physical condition of the seafarer is unimportant and recovery may be
had therefor independent of any pre-existing disease.
4) Post-employment medical examination of the seafarer by a
company-designated physician within three days from arrival not a
requisite for recovery of compensation and benefits relating to a
seafarer’s death
Finally, the Court ruled that the insistence of the employer on the post-
employment medical examination of the seafarer by a company-
designated physician within three days from arrival at the point of hire
was misplaced.
Said post-employment medical examination was required under
Section 20 (B) (3) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract for compensation and
benefits for a seafarer’s injury or illness; it was not a requisite under
Section 20 (A) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract for compensation and
benefits for a seafarer’s death.
In addition, Section 20 (B) (3) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract itself
allowed as an exception from said requirement a seafarer who is
physically incapacitated from complying with the same.
The Court found that the seafarer in this case was already of poor health
and weak physical condition upon his repatriation on 16 March 2003,
which necessitated his immediate visit to a nearby clinic the very next
day, on 17 March 2003.
In any event, the seafarer still had until 19 March 2003 to see a
company-designated physician but he died on the same day of a
cause (“Hypertensive Heart Disease”) directly linked to the illness
(“Essential Hypertension”) he developed during his term of employment
on M/T Umm Al Lulu and for which he was medically repatriated.
The Court reiterated the principle that the post-employment medical
examination requirement is not absolute and admits of an exception,
i.e., when the seaman is physically incapacitated from complying with
the requirement.
For a man who was terminally ill and in need of urgent medical
attention, one could not reasonably expect that he would immediately
resort to and avail of the required medical examination, assuming that
he was still capable of submitting himself to such examination at that
time.
Under the circumstances, the seafarer’s surviving heirs cannot be
denied their right to claim benefits under the law.
Further reading:
 C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Legal Heirs of Repiso, G.R.
No. 190534, February 10, 2016.
 The Law on Labor Standards 59-71 (2016).
 Labor Law Review [The Fundamentals] 148-158 (2018).
 Agrarian Law and Social Legislation 235-257 (2018).
No Objection to Company-designated Physician’s Assessment
The seafarer in this case entered into a ten-month employment
contract and was engaged to work as an able seaman by his
employer, Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd., through its agent, Marlow
Navigation Philippines, Inc., onboard the vessel M/V BBC OHIO. His
engagement was also subject to a collective bargaining agreement
between the employer and its employees. The seafarer boarded the
vessel on 23 November 2009.
While on duty on 30 December 2009, the seafarer fell from a height of
four meters in his work area. The fall affected his side, shoulder, and
head. He was brought to a hospital in Huangpu, China, where he was
diagnosed with “Left l-4 Verterbra Transverse Bone broken (accident).”
He was declared unfit to work for 25 days. On 7 January 2010, he was
medically repatriated to the Philippines.
The seafarer arrived in Manila on 8 January 2010, where he was referred
to the company-designated physician for examination and treatment.
After undergoing several tests (which included a CT scan, audiometry
and MRI, as well as therapy sessions with the company-designated
physician that spanned six months) the company-designated physician
gave him a combined 36% disability assessment.
The seafarer did not object to the company-designated physician’s
assessment. Yet, he filed a claim for permanent total disability
compensation against his employer.
The Supreme Court ruled that the seafarer was not entitled to
permanent total disability compensation.
The Court noted that the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract and the collective
bargaining agreement were instruments that governed the seafarer’s
employment with the petitioners. According to the Court, these
instruments are the law between the parties.
Under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the company-
designated physician who not only declares/establishes the fitness to
work or the degree of disability of a seafarer who is repatriated for
medical reasons, but also determines whether a seafarer needs further
medical attention. Thus, under the said contract, the seafarer is required
to submit to a post-employment medical examination by the
company-designated physician.
