CASE DIGEST: PARAS VS COMELEC

PARAS v COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169

Facts:
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994.
Sometime in October 1995, A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was
filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC resolved to approve
the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the
petitioner’s opposition, COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it
on December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the
petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued
a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court dismissed the petition
and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date
January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996.
Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the pursuant to
Section 74b of the Local Government code: “no recall shall take place within
one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the
scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was
set on the first Monday of May 1996.

Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions
of Section 74b of the Local Government Code.

Held:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that every part of the statute must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the law is too
literal that it does not accord with the intentions of the authors of the law. The
spirit rather that the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it was
held that the “regular local election” refers to an election where the office held
by the local elective official sought to be recalled.
C. BOLOS vs. D. BOLOS Digest
Posted on August 16, 2016
C. BOLOS vs. D. BOLOS G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

FACTS:

 On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) u
nder Art. 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
 On January 16, 2007, judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner C
YNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on
February 14, 1980as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of
the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.
 Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorar
i under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC on January 16, 2007
declaring as final and executory
 On December 10, 2008, the Court of Appeals in an original action for certior
ari under rule 65 entitled “Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna a
nd Cynthia S. Bolos” reversedthe January 16, 2007 decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City.
 The appellate court in its decision stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-
SC (Rule on Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void Mariages And Annul
ment Of Voidable Marriages) is not applicablein this case since the marriag
e of Cynthia and Danila was solemnized before the Family Code took effe
ct.
 Moreover, the appellate court relied on its ruling in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinacelli stating that “coverage of A.M. 02-11-10-
SC extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988”.
 Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking a review of the December 10, 2008 decision of the C
ourt of Appeals.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling because the phrase “under t
he Family Code” in A.M. 02-11-10-
SC pertains to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages”

RULING:

The Court of Appeals ruled that the categorical language in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC is explicit in its scope.

RATIONALE:

In Section 1 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-

SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, it reads that:

Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nulli
ty of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code
of the Phillipines.

The categorical language being used clearly states that the coverage of this Rule ex
tends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which became effective on August 3, 1988. The Court therefore cannot apply meri
t to the petitioner’s interpretation stating that “petitions” is being categorized in the
phrase “under the Family Code” when the Rule took effectivity.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that a cardinal rule in statutory construction is that
when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for c
onstruction or interpretation, only application. It must therefore be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation in what is known as “plain-
meaning rule” or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “
speech is the index of intention”. Additionally, there is also the maxim verba legis
non est recedendum, or “from the words of a status there should be no departure.”
Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% of the special allowance
for judges be included in the computation of his retirement benefits; Callejo
Sr., J., AM No. RTJ-04-1868

I. The Facts:

In his letter dated May 26, 2004 addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Judge
Tito G. Gustilo requested that considering his retirement is “barely one month from
November 2004,” the second tranche of the Special Allowance granted to judges
under the Republic Act No. 9227 included in the computation of his retirement
benefits. In support thereof, Judge Gustilo points out that “in the past, Judges who
retire in October are included in the grant of the December 13th month pay, invoking
the “liberal policy” of the Court in granting benefits to the underpaid Trial Court
Judges.”

To recall, Rep. Act No. 9227 granting additional compensation in the form of Special
Allowance to judges took effect in November 11, 2003. The special allowances shall
be equivalent to 100% of the basic monthly salary specified for their respective
salary grades to be implemented uniformly in 4 years in such sums or amounts
equivalent to 25% of the basic salaries of the positions covered thereof. Subsequent
implementation shall be in such sums and amounts and up to the extent only that can
be supported by the funding source specified in Section 3 thereof. It is likewise
reiterated that for purposes of computing the retirement benefits, only the special
allowance actually received and that which accrued at the time of retirement shall be
included.

II. The Issue:

Whether or not the Court can adopt a liberal stance in interpreting the retirement
laws in favor of retiree Judge Gustilo.

