Transient Stability Enhancement of Power Grid
by Neural Network Controlled BFCL
Considering Cyber-Attacks
Mohammad Ashraf Hossain Sadi1
Huaxi Zheng2
School of Technology1
University of Central Missouri1
Warrensburg, Missouri, USA1
Power Systems Consulting 2
ABB Inc.2
Raleigh, North Carolina, USA 2
sadi@ucmo.edu1
huaxi.zheng@us.abb.com2
Abstract—In this paper, a neural network predictive controlled
bridge type fault current limiter (FCL) is proposed to enhance the
transient stability of power systems. Cyber security issues on the
performance of neural network controller is also investigated. It is
noteworthy that simulations have been conducted by the
Matlab/Simulink software. Both symmetrical and unsymmetrical
types of permanent and temporary faults have been considered at
different locations of a multi-machine power system. Based on the
simulation results, it can be concluded that the bridge type FCL
based on neural network predictive controller can enhance the
transient stability of the system well. Moreover, the cyber-attack has
profound effect on the controller performance and the system
becomes fully unstable even with the presence of the neural network
predictive controlled bridge type FCL.
Index Terms— Bridge type FCL, cyber-attack, neural network,
power system stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability of a power system to regain its stability following
unexpected and severe faults in the network is defined as the
transient stability [1]. Several methods have been proposed by
the power engineers to augment the transient stability of power
systems. The dynamic braking resistor (BR) [2], Flexible AC
Transmission Systems (FACTS) devices [3], Superconducting
Fault Current Limiter (SFCL) [4], Static VAR Compensator
(SVC) [5], Superconducting Magnetic Energy Storage (SMES)
[6], etc., are the most popular transient stability enhancing
methods and they are getting more applications day by day.
Fault current limiters decrease the magnitude of fault current
by introducing fixed impedances during fault [7, 8], and thus
enhance the transient stability of the power system. Due to its
ability to effectively control high fault current, the bridge type
fault current limiter (BFCL) has recently been known as a very
popular and effective means to augment the transient stability [7].
Moreover, due to its simple construction, lower price value and
978-1-5386-1539-3/17/$31.00 ©2017 IEEE
Mohd. Hasan Ali3
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering3
University of Memphis3
Memphis, Tennessee, USA3
mhali@memphis.edu3
reasonable installation characteristics, it is gaining increasing
acceptance to the power engineers.
Neural networks have extensive applications and have been
implemented in various scientific fields for proper modeling and
controlling purpose [9]. Neural networks can be easily
implemented for transient stability enhancement of power
systems, as it offers the inherent quality of storing and learning
information about the nonlinearities of the system [9]. Moreover,
neural network can provide the stored information whenever
required. It can optimize the systems performance based on few
layers. Further, neural networks are non-parametric models that
represent similar characteristics to human decision making based
on its ability to function from vast data and explore exact
solutions [10].
A neural network predictive controlled BFCL has been
proposed in this work to enhance the transient stability of multi-
machine power system. As per the literature, no application of
neural network predictive controlled BFCL has ever been
reported to augment the stability of multi-machine power system.
And here lies the originality of this work.
Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) represents the
real-time measurements that could be used to improve and
maintain the stability of the power systems. Traditional point to
point communications are unable to meet the communication
requirements, as the power grid is becoming more complex,
increased, and interconnected [11]. The WAMS overcomes the
traditional measurement systems drawbacks by using modern
Wide Area Network (WAN) or Local Area Network (LAN)
technology [11]. Communication/Information infrastructure as
well as WAMS are the backbone of the power grid where
different grid components are connected with each other through
these structures and managed by the Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) system for supervisory control [12].
The vulnerabilities of the communication architecture are high
and thus the communication network in the smart grid can be
exploited by the cyber intruders to damage different layers
because of poor and insufficient network security. As power grid
is a complex cyber physical interconnected network, cyber
intrusion in the cyber network consequently will have devastating
impact on the physical network too.
The proposed neural network predictive controlled BFCL will
use the Total Kinetic Energy (TKE) of the generators as the
control input. The calculation of TKE depends on the generators
speed responses and they are collected from field devices like
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) or Remote Terminal Units
(RTUs). But in the process of collection and processing, the
TKE/Total Kinetic Energy Deviation (TKED) signal can be
hacked or lost by cyber-attacks
Fig. 1. IEEE 39 bus system with BFCL and connected to SCADA