Furthermore, under the collective bargaining agreement, the disability
suffered by the Seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed
mutually by the employer and the union, and the employers shall
provide disability compensation to the seafarer in accordance with the
compensation scale prescribed therein. The Court found that the
company-designated physician based her assessment of the seafarer’s
disability on the said compensation scale.
In the present case, the seafarer was able to submit himself to the care
of the company-designated physician upon his medical repatriation.
The company-designated physician thereafter gave the seafarer a 36%
disability assessment under the compensation schedule prescribed in
the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court noted the seafarer’s own admission that he no longer
disputed the findings of the company-designated physician. It was also
not shown that the seafarer offered a contrary finding. And although
the collective bargaining agreement stated that the seafarer’s
disability shall be determined by a doctor mutually appointed by the
employer and the union, it was was not established that the parties
even resorted to this step.
The Court ruled that the absence of a disability assessment by a doctor
chosen by the parties will not invalidate the company-designated
physician’s assessment, not only because the seafarer accepted said
physician’s findings, but also because record established that the
seafarer refused the employer’s proposal that his medical condition be
referred to a mutually appointed doctor for determination.
According to the Court, a seafarer could not claim full disability benefits
on his mere say-so, in complete disregard of the Standard Employment
Contract and the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court thus held that company-designated physician’s assessment
should stand.
Further reading:
 Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. v. Cabatay, G.R. No. 212878,
February 1, 2016.
 The Law on Labor Standards 59-105 (2016).
 Labor Law Review [The Fundamentals] 148-158 (2018).
 Agrarian Law and Social Legislation 235-257 (2018).
Effect of Delaying Payment of Just Compensation
The landowner in this case had a parcel of agricultural land in
Camarines Sur which was taken in 1984 under Presidential Decree No.
27,1 then distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries. The Department of
Agrarian Reform fixed just compensation of the said land at P66,214.03
using the formula provided under Executive Order No. 228, Series of
1987.2
On 30 August 2000 and 17 December 2003, respectively, the landowner
was issued Agrarian Reform Bond No. 0079665 in the amount of
P11,674.59 representing the initial valuation of the taken land and AR
Bond No. 0079666 in the amount of P30,428.83 representing the 6%
increment under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No.
228, and paid cash in the total amount of P4,678.16.
The landowner found the valuation unreasonable, which is why he filed
a petition for summary administrative proceedings for the
determination of just compensation of the taken land before the Office
of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator.
On 27 March 2001, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator fixed just compensation in the amount of P1,147,466.73 24,
using the formula, LV = AGP x 2.5 x GSP. However, in arriving at such
values, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator used
the recent government support price for corn of P300.00/cavan
(P6.00/kilo) as certified by the National Food Authority Provincial
Manager of Camarines Sur, instead of the P31.00/cavan provided
under Section 23 of Executive Order No. 228.
Hence, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator no
longer applied the 6% annual incremental interest granted under
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 13, Series of
1994.4 In a letter dated 5 September 2001, the landowner
unconditionally accepted and called for the immediate payment of
the valuations for the land.
Dissatisfied with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator’s valuation, the Land Bank of the Philippines instituted a
complaint for the determination of just compensation before the
Regional Trial Court, averring that the said office erred in disregarding
the formula provided under Executive Order No. 228.
In an Order dated 17 March 2010, the Regional Trial Court directed the
Land Bank of the Philippines to submit a revaluation for the land in
accordance with the factors set forth under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,5 as implemented by Department of
Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2010.6
The Land Bank of the Philippines complied and reached an amount of
P1,155,223.41, as recomputed value of the land. The landowner
accepted the said computation.
On 22 June 2011, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision adopting
and approving the Land Bank of the Philippines’ uncontested
revaluation the land in the amount of P1,155,223.41, as well as ordering
its payment to landowner in accordance with Section 18 of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, minus the initial valuation
that had already been paid to him.
The landowner moved for reconsideration, contending that the
Regional Trial Court failed to order an additional payment of 12%
interest in his favor, reckoned from the time his land was taken from him
by the government in 1972 and distributed to the farmer
beneficiaries until full payment of the just compensation.
