BLARDONY, JR. v. COSCOLLUELA, JR.
accounting of his salaries, allowances, bonuses, and
The petitioner seeks a review of the orders dated August 9,
1983, and February 20, 1985, of respondent Judge Jose
Coscolluela, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
CXLVI, amending the order of his predecessor, Judge Segundo
Soza, (which dismissed private respondent's petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership and partition of
conjugal properties) by requiring petitioner to submit an
accounting of his salaries, allowances, bonuses and
commissions.
The petitioner and the private respondent are spouses. They
were married on April 30, 1975. During their marriage, they
begot one child named Patricia Araneta Blardony, who was
born on November 10, 1975. Due to irreconcilable
differences, petitioner and private respondent separated in
March, 1981.
On different dates, the spouses executed the following
agreements:
(a) Memorandum of Agreement dated July 1981 for the
support of their child, Patricia;
(b) Receipt dated January 11, 1982, evidencing the
Compromise of Settlement of Advances claimed by private
respondent from petitioner;
[c] The Deed of Conveyance of a property situated in
Alabang, Muntinlupa; and
(d) The Confirmation of the waiver by private respondent in
favor of petitioner over a property situated in Calatagan,
Batangas. (p. 25, Rollo.)
On May 3, 1982, the wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership and Partition of Conjugal Partnership
Properties in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI,
in Makati, where it was docketed as Sp. No. 9711.
The husband, in his answer, admitted that he had abandoned
the conjugal home since March 1981; that before the filing of
the petition, he and his wife, assisted by their respective
counsel, tried to file a joint petition for the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership but their attempt failed due to their
inability to agree upon the equitable partition of their
conjugal partnership properties and he prayed the court to
order "a fair and equitable dissolution of their conjugal
partnership in accordance with law." (p. 74, Rollo.).
On October 8, 1982, the husband filed a motion to dismiss
the petition on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that it should
have been filed first in the Lupon Tagapamayapa as provided
in P.D. 1508, because both are residents of the same
Municipality of Makati.
Mrs. Blardony opposed the motion to dismiss. Nevertheless,
Judge Segundo Soza dismissed her petition on October 8,
1982 for her failure, as plaintiff, to comply with Section 6 of
P.D. 1508.
Mrs. Blardony filed a motion for reconsideration. In the
meantime, the courts were reorganized and the case was
transferred to Branch CXLVI (146) of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, presided over by Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr.
On August 9, 1983, Judge Coscolluela set aside Judge Soza's
order of dismissal and required the defendant to submit an
commissions. The latter's motion for reconsideration of that
order was denied by the court on February 20, 1985. Hence,
this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the
grounds that respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction:
1. in assuming jurisdiction over the case without prior
referral to the Lupon Tagapamayapa as required by P.D. 1508;
and
2. in declaring that the issues of support pendente lite and
delivery of personal property belonging to the conjugal
partnership of the parties are essentially involved in the
petition, hence, the parties could go directly to court without
passing through the Lupon Tagapamayapa, as provided in
Section 6 of P.D. 1508.
The petition has no merit. Our jurisprudence is replete with
decisions of this Court to the effect that while the referral of a
case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for
filing a complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional
requirement, "its non-compliance cannot affect the
jurisdiction which the court has already acquired over the
subject matter or over the person of the defendant."
(Fernandez vs. Militante, May 31, 1988; Gonzales vs. Court of
Appeals, 151 SCRA 287; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 127 SCRA 470). Petitioner waived the pre-litigation
conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he
did not file a motion to dismiss the complaint on that score,
but filed his answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to
make an equitable partition of the conjugal properties.
"While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from
exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking
exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same
jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief
from it . . . Upon this premise, petitioners cannot be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted
themselves voluntarily." (Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 127 SCRA 470.)
Furthermore, under Section 6 of P.D. 1508, the complaint may
be filed directly in a competent court without passing the
Lupon Tagapayapa in the following cases:
"SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of
complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding
involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as
provided in Section 2 hereof, shall be filed or instituted in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the
Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or
the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat
Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
However, the parties may go directly to court in the following
cases:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as
preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
property and support pendente lite; and
"xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Judge correctly observed that:
". . . the issues of support pendente lite and delivery of
personal properties belonging to the conjugal partnership,
although not `coupled' in the strict sense of the word with the
instant petition, are essentially involved in this petition
because of the minority of the daughter, Patricia Araneta
Blardony who, as of this date, is not yet 8 years old, and
because the resolution or decision of this court on the
pending petition would be incomplete without a clear cut
disposition on the partition of the personal and real
properties of the conjugal partnership and consequent
delivery thereof to the proper parties." (p. 20, Rollo.)
G.R. No. 70261, 1990 February 28
ANDRES v. CA
In an information that was filed in the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Isabela, the petitioner,
Ernesto Andres, was charged with the crime of homicide with
frustrated homicide. Trial on the merits thereon ensued after
the petitioner pleaded not guilty upon being arraigned. The
petitioner invoked the justifying circumstance of self-defense
under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code as his main
defense after it was indubitably proved that he stabbed the
deceased and the other offended party.
On June 25, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision finding
the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of homicide and frustrated homicide. The trial court held that
the petitioner failed to establish self-defense by clear and
convincing evidence for no unlawful aggression on the part of
the group of the deceased was attendant. Thus, in the
dispositive portion of the said decision the petitioner was
convicted and sentenced:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds ERNESTO ANDRES guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE, as
charged, for the unjustified killing of FEDERICO BAYYA, the
commission of which was attended by the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation without any
aggravating circumstance to offset it, for which crime the said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as
minimum, and TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs
of Federico Bayya in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND
(P12,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The Court also hereby finds the same accused ERNESTO
ANDRES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, as charged, for the frustrated killing
of RODOLFO CUMARAT, the commission of which was
attended by the lone mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation, without any aggravating circumstance to offset
it. Accordingly, the said accused is also sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS of prision correccional, as minimum, and SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
indemnify the said RODOLFO CUMARAT in the sum of ONE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY (P1,850.00) PESOS, as
actual damages and in the sum of THREE THOUSAND
(P3,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as moral damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The knife (bread slicer) used in the commission of said crimes
is ordered confiscated in favor of the Government.
The accused shall also pay the costs." 1
Not satisfied therewith, the petitioner elevated this case to
the herein respondent Court of Appeals. The respondent
Court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. However,
in the ratio decidendi of its decision, the respondent Court
brushed aside a discussion, in relation to the case at bar, of
the most important requisite of the justifying circumstance of
self-defense, i.e., unlawful aggression, and merely proceeded
in adjudicating the case based on the absence of the second
requisite of self-defense, that of the "reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it." 2 It held that:
"We are now called upon to rule on the appellant's plea of
self-defense. Assuming for the sake of argument that the
circumstances here as described by the witnesses for the
defense are true, We cannot see our way clear to crediting
appellant with the justification for taking the life of Federico
Bayya and for inflicting upon Rodolfo Cumarat with a stab
wound which nearly caused Cumarat's life for it is clear from
the evidence that the four men were unarmed (the claim that
one of them was carrying a club is hardly to be believed) and
the accused himself stated that the attackers were only using
their fists on him. His claim that there were 'many people'
may be true in the sense that there were many passersby. But
as far as persons attacking him were concerned there were
only four, for which reason We find it hardly justifiable for him
to use his breadknife against his attackers, a weapon which
proved so lethal that only one thrust on the victim was fatal
enough." 3
In assuming for the sake of argument that the defense's
version of the facts is true and then ruling on the case only on
the basis of the second requisite of self-defense, the
respondent Court paved the way for this petition for review
on certiorari. The petitioner then saw the ripe opportunity to
call for an interpretation and a correct application of the
second requisite of self-defense.
The facts of the case as found by the respondent Court are
herein reproduced, to wit:
"Facts Not Contested:
It was the town fiesta of Santiago, Isabela and the streets
were full of pedestrians. At 1:00 in the early morning of July
26, 1972, the accused in the company of three ladies, Eufemia
Calso, his fiancee, who later became his wife, her sister Sally
and one other were walking along the provincial road on their
way home from a late movie. On the same road and going
along the same direction were four men, the deceased
Federico Bayya, his cousin Fernando Bayya, Rodolfo Cumarat
and one other, who too, were on their way home after having
drunk one bottle of beer each in a nearby restaurant when
Federico Bayya happened to bump Eufemia (defense says he
kissed Eufemia) which displeased the accused causing the
latter to box Federico. Federico tried to retaliate but due to
the intervention of the lady companion of the accused.
Federico was appeased and both groups proceeded on their
way.
"Disputed Facts:
"According to the prosecution witnesses, after the bumping
(kissing) incident Federico and his companions walked ahead
of the group of the accused, but upon reaching the
intersection of the road where they were about to turn to go
to their respective houses, the accused suddenly caught up
with them, and without any word of warning stabbed first
Rodolfo Cumarat or the left side of his abdomen, followed by
another stab at Federico. Federico's stab wound proved fatal,
while Rodolfo's, although likewise fatal, was attended to on
time and fortunately treated effectively, thus averting his
death.
"The defense on the other hand, thru witnesses Efufemia and
Sally Calso offer a different version. They claim that after the
'first incident' they proceeded to walk ahead, with the four
men trailing behind them; and when they were about to
reach the intersection, one of the four men who was later
identified by the witnesses as Rodolfo Cumarat tried to catch
up with Andres, and placing his hand over Andres' shoulder,
boxed Andres twice. Andres tried to run away but all the four
men chased him and started to pummel him with fist blows.
Andres testifies that one of his attackers was carrying a club
with which he sought to strike the accused. (t.s.n. pp. 3-11,
April 2, 1975).
Q. Why were you not able to reach the house of Eufemia
Calso on that particular night?
