MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF GLAN, ENRIQUE B. YAP, JR., VENANCIO S. WATA, JR., GILDO VILLORENTE, SR.

, JING MUSA, BENEDICTO L.

RUIZ, ANANIAS S. EMNACE, VANNEVAR B. ALEGADO, ALITO ARNOLD CARIO, SATURNINO BAG, JR., and FEDERICO J. TANGAN, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (En Banc) and FLORA L. BENZONAN, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

The present petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, originated from SPC No. 01-032, a pre-proclamation controversy instituted
by respondent Flora L. Benzonan with the Commission on Election (COMELEC) en banc. Benzonan, who was a mayoralty candidate in the
Municipality of Glan, Sarangani during the May 14, 2001 elections, sought to declare null and void the canvass conducted by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) of Glan, Sarangani and to recall the proclamation of petitioners Enrique B. Yap, Jr., Venancio S. Wata, Jr., Gildo Villorente, Sr.,
Ting Musa, Benedicto L. Ruiz, Ananias S. Emnace, Vannevar B. Alegado, Alito Arnold Carino, Saturnino Bag, Jr. and Federico J. Tangan, as duly
elected Mayor, Vice-Mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Glan, Sarangani, respectively.

Benzonan argued her pre-proclamation case on the grounds that: a) after the original and second MBC had resigned, the third MBC was illegally
constituted as its Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary are not qualified under the Omnibus Election Code;[1] b) the canvassing proceedings,
which were initially held in the Session Hall of the Sangguniang Bayan of Glan, were later transferred to the Provincial Capitol of Danao Province,
contrary to COMELEC Resolution No. 3848;[2] c) the Secretary of the MBC failed to record the minutes of the canvassing proceedings since the start
of the canvass; d) neither Benzonan nor her representatives were notified of the last three days of the canvassing proceedings and, consequently,
they were not able to participate therein; e) a substantial number of the election returns had been tampered with or falsified; and f) the MBC had
falsified the certificate of canvass votes.[3]

On December 4, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution[4] finding that, based on the evidence presented, the canvass of votes had been
conducted in a place other than the previous venue at the inception of the proceedings to which all were notified. Thus, the proclamations of the
winning candidates were declared null and void and a re-canvass of the election returns was ordered.

To reverse the COMELEC en bancs resolution, petitioners filed the present petition with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
prohibitory injunction.[5] On December 21, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from
implementing its December 4, 2001 resolution.

Although not raised as an issue, the Court is compelled to resolve whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over this case.

Section 3 (c) of Article IX-C of the Constitution reads:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

Beginning with Sarmiento v. COMELEC[6] and reiterated in subsequent cases,[7] the most recent being Balindong v. COMELEC,[8] the Court has
upheld this constitutional mandate and consistently ruled that the COMELEC sitting en banc does not have the requisite authority to hear and
decide election cases in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission and any decision by the Commission en banc as
regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

It is important to clarify, however, that not all cases relating to election laws filed before the COMELEC are required to be first heard by a division.
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters
falling within its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-judicial powers are involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide
cases first in division, and then, upon motion for reconsideration, en banc.[9]

It is clear that SPC No. 01-032 is one that involves a pre-proclamation controversy that requires the exercise of the COMELECs quasi-judicial
powers, as the illegality of the composition and proceedings of the MBC, including the falsification of election returns and certificate of canvass,
were alleged to be in issue.[10] Furthermore, in her comment to the petition dated January 9, 2000,[11] Benzonan categorically stated that it is not
disputed that what is involved here is a pre-proclamation controversy.

Also undisputed is the fact that Benzonan filed her pre-proclamation case directly with the COMELEC en banc and that the case was subsequently
decided by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. As aforestated, the COMELEC en banc is without jurisdiction to decide cases involving these types of
controversies in the first instance. Thus, the procedure taken by Benzonan resulted in a resolution in her favor that the Court must declare null and
void and set aside.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated December 4, 2001 in SPC No. 01-032
is hereby declared null and void and set aside, and the COMELEC is directed to assign SPC No. 01-032 to a division.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205136 December 2, 2014

OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For the consideration of the Court is the Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the ruling of
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) which cancelled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica (Kimberly) and
denied the substitution of Kimberly by petitioner Olivia Da Silva Cerafica (Olivia).

On 1 October 2012, Kimberly filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October
1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the elections,1 in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on the day of the elections as set out in Sec. 9 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8487 (Charter of the City of Taguig).2 As
such, Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification.