In this paper, the cyber security issues have been explored on
the performance of the BFCL against transient stability of power
grid. Moreover, for cyber security testing purpose, the Denial of
Service (DoS) and tampering the communication signal cyber-
attacks have been considered in the event of TKE/TKED data
transfer from the SCADA to the neural network controller of the
BFCL. So far, based on the literature review carried out by the
authors, no work is available on the effect of cyber-attacks on the
controller signal accumulation process for fault current limiters,
which is another novelty of this work.
The IEEE 39 bus large power system model [13] has been
used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the neural network
predictive controlled BFCL. Both permanent and temporary
types of balanced and unbalanced faults are considered in the
system. All simulations have been conducted in the
Matlab/Simulink software platform.
II. MODEL SYSTEM DESIGN
To analyze the transient stability, the IEEE 39 bus power
system consisting of ten generating units as shown in Fig. 1 is
used. The generators are interconnected with 19 loads, 36
transmission lines and 12 transformers. The system base is 100
MVA and 60 Hz. Three buses are rated as 135 KV, whereas the
other buses as 33 KV. As shown in Fig. 1, the BFCL is placed at
the Point of Common Coupling (PCC) points of generator 1,
generator 2, generator 4 and generator 6 based on the coherency
analysis [14, 15]. Details about the positioning of BFCL are
described in [13].
Fig. 1 also represents a SCADA system based on the
NASPInet architecture [16, 17]. The field devices like IEDs or
RTUs are used to collect state responses from the generators
situated in diverse locations of the IEEE 39 bus power system.
Then the state responses from the generators are transferred to
the SCADA system through IP based communication networks
for further processing. Real time synchronization for the
collected data is achieved by timing signals from the Global
Positioning System (GPS).
III. BRIDGE TYPE FAULT CURRENT LIMITER (BFCL)
The BFCL is an auxiliary device and it introduces resistance
and inductance in the event of fault. Moreover, for its proper
operation, no superconductivity is needed [7, 18, 19]. Thus, its
installation cost is much lower than that of other FCLs [7, 18,
19]. There are two main parts of BFCL as shown in Fig. 2. The
diode rectifier bridge, a small dc limiting reactor (Ldc) along with
a very small resistor (Rdc), a IGBT/GTO based semiconductor
switch and a freewheeling diode (Df) combinedly create the
bridge part. Additionally, the shunt path consists of a variable
resistor and an inductor (Rsh+ jωLsh), which is considered as the
main part [7, 18, 19]. When the IGBT switch remains turned on,
the line current passes through D1, Ldc, semiconductor switch and
D4 during positive half cycle of the normal operating conditions.
Also, the line current passes through D3, Ldc, semiconductor
switch and D2 during negative cycle of the normal operating
conditions. During normal operating condition, the Ldc is charged
to the peak of the line current, and behaves like a short circuit,
and consequently almost negligible voltage drop appears.
 The performance of the BFCL switch is controlled by the less significant disturbance at fault, the BFCL is expected to
TKE variation of all the generators in the system. During initial dissipate most of the power. The currents passes through the
stage of the fault, the TKE of the generators varies abruptly and shunt impedance during fault current limiting mode. Therefore,
the line current increases excessively, but the dc reactor Ldc the improved active power given in (3) was calculated to
reduces its swelling rate and protects the IGBT/GTO switch from approximate the value of ZBFCL= Rsh + jωLsh for each BFCL in
severe di/dt change. As soon as the TKE change becomes very the system.
acute, the IGBT switch turns off and the shunt impedance
appears in series with the disturbed line. Thus the series From the parametric equations, the optimal values of each
impedance reduces the fault current to an acceptable limit. The shunt path are approximated to be within 1 pu. The shunt
free path of dc reactor current as soon as the IGBT switch turns resistance values of the BFCL are varied within 1 pu for different
off is provided by the freewheeling diode Df [7, 18, 19]. The fault conditions depending on the systems operation. The
IGBT switch turns on again after the removal of fault and the calculated parameters of BFCL are given in Table I.
BFCL resumes its usual operation. The BFCL control scheme is
described in detail below.
A. Design of the Bridge Type Fault Current Limiter
Since power system is inherently nonlinear and always there
are load changes, determination of the suitable values of the
current reducing impedance is needed. As mentioned in section
II, four BFCLs are connected in four coherent groups having two
generators in the group. Therefore, for determining the proper
impedance value of the BFCLs, the equivalent network for each
coherent group having two areas as represented in Fig. 2 are
considered.
Fig.2. Equivalent two area network of the coherent group with the BFCL.
The power transmitted in the coherent network without BFCL
TABLE I
can be expressed as: BFCL PARAMETERS
Parameters Values
∗ Bridge Type Fault Ldc=0.01H, Rdc= 0.05Ω,
( ) = sin (1) Current Limiter Lsh= 0.012H, Rsh ≤4.8Ω.