A. When we were about to reach the Kwikway, or the corner
a certain man put his arms on my shoulder.
Q. After that man placed his arms on your shoulder what
happened next if any?
A. That man when he placed his arm on my shoulder boxed
me on my throat and then the arms which was placed on my
shoulder boxed me at the back of my head.
Q. Do you know that man who placed his arms around your
shoulder and boxed you?
A. Before I did not know the name of that man and I came to
know him only during the investigation.
Q. And what is the name?
A. Rodolfo Cumarat, sir.
Q. After Rodolfo Cumarat boxed you in your throat and nape,
what happened next if any?
May we make the observation that the trend of the question
would lead the witness.
COURT:
Sustained.
Atty. Delizo.
Q. When Rodolfo Cumarat boxed you what did you do, if any?
A. After Rodolfo Cumarat boxed me I ran from here to that
place and then his companions got near me with clubs and
they started boxing me.
Q. How many persons have you seen with a club on that
particular night?
A. Only one sir.
Q. And how many persons were boxing you?
A. I did not know, sir, because when they were boxing me I
covered my face (witness demonstrating the way he placed
both his hands in his face and crouch with his hands trying to
protect his head and face). And when I put up my face I saw
plenty of persons.
Q. Where did you see those persons?
A. The place where they overtook me, sir.
Q. When you were boxed by those persons whom you do not
know the number what did you do, if any?
Fiscal Lopez:
Misleading.
Atty. Delizo:
I withdraw my question.
Q. You said you saw a man with a club what did that man do,
if any?
A. The man with a club clubbed me.
Q. What part of your body was hit?
A. Right shoulder, sir.
Q. How many times were you hit by the club?
A. I don't remember how many times, sir.
Q. How about Rodolfo Cumarat what did he do, if any?
A. Rodolfo Cumarat also boxed me and when I crouched and
covered my face, Rodolfo kept on boxing me and when I
raised my face I saw already many people.
Q. Do you know how many times were you boxed by those
persons who boxed you?
A. I don't know how many times sir.
Q. What did you do if any, when you were boxed and clubbed
by those persons?
A. When I lifted my face I looked around and saw many
people and they told me that they are going to kill me and I
remember my knife bread slicer in my waist." 4
According to the respondent Court, the petitioner was not
justified in using his knife as against the bare fists of the
unarmed group of his alleged assailants. In addition, the
respondent Court made the observation that "the accused
was a little too fast and imprudent in the use of his
breadknife, for there really was no imminent danger to his life
and limb when he wielded it against the deceased and
Rodolfo Cumarat." 5 Consequently, it held that the second
requisite of self-defense was absent in this case.
The petitioner claimed otherwise, hence, this petition.
It must be noted that the petitioner originally pleaded self-
defense. In this kind of a defense, the burden of proof rests
upon the accused. His duty is to establish self-defense by
evidence clear and convincing, relying on the strength of his
own evidence not on the weakness of the prosecution." 6
The first requisite of self-defense is indispensable. There can
be no self-defense until it is proved that there has been
unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed
by the accused. 7
If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent
or to repel. The second requisite of self-defense will have no
basis. In the case of People vs. Yuman, 8 this rule was
explained as follows:
". . . it is evident that our conclusion will have to be that her
act of mortally wounding her lover Marciano Martin had not
been preceded by aggression on the part of the latter. There
is no occasion to speak here of the 'reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it,' nor is it necessary
to inquire whether or not there was 'sufficient provocation'
on the part of the one invoking legitimate self-defense
because both circumstances presuppose unlawful aggression
which, we repeat, was not present in the instant case."
Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that the issue raised
by the petitioner as to the second requisite of self-defense is
rather premature for he must first establish the existence of
unlawful aggression being perpetrated against his person.
Now, was there unlawful aggression on the part of the
petitioner's alleged assailants?
We hold that there was none.
During the trial of the case, the prosecution and the defense
presented two conflicting versions of the facts. Each one
contended that the opposing party was the aggressor. Thus,
the trial court's findings of fact and assignment of values as to
the evidence adduced become relevant and decisive.
After a thorough perusal of the evidence on record, We find
the trial court's findings and conclusions to be well in accord.
We thus agree with the following:
"From the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, Fernando
Bayya and Rodolfo Cumarat, and that of the witnesses for the
defense it is clear that the incident that happened in the early
morning of July 26, 1972 which resulted in the fatal stabbing
of Federico Bayya and the almost fatal stabbing of Rodolfo
Cumarat by the accused consisted of two stages. The first
stage was the "accidental bumping" or "kissing" of Eufemia
Calso, the then sweetheart of the accused, by Federico Bayya
in front of the store of the Singer Sewing Machine along the
provincial road of Santiago. The accused boxed Federico
Bayya on the face but before the latter could retaliate, Sally
Calso intervened by pacifying Federico Bayya and holding his
collar. Eufemia Calso also held the accused and pulled him
away; while the companions of Federico Bayya apologized for
their companion's conduct and also pulled away the latter.
Thus, the trouble was peacefully settled and the two groups
separated and continued walking along the road in the same
direction. The second stage happened at the intersection near
the Kwik-Kway Engineering where the stabbing took place.
"As to who started the unlawful aggression in the second
stage, the two sets of witnesses do not agree. The
prosecution witnesses claim that when their group was at the
intersection near the Kwik-Kway Engineering building, the
accused suddenly attacked them with his knife and stabbed
Rodolfo Cumarat and then Federico Bayya. The defense
witnesses, however, testified that it was the group of the four
men that first attacked the accused. They claim that Rodolfo
Cumarat walked to the side of the accused, placed his arm on
the shoulder of the accused and then boxed him on the back
of his head and on his throat. The accused then ran but he
was chased by the four men. When they were able to
overtake the accused, they rained fist blows on all parts of his
body and one of them clubbed him on the shoulders. The
accused crouched and tried to parry the blows with hi hand.
Eufemia Calso told the accused to run but the latter could not
run because he was wounded. The accused heard his
attackers say that they were going to kill him, he remembered
that he had hi knife (bread slicer) tucked in his waist. He
pulled it, closed his eyes and swung it indiscriminately against
his attackers. Then he heard the whistle of a policeman and
his assailants ran away. The policeman ran after his attackers
and he also ran after the policeman to tell the latter his
attackers. He did not, however, continue to run after the
policeman and instead went to the house of his sweetheart,
Eufemia Calso. He did not know if he was able to stab any of
his attackers.
"The Court is not impressed by the testimony of the accused
on this point and that of his sweetheart Eufemia Calso
because they are full of contradictions and improbabilities.
"(1) The testimony of the accused that he ran away after he
was boxed by Rodolfo Cumarat is contradictory to his sworn
statement, marked Exhibit "3", in which he stated that after
Cumarat boxed him, he immediately stabbed the latter.
"(2) The testimony at the trial of Eufemia Calso that the
accused ran away after he was boxed by Cumarat is also
contradictory to her sworn statement given by her to the
police (Exhibit "1") and also to her testimony at the
preliminary investigation (Exhibit "2") in which she stated that
the accused did not run away.
"(3) The testimony of the accused at the trial that after he
was overtaken by the four men, they boxed him and clubbed
him and that he crouched to evade the blows is contradicted
by his sworn statement, marked Exhibit "3", in which he
stated that after Cumarat boxed him, he immediately stabbed
the latter and when he saw that the companions of Cumarat
were surrounding him he immediately attacked them by
stabbing them indiscriminately, without stating that these
companion boxed him and clubbed him.
"(4) The testimony at the trial Eufemia Calso that it was
Cumarat who first boxed the accused and then the former's
companion also boxed and clubbed the latter is contradicted
by her sworn statements, Exhibit "1" and Exhibit "2", in which
she did not mention the boxing and clubbing of the accused
by the other companions of Cumarat.
"(5) The testimony of the accused at the trial that the four
men were armed is contradicted by his aforementioned
sworn statement, Exhibit "3", in which he did not mention any
club at all. That the men had a club is also highly improbable
and unbelievable because not one of them was armed with a
club when they first met the group of the accused in front of
the store of the Singer Sewing Machine and since the two
groups walked together up to the intersection, it can safely be
presumed that the four men were also unarmed when they
reached the intersection since no evidence was presented to
show that somebody else handed a club to one of the four
men. Moreover, Eufemia Calso in her two sworn statements,
Exhibit "I" and Exhibit "2", stated that she did not notice any
arm or weapon held by any of the four men. These
statements also contradict Eufemia Calso's testimony at the
trial that one of the four men was armed with a club.
"(6) The testimony of the accused at the trial he suffered
contusions on his face and other parts of his body is not only
contradictory to his sworn statement, Exhibit "3", but also
belied by the following facts: (a) he did not submit himself for
medical treatment; (b) he was able to report for work as usual
at 4:00 o'clock that same morning of July 26, 1972, only a few
hours after the occurrence of the fatal incident; (c) he went to
the municipal building at about 6:00 o'clock that same
morning where he was investigated by the police, and nothing
was mentioned about his physical condition or appearance
during the investigation, which shows that the contusions that
he claimed at the trial to have suffered is not true; otherwise,
the police investigator would not have failed to notice said
contusions, if any, and to ask him about it; (d) Eufemia Calso,
in her aforementioned sworn statements did not also
mention the wounds suffered by the accused.
"(7) If is true as claimed by the accused that the four men
ganged up on him, boxed him and clubbed him, it would seem
unbelievable that the many people who were all around them
on the road did not intervene to stop it by holding the alleged
combatants and calling a policeman. An attack by several men
did not seem to be probable on the crowded road, but a
sudden and swift attack by a single person seemed possible.