III. The Ruling:

No. The court denied Judge Gustilo's request for the inclusion of the second 25%
Of the special allowance in the computation of his retirement benefits because Sec
5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is quite clear and unambiguous which, in plain reading,
shows that only the allowances “actually received” and the tranche or tranches
“already received and implemented,” upon date of retirement, shall be included in
the computation of the retirement benefits. As such, there is no room for
interpretation but only simple application of the law.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN v. CA, GR NO. 121920, 2005-08-09
Facts:
Under a "Contract For Water Service Connections"[2] entered into by and between
the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and Kwok Cheung as
sole proprietor of K.C. Waterworks System Construction (KC, for short), the former
engaged... the services of the latter to install water service connections.
On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of MWSS
to conduct and effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road,
San Juan, Metro Manila, a national road, for the laying of water pipes and tapping
of water to the respective houses of... water concessionaires.
Meanwhile, between 10 o'clock and 11 o'clock in the evening of 31 May 1988,
Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991 at a speed
of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan Road towards the
direction of Pinaglabanan, San Juan,... Metro Manila.
With her on board the car and seated on the right front seat was Assistant City
Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa.
The road was flooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of
the car fell on a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made... excavations.
According to this police officer, he did not see any barricades at the scene when he
arrived less than an hour later.
Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila a
complaint for damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan and a number
of San Juan municipal officials.
Later, Biglang-awa amended her complaint twice. In her second amended complaint,
she included KC as one of the defendants.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa
adjudging MWSS and the Municipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to
her.
Unable to accept the judgment, both Biglang-awa and the Municipality of San Juan
went to the Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court... the appellate court, in a decision dated 08 September 1995, affirmed with
modification that of the trial court
Therefrom, petitioner Municipality of San Juan came to this Court thru the present
recourse
Issues:
the Court shall limit itself to the liability or non-liability of petitioner municipality
for the injury sustained by Biglang-awa.
Ruling:
In denying liability for the subject accident, petitioner essentially anchored its
defense on two provisions of laws, namely: (1) Section 149, [1][z] of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1983; and
(2) Section 8, Ordinance
82-01, of the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
Petitioner maintains that under Section 149, [1][z] of the Local Government
Code,[6] it is obliged to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and
maintenance of only municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges,... parks
and other public places
Ergo, since Santolan Road is concededly a national and not a municipal road, it
cannot be held liable for the injuries suffered by Biglang-awa on account of the
accident that occurred on said road.
Additionally, petitioner contends that under Section 8, Ordinance No. 82-01, of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, which reads:... only the Project Engineer of KC
and MWSS can be held liable for the same accident.
It is argued, however, that under Section 149, [1][z] of the Local Government Code,
petitioner has control or supervision only over municipal and not national roads, like
Santolan Road.
Sadly, petitioner failed to take note of the other provisions of Section 149 of the
same Code, more particularly the following:
Clear it is from the above that the Municipality of San Juan can "regulate" the drilling
and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes
within its territorial jurisdiction.
Doubtless, the term "regulate" found in the aforequoted provision of Section 149 can
only mean that petitioner municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the very
least, supervision over all excavations for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other
pipes within its... territory.
While it may be true that the Department of Public Works and Highways may have
issued the requisite permit to the Appellee KC and/or concessionaires for the
excavation on said road, the Appellant San Juan is not thereby relieved of its liability
to [Biglang-awa] for... its own gross negligence. Indeed, Evangeline Alfonso, the
witness for the Appellant San Juan unabashedly [sic] admitted, when she testified in
the Court a quo, that even if the Department of Public Works and Highways failed
to effect the requisite refilling, the
Appellant San Juan was mandated to undertake the necessary precautionary
measures to avert accidents and insure the safety of pedestrians and commuters
It must be borne in mind that the obligation of the
[petitioner] to maintain the safe condition of the road within its territory is a
continuing one which is not suspended while a street is being repaired (... nowhere
can it be found in said Ordinance any provision exempting municipalities in Metro
Manila from liabilities caused by their own negligent acts
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the
appellate court AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
Jurisprudence[7] teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189[8] of the Civil
Code, ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public
works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that a... province, city or
municipality has control or supervision thereof.
CASE DIGEST: LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010. CONSOLIDATED WITH G.R. No.
193036

FACTS: For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of
which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No.
1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010."

In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of
the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as
it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office
and to appropriate funds therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon
A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.

The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the
Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and
thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial
body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and
subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body
is one.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body
under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not,
however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations.
It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal,
civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.

ISSUES: Is EO No. 1 unconstitutional?

HELD: The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of
the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their
petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to
which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the
cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the
usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the
Court.

As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a

derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to
the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their
mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall
within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as
limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the
Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa.

Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or

abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point
to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere
mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to
the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President
under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning
attributable to the term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure."
Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President
prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power
of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of
control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is
inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress,

empowering the President to create a public office? According to the OSG, the
power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds
statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the
President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and
inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government
including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one
of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will

necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency
during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus
oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section
6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily

investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate
action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said
body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it.

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman
or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of
the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the
overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual
prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the
charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the commission. The
phrase, "when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights
this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the
petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman.

At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. The
same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2),
Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means
exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
commission of crimes.

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative
power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of
the equal protection clause.

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of
the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever
guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons
or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test
of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class."Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck
down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order.

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just
a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review
which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the
constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These
provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme
Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other.
Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other
departments.

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own
will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of
government isdone in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it
by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions
under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as
void and unconstitutional. GRANTED.