Title: SJS Officer vs Mayor Alfredo Lim

Facts:

On November 2001, during the incumbency of former Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panglungsod
enacted Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the use of the land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana and its adjoining
areas from Industrial II to Commercial I. The owners and operators of the business thus affected by
the reclassification were given six months from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which
to stop the operation of their business. Writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in favor of the oil depot operators.

On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Lim, the Sangguniang Panglungsod enacted
Ordinance No. 8187. The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified
Ordinance No. 8027 which objective “is to protect the residents of manila from the catastrophic
devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals”, Section 23
of Ordinance No. 8119, entitled “AnOrdinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan
and Zoning Regulationsof 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment
thereto”and all other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent therewith thereby allowing, once again,
the operations oil depots.

Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187. On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim,
et.al. and the intervenors oil companiescontend that the principle of the hierarchy of courts is
violated because the SC only exercisesappellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality
or validity of anordinance under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

Issue:Whether or not the hierarchy of courts is violated

Ruling:

No.

Section 5.The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courtsin:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
To further support its position, it cites the case of Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of
Manila,where the petitioners sought the nullification of the mayor’s executive order and the council’s
ordinance concerning certain functions of the petitioners that are vested in them by law. There, the
Court held:

Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the
declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and
executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides: x
xx

As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.

Assuming that a petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy, and that the petitions should
have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, we have, time and again, resolved to treat such a
petition as one for prohibition, provided that the case has far-reaching implications and
transcendental issues that need to be resolved, as in these present petitions.

On a related issue, we initially found convincing the argument that the petitions should have been
filed with the Regional Trial Court, it having concurrent jurisdiction with this Court over a special civil
action for prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. However, as we
have repeatedly said, the petitions at bar are of transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In the case of Jaworski v. PAGCOR,90 the Court ratiocinated:

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition,
the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that weset aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. x x x This is in accordance with
the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed.

Title: Banco de Oro et al vs Republic of the Phil

Facts:

FACTS:

By letter dated March 23, 2011, the CODE-NGO with the assistance of its financial advisers, RCBC,
RCBC Capital, Capex finance investment corporation (CAPEX) and Seed Capital Ventures, Inc., (SEED),
requested and approval from the Department of Finance (DOF) for the issuance by the Bureau of
Treasury (BTr) of 10- year zero-coupon Treasury Certificates (T-Notes).

The t-notes would initially be purchased by a special purpose vehicle on behalf of CODE-NGO,
repackaged and sold at a premium to investors as the PEACe Bonds.
The net proceeds from the sale of the bonds will be used to endow a permanent fund (Hanapbuhay
fund) to finance meritorious activities and projects of accredited non-government organization (NGOs)
throughout the country.

Prior to and around the time of the proposal of CODE-NGO, other proposals for the issuance of
zero-coupon bonds were also presented by banks and financial institutions. Both the proposal of First
Metro Investment Corp. and ATR-Kim Eng Fixed Income indicate that the interest income or discount
earned on the proposed zero-coupon bonds would be subject to the prevailing withholding tax.

On May 31, 2001, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), in reply to CODE-NGO’s Letters dated May
10,15 and 25, 2001, issued BIR Ruling no. 020-2001 on the tax treatment of the proposed PEACe
bonds. It confirmed that the PEACe bonds would not be classified as deposit substitutes and would
not be subject to the corresponding withholding tax.

After the auction, RCBC which participated on behalf of CODE-NGO was declared as the winning
bidder having tendered the lowest bids. Accordingly, on October 18, 2001, the Bureau of Treasury
issued P35 billion worth of Bonds at yield-to-maturity of 12.75% to RCBC for approximately P10.17
billion, resulting in a discount of approximately P24.83 billion.

Also on October 16, 2001, RCBC Capital entered into an underwriting agreement with CODE-NGO,
whereby RCBC Capital was appointed as the Issue Manager and Lead Underwriter for the offering of
the PEACe Bonds. RCBC Capital agreed to underwrite on a firm basis the offering, distribution and
sale of the P35 billion Bonds at the price of P11,995,513,716.51.47 In Section 7(r) of the
underwriting agreement, CODE-NGO represented that “all income derived from the Bonds, inclusive
of premium on redemption and gains on the trading of the same, are exempt from all forms of
taxation as confirmed by BIR letter rulings.

RCBC Capital sold the Government Bonds in the secondary market for an issue price of
P11,995,513,716.51. Petitioners purchased the PEACe Bonds on different dates.