"(8) The claim of innocence at the trial by the accused is
negatived by the fact that he ran away after having stabbed
his victims and went to throw his knife away to another street
and also by the fact that he did not surrender to the police
right away." 9
Even the respondent Court of Appeals added a piece of its
opinion in withholding credence from the defense's version of
the facts by stating that:
"Besides We are not quite convinced that the defense
witnesses' story on the witness stand is a true recital of the
incident as it really happened. . . ." 10
In view of the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the defense's
version of the facts was discredited by both Courts a quo,
proving without doubt that there was no unlawful aggression
on the part of the petitioner's victims. On the contrary, it was
petitioner who was the unlawful aggressor. His pretension as
to the presence of the second requisite of self-defense is
obviously without basis.
The indemnity to the heirs of Federico Bayya is increased to
P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the indemnity
the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-48957, 1987 June 23
BOLELEY v. VILLANUEVA
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari
assailing the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Baguio City1 [Presided over by Judge Clarence J. Villanueva.]
that granted private respondent's motion to dismiss the
complaint below on the ground that petitioner did not refer
the action to the barangay lupon for conciliation or
settlement before filing the case in court, as prescribed in the
Revised Katarungan Pambarangay Law.
The facts are as follows:
On August 7, 1996, petitioner Angel L. Boleyley filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, a complaint against private
respondent for collection of a sum of money, as follows:
"1.) The sum of P530,000.00 for actual damages;
"2.) The sum of P50,000.00 for moral damages;
"3.) The sum of P30,000.00 for exemplary damages;
"4.) The sum of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P1,000.00
per court hearing;
"5.) The costs of suit."2 [Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 23-28.]
On September 13, 1996, private respondent Albert S. Surla
filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that petitioner did not comply with the Revised
Katarungan Pambarangay Law requiring as a condition for the
filing of a complaint in court referral of the matter to the
barangay lupon chairman or the pangkat, for conciliation or
settlement.3 [Petition, Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 29-32.]
On September 17, 1997, petitioner filed an opposition to
motion to dismiss on the ground that private respondent was
not a resident of Baguio City so that the dispute involving the
parties was not within the authority of the lupon to bring
together for conciliation or settlement.4 [Petition, Annex "E",
Rollo, pp. 33-35.]
On November 29, 1996, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the case for being premature, for not having been
referred to the barangay lupon.5 [Petition, Annex "A", Rollo,
pp. 20-21.]
On December 5, 1996, petitioner filed with the trial court a
motion for reconsideration on the ground that private
respondent could not invoke the Katarungan Pambarangay
Law because he was not a resident of Baguio City.6 [Petition,
Annex"F", Rollo, pp. 36-38.]
On February 17, 1997, the trial court resolved to deny the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, notice of which
denial was received by petitioner on March 4, 1997.7
[Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, p. 22.]
Hence, this petition.8 [Filed on April 8, 1997, by registered
mail.]
On July 9, 1997, the Court resolved to require the
respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days
from notice.9 [Rollo, p. 45.]
On August 26, 1997, private respondent filed his comment.10
[Rollo, pp. 49-56.]
On November 10, 1997, petitioner filed a reply,11 [Rollo, pp.
58-60] in compliance with the resolution of September 29,
1997.12 [Rollo, p. 57.]
At issue is whether or not petitioner was bound to refer the
dispute to the barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or
settlement before he could file an action for collection with
the regional trial court.13 [Petition, Rollo, pp. 10-19 at p. 13.]
We give due course to the petition.
It is a basic rule of procedure that "jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of the action is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court can not
be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer
or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendant."14 [Serdoncillo vs. Benolirao, G. R. No. 118328,
October 8, 1998; San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 255 SCRA
133 [1996]; Citibank, N. A. vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No.
108961, November 27, 1998.]
In the complaint filed by petitioner with the Regional Trial
Court, Baguio City, he stated that:
"COMPLAINT
"COMES NOW the plaintiff by his undersigned counsel and to
this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
"1.) That plaintiff is of legal age, married, Filipino and a
resident of No. 100 Imelda Village, Baguio City while
defendant is also of legal age, Filipino and with postal office
address at C-4 Ina Mansion, Kisad Road, Baguio City where he
may be served with summons and other legal processes;" 15
[Annex "C", Petition, Rollo, pp. 23-25.]
From the above allegations, it is obvious that the parties do
not reside in the same city or municipality, and hence, the
dispute is excepted from the requirement of referral to the
barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or settlement prior
to filing with the court.16 [Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, 169
SCRA 566 [1989]; Candido vs. Macapagal, 221 SCRA 328
[1993].]
It is true that plaintiff's complaint should have alleged
defendant's place of actual residence, not his postal office
address. The allegation of defendant's actual residence would
have been ideal to determine venue, which is plaintiff's choice
of either his place of residence or that of the defendant or
any of the principal defendants.17 [Rule 4, Section 2, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.] "In procedural law, however,
specifically for purposes of venue it has been held that the
residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation or his actual residence or place of abode, which
may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency,
thus:
"x x x We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides'
connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from
'legal residence or domicile'. The term 'resides', like the term
'residing' or 'residence' is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. x x x In other words, 'resides' should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. x x x No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary" talics supplied),"18 [Bejer vs.
Court of Appeals, supra, citing Dangwa Transportation Co.,
Inc. vs. Sarmiento, 75 SCRA 124 [1977].]
Nevertheless, the complaint clearly implies that the parties do
not reside in the same city or municipality.
The venue of the action is not affected by the filing of
defendant's (respondent's) motion to dismiss stating that he
also resided in Baguio City. That is not decisive to determine
the proper venue.
Consequently, we rule that there is no need of prior referral
of the dispute to the barangay lupon or pangkat in the
absence of showing in the complaint itself that the parties
reside in the same city or municipality.19 [Section 408 [f], R.
A. 7160; Agbayani vs. Belen, 145 SCRA 635 [1986].]
In thus dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of cause of
action or pre-maturity, the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
entitling petitioner to the relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for
certiorari and ANNULS the orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Baguio City, Branch 07, dated November 20, 1997, and April
28, 1998, in Civil Case No. 3483-R.
The Court orders the trial court to forthwith deny private
respondent's motion to dismiss, and proceed to the
disposition of the case with all deliberate dispatch.
G.R. No. 128734, 1999 Sep 14
FARRALES, et al. v. CAMARISTA
Through a verified complaint dated December 15, 1997,
complainants, client and counsel, charged respondent with
gross incompetence, gross inefficiency, and ignorance of the
law, with regard to two civil cases, as follows: (a) Civil Case
No. 144411-CV entitled "Amparo Farrales, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Eldorado T. Lim vs. Mrs. Meny Martin"
(also referred to in the record as Menny Martin) for
Ejectment/Unlawful Detainer; and Civil Case No. 144414-CV
entitled "Amparo Farrales, represented by her Attorney-in-
Fact, Atty. Eldorado T. Lim vs. Mrs. Mely Rizon" for
Ejectment/Unlawful Detainer.
The factual antecedents of the subject complaint are as
follows:
On June 10, 1994 and June 13, 1994, both aforestated cases
were filed by complainants and were raffled to Branch I,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, presided over by
respondent.
In the first case, therein defendant, on June 22, 1994, filed her
responsive pleading. On January 25, 1995, respondent, motu
proprio issued an order referring the case for conciliation to
the barangay chairman of Barangay 676, Zone 73, Ermita,
Manila. From January 25, 1995 to January 25, 1996, the case
was not calendared for hearing, until herein complainant-
counsel, Atty. Raul S. Sison, who took over the case from Atty.
Eldorado T. Lim, filed his formal entry of appearance. On
February 2, 1996, the plaintiff (complainant herein) filed a
motion to set aside the order of January 25, 1995, and to set
the case for preliminary conference, which was denied by
respondent. Subsequently, the parties submitted themselves
to conciliation but no settlement was reached. There being no
clarificatory hearing set, the case was deemed submitted for
decision as of October, 1996. On February 27, 1997, plaintiff
filed a motion for early decision. However, despite repeated
follow-ups, the case remained undecided.
In the second case, the defendant therein, on June 21, 1994,
filed a motion for referral to the proper barangay for
arbitration and/or conciliation. Later, respondent issued two
orders dated November 7, 1994 and January 27, 1995,
respectively, directing the parties to conciliate before the
Chairman of Barangay 676, Zone 73, Ermita, Manila.
Meanwhile, complainant Sison entered his appearance as
counsel for plaintiff therein. On February 12, 1996,
complainants filed a motion to set aside the order of
November 7, 1994, as well as to render judgment.
Respondent denied the same and referred the case to said
barangay for conciliation proceedings under penalty of the
case being dismissed. Subsequently, a certificate to file action
was issued by the barangay chairman following defendant’s
failure to appear during the scheduled conciliation meeting.
On July 12, 1996, after the lapse of two years and one month
from the service of summons, defendant filed her answer.
However, notwithstanding the lapse of time in filing the
answer and plaintiff’s opposition thereto, respondent, in an
order dated September 3, 1996, directed the parties to file
their respective position papers. After the lapse of thirty days
from submission of position papers and there being no
decision rendered by respondent, plaintiff filed a motion for
early decision on February 27, 1997. When still no decision
was rendered, complainant Sison (plaintiff’s counsel) wrote
respondent on July 18, 1997 requesting that a decision be
rendered in the case. Still, the case remained unresolved.
Herein complainants contend that the delay in the disposition
of the above-stated cases was a result of respondent’s lack of
basic knowledge of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure and/or her ignorance of the law. They likewise
question respondent’s act of referring the case to the
barangay level for conciliation when the parties actually
reside in barangays of different cities/municipalities.
Thereafter, complainant Sison submitted his manifestation
dated January 26, 1998 informing the Court that despite the
filing of the instant administrative complaint, no decision had
yet been rendered by respondent in the two civil cases.