Instead of attending the hearing,Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC on 17 December 2012.3 Simultaneously, Olivia
filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly. Owing to these events, the clarificatory hearing no longer pushed through.

In a Memorandum dated 18 December 2012, Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra (Director Amora-Ladra) of the Comelec Law Department
recommended the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and consequently, the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. Relying on Comelec
Resolution No. 9551,4 Director Amora-Ladra opined that it is as if no COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be substituted.

In a Special En Banc Meeting of the Comelec on 3 January 2013,5 the Comelec adopted the recommendation of Director Amora-Ladra, cancelled
Kimberly’s COC, and denied the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an effect of the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, viz:6

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the foregoing recommendation of Director Esmeralda-AmoraLadra, Law
Department, as follows:

1. To cancelthe Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of aspirant Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica without prejudice to any civil, criminal or administrative
liability that she may have incurred pursuant to Section 14 of COMELEC Resolution 9518; and

2. To deny the substitution of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica by Olivia Da Silva Cerafica as an effect of the cancellation of the COC of Kimberly.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Olivia then filed the present petition for certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, Status Quo AnteOrder, and/or
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, raising the following issues:7

I.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED MINUTE RESOLUTION RESULTING IN THE CANCELLATION
OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC) OF ASPIRANT KIMBERLY DA SILVA CERAFICA AND THE DENIAL OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF KIMBERLY DA
SILVA CERAFICA BY OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA AS AN EFFECT OF THE CANCELLATION OF THE COC OF KIMBERLY.

II.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO VALID SUBSTITUTION BY PETITIONER FOR
KIMBERLY RESULTING IN THE MOTU PROPRIO DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.

III.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONER AN
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, THEREBY RESULTING IN THE MOTU PROPRIODENIAL OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF KIMBERLY DA SILVA CERAFICA BY
OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA.

In its Comment8 filed on 22 April 2013, respondent Comelec argued that Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly as the latter was never an official
candidate because she was not eligible for the post by reason of her age, and that, moreover, the COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it
contained a material misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the office she seeks to be elected to.9 The Comelec further averred that it can
cancel Kimberly’s COC motu proprioas it may look into patent defects in the COCs, such as Kimberly’s failure to comply with the age
requirement.10

In her Reply11 filed on 10 May 2013, Oliviacountered that although Kimberly may not be qualified to run for election because of her age, it cannot
be denied that she still filed a valid COC and was, thus, an official candidate who may be substituted.12 Olivia also claimed that there was no
ground to cancel or deny Kimberly’s COC on the ground of lack of qualification and material misrepresentation because she did not misrepresent
her birth dateto qualify for the position of councilor, and as there was no deliberate attempt to mislead the electorate, which is precisely why she
withdrew her COC upon learning that she was not qualified.13

At the outset, we note that a verification with the Comelec database yields the finding that Olivia was not among the official candidates14 for the
2013 Elections and, thus, was not voted for.15 As such, a ruling on the present petition would no longer be of practical use or value. Even if we
were to resolve the petition for the purpose of determining Olivia’s legal status as a legitimate and qualified candidate for public office, such
purpose has been rendered inconsequential as a result of the proclamation of the winning councilors for the 2013 elections.16

Be that as it may, the Court deems it opportune to address the merits of the case, if only to caution the Comelec against the precipitate
cancellation of COCs.

In Albaña v. Comelec,17 we held that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the
resolution of the same of no practical use or value. Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review. In this case, we find it necessary to resolve the issues raised in the petition in order to prevent a repetition thereof
and, thus, enhance free, orderly, and peaceful elections.

VALID SUBSTITUTION

In declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid COC and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia,
we find that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion.

Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates18 and its power to deny due course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 881, the Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs.19

In Cipriano v. Comelec,20 we ruled that the Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give due couse to COCs. We emphasized that the duty of
the Comelec to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that whilethe Comelec may look into patent defects in the
COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of the Comelec.

Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides for the procedure of substitution of candidates, to wit:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. – If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an
official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of the election.

If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be
filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is candidate or, in case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B. P. Blg. 881, not just any person, but only "an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party" may be substituted.21 In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party;22 thus, she can be validly substituted.

The next question then is whether Olivia complied with all of the requirements for a valid substitution; we answer in the affirmative. First, there
was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the last day for the filing of COCs; second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same political
party to which Kimberly belongs;23 and third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election day.24

In Luna v. Comelec,25 where the candidate, who was also under age, withdrew his COC before election day and was substituted by a qualified
candidate, we declared that suchsubstitution was valid. The Court eloquently explained:

Substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was Valid

Luna contends that Hans Roger filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, subsequently, upon Hans Roger’s withdrawal of his certificate of
candidacy, there was a valid substitution by Luna. On the other hand, the COMELEC ruled that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be
considered tohave filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, therefore, is not a valid candidate who could be substituted by Luna.