 BIR Ruling:

On October 7, 2011, “the BIR issued the assailed 2011 BIR Ruling, in response to a query
of the Secretary of Finance on the proper tax treatment of the discount or interest income derived
from the Government Bonds, imposing a 20% FWT on the Government Bonds and directing the BIR to
withhold said final tax at the maturity thereof, allegedly without consultation with Petitioners as
bondholders, and without conducting any hearing.”

It is now settled that all treasury bonds including PEACe Bonds, regardless of the number of
purchasers/lenders at the time of origination/issuance are considered deposit substitutes. On
October 17, 2011, replying to an urgent query from the BTr, the BIR issued BIR Ruling No. DA
378-201157 clarifying that the final withholding tax due on the discount or interest earned on the
PEACe Bonds should “be imposed and withheld not only on RCBC/CODE NGO but also on ‘all
subsequent holders of the Bonds.’”

 Petitioners’ Actions

On October 17, 2011, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and/or mandamus with
urgent application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before this
court.
On October 18, 2011, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) “enjoining the
implementation of BIR Ruling No. 370-2011 against the PEACe Bonds, subject to the condition that
the 20% final withholding tax on interest income therefrom shall be withheld by the petitioner banks
and placed in escrow pending resolution of the petition.”

Meanwhile petitioners filed their “Manifestation with Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Direct Respondents
to comply with the TRO.” They alleged that on the same day that the TRO was issued, the BTr paid to
petitioners and other bondholders the amounts representing the face value of the Bonds, net
however of the amounts corresponding to the 20% final withholding tax on interest income, and that
the Bureau of Treasury refused to release the amounts corresponding to the 20% final withholding
tax.

 Respondents argue that petitioners’ direct resort to this court to challenge the 2011 BIR Ruling
violates the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, resulting
in a lack of cause of action that justifies the dismissal of the petition. According to them, “the
jurisdiction to review the rulings of the CIR, after the aggrieved party exhausted the
administrative remedies, pertains to the Court of Tax Appeals.”

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners’ direct resort to this Court to challenge the 2011 BIR Ruling violated the
Doctrine of hierarchy of courts

Ruling:

In exceptional cases, however, this court entertained direct recourse to it when "dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the
orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy."In Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA) v. The
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,this court noted that the petition for
prohibition was filed directly before it "in disregard of the rule on hierarchy of courts. However, [this
court] opt[ed] to take primary jurisdiction over the . . . petition and decide the same on its merits in
view of the significant constitutional issues raised by the parties dealing with the tax treatment of
cooperatives under existing laws and in the interest of speedy justice and prompt disposition of the
matter.

Here, the nature and importance of the issues raised to the investment and banking industry with
regard to a definitive declaration of whether government debt instruments are deposit substitutes
under existing laws, and the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling circumstances to
justify resort to this court in the first instance.

The tax provision on deposit substitutes affects not only the PEACe Bonds but also any other financial
instrument or product that may be issued and traded in the market. Due to the changing positions of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue on this issue, there is a need for a final ruling from this court to
stabilize the expectations in the financial market.

Finally, non-compliance with the rules on exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of
courts had been rendered moot by this court’s issuance of the temporary restraining order enjoining
the implementation of the 2011 BIR Ruling. The temporary restraining order effectively recognized
the urgency and necessity of direct resort to this court.

TITLE: QUERUBIN VS COMELEC 2015

FACTS:

On October 27, 2014, the COMELEC en banc, through its Resolution No. 14-0715, released the bidding
documents for the "Two-Stage Competitive Bidding for the Lease of Election Management System
(EMS) and Precinct-Based Optical Mark Reader (OMR) or Optical Scan (OP-SCAN) System."

The joint venture of Smartmatic-TIM Corporation (SMTC), Smartmatic International Holding B.V., and
Jarltech International Corporation (collectively referred to as "Smartmatic JV") responded to the call
and submitted bid for the project on the scheduled date.

During the opening of the bids, Smartmatic JV, in a sworn certification, informed the BAC tha't one of
its partner corporations, SMTC, has a pending application with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to amend its Articles of Incorporation (AOI), attaching therein all pending
documents. The amendments adopted as early as November 12, 2014 were approved by the SEC on
December 10, 2014. On even date, Smartmatic JV and Indra participated in the end-to-end testing of
their initial technical proposals for the procurement project before the BAC.