In an Order dated 31 August 2011, the Regional Trial Court granted the
said motion and awarded 12% interest computed from 26 June 2000,
when the Land Bank of the Philippines approved the payment of the
initial valuation for the land up to the date the decision was rendered,
or a total amount of P1,437,669.75.
The Regional Trial Court modified its 31 August 2011 Order, by way of its
Order dated 10 October 2011, holding that the 12% interest should be
reckoned from 1 January 2010until full payment since the revaluation
the land already included the required 6% annual incremental interest
under Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 13,
Series of 1994,7 Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order
No. 2, Series of 2004,8 and Department of Agrarian Reform
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2008,9 from the time of taking until
December 31, 2009.
Is the landowner entitled to the payment of annual interest of 12% on
the unpaid balance of just compensation, even if he was already
granted the 6% annual incremental interest prescribed under
Department of Agrarian Reform Order Nos.
 13, Series of 1994;
 02, Series of 2004; or
 06, Series of 2008?
Yes.
The Supreme Court ruled that in expropriation cases, interest is imposed
if there is delay in the payment of just compensation to the landowner
since the obligation is deemed to be an effective forbearance on the
part of the State.
The Court pegged said interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the
unpaid balance of the just compensation, reckoned from the time of
taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic,
or emancipation patents are issued by the government, until full
payment.
The Court clarified that, unlike the 6% annual incremental interest
allowed in the above-mentioned department orders, this 12% annual
interest is not granted on the computed just compensation. Rather, it is
a penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due to the
delay in its payment.
The reason is that just compensation also embraces, not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but
also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking,
as otherwise, compensation cannot be considered “just,” for the owner
is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of
his land while being made to wait for years before actually receiving
the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Said the Court:
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The true measure is
not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to
modify the meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea
that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full, and ample.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but
also payment within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the
property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a
decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to
cope with his loss.
While prompt payment of just compensation requires the immediate
deposit and release to the landowner of the provisional compensation
as determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform, it does not end
there. Verily, it also encompasses the payment in full of the just
compensation to the landholders as finally determined by the courts.
Thus, it cannot be said that there is already prompt payment of just
compensation when there is only a partial payment thereof, as in this
case.
Further reading:
 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, G.R. No. 213863 & 214021,
January 27, 2016.
 Agrarian Law and Social Legislation 67-83 (2018)
Seafarer’s Unjustified Refusal to Continue His Medical Treatment
On 30 September 2008, the respondents hired the seafarer in this case
as fitter aboard the vessel Crown Garnet for a period of nine (9) months.
He embarked on 4 October 2008.
The seafarer claimed that in January 2009, he started experiencing
neck and lower back pain. He then stated that he signed off from the
vessel on 13 July 2009 (although it was not clear in the case whether the
same was by way of medical repatriation or of the expiration of his
employment contract).
Upon arrival in the Philippines on 15 July 2009, he was referred to the
company-designated physician and was diagnosed with “cervical
radiculopathy, thoracic and lumbar spondylosis, as well as carpal
tunnel syndrome of the left, and trigger finger, third digit of his right
hand.” He underwent carpal tunnel surgery on his left hand, and
physical therapy sessions for his cervical and lumbar condition.
On 23 November 2009, the seafarer filed a complaint for disability
benefits against the respondents.
The Supreme Court denied the seafarer’s disability benefits in this case.
At the time the complaint for disability benefits was filed, the seafarer
had no cause of action.
The Court found that when the seafarer filed said complaint, he was still
under the care of the company-designated physician. He also had not
even consulted a personal doctor before he instituted his complaint.
The company-designated physician even advised the seafarer to seek
the opinion of an orthopedic specialist. The seafarer, however, did not
heed the advice and proceeded to file his complaint for disability
benefits. It was only a day after its filing that the seafarer requested from
the company-designated physician the latter’s assessment on his
medical condition.