When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. Section 76 of the
Omnibus Election Code(Election Code) provides:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. – The Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer
designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.

In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to give due course to Hans Rogers
certificate of candidacy.

On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The Election Code allows a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy to
withdraw the same prior to the election by submitting a written declaration under oath. There is no provision of law which prevents a candidate
from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the election.

On the same date, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans Roger. Section 77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on
substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing
of certificate of candidacy. Section 77 of the Election Code provides:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. – If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an
official candidate of a registered or accredited politicalparty dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later thanmid-day of election day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and midday of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where
he is candidate or, in case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid
substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger.

The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could
not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself,
without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, the Court
ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.

Section 74 of the Election Code provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state, among others, the date of birth of the person filing the
certificate. Section 78 of the Election Code provides that in case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false material
representation, a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of said person may be filed at any time not later than
25 days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy.

If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned
through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code.

In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacyof Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans
Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna’s
certificate of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy and declared the
substitution by Luna invalid.

It would have been different if there was a petition to deny due course to or cancel Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy.1âwphi1 For if the
COMELEC cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy after the proper proceedings, then he is no candidate at all and there can be no
substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course. However, Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy
was never cancelled or denied due course by the COMELEC.

Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC declared that he was not a valid candidate. Therefore,
unless Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance with Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Roger’s
certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.26 (Emphases supplied.)

LACK OF DUE PROCESS

Moreover, in simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora Ladra in cancelling Kimberly’s COC and denying the latter’s substitution by
Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Court finds that the Comelec once more gravely abused its discretion.
The Court reminds the Comelec that, inthe exercise of it adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution27 mandates it to hear and decide
cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc.

Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge,
or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.28 As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi
judicial functions of the Comelec, the Comelec in Division should have first decided this case.
In Bautista v. Comelec, et al.,29 where the Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of a candidate’s COC for lack of qualification,
and which recommendation was affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, the Court held that the Comelec En Banc cannot short cut the proceedings by
acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate. The Court held:

A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en banc can only act on the case if there is a motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of Bautista’s
certificate of candidacy without first referring the case to a division for summary hearing.

xxxx

Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be
heard summarily after due notice. It isthus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC
which the COMELEC in divisionshould first decide. More so in this case where the cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from
a report of the election officer regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en bane cannot short cut
the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate.30 (Emphasis supplied.)

The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where parties must be allowed
to adduce evidence in support of their contentions.31 We thus caution the Comelec against its practice of impetuous cancellation of COCs via
minute resolutions adopting the recommendations of its Law Department when the situation properly calls for the case's referral to a Division for
summary hearing.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, with the cautionary counsel that cancellation of certificate of candidacy is a quasi-judicial process, and
accordingly is heard by the Commission on Elections in Division and En Banc on appeal, we DISMISS the present petition for being moot and
academic.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127624. November 18, 2003]

BPI LEASING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEAL AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

The present petition for review on certiorari assails the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38223 and its subsequent resolution[2]
denying the motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision and resolution affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which denied
petitioner BPI Leasing Corporations (BLC) claim for tax refund in CTA Case No. 4252.

The facts are not disputed.

BLC is a corporation engaged in the business of leasing properties.[3] For the calendar year 1986, BLC paid the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(CIR) a total of P1,139,041.49 representing 4% contractors percentage tax then imposed by Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC), based on its gross rentals from equipment leasing for the said year amounting to P27,783,725.42.[4]

On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued Revenue Regulation 19-86. Section 6.2 thereof provided that finance and leasing companies registered
under Republic Act 5980 shall be subject to gross receipt tax of 5%-3%-1% on actual income earned. This means that companies registered under
Republic Act 5980, such as BLC, are not liable for contractors percentage tax under Section 205 but are, instead, subject to gross receipts tax under
Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC. Since BLC had earlier paid the aforementioned contractors percentage tax, it re-computed its tax
liabilities under the gross receipts tax and arrived at the amount of P361,924.44.