In respondent’s answer, she alleged that the subject civil
cases were two of those left by then Acting Presiding Judge
Alden Cervantes and were originally pending before Branch
28, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila before they were
reassigned by raffle to respondent’s sala. She also contends
that although barangay conciliation is not necessary in Civil
Case No. 144414-CV, she referred the case, motu proprio, to
the lupon of the barangay where the realty subject thereof is
located in accordance with the last paragraph of Section 2,
Presidential Decree No. 1508, and the last paragraph of
Section 408 of the Local Government Code of 1991. For
failure of the parties to settle the case before the lupon, the
same was deemed submitted for decision.
The subject complaint also cited our decision in
Administrative Matter No. MTJ-97-1123 (initiated by Atty.
Joselito Enriquez against herein respondent on the basis of
which the latter was found to be unconscientious and not
prompt in the performance of her duties and was fined
P3,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely).
Respondent avers that such conclusion was arrived at since
the Court overlooked some facts in her favor in imposing
upon her a fine with warning.
On March 17, 1999, the Court issued a resolution requiring
the parties to manifest if they were submitting the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings. Atty. Sison filed his
manifestation to the effect that complainants were
withdrawing their complaint. Respondent, on the other hand,
submitted a supplemental answer or explanation. On the
basis of the second, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommends that a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 be
imposed against respondent with a stern warning that the
same or similar acts in the future be dealt with more severely.
The crux of the matter is respondent’s violation of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and her erroneous
application of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
(Presidential Decree No. 1508).
The Rule on Summary Procedure clearly and undoubtedly
provides for the period within which judgment should be
rendered. Section 10 thereof provides:
SEC. 10. Rendition of judgment.-Within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall
render judgment.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain
material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order
specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties
to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters
within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall
be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the
last clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the period for
filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to
gain time for the rendition of the judgment.
Section 8 thereof, which provides the contents of the record
of the preliminary conference, includes a statement as to --
c) Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations
and admissions made by the parties, judgment may be
rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which
event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days
from issuance of the order;
It is thus very clear that the period for rendition of judgment
in cases falling under summary procedure is thirty days. This
is in keeping with the spirit of the rule which aims to achieve
an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases
falling thereunder.
The jurisprudential direction consistently taken by the Court
adheres to the rule that failure to decide a case within the
required period is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency Abarquez vs. Rebosura, 285 SCRA 109 [1998]; In
re Judge Jose F. Madara, 104 SCRA 245 [1981]; Longboan vs.
Judge Polig, 186 SCRA 557 [1990]; Sabado vs. Cajigal, 219
SCRA 800 [1993]). Delay in disposition of cases erodes the
faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it into disrepute (Abarquez vs.
Rebosura, supra).
Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the period fixed by law.
Rule 3.01 compels them to be faithful to the law and prompts
them to maintain professional competence.
Failure to observe time provisions for the rendition of
judgments constitutes a ground for administrative sanction
against the defaulting judge (Alfonso-Cortes vs. Maglalang,
227 SCRA 482 [1993]; Mappala vs. Nuñez, 240 SCRA 600
[1995]), absent sufficient justification for his non-compliance
therewith (Abarquez vs. Rebosura, supra). Of special import is
the requirement under the Rule on Summary Procedure
which was intended precisely for the expeditious resolution of
cases falling thereunder. For this reason, respondent’s
attempt to excuse herself from such requirement must
necessarily fail.
The last affidavits and position paper in Civil Case No. 144411-
CV were filed on October 25, 1996, whereas the last pleading
(defendant’s position paper) in Civil Case No. 144414-CV was
filed on October 23, 1996. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 10 of the Rule, complainant Sison received the
decision in both cases only on February 12, 1998, almost two
years from submission of the last affidavits and position
papers therein.
Respondent submits that she cannot be held administratively
liable for gross inefficiency because both cases were not
originally assigned to her but to Branch 28, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Manila, and were only assigned to her on October 24,
1994. She also claims that her court was transferred in an
untimely and abrupt manner to a makeshift office too small
for proper court operations which left both the court records
and court personnel in disarray to such degree that
disallowed the latter to have an effective filing system.
Further, it is argued that at the time of the pendency of the
subject cases, Republic Act No. 7691 which provides for the
expanded jurisdiction of the inferior court, was at its peak.
Consequently, the sudden deluge of cases unloaded by the
regional trial court together with those filed by litigants
combined with the deplorable conditions of her court caused
the delay.
All the above-stated posturings are lame excuses for a
delayed decision, especially when it falls under the Rule on
Summary Procedure. To accept them as valid will defeat the
very purpose of the rule since any judge would be given the
imprimatur of violating the time provisions merely for such
frivolous reasons.
In addition, respondent also erroneously applied the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law. She anchors her act on
Section 2 thereof (or Sec. 408, Republic Act No. 7160) which
reads in full:
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception
Thereto.-The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to
bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a).....Where the party is the government, or any subdivision
or instrumentality thereof;
(b).....Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the
dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
(c).....Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d).....Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e).....Where the dispute involves real properties located in
different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by
an appropriate lupon; Chief
(f).....Disputes involving parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where
such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by
an appropriate lupon;
(g).....Such other classes of disputes which the President may
determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the
authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any
time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon
concerned for amicable settlement.
The last paragraph of the aforecited provision apparently
gives the Court discretion to refer the case to the lupon for
amicable settlement although it may not fall within the
authority of the lupon (such as the civil cases subject of this
administrative proceeding). However, referring the subject
civil cases to the lupon is saliently an unsound exercise of
discretion considering that the matter falls under the Rule on
Summary Procedure. As aptly explained in Gachon vs. Devera,
Jr. (274 SCRA 540 [1997]), the Rule on Summary Procedure
was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious
and inexpensive determination of cases." The fact that
unlawful detainer cases fall under summary procedure,
speedy resolution thereof is thus deemed a matter of public
policy. Thus, the Rule frowns upon delays.
Manifestly, respondent’s act of referring the subject cases to
the lupon subverts the very nature of the Rule and defeats its
objective of expediting the adjudication thereof. Besides, as
correctly explained by the Court Administrator, the
preliminary conference under Sections 7 and 8 serves the
purpose of a possible amicable settlement, viz:
SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties.-Not
later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a
preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in
ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary
conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this
Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary
conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint.
The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff
shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in
accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be
dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be
entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This
Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants
sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a
common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.
Section 8 of said Rule reads in full:
SEC. 8. Record of preliminary conference.—Within five (5)
days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the
court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up
therein, including but not limited to:
a).....Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable
settlement, and if so, the terms thereof;
b).....The stipulations or admissions entered into by the
parties;
c).....Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the
stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment
may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in
which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30)
days from issuance of the order;
d).....A clear specification of material facts which remain
controverted; and
e).....Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition
of the case.
The last issue that we have to pass upon is the effect of the
affidavit of desistance on respondent’s administrative liability.
In Rogue vs. Grimaldo (260 SCRA 1 [1996]), the complainants,
who filed a complaint against a court stenographer for illegal
exaction of money, later executed an affidavit of desistance
which prompted therein respondent to move for the dismissal
of the complaint. We pronounced that the affidavit of
desistance by the complainant cannot divest this Court of its
jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the
matter alleged in the complaints against respondent. We cited
Caña vs. Santos (234 SCRA 17 [1994]) where we held that
"[t]he Court has an interest in the conduct of the officials and
employees of the judiciary and in improving the delivery of
justice to the people and its efforts in that direction cannot be
frustrated by any private arrangement of the parties."
All the more in the instant case, which involves a judge, must
we apply the above-stated rule for a judge should always be
the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence
and should administer justice impartially and without delay
(Bolalin vs. Occiano, 266 SCRA 203 [1997]). Judges, who are
called upon to administer the law and apply it to the facts,
should be studious of the principles of law and diligent in
endeavoring to ascertain the facts. They should exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules (Del Callar vs. Salvador, 268 SCRA 320
[1997]). They must always strive to live up to their
responsibility of assisting parties litigants in obtaining a just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases and
proceedings (Perez vs. Andaya, 286 SCRA 40 [1998]).
Considering that this is not respondent’s first administrative
case of the same nature, we take cognizance of the Court
Administrator’s reasons for recommending a fine of
P20,000.00. Nevertheless, we deem the amount of
P10,000.00 as a reasonable fine under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Ruby B. Camarista, presiding
judge of Branch I, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, is
hereby declared GUILTY of gross incompetence, gross
inefficiency, and ignorance of the law, and is hereby ordered
to pay a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). She is also
WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1184, 2000 Mar 2
KER & COMPANY, LTD. v. CTA, et al.
An appeal from a resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals
sustaining a Motion to Dismiss of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, on the ground that said Court is without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the case.
On the basis of its income tax returns filed for the years 1947,
1948, 1949 and 1950, the petitioner was assessed by the
Collector in the respective sums of P42,342.30, P18,651.87,
P139.67 and P12,813.00 (Exhibits 1-9). Upon failure of
petitioner to pay the said assessments, the Collector sent a
demand letter dated February 16, 1953, (Exh. 10). In a letter
dated May 24, 1953 (Exh. 12), counsel for petitioner sought
the reconsideration of the demand letter. A revision of the
previous assessments was made by the Collector in his letter
of January 5, 1954 (Exh. 13), reducing the tax liabilities of
petitioner for 1947 from P42,342.30 to P27,026.28 and for
1950 from P12,813.00 to P8,542.00; the assessments for 1948
to 1949 in the sum of P18,651.87 and P139.67 remain the
same.