IV. NEURAL NETWORK PREDICTIVE CONTROL

Where ZL = ZL1+ZL2 and = − .
Artificial neural networks have been widely used in different
research fields because of their ability to represent the
mathematical modeling through human neural networks. A
Similarly, power transmitted with the presence of BFCL can
neural network consists of single or multiple layers of neurons
be expressed as:
connected through weights which are adjusted to achieve the
desired control [9, 10, 20, 21]. Fig. 3 represents a neural network
( ) =
∗
sin (2) predictive control system.

Where ZBFCL= Rsh + jωLsh is the BFCL shunt path impedance.

The BFCL is active power compensating auxiliary device and
the active power improved by it can be expressed as:

∗ ( ∗ )
PBFCL = P(t) – P(e) = sin (3)
( )

Fig.3. Neural network predictive controller.

Equal amount of current is carried by each line during normal
operations. For resuming the normal operation and to ensure the
A. BFCL Closed Loop Control Scheme
The closed loop control scheme of the proposed neural
network predictive controlled BFCL is given in Fig. 4. The TKE
of the generators in the system is used as the input signal for the
controller switching signal. The neural network predictive
controller is designed to produce varied limiting resistance Rsh as
its output. Because of the variation in the TKE, the output Rsh
from the controller is varying in nature. To keep the shunt
resistance value Rsh within the limit as shown in Table I, it is
passed through a limiter. Then it’s passed through a logic circuit
to generate the actual variable shunt resistance of the BFCL.
Fig.4. Neural network predictive controller connection scheme with BFCL.
The IGBT switch is controlled by the TKED variation
through a logic circuit. The logic is set in such a way that the
IGBT switch remains turned on if TKED becomes less than
0.0002 pu, otherwise the switch is turned off.
B. Neural Network Predictive Controller Algorithm
The purpose of the Neural Network Predictive Control
(NNPC) is to generate a signal u(t) so that the output of plant y(t)
is made as close to the reference signal r(t). The input signal r(t)
is converted into yr(t) and then fed into the Cost Function
Minimization (CFM) block as represented in Fig. 3. For each
sampling time instances, the control input is calculated in such a
way to minimize the cost function [10, 20]. Here, N1 is the
prediction horizon. The predicted control inputs for future
horizons are fed to the neural plant identifier to enable the cost
function minimization. Then the best optimized control input
signal calculated by CFM is fed to plant. The neural identifier is
used to predict the performance of the plant based on previous
control input [10, 20]. The control input is calculated until the
cost function is minimized.
The Neural Network Predictive Control algorithm is
described below.
i) Generate a reference signal.
ii) Predict the performance of the system depending on
the previously calculated control input vector and neural
identifier.
iii) Calculate the new control input which will optimize the
CFM.
iv) Repeat the first two steps until optimization of CFM is
achieved.
v) Provide the control input vector to the plant.
Repeat the previous three steps for each time step.
C. Neural Network Predictive Control Design
A neural network with an input layer, output layer and two
hidden layer neurons are used in this work. Sigmoidal hidden
layers are used to ensure the nonlinear and linear relation
between the input and outputs of the neural network [9, 10]. The
hidden layers consist ten neurons each and the output layer
consists of one neurons. The neural plant identifier uses the value
of total kinetic energy at two previous instances to predict the
value of total kinetic energy. Therefore, two-layer feedforward