On April 11, 1988, BLC filed a claim for a refund with the CIR for the amount of P777,117.05, representing the difference between the
P1,139,041.49 it had paid as contractors percentage tax and P361,924.44 it should have paid for gross receipts tax.[5] Four days later, to stop the
running of the prescriptive period for refunds, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA.[6]

In a decision dated May 13, 1994,[7] the CTA dismissed the petition and denied BLCs claim of refund. The CTA held that Revenue Regulation 19-86,
as amended, may only be applied prospectively such that it only covers all leases written on or after January 1, 1987, as stated under Section 7 of
said revenue regulation:

Section 7. Effectivity These regulations shall take effect on January 1, 1987 and shall be applicable to all leases written on or after the said date.

The CTA ruled that, since BLCs rental income was all received prior to 1986, it follows that this was derived from lease transactions prior to January
1, 1987, and hence, not covered by the revenue regulation.

A motion for reconsideration of the CTAs decision was filed, but was denied in a resolution dated July 26, 1995.[8] BLC then appealed the case to
the Court of Appeals, which issued the aforementioned assailed decision and resolution.[9] Hence, the present petition.

In seeking to reverse the denial of its claim for tax refund, BLC submits that the Court of Appeals and the CTA erred in not ruling that Revenue
Regulation 19-86 may be applied retroactively so as to allow BLCs claim for a refund of P777,117.05.

Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the provision on the date of effectivity of Revenue Regulation 19-86 is clear and unequivocal,
leaving no room for interpretation on its prospective application. In addition, respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed on the
ground that the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by the counsel of record and not by BLC, through a duly authorized
representative, in violation of Supreme Court Circular 28-91.

In a resolution dated March 29, 2000,[10] the petition was given due course and the Court required the parties to file their respective Memoranda.
Upon submission of the Memoranda, the issues in this case were delineated, as follows:[11]

WHETHER THE INSTANT PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIES WITH SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR 28-91.

WHETHER REVENUE REGULATION 19-86, AS AMENDED, IS LEGISLATIVE OR INTERPRETATIVE IN NATURE.

WHETHER REVENUE REGULATION 19-86, AS AMENDED, IS PROSPECTIVE OR RETROACTIVE IN ITS APPLICATION.

WHETHER PETITIONER, AS FOUND BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, FAILED TO MEET THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN REFUND CASES.

WHETHER PETITIONER, AS FOUND BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING ITS PRESENT REFUND.

As to the first issue, the Court agrees with respondents contention that the petition should be dismissed outright for failure to comply with
Supreme Court Circular 28-91, now incorporated as Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The records plainly show, and this has not been
denied by BLC, that the certification was executed by counsel who has not been shown to have specific authority to sign the same for BLC.
In BA Savings Bank v. Sia,[12] it was held that the certificate of non-forum shopping may be signed, for and on behalf of a corporation, by a
specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. This ruling, however, does not
mean that any lawyer, acting on behalf of the corporation he is representing, may routinely sign a certification of non-forum shopping. The Court
emphasizes that the lawyer must be specifically authorized in order validly to sign the certification.

Corporations have no powers except those expressly conferred upon them by the Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are incidental
to its existence. These powers are exercised through their board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. Hence, physical acts, like
the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate bylaws or by specific act of the
board of directors.[13]

The records are bereft of the authority of BLCs counsel to institute the present petition and to sign the certification of non-forum shopping. While
said counsel may be the counsel of record for BLC, the representation does not vest upon him the authority to execute the certification on behalf
of his client. There must be a resolution issued by the board of directors that specifically authorizes him to institute the petition and execute the
certification, for it is only then that his actions can be legally binding upon BLC.

BLC however insists that there was substantial compliance with SC Circular No. 28-91 because the verification/certification was issued by a counsel
who had full personal knowledge that no other petition or action has been filed or is pending before any other tribunal. According to BLC, said
counsels law firm has handled this case from the very beginning and could very well attest and/or certify to the absence of an instituted or pending
case involving the same or similar issues.

The argument of substantial compliance deserves no merit, given the Courts ruling in Mendigorin v. Cabantog:[14]

The CA held that there was substantial compliance with the Rules of Court, citing Dimagiba vs. Montalvo, Jr. [202 SCRA 641] to the effect that a
lawyer who assumes responsibility for a client's cause has the duty to know the entire history of the case, especially if any litigation is commenced.
This view, however, no longer holds authoritative value in the light of Digital Microwave Corporation vs. CA [328 SCRA 286], where it was held that
the reason the certification against forum shopping is required to be accomplished by petitioner himself is that only the petitioner himself has
actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals. Even counsel of record may be
unaware of such fact. To our mind, this view is more in accord with the intent and purpose of Revised Circular No. 28-91.