The letter of January 5, 1954 (Exh. 13), has remained
unaltered and unrevised up to this date, in spite of the
repeated requests for reconsideration by petitioner, as
evidenced by its letter dated February 12, 1954 (Exh. 14) and
May 22, 1954 (Exh. 17). In fact, the Collector reiterated the
demand contained in said letter of January 5, 1954, as shown
by his letters dated July 28, 1954 and December 9, 1954
(Exhs. 18 and 19, respectively). The petitioner denied having
received the said letter (Exh. 18), although it was mailed to
petitioner in the ordinary course of business. The record
shows that it had received all the letters of the Collector
except, allegedly, said Exh. 18. Although petitioner did not
know when it received the communication dated December
9, 1954 (Exh. 19), it is a fact that said petitioner replied to this
letter (Exh. 19), in its letter dated August 1, 1955, which was
wholly denied in the Collector's letter dated January 23, 1956
reiterating the assessment of January 5, 1954. On February 9,
1956, the Collector issued a warrant of distraint and levy
against the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a petition for review with preliminary
injunction on March 1, 1956. After issues were joined, the Tax
Court heard the incident of preliminary injunction. Before the
incident was resolved, however, the Tax Court motu proprio
issued an order setting the case again for hearing for the
purpose of determining whether or not, the court had
jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by petitioner on
March 1, 1956.
On October 3, 1956, the Collector filed his motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and over the opposition
of the petitioner, on January 5, 1957, the Tax Court dismissed
the petition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied on May 9, 1957.
In the instant appeal, petitioner-appellant submits the
following issues:
1. Whether the ruling of the Collector which
is appealable was his letter of January 5, 1954 (Exh. 13), or his
letter of January 5, 1954 (Exh. 20).
2. Whether or not the 30-day period
provided by section 11 of R.A. 1125 should commence to run
only on February 1, 1956, the date on which the petitioner
received the respondent's letter of January 23, 1956 (Exh. 20).
3. Whether or not the 30-day period is a
jurisdictional requirement.
4. Whether respondent Collector was barred
from filing a motion to dismiss based on said section 11, after
he had filed his answer to the petition below, which did not
contain such a defense; and
5. Whether the Tax Court erred in not holding
that the Collector's order to collect by warrant of distraint and
levy had been timely appealed by the petitioner.
While the right to appeal a decision of the Collector to the Tax
Court is merely a statutory remedy, nevertheless the
requirement that it must be brought within thirty days after
receipt of the Collector's decision, or ruling is jurisdiction. "If a
statutory remedy provides as a condition precedent that the
action to enforce it must be commenced within a prescribed
time, such requirement is jurisdictional and failure to comply
therewith may be raised in a motion to dismiss" (Callahan vs.
Chespeake & Ohio, 407 Supp. 323, mentioned on p. 175,
Moran's Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1952 Ed.). The right to appeal
from a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources is a statutory right, but it can be invoked only in
accordance with the manner in which the legislature has
provided for the purpose (The Secretary of Agriculture, etc.
vs. Judge CFI, G. R. No. L-7752, May 27, 1955). The right to
appeal from the decision of the Collector being a statutory
right, the same can be invoked only in accordance with the
requisites provided by law (Wee Poco v. Posadas, 64 Phil.
648). And this should be so because in cases involving a tax,
there is an imperious need for its prompt collection. Appealed
cases decided by the Tax Court shall have preference over all
civil proceeding except habeas corpus, workmen's
compensation and election cases (sec. 18, par. 4, Rep. Act
1125), and the appeal therefrom is directly taken to the
Supreme Court (Ibid, par. 3). It is the interest of the
Government to know promptly those assessments which are
acquiesced in and those disputed by the tax payers. Such
knowledge is essential in formulating the Government's
estimate of expected revenues and expenditures.
Petitioner-appellant questions the right of the lower court to
raise the question of jurisdiction motu proprio. It should be
recalled, however, that the Tax Court is a court of special
jurisdiction. As such, it can only take cognizance of such
matters as are clearly within its jurisdiction. To obviate the
possibility that its decision may be rendered void, it can, by its
own initiative, raise the question of jurisdiction, although not
raised by the parties.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 partly provides: —
"SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. — Any
person, association or corporation adversely affected by a
decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal revenue, the
Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of
Assessment Appeals may file an appeal in the Court of Tax
Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or
ruling. . . . ."
It is argued that the decision or ruling of the Collector which
should be appealed to the Tax Court is the former's letter
dated January 5, 1954 (Exh. 13), and that the 30-period
provided in section 11, commenced to run only on February
1, 1956, the date on which the petitioner-appellant received
the Collector's letter dated January 23, 1956. This contention
is without merit. The Collector's letter dated January 23,
1956, partly reads as follows:
"With reference to your letter dated August 1, 1955,
concerning the deficiency income tax liabilities of Ker & Co.,
Ltd., Manila, for 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950, I regret to have
to inform you that, notwithstanding your allegations therein,
this Office still finds no justification to alter, reverse or modify
the assessments issued against your client for said years.
As elucidated in our letter to you of January 5, 1954, the
alleged home-leave liabilities which your client claimed as
deduction were disallowed as such because the same were
not actually incurred but were mere reserve accounts for
contingent purpose. No evidence were presented by you
showing that the said expenses were actually incurred in the
years of their deductions or in the subsequent years. . . .".
It is thus noted that the allegation in the above quoted letter
is simply a reiteration of the previous demand as contained in
the Collector's letter of January 5, 1954 (Exh. 13). Again the
Collector sent to the petitioner-appellant the demand letter
dated July 28, 1954 (Exh. 18), which merely reiterated the
demand dated January 5, 1954. Although petitioner denied
having received said letter, yet it is significant to mention that
when it was presented to the lower court as Exhibit 18 for the
Collector, the petitioner had not objected to it. This is the first
time they attack its receipt. It is finally to be observed that the
ruling of the Collector contained in his letter of January 5,
1954, remained unaltered and unmodified. As the Court a
quo has correctly commented —
"Under the facts stated above, we find that the decision of
respondent which is appealable to this Court under Sections 7
and 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 is the one contained in his
letter of January 5, 1954, the same having remained
unaltered and unmodified up to the date the appeal was filed
(See Angel Saraos v. CIR, CTA Case No. 229, March 5, 1956;
Merced Drug Store v. CIR, CTA Case No. 180, May 21,
1956. . . . .
Moreover, since a letter of demand or assessment was sent
by the Collector of Internal Revenue to a taxpayer contains a
determination of the tax liability of the latter, such letter or
assessment must be considered as the 'decision' appealable
to this Court. The Supreme Court appears to recognize the
same view when it held that the `assessment made by the
Collector of Internal Revenue is the substantive and
dispositive part of his decision' (Ventanilla v. BTA, G.R. No. L-
7384, prom. Dec. 19, 1955). Under circumstances comparable
with our law, the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Gull v. U.S. (1935, 295 U.S. 247; 79 L. ed., 1941) sustained the
same theory that the assessment is the action of an
administrative agency equivalent to a decision and is
therefore given the force of a judgment".
This being the case, it logically follows that the decision which
was appealed was that of January 5, 1954 and that the 30-day
period should have started from the receipt of the said letter
on January 25, 1954 (Exh. 14). No appeal having been taken
from this decision, the same became final, conclusive and
executory (Roxas v. Sayoc, G. R. No. L- 8502, Nov. 29, 1956).
Petitioner contends that the Collector waived the defense
based on said section 11, when he failed to file a motion to
dismiss within the reglementary period and did not set it up
as a defense in the answer filed by him. Suffice it to state,
however, that a motion to dismiss may be allowed after the
answer is filed or even after the hearing had been
commenced (Bugayong v. Ginez, G. R. No. L-10033, Dec. 28,
1956; 53 O.G. No. 4, p. 1050). Moreover, the present case
involves jurisdiction over subject-matter, which can not be
waived, and which can be raised at any stage of the
proceeding, even if no such defense is made in the answer
(Juanillo v. De la Rama, II Off. Gaz. 304 [1943]; I Francisco Trial
Technique and Practice Court pp. 128-129).
Petition-appellant also claims that inasmuch as the disputed
assessment was made prior to the creation and actual
organization of the Tax Court (The Court of Tax Appeals was
established upon the enactment of R.A. No. 1125, although
the act took effect only on July 21, 1954 with the
appointment of two judges and the Court Personnel and with
the adoption by it in the interim of the Rules and Regulations
of the defunct Board of Tax Appeals [See Sta. Clara Lumber
Co. v. Coll. of Int. Rev. CTA Case No. 91, Res. dated Sept. 20,
1955]), there was, legally speaking, no 30-day period to
compute or determine in relation to the appeals from the
decisions of the Collector. However, in admitting that the
disputed assessment was issued prior to the organization of
the Tax Court, the petitioner- appellant, if it really wanted to
protect itself, should have paid the taxes due and then filed a
suit for their refund under section 306 of the Tax Code with
the proper Court if First Instance. The petitioner- appellant
failed to take this step. With the actual organization of the Tax
Court on July 21, 1954, the petitioner-appellant could have
filed a petitioner for review with the said court within 30 days
after July 21, 1954 (Sta. Clara Lumber Co. vs. Court of Int. Rev.,
supra; Ipekdian Merchandising Co. Inc. vs. C.I. Revenue, CTA
Case No. 107). In these two CTA cases, the petitioner-taxpayer
appealed the decisions of the Collector to the defunct Board
of Tax Appeals which found for the respondent-appellee.
Later, they appealed to this Court which dismissed their cases
without prejudice. When they brought these cases to the Tax
Court, the latter dismissed them for having been filed outside
the 30-day period after July 21, 1954. In the case at bar, after
receipt of the Collector's demand letter dated January 5,
1954, petitioner not only did not pay the taxes due and sue
for their refund but also failed to file its petition for review
within 30 days after July 21, 1954. A taxpayer should display
more alertness in the protection of his rights (Koppel [Phil.],
Inc. vs. Coll. Int. Rev., G.R. No. L-10550, Sept. 19, 1961).