Since the company-designated physician was yet to issue an
assessment on the seafarer’s medical condition, and since the 240-day
maximum period for determining the seafarer’s disability or fitness to
work had not yet lapsed, the Court accordingly concluded that the
seafarer prematurely filed his complaint.
The seafarer reneged on his duties under the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract.
In his report, the company-designated physician stated that while there
was a good chance the seafarer will be declared fit to work, this was
premised on the completion of his remaining therapy sessions to
address the pain in his left hand and back. The seafarer thereafter
complained of pain on the neck and additional pain of the lower back
which was not originally present at the start of his treatment. Thus, the
company-designated physician intended to prolong the seafarer’s
treatment. However, the seafarer no longer reported to the clinic of the
said physician.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard
Employment Contract1 provides
“[n]o compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any
injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his
willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided
however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity,
disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.”
The Court found that the seafarer was aware that he was duty-bound
to undergo the medical treatment, physical therapy sessions, including
the recommended consultation to an orthopedic specialist, in order to
give the company-designated physician the opportunity to determine
his fitness to work or to assess the degree of his disability. His inability to
continue his treatment without any valid explanation proved that he
neglected his corresponding duty to continue his medical
treatment. Consequently, the seafarer’s inability to regularly return for
his treatment caused the regress of his condition.
According to the Court, had the seafarer been cooperative with his
treatment and shown interest in improving his condition, it would have
been possible for the company-designated physician to declare him fit
to work.
The Court thus declared that the seafarer failed to comply with the
terms of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard
Employment Contract. The absence of a timely assessment from the
company-designated physician was not of his doing, but had resulted
from seafarer’s refusal to cooperate and undergo further treatment.
Such failure to abide with the procedure under the said contract results
in his non-entitlement to disability benefits.
Further reading:
 Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Quillao, G.R. No. 202885,
January 20, 2016.
 The Law on Labor Standards 66 (2016).
 Labor Law Review [The Fundamentals] 155-156 (2018).
 Agrarian Law and Social Legislation 242-243 (2018).
Sale of Agricultural Land and Waiver of Retention Rights
Decision in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549,
January 20, 2016.
On 26 June 1986, Romeo C. Carriedo bought approximately 70.4788
hectares of agricultural land covered by the following titles and tax
declarations:
 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35055
 Tax Declaration No. 48354
 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17681
 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56897
 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680
The area sold to Romeo C. Carriedo included a part covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680 of which herein petitioner, Pablo
Mendoza, was a tenant.
In June of 1990, Romeo C. Carriedo then sold these lands to the
Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc. Except for that area covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680, the lands were subjected to the
Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme and were awarded to
agrarian reform beneficiaries in 1997.
On 5 October 1999, the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
17680 was divided into five (5) sub-lots.
Three of these lots were then distributed to beneficiaries under
Presidential Decree No. 27 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 44384, 44385, and 44386, issued on 10 September 1999.
The remaining two (2) lots, consisting of approximately 5 hectares and
which was also the land being occupied by Pablo Mendoza, were
registered in the name of Romeo C. Carriedo and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282, respectively.
On 26 February 2002, Pablo Mendoza, Corazon Mendoza, and Orlando
Gomez filed a Petition for Coverage of these two (2) lots under
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. They claimed that they
had been in physical and material possession of the said land as tenants
since 1956 and had made the land productive. They prayed that
  an order be issued placing the land under Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program; and
 the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer, and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer be
ordered to proceed with the acquisition and distribution of the
land in their favor.
The Regional Director granted the petition in an Order dated 2 October
2002.
The Supreme Court, in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R.
No. 176549, January 20, 2016, however, reversed the said order and
declared that the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
344281 and 344282 was Romeo C. Carriedo’s retained area.
In said case, the Court ruled:
The right of retention is a constitutionally-guaranteed right1, subject to
certain qualifications specified by the legislature 2. It serves to mitigate
the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the
landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social
justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.
