bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to

assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B.
Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE
Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an
Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.

Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all,
with nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires.5 The
Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the
Filipino local-hires.

The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of
race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as
Filipino local hires.6

The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:

The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case. The
international character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with
different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.

We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to
foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities
have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their services in the
Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international market.

Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment
unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other
benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of employment which include
the employment which include the employment contract.

A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and
professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:

All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with
Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to
recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions that are
consistent with accepted international practice.

Appendix C of said CBA further provides:

The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS)
salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system
 displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured
status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).

To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the
status of two types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.

The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an
established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A
classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of
the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the
former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and
have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching
faculty of the School.7

We cannot agree.

That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws
reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution8 in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights
exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad
Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

International law, which springs from general principles of law,9 likewise proscribes discrimination.
General principles of law include principles of equity, 10 i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice,
based on the test of what is reasonable. 11 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 12 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 13 the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14 the Convention against Discrimination in
Education, 15 the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation 16 — all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness
and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.

In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital,
inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.

The Constitution 17 specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These
conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but
include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in
spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes
to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. 20
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for
example, prohibits and penalizes 21 the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against
a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof,
provides:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:

a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of
work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of
"equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. 22 This rule applies to the School,
its "international character" notwithstanding.

The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to
that of foreign-hires. 23 The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees
the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This
presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the
rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That
would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the
employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-
hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions
and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the
distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.

"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services
performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid
at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 24 we said that:

"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in
another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal,"
 the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for
services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an
enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and
they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and
the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The
dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain
benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25 "to
afford labor full protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. 27These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common
good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not
hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of
the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not
deserve the sympathy of this Court.1avvphi1

We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law." 29 The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. 30 The
basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. 31

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-
hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows
that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy
security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions
as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits,
such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably
related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include
foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their
respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-
hires higher salaries than local-hires.

SO ORDERED.

Puno and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is on leave.
CASE 3: Oposa v. Factoran G.R. No. 101083

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented
by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her
parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES,
minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN
V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA,
minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA,
JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by
their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and
DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING,
DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their
parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA,
ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents
RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed
QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have
a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has
a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests
in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a
genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous
Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area
should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per
cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of
the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes,
(d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and
other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and
about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as
Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25
hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not
earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage
of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from
and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural

resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging
permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative
of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that
is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
 (c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of
dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is

contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make
full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14,
Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural
law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant
action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that
(1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the
action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 93454. September 13, 1991.]

DR. HECTOR S. RUIZ, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS, Iba, Zambales, RODOLFO V. SIOJO, ANGEL AL. CALUNTAD, Respondents.

Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion Law Office for Petitioner.

Caluntad-Alfaro, Dabu & Associates for Private Respondents.

 SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; LITIGATIONS SHOULD BE DECIDED ON THEIR

MERITS AND NOT ON TECHNICALITIES. — It is well settled that litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits, and not on technicalities, and that every party litigant must
be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from
unacceptable plea of technicalities. This Court, in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, may disregard
technicalities in order to resolve the case on its merits based on evidence (Tesorero v. Mathay,
185 SCRA 124 [May 8, 1990]).

2. ID.; ID.; GROUNDS TO ANNUL A FINAL JUDGMENT. — Certain requirements must be

established before a judgment can be annulled only on two (2) grounds: (a) the judgment is void
for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law; or (b) it has been obtained by fraud (Mercado
v. Ubay, 187 SCRA 719 [July 24, 1990]).

3. ID.; ID.; FRAUD AS A GROUND; CONSTRUED. — An action to annul a final judgment on the
ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. It is regarded as
extrinsic or collateral where it has prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting all of
his case to the court (Asian Security and Insurance Co., Inc.. v. Island Steel, Inc., 118 SCRA 233
[November 15, 1982]).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT WHEN PARTIES ARE DULY NOTIFIED; CASE AT BAR. — A perusal of
the records reveals that none of these grounds exists to warrant the annulment of the decision of
the trial court. Petitioner’s receipt of the summons is shown by the return submitted by the sheriff
dated June 24, 1983. He was represented by Atty. H.A. Jambora who, on July 8, 1983, filed an
Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File an Answer which, however, was not filed despite the
extension granted by the lower court. Nevertheless, Atty. H.A. Jambora was consistently furnished
copy of court orders as well as the decision rendered by the court a quo as shown by the registry
receipts on record. It has been settled that when a party appears by counsel in an action in court,
all notices required to be given must be served to the counsel and not to the client, for the rule is
that notice to the counsel is notice to the client (Lincoln Gerard, Inc. v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 701 [July
23, 1990]). He cannot, therefore allege that he was not aware of the case and that he was not
given a chance to present his case in court.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction
Restraining Order seeking to annul the Resolutions * of respondent Court of Appeals dated
February 28, 1990, which dismissed herein petitioner’s petition for annulment of decision, and May
8, 1990, which denied his motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts which gave rise to this petition are as follows: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