Upon evaluation of the submittals, the BAC, through its Resolution No. 1 dated December 15, 2014,
declared Smartmatic JV and Indra eligible to participate in the second stage of the bidding process.
The BAC then issued a Notice requiring them to submit their Final Revised Technical Tenders and Price
proposals on February 25, 2015, to which the eligible participants complied. Finding that the joint
venture satisfied the requirements in the published Invitation to Bid, Smartmatic JV, on March 26,
2015, was declared to have tendered a complete and responsive Overall Summary of the Financial
Proposal.

After the conduct of post-qualification, the BAC, through Resolution No. 9 dated May 5, 2015,
disqualified Smartmatic JV on two grounds, viz:

Failure to submit valid AOI; and

The demo unit failed to meet the technical requirement that the system shall be capable of writing all
data/files, audit log, statistics and ballot images simultaneously in at least two (2) data storages.

The ruling prompted Smartmatic JV to move for reconsideration but still denied.

Aggrieved, Smartmatic JV filed a Protest, seeking permission to conduct another technical

demonstration of its SAES 1800 plus OMR (OMR+), the OMR Smartmatic JV presented during the
public bidding before the COMELEC en banc and the latter granted its protest.

Petitioners contentd that SMTC misrepresented itself by leading the BAC to believe that it may carry
out the project despite its limited corporate purpose and by claiming that it is Philippine corporation
when it is, allegedly, 100% foreign owned. Also Anent the procedural issues, the OSG, in its bid to
have the case dismissed outright, questioned petitioners' locus standi and failure to observe the
hierarchy of courts.

ISSUES:

Whether or not respondents direct resort to this Court to assail the decision of the COMELEC En
Banc violated the Doctrine of hierarchy of courts

RULING

Hierarchy of courts and the exceptions to the doctrine

Much has already been said of the "compelling significance and the transcending public importance"
of the primordial issue underpinning petitions that assail election automation contracts: the success
and the far-reaching grim implications of the failure—of the nationwide automation project. So it is
that the Court, in the growing number of cases concerning government procurement of election
paraphernalia and services, has consistently exhibited leniency and dispensed of procedural
requirements for petitioners to successfully lodge certiorari petitions.Technicalities should not stand
in the way of resolving the substantive issues petitioners raised herein. On this same ground of
transcendental importance, the Court may opt to treat the instant petition as one for certiorari under,
not merely in relation to, Rule 65.

The rulings of the COMELEC, as a constitutional body, can immediately be reviewed by the Court on
proper petition. As quoted in The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, citing Albano v. Arranz, "it is easy
to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were
[to] arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on
Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."

In sum, there exist ample compelling reasons to justify the direct resort to the Court as a departure
from the doctrine of hierarchy of courts not in relation to but under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on
certiorari and prohibition, and to brush aside the procedural issues in this case to focus on the
substantive issues surrounding the procurement of the 23,000 additional OMRs for the 2016
elections.

TITLE: Joseph SCott Pemberton vs Hon. Leila de lima 2016

FACTS:
A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National Police-Olongapo City Police Office and
private respondent Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo (Laude) against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton
(Pemberton).

The City Prosecutor of Olongapo City continued to evaluate the evidence and conducted ocular
inspections in connection with the preliminary investigation. Through the Resolution dated December
15, 2014, it "found probable cause against [Pemberton] for the crime of murder. On the same day, an
Information for murder was filed against Pemberton before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City.

On December 18, 2014, Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. On
the same day, he filed a Motion to Defer the Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court.

In the Resolution dated January 27, 2015, Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton's Petition for Review
and stated that based on the evidence on record, there was "no reason to alter, modify, or reverse
the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City." Pemberton's Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied for lack of merit.Aggrieved, Pemberton filed this Petition for Certiorari with
application for the ex-parte issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.

Pemberton argues that in sustaining a finding of probable cause, Secretary De Lima committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or absence of jurisdiction

Secretary De Lima, through the Office of the Solicitor General, points out that this Petition is
procedurally infirm. The Petition assails the appreciation of evidence and law by Secretary De Lima,
which are "errors of judgment . . . [that] cannot be remedied by a writ of certiorari."Further, by filing
this Petition before this court and not the Court of Appeals, Pemberton violated the principle of
hierarchy of courts.