Deparment of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of
20033 clearly shows that the disposition of agricultural land is not an act
constituting waiver of the right of retention.
The Court further found that Romeo C. Carriedo has not committed any
of the acts found under Deparment of Agrarian Reform Administrative
Order No. 02, Series of 2003.
1)
Romeo C. Carriedo was not shown to have expressly waived in writing
his right of retention, as required under sub-section 6.3, Section 6 of
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of
2003.
2)
Romeo C. Carriedo was not said to have abandoned or declined to
assert his right of retention, under subsection 6.7, Section 6 of
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of
2003.
According to the Court, prevailing rules4 give Romeo C. Carriedo any
time before receipt of the notice of coverage to exercise his right of
retention, or if under compulsory acquisition, within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the notice of coverage. Since the validity of the notice of
coverage was the very subject of the present case, the Court ruled that
the period within which Romeo C. Carriedo should exercise his right of
retention had yet to commence.
The Court added that even assuming that the period within which
Romeo C. Carriedo could exercise his right of retention has
commenced, he could not have been said to have neglected to assert
his right of retention over the land, for he filed an application for
retention which was even contested by Pablo Mendoza’s son,
Fernando. Although Romeo C. Carriedo was shown to have
subsequently withdrawn his application, his act of filing an application
for retention had belied the allegation that he abandoned his right of
retention or declined to assert it.
3)
Not even the sale made by the herein Romeo C. Carriedo of more than
fifty (50) hectares in favor of the Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc.
could have been considered as a waiver of his right of retention.
In this case, it was asserted that Romeo C. Carriedo has waived his right
of retention by way of estoppel under another rule, i.e., Item No. 4,
Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative
Order No. 05, Series of 2006 which states:
II. Statement of Policies
xxx
4. Where the transfer/sale involves more than the five (5) hectares
retention area, the transfer is considered violative of Sec. 6 of R.A. No.
6657.
In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five (5) hectares
sold/conveyed without DAR clearance and the corresponding titles
issued by the Register of Deeds (ROD) in the name of the transferee
shall, under the principle of estoppel, be considered valid and shall be
treated as the transferor/s’ retained area but in no case shall the
transferee exceed the five-hectare landholding ceiling pursuant to
Sections 6, 70 and 73(a) of R.A. No. 6657. Insofar as the excess area is
concerned, the same shall likewise be covered considering that the
transferor has no right of disposition since CARP coverage has been
vested as of 15 June 1988. Any landholding still registered in the name
of the landowner after earlier dispositions totaling an aggregate of five
(5) hectares can no longer be part of his retention area and therefore
shall be covered under CARP. x x x (emphasis supplied)
It was argued that Romeo C. Carriedo should have lost his right of
retention over the land because he had already sold or disposed, after
the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
more than fifty (50) hectares of land in favor of Peoples’ Livelihood
Foundation, Inc.
The Court, however, found such assertions untenable. According to the
Court, nowhere in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 was
it indicated that a multiple or series of transfers/sales of land would result
in the loss of retention rights. Neither did it provide that the multiple or
series of transfers or sales would amount to the waiver of such right.
The Court mentioned the following relevant portions of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as referred to in Item No.
4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative
Order No. 05, Series of 2006:
Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act,
no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-size farm, such as the commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case
shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. x x x
xxx
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease,
management, contract or transfer of possession of private lands
executed by the original landowner in violation of the Act shall be null
and void: Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall
be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period
of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all
Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural
lands in excess of five (5) hectares. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 70. Disposition of Private Agricultural Lands. — The sale or
disposition of agricultural lands retained by a landowner as a
consequence of Section 6 hereof shall be valid as long as the total
landholdings that shall be owned by the transferee thereof inclusive of
the land to be acquired shall not exceed the landholding ceilings
provided for in this Act.