network with 2 inputs, 2 hidden layers with 10 sigmoidal neurons
each and a linear output neuron as an output layer is used. The
hidden layers enable the learning of linear as well as nonlinear
relationships between inputs and outputs of the plant. The neural
network identifier used in this work is presented in Fig. 5.
Fig.5. Neural network identifier structure.
The output of each input neurons are given as
a02*1 = [TKE (t-1) TKE (t-2)] T (4)
Therefore, the net input to the neuron i in the first hidden
layer is
2
n 1 (i ) =  w (i , j ) a 0
( j ) + b 1 (i ) (5)
j =1
Here, b(i) is the bias and w(i, j) is the weight matrix between
the neurons.
The output of the first hidden layer is given in the following
matrix form.
a110*1 = tansig([W] 110*2 a02*1 + b110*1) (6)
Similarly, the net input of the second hidden layer neuron is
10 (7)
n 2
(i) = 
j =1
w (i, j )a 1 ( j) + b 2
(i)
Similarly, the output from the second hidden layer is
 a210*1 = tansig([W] 210*10 a010*1 + b210*1)
The net output from the hidden layers to output layer will be
10
n 3 (i ) =  w (i , j ) a
j =1
2
( j ) + b 2 (i )
Finally the output from output layer will be
TKE= purelin(W31*10 a210*1 + b3)
To train the neural network, the Backpropagation algorithm
utilizing the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm is used [10, 20].
In backpropagation algorithm, the gradient of the error
function is determined to demonstrate the convergence of the
neural network under consideration. The error function of the
considered network is
N 2
E ( x) = e
j =1 j
( x)
Here, x is the weight of the neurons.
The weights of the network are modified during the training
process until a desired performance is achieved. Therefore, the
update in x can be expressed as
Δ x = −[Δ
2
E ( x )] − 1
Δ E (x)
The update in the x is further modified using the Levenberg-
Marquardt algorithm. Thus, the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm
is used for convergence of the backpropagation algorithm [10,
20].
The cost function minimization (CMF) block works on the
receding horizon technique. The CMF block minimizes the
difference between the instantaneous value of the total kinetic
energy and its steady state values over some operating time
horizon.
V. CYBER-ATTACKS IN POWER GRID
In power systems, numerous critical equipment and field
devices are used at the remote locations to effectively and
efficiently collect the customer operating conditions and thus
represents the wide area measurement and control technique. The
field devices like PLCs, IEDs, RTUs, PMUs, and smart meters
have algorithms which can be manipulated by either customers or
cyber intruders [12]. By hampering and tampering the data
collection process, the utilities can get misleading feedbacks and
thus can cause interruptions which may ultimately result in a
blackout.
The communication network in the power systems can be
exploited by the intruders to damage different layers present in
the grid. The RTUs forward the state estimation data to the
SCADA center [22, 23]. The false data injection either in the
(8) SCADA system state estimation scheme or data sent from the
RTUs to the SCADA system can provoke negative
consequences. There are possibilities of the false data not
detectable by the state estimation scheme or even the false data
(9) attack can be detectable without remedy.
There are mainly three types of attack that can happen in the
smart grid system. Packet drop attacks can be caused at choke
points in the communication path, Distributed Denial of Service
(10) (DDoS) type attacks are mainly caused by disrupting, blocking or
jamming the flow of information through control and
communication networks, tampering communication data/signal
type attacks not only delays communication but also