Petitioner-appellant argues that the Tax Court acted
erroneously in not holding that insofar as the Collector's
order to collect (by warrant of distraint and levy) is
concerned, it has the power to hear and determine the
legality thereof, because the appeal from said order had been
timely made to said court by petitioner-appellant. This
argument is unmeritorious once it is considered, as we do,
that what has been appealed in this case is the decision of the
Tax Court dated January 5, 1957, in which decision, the
incident regarding the legality or illegality of the Collector's
issuance of the warrant of distraint and levy had not at all
been brought out or ventilated.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the resolution appealed from being in
accordance with law, hereby is affirmed en toto, with costs
against the petitioner-appellant.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-12396, 1962 Jan 31
FABIAN v. DESIERTO
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public
respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-
0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and
absolved private respondents from administrative charges for
inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then
Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH).
I Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts
of the parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major
stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in
the construction business. Private respondents Nestor V.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District
(FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which
he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of
the Ombudsman.
Promat participated in the bidding for government
construction project including those under the FMED, and
private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official
position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship.
Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which
private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works
contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the
same in his office.
Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed
between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate
their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted
her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the
aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-
complaint dated July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent
for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential
Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer
for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the
charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of
oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez
issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the
approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February
26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with
modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of
misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension
without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for
reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the
former’s new counsel had been his "classmate and close
associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F.
Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18,
1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent
Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the
administrative charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective
November 17, 1989.] pertinently provides that -
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of
of the Ombudsman),2 [Effective May 1, 1990.] when a
respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative
proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and
unappealable. She accordingly submits that the office of the
ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the
manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal
allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of
review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in
those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it
"necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the
availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined
that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the
Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman
can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such
other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional
mandate with these relevant provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or
application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure question on
law.
xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the
Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules of procedure for
the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions,
and duties.
xxx
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative
investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in
accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with
the due process. x x x
xxx

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary
orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately
effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within
five (5) days after receipt of written notice shall be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary
shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of
the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing
constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail
the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office
of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceeding
before it, including those with respect to the availabity or
non-avalability of appeal in administrative cases. Such as
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner’s
proposition that, although she definitely prefaced her petition
by categorizing the same as "an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted
ambivalent statement which in effect asks that, should the
remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated
in the alternative as an original action for certiorari under
Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the
differences between a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the
decision of this Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 vis-à-vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.
07. As correctly pointed out by public respondents, Ocampo
IV vs. Ombudsman, et al.3 [G.R. Nos. 103446-47, August 30,
1993, 225 SCRA 725.] and Young vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al.4 [G.R. No. 110736, December 27, 1993.
228 SCRA 718.4 were original actions for certiorari under Rule
65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.5 [G.R. No.
111304, June 17, 1994, 223 SCRA 310.] was commenced by a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came
Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al.,6 [G.R. No. 107 837, June 27, 1994,
233 SCRA 439.] Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., 7
[G.R. No. 102420, December 20, 1995, 239 SCRA 283.]
Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,8 [G.R. No. 118533, October
4, 1995, 248 SCRA 700.] and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez,9 [G.R. No.
111223, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 35, jointly deciding G.R.
No. 104604.] which were for certiorari, prohibition and/or
mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et al.10 [G.R.
No. 120223, March 13, 1996, 254 SCRA 753.] was initiated by
a pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for
Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary
remedies, and ultimately followed by Constantino vs. Hon.
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al.11 [G.R. No. 127457, April
13, 1998.] which was a special civil action for certiorari.
Considering, however the view that this Court now takes of
the case at bar and the issues therein which will shortly be
explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the
controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and
propriety of application of the writ of certiorari when used as
a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original action,
and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or
alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto appear to
be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in Yabuts and
Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we
will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever
an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision
in an administrative diciplinary action. It cannot be taken into
account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65
is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an
incident in a criminal action.
III
After respondents’ separate comments had been filed, the
Court was intrigued by the fact, which does appear to have
been seriously considered before, that the administrative
liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of
both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private
respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act.
No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet,
pursuant to the amendment of section 9, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil
Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were
made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18,
1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are
appealable to this Court.
It could thus be posible that in the same administrative case
involving two respondents, the proceedings against one could
eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while
the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from
which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic
and efficient case management would dictate the
consolidation of thos cases in the Court of Appeals, both for
expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed
increasing the appellate indiction of the Supreme Court as
providedin this Constitution without its advice and consent,"
and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section
27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of
that constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the
case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an
inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the
judiciary and other departments of the government and the
judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not
at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or
countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute
trangresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the
duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not
the statute, governs in a case before them for judgement.12
[See 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 155-156, pp531-
537.]
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional
questions which are not raised in the pleadings,13 [Op. Cit., §
174, p. 184.] the rule has been recognized to admit of certain
exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its
own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement that it
lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court’s
jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the
court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily
follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the
statute.14 Mendoza vs. Small Claims Court of Los Angeles J.D.,
321 P. 2d 9.14
Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly
procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the
jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appelate court is
involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the
court’s own motion.15 [State ex re. Burg vs. City of
Albuquerque, et al. 249 P.242.] The Court ex mero motu may
take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case
where the fact is developed.16 [State vs. Huber, 40 S.E. 2d
11.] The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its
own jurisdiction in any proceeding.17 [In re Thomas, 117 N.E.
2d 740.]
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed
that the parties hereto should be further heard on this
constitutional question. Correspongdingly, the following
resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts
stating as follows:
The Court observes that the present petition, from the very
allegations thereof, is "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court from the ‘Joint Order (Re: Motion for
Reconsideration)’ issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411,
entitled ‘Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst.
Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,’ which
absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave
misconduct, among other."
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this
Court is allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of
1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof
is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled
that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with
Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all
administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this
Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the
two comments thereon took into account or discussed the
validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light
of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advise and consent."
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its
relevant ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of
Appeals , et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA
519) and the provisions of its former Circular No. 1-95,as now
substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
is invoked and involved and in this case, and the foregoing
legal consideration appear to impugn the constitutionality
and validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the
Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon
and the issue be first resolved before conducting further
proceedings in this appellate review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to
Submit their position and arguments on the matter subject of
this resolution by filing their corresponding pleadings within
ten (10) days from notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor
General has complied with such requirement, hence the
Court dispenses with any submission it should have
presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses the thoery
that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the
aforementioned adjudications of the Ombudsman is not
violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She
claims that what is proscribed is the passage of law
"increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as
provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction
includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution
authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgement or
orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said
Section 27 does not increase this Court may provide," said
section 27 does not increase this Court’s appellate jurisdiction
since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by
petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised
therein are only questions of law of which this Court already
has of which this Court already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact
that by jurisprudential developments over the years, this
Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a
substantial number of cases and instances even if questions
of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved by the
appellate court.18 [See Reyes, et al./ vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 110207, July 11, 1996, 258 SCRA 651, and the
cases and instances therein enumerated.] Also, the very
provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be
exercised over "final judgements and orders of lower courts,"
that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It
does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence
whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or
resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reveiwable by
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific
provision to that effect is included in the law creating that
quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special
statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is
required for the regular courts of the integrtated judicial
system because they are what are referred to and already
provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by
private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure19
[Effective July 1, 1997.] preclude appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme
Court," explicitly states:
SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgement or final
order or Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court
whenevr authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court
a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall
raise only question of law which must be distinctly set forth.
(Italics ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of
Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and
had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for
appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies,
whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal
to questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate
review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by
recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there
was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a
petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and
final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
Appeals from udgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies20 [At present, the sole exception which still subsists
is a judgment or final order issued under the Labor Code of
the Philippines (Sec. 2, Rule 43), presently under
reexamination.] are now required to be brought to the Court
of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of
appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.21 [Rule 43
was substantially taken from and reproduces the appellate
procedure provided in Circular No. 1-91 of the Supreme Court
dated February 27, 1991 and its subsequent Revised
Administrative Circ No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1,
1995.]
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should
apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the
Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional
body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical
rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards
the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President
and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even
an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office
of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but
statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would
cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive
that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual
controversies are usually involved in administrative
disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil
Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of
fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On
the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule
45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular
courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review
therein is limited to jurisdictional questions.* [Petitioner
suggests as alternative procedures, the application of either
Rule 65 or Rule 43 (Rollo, 433)]
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance
of cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that
fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of
the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is
unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not of
acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment
as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the
cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some
statements therein, and we have pointed out the instances
when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that
provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule
65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally
avoid having to decide a constitutional question, especially
when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a general
proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual
case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the
constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was
raised by the proper parties, although there was even no
need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua
sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The
constitutional question was timely raised, although it could
even be raised any time likewise by reason of the
jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally,the
resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously
necessary for the resolution of the present case. 22 [Board of
Optometry, etc., et al. vs. Colet, G.R. No. 122241, July 30,
1996, 260 -SCRA 88, and cases therein cited; Philippine
Constitution Association, et al. vs. Enriquez, etc., et a1., G.R.
No. 113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506, and companion
cases.]
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided
on other grounds, short of passing upon; the constitutional
question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private
respondent but regret that we must reject the same. That
private respondent could be absolved of the charge because
the decision exonerating him is final and unappealable
assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.
07 is valid, but that is precisely one of the issues here. The
prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as
earlier explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court
supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7
of Rule III is precisely under review here because of some
statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and
the decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence to
invoke the same would be to beg the question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles
and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which,
as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The
Court of Appeals, el al. 23 [G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994,
237 SCRA 519.] was intended to give this Court a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the Court 24 [See Records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, VoI . II, pp. 130-132.]