Clearly, therefore, the present petition lacks the proper certification as strictly required by jurisprudence and the Rules of Court.

Even if the Court were to ignore the aforesaid procedural infirmity, a perusal of the arguments raised in the petition indicates that a resolution on
the merits would nevertheless yield the same outcome.

BLC attempts to convince the Court that Revenue Regulation 19-86 is legislative rather than interpretative in character and hence, should retroact
to the date of effectivity of the law it seeks to interpret.

Administrative issuances may be distinguished according to their nature and substance: legislative and interpretative. A legislative rule is in the
matter of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the other
hand, is designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.[15]

The Court finds the questioned revenue regulation to be legislative in nature. Section 1 of Revenue Regulation 19-86 plainly states that it was
promulgated pursuant to Section 277 of the NIRC. Section 277 (now Section 244) is an express grant of authority to the Secretary of Finance to
promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. In Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[16] the Court recognized that the application of Section 277 calls for none other than the exercise of quasi-
legislative or rule-making authority. Verily, it cannot be disputed that Revenue Regulation 19-86 was issued pursuant to the rule-making power of
the Secretary of Finance, thus making it legislative, and not interpretative as alleged by BLC.

BLC further posits that, assuming the revenue regulation is legislative in nature, it is invalid for want of due process as no prior notice, publication
and public hearing attended the issuance thereof. To support its view, BLC cited CIR v. Fortune Tobacco, et al.,[17] wherein the Court nullified a
revenue memorandum circular which reclassified certain cigarettes and subjected them to a higher tax rate, holding it invalid for lack of notice,
publication and public hearing.

The doctrine enunciated in Fortune Tobacco, and reiterated in CIR v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc.,[18] is that when an administrative rule goes
beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the law and substantially increases
the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard and, thereafter, to be duly
informed, before the issuance is given the force and effect of law. In Lhuillier and Fortune Tobacco, the Court invalidated the revenue memoranda
concerned because the same increased the tax liabilities of the affected taxpayers without affording them due process. In this case, Revenue
Regulation 19-86 would be beneficial to the taxpayers as they are subjected to lesser taxes. Petitioner, in fact, is invoking Revenue Regulation 19-86
as the very basis of its claim for refund. If it were invalid, then petitioner all the more has no right to a refund.

After upholding the validity of Revenue Regulation 19-86, the Court now resolves whether its application should be prospective or retroactive.

The principle is well entrenched that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative
intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication.[19] In the present case, there is no indication that the revenue
regulation may operate retroactively. Furthermore, there is an express provision stating that it shall take effect on January 1, 1987, and that it shall
be applicable to all leases written on or after the said date. Being clear on its prospective application, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without further interpretation.[20] Thus, BLC is not in a position to invoke the provisions of Revenue Regulation 19-86 for lease rentals it
received prior to January 1, 1987.

It is also apt to add that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, these are regarded as in derogation of sovereign authority and
are to be strictly construed against the person or entity claiming the exemption. The burden of proof is upon him who claims the exemption and he
must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant under Constitutional or statutory law, and he cannot be permitted to rely upon vague
implications.[21] Nothing that BLC has raised justifies a tax refund.

It is not necessary to rule on the remaining issues.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) and JUAN A. ALEGRE, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at
9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, with the
following identical texts:

MANONG POLING DIED INTERMENT TUESDAY 1

Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. Private respondent filed a letter-complaint against the RCPI with the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a request for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the
company.

Taking cognizance of the complaint, NTC directed RCPI to answer the complaint and set the initial hearing of the case to 2 May 1989. After two (2)
resettings, RCPI moved to dismiss the case on the following grounds:

1. Juan Alegre is not the real party in interest;

2. NTC has no jurisdiction over the case;

3. the continued hearing of the case violates its constitutional right to due process of law. 2

RCPI likewise moved for deferment of scheduled hearings until final determination of its motion to dismiss.

On 15 June 1989, NTC proceeded with the hearing and received evidence for private respondent Juan Alegre. On 3 October 1989, RCPI's motion to
dismiss was denied, thus:

The herein complainant is the husband of the sender of the "rush" telegram that respondent allegedly failed to deliver in a manner respondent
bound itself to undertake, so his legal interest in this administrative case cannot be seriously called in question. As regards the issue of jurisdiction,
the authority of the Commission to hear and decide this case stems from its power of control and supervision over the operation of public
communication utilities as conferred upon it by law.

