PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION
V. POSSESSION Whether or not ownership over Langcaan Property was properl7y
Possession And Kinds
3. Elements
Case 1. Yu v Pacleb
FACTS:
Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife Angelita Chan are registered
owners of an 18,000-square meter parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, covered by TCT No. T-118375 (Langcaan
Property). On Feb. 27, 1992, Spouses Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita
Chan sold the property to Rebecca del Rosario. On May 7, 1992, an
absolut deed of sale was made between del Rosario and to Ruperto
Javier in favor of the latter. On Nov. 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell was
entered into between Javier and Spouses Yu wherein petitioner
spouses agreed to pay Javier P200,000 as partial payment and
P400,000 to be paid upon execution of the contract, and Javier
undertook to deliver possession of the Langcaan Property and to sign a
deed of absolute sale within 30 days from execution of contract.
All the aforementioned sales were not registered. In 1993, spouses Yu
filed a complaint with the RTC for specific performance and damages
against Javier, docketed as Civil Case No. 741-93, to compel Javier to
deliver to them ownership and possession as well as title of the
property. They also contended that Javier represented to them that
the Langcaan Property was not tenanted, but after they already paid
P200,000 as initial payment and entered into the agreement of sale on
Sept. 11, 1992, they discovered that it was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb,
son of Baltazar Pacleb. Subsequently, spouses Yu demanded for the
cancellation of the agreement and for the return of their initial
payment. RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Yu. In the said case, Javier
was defaulted for not appearing in the proceeding and the decision
gained finality.
On March 10, 1995, spouses Yu, Ramon, and the latter’s wife executed
a “Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng
Pagtalikod sa Karapatan” where spouses Yu paid Ramon P500,000 in
exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the subject
property. But on Oct. 12, 1995, Baltazar Pacleb filed a complaint for
annulment of the deed of sale to Javier, alleging that the deed of sale
executed between him and his late first wife Angelita was spurious as
their signatures were forgeries. Meanwhile, on Nov. 23, 1995, spouses
Yu filed an action for forcible entry against respondent with the MTC
alleging that they had prior physical possession of the Langcaan
Property through their trustee Ramon until the latter was ousted by
respondent in Sept. 1995. MTC ruled in favor of spouses Yu, affirmed
by the RTC, but set aside by CA.
His first action for annulment of deed of sale having been dismissed,
respondent filed action for removal of cloud from title on May 29,
1996, contending that the deed of sale between him and his late first
wife and Rebecca del Rosario could not have been executed on Feb.
27, 1992, because on said date, he was residing in the U.S. and his
late first wife died 20 years ago. During pendency of the case,
respondent died, succeeded by his surviving spouse and
representatives of children with his first wife. RTC held that spouses Yu
are purchasers in good faith, but on appeal, CA reversed and set aside
lower court’s decision and ordered for the cancellation of the
annotation in favor of spouses Yu on the TCT of Langcaan Property.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value
and in good faith.
The Other Side | EH 407 1
vested in petitioner by virtue of the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93
(Specific Performance with damages filed by Spouses Yu against
Javier)
HELD:
Spouses Yu said in their testimony that they had prior inspection of the
land in the guidance of Ramon before buying the property. This is not
true because according to their allegation in the case for specific
performance, it was only at the time they paid for initial payment that
they discovered the property was tenanted by Ramon. This
inconsistency casts grave doubts as to whether spouses did personally
inspect the property before buying it.
Petitioner spouses are not innocent purchasers for value, and they are
not in good faith.
First, the property remains to be registered in the name of respondent
despite the 2 Deeds of Absolute Sale from respondent to Del Rosario
then from the latter to Javier, and both deeds were not even
annotated in the title of the subject property.
Second, the 2 deeds of absolute sale were executed only 2 months
apart containing identical provisions.
Third, the fact that the Langcaan Property is in the possession of
Ramon, son of the registered owners, this should have made petitioner
spouses suspicious as to the veracity of the alleged title of their
vendor, Javier. Petitioner spouses could have easily verified the true
status of the subject property from Ramon’s wife, since the latter is
their relative.
The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys
from the registered owner himself.
Corollary, it requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys
from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land
object of the transaction is registered. While one who buys from the
registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title,
one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to
examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances
necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the
transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land.
Petitioner spouses argue that the decision of the Regional Trial Court
in Civil Case No. 741-93 as to the rightful owner of the Langcaan
Property is conclusive and binding upon respondent even if the latter
was not a party thereto since it involved the question of possession
and ownership of real property, and is thus not merely an action in
personam but an action quasi in rem.
Civil Case No. 741-93 is an action for specific performance and
damages filed by petitioner spouses against Javier to compel
performance of the latters undertakings under their Contract to Sell. ,
Its object is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the
purchase price, and to execute a deed of absolute sale over the
Langcaan Property in their favor. The obligations of Javier under the
contract to sell attach to him alone, and do not burden the Langcaan
Property. Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to
be heard. Neither can respondent be considered as privy thereto since
his signature and that of his late first wife, Angelita Chan, were forged
in the deed of sale.
PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION
10. Doctrine of Constructive Possession
Case 2. Republic v Jacob
Summary:
A government declaration was issued reserving a parcel of land for
development of geothermal energy. A portion of the subject lot was
under an application for registration. The period of possession and
occupancy after such proclamation could no longer be tacked in favor
of the claimant. Further, private respondent cannot tack her own
possession of the property to that of her parents because there no
evidence that the parents ever had open, continuous, adverse and
actual possession of the lot.
FACTS:
On August 14, 1970, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 739, "Establishing as Reservation for the Purpose of
the Exploration, Development, Exploitation and Utilization of
Geothermal Energy, Natural Gas and Methane Gas a Parcel of Land in
the Province of Albay, Island of Luzon, Philippines." Lot No. 4094 of
the Malinao Cadastre, consisting of 15,520 square meters, is covered
by the said proclamation.
On May 6, 1994, private respondent, a retired public school teacher,
filed an application with the RTC of Albay for the confirmation and
registration of her alleged title over Lot No. 4094 which was opposed
by the Republic through the OSG.
Private respondent appended to her application the tracing cloth plan
of the property under the name of Sotero Bondal. The blue print, dated
February 27, 1991, was prepared and signed by Geodetic Engineer del
Valle and approved by the Chief, and Regional Surveys Division of the
Lands Management Service. Per Report of the LRA dated September
27, 1994, the property was the subject of an application for
registration but "no decision has been rendered thereon, or if there
had been any, no copy of the same was furnished to the [Land
Registration Authority]." The report also states that the property is
covered by Free Patent No. V-13062 dated May 21, 1955. Private
respondent had also applied for a free patent over the property, but
withdrew her application in a Letter dated October 27, 1994 addressed
to the DENR, Region V, Legaspi City.
Private respondent alleged that Bondal sold the property to Macario
Monjardin, a brother of private respondent's mother. Macario declared
the property in his name for tax purposes. Since Macario was residing
in Manila and was unable to cultivate the property, he asked his sister,
Josefa to be his encargado. By then, private respondent was already a
17-year old substitute teacher who then accompanied her mother in
supervising the planting and harvesting of palay and the improvement
of the lot. Macario decided to marry and that he sold the property to
the parents of the private respondent but failed to declare the property
for taxation purposes under their names. When her parents died,
private respondent executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Adjudication
where she declared that as sole heir of the spouses Patricio.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the applicant.
CA rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision.
ISSUE: WON the private respondent/claimant was a qualified
applicant
RULING:
NO.
The Other Side | EH 407 2
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the
following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
In the case at bar, when private respondent filed her application with
the RTC on May 6, 1994, Lot No. 4094 was no longer alienable and
disposable property of the public domain, since as of August 14, 1970,
by virtue of Proclamation No. 739, it was segregated from the public
domain and declared part of the reservation for the development of
geothermal energy. Private respondent filed her application for
confirmation 24 years after the said proclamation was issued; thus, the
period of her possession and occupancy after such proclamation can
no longer be tacked in favor of the claimant.
In this case, however, private respondent failed to offer in evidence
the deed of sale purportedly executed by Sotero Bondal in favor of
Macario Monjardin as vendee. On cross-examination, she admitted that
the only deed of sale she had was the deed of absolute sale Macario
Monjardin executed in favor of her parents, the spouses Igmedio
Patricio. The documentary evidence adduced by private respondent
even belies her claim that Sotero Bondal sold the property to her
uncle. She even failed to identify "B.C. Monjardin," much less explain
whether such person was really her uncle. She even failed to adduce in
evidence any tax declaration over the property under his name and
that he paid the realty taxes for the property from 1930 to 1946.
As pointed out by petitioner, private respondent failed to adduce clear
and convincing evidence that by August 14, 1970, she had already
acquired ownership over the property by herself or through her
predecessors-in-interest through open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the property since 1945 or
earlier. There is thus no evidence that the parents of private
respondent ever had open, continuous, adverse and actual possession
of Lot No. 4094.
Case 3. Sarmiento v Lesaca
FACTS:
On January 18, 1949, plaintiff Alejandra Vda. De Sarmiento bought
from defendant Josefa Lesaca two parcels of land for P5,000. After the
sale, plaintiff tried to take actual possession of the two parcels of land
but was prevented by doing so by one Martin Deloso who claims to be
the owner thereof.
On December 12, 1949, plaintiff wrote defendant asking the latter
either to change the lands sold with another of the same kind and
class or to return the purchase price together with the expenses she
had incurred in the execution of the sale, plus 6 per cent interest; and
that since defendant did not agree to this proposition as evidenced by
her letter dated December 21, 1949, plaintiff filed the present action.
RTC rendered judgment declaring the deed of sale entered into
between plaintiff and defendant rescinded
ISSUE:
whether the execution of the deed of sale in a public document is
equivalent to delivery of possession of the lands sold to appellee thus
relieving Lesaca of the obligation to place Sarmiento in actual
possession thereof
Can plaintiff rescind the contract of sale in view of defendant's failure
to deliver the possession of the lands?
RULING:
PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION
No. Articles 1461 and 1462 of the Civil Code provide that when a
contract of sale is executed, the vendor is bound to deliver to the
vendee the thing sold by placing the vendee in the control and
possession of the subject-matter of the contract. However, if the sale
is executed by means of a public instrument, the mere execution of
the instrument is equivalent to delivery unless the contrary appears or
is clearly to be inferred from such instrument.
However in the instant case, there is no stipulation in the sale in
question from which we can infer that the vendor did not intend to
deliver outright the possession of the lands to the vendee.
On the contrary, it can be clearly seen therein that the vendor
intended to place the vendee in actual possession of the lands
immediately as can be inferred from the stipulation that the vendee
"takes actual possession thereof . . . with full rights to dispose, enjoy
and make use thereof in such manner and form as would be most
advantageous to herself." The possession referred to in the contract
evidently refers to actual possession and not merely symbolical
inferable from the mere execution of the document.
Although it is postulated in the same article (Art. 1462[2]) that the
execution of a public document is equivalent to delivery, this legal
fiction only holds true when there is no impediment that may prevent
the passing of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of
the vendee.
Yes. In a contract of sale the obligation of the parties is reciprocal,
and, as provided by law, in case one of the parties fails to comply with
what is incumbent upon him to do, the person prejudiced may either
exact the fulfillment of the obligation or rescind the sale.
11. Concept of Possession and Occupation in Registration
Cases
Case 4. Malabanan v Republic
Facts:
Malabanan filed an application for judicial confirmation of title with the
RTC in 1998. He claimed that he bought the property from Velazco;
that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years. To
prove that the property was alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, he presented a certification from Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR which verified the land
to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 approved on March 15, 1982. He also provided Tax
Declarations, the earliest of which was dated 1948. The trial court
approved his application.
The OSG appealed from the decision.
The CA ruled that any period of possession prior to the classification of
the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from computation of the period of possession. Since the land
was declared alienable and disposable only in March 15 1982, CA was
of the opinion that Velazco’s possession of the property prior to that
date could not be factored in the computation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not OSG’s contention (sustained by the CA) is correct?
Whether or not Malabanan has proved the requisite possession and
occupation contemplated under the law?
The Other Side | EH 407 3
RULING:
ISSUE I.
The interpretation given by the OSG and the CA, if upheld, would in
effect preclude the lands declared as alienable and disposable after
June 12, 1945 from getting registered either under the Property
Registration Decree and Public Land Act. This is an absurd implication,
said the Supreme Court.
In elucidating, the Supreme Court cited the case of Naguit:
Such interpretation (of the OSG) is not borne out by the plain meaning
of Section 14(1). “Since June 12, 1945” qualifies its antecedent phrase
“under a bona fide claim of ownership”. Qualifying words restrict or
modify only words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated.
Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable.
The more reasonable interpretation is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration of title is filed.
ISSUE 2:
In the case at bar, there was no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest
that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidence — the Tax Declarations they presented in particular — is to
the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Thus, the OSG is wrong in saying that the land must be alienable and
disposable since June 12, 1945. It is enough that the land be alienable
and disposable at the time of the application for registration was
made. And second, “possession and occupation” is the requisite that
should have started before or since June 12, 1945.
12. How exercised
Case 5. Chua-Burce v CA
Recit Ready
The petitioner is the respondent bank’s cash custodian. On August
1985, a total of P150,000 shortage was discovered. Upon
investigation, the petitioner was unable to explain the loss. She was
terminated and an estafa case was filed against her. The lower courts
ruled in favor of the bank. The Supreme Court now addresses the
issue of the validity of the criminal case regarding the establishment of
the requisites of estafa. The Supreme Court ruled that the first
requisite of estafa through conversion or misappropriation is absent.
The 1st requisite is that personal property is received in trust, on
commission, for administration or under any other circumstance
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond. When the money,
goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from
the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical
possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over
the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.
Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical
possession over the missing funds. Hence, the element of juridical
PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION
possession being absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of
estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Facts:
On August 1985, the Manager Rocamora of Metrobank Calapan Branch
(respondent bank) discovered a shortage of P150,000. Supposedly,
there should have been P4,000,000 from the vault but upon cash
count, there was only a total of P 3,850,000. Upon investigation, the
shortage was traced back to the bank’s cash custodian, Chua-Burce
(petitioner). The petitioner was unable to explain the loss so the bank
decided to terminate her and file an estafa through conversion and
misappropriation case.
Lower court’s ruling- The courts decided that the petitioner is guilty
with estafa. The ruling was based on Article 315 of the Civil Code.
Issue: WON the petitioner is guilty of estafa
SC Ruling
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is not guilty with estafa
through conversion or misappropriation.
The e elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation
under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for
administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is
guaranteed by a bond;
(2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person
who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it;
(3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another
and
(4) that there be demand for the return of the property.
The first requisite is absent. When the money, goods, or any other
personal property is received by the offender from the offended party
(1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender
acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession
of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which
gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may
set up even against the owner. In this case, petitioner was a cash
custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her
possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank
teller, both being mere bank employees.
Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical
possession over the missing funds. Hence, the element of juridical
possession being absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of
estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Other Side | EH 407 4
14. Possession in concept of holder
Case 6. Carlos v Republic
Facts:
On Dec 2001, petitioner represented by her daughter filed an
application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of
land located at Pusawan, Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Petitioner
alleged, among others, that she is the owner of said parcel of land
which she openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied
since July 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide claim of ownership;
that there is no mortgage or encumbrance affecting said property, nor
is it part of any military or naval reservation; that the property is being
used for industrial purposes; and that there are no tenants or lessees
on the property. Petitioner further claimed that she has been in
possession of the subject land in the concept of an owner for over 50
years.
The Republic opposed such application. Subsequently, petitioner
presented testimonial evidence that the subject property belonged
Jose Carlos. The same person planted it with palay and sold the
harvest. The petitioner is his daughter. After his death, petitioner
inherited the property and took possession in the concept of an owner.
However, Teresita stated on the witness stand that together with her
co-heirs agreed to undertake the titling of the property to be delivered
to Ususan Development Corporation which bought the property.
DENR confirmed that the same land is alienable and disposable with no
record of any application.
Trial Court granted the application. But on appeal, CA reversed and set
it aside. It noted that their possession ended in 1996 when the sale
occurred, thus, they cannot apply for the titling.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners hold the property in the concept
of an owner.
Ruling:
It is clear in the case at bar that the applicant, Maria Carlos, no longer
had possession of the property at the time of the application for the
issuance of a certificate of title. The application was filed in court on
December 19, 2001. Teresita Carlos Victoria, the daughter of Maria
Carlos, admitted during the hearing that her mother had sold the
property to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996. They also
presented as evidence the deed of absolute sale executed by and
between Maria Carlos and Ususan Development Corporation on
October 16, 1996. The document states, among others:
xxx
4. That the VENDOR, by this Deed hereby transfer(s) possession of the
property to the VENDEE.
This contradicts petitioners claim that she was in possession of the
property at the time that she applied for confirmation of title.
Nonetheless, even if it were true that it was petitioner who had actual
possession of the land at that time, such possession was no longer in
the concept of an owner. Possession may be had in one of two ways:
possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A
possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself
or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who
possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a
superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his
PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION

belief be right or wrong. Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of

the property to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996 and in fact
promised to deliver the certificate of title to the corporation upon its
obtention. Hence, it cannot be said that her possession since 1996 was
under a bona fideclaim of ownership. Under the law, only he who
possesses the property under a bona fide claim of ownership is entitled
to confirmation of title.
Additional Concept: Actual possession
Facts:
Lots 1557 and 1558 are lots subject of the case. Owner Lim Kok
Chiong sold the lots to Legaspi Avenue Hardware Company (LAHCO)
sometime in the early 60’s. However, Felix Lim, Lim Kok Chiong’s
brother, filed a complaint to annul the deeds of sale on the ground
that he owns 3/14 pro-indiviso shares of the lots.

Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following:

(a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
1st req-present
2nd req-lacking
The Court held in Republic vs. Alconab that the applicant must show
that he is in actual possession of the property at the time of the
application, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction []and[], the clear intention of the law is
not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with
the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
15. Possessor in good faith; in bad faith
A notice of lis pendens was inscribed over the TCT No 2580 and 2581
covering the two lots. Later, the case was dropped against Lim Kok
Chiong on the motion of Felix Lim. The trial court declared LAHCO to
be the absolute owner of the lots, and ordered the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens. However, the notice of lis pendes on TCT 2581
remained uncancelled because the duplicate owner’s copy was with
Continental Bank, Lot 1558 having been mortgaged by LAHCO to said
bank.
Felix Lim appealed to the CA and during its pendency, LAHCO sold the
two lots to petitioners Po Lam. Petitioners had the notice of lis
pendens cancelled and thereafter new TCTs 8102 and 13711 were
issued to the petitioners.
The CA ruled that Felix Lim, could exercise the right of redemption
over the said two lots sold by Lim Kok Chiong to LAHCO.
In a new civil case, Felix lim moved to have the CA resolution
annotated on the new TCT’s. however this motion was denied by the
RTC on the ground that Po Lam were not impleaded as party litigants
in the CA case. However the trial court reserved to Lim the right to
institute an action on whether or not the acquisition of the properties
in question by Po lam were made in good faith or bad faith.

Requisites In the meantime, after petitioners bought the two lots from LAHCO,
they leased the commercial building to respondent Jose Lee. Upon
expiration of the lease agreement, Jose Lee refused to pay rentals to
Case 7. Po Lam v CA petitioners, informing them that he would deposit the rentals in court
since Felix Lim had promised to sell the property to him. This
Recit Ready Digest: prompted the petitioners to file an unlawful detainer against Jose Lee.

Petitioners Spouses Po Lam bought Lot 1557 and 1558 from Legaspi
Avenue Hardware Company (LAHCO). However, the acquisition of Subsequently, Felix Lim assigned all his rights to Jose Lee.
LAHCO from Lim Kok Chiong was questioned by the vendor’s brother,
Felix Lim on the ground that he owns 3/14 pro indiviso shares of the
lots. Felix Lim caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendes on the
In the interim, the civil case for reconveyance and annulment of sale
TCT of the two lots. In the civil case for cancellation of the deed of
filed by Felix Lim (now Jose Lee) was decided in favor of respondents.
sale from Kok Chiong to LAHCO, the RTC ruled that LAHCO is the
The RTC declared petitioners transferees pendente lite and not
absolute owner and cancelled the notice of lis pendens over the 2 lots;
purchasers in good faith.
however only one notice was cancelled as the other TCT ow’er's copy
was with Continental Bank after LAHCO mortgaged it. It was at this The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
time that petitioners purchased the lot from LAHCO. The issue of this
case is whether or not petitioners should be considered purchasers in The SC affirmed the CA decision, hence this motion for
bad faith considering that there was a notice of lis pendens over the reconsideration.
title of the property at the time of purchase. The SC, in granting this Issue: W/N it was an error to hold the petitioners as
motion for reconsideration, held that the petitioners could not be purchasers in bad faith.
considered as purchasers in bad faith. Even though there was a notice
of lis pendens over the 2 lots, there was also an order from the court
ordering such notices to be cancelled. Under the purview of Art 526 of
the New Civil Code, petitioners cannot be considered as being “aware
of a flaw which invalidates their acquisition of the thing” since the Held:
alleged flaw, was already being ordered cancelled at the time of the
purchase.

The Other Side | EH 407 5

PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION
Yes, it must be stressed that the sole basis for finding petitioners to
be purchasers in bad faith was the subsistence of the notice of lis
pendes inscribed in the TCT at the time petitioner purchased the lots in
dispute. However, it must be pointed out that even if a notice of lis
pendens on TCT 2581 was still subsisting at the time of purchase,
there was a court order ordering the annotation be cancelled.
A possessor in good faith has been defined as “one who is unaware
that there exists a flaw which invalidates his acquisition of the thing”
(art 526 NCC).
In this case, while petitioners bought the land while a notice of lis
pendens was still annotated, there was also a court order cancelling
the same. Petitioners cannot be considered as being “aware of a flaw
which their acquisition of the thing” since the alleged flaw was already
being ordered cancelled at the time of the purchase. On this ground
alone, petitioner can already be considered buyers in good faith.
ii. Concept of Good Faith
Case 8. Heirs of M. Cabal v Sps. L&R Cabal
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a parcel
of land situated. Sometime in 1954, Marcelo died, survived by his
wife and his children. It appears that sometime in 1949, five years
before he died, Marcelo allowed his son, Marcelino, to build his house
on a portion of the lot. Since then, Marcelino resided thereon. Later,
Marcelino’s son also built his house on the disputed property.
In 1964, Marcelo’s heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves the
lot. In the interim, based on a consolidated subdivision plan, it was
revealed that Marcelino and his son occupied and built their houses on
an area located on the southernmost portion of another lot and not the
adjacent lot designated to him. The spouses Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal
(respondents) confronted Marcelino on this matter which resulted to
an agreement to a re-survey and swapping of lots for the purpose of
reconstruction of land titles. However, the agreed resurvey and
swapping of lots did not materialize.
Hence, respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with
Damages against Marcelino. They alleged that Marcelino introduced
improvements in bad faith on their land with knowledge that the
adjacent lot is titled in his name. Marcelino contends that respondents
have no cause of action against him because he has been in
possession in good faith since 1949 with the respondents’ knowledge
and acquiescence. He further avers that acquisitive prescription has set
in.
Issue:
Whether or not Marcelino is a builder in good faith
Ruling:
Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until the time he
was informed by respondents of his encroachment on their property.
Marcelino’s possession of the disputed lot was based on a mistaken
belief that the lot covered by his title is the same lot on which he has
built his house with the consent of his father. There is no evidence,
other than bare allegation, that Marcelino was aware that he intruded
The Other Side | EH 407 6
on respondents’ property when he continued to occupy and possess
the disputed lot after partition was effected.
Case 9. Negrete v CFI of Marinduque
Doctrine: “The possessor in good faith is the one who is not aware
of any flaw in his title or mode of acquisition; conversely, one who is
aware of such flaw is a possessor in bad faith.” (Art. 525 Civil Code)
Recit-Ready:
In 1967, Negrete filed an action for recovery against Maderazo alleging
that they have been in an open and peaceful possession of their land
since 1945 when defendant forcibly entered their land in 1954 and
started cultivating it. Maderazo denied the claims of plaintiff and
asserted that they already became the owners of the land through
acquisitive prescription having possessed it in good faith within a
period of 10 years. There is good faith because the defendant’s
possession is by virtue of the deed of sale executed by said Tito
Oriendo. The issue herein is whether or not the deed of sale can be a
valid basis for their good faith in order to justify their acquisition. The
Court ruled that Maderazo is not a possessor in good faith. A deed of
sale, in order to constitute a just title and to generate a good faith for
the ordinary acquisitive prescription of 10 years, should refer to the
same parcel of land, which is adversely possessed. In the case at bar,
the deed of sale in favor of Maderazo covers a parcel of land patently
different from the disputed land owned by plaintiff as to area, location
and boundary owners. It was later found out that the land sold by Tito
Oriendo was distinct from the land of Negrete as to location,
boundaries and area. Maderazo is a possessor in bad faith and can
only acquire ownership by extraordinary acquisitive prescription thru
an adverse possession of 30 years (Art. 1137 Civil Code).
FACTS:
On 1956, plaintiff Negrete filed a forcible entry suit against Igmedio
Maderazo alleging that they have been in a peaceful occupation and
possession over a 9 hectare parcel of land since 1945 when said
defendant, through strategy, force, intimidation and stealth unlawfully
entered the northern portion of their land and cultivated it.
Defendant asserted that the land he is presently cultivating is a
different land so an ocular inspection was conducted on the disputed
land to determine whether the area cultivated by Maderazo is the
same land claimed by plaintiff as the northern portion of her land
under Tax Declaration No. 8431. The ocular inspection showed that it
was the same land.
The municipal trial court decided in favor of Maderazo based on the
finding that the defendant has been in a material and physical
possession of said land since 1951 when he bought it.
The plaintiff did not file an appeal. Instead, she filed an action for
recovery of ownership of property (reinvindicatoria) after the lapse of
10 years against defendant alleging that she is the owner of the 9 ha.
parcel of land in Putting Buhangin having inherited the same from her
father and that when defendant entered in 1957, she repeatedly
prohibited the defendant from making any improvement but the latter
threatened her with bodily harm. The defendant, on the other hand,
denied the allegations and asserted that he bought the northern
portion in 1954 from Tito Oriendo as proven by their tax declaration
and deed of sale.
PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION
The Court of First Instance again decided in favor of Maderazo
declaring that the deed of sale was perfectly valid and even if there
was flaw in their title, the defendant would still have the land through
acquisitive prescription having possesses it in good faith within a
period of 10 years. There is good faith because the defendant’s
possession is by virtue of the deed of sale.
ISSUE: WON the deed of sale executed by Tito Oriendo on August 30,
1954 in favor of Maderazo could be considered as a valid basis for
good faith and as a just title, in order to justify the acquisition of the
disputed land by ordinary prescription thru adverse possession of only
10 years
RULING:
No. A deed of sale, in order to constitute a just title and to generate a
good faith for the ordinary acquisitive prescription of 10 years, should
refer to the same parcel of land, which is adversely possessed. In the
case at bar, the deed of sale in favor of Maderazo covers a parcel of
land patently different from the disputed land owned by plaintiff as to
area, location and boundary owners.
It was later found out that the land sold by Tito Oriendo was distinct
from the land of Negrete as to location, boundaries and area. The land
of Negrete is 9 ha located in Sitio Putting Buhangin, Mogpog, while the
land of defendant is only 3,700sqm and situated in barrio Puyog, Boac.
The 2 parcels have also different boundary owners.
Defendant cannot claim good faith in occupying said land on the basis
of the said deed of sale. Having signed the deed of sale, which clearly
states that the southern half of the portion containing an area of
3,700sqm was the parcel he acquired from his vendor which is located
in barrio Puyog, Boac, Marinduque. He is therefore aware that the land
sold to him is situated in Barrio Puyog and is only about 3,700sqm not
the 9ha in barrio Putting Buhangin belonging to plaintiff. Tito Oriendo
did not also testify in the forcible entry suit. Moreover, defendant did
not submit any tax declaration or tax receipts in the name of Tito
Oriendo.
Maderazo is a possessor in bad faith and can only acquire ownership
by extraordinary acquisitive prescription thru an adverse possession of
30 years (Art. 1137 Civil Code). Since he only occupied it from 1954-
1967 (13 years), his claim is untenable.
Case 10. Baltazar v Caridad
The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, in a Cadastral Case No. 54,
CLRO Cad. Case No. 1222, compelled respondents Silvina Caridad and
Eduarda Caridad to remove their houses built on the southern portion
of Lot No. 8864 within thirty days from receipt of said order and
awarded Lot No. 8864 to the spouses as their conjugal property.
This case is an appeal of the above ruling.
Facts:
While the lot was still in the process of being registered and eventually
getting transcribed. Julio Baltazar, the registered owner of said Lot No.
8854, died. His wife and children, filed a motion, in the cadastral case,
praying for writ of possession against respondents Silvina Caridad and
her daughter, Eduarda Caridad, who had been in possession of the
southern portion of said Lot No. 8864 since 1939, while the cadastral
case involving said lot was pending before the trial court, and before
The Other Side | EH 407 7
the decision was rendered and the corresponding decree issued in
1941.
The trial court issued an order, granted petitioners' motion, and
overruled respondents' opposition but directed the sheriff not to
remove or destroy the permanent improvements on the lot without an
express command. On January 2, 1962, the order having become final,
the sheriff enforced the writ and placed petitioners in possession of the
southern portion of the lot.
On March 20, 1962, the trial court, after due hearing, granted
petitioners' motion, ordered respondents to remove their respective
houses from the southern portion of said lot No. 8864 within thirty
days from receipt of said order.
Issues: Whether or not respondents-appellants the court sitting as a
cadastral court has the power to order the removal of the respondents
houses which were built in the disputed lot long after the issuance of
the final decree of registration.
Whether or not the respondents are good faith builders and therefore
covered by Art. 448 of the Civil Code?
SC Ruling: The above contentions of respondents are without merit.
The late Andres Caridad, his surviving spouse, respondent Silvina
Caridad, and their children, one of whom is respondent were in
possession of the southern portion of undisputed lot; and that
respondent Eduarda Caridad claims right and title thereto as a mere
heir and successor-in-interest of said Andres Caridad.
Under these circumstances, we hold that the order, dated March 20,
1962, of the cadastral court, granting petitioners' motion to compel
respondents to remove their respective houses from the disputed lot,
is valid and enforceable against respondents. In the case of Marcelo
vs. Mencias, etc., et al., L-15609, April 29, 1960, 58 O.G. 3349, this
Court had already upheld the jurisdiction or authority of the court of
first instance, sitting as a land registration court, to order, as a
consequence of the writ of possession issued by it, the demolition of
improvements introduced by the successor-in-interest of a defeated
oppositor in the land registration case.
Appellants can not be regarded as builders in good faith because they
are bound by the 1941 decree of registration that obligated their
parents and predecessors-in-interest. Good faith must rest on a
colorable right in the builder, beyond a mere stubborn belief in one's
title despite judicial adjudication. The fact that in 1959 appellants
demolished and replaced their old house with new and bigger ones can
not enervate the rights of the registered owners. Otherwise, the rights
of the latter to enjoy full possession of their registered property could
be indefinitely defeated by an unsuccessful opponent through the
simple subterfuge of replacing his old house with a new one from time
to time.
Wherefore, the appealed order should be, as it is hereby affirmed.
With costs against respondents-appellants.
iii. Concept of Bad Faith
Case 11. Heirs of Roxas v CA
Facts:
This petition stems from a case filed by Trinidad de Leon Vda. De
Roxas to set aside the decree of registration over two unregistered
parcels of land in Tagaytay City granted to Maguesun Management
and Development Corporation (Maguesun) before the Regional Trial
Court on the ground of actual fraud. The RTC and CA denied the
petition, but the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts decisions
and ordered the cancellation of titles in the name of Maguesun and
ordered to issue a new one in the name of Roxas.
PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION
Meycauayan filed a motion to intervene alleging that it bought 3
properties from Maguesun which are part of the litigation between
Roxas and Maguesun; that it is a purchased in good faith for value, the
court should afford it opportunity to be heard. SC denied the petition.
Subsequently, Meycauayan filed a complaint for reconveyance,
damages and quieting of title against Roxas and Maguesun raising the
same allegation that the company has a right to be protected because
it is a purchaser in good faith for value.
Roxas filed for a petition to cite for indirect contempt the officers of
Meycuayan.
Issue:
Whether or not Officers of Meycauyan is guilty of indirect contempt?
Whether or not it is a purchaser in good faith for value?
Held:
Yes, Meycauayan’s defiance of the Court’s Decision by filing an action
for reconveyance involving the same parcel of land which the Court
already decided with finality constitute indirect contempt.
Meycauayan’s obstinate refusal to abide by the court’s decision has no
basis; applying the doctrine of res judicata, the decision of the court
binds Meycauayan under the principle of privity of interest.
Moreover, the court ruled that Meycauayan has no rights over the
properties because it purchased the lands in BAD FAITH.
Contention: Meycauayan claims that the trial court had already
canceled the notice of lis pendens on the titles when it purchased the
lots from Maguesun. In its Memorandum, Meycauayan stresses that to
ensure the authenticity of the titles and the annotations appearing on
the titles, particularly the cancelation of the notice of lis pendens,
Meycauayan checked with the Register of Deeds and the Regional Trial
Court of Tagaytay City.
However the court explained, Since Meycauayan checked with the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Meycauayan then had actual
knowledge, before it purchased the lots, of the pending case involving
the lots despite the cancelation of the notice of lis pendens on the
titles.
Furthermore, as found by this Court in G.R. No. 118436 (Roxas v.
Maguesun), the Roxas family has been in possession of the property
uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez, who resided on
the property. Where the land sold is in the possession of a person
other than the vendor, the purchaser must go beyond the certificates
of title and make inquiries concerning the rights of the actual
possessor.
Meycauayan therefore cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good
faith and could not have acquired a better right than its predecessor-
in-interest. This Court has already rejected Meycauayans claim that it
was a purchaser in good faith when it ruled in G.R. No. 118436 that
there had been no intervening rights of an innocent purchaser for
value involving the lots in dispute.
The Other Side | EH 407 8
Indeed, one who buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and
defects of the title of his vendor and of a pending litigation over the
property gambles on the result of the litigation and is bound by the
outcome of his indifference. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts
which should put a reasonable man on guard and then claim that he
acted in good faith believing that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor.
Case 12. Benin v Tuazon
CONCEPT OF BAD FAITH – Whether or not OCT No. 735 of
Defendant can be cancelled
On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints
containing substantially the same allegations. In Civil Case No. 3621,
the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the
three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the
complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose)
in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal and that
they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin; In
Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners
and possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in
paragraph V of the complaint, and that these parcels of land were
inherited by them from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara.
In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and
possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La
Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal,
having an area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel
of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who
in turn inherited the same from his parents; and they and their
predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous
possession of the same; had said lands declared for taxation purposes.
The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their
respective complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were
enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants,
particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through
their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force
and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment,
illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the
dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the
improvements. They made inquiries regarding the probable claim of
defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their
lands, as described in their respective complaint, had either been
fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in
what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal
in the names of the original applicants for registration, now
defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta
Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion
Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the
registered owners had applied for the registration of two parcels of
land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate; that the
registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court
of Land Registration; They allege that the application for registration in
LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and
areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman
Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision
was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical
descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the area
of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the
area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as
published in the Official Gazette; that the amendments and alterations,
which were made after the publication of the original application, were
PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION
never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in
LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the
decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July
6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the
names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate
and Diliman Estate).
They contend that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681
is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction
to render the decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431
issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is
likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued
pursuant to a void decision and that Original Certificate of Title No.
735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void
from the beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of
registration. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiffs. A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965.
However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the court,
said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this
Court and an appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the
record on appeal. The record on appeal, after it had been corrected
and amended, as ordered and/or authorized by the trial court, was
approved on September 29, 1965
ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRC had jurisdiction to render the decision for the
reason that the amendment
to the original plan was not published.
FACTS:
a) Plaintiff-Appellee’s Arguments (Benin, et al. - Lost)
-Filed a case to nullify the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No.
735 to Defendant pursuant to LRC No. 7681
-Argued that LRC No. 7681 null and void from the beginning, because
it was issued pursuant to a void decision and because the boundaries,
technical descriptions and areas appearing in the decree are different
and not identical with the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas
in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette;
that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is
bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for
registration as published in the Official Gazette
b) Defendant-Appellant’s Arguments (Tuason, et al. - Win)
-
ISSUE:
- Whether or not OCT No. 735 of Defendant can be cancelled
RULING:
Conclusion:
OCT No. 735 of Defendant is valid. The appeal is dismissed
Rule:
- It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the
original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings by
the addition of lands not previously included in the original plan should
publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to
order the registration of the area that was added after the publication
of the original plan. 22
- The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had
acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the
The Other Side | EH 407 9
registration proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application,
that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described
in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of registration
had included land or lands not included in the original application as
published, then the registration proceedings and the decree of
registration must be declared null and void in so far — but only in so
far — as the land not included in the publication is concerned. This is
so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land not
included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of the
jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of
registration, relating to the lands that were included in the publication,
are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued
covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the
certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or
lands over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction.
Application:
- In this case, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in
the decree of registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the
application as published, it did not mention the fact that the difference
in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference of
27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in
the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
It was error on the part of the lower court to lay stress on this
circumstance and made it a basis for ruling that because in the
amended plan there is this increase in area as compared to the area
appearing in the application as published, the Land Registration Court
did not have jurisdiction to render the decision decreeing the
registration of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681
- And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that
the registration court had no jurisdiction over the increased area of
27.10 square meters (as alleged by appellees), the most that the lower
court could have done was to nullify the decree and the certificate of
title insofar as that area of 27.10 square meters is concerned, if that
area can be identified. But, certainly, the lower court could not declare,
and should not have declared, null and void the whole proceedings in
LRC No. 7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null
and void ab initio Original Certificate of Title 735 which covers not only
the supposed excess area of 27.10 square meters but also the
remaining area of 8,798,617 square meters of Parcel 1 and the entire
area of 15,961,246 square meters of Parcel 2
Conclusion:
- Thus, OCT No. 735 of Defendant is valid. The appeal is dismissed
17. Interruption of Good Faith\
Case 13. Suobiron v CA
Doctrine: Interruption of good faith upon service of summons.
FACTS:
Spouses Luis Adelantar and Fortunata Ponce were declared owners of
2 parcels of land in LRC Case No. 673 against Doroteo Legarde and
Bernabe, Basilia, Quintin and Fortunato, all surnamed Lorezo.
After the American forces liberated Panay Island, the CFI was
reorganized. Pursuant to Act 3110, the clerk of court submitted a
report stating that all court records were destroyed or burned as a
result of the battle for liberation. Thereafter, on 7 June 1945 the court
issued an order directing the reconstitution of the records.
On 18 August 1945 Luis Adelantar filed a motion for reconstitution of
the records of LRC Case No. 673 furnishing copies thereof to the
PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION
Lorezos which the CFI gave due course on 25 August 1945. On 28
January 1946, the CFI directed the issuance of decrees covering the
property in litigation in the name of the spouses Luis Adelantar and
Fortunata Ponce.
Taking advantage in the meantime of the chaotic conditions during the
war, Quintin Lorezo and Bernabe Lorezo entered the litigated property
and appropriated the produce thereof. Consequently, on 26 August
1947, the Adelantars filed an action in the CFI of Iloilo against the
Lorezos for recovery of possession, docketed as Civil Case No. 938.
The CFI rendered judgment declaring the Adelantar spouses owners of
the property.
The property soon became the subject of a cadastral survey. Fortunata
Ponce filed an answer claiming ownership. The spouses Andres
Suobiron and Socorro Suobiron also filed an answer claiming
ownership of portions thereof by purchases from Quintin in 1960, from
Basilia and Isabel Lorezo in 1961, and from Canuto Lucero in 1969.
On 29 August 1986, the trial court directed the petitioners to vacate
the property and deliver possession thereof to private respondents and
to pay them jointly and severally P39,750.00 annually as net produce
from 1970 until possession was restored to the latter, P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
Petitioners instituted an action to annul the orders dated 25 August
1945 and 28 January 1946 of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Iloilo in LRC Case No. 673 directing the issuance of decrees covering
the property in litigation in the name of the spouses Luis Adelantar and
Fortunata Ponce.
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that the land registration court
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing both orders
because the requirements of the law on reconstitution of court records
were not complied with thus rendering void not only the orders but
also the decrees and certificates of title issued thereunder.
ISSUES:
WON the provisions of Act 3110 have been complied with
WON the decision in Civil Case No. 938 is conclusive upon the
petitioners
RULING:
Yes, the requirements of the law for the reconstitution of a court
record were fulfilled.
Yes. The trial court held petitioners liable to private respondents for
the net produce of the properties in question from the time the
former's possession in good faith was legally interrupted when they
were served summons in connection with private respondents'
complaint for recovery of possession with damages filed 22 July 1970,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8283, at the rate of P1, 500.00 per hectare
or P39, 750.00 for 26.5 hectares annually until possession was
restored.
The Other Side | EH 407 10
It may be that petitioners acquired the disputed properties in good
faith and had since then occupied the same but such bona fide
character of possession ceased when they were served summons.
Possession acquired in good faith may not lose this character except in
the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the
possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully, conformably with Article 528 of the Civil Code.
Case 14. Maneclang v Baun
Recit Ready
Margarita Santos, owner of parcels of land died intestate. She had 9
children, one of which was the petitioner acting as the administrator at
the time of this petition. On September 1949, Feliciano, the
administrator at that time filed and was awarded authority to dispose
of the parcels of land for payment of debts. The authority was
subsequently passed on to Oscar Maneclang, one of the heirs by which
he instituted a deed of sale to respondents. The petitioner in the case
at bar are contending that the sale is made in bad faith since the sale
was made through inducement by the Mayor and Councilor which are
3rd parties. The SC held that the respondents were not in bad faith at
the time of sail, upholding the validity and presumption of regularity of
the approval made by the lower court. However, the SC decided that
the good faith was interrupted upon the filing of the case alleging bad
faith. The decision was pursuant to Article 528 of the Civil Code.
But the interruption of the possession in good faith does not entitle the
petitioners for back rentals.
Under Article 544 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is entitled
to the fruits received before
the possession is legally interrupted.
Facts:
Margarita Santos owner of parcels of lands died intestate. She was
survived by her husband and 9 children. On July 30, 1987, Hector
Maneclang, the eldest son and one of the heirs filed for a petition of
settlement of her estate at the CFI. At the time of the petition, 7 of the
9 children were still below 18 but no guardian was appointed for them.
Sept. 2, 1949- Pedro Feliciano, the administrator of the intestate estate
filed a petition asking the court to give him the authority to dispose of
the land to cover for the debts the deceased incurred during her
lifetime. However, the husband of the deceased alleged that there was
no such notice that was sent.
The subsequent administrator, Oscar Maneclang, sold the subject Lot
203 for P 11, 687.50 duly approved by the intestate court pursuant to
the decision rendered on Sept 9, 1949 which was filed by Feliciano. It
was sold to the City of Dagupan which they immediately took
possession and constructed a market.
The petitioner here who was the new administratrix prated for the
annulment of sales made by the previous administrator against the
vendees, Sps. Baun and the City of Dagupan. Respondents countered
that they were in good faith when they bought the land.
Issue: WON the respondents were in bad faith and required to pay
rentals for the possession of the land.
SC Ruling
PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION
There was good faith on the part of the respondents but it was
interrupted upon the filing of case alleging bad faith
The trial court decided The petitioners alleged that there was
inducement from the Mayor and Councilor (3rd parties) to sell the lot to
the respondents. This was dismissed by the SC stating that even if
there was inducement, the fact remains that there was already a court
order authorizing that sale. It is to be presumed that the judge acted
in lawful exercise of his jurisdiction and his duty was regularly
performed. With this presumption, the respondents need not to go
beyond the order to check the validity of the authority. This makes
them a buyer of good faith.
However their good faith was interrupted when the petitioners filed a
case alleging their bad faith. Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that:
"Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except
in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the
possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully." The filing of a case alleging bad faith on the part of a
vendee gives cause for cessation of good faith.
Regarding the payment of rentals, as a possessor in good faith, it was
entitled to all the fruits of the property and was under no obligation to
pay rental to the intestate of Margarita for the use thereof. Under
Article 544 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is entitled to the
fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted. Thus, the
trial court committed an error when it ordered the City of Dagupan to
pay accumulated rentals in the amount of P584,602.20 from 4 October
1952 up to the filing of the complaint.
Acquisition of Possession
5. Recourse to the Courts
Case 15. Villafuerte v CA
FACTS:
- Spouses Villafuerte own and operated a gasolie station on the
premises of 3 adjoining lots which is owned by several persons, De
Mesa, brothers Daleon and Mrs. Yap, mother of appellee.
- Appellants De Mesa and Daleon acquired their respective lots subject
to the lease by Petrophil Corporation which built a gasoline station
therein operated by Spouses Villafuerte. When the lease expired, the
Spouses were able to obtain a new lease from De Mesa.
- With respect to the brothers Daleon, they were not able to renew
their lease but received a demand letter ordering them to vacate the
premises. However, the Spouses Villafuerte ignored it and continued
with the operation of the gasoline station.
- Gonzalo Daleon the filed a complaint against the Spouses in the
Barangay however, no settlement was reached.
- De Mesa and Daleon and in the aid of other people and without the
knowledge of the Villafuertes caused the closure of the gasoline station
by constructing fences around it.
- The Villafuertes then filed a complaint fro damages with preliminary
mandatory injunction against De Mesa and Daleon for the malicious
and unlawful fencing of the plaintiff’s premises.
The Other Side | EH 407 11
ISSUE: WON IT WAS UNLAWFUL FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO
RESORT TO FENCING THEIR PROPERTIES IN ORDER TO OUST
SPOUSES VILLAFUERTE
RULING:
YES.
Article 536 states that: “ In no case may possession be acquired
through force and intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to
deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
In this case, when private respondents personally took it upon
themselves to evict themselves the Villafuertes from their properties
which act was in clear contravention of the law, they became liable for
the necessary and natural consequences of their illegal act.
6. Possession by mere tolerance
Case 16. Arambulo v Gungab
FACTS:
1. Emerenciana is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Quezon
City, covered by TCT No. 48330.
2. Victoria and Miguel have been in continuous possession and
occupation of the said parcel for 20 and 15 years respectively.
3. Emerenciana sent separate letters dated October 19, 1998, for
petitioners to vacate but they refused. She made a formal demand
through counsel for petitioners to vacate the property to no avail. They
also sought the assistance of barangay authorities but no amicable
settlement was reached.
4. Emerciana filed an ejectment complaint on February 2, 1999,
against petitioners in MeTC on the allegation that (1) she owns the
property, (2) she merely tolerated petitioner’s occupancy without rent,
and (3) that despite her demands, they refused to vacate said
property.
5. Of course, petitioners denied respondent’s claim of ownership
asserting that (1) Victoria is a co-owner, (2) that when their father
died intestate, the property became part of the common properties of
the Reyes clan, (3) that while their mother Anastacia was alive, she
allowed Victoria and Miguel to use and occupy the property (their “use
and possession” of these portions of the subject property “had
beenwith the knowledge, consent and tolerance of all the other co-
owners”.
6. As a matter of fact, petitioners filed a case for annulment of transfer
and reconveyance of title (which is pending) before the RTC of QC
against respondent and her husband .
7. MeTC dismissed the ejectment cases (unlawful detainer) against
Victoria & Miguel for lack of cause of action. It ruled that summary
procedure was not the proper procedure to resolve the cases.
8. Respondent Emerciana appealed to RTC but RTC affirmed MeTC.
9. Respondent filed a petition for review with CA. CA found that
respondent had preferred right to possess as she had a genuine TCT.
CA then set aside the rulings of MeTC and RTC and ordered petitioners
to vacate the premises and surrender the property to respondent.
10. Petitioners now allege that CA erred in (1) relying solely on the
TCT, (2) in not considering the fact that respondent was never in
possession of the property, and (3) in ignoring the equitable and
PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION
special circumstances obtaining between the parties, particularly the
intended sale of the subject property by the respondent, that is likely
to create confusion, disturbance, and even blood-shed, which will
justify the suspension of the decision in the unlawful detainer case
rendered by the honorable court of appeals to await the disposition in
the pending civil action for annulment of transfer and reconveyance of
title of the same property
ISSUE:
Can respondent Emerenciana eject Victoria & Miguel?
RULING:
Arguments:
Petitioners say that the CA erred by relying on the TCT considering
that respondent was never in possession of the property. They have
always been in possession and so there was no possession from
Emerenciana to restore. Petitioners asked for suspension of the CA
decision pending resolution of their case for annulment of transfer and
reconveyance at RTC.
Respondent contends that CA correctly ruled as the TCT is the best
evidence of ownership. She also says that a pending civil action for
annulment of transfer and reconveyance of title in a separate
proceeding should not affect an ejectment case.
PETITION DENIED. EMERCIANA CAN EJECT VICTORIA & MIGUEL
FROM THE PROPERTY AS SHE HAS BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESS IN
THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FILED IN MeTC.
In the case at bar, Emerenciana’s cause of action was not deprivation
of possession by FISTS, but rather for unlawful detainer (she owned
the property, she allowed them to occupy by tolerance and she
withdrew her consent and demanded petitioners to vacate). She also
filed the case within one year from her last demand.
The cause of action in summary proceedings is determined by the
nature of entry into the land.
If illegal Forcible Entry
If legal but became illegal after termination of contract Unlawful
Detainer
The summary proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
differentiated under Section 1, Rule 70 of ROC:
The Court ruled that the sole issue here is the physical/material
possession of the property. MeTC may take cognizance of the case
even if there was a claim of judicial possession, but they can only
make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property so
that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent any other
evidence to resolve ownership. Respondent showed as evidence the
TCT which grants the respondent preferred right to possess. This
determination of ownership is not final however, as this is solely for
the purpose of settling the issue of possession initially. Therefore, it
would not prejudice pending action for annulment of transfer and
reconveyance in RTC.
Petitioners admit and are aware that they are occupying the property
by mere tolerance, and as per Art 448, are not entitled to retain it
once demand to vacate the same is made. They confuse forcible entry
with unlawful detainer here. It is enough that Emerciana has better
right of possession over the property, no prior physical possession
needed (unlike forcible entry).
Case 17. Barnachea v CA
The Other Side | EH 407 12
Doctrine: Possession of another by mere tolerance is not unlawful.
Neither is it adverse and, therefore, no matter how long continued,
cannot ripen to ownership by prescription or be barred by laches. The
period for filing the action for unlawful detainer is a prescriptive period
as well as a jurisdictional requirement.
FACTS:
The respondents (Spouses Ignacio) filed their complaint for ejectment
against the petitioners before the MTC on October 20, 1998. The
subject matter of the complaint were lots titled in respondent Avelino
Ignacio's name which lots are adjacent to the property that the
petitioners own and occupy.
The complaint was dismissed on December 8, 1999, but was revived
on April 5, 2000. The petitioners received summons and, instead of
filing a new Answer, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer which the MTC denied. Meanwhile, the respondents filed a
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution.
On July 21, 2000, the MTC issued an order declaring the petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration abandoned because of the Notice of Appeal
they previously filed. Thereafter, the MTC forwarded the entire record
of the Case to the RTC which affirmed the MTC decision.
On October 5, 2000, the petitioner Julita's sister, Leticia, representing
herself to be the sole owner filed a Petition for Quieting of Title with
the RTC. RTC denied the petitioners' urgent motion and their
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
The petitioners brought the denials to the CA but denied the petition.
Issues:
1) WON the ejectment case filed by the respondents against
petitioners with the MTC of Pulilan is for unlawful detainer or for
forcible entry;
2) Whether the MTC of Pulilan had validly acquired and exercised
jurisdiction over the ejectment case considering that the complaint was
filed beyond one year from the demand to vacate the subject
premises; and
3) WON the ejectment proceedings should be suspended at any stage
until the action on ownership of the disputed portion of the subject
property is finally settled.
Ruling: (N.B. These 3 issues are interrelated and important to the
topic)
1. Nature of the Action before the MTC.
The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are similar because
they are both summary actions where the issue is purely physical
possession. However, they possess dissimilarities that are clear,
distinct, and well established in law.
In forcible entry, (1) the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior
physical possession of the property until he was deprived of possession
by the defendant; (2) the defendant secures possession of the
disputed property from the plaintiff by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth; hence, his possession is unlawful from the
beginning; (3) the law does not require a previous demand by the
plaintiff for the defendant to vacate the premises; and (4) the action
can be brought only within one-year from the date the defendant
actually and illegally entered the property.
On the other hand, unlawful detainer is attended by the following
features: (1) prior possession of the property by the plaintiff is not
necessary; (2) possession of the property by the defendant at the start
is legal but the possession becomes illegal by reason of the
termination of his right to possession based on his or her contract or
other arrangement with the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff is required by law
PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | POSSESSION
to make a demand as a jurisdictional requirement; and (4) the one-
year period to bring the complaint is counted from the date of the
plaintiff's last demand on the defendant.
In this case, the complaint shows that respondents allowed them to
occupy the disputed property by tolerance; that the respondents
eventually made a demand that the petitioners vacate the property but
petitioners refused to vacate the property.
The complete absence of any allegation of force, intimidation, strategy
or stealth in the complaint with respect to the petitioners' possession
of the respondents' property does not signify an illegality in the entry
nor an entry by force, intimidation, strategy or stealth that would
characterize the entry as forcible. It has been held that a person who
occupies land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy. The status of the defendant
is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose terms have expired
but whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner. Thus,
respondents’ action is one of unlawful detainer.
2. The Jurisdictional Issue — Was the Ejectment Complaint
Seasonably Filed?
The one-year period within which to commence an ejectment
proceeding is a prescriptive period as well as a jurisdictional
requirement. Under Article 1155 of the Civil Code, the filing of a
complaint in court interrupts the running of prescription of actions. As
an action for unlawful detainer, the one-year prescription period
started running after August 31, 1998 — the date of receipt of the
respondents' demand letter. The period ran for almost two months
until it was interrupted on October 20, 1998 when the respondents
filed their ejectment complaint. This complaint, however, was
dismissed on December 8, 1999. Upon this dismissal, the prescriptive
period again began to run for about four months when another
interruption intervened — the revival of the complaint on April 5, 2000.
Evidently, under these undisputed facts, the period when the
prescriptive period effectively ran does not add up to the one-year
prescriptive period that would jurisdictionally bar the ejectment case.
Hence, the ejectment suit was filed within the prescriptive period.
3. Suspension of the Ejectment Proceedings until Resolution
of the Ownership Issue.
The issue in an unlawful detainer case is limited to physical possession.
When a claim of ownership is used as a basis for de facto possession
or to assert a better possessory right, the court hearing the case may
provisionally rule on the issue of ownership. As a rule, however, a
pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not
justify the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. Only in rare cases
has this Court allowed a suspension of the ejectment proceedings and
one of these is in the case of Amagan v. Marayag —where the Court
allowed the suspension of ejectment proceedings because of strong
reasons of equity applicable to the case--the demolition of the
petitioner’s house unless the proceedings would be suspended.
However, the Amagan case is not applicable in this case.
First. In Amagan, the party refusing to vacate the disputed premises
was the same party seeking to quiet his title. In the present case, the
petitioners are not parties to the civil action (for quieting of title)
whose result they seek to await; the plaintiff in the quieting of title
case is Leticia, the petitioner Julita's sister.
Second. In Amagan, the MCTC decision involved the demolition of the
petitioners' house — a result that this Court found to be "permanent,
unjust and probably irreparable"; in the present case, only a portion of
the petitioners' house is apparently affected as the petitioners occupy
the lot adjoining the disputed property. Significantly, the height, width
and breadth of the portion of the house that would be affected by the
execution of the RTC decision does not appear anywhere in the
The Other Side | EH 407 13
records, thus, unavoidably inviting suspicion that the potential damage
to the petitioners is not substantial.
In the absence of a concrete showing of compelling equitable reasons
at least comparable and under circumstances analogous to Amagan,
we cannot override the established rule that a pending civil action for
ownership shall not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding.
Petition is denied.
Case 18. Llobrera v Fernandez
Synopsis: Petitioners failed to establish a lessor-lessee
relationship/contractual relationship between them and the
respondent. Said receipts from their payment of monthly rental of
20php were not presented during the proceeding and because MTC,
RTC and CA ruled unanimously on this factual issue, the Court is
bound to respect such in the absence of cogent reasons. In other
words, petitioners’ occupation was by mere tolerance of the
respondents and upon demand, they shall vacate. Moreover, action for
ejectment is the proper remedy for such. Lastly, there being no
contractual relationship between the two parties, consignation made
by the petitioner wont bind respondents in this case as such action
indispensably requires a creditor-debtor relationship.
Facts:
Josefina Fernandez, one of the registered co-owners of land in
Dagupan City, sent a demand letter to Sps Llobrera et al to vacate
premises within 15 days. Petitioners refused and no settlement was
reached on the barangay level.
Fernandez then filed a complaint for ejectment and damages in the
MTCC pf Dagupan
Petitioners defended that they occupied lot since beginning of 1945
with the permission of Gualberto de Venecia, one of co-owner, on
condition of payment of 20Php monthly rental. The representative of
Gualberto refused to receive the payments of rentals so in June 1996,
they were prompted to consign the same and pay it to Banco San Juan
instead which they maintained and update their payment.
MTCC, RTC and CA favored Fernandez.
Issue: WON possession of the subject property is founded on
contract
Ruling:
No. Petitioners failed to present any written memo of the alleged lease
arrangements between them and De Venecia. There is dearth of
evidence to substantiate the averred lessor-lessee relationship.
Petitioners failed to present any written memorandum of the alleged
lease arrangements between them and Gualberto De Venecia. The
receipts claimed to have been issued by the owner were not presented
on the excuse that the March 19, 1996 fire burned the same. Simply
put, there is a dearth of evidence to substantiate the averred lessor-
lessee relationship.
Absent such proof of any contractual basis for their
possession, the legal implication is that they were possessing
by mere tolerance. Therefore, the person occupying is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he/she will vacate upon demand.
The bank deposits made, as consignation, has no legal effect insofar
as the respondent is concerned since there is no contractual
relationship. Therefore, Fernandez cannot be compelled to receive
such deposits.