On August 23, 1988, Petitioner Dr. Hector S. Ruiz filed before the Court of Appeals a complaint for
Annulment of Decision, Documents, Surrender of Owner’s Duplicate of Title, Damages with
Preliminary Injunction against respondent Siojo docketed as CA-G.R. No. 15411. In said complaint,
Ruiz alleged that:chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

1. He is the registered owner of Magalawa Island embraced and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 25102 of the Province of Zambales, located in the Municipality of Palauig, containing an
area of 425,904 sq. meters;

2. In the early part of March 1979, he constituted respondent Siojo as his exclusive agent for a
period of one year to sell the aforementioned property for P3.5 M with a 5% commission of the
price; should he be able to sell the property for more than the said amount, he shall be entitled to
the excess thereof On or about March 29, 1979, respondent Siojo handed the amount of
P200,000.00 for which petitioner’s wife signed a receipt prepared by the Respondent.

3. After the lapse of one year, without Siojo selling the property, Ruiz entered into an agreement
with one Mr. Francisco Joaquin to organize a corporation to develop the Magalawa Island property
into a tourist beach resort. However, after the lapse of another year without the corporation being
organized, Ruiz demanded from Mr. Joaquin the return of the owner’s duplicate copy of the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25102. The latter’s refusal to return said document prompted Ruiz
to file a replevin suit against Mr. Joaquin before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 3109-0, in which a judgment on the pleadings was rendered in favor of
Ruiz (Rollo, pp. 110-112). Said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
01727-R in its decision dated February 28,1988. Mr. Joaquin’s petition for review on certiorari was
denied by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated July 1, 1985 in G.R. 70350.

4. On or about February 23, 1983, Ruiz executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of herein
respondent Siojo to hamper Mr. Joaquin in holding TCT No. 25102, to protect the P200,000.00
advance payment by way of earnest money and for humanitarian reason that Mr. Siojo may show
the French Embassy that he is a propertied businessman to allow his daughter to become a nun in
France.

5. On March 1983, respondents Siojo and Caluntad approached and convinced petitioner Ruiz of
the necessity of filing a replevin suit by respondent Siojo against petitioner Ruiz to foreclose any
right which Mr. Joaquin may have over the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
37590 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch XCV). However, he was not informed
of the status of the case and by means of malicious, fraudulent and illegal manipulations, a
judgment was rendered in their favor, and through misrepresentations, succeeded in getting TCT
No. 25102 to the damage and prejudice of Ruiz in the amount of P1 M.

6. On May 28, 1985, Ruiz sold the property to Mr. Christian M. Prohn for P7.2 M; although the
latter was aware of the status of Ruiz’s title to the property.

7. Siojo, upon learning of the sale, pleaded for the return of the P300,000.00 to which Ruiz
agreed.

8. A Deed of Reconveyance was executed by Siojo in favor of Ruiz which was acknowledged before
Notary Public Jose Padolinas on September 27, 1985 as Document No. 445, Page No. 90, Book No.
487 Series of 1985.

9. In view of the contract of sale in favor of Mr. Prohn, Ruiz was assured by respondent Caluntad
that the decision of the Supreme Court as to appeal of Mr. Joaquin was forthcoming.

10. That unknown to Ruiz, Respondents, by conniving with one another, succeeded in getting TCT
No. 25102. It was only upon his inquiry at the Supreme Court that he learned that the title to the
property has been delivered to the Respondent.

11. Due to respondent Siojo’s refusal to return the TCT No. 25102, Ruiz filed the replevin case
before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales but later, he moved for its dismissal upon realizing the
need to nullify the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No.
37590.

Respondent Siojo filed his Answer with Counterclaim in CA-G.R. No. 15411 on September 26, 1988
(Rollo, pp. 59-83) while that of respondent Caluntad was filed on October 2, 1988 (Ibid., pp. 84-
107).chanrobles vi rt ualawlib ra ry chan roble s.com:c han robles. com.ph

On petitioner’s motion, the respondent Court of Appeals gave petitioner until August 22, 1989 to
file his amended petition (Ibid., p. 142). On September 21, 1989, petitioner’s amended petition
was admitted, the same having been filed within the period granted by the Court. Respondents
were required to answer the amended petition (Ibid., p. 163). Respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the September 21, 1989 Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals on October
12, 1989 pointing out that the petition was filed out of time and that Ruiz was directed to implead
the trial court that rendered the decision sought to be annulled but he also impleaded Atty.
Jambora which is in violation to Rule 10 of the Rules of Court (Ibid., pp. 282-285). On October 20,
1989, respondent Court of Appeals required petitioner to comment on respondent Siojo’s Motion
for Reconsideration (Ibid., p. 286). Ruiz filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to Comment
wherein he stated that respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration is pro-forma, hence on the basis of
the time-honored principle of law — res ipsa loquitur — submitted the incident for resolution (Ibid.,
p. 168).

On February 28, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals issued the questioned resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"WHEREFORE, for late filing of the amended petition; and for petitioner’s failure, among other
things, to file his opposition or comment on respondents’ motion for reconsideration dated October
12, 1989 despite being required to do so, among other things, Our resolution of September 21,
1989 is hereby set aside, the amended petition filed on August 23, 1989 is denied admission, and
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

(Ibid., p. 171).

Ruiz filed his motion for reconsideration of March 26, 1990 (Ibid., p. 172) which was denied by the
respondent Court of Appeals on May 8, 1990.

Hence, this petition which was given due course on January 16, 1991. On the same day, the notice
of death of the petitioner, filed by his counsel, Atty. Eduardo Balaoing, with the information that
the petitioner is survived by his widow Lourdes E. Ruiz and children Alman, Paul, Joan and Joseph,
all surnamed Ruiz, with residence and postal address at 88 Jose Abad Santos St., Heroes Hill,
Quezon City, with prayer that copies of court processes be sent to them to give them reasonable
time to hire the services of another counsel, was noted and granted (Ibid., p. 353).

Petitioner Ruiz submits that the respondent court seriously erred when it dismissed CA-G.R. No.
15411 on mere technical grounds. He admits that the amended petition was f led one day late but
such delay is not sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the petition. He stressed that the amended
petition was admitted by respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated September 21, 1989,
which also directed the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch XCV) to
elevate the complete records of Civil Case No. 37590 (Petitioner’s Memorandum p. 420).

He asserts that a closer scrutiny of his Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to Comment dated
November 20, 1989 would show that his counsel filed his comment when he made the following
statement: chanroble s virtualawl ibra ry c hanro bles. com:chan rob les.com. ph

"However, it may be amiss to state that the petitioners motion for Leave of Court to admit
Amended Petition well explained the necessity of amending the aforesaid petition, which motion
for reconsideration of respondent’s failed (to) refute; the latter’s motion for reconsideration is
utmost (sic) pro-forma; hence, on the basis of the time-honored principle of law — RES IPSO
LOQUITOR — petitioner, most respectfully submit the incident for resolution." cra law virt ua1aw li bra ry

Accordingly, Ruiz insisted that considering the well established principle that pleadings should be
liberally construed, the respondent court should have considered the aforequoted statement as his
comment (Ibid., pp. 423-444).

Ruiz further contends that the inclusion of Atty. Jambora as a party-respondent was neither aimed
to delay the early disposition of the case nor did it alter the cause of action. His inclusion was done
solely for the purpose of presenting a complete case that would settle the case in a single
proceeding (Ibid., p. 427).

On the other hand, respondent Siojo submits that the petitioner is guilty of gross negligence when
he failed to implead the trial judge that rendered the decision sought to be annulled and m filing
his petition beyond the period granted by the court despite the warning that no further extension
will be granted (Respondents’ Memorandum, Rollo, p. 386). Furthermore, even the instant petition
was filed out of time. The May 8, 1990 resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals was received
by the petitioner on May 18, 1990, from which date he had 15 days or until June 2, 1990 to appeal
to this Court. He was granted a 30-day extension or until July 3, 1990 to file this petition.
However, records show that this petition was filed on July 12, 1990 which is clearly beyond the
period allowed by the Court (Ibid., p. 390).

It is well settled that litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits, and not
on technicalities, and that every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his case, free from unacceptable plea of technicalities. This Court,
in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, may disregard technicalities in order to resolve the case on its
merits based on evidence (Tesorero v. Mathay, 185 SCRA 124 [May 8, 1990]).

A careful perusal of the records however shows that even if the issue of technicalities is
disregarded, and the case be decided on the merits, still no sufficient grounds can be found to
grant the petition.

In his petition filed before the respondent Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 15411, Ruiz
sought to annul the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch XCV) in
Civil Case No. 37590 which was allegedly obtained through deceit and malicious manipulation and
that he was never notified of any proceeding concerning the case. But certain requirements must
be established before a judgment can be the subject of an action for annulment. A judgment can
be annulled only on two (2) grounds: (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of
due process of law; or (b) it has been obtained by fraud (Mercado v. Ubay, 187 SCRA 719 [July
24, 1990]). An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character. It is regarded as extrinsic or collateral where it has prevented a
party from having a trial or from presenting all of his case to the court (Asian Security and
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Island Steel, Inc., 118 SCRA 233 [November 15, 1982]).

A perusal of the records reveals that none of these grounds exists to warrant the annulment of the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s receipt of the summons is shown by the return submitted by
the sheriff dated June 24, 1983 (Original Records, p. 15). He was represented by Atty. H.A.
Jambora who, on July 8, 1983, filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File an Answer
(Ibid., pp. 17-18) which, however, was not filed despite the extension granted by the lower court.
Nevertheless, Atty. H.A. Jambora was consistently furnished copy of court orders as well as the
decision rendered by the court a quo as shown by the registry receipts on record. It has been
settled that when a party appears by counsel in an action in court, all notices required to be given
must be served to the counsel and not to the client, for the rule is that notice to the counsel is
notice to the client (Lincoln Gerard, Inc. v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 701 [July 23, 1990]). He cannot,
therefore allege that he was not aware of the case and that he was not given a chance to present
his case in court.

Upon the other hand, there is no allegation of fraud whether intrinsic or extrinsic. cha nrob les.co m:cralaw: red

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.