Besides, the filing of a motion to dismiss is not allowed by the rules (Section 1, Rule 12, Rules of Practice and Procedures). Following, however, the
liberal construction of the rules, respondent (sic) motion shall be treated as its answer or be passed upon after the conclusion of the hearing on the
merits. . . . 3

Hearings resumed in the absence of petitioner RCPI which was, however, duly notified thereof. On 27 November 1989, NTC disposed of the
controversy in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Commission finds respondent administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service defined
under Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and hereby imposes the penalty of FINE payable within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof in the aggregate
amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) for:

1. Rush Telegram sent to Valencia, Bohol on March 17, 1989 and received on March 21, 1989

3 days x P200.00 per day = P600.00

2. Rush Telegram sent to Espiritu, Ilocos Norte on March 17, 1989 and received on March 20, 1989

2 days x P200.00 per day = P400.00

Total = P1,000.00

ENTERED. November 27, 1989. 4

A motion for reconsideration by RCPI reiterating averments in its earlier motion to dismiss was denied for lack of merit; 5 hence, this petition for
review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates. RCPI
submits that its position finds support in two (2) decided cases 6 identical with the present one. Then Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando writing
for the Court stated:
. . . There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission imposing the fines for these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer.
The only power it possessed over radio companies, as noted was the (sic ) fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for negligence or
misfeasance. It was bereft of such competence. It was not vested within such authority. . . .

The Public Service Commission having been abolished by virtue of a Presidential Decree, as set forth at the outset, and a new Board of
Communications having been created to take its place, nothing said in its decision has reference to whatever powers are now lodged in the latter
body. . . . . . . (Footnotes omitted)

Two (2) later cases, 7 adhering to the above tenet ruled:

Even assuming that the respondent Board of Communications has the power of jurisdiction over petitioner in the exercise of its supervision to
insure adequate public service, petitioner cannot be subjected to payment of fine under sec. 21 of the Public Service Act, because this provision of
the law subjects to a fine every public service that violates or falls (sic) to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders,
decisions and regulations of the Commission. . . . .

The Office of the Solicitor General now claims that the cited cases are no longer applicable, that the power and authority of the NTC to impose
fines is incidental to its power to regulate public service utilities and to supervise telecommunications facilities, which are now clearly defined in
Section 15, Executive Order No. 546 dated 23 July 1979: thus:

Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall exercise the following functions:

xxx xxx xxx

b. Establish, prescribe and regulate the areas of operation of particular operators of the public service communications;

xxx xxx xxx

h. Supervise and inspect the operation of radio stations and telecommunications facilities.

Regulatory administrative agencies necessarily impose sanctions, adds the Office of the Solicitor General. RCPI was fined based on the finding of
the NTC that it failed to undertake adequate service in delivering two (2) rush telegrams. NTC takes the view that its power of supervision was
broadened by E. O. No. 546, and that this development superseded the ruling in RCPI vs. Francisco Santiago and companion cases.

The issues of due process and real parties in interest do not have to be discussed in this case. This decision will dwell on the primary question of
jurisdiction of the NTC to administratively impose fines on a telegraph company which fails to render adequate service to a consumer.

E. O. 546, it will be observed, is couched in general terms. The NTC stepped "into the shoes" of the Board of Communications which exercised
powers pursuant to the Public Service Act. The power to impose fines should therefore be read in the light of the Francisco Santiago case because
subsequent legislation did not grant additional powers to the Board of Communications. The Board in other words, did not possess the power to
impose administrative fines on public services rendering deficient service to customers, ergo its successor cannot arrogate unto itself such power,
in the absence of legislation. It is true that the decision in RCPI vs. Board of Communications seems to have modified the Santiago ruling in that the
later case held that the Board of Communications can impose fines if the public service entity violates or fails to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any order, decision or regulation of the Commission. But can private respondent's complaint be similarly treated
when the complaint seeks redress of a grievance against the company? 8 NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public
Service Commission (G. R. No. L-27250, 21 January 1987, 147 SCRA 269) says so categorically.

Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties.

xxx xxx xxx

The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in
Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed negligence has nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the
Commission over petitioner.

Moreover, under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or
failure by a public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission.
Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate.
Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed,
defied or disregarded.

No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction.
The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which
have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency.
There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that:
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent
Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order
without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective . . . (Globe Wireless case, supra).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC to render it. The temporary restraining
order issued on 18 June 1990 is made PERMANENT without prejudice, however, to the filing by the party aggrieved by the conduct of RCPI, of the
proper action in the proper forum. No costs.

SO ORDERED.