ISSUES:

Whether or not respondents direct resort to this Cour violated the Doctrine of hierarchy of
courts

Ruling: PETITION DISMISSED affirming the resolution of Sec. Of Justice Leila De lima

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of
facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints
in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction
over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is
competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not
necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

We proceeded to name exceptional cases, where direct resort to this Court may be allowed:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time. Second exception is when the issues involved are of
transcendental importance.Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. Fourth,
the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. Fifth, the time element presented in
this case cannot be ignored. Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. Seventh,
petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of their
right to freedom of expression. Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the
orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy."
Petitioner alleges that the case against him has been scheduled for an expedited trial. Thus, petitioner
claims that it is necessary "to expeditiously arrive at a definitive ruling as to whether respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the [a]ssailed [r]esolutions."In his view, a direct
invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction is necessary.

This argument is completely bereft of merit. It is not clear why any action by the Court of Appeals,
which has concurrent original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, cannot be
considered as sufficient for review of petitioner's case.

Furthermore, the possibility of the conclusion of the trial of the case against petitioner is not a reason
that is special and important enough to successfully invoke this Court's original jurisdiction. Once
there has been a judicial finding of probable cause, an executive determination of probable cause is
irrelevant. Consequently, even assuming that grave abuse of discretion somehow taints an executive
finding of probable cause, such grave abuse of discretion has no effect in a trial. Whether respondent
De Lima, indeed, committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the executive determination of
probable cause is irrelevant to the trial itself.

TITLE: Liza Maza et al. Vs Hon Evelyn Turla 2017

FACTS:

In three letters all dated December 14, 2006, Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo (Inspector
Palomo), Deputy Provincial Chief of the Nueva Ecija Criminal Investigation and Detection Team,
referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, three (3) cases of murder
against petitioners and 15 other persons.

On February 2, 2007, Investigating Prosecutor Antonio Ll. Lapus, Jr. issued a subpoena13 requiring
petitioners to testify at the hearings scheduled on February 16 and 23, 2007.On March 9, 2007,
petitioners filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Quash Complaint/Subpoena and to Expunge
Supporting Affidavits.

Petitioners filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Judge Evelyn A. Turla, Prosecutors
Floro F. Florendo, Antonio Ll. Lapus, Jr., Edison V. Rafanan, and Eddie C. Gutierrez, and Justice
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez (respondents) but denied by the panel of prosecutors.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the
Case Outright on the Guimba case and was granted by Judge Napoleon R. Sta. Romana. But Judge
Turla issued an Order on the Palayan cases remanding it back to the provincial prosecutors "for' a
complete preliminary investigation.

Petitioners pray that the July 18, 2008 and December 2, 2008 Orders of Judge Turla be set aside and
annulled and that the murder cases against them be dismissed for failure to show probable cause.
They also ask for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin Judge Turla from remanding the cases to the provincial prosecutors, and "the respondent
prosecutors from conducting further preliminary investigation [on] these cases.
Respondents claim that the petition before this Court violates the principle of hierarchy of courts.
They contend that petitioners should have filed their petition before the Court of Appeals since it also
exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. According to respondents,
petitioners failed to justify a direct resort to this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners direct resort to this Court violated the Doctrine of hierarchy of courts

RULING: PETITION PARTIALLY GRANTED

We proceeded to name exceptional cases, where direct resort to this Court may be allowed:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time. Second exception is when the issues involved are of
transcendental importance.Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. Fourth,
the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. Fifth, the time element presented in
this case cannot be ignored. Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. Seventh,
petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of their
right to freedom of expression. Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the
orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy."

In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances warrants the exercise of this Court's
jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners were incumbent party-list representatives.
The possibility of their arrest and incarceration should the assailed Orders be affirmed, would affect
their representation of their constituents in Congress.

Although the circumstances mentioned are no longer present, the merits of this case necessitate this
Court's exercise of jurisdiction.

TITLE: Republic of the Philippines vs Sandiganbayan et al. 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Certiorari against the respondent
Sandiganbayan challenging the denial by the Sandiganbayan, of its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. The Solicitor General alleges that its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment must first be
resolved, as a continuation of the proceedings in the civil case by the Sandiganbayan might be
rendered unnecessary in the event that its petition before the Supreme Court is resolved in its favor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of preliminary injuction can be granted during the pendency of the Petition
for Certiorari against the Sandiganbayan

Held: Petition was denied. But the Sandiganbayan was ordered to continue the proceedings in the
said case as well as in all other cases where its interlocutory orders are on challenge before this
Court but no Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction has been issued and
there is no strong probability that the issues raised before this Court would be rendered moot and
moribund.