contaminates the data in the communication. In the literature,
several other cyber-attack scenarios are considered, for example,
intentionally data injection into the power system through
telemetered data [24], malicious modification of network stored
data [25], coordinated data attack staged without being exposed
by the state estimation algorithm [26], and undetected
manipulation and the incorrect database parameters by cyber-
(11)
attacks [27].
The National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization
Resource (NESCOR) recently defined many cybersecurity
realistic events that create negative impact on the power systems
operation [28]. In this work, two NESCOR recommended
realistic events have been considered to see the effectiveness of
cyber-attack on the performance of neural network controlled
bridge type FCL. Fig. 6 represents the cyber-attack scenarios
(12) considered in this work. Firstly, false data injection in the TKE
calculation scheme of the SCADA system has been used as input
for the neural network predictive controller. This is considered as
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) type cyber-attack.
Secondly, tampering the signal or data attack can happen either
in the RTU level or even in the communication channel between
the RTUs and SCADA system. In this work, a cyber-attack has
been considered, where data to be sent from the RTUs to the
SCADA are altered to values specified by the attacker.
Fig.6. Cyber-attack scenarios.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
All simulations have been conducted in the Matlab/Simulink
software platform. Both temporary and permanent balanced
(3LG: three-phase-to-ground) and unbalanced (1LG: single-
phase-to-ground) faults are considered in the simulations. Also,
twenty-two fault points (A to V) as shown in the model system of
Fig. 1 have been considered. For the simulation, 20s and 50µs are ( )
Wc (sec) = / (13)
considered as simulation time and time step, respectively. The
temporary fault is considered to persist for 0.5 sec, while the
permanent fault persists for a substantial time.
Where, T is the simulation time and Wtotal is the total kinetic
A. Transient Stability Analysis for Permanent and Temporary energy of the system which can be evaluated from the rotor speed
Fault Without Considering Cyber-Attacks of each generator. Lower value of Wc, indicates better system’s
It is considered that for permanent fault, the circuit breakers performance. Table II and Table III represent the stability index
open at 0.0833 sec after the fault occurrence, reclose according to values for 3LG permanent and temporary faults, respectively, at
the optimal reclosing time (ORCT) [4, 5],[13] and reopen at three different fault positions in the IEEE 39 bus power system.
0.0833 sec after the reclosing. On the other hand, for temporary The values of the stability indexes prove the efficacy of the
fault, the circuit breakers open at 0.0833 sec after the fault neural network predictive controlled BFCL for improving the
occurrence and recloses according to the ORCT time [4, 5],[13]. transient stability.
The generators TKE responses for 3LG permanent fault at TABLE II
position B in the IEEE 39 bus power system is presented in Fig. VALUES OF WC WITH NEURAL NETWORK PREDICTIVE CONTROLLED BFCL FOR
7. Similarly, the generators total kinetic energy responses for PERMANENT FAULT
1LG temporary fault at position B in the IEEE 39 bus power Fault Wc values (with Wc values
system is represented in Fig. 8. It is explicit from the TKE Fault point neural network (without
responses that the neural network predictive controller based Type predictive controlled controller)
BFCL makes the system stable. BFCL) (sec) (sec)
A 0.501 1.521
3LG B 0.505 1.735
C 0.524 1.441