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed
inconsistency of the ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics and some
statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the
difference in the factual settings, but also because those
isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best be
clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By way
of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on
whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the
jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent,
private respondent’s position paper correctly yields the
legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On
September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on
S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version
of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved
on second reading by the House of Representatives.25 [Citing
the Journal and Record of the House of Representatives, Third
Regular Session, 1989-90, Vol. II, p. 512.] The Senate was
informed of the approval of the final version of the Act on
October 2, 1989 26 [Citing the Journal of the Senate, Third
Regular Session, 1989-90, Vol. 1, pp. 618-619.] and the same
was thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on
November 17, 1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that
the Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal
from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware
of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution.
It also reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author
and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the
said provision will expand this Court’s jurisdiction, and that
the Committec on Justice and Human Rights had not
consulted this Court on the matter, thus:
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI
xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides
that the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani’s
query whether the Supreme Court would agree to such
provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence in
laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara
informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the
Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the
provision will expand the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction by
allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that
they should be appeals on certiorari.27 [27 Journal of the
Senate, Second Regular Session, 1988-89, Vol. 1, p. 77, August
3, 1988.] There is no showing that even up to its enactment,
Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for its
advice and consent .28 [28 Ibid., id., id., pp. 111-112, August
9, 1988.]
VI
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy
adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said
Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being
substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court
under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a
diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights.
Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence
and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a
proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making
power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of
whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or
procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between
those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the
scope of this Court’s rule-making power, and those which are
substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one
context and substantive in another.29 [8 Ninth Decennial
Digest 155.] It is admitted that what is procedural and what is
substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.30
[People ex rel. Mijares, et al. vs. Kniss, et al. , 357 P. 2d 352.] It
is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and
pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own
procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme
Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test
is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.31 [32 Am. Jur.
2d, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 505, p. 936.] If the rule
takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified
as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means o
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.32 [People vs. Smith, 205 P. 2d 444.]
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of
pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the
Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only.33
[21 CJS, Courts, § 502, p. 769.] This is so because it is not the
right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the
law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by
which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed.
The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a
particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution
without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in
rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.34 [34 Elm Park
Iowa, Inc. vs. Denniston, et al., 280 NW 2d 262.]
Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of
creating a new right of appeal because such power of the
Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate
courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power.
Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested
right because the parties have still a remedy and still a
competent tribunal to administer that remedy.35 [35 Id., id.]
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes
involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are
procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are
applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went
into effect36 [21 CJS, Courts, § 502, pp. 769-770, 5 NR 2d
1242.] or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared.
Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex
hypothesi the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases
to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or
issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they
provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from
the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are
hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the
Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be
considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a petition
for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring
the parties to submit such amended or supplemental
pleadings and additional documents or records as it may
deem necessary and proper.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129742, 1998 Sep 16
SUAREZ v. CA
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals condemning petitioner Rodolfo Suarez to
pay moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees
in favor of private respondent Cesario Manigbas.
Respondent Manigbas used to be a security guard of the
D'Robe Security Agency of which petitioner, Capt. Rodolfo
Suarez, was the general manager.
He was assigned to the Security Bank and Trust Agency
branch at Sucat, Parañaque, Metro Manila. During his tour of
duty with the said bank, he alleged that his employer pulled
him out of his assignment and later dismissed him. This
dismissal was contested by him before the National Labor
Relations Commission.
Respondent found another employment with the RP Guardian
Security Agency. While he was with his second employer,
petitioner Suarez signed and sent a letter to the Philippine
Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators,
(PADPAO), an association of security agencies, which reported
misdemeanors committed by several of its guards, including
the respondent.
The remarks pertaining to respondent Manigbas states, to
wit: "Padding payroll; used to leave his post every weekend
without a reliever nor permission from the Agency;
misrepresentation on the submission of Daily Time Record."
(p. 19, Memorandum of Petitioner) Consequently, plaintiff
was dismissed by the RP Guardian Security Agency and was
unemployed for six (6) months until re-hired by the said
agency but on temporary basis. Plaintiff claimed that the
letter of defendant Suarez to the PADPAO exposed him to
public ridicule, inconvenience, humiliation and contempt
which resulted in his being blacklisted by security agencies
giving him difficulty in finding employment and causing him
mental torture and anguish.
Petitioner Suarez denied that respondent was similarly
relieved or dismissed from employment. He claimed that after
his relief of his assignment with the Security Bank and Trust
Company branch at Sucat, Parañaque, Metro Manila, the
respondent refused to accept re-assignment. Respondent's
relief was done in accordance with the company rule not to
allow guards to stay for a long time at one post for security
reasons. The letter complained of was a privileged
communication consistent with the call of the PADPAO to
make available to it information on misdemeanors of security
guards. It was written in good faith and without any intention
to cause damage to the respondent.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the
respondent awarding moral damages in the amount of
P10,000; exemplary damages in the amount of P3,000; actual
damages in the amount of P1,000; attorney's fees in the
amount of P2,000 and costs. On appeal to respondent court,
the said decision was affirmed with the modification
eliminating the award of actual damages.
Hence, this petition.
Basically, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not the regional trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case at bar considering that the total
money claims of respondent is only ten thousand pesos
(P10,000); and
2. Whether or not the letter sent to PADPAO is covered by
the rule on privileged communication.
In the resolution of August 22, 1988, the petition was given
due course and the parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice
thereof. Petitioner filed his memorandum of November 7,
1988 while respondent filed his on October 27, 1988.
Anent the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo in
entertaining this case, petitioner's contentions are devoid of
merit. While though it is clear from the complaint filed that
the total amount claimed by respondent Manigbas is ten
thousand pesos (P10,000) and that under BP 129, the
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases in which the demand, exclusive of
interest and cost, or the value of the property in controversy,
amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000),
petitioner is estopped from invoking this rule since he never
questioned this flaw until this case was appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals from the adverse decision of the
trial court. It is settled that any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any
time, even on appeal before this Court. The only exception is
where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel. (Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, reiterated in Solid Homes, Inc. v.
Payawal and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84811, August 29,
1989).
While petitioner could have prevented the trial court from
exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking
exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same
jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief
from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case
by cross-examining respondent. Upon the premises,
petitioner, cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an
inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court
to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily. (Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, supra)
With regard to the issue on whether or not the letter sent to
the PADPAO and signed by petitioner, considering the
derogatory remarks on the private respondent, is covered by
the protective mantle of privileged communication, the
answer is in the negative. Petitioner, in support of his
contention that such letter is privileged communication, cites
the case of U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, wherein the court laid
down the following:
"A communication made in good faith upon any subject
matter in which the party making the communication has an
interest or concerning which he has a duty is privileged if
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter
which, without the privilege, would be libelous and
actionable." (p. 21, Memorandum for the Petitioner)
And also the case of Santiago v. Calvo, 48 Phil. 919, where the
Court held:
"Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge
is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover
the mistake of the individual. The privilege is not defeated by
the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate
terms. A privileged communication should not be subjected
to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or
falsity." (p. 22, Memorandum for the Petitioner)
Petitioner contends that the alleged libelous letter to the
PADPAO is a privileged communication, hence, not actionable.
We believe that the letter sent is not really a privileged
communication.
In the case of Lu Chu Sing vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669, the
Court said that "the fact that a communication is privileged
does not mean that it is not actionable, the privileged
character simply does away with the presumption of malice
which the plaintiff has to prove in such a case." And the
evidence necessary to prove malice on the part of the writer
of a privileged communication is not strictly documentary for
it may be either extrinsic, internal, and circumstantial, like any
other fact necessary to make out plaintiff's case (U.S. vs.
Cañete, 38 Phil. 253).
As aptly put by the respondent Court:
"In the present case, malice is strongly shown in appellant's
writing the letter which put the person of the appellee in bad
light before his peers and the security agencies who may have
come across said letter in the course of his employment. The
said letter accused the appellee of "padding payroll Used to
leave his post every weekend and without a reliever nor
permission from the agency. Misrepresentation on the
submission of Daily Time Record." These charges, however,
were not duly substantiated by any proof contrary to the
PADPAO guidelines that the report on security guards been
based on "actual facts and not on imaginary or personal
considerations." (Exh. 2). Besides, the letter was written
almost three months after appellee's employment with the
D'Robe Security Agency of which the appellant was the
general manager had already been terminated. In fact,
appellee's termination caused him to file a labor case against
the D'Robe Security Agency with the then Ministry of Labor
and Employment docketed as NLRC NRC No. 5-3833-82 and
resulted in the payment of his back wages. With this in mind,
appellant was guided and motivated by revenge in writing
and sending the derogatory letter to the PADPAO which, in
the guise of an official communication was designed to
damage appellee's name as well as compromise his future
employment with any security agency associated with the
PADPAO. In other words, this would result in the blacklisting
of appellee by prospective employers. In fact, appellee's
employment with the RP Guardian Security Agency hangs on
a balance. As a consequence, he was dismissed; although he
was re-hired after six months this was on a temporary basis
pending the outcome of the present case. These significant
facts evidently betray the conduct of appellant who shall be
denied the benefits of qualified privilege and justify the
imposition of personal liability to the appellee.
"A private communication, maliciously made by one person to
another, although in the performance of a legal, moral or
social duty, is not privileged (Imperial vs. Ziga, L-19726, April
13, 1967, 19 SCRA 726). According to Justice Street in his
work, Foundation of Legal Liability, quoted in U.S. vs. Cañete,
et al., (38 Phil. 253), malice is a "term used to indicate the fact
that the defamer is prompted by personal ill-will or spite, and
speaks not merely in response to duty, but merely to injure
the reputation of the person defamed (People vs. De los
Reyes, (CA) 47 O.G. 3569)." (pp. 32-33, Rollo)
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
The questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto.