The Court finds that petitioner has failed to discharge the burden. The ground on which it bases its
urgent motion is the alleged futility of proceeding with the trial of the case. This assertion, however, is
speculative, anchored on the mere supposition that the petition would be decided in its favor.

There is thus, in this case, a marked absence of any urgent necessity for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.

There are of course instances where even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to
suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy.

This Court explained, however, that the rule on "judicial courtesy" applies where "there is a strong
probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result
of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court [or court of origin]".

TITLE: Pacific ace finance ltd vs eiji Yanagisawa

FACTS:

Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanese national, and Evelyn F. Castañeda (Evelyn), a Filipina,
contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall of Manila.

On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a townhouse unit. In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. During the pendency of the
case, Eiji filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a
Writ of a Preliminary Injunction. He asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all
of the properties registered in her name.

Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan from petitioner. To secure the loan, Evelyn executed
a real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner over the Parañaque townhouse unit. The instrument was
submitted to the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City for annotation on the same date.

At the time of the mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending before the CA.
The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage, and had ordered the liquidation of their
registered properties, including the Parañaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided
between the parties. The Decision of the Makati RTC did not lift or dissolve its Order on Evelyn’s
commitment not to dispose of or encumber the properties registered in her name.

Eiji learned of the REM upon its annotation on TCT No. 99791. Deeming the mortgage as a violation
of the Makati RTC’s Order, Eiji filed a complaint for the annulment of REM against Evelyn and PAFIN
and was raffled at RTC of Paranaque City but was dismissed. The CA reversed the decision stating
that Paranaque RTCs Decision was improper because it violated the doctrine of
non-interference. Courts of equal jurisdiction, such as regional trial courts, have no appellate
jurisdiction over each other.

For its defense, PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order against Evelyn.PAFIN
maintained that Eiji has no personality to seek the annulment of the REM because a foreign national
cannot own real properties located within the Philippines.Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the
October 2, 1996 Order. Evelyn asserted that she paid for the property with her own funds and that
she has exclusive ownership thereof. Petitioner seeks a reversal of the CA Decision, which allegedly
affirmed the Makati RTC ruling that Eiji is a co-owner of the mortgaged property.

ISSUE: Whether the Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same issue was
already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA.

RULING:

The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and
Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending appeal before the
CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati
RTC over the issue operates as an insurmountable barrier to the subsequent assumption by the
Paraaque RTC. By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with
the Makati RTCs resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions. It has
been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first
acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts."

TITLE: Conrado Nicart, Jr. Vs Josefina Titong and Joselito Abrugar, Sr.

FACTS:

Titong and Abrugar, together with 93 others, were appointed as department heads by the then
Governor Evardone of Samar a few days before the end of his term.Their appointments were
disapproved by the CSC Regional Office for violation of CSC rules and for not having met the
requirements laid down in Nazareno vs City of Dumaguete case. Titong and Abrugar filed a petition
for review before the CSC Main, which granted and declared their appointments as valid. The new
Governor Nicart sought for reconsideration, but it was denied. Before the CA, he appealed arguing
that their appointments cannot be valid since there was no need to fill up the positions and that their
appointments were en masse.

Meanwhile, the CSC Main issued a writ of execution ordering Gov Nicart and the provincial
government to pay the salaries and emoluments of Titong and Abrugar. Gov Nicart refused, so they
filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC even while the case before the CA was still pending.

The RTC decided the petition on the basis of the CSC memo circular 82 which states that the
non-issuance of a restraining order or injunction would make the CSC resolution executory pending
appeal. Since there was no TRO or injunction, and its opinion that the CA decision would not
constitute res judicata or in any way affect the petition for mandamus, the RTC issued a writ of
mandamus and went even further in deciding that the appointments were valid.

Issue: W/N it is proper for the RTC to take cognizance of the petition for mandamus even while the
issues involved is still pending resolution before the CA

Held:

No. First, it is erroneous for the RTC to opine that the CA decision would not affect the petition before
it because clearly, the mandamus petition heavily relies on the validity or invalidity of the
appointments which issue is yet to be resolved by the CA. Second, even while there is no preliminary
injunction or TRO issued by the higher court, ordinarily it would be proper for a lower court or a court
of origin to suspend the proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. Hence, the RTC erred when it
decided on the mandamus petition for disregarding such principle.