TABLE III
VALUES OF WC WITH NEURAL NETWORK PREDICTIVE CONTROLLED BFCL FOR
TEMPORARY FAULT
Fault Wc values (with Wc values
Fault Point neural network (without
Type predictive controlled controller)
BFCL) (sec) (sec)
A 0.503 1.462
3LG B 0.498 1.688
C 0.508 1.379

Fig.7. Total kinetic energy of the generators for 3LG permanent fault at position
B and without any cyber-attack.
Fig.8. Total kinetic energy of the generators for 1LG temporary fault at position B
and without any cyber-attack.
To assess the transient stability, in this work the TKE based
stability index, Wc [4, 5] has been used, which is given by
B. Transient Stability Analysis in the Event of Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) type Attack.
For the neural network predictive controller, the TKE/TKED
is used as control input in this work. We collected speed response
from all the remotely located generators and calculated the
TKE/TKED in a simply designed SCADA system as represented
in Fig. 1, and Fig. 4. For initiating the DDoS attack, we
considered total loss of TKE/TKED by signal failure to the
considered controllers of the BFCL. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 represent
the generators total kinetic energy responses considering DDoS
cyber-attack for three phase to ground and single phase to ground
permanent fault, respectively, at point B with the presence of
neural network predictive controlled BFCL. From the responses,
it is clear that for DDoS cyber-attack, the total kinetic energy
goes out of step and control even with the presence of neural
network predictive controlled BFCL.
C. Transient Stability Analysis in the Event of Tampering the
Communication Data/Signal type Attack
For initiating tampering the communication data/signal
attack, a malicious data was inserted in the TKE/TKED
calculation process in the SCADA system. Therefore, an abruptly
high value of TKE/TKED was passed to the controllers in
operation. Generators total kinetic energy responses considering
tampering the communication signal cyber-attack for 3LG and
1LG permanent faults at point B with the presence of neural
network predictive controlled BFCL are represented in Fig. 11
and Fig. 12 respectively. From the response, it is clear that for
tampering the communication signal cyber-attack, the total
kinetic energy goes out of step and control even with the
presence of neural network predictive controlled BFCL. Table IV
and Table V represent the Wc stability index values for 3LG
permanent fault considering DDoS and tampering the
communication signal cyber-attack.

Fig.11. Total kinetic energy of the generators considering tampering the

communication signal cyber-attack and 3LG permanent fault at position B.

Fig.9. Total kinetic energy of the generators considering DDoS cyber-attack and
3LG permanent fault at position B.

Fig.12. Total kinetic energy of the generators considering tampering the

communication signal cyber-attack and 1LG permanent fault at position B.

TABLE V
VALUES OF WC WITH NEURAL NETWORK PREDICTIVE CONTROLLED BFCL FOR
TAMPERING THE COMMUNICATION SIGNAL CYBER ATTACK
Wc values (with Wc values (with Wc values
Fault Fault controller and controller and (without
Type point cyber-attack) without cyber- controller
(sec) attack) (sec) and cyber-
attack) (sec)
A 1481 0.501 1.521
Fig.10. Total kinetic energy of the generators considering DDoS cyber-attack and 3LG B 1509 0.505 1.735
1LG permanent fault at position B. C 1492 0.524 1.441

TABLE IV VII. CONCLUSION

VALUES OF WC WITH NEURAL NETWORK PREDICTIVE CONTROLLED BFCL FOR
DDOS CYBER ATTACK This paper presents the implementation of neural network
Wc values (with Wc values (with Wc values predictive controlled BFCL for enhancing the transient stability
Fault Fault controller and controller and (without of multi-machine power system. The cyber security issues on the
Type point cyber-attack) without cyber- controller controller performance have been investigated. From the
(sec) attack) (sec) and cyber-
attack) (sec) simulation results, the following conclusions can be drawn.
A 1233 0.501 1.521 a) The proposed neural network predictive controlled BFCL
3LG B 1331 0.505 1.735
C 1189 0.524 1.441
can enhance the transient stability of the large power system.
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