G.R. No. 80199, 1990 June 06
GALUBA v. Sps. LAURETA, et al.
G.R. No. 71091 January 29, 1988
The issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether
the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to annul an amicable
settlement arrived at by the parties through the mediation of
the Lupong Tagapayapa, in the absence of a repudiation of
said amicable settlement within the 10-day period provided
for in Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1508.
In a quitclaim and waiver executed on July 10, 1982, Alfredo
and Revelina Laureta ceded to petitioner all their rights and
interests over a house and lot located in Quezon Hill, Baguio
City for P70,000. Petitioner paid the Lauretas P50,000 with
the balance payable later.
When P18,000 of the balance remained unpaid, the parties
brought the matter before the barangay captain of Victoria
Village in Baguio City. On February 10, 1984, the parties
entered into an amicable settlement whereby they agreed
that the P18,000 would be paid in monthly installments
starting April, 1984 and that non-compliance therewith would
"mean execution in accordance with the Barangay Law." 1
A month later, petitioner discovered that the house he had
bought was encroaching on the adjoining lot, that the owner
thereof was demanding payment for such encroachment, and
that there were arrears on electric bills and taxes amounting
to P6,117. Consequently, on July 17, 1984, he filed in the
office of the barangay captain of Victoria Village an unsworn
complaint for the annulment of the amicable settlement. He
alleged therein that his consent to said settlement had been
vitiated by mistake or fraud and therefore, the amicable
settlement should be annulled and a new one entered into by
the parties. 2
Meanwhile, the Lauretas filed in the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch IV, a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution based on the amicable settlement. As the inferior
court issued the writ, petitioner filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City a complaint for the annulment of the
amicable settlement with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/ or restraining order. 3
The lower court denied the prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Thereafter, the Lauretas filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action. Alleging that in praying for a restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, petitioner wanted
to "circumvent the mandatory provisions of P. D. 1508," the
Lauretas averred that "without the unmeritorious petition for
preliminary injunction," the dispute between them and
petitioner was subject to amicable settlement. They cited
Section 6 of P.D. 1508 which provides:
SEC. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of
complaint.—No complaint, petition action
or proceeding involving any matter within
the authority of the Lupon as provided in
Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted
in court or any other government office of
adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation of the parties before the
Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no
conciliation or settlement has been reached
as certified by the Lupon Secretary or
the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the
Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the
settlement has been repudiated. However,
the parties may go directly to court in the
following cases:
[1] Where the accused is under detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been
deprived of personal liberty calling
for habeas corpus proceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property
and support pendente lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be
barred by the Statute of Limitations.
In his comment and opposition to the motion to dismiss,
petitioner contended that the lower court had jurisdiction
over the case because he had named as defendants therein
the municipal trial court and the sheriff of Baguio City and
hence, the complaint fell under the exceptions in Section 2
[21 of P.D. 1508]. He also expressed doubt that the Lauretas
were still residing in Baguio City as Alfredo Laureta had been
considered at large in some pending criminal cases against
him. He asserted that he had substantially complied with P.D.
1508 because he filed the aforementioned complaint of July
31, 1984 before the barangay captain and that after two
months of trying to locate defendants, the barangay captain
of Victoria Village as Pangkat Chairman,' issued a certification
to file action on October 11, 1984.
Thereafter, the Lauretas filed an addendum to their motion to
dismiss stating that the complaint did not state a cause of
action as petitioner failed to repudiate the amicable
settlement or to file a "Petition for [the] nullification of the
award" pursuant to Section 11 of P.D. 1508, and that said
complaint should have been filed in the municipal trial court. 4
In his opposition thereto, petitioner argued that the 10-day
repudiation period having expired, he was left with no
recourse but to file the action for nullification in court
considering that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, specifically Section
9[1] thereof which gives regional trial courts exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of litigation
is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and its repealing clause
under Section 47, should prevail over the provisions of P.D.
1508.
On January 9, 1985, the lower court issued an order granting
the motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction as
well as cause of action. Citing Sections 11 and 13 of P.D. 1508,
the lower court said:"... [T]here is no authorized judicial
procedure under P.D. 1508 for the annulment of an amicable
settlement. Only an arbitration award, which is different from
an amicable settlement, may become the subject of a petition
for nullification to be filed yet with the proper municipal trial
court. ..." The Court noted the fact that petitioner failed to
repudiate the amicable settlement within the 10-day period
provided for in Section 11 of P.D. 1508 as the parties entered
into said amicable settlement on February 10, 1984 and yet it
was only on July 27, 1984 when petitioner repudiated it
through an unsworn complaint for its annulment.
The lower court suggested that "an action for the annulment
or rescission of the contract he had with private defendants
with a prayer for injunction to restrain in the meantime the
enforcement of the amicable settlement" would perhaps be
availed of by the petitioner.
From said order, petitioner filed a notice of appeal to this
Court. The records of the case having been erroneously
transmitted to the Court of Appeals, said court certified the
case to this Court on March 19, 1985. 5
In his petition for review on certiorari, petitioner contended
that "there must be a provision of judicial procedure that
supplements the deficiency of P.D. 1508." Finding it in Rule
143 of the Rules of Court, petitioner averred that P.D. 1508
being a special law, the Rules of Court may be applied by
analogy or in a suppletory character. Thus, under Rule 39, his
remedy against an executory amicable settlement which, by
analogy is a final judgment, is an action to annul it. Moreover,
petitioner asserts that he has a cause of action because of the
fraudulent act or misrepresentation of private respondents
herein.
As private respondents failed to file a timely comment on the
petition, they filed an explanation, apology and comment
alleging that during the extended period for the filing of said
comment, petitioner partially satisfied the "judgement of the
barangay court 6 by paying them P2,000 thus misleading them
to believe that petitioner had abandoned the petition; that on
December 6, 1985, the deputy sheriff received from Mrs.
Elizabeth Galuba, wife of petitioner, four [4] checks in the
total amount of P10,000 representing full satisfaction of
Galuba's obligation to them; that petitioner himself requested
the municipal trial court of Baguio City to issue a certification
that he had fully settled his obligation in Barangay Case No.
76 which certification was issued by the clerk of said court on
May 18, 1980; that as petitioner himself requested for said
certification, they thought that petitioner would take the
initiative of filing a motion to dismiss the petition; that having
settled his obligation in said case, petitioner is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the barangay captain, and that
they admit that they erred in not informing this Court of the
settlement of the case.
In his reply to said explanation, apology and comment, the
petitioner alleged that he was forced to satisfy his obligation
because "there was nothing more to stay the execution of the
amicable settlement" [sic] after the municipal trial court had
issued the writ of execution. He insisted that "the absence of
"authorized judicial procedure under PD 1508" must be
supplemented by the Revised Rules of Court in conjunction
with the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, BP Blg. 129."
We vote to deny the petition for review on certiorari.
Section 6 of P.D. 1508 is mandatory in character. Thus,
in Morata v. Go, 125 SCRA 444, Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy,
126 SCRA 216 and Peregrina v. Panis, 133 SCRA 72, We
accordingly held that the conciliation process at the barangay
level is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in
court. In Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA
470, We ruled that non-compliance with the condition
precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency
of the plaintiff s cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of
action or prematurity. Once the parties have signed an
amicable settlement, any party who finds reasons to reject it
must do so in accordance with Section 13 of P.D. 1508 which
states:
The primordial objective of P.D. 1508 is to reduce the number
of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the
quality of justice which has been brought about by the
indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To allow court
actions assailing unrepudiated amicable settlements would
exacerbate congestion of court dockets. This is repugnant to
the spirit of P.D. 1508.
Having failed to repudiate the amicable settlement within the
ten-day period, petitioner is left with no recourse but to abide
by its terms. He, therefore, acted correctly when he
eventually fully satisfied his obligation pursuant to the
amicable settlement, thereby, rendering his case moot and
academic.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby
DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

SEC. 13. Repudiation. — Any party to the

dispute may, within ten [10] days from the
date of the settlement, repudiate the same
by filing with the Barangay Captain a
statement to that effect sworn to before
him, where the consent is vitiated by fraud,
violence or intimidation. Such repudiation
shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of
the certification for filing of a complaint,
provided for in Section 6, hereof.

Pursuant to P.D. 1508, Section 12, Rule VI of the Katarungang

Pambarangay Rules which were promulgated "for the
amicable settlement of disputes at the barangay level,
without judicial recourse," also provides that "[f]ailure to
repudiate the settlement or the arbitration agreement within
the time limits respectively set [in Section 10 thereof], shall
be deemed a waiver of the right to challenge on said
grounds," i.e., fraud, violence or intimidation.

Any party, therefore, who fails to avail himself of the remedy

set forth in Section 13 must face the consequences of the
amicable settlement for he can no longer file an action in
court to redress his grievances arising from said settlement.

It should be emphasized that under Section 11 of said law,

"[t]he amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have
the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the
expiration of the ten [10] days from the date thereof unless
repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition for
nullification of the award has been filed before the proper city
or municipal court."

Hence, the lower court correctly held that P.D. 1508 does not
provide for a judicial procedure for the annulment of an
amicable settlement because the remedy of repudiation
supplants the remedy of a court annulment. An aggrieved
party may only resort to a court action after he has
repudiated the settlement in accordance with Section 13 as
Section 6 clearly states that repudiation is a pre-condition to
the filing of a complaint regarding any matter within the
authority of the Lupong Tagapayapa. It should be clarified,
however, that the "petition for nullification" mentioned in
Section 11 refers to an arbitration award pursuant to Section
7 of the same law and not to an amicable settlement.