Any sale or disposition of agricultural lands after the effectivity of this Act
found to be contrary to the provisions hereof shall be null and void. x x
x (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. — The following are
prohibited:
(a) The ownership or possession, for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Act, of agricultural lands in excess of the total retention
limits or award ceilings by any person, natural or juridical, except those
under collective ownership by farmer-beneficiaries; x x x
The Court ruled that Sections 6 and 70 are clear in stating that any sale
and disposition of agricultural lands in violation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall be null and void. The reasonable
reading of these three provisions in relation to the constitutional right of
retention reveals that the consequence of nullity pertains to the area/s
which were sold, or owned by the transferee, in excess of the five (5)-
hectare land ceiling. Thus, the Court ruled that the lands covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282 fell within Romeo C.
Carriedo’s retained area.
The Court stressed that item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of
Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 has
attempted to defeat the above reading by providing that, under the
principle of estoppel, the sale of the first five (5) hectares is valid. But,
said rule has also hastened to add that the first five (5) hectares sold
corresponded to the transferor/s’ retained area. Thus, since the sale of
the first five (5) hectares was valid, therefore, the landowner had lost
the five (5) hectares because it happened to be, at the same time, the
retained area limit. In reality, Item No. 4, Statement of Policies,
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of
2006 had operated as a forfeiture provision in the guise of estoppel. It
punished the landowner who had sold agricultural land in excess of five
(5) hectares. For the Court, forfeitures, however, partake of a criminal
penalty.
The Court stated that in order for an administrative regulation to have
the force of a penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative
regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and
(2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.
Sections 6, 70 and 73 (a) of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 does not provide that a sale or disposition of land in excess of five
(5) hectares results in a forfeiture of the five (5) hectare retention area.
According to the Court, Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department
of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 imposed
a penalty where none was provided by law.
The Court further stated that the repugnancy between the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and Item No. 4,
Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative
Order No. 05, Series of 2006 was apparent by a simple comparison of
their texts. The conflict undermined the statutorily-guaranteed right of
the landowner to choose the land he shall retain, and Item No. 4,
Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative
Order No. 05, Series of 2006, in effect, amended the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which should not have happened.
Consistent with the principle that a statute prevails over an
administrative order, the Court declared the invalidity of Item No. 4,
Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative
Order No. 05, Series of 2006 for being ultra vires. Thus, Romeo C. Carriedo
neither waived his right to retain the land, nor was placed under
estoppel for his sale the land to the Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc.
Resolution of Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration in Department of
Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, October 10, 2018.
The Court gave due course to the motion filed by the Department of
Agrarian Reform that sought the reconsideration of the Decision dated
20 January 2016.
The Court noted that the Department of Agrarian Reform is legally
mandated to implement the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988. The said department possesses the special knowledge and
acquired expertise on the implementation of the agrarian reform
program. According to the Court, to pay no heed to the issues the said
department has raised would ignore the basic precepts of due process.
The Court accordingly revisited its Decision by taking into account the
arguments and position of the department.
The Court reversed and set aside its Decision dated 20 January 2016,
taking into consideration Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department
of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006, which
provides:
II. STATEMENT OF POLICIES
xxx
4. Where the transfer/sale involves more than the five (5) hectare
retention area, the transfer is considered violative of Sec. 6 of R.A. No.
6657.
In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five (5) hectares
sold/conveyed without DAR clearance and the corresponding titles
issued by the Register of Deeds (ROD) in the name of the transferee
shall, under the principle of estoppel, be considered valid and shall be
treated as the transferor/s’ retained area but in no case shall the
transferee exceed the five-hectare landholding ceiling pursuant to
Sections 6, 70 and 73 (a) of R.A. No. 6657. Insofar as the excess area is
concerned, the same shall likewise be covered considering that the
transferor has no right of disposition since CARP coverage has been
vested as of 15 June 1988. Any landholding still registered in the name
of the landowner after earlier dispositions totaling an aggregate of five
(5) hectares can no longer be part of his retention area and therefore
shall be covered under CARP.
In the present case, the Court acknowledged that the sale of the first
(5) hectares of agricultural land to the Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation,
Inc. made by Romeo C. Carriedo could be viewed as valid.
However, said sale should also be treated as the exercise of Romeo C.
Carriedo’s retention rights, such that he would no longer be able to
lawfully claim the subject landholding as his retained area.
Accordingly, the remaining landholding also can no longer be part of
his retention area and therefore shall be covered under
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. As narrated above, the
remaining land that pertained to Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680
was divided into sub-lots, of which two (2) of the lots (the land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282) were thereafter
registered in the name of Romeo C. Carriedo.
1)
Both the Constitution5 and Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
19886underscore the underlying principle of the agrarian reform
program, that is, to endeavor a more equitable and just distribution of
agricultural lands taking into account, among others, equity
considerations. The objective of Department of Agrarian Reform
Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is equitable — that in order
to ensure the effective implementation of the law, previous sales of
landholding (without Department of Agarian Reform clearance) should
be treated as the exercise of retention rights of the landowner, as
embodied in Item No. 4 of the said administrative order.
2)
The equity in this policy of Department of Agrarian Reform
Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is apparent and easily
discernible. With the sale of the lands, it was reasonably presumed that
the landowner already received an amount (as purchase price)
commensurate to the just compensation conformable with the
constitutional and statutory requirement. At this point, equity dictates
that he ought not to claim anymore, either in the guise of his retention
area or otherwise, that which he already received in the previous sale
of his land.
3)
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of
2006 is in consonance with the Stewardship Doctrine, under which
private property is supposed to be held by the individual only as a
trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners. As a mere
steward, the individual must exercise his rights to the property not for his
own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire
community or nation. Property use must not only be for the benefit of
the owner but of society as well. The State, in the promotion of social
justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and
disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits.
4)
The objective of land distribution to the landless farmers and
farmworkers is carried out by Item No. 4, Statement of Policies,
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of
2006, as it provides for the consequences in situations where a
landowner had sold portions of his/her land with an area more than the
statutory limitation of five (5) hectares. In this scenario, such
administrative order treats the sale of the first five hectares as the
exercise of the landowner’s retention rights because, effectively, the
landowner has already chosen, and in fact has already disposed of,
and has been duly compensated for, the area he is entitled to retain
under the law.
5)
Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform
Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is consistent with Section
707 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as the former
likewise treats the sale of the first five hectares (in case of multiple/series
of transactions) as valid, such that the same already constitutes the
retained area of the landowner. This legal consequence arising from
the previous sale of land therefore eliminates the prejudice, in terms of
equitable land distribution, that may befall the landless farmers and
farmworkers.
6)
Finally, the sale of Romeo C. Carriedo’s landholdings was made in
violation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 8, having
been made without the clearance of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. To rule that Romeo C. Carriedo was still entitled to retain the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282 will,
in effect, reward the violation, which the Court maintains will not allow.
The Court stressed that the right of retention serves to mitigate the
effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the
landowner and the tenant, and by implementing the doctrine that
social justice is not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the
landowner.
In this case, however, the Court noted that Romeo C. Carriedo has
claimed his right over the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 344281 and 344282, not because he was “deprived” of a portion
of his land as a consequence of compulsory land coverage, but
precisely because he already previously sold his landholdings, so that
the remaining portion would still be his.
The Court accordingly stated that although the exercise by a
landowner of his retention right is constitutionally guaranteed, the same
should not be done without due regard to other considerations which
may affect the implementation of the agrarian reform program. This is
especially true when such exercise pays no heed to the intent of the
law, or worse, when such exercise amounts to its circumvention.
The Court upheld the validity of Item No. 4, Statement of Policies,
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of
2006. As a corollary, Romeo C. Carriedo no longer possessed retention
rights to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and
344282.
Further reading:
 Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549,
January 20, 2016.
 Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549
(Resolution), October 10, 2018.
 Agrarian Law and Social Legislation 18-33 (2018).
Guiding Principle in Conversion of Agricultural Land
On 15 June 2011, the Supreme Court promulgated a Decision in Ayala
Land, Inc. v. Castillo1 upholding the Conversion Order issued by the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform on 31 October 1997.
The land in this case is in Silang, Cavite.
The farmers who were parties in this case filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the said decision arguing that conversion is not a
legal mode to exempt the property from the coverage of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
The Court denied the motion.
The guiding principle2 in conversion governs only prime agricultural
lands.3
In the present case, the subject land was already reclassified from
agricultural to other uses as early as 7 May 1996.
Various government agencies found that:
 The property is about 10 kilometers from the Provincial Road;
 The land sits on a mountainside overlooking Santa Rosa
technopark;
 The topography of the landholding is hilly and has an average
slope of over 18%. It is undeveloped and mostly covered with a
wild growth of vines, bushes, and secondary growth of forest
trees;
 The dominant use of the surrounding area is its industrial/forest
growth as the landholding is sitting on a mountain slope
overlooking the Sta. Rosa Technopark; and
 The area is not irrigated and no irrigation system was noted in
the area.
The Department of Agrarian Reform had long investigated and ruled
that the property was not suitable for agricultural use, as it had
remained undeveloped with no source of irrigation.
The Court thus concluded that the subject land was not prime
agricultural land as contemplated under the law. The Department of
Agrarian Reform properly issued the assailed Conversion Order.
Further reading:
 Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 178110 (Resolution),
January 12, 2016.
 Agrarian Law and Social Legislation 166-174 (2018).
Mere Reliance on a Causality Presumption
A seafarer was hired as an assistant butcher on a certain cruise ship. On
22 August 2005, he entered into a 12-month contract of
employment with the respondent incorporating the Standard Terms
and Conditions the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-
Going Vessels (Standard Employment Contract) as prescribed by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Having passed
the medical exam and having been declared fit for work, he boarded
the said ship on 26 August 2005.
During his employment, he was confined in a hospital sometime in
December 2005 after suffering a month of rectal bleeding and lower
abdominal pain. Soon he was medically repatriated, and upon arrival
in the Philippines on 24 December 2005, he was immediately confined
in a hospital, where he was found to be suffering from stage IV colon
cancer. After months of confinement and treatment for his illness, he
passed away.
His widow thereafter filed a Complaint with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for death benefits, and the case went up to the
Supreme Court.
“Claimants in compensation proceedings must show credible
information that there is probably a relation between the illness and the
work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required; otherwise, the
resulting conclusion would proceed from deficient proofs.”
Further reading:
 Joraina Dragon Talosig v. United Philippine Lines, Inc., et al., G.R.
No. 198388, July 28, 2014.
 The Law on Labor Standards 59-96 (2016).
 Labor Law Review [The Fundamentals] 148-158 (2018).
 Agrarian Law and Social Legislation 235-257 (2018).

The Court denied her claims. The basis for the denial was the absence
of showing that the cause of his death was one of those covered by the
POEA Standard Employment Contract, and that the said cause was not
work-related. It found that the Standard Employment Contract (under
Section 32-A) lists down certain types of illnesses as compensable, but
colon cancer is not one of them. And although there exists a disputable
presumption of compensability (under Section 20 B (4)) for illnesses not
listed therein, the Court ruled that it should be read in relation to said
Section 32-A.

In other words, she cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption

provision mentioned in Standard Employment Contract, as she still has
to substantiate her claim in order to be entitled to disability
compensation.

The widow, in this case, did not present any proof of a causal
connection or at least a work relation between the employment of her
husband and his colon cancer. Neither did she mention the risks that
could have caused or, at the very least, contributed to the disease her
husband had contracted.

Because of these findings, the claim was not granted